Movement, life, soul and intelligence: the dynamis of being at Sophist 248e–249a and its reception in the history of Platonism

In this paper I intend to discuss the few yet quite controversial lines of Soph. 248e7–249a2 and some of their main theoretical and historical implications. I will gradually move from the interpretation of the passage and its context, with particular attention to its tone and general thrust, to the sense and significance of some of the problematic expressions appearing in it (especially the syntagma pantelōs on and its description as semnon [kai hagion]). Next I will briefly highlight some moments in the exegetical history of the passage – most notably the interpretations offered by Aristotle, Theophrastus and Plotinus, who certainly allude to it – and make a connection between the status of (true) being and some of its properties, which can be traced back to some form of “mobility” or “dynamicity”, a certain kind of “vitality” and strictly “intellectual” features.