The rules on takeover bids are generally considered to be an important factor within the debate on corporate governance. The risk of a takeover bid – and of a consequent change in company control – should motivate a company’s board to act in the best interests of the shareholders (the so-called disciplinary mechanism). The European rules on takeover bids are enshrined in Directive 2004/25/EC (which is also known as the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law), which applies to bids for securities of companies (issuers) governed by the laws of Member States. This chapter analyses the European rules on takeover bids, and highlights certain national options for implementing the Directive, although a revision of the European Directive, which will be based, among other things, on an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of its application, has been under way since 2004. The chapter also considers the revisions currently being proposed by the European Commission and the European Parliament.
Le norme relative all'offerta pubblica d'acquisto (OPA) sono pacificamente considerate un elemento centrale nel dibattito in tema di corporate governance. Il rischio di un'OPA – e del conseguente avvicendamento nel controllo della società – dovrebbero motivare gli amministratori ad agire nel miglio interesse degli azionisti (c.d. disciplinary mechanism). Le norme europee sull'OPA sono dettate nella Direttiva 2004/25/EC, che trova applicazione alle offerte di strumenti finanziari di emittenti assoggettati agli ordinamenti degli Stati Membri. Il lavoro analizza le regole europee sull'OPA, sottolineando le diverse scelte di attuazione compiute, ove possibile, dai singoli Stati Membri. Il lavoro si occupa inoltre del processo di riforma della Direttiva che dovrebbe basarsi, innanzitutto, sui vantaggi e gli svantaggi dell'applicazione della Direttiva registrati dal 2004 ad oggi.
Takeover Bids European Law and Corporate Governance / Garcea, Maura. - STAMPA. - 99(2018), pp. 139-162.
Takeover Bids European Law and Corporate Governance
Maura Garcea
2018
Abstract
The rules on takeover bids are generally considered to be an important factor within the debate on corporate governance. The risk of a takeover bid – and of a consequent change in company control – should motivate a company’s board to act in the best interests of the shareholders (the so-called disciplinary mechanism). The European rules on takeover bids are enshrined in Directive 2004/25/EC (which is also known as the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law), which applies to bids for securities of companies (issuers) governed by the laws of Member States. This chapter analyses the European rules on takeover bids, and highlights certain national options for implementing the Directive, although a revision of the European Directive, which will be based, among other things, on an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of its application, has been under way since 2004. The chapter also considers the revisions currently being proposed by the European Commission and the European Parliament.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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