Some blunt instruments of dogmatic logic: Sextus Empiricus’s sceptical attack

Within a sort of conceptually homogeneous logical-epistemological arsenal that reflects a perspective marked by the dichotomy true/false, I would like to focus on one of the ‘logical’ sections of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, book II, namely: division, whole/parts, genus/species, accidents (PH II 213-228). These are unique in Sextus’ work and hence find no parallels in the more meticulous analysis provided in M VII and VIII. This uniqueness does not merely concern the dogmatic theories pertaining to the notions of syllogism, induction/definition and sophism, but extends to a range of points made with regard to logical-demonstrative argumentation, and which appear to play a leading role in the doctrines that Sextus seeks to refute.