This article discusses the philosophy of Arcesilaus, who was the scholarch of Plato’s Academy from 268/266 BCE. The article aims to provide an overview of Arcesilaus’s philosophy (especially in the field of epistemology), focusing particularly on how Cicero presents this philosopher in the Academics. Cicero is interested in Arcesilaus, as he aligns with the so-called Skeptical Academy, which finds its founder in Arcesilaus himself. However, a comparison with other sources shows that Cicero’s presentation of Arcesilaus in the Academics is essentially faithful and comprehensible even when set aside from the anti-Stoic polemic. Normally, Arcesilaus is considered the origin of the ‘skeptical turn’ of Hellenistic Platonism. I problematize this assumption by referencing ancient sources and showing how Arcesilaus was not a skeptical philosopher in the sense of the Neo-Pyrrhonian tradition. Analysis of key passages in Cicero’s Academics leads to the conclusion that Arcesilaus had a specific position about the nature of things, which were considered obscure and ungraspable. Hence, the theorization of the suspension of judgment on all things and the weakness of the senses and the mind in cognitive activity. Such a position cannot be regarded as skeptical. Arcesilaus’ stance is understandable within Plato’s philosophy, of which the scholarch gives an interpretation that is peculiar but not illicit.
Arcesilaus’ Philosophical Stance in Cicero’s 'Academics' / Verde, F.. - (2024).
Arcesilaus’ Philosophical Stance in Cicero’s 'Academics'
VERDE F.
2024
Abstract
This article discusses the philosophy of Arcesilaus, who was the scholarch of Plato’s Academy from 268/266 BCE. The article aims to provide an overview of Arcesilaus’s philosophy (especially in the field of epistemology), focusing particularly on how Cicero presents this philosopher in the Academics. Cicero is interested in Arcesilaus, as he aligns with the so-called Skeptical Academy, which finds its founder in Arcesilaus himself. However, a comparison with other sources shows that Cicero’s presentation of Arcesilaus in the Academics is essentially faithful and comprehensible even when set aside from the anti-Stoic polemic. Normally, Arcesilaus is considered the origin of the ‘skeptical turn’ of Hellenistic Platonism. I problematize this assumption by referencing ancient sources and showing how Arcesilaus was not a skeptical philosopher in the sense of the Neo-Pyrrhonian tradition. Analysis of key passages in Cicero’s Academics leads to the conclusion that Arcesilaus had a specific position about the nature of things, which were considered obscure and ungraspable. Hence, the theorization of the suspension of judgment on all things and the weakness of the senses and the mind in cognitive activity. Such a position cannot be regarded as skeptical. Arcesilaus’ stance is understandable within Plato’s philosophy, of which the scholarch gives an interpretation that is peculiar but not illicit.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.