The most prominent Italian theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. Despite this common point of analytical departure, their theories of public debt diverged sharply. In this divergence, moreover, lies a fundamental gulf between two distinct analytical schemes for connecting the micro and macro levels of analysis. Ricardo treated macro aggregates as analytical primitives, with individual action being induced from those aggregates. In sharp contrast, de Viti took individual variables as primitive, with aggregate conditions being induced from interaction among those individual variables. Within de Viti’s framework of a fully cooperative state, public debt would be self-extinguishing. De Viti also recognized that democracies were never exclusively cooperative, as continuing competition among elites striving for power would enable politically dominant groups to pass cost onto the remainder of society, thereby operating as a de facto form of default.

De Viti de Marco vs. Ricardo on public debt: self-extinction or default? / Eusepi, Giuseppe; Wagner, RICHARD E.. - STAMPA. - (2018), pp. 3-16. - NEW THINKING IN POLITICAL ECONOMY SERIES. [10.4337/9781788117937].

De Viti de Marco vs. Ricardo on public debt: self-extinction or default?

EUSEPI, GIUSEPPE
;
2018

Abstract

The most prominent Italian theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. Despite this common point of analytical departure, their theories of public debt diverged sharply. In this divergence, moreover, lies a fundamental gulf between two distinct analytical schemes for connecting the micro and macro levels of analysis. Ricardo treated macro aggregates as analytical primitives, with individual action being induced from those aggregates. In sharp contrast, de Viti took individual variables as primitive, with aggregate conditions being induced from interaction among those individual variables. Within de Viti’s framework of a fully cooperative state, public debt would be self-extinguishing. De Viti also recognized that democracies were never exclusively cooperative, as continuing competition among elites striving for power would enable politically dominant groups to pass cost onto the remainder of society, thereby operating as a de facto form of default.
2018
Debt Default and Democracy
978-1-78811-792-0
Ricardian equivalence; debt default; micro foundations of macro; circulation of elites; capital budgeting.
02 Pubblicazione su volume::02a Capitolo o Articolo
De Viti de Marco vs. Ricardo on public debt: self-extinction or default? / Eusepi, Giuseppe; Wagner, RICHARD E.. - STAMPA. - (2018), pp. 3-16. - NEW THINKING IN POLITICAL ECONOMY SERIES. [10.4337/9781788117937].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1117283
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