L'interpretazione lévinassiana della temporalità della coscienza ne La théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie d'Husserl

Beyond the generally accepted abstraction of time in Lévinas’ analysis in La théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, this contribution tries to develop the Lévinassian interpretation of the phenomenon of the temporality as the way of being and givenness of consciousness. First of all, by using the Husserlian references quoted by Lévinas, the difference between the flow of consciousness and the spatiality will be showed thanks to the notion of incalculability and inexact essences, so that conscious life is described as interpenetration of moments; secondly, it will be possible to articulate the way of givenness of consciousness as absoluteness through the description of the specific nature of the passing of inner time, i.e., of temporal sketching against spatial overshadowing.