In the first part I give an overview of the problems posed by rational psychology in the Transcendental Dialectic, particularly in the second edition of the Critique or pure reason, where Kant, on the one hand, acknowledges the necessity of the psychological idea, and on the other hand denounces the dialectical abuse of that idea. In the second part, I examine Kant’s thesis about the dual nature of apperception (pure and empirical). In the third part I take into account the complex explanation offered by Kant about the possibility that we have to know ourselves only as phenomena, with particular attention to the aspects of this explanation that enhance the role of sensibility and of its two a priori forms (space and time)
L'io e la conoscenza di sé in Kant / Capozzi, Mirella. - STAMPA. - (2007), pp. 267-326.
L'io e la conoscenza di sé in Kant
CAPOZZI, Mirella
2007
Abstract
In the first part I give an overview of the problems posed by rational psychology in the Transcendental Dialectic, particularly in the second edition of the Critique or pure reason, where Kant, on the one hand, acknowledges the necessity of the psychological idea, and on the other hand denounces the dialectical abuse of that idea. In the second part, I examine Kant’s thesis about the dual nature of apperception (pure and empirical). In the third part I take into account the complex explanation offered by Kant about the possibility that we have to know ourselves only as phenomena, with particular attention to the aspects of this explanation that enhance the role of sensibility and of its two a priori forms (space and time)I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.