What is moral philosophy (good) for, and how should we understand and practice it accordingly? In attempting an answer to this vexed metaphilosophical questions about the very nature and point of ethical thinking, the multi-layered position advanced by Dewey in his 1932 Ethics represents a rich source for reflection – pragmatist and otherwise. What we find in this text, in fact, is both an elaboration of a number of ethical insights sketched in earlier texts (most notably, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics and Human Nature and Conduct, as well as “Moral Theory and Practice”, “Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal”, and “Three Independent Factors in Morals”) and an attempt at systematization. In particular, in the later work we find the problematic yet productive coexistence of a conception of moral philosophy as piecemeal criticism of conduct from within moral practice and as directive device for moral education and growth governing practice from without. This very duality lies – in spirit as well as in letter – at the core of pragmatist moral thinking, and hence Dewey’s text can be seen as a source of both quietist/therapeutic and substantive/theoretical approaches to moral matters. The present chapter aims to explore this tension in the light of the contemporary debate on the scope and limits of moral philosophizing.
Moral theory and anti-theory in Dewey’s 1932 Ethics / Marchetti, Sarin. - (2020), pp. 235-254.
|Titolo:||Moral theory and anti-theory in Dewey’s 1932 Ethics|
MARCHETTI, SARIN (Corresponding author)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2020|
|Citazione:||Moral theory and anti-theory in Dewey’s 1932 Ethics / Marchetti, Sarin. - (2020), pp. 235-254.|
|Appartiene alla tipologia:||02a Capitolo o Articolo|