The Last IRI. Perspectives of a unitary, long-term industrial policy in Italy in 1980s

Italian privatization process represents a rare specimen of how things can abruptly change even in a country as Italy, usually reluctant toward political reforms. Actually, privatization in Italy can be included between 1992 (transformation of the whole State-owned enterprises’ system into a joint stock company’s one) and 2002 (with the official closure of the biggest and most relevant State-owned conglomerate: IRI). These two arrangements seem then even more relevant for they exactly coincide with two other major moments in European integration history; namely, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty – establishing a European Union – and the official launch of the euro – establishing a common currency for the initial core of twelve member States. This matter of fact, far from being instead a simple matter of chance, sets this apparently plain domestic issue into a broader, international frame, changing alongside the way we should look at the whole subject. Today there is indeed a widespread accord about the fact that Italian privatization process was mainly aimed at the political necessity, for Rome, of being included into the rising Union; to do that, though, Italy had to sensibly reduce its public debt and finally arrange a credible plan of economic reforms that would encompass its industry, as well, modernizing it in the way that Brussels meant: that is, indeed, a swift dismantling of a massive mixed-economy system, built on a vast and strong State-owned enterprises’ structure. Yet, all these complex and interrelated dynamics arose with sudden force only after the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989), while recent historiography do teach us how that single and decisive event was largely unforeseen in Europe (not only in Europe), before it happened. Nevertheless, other external and pivotal pushes, as globalization of markets, did clearly emerge from the early 1980s decade, so that the need for a change in European countries’ industrial policies was largely felt as compelling from that very moment. Italy is not an exception in this kind of scenario, as far as we can find clear signs of a wide and strong will to launch an all-encompassing industrial reform plan since – at least – 1982: namely, when Romano Prodi was nominated as new President of the Institute for Industrial Recovery – IRI. Hence, well away from that «Objective 1992» which started to be, increasingly, a pressing goal for Italian rulers only in the aftermath of November 1989. Then, that seven-year period comprised between 1982 and 1989 looks particularly interesting (and underrated), in showing us a hint of how Italian industry could have been if only it had time and space to shape its own trajectory. Indeed, if after 1987 (European Single Act) and all the more so after November 1989, the path that Italian economy should follow became more and more reliant on Brussels’ indications, in the previous years it seemed instead there could be room for an independent industrial policy and we can then legitimately wonder what would have been if Italy had time and no constraints to set its industry in a way which, yes, could comply with international new requirements and orientations but also fully preserved country’s own national features and interests. On the basis of archival sources, we can actually perceive such a widespread – yet generally underrated – disposition of Italian decision makers toward issues as modernization and internationalization of national industry, even before similar solutions became somehow mandatory in order to join the European Union project; furthermore, we can notice how many attempts were concretely made – starting from the early 1980s – to rationalise Italian industrial effort, thereby improving its international efficiency and competitiveness and then, alongside, the whole country’s international stance. What is at the very heart of the matter, here, is the entrenched, utilitarian – sometimes ambiguous – relationship between Italian politics and economy. A relationship built on a delicate equilibrium, fluctuating periodically from one side to the other, never in full control of neither the two parts. In the lapse of time that we intend to observe, the needle of the scale was still oriented toward politics but was also in the process to change its direction, in a world more and more influenced by free market’s doctrine and globalisation process. This matter of fact seemed then to be understood in advance by a bunch of Italian decision makers and technocrats, who did try to react, setting an all-encompassing reorganization of the State-owned enterprises’ system, aimed at fostering a selected core of companies, deemed vital for the country’s national interest. A relevant feature in our study is that the path chosen by the Italian institutions to achieve this primary goal was not bent on a plain (and more predictable) protectionist adjustment, but on a sincere attempt to comply with «modern» free market’s forces and an effective opening to new commercial strategies as international partnerships, joint ventures and mergers. The ultimate result thereof is a short-lived glow, such an intriguing and original approach toward «modernity», a sort of Italian way to globalization