Τò προσμένον: Epicurus’ propositional theory of truth

F. Verde’s article, “Τò προσμένον: Epicurus’ Propositional Theory of Truth”, sets out from a recent essay by Andree Hahmann and Jan Maximilian Robitzsch, Epicurus’ Non-Propositional Theory of Truth, in which the notion of τò προσμένον – translated as “that which awaits confirmation”, an essentially correct yet only partial translation – is analyzed within a broader argumentative context aimed at demonstrating that Epicurus upheld a non-propositional theory of truth. Hahmann and Robitzsch’s work provides Verde with an opportunity to reflect on τò προσμένον, one of the least studied concepts, but one fundamental to the Epicurean Canonic. The aim of his paper is twofold: first, Verde shows that τò προσμένον requires a propositional theory of truth; second, he investigates the function and role of τò προσμένον in Epicurean epistemology by referring especially to the relationship between the acquisition of truth/knowledge and time. On the basis of the occurrences of the term in the Letter to Herodotus and the Capital Maxims, Verde argues that “what awaits confirmation” is a notion that was introduced by Epicurus himself and which must be identified with the content of the opinion formed in the subject through the processing of sensory experience.