Государственный бюджет, основанный на предприятиях: сплав старого и нового

This paper seeks to overcome a deep antinomy within the theory of public finance: while market outcomes are treated as resulting from polycentric competition, political outcomes are treated as resulting from hierarchic planning. We seek to overcome this antinomy by treating political outcomes as likewise resulting from polycentric competition, taking due account of relevant institutional differences. For example, a parliamentary assembly is treated as a peculiar form of investment bank: a parliament intermediates between the sponsors of enterprises and those within the citizenry who have means to support those enterprises. What results is a theory in which budgets emerge in largely bottom-up fashion through complex networks of exchanges. Much of the inspiration for this paper arises from the Italian School of Public Finance, particularly Giovanni Montemartini, Maffeo Pantaleoni and, in more general terms, Antonio De Viti de Marco.