Lucretius' epistemological language

The article deals with some issues of Lucretius' epistemological language. The aim of the essay is to show that the poet's lexical choices prove to be particularly significant for any attempt to assess Lucretius' reception of Epicurean theory of knowledge in the light of a compariscon with Aristotle's theory of the soul and perception. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the terminology the Latin author uses to theorize and designate (1) visual sense-perception (and, more specifically, the potestas of sight), (2) prolepsis (which Lucretius renders by means of the words notitia/notities), (3) the 'impetus' of the soul (animi iactus/iniectus, inice mentem) and, in the semiotic sphere, (4) the very concept of 'sign' (signum, uestigium, indicium). Keeping always in the background a comparison with the writings of Epicurus and some of the Epicureans (Philodemus above all), as well as taking advantage of the comparison with testimonies external to the Epicurean tradition (from Aristotle's De anima to some Ciceronian passages), this chaptertries to bring out the precision with which Lucretius weighs and selects the technical terms he emloys, not only moved by the need to present, in Latin, the epistemological teaching promoted by his master, but also with the primary objective of defending Epicurus against objections and invectives (coming from schools and philosophical directions other than the Garden) that aimed to undermine its validity and, above all, its scientific relevance.