The economic literature had empirically verified the informational efficiency of the sport betting market. This finding supports the hypothesis that gamblers behave as rational investors, who make an efficient use of the available information to forecasts the matches’ outcome. Therefore, the gamblers cannot “beat the market”, and their returns, including commissions, are negative. This empirical fact denies the hypothesis that bettors behave as rational expected-utility maximizers, unless they are risk lovers. The hypothesis that bettors are (at least locally) risk lovers can be supported by assuming that there is a (small) utility of gambling. If gambling is amusing, then the gamblers are consumers rather than investors, and the money spent on gambling is not a financial loss, but it is price paid for the pleasure of gambling. Actually, the empirical evidence suggests that the demand for sports entertainment includes sports betting. Betting and watching a game appear to be strong complements, as if betting on the game watched on tv (or on other media) would make attending the game more exciting. A complementarity which is economically very relevant, as the sale of broadcasting rights is (increasingly) the most important revenue for professional sport teams. Theoretically, the pleasure of gambling may also affect some financial trader, therefore explaining some of the noise trading recorded in financial markets.
Giocare per il denaro o giocare con il denaro? La ri-valutazione edonistica del “blakennomion” nella letteratura economica delle scommesse sportive / Rossi, Marco. - (2023), pp. 1-32. - WORKING PAPERS-DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE SOCIALI ED ECONOMICHE.
Giocare per il denaro o giocare con il denaro? La ri-valutazione edonistica del “blakennomion” nella letteratura economica delle scommesse sportive
marco rossi
2023
Abstract
The economic literature had empirically verified the informational efficiency of the sport betting market. This finding supports the hypothesis that gamblers behave as rational investors, who make an efficient use of the available information to forecasts the matches’ outcome. Therefore, the gamblers cannot “beat the market”, and their returns, including commissions, are negative. This empirical fact denies the hypothesis that bettors behave as rational expected-utility maximizers, unless they are risk lovers. The hypothesis that bettors are (at least locally) risk lovers can be supported by assuming that there is a (small) utility of gambling. If gambling is amusing, then the gamblers are consumers rather than investors, and the money spent on gambling is not a financial loss, but it is price paid for the pleasure of gambling. Actually, the empirical evidence suggests that the demand for sports entertainment includes sports betting. Betting and watching a game appear to be strong complements, as if betting on the game watched on tv (or on other media) would make attending the game more exciting. A complementarity which is economically very relevant, as the sale of broadcasting rights is (increasingly) the most important revenue for professional sport teams. Theoretically, the pleasure of gambling may also affect some financial trader, therefore explaining some of the noise trading recorded in financial markets.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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