Irony is a complex discursive modality, still uncertain in both its theoretical and methodological definition. Among recent approaches, the “Pretense Theory” interprets irony as a form of pretence intended to be recognized as such. However, the primary critique concerns the ambiguity of the concept of “pretence.” Although conceived in a deliberately broad sense to encompass as many perspectives on irony as possible, this notion proves too flexible to clearly distinguish this peculiar phenomenon from other forms of indirect speech. This paper aims to investigate the interplay of irony and pretence in Latin rhetoric, with particular focus on dissimulatio and simulatio, two rhetorical strategies in which a speaker simulates a thought not genuinely held, either by concealing persuasive intentions to reduce the listener’s certainty or by pretending to share the opponent’s view in order to reveal its inconsistency. An integration of ancient and modern perspectives could lead to a more precise and detailed concept of “pretence".
L'ironia dal moderno all'antico. Rivisitare la Pretense Theory attraverso la retorica classica / Ruggiero, Federica. - (2025), pp. 171-189.
L'ironia dal moderno all'antico. Rivisitare la Pretense Theory attraverso la retorica classica
Ruggiero FedericaPrimo
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2025
Abstract
Irony is a complex discursive modality, still uncertain in both its theoretical and methodological definition. Among recent approaches, the “Pretense Theory” interprets irony as a form of pretence intended to be recognized as such. However, the primary critique concerns the ambiguity of the concept of “pretence.” Although conceived in a deliberately broad sense to encompass as many perspectives on irony as possible, this notion proves too flexible to clearly distinguish this peculiar phenomenon from other forms of indirect speech. This paper aims to investigate the interplay of irony and pretence in Latin rhetoric, with particular focus on dissimulatio and simulatio, two rhetorical strategies in which a speaker simulates a thought not genuinely held, either by concealing persuasive intentions to reduce the listener’s certainty or by pretending to share the opponent’s view in order to reveal its inconsistency. An integration of ancient and modern perspectives could lead to a more precise and detailed concept of “pretence".I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


