In science, hypotheses are considered crucial to the process of acquiring knowledge. However, when it comes to logic, things are quite different. Many philosophers would argue that forming hypotheses does not play a significant role in acquiring logical knowledge. Indeed, if drawing consequences from a given hypothesis p requires logic, then logic itself cannot be made up of hypotheses, otherwise there would be a regress or circularity. Therefore, there is an asymmetry between logic and science with regard to the role played by hypotheses in the acquisition of knowledge. This issue intersects with the debate between exceptionalists and anti-exceptionalists within the philosophy of logic. Exceptionalism about logic asserts that logic is special with respect to the natural sciences, particularly in terms of how logical knowledge is justified. In contrast, anti-exceptionalists argue that logic is not exceptional in this respect. One might think that exceptionalists should accept the asymmetry between logic and science with respect to the role played by hypotheses in the process of knowledge acquisition, and that anti-exceptionalists should reject it. However, things are more nuanced. Standard formulations of anti-exceptionalism about logic appear unable to eliminate the asymmetry between logic and science because they share key assumptions about logic with exceptionalism. My claim is that one can only remove the asymmetry between logic and science by assuming that there can be a logic of discovery, and that this removal is crucial to developing an adequate anti-exceptionalist view of logic. I present a non-standard formulation of anti-exceptionalism about logic, namely, the heuristic view of logic, which could help to eliminate the asymmetry between logic and science. I also illustrate the most threatening exceptionalist challenge, the Adoption Problem. Finally, I provide some reasons to suggest that the heuristic view of logic could adequately address the Adoption Problem.

Hypotheses in logic, the adoption problem, and the search for a logic of discovery / Sterpetti, Fabio. - (2026), pp. 89-122. - SYNTHÈSE LIBRARY. [10.1007/978-3-032-13650-3_6].

Hypotheses in logic, the adoption problem, and the search for a logic of discovery

Fabio Sterpetti
2026

Abstract

In science, hypotheses are considered crucial to the process of acquiring knowledge. However, when it comes to logic, things are quite different. Many philosophers would argue that forming hypotheses does not play a significant role in acquiring logical knowledge. Indeed, if drawing consequences from a given hypothesis p requires logic, then logic itself cannot be made up of hypotheses, otherwise there would be a regress or circularity. Therefore, there is an asymmetry between logic and science with regard to the role played by hypotheses in the acquisition of knowledge. This issue intersects with the debate between exceptionalists and anti-exceptionalists within the philosophy of logic. Exceptionalism about logic asserts that logic is special with respect to the natural sciences, particularly in terms of how logical knowledge is justified. In contrast, anti-exceptionalists argue that logic is not exceptional in this respect. One might think that exceptionalists should accept the asymmetry between logic and science with respect to the role played by hypotheses in the process of knowledge acquisition, and that anti-exceptionalists should reject it. However, things are more nuanced. Standard formulations of anti-exceptionalism about logic appear unable to eliminate the asymmetry between logic and science because they share key assumptions about logic with exceptionalism. My claim is that one can only remove the asymmetry between logic and science by assuming that there can be a logic of discovery, and that this removal is crucial to developing an adequate anti-exceptionalist view of logic. I present a non-standard formulation of anti-exceptionalism about logic, namely, the heuristic view of logic, which could help to eliminate the asymmetry between logic and science. I also illustrate the most threatening exceptionalist challenge, the Adoption Problem. Finally, I provide some reasons to suggest that the heuristic view of logic could adequately address the Adoption Problem.
2026
Hypotheses in science
978-3-032-13649-7
adoption problem; logic of discovery; anti-exceptionalism about logic; heuristic view of logic
02 Pubblicazione su volume::02a Capitolo o Articolo
Hypotheses in logic, the adoption problem, and the search for a logic of discovery / Sterpetti, Fabio. - (2026), pp. 89-122. - SYNTHÈSE LIBRARY. [10.1007/978-3-032-13650-3_6].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1764910
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