This chapter outlines the history of the notion of intentionality. Starting from its origins in the works of Brentano and Husserl, it will be considered within the framework of the linguistic turn, up to its re-elaboration through the lenses of the cognitive revolution. Originally considered the ‘mark’ of the mental, the concept of intentionality plays a central role in cognitive ethology. In a key article of 1983, Daniel Dennett links it to the question of the meaning of animal signals. Thereafter, as for the possibility of attributing to non-human species communicative capacities in the strict sense, referential and mindreading capacities become particularly relevant. In relation to this issue, some empirical studies on vervet monkeys and chimpanzees will be taken into account.

L'intenzionalità. Breve storia di un concetto filosofico / Palazzolo, Giulia. - (2020), pp. 451-471. - SEMEIA.

L'intenzionalità. Breve storia di un concetto filosofico

Giulia Palazzolo
2020

Abstract

This chapter outlines the history of the notion of intentionality. Starting from its origins in the works of Brentano and Husserl, it will be considered within the framework of the linguistic turn, up to its re-elaboration through the lenses of the cognitive revolution. Originally considered the ‘mark’ of the mental, the concept of intentionality plays a central role in cognitive ethology. In a key article of 1983, Daniel Dennett links it to the question of the meaning of animal signals. Thereafter, as for the possibility of attributing to non-human species communicative capacities in the strict sense, referential and mindreading capacities become particularly relevant. In relation to this issue, some empirical studies on vervet monkeys and chimpanzees will be taken into account.
2020
La voce e il logos. Filosofie dell'animalità nella storia delle idee
9788846757166
Intentionality; Brentano; linguistic turn; cognitive revolution; animal communication
02 Pubblicazione su volume::02a Capitolo o Articolo
L'intenzionalità. Breve storia di un concetto filosofico / Palazzolo, Giulia. - (2020), pp. 451-471. - SEMEIA.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1439646
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