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**BOURDIEUSIAN CAPITAL, HABITUS AND FIELD:
Iraqi Migrants' Networking Strategies in the Lebanese and
Finnish Host Societies**

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“They will fight against you; but they shall not prevail against you, for I am with you, says the LORD, to deliver you.”

Jeremiah 1, 19

*In the loving memory of my dear friend Nada Aoun who had spent her
childhood in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq.*

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KEYWORDS

International migration, forced migration, global social transformation, human smuggling, asylum seeker, refugee, migrant, international migrant stock, social networks, inflows, capital, social, linguistic, religious, cultural, ethnic, field, habitus, power, resident, citizen, convert.

ACRONYMS

EU	European Union
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MDMC	Mother of Divine Mercy Centre
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WEC	Women Empowerment Centre

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INTRODUCTION

Migration connects with people's needs for fulfilment, whether economic or cultural. The necessity for movement outside one's own city, or even country in search for better economic opportunities or decent life conditions, pushes individuals and/or households to leave behind their territory, their possessions even their own relatives for the sake of having a brighter future. Zlotnik described international migration as 'a volatile process that can and does change markedly in magnitude and even in direction over short spans of time' (2015). Indeed, as a constant in human history, it is widely associated with livelihoods, culture and disastrous events, as well as exile (McAuliffe, Kitimbo, Goossens and Ullah, 2018). Song and Liang viewed international migration as an on-going process encompassing 'a temporal series of events' with an important feature such as networks that continuously operate in migration destinations (2016).

Furthermore, according to Boyd (1989), migrants' behaviours are responses to push and pull factors from both source and destination. She even portrayed migration as a calculated move 'designed to relieve economic pressures at various stages of the life cycle' (*ibidem*). The existence of a diaspora can determine new migratory flows from the same origin since it represents an 'attraction mechanism for future migrants' (Beine, 2016). In addition, people decide to move according to economic and non-economic incentives defining the supply side for the labour market, while the destination's immigration policies determine the demand side (Mayda, 2005). There has been a worldwide acceleration of migrant stocks, considering that the identification of a migrant pertains to the place of birth (Zlotnik, 1999). Any individual, desiring to migrate, attempts to establish personal connections which serve as channels for information and for assistance whether financial or social (Boyd, 1989). Networks coming from their country of origin and existing in destination countries could ease their coping with the new setting.

In the case of EU Member States as host societies for migrants, they seem to be diverse in terms of social construction, economic growth and migrant integration. According to the categorisation scheme of Pastore, immigrants differ from 'free movers' (2015). The latter belong to the mobility of EU citizens category, while the former can be forced migrants entitled to protection or voluntary economically motivated migrants, they can even fit into a new category

called ‘mixed flows’ (*ibidem*). Whatever the case may be, Europe seems to have enlarged its population thanks to immigration flows precluding an expected decline in native population (Zlotnik, 2015). Actually, leaving one’s home due to persecution and fear in wartime is a very hard decision to make, since it entails abandoning almost everything familiar and dear, and potentially encountering uncertainties, hardships and dangers which refugees usually face (Melander and Öberg, 2006).

Throughout the present decade, the world has been witnessing a global social transformation, linked to the accelerated mass migration flows from African and Asian countries towards the old continent. Aside the legal migration to respond to the unskilled and skilled labour markets, and the increase in asylum seeking due to unstable warfare situations in multiple countries of origin, many migrants chose to imperil their lives at sea for the purpose of escaping the somehow bitter reality at the country of origin in the hope of finding a safe haven in any of the European countries where they could redeem some of their acknowledged universal Human Rights, left unfulfilled in their source countries. Ultimately in response to large migrant inflows, most of the EU Member States intensified border controls and added more restrictions to the legal migration channels. However this did not prevent migrants or human smugglers to penetrate Fortress Europe by all means possible. What is certain is that migration industry is highly lucrative and opportunistic merchants will not stop taking advantage of needy aspiring voyagers, ready to put their lives at stake for the sole reason of reaching the developed world.

Today, many scholars carry out research on international migration in most of the academic fields such as geography, demography, ethnography, anthropology, political sciences, law and sociology... Indeed, migration is a phenomenon connected with human behaviour but also with political and socio-economic conditions. Thus people frequently move from their place of birth to find better socio-economic settings. Forced migration, a subcategory of international migration, constitutes a current process of global social transformation drastically growing due to both security and political concerns accompanied by human rights breaches in the countries of origin (Al Rahi, 2017).

Furthermore, millions of people around the world today live as refugees, raising fundamental challenges for governments. The definition of a refugee, as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, is someone who “...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”¹(Arar, 2016; Leenders, 2009; Grove and Zwi, 2006). But this definition does not embrace the whole universe of people who are forcibly displaced inside and outside their countries of origin and who do not easily fit under this formal definition. It has been agreed upon to identify a refugee as “a person who has crossed an international frontier because of a well-founded fear of persecution” (Shacknove, 1985). As per the UNHCR, resettlement is one of the three durable solutions for the refugee plight, ‘designed to identify and protect the ‘most vulnerable’ refugees (Swing, 2017).

Indeed, ‘based on their objective need for resettlement and not on their subjective desire’, refugees seem to have a tight choice in the resettlement scheme (Lindsay, 2017). However, when migrants establish contact with natives in a host society they somehow would be gaining access to the labour market and a possible way of learning the local language (Savelkoul, Tolsma and Scheepers, 2015). Often, forced migrants remain suspended in a transit country viewed as a geopolitical space fulfilling ‘a political function of enacting suspension’ that is understood as ‘a temporary debarment from or cessation of a privilege’ (Oelgemöller DPhil, 2011).

In this research, I study Iraqi migrants and their religious, cultural and social capitals pertaining to Bourdieu’s forms of capital and the networking strategies they employ to enhance their positions in the national field of a host society. International migration from Iraq had already started as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s, then continued throughout the 1990s with The Gulf war and in the 2000s after the fall of the Saddam regime followed by political and religious turmoil, thus creating an ‘environment of insecurity’ as described by Sirkeci (2005). Furthermore, the emergence of Al-Qaeda terrorist groups and the

¹ For text: UN Treaty Series
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20189/v189.pdf> (last visited on 28 January 2021).

Islamic State insurgence induced more migration within the Iraqi population towards different countries of the globe where networks of Iraqi communities were already established. These migrants largely belong to the refugee category or the refugee-like category e.g. asylum seekers... Some could still be caught in a state of waiting in a transit country, such as those present in Lebanon, while others could be permanent residents or even citizens in a host country, as in the case of those in Finland.

The field research regarded two host societies one qualified as a transit society and the other as a settlement society. The first phase of field research done in Lebanon studied temporary settled Iraqi refugees, focusing on their social networks and the impact of their religious affiliation and their cultural background on their migratory choices and on their present situation in the Lebanese society, essentially in Mount-Lebanon governorate. While the second phase done in Finland observed Iraqi migrants who currently reside in the city Turku and surrounding areas, highlighting the networking strategies they use in the process of integration within the Finnish community, with emphasis on their various religious affiliations and cultural backgrounds. Bearing in mind that Iraqi refugees in Lebanon are mostly in a transitional phase since they are in a state of waiting, the Lebanese and Finnish contexts can be quite dissimilar in terms of legal status and in terms of integration and adjustment in the host society.

In the following pages I present the state of the art literature regarding migration (international migration, forced migration, global social transformation, asylum seeking and human smuggling), in addition to some theories of perpetuation of international movement and Bourdieu's theory of capital, habitus and field according to various scholars.

Thus, Chapter 1 constitutes the basis of this thesis and specifies the theoretical framework in the application of Pierre Bourdieu's notions of capital, habitus and field in the migration arena. I then look at the convertibility of migrants' capitals translated in networking strategies in the national field of a host society which I test empirically in the two case studies of Iraqi migrants as mentioned earlier.

Accordingly, in Chapter 2 I analyse the Iraqi migrant population capitals at play in the Lebanese society through accounts from interviews with Iraqis and non-Iraqis and through participant observation performed on field, done in late 2017.

Moving to Chapter 3, although the Finnish context is rather different, the methodology I use is quite similar. Thus I analyse interviews with Iraqis and non-Iraqis employing the Bourdieusian approach of capital, habitus and field, in addition to participant observation, all done in the city of Turku in early 2018.

In the last part of this dissertation, I wrap up the results of both field studies regarding Iraqi migrants networking strategies through the Bourdieusian lens and conclude with recommendations regarding the application of this theoretical framework in future migration studies.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1- INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I present the state of the art literature regarding international migration and its relevant subcategories in accordance with this research. The purpose of this review is to orient the reader in the various aspects of migration encountered through the realization of the study. Indeed it was necessary to revisit the migration terminology used in the scholarly world across disciplines. I start with how international migration is seen by different scholars, then, I shift to the subcategory of forced migration and what derives from it. Afterwards, I attempt to give a concise overview regarding selected theories of perpetuation of international migration, which I believe are important in the understanding of migrant continuous flows throughout time and to a specific destination. Last, I examine Pierre Bourdieu's theory of capital, habitus and field found in his own work but also in its application by other scholars in the migration arena with the intent to provide the theoretical framework for the two empirical case studies.

1.2- INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The definition for international migration as found on the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) website is as follows: "The movement of persons away from their place of usual residence and across an international border to a country of which they are not nationals"².

Castles designates international migration as the movement of passing the border of a given country to any other country in the world, for a more secure settlement and a better livelihood (2000). Many governments view the migration process as disruptive and necessitating control. However spatial distribution of economic opportunities determines the direction of migratory flows (Tacoli, 2009). Cultures of hospitality often encourage or discourage all types of migrants in the choice of a particular country of destination (Gill, Caletrío, and Mason, 2011). Betts states that there is no global institutional framework for the governance of international migration (2010). For Andersson, international migration is a driver of economic and urban

² <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms> (last visited on 28 January 2021).

change modifying demographic patterns and bridging places and regions, thus creating links between people (2011). International migration could be temporary or permanent; it also could be a result of economic pursuit or induced by persecutions or natural disasters (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007).

Nowadays, a large portion of migration is performed in an illegal manner. Most of the current sea border crossings share a common characteristic of illegality, since this market reacts in response to dramatic movements of populations (Monzini, 2007). Munck asserts that migration involves labour mobility in the pursuit of capital accumulation, thus taking a major part in the globalisation process. He further explains that “politics of scale” influences peoples’ mobility on all levels local, regional, national and trans-national (2011). Kivisto and La Vecchia-Mikkola viewed migration as ‘a paradigmatic instance of a situation that is capable of generating ambivalence – a mixture of attraction and repulsion’ (2015).

Other scholars suggest that increased mobility in the world, commonly intimately linked to freedom, stirs to a global novelty in the future (Gill *et al.*, 2011). Ultimately, international migration could impact inequality positively or negatively in the countries of origin, ‘depending on where in the income distribution migrants come from, how much return migration occurs and how much migrants earn (Massey, 1998; cited in Clemens, 2014).

1.2.1- GLOBAL SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

While receiving states are concerned with border control and national security, sending states undergo irreversible drastic societal changes emphasized by political upheavals, environmental degradation, epidemics, internal wars, increasing violence and ethnic clashes (Jandl, 2007). Sending nations are losing both skilled workers who seek better labour conditions through legal migration channels, and, unskilled workers through illegal channels such as human smuggling or even human trafficking. Receiving nations are pushing towards rigorous border controls (Gallagher, 2015; Collyer, 2007) and are imposing more restrictions on visa requirements for legal entry (Weber and Grewcock, 2011), or even physical barriers to entry to curb smuggling activities (Gill, 2010).

For Castles (2008) social transformation is a driver of emigration from poorer countries, nevertheless it influences richer countries through determining the conditions of immigration and

integration. For La Vecchia (2011), expectations and events in both countries, origin and destination, affect the long-standing process of integration. Kasinitz reported that many nations manifested a broad societal membership crisis in terms of including or excluding newcomers from taking part in the receiving societies (2012).

Therefore, host countries tend to be selective towards opening up to the entrance of migrants who represent, in the case of illegal migration, a threat to national security and a serious risk of terrorism. In the context of multicultural societies, many European countries are rather reluctant to receive more migrants following previous unfortunate experiences of criminal activities premeditated by various categories of migrants already present in the territory. All of these developments come from unbalanced development levels between developed, less developed and least developed countries. Indeed, immigrants consider travelling to the European Union countries ‘to have a worthwhile life’, perhaps due to high unemployment rates in sending countries (André, Dronkers and Fleischmann, 2008).

1.2.2- FORCED MIGRATION

For the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) forced migration³ is seen as follows: *“in a broader sense, this includes not only refugees and asylum seekers but also people forced to move due to external factors, such as environmental catastrophes or development projects. This form of migration has similar characteristics to displacement”*. Meanwhile IOM defines forced migration as “a migratory movement which, although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion, or coercion”, with further clarification that the term is “not an international legal concept” but refers to “the movements of refugees, displaced persons, and, in some instances, victims of trafficking”⁴.

It is relevant to say that the forced movement of people, stepping outside their national borders ‘due to external factors’, requires from them to leave their home countries perhaps

³ UNESCO <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/migrant/> (last visited on 28 January 2021).

⁴ International Migration Law Glossary on Migration IOM UN Migration N34 2019 ISSN 1813-2278: At the international level the use of this term is debated because of the widespread recognition that a continuum of agency exists rather than a voluntary/forced dichotomy and that it might undermine the existing legal international protection regime (last visited on 28 January 2021).

unwillingly or even as a last resort, in the hope of attaining a decent life elsewhere. Indeed, forced migrants undergo life-changing events which could negatively or positively influence their pre-migration living conditions (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013). Environmental changes could somehow influence the size of potential future movements of migrants (Beine and Parsons, 2012). However, the term ‘environmental refugee’ is debatable since it is clearly not included in the definition brought by the UN Convention of 1951 (Warner, 2010). Nonetheless, if environmental degradations caused by the impact of mankind on the climate produce forced migration flows, then the need for forced migrant protection cannot be neglected (Piguet, 2008). Indeed, climate change does not destabilise human security unless combined with other factors such as poverty, insufficient state support to a community, compromised access to economic opportunities, ineffective decision-making processes and undermined social cohesion within and surrounding vulnerable groups (Boano, Zetter and Morris, 2007; Reuveny, 2007).

As for Grove and Zwi, forced migration is seen as an experience of isolation and dislocation, notably in the host societies which adopt policies of dispersal of the refugee communities, thus disrupting support networks (2006).

On the contrary, Lubkemann (2008) viewed that forced migration during wartime could produce ‘an ambiguous mix of both loss and empowerment’ whether economically, socially and/or politically in the life of forced migrants, collectively or even individually.

Many scholars argued that there seems to be an increasingly blurred distinction between interest-based particular economic migration through illegal channels and international protection-based migration. For instance, Pastore reveals that there is an increased mix up between migrants and refugees (2015); while for İçduygu and Yüksek, the securitisation of migration towards Europe is partly blurring the boundaries between transit migration and asylum seeking (2012). On the other hand, Gill asserts that in poorly regulated labour markets, there seems to be a blurred distinction between economic migrants and refugees who are not officially supposed to work (2010).

For Chimni, the borders between voluntary and forced migration are blurred at the existential level (2009). Castles expresses that it is actually the result of the existing divide between North and South which has led to an increasing social inequality (2003b). He further conveys that there are huge disparities between North and South in terms of human rights, social welfare and economic conditions (2003a). The fact remains that it is hard to clearly distinguish

between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ migration flows, between migrants escaping life threatening situations and those fleeing poverty and social injustice (Crisp, 1999). For Yarris and Castañeda (2015), the movement of people crossing borders involves some sort of a continuum between “force” and “will” whether ‘voluntary’ as in the economic migrants’ choice or ‘involuntary’ as in the refugees’ forced choice.

Other scholars described unequal development or underdevelopment as a generator of massive migratory flows of marginalised and excluded groups, particularly outlined in the article written by Delgado Wise *et al.* (2013). Moreover, Nyberg Sørensen attributes the relationship between development and migration to disparities in the levels of development between diverse regions (2012).

Currently, the concept of forced migration is gradually modifying due to the latest continuous migration trends from the South to the North. In some way, it seems to connect with the global social transformation caused by the neoliberal globalisation (*ibidem*). According to Smith, the world is witnessing complex patterns of migration across nation-states more than ever before (2005). Furthermore, a migrant from the global South might justify his illicit movement towards a given developed country in the global North through his alleged, but somehow logical, need for political stability and security, fulfilment of basic human rights, as well as economic welfare in the form of satisfactory livelihood. Rising inequalities between the global poles is contributing to this major shift from one part of the globe to the other. The consequences of the contemporary globalisation wave are significantly sensed through the mounting risky mobility undertaken by various ethnic and religious groups from the bitter South, putting their lives at stake, whether in the desert or at sea, just so they could arrive to the luring Europe.

1.2.2.1- ASYLUM SEEKING AND HUMAN SMUGGLING

Jones *et al.* define smuggling as the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation, or illegal entry of a person or persons across an international border (2007). Kleemans and Van De Bunt conveyed that there is a symbiotic relation between smugglers, smuggled migrants and their families in the form of smuggling rings that connect poor perilous countries and wealthy democratic countries (2003).

For the moment, smuggling activity of human beings seems substantially on demand, in response to the stricter border regulations for migrants to reach destination countries. It is noteworthy to mention that human smugglers perform their criminal activities through networks connected via latest technologies such as internet or mobile communication. These networks operate within origin, transit and destination countries (Collyer, 2007). At present, it appears to be a highly lucrative and expanding business, particularly due to the closing of borders and visa restrictions for entering legally to the European Union Member States.

McAuliffe and Jayasuriya (2016) proposed a new concept regarding the asylum seeking movement, the 'proactive asylum seeker', entailing sort of a degree of freedom in choosing the country of destination. The supply of asylum seeking is considerably high these last few years, since in different areas of the world, continuous internal wars are intensifying and seem to have no end. Ultimately, many desperate people, fleeing those unforeseen events, had no option but to choose smuggling as the only available and somehow affordable paid service to cross the borders. They sought this service for the sake of claiming asylum, whether journeying at sea or across land borders (Gallagher, 2015; Collyer, 2007). Furthermore, many undocumented migrants whose visas had expired or had overstayed their residence permit turn to smugglers to move from a country to another (Andrijasevic, 2010). Whilst in some cases, migration brokers facilitate the move of aspiring migrants from sending to receiving countries (Alpes, 2017).

Accordingly, States started questioning the refugee regime's recommendations because of 'costs of status determination and the maintenance or tolerance of asylum seekers, concerns about disguised economic migration and the growing prevalence of organized smuggling, and pressure from anti-migrant political elements' (Fitzpatrick, 2000). Bakewell argues that, among migrants who illegally cross borders, those who are under the control of human traffickers would benefit from some sort of protection; while as those who intentionally chose illegal routes could be seen as criminals or as a threat to the host society (2010). Nevertheless, human trafficking, as a transnational process, implicates coercion and abuse of power employed by traffickers on people moved across state borders for the purposes of exploitation (Limoncelli, 2009). This type of violation extends over several geographical and legal frontiers, though actions to counter it usually happen in the place of exploitation (Zimmerman, Hossain and Watts, 2011).

1.3- THEORIES OF PERPETUATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Douglas Massey *et al.* explain that the conditions for initiation of migration are rather different than those that extend it across time and space. Furthermore, the authors refer to the spread of migrant networks as a perpetuating cause among other factors contributing to the continuum of migration (1993). For Herman, once a migratory flow starts, various effects emerge and increase the likelihood of subsequent mobility (2006). She also stresses on Price's concept of 'chain migration' stating that "the influence of social networks on migrants and immigration was paramount" (*ibidem*). In addition, other transformations in both sending and receiving societies induce further movements such as the development of transnational institutions which support international migration (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Thus, I will use the meso-level (network theory and cumulative causation) and macro-level theory (migration systems theory) as classified by Hagen-Zanker to underline the reasons behind the perpetuation of international migration (2008).

1.3.1- NETWORK THEORY

The network theory highlights the importance of social networks during the three phases of migration: mobilization, mobility and integration (Herman, 2006). For Boyd "networks connect migrants and non-migrants across time and space" (1989). Once potential migrants decide to migrate, they connect with compatriots already present in the destination country. They even create interpersonal ties with non-migrants in the homeland as well as return migrants in the community of origin. These relationships plus familial and friendship ties can be particularly helpful when it comes to getting support in the traveling experience about to be taken and in exchanging information about new settlement countries ((McAuliffe, Kitimbo *et al.*, 2018). Hiwatari underlines the importance of 'peer effects' in a community; the former seem to differ from simple network effects as they take into account the actual behaviour of diverse network members (2016).

Networks motivate the migrant to embark on their journey to destination and provide an important conduit for consequent resource exchange between source and host countries (Somerville, 2015). Indeed, social networks seem to function through different time scales and

spaces, both virtual (i.e. online forums) and physical (Ryan, Sales, Tilki and Siara, 2008; cited in Janta, Lugosi, Brown and Ladkin, 2012). From the network theory perspective, migration is assumed to be ‘a collective process shaped by both agency and structure’ (Gold, 2005). In fact, migrant networks seem to decrease the costs and risks of migration and increase expected net returns to migration (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

According to Palát (2017), networks are both a product of migration through time and produce further migration. Contributions made by family and friends facilitate the move for the migrant who does not randomly select where to go (Johnson and Schultz, 2011). Moreover, such connections relate to social capital in the migrant community or diaspora found in the host society. Strong ties (kinship and close friends) and weak ties (acquaintances) could reinforce bonding and bridging social capital to gain employment (Maher and Cawley, 2015). Kalter and Kogan argue that existing social networks to co-ethnic migrants present in the receiving society drive migration and play a crucial role in the post-migration phase (2014).

For Cedeberg, the existence of co-ethnic networks in a receiving country constitutes key ‘bridges’ for newcomers (2012). These networks also serve as means to access assistance and to participate in the labour market at the point of destination (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Moreover, transnational social networks could be viewed as a significant source of information, namely for potential asylum seekers through the provision of details regarding ‘transport arrangements, entry requirements, asylum procedures, social welfare benefits, detention situations and deportation policies’ in the future destination countries (Crisp, 1999). For Faist (2000; cited in Wahlbeck, 2015), the availability of migrant networks leads to a self-perpetuation of migration since ‘each act of migration strengthens the necessary ties and creates additional resources that promote and sustain more migration in processes of cumulative mobility’. Ultimately, migration becomes a self-sustaining and disseminating process (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

1.3.2- CUMULATIVE CAUSATION

The cumulative causation theory assumes that progressive additional movements over time are the outcome of each act of migration which changes the social setting and causes subsequent migratory flows (Heering *et al.*, 2004; Massey *et al.*, 1993). In other words, migration is produced by a complex sequence of changes originally initiated by migration itself

(Palát, 2017). These changes can be perceived in multiple dimensions within the community of origin. Moreover, the expansion of networks transforms the migration process into an integral part of the local culture easily reached by all members of the community (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). First, remittances received by migrants' families impact income distribution between households stimulating outmigration, since non-migrant families feel a relative deprivation which in turn prompts some of them to migrate as means to increase their income. Henceforth, this generates more income inequality and more out-movement to remedy to the economic situation (*ibidem*). Second, the diffusion of migration modifies community values and cultural perceptions, and predicts further trips in the future. Indeed migrants develop a better notion about social mobility and a taste for consumer goods and lifestyles unlike in the homeland (Heering *et al.*, 2004).

In some sending regions, migration is portrayed as a 'rite of passage' to many young men and women (Castles, 2007; Massey *et al.*, 1993). However, co-ethnic ties sometimes lower the opportunities for career advancement or upward social mobility (Ballarino and Panichella, 2015), given that social labelling for 'immigrant jobs' (Massey *et al.*, 1993) constitutes a sort of 'entrapment' (Kalter and Kogan, 2014).

Last, the outflow of human capital away from the sending regions and into the receiving regions depletes productivity in the former while enhancing it in the latter. In other words, economic growth is strengthened abroad while it is bound to stagnate at home leading to more migration (Massey *et al.*, 1993).

1.3.3- MIGRATION SYSTEMS THEORY

This theory defines a migration system as a specific set of countries including core receiving and migrant-sending countries characterized by large outflows to the said core countries. Within a system, geographical proximity is not the most essential component because flows are generally linked to political and economic relations between the countries. In addition, systems can be multipolar with overlapping sending countries (*ibidem*). Palát portrayed international migration as related to past colonial powers and their former colonies because of their important links in matters of language, culture, investment, communication and transport (2017). Fawcett describes the linkages' categories (State to State relations, mass culture connections, family and personal networks, and migrant agency activities) and types (tangible,

regulatory, and relational) that exist in a migration systems theory, where he emphasizes that family networks present an enduring impact on migration, in addition to the role model played by a migrant family member, the credibility of source and the effective communication, and the information given to potential migrants (1989).

Hagen-Zanker depicts migration as an interdependent dynamic spatial process, but designates migration system models as appearing to be equivocal with no tangible prediction for migration trends (2008). De Haas noticed that there is a rise in the number of developing countries ‘incorporated within migration systems’ that connect them with developed countries (2006). Eventually, it is necessary to inspect both ends of the flow and the pre-existing ties between the source countries and the destination countries as regards to trade, investment, potential colonial history, political influence and cultural links (Castles, Miller and Ammendola, 2005).

1.4- BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF CAPITAL, HABITUS AND FIELD

Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist, analysed types of capital trying to explain their interconnectedness through determining fields of power. He explicitly stated that it takes time to accumulate capital in the embodied form, since capital is able to generate profit and even able to reproduce itself, but also it can tend to remain the same (Bourdieu, 1986).

1.4.1- BOURDIEU’S CONCEPT OF CAPITAL

Bourdieu defined capital as “Any resource effective in a structured arena of social action (or field) that allows one to obtain the specific profits that arise out of activity and contest within that arena” (Smith, 2013). His composition of capital allows us to understand the functioning of both groups and individuals in society. In fact, the dynamics of capital and the Bourdieusian categorization can be key elements in the analysis of behaviours and attitudes in different societies. Aside the economic capital which can be accumulated and materialized through money, land property or other concrete objects of tradable value, Bourdieu categorized capital in ‘social, cultural, political, religious, linguistic etc or a combination of such species of power’

(Tabar, Noble and Poynting, 2010) which are specific to a certain society. These forms of capital are acquired and can be developed or converted according to the context or the field as per Bourdieu.

Moreover, he classified capital by its state, embodied or objectified (Bourdieu, 1986). Moore (2008) regarded social and cultural capital as “transubstantiated” forms of economic capital. On one hand, ‘the instrumental and self-interested nature of the exchange’ in economic capital is transparent with a means to an end (profit, interest, a wage...). On the other hand, forms of symbolic capital reject their instrumental character and present themselves as disinterested and of intrinsic value (*ibidem*). Cederberg (2012) explains that a resource is defined as capital through its convertibility to other forms of capital. Although, for Bourdieu, symbolic capitals are characterized as arbitrary and instrumental when considered as types of assets inducing cultural and social advantage or disadvantage (Moore, 2008).

When talking about conversion of capital, Bourdieu reported that all other forms of capital can derive from economic capital only after employing a significant effort of transformation that is necessary in the production of the type of power effective in the field in question (1986). Thus, economic capital can be understood as at the core of all other forms of capital which in turn when transformed, produce their most precise effects while disguising the fact that economic capital is also at the core of those effects. Ultimately, convertibility of the various types of capital works as a principal strategy to guarantee capital reproduction and position-taking in the social space (*ibidem*).

If we apply the theory of capital in the migration context we could attribute to the migrant’s wealth four important types of capital in addition to the economic capital. Indeed, cultural heritage, language, religious background and social ties constitute valuable resources for migrants.

1.4.1.1- SOCIAL CAPITAL

“The aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” is what social capital is all about (Bourdieu, 1986; also cited in Fokkema and De Haas, 2015). The very existence of these relationships could be through material and/or symbolic

exchanges which help in maintaining them; it also could be through their social institutionalization by applying ‘a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party...) and by a whole set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them’ (Bourdieu, 1986). It is worthy to say that both the size of network established by a given agent and the volume of capital mobilized by members within that network to the agent’s right determine the volume of social capital possessed by that same agent.

Pehkonen conveyed that social capital, as an individual resource, requires support for individuals partly dependent on social capital as a collective resource (2017). She further said that social capital boosts the well-being of individuals and groups since ‘reliable and credible social networks and social support facilitate people’s activities’. Therefore, network formation is a product of individual or collective investment strategies, whether consciously or unconsciously, intended to either create or reproduce social relationships, directly functional in the short or long term. What is more is that the reproduction of social capital requires a continuous effort of sociability and constant exchanges in which recognition is unceasingly and repeatedly acknowledged (Bourdieu, 1986). In fact, the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment totally rules social capital, hence the latter operates all the time as symbolic capital (*ibidem*).

For Putnam (2000; cited in Quetulio-Navarra, Zetter, Niehof and Zhao, 2017), social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness emerging from them form the social capital. While for Boccagni and Decimo (2013; cited in Tabar and Maalouf, 2016) social capital is described ‘as a set of interpersonal relationships that facilitate individuals and groups in reaching their objectives’. As for Peggy Levitt (1998; cited in Tabar, 2014), social remittances embraced ‘the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending-country communities’.

Schapendonk (2015) shed the light on the importance of grasping Bourdieu’s ‘dynamic dimension of social capital’ in the maintenance of networks as ‘a product of investment strategies, individual or collective’.

Fokkema and De Haas argued that even if networks of migrants could contribute significantly in the migration process, they could turn to be exclusionary in the integration process in host societies (2015).

For Gold (2005), networks that form the migrant's social capital are more beneficial than separate forms of collaboration triggering impersonal economic exchange.

Garip (2008) suggested that usually social capital in the migration scholarship is theorized as 'resources of information or assistance that individuals obtain through their social ties to prior migrants'. She also referred to the theory of 'cumulative causation' found in the work of Massey (1990) in that the building-up of a migrant social capital produces a self-sustaining effect on migration flows. Then, she continues her article stressing on Bourdieu's notion of social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition." Moreover, she went through the description of Coleman (1988) regarding the emergence from 'closure in the social structure' and the convertibility of social capital as a resource for action "embodied in relations among persons".

Cedeberg (2012) highlighted that Coleman's work presented social capital as important in the 'creation of human capital' for individuals through closed networks regulated by the reproduction of relations of trust and reciprocity however it was unable to present a clear situation in terms of social hierarchies.

Garip expanded Burt's idea of "structural holes" (1992) stating that social capital is a result of 'the relative absence of ties in the structure' which basically is linked with the work of Granovetter (1973) viewing social capital as 'information channels'. She then reported the idea of decomposability of social capital into three distinct dimensions (the recipients or those making claims, the sources or those agreeing to those demands, and the resources themselves) seen in the work of Portes (1998). She returned to the notion 'that potential migrants access these resources through migrant networks, which are a set of interpersonal ties based on kinship, friendship, or shared origin community that connect migrants and non-migrants found in Massey *et al.* (1993). Ultimately she concluded by redefining the migrant social capital, as in the words of Portes, 'as a resource (information about or assistance with migrating) that recipients (potential migrants) access through their social ties to sources (prior migrants)'.

Portes and Landolt (2000) in their commentary highlighted Bourdieu's instrumentalism of the concept of capital when affirming that people deliberately construct their relations upon the potential benefits that they would convey afterward. Indeed, the authors showed the Bourdieusian insightfulness regarding the tradability of capital as inter-tradable and essential for

the development of each capital. Thus economic capital, social capital and cultural capital - which is described as 'the formal educational credentials that an individual possesses together with the more intangible complex of values and style in demeanour' - are strongly interconnected. They proceeded with notions from Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Simmel in relation to groups' dynamics identifying 'four sources of social capital distinguished by the presence/absence of over-arching structures defining the character of the transaction'. These sources can be either 'altruistic' or 'instrumental'. By altruistic, they meant resources given 'to others out of moral obligation or out of solidarity with members of the same territorial, ethnic or religious community' thus introducing the concept of *bounded solidarity*. While by instrumental, they were indicating 'face-to-face reciprocal transactions that carry the full expectation of commensurate return by the benefited party', wrapped up with the concept of *simple reciprocity*; and 'resource transactions embedded in larger social structures that act as guarantors of full returns to donors either from the benefited party or from the community at large' designating the concept of *enforceable trust*.

Shifting to Putnam's 'stock' of social capital pertaining to states and communities, they showed that there is a need to pay attention for the qualitative distinction between individual social capital and collective social capital or 'civiness' relevant to communities or states. They concluded their commentary with the idea that 'social capital can be a powerful force promoting group projects but, as noted previously, it consists of the ability to marshal resources through social networks, not the resources themselves'.

In her article of 2013, Smith used the Bourdieusian concepts of social and cultural capitals to analyse the social life of the Somali Bantu who were forced to move to the United States. Ritzer and Goodman (2004; cited in Smith, 2013) interpreted Bourdieu's cultural capital as encompassing knowledge acquisition and validation in a given society and social capital as involving 'valued social relations between people'. Smith used Bourdieu's notion of 'formalized sociability' in her analysis of the Bantu intra-ethnic relational system established in Somalia. Furthermore, she applied Bourdieu's social reproduction phenomenon in her investigation regarding the generational persistence of hierarchy within the Bantu group.

In addition, for Bourdieu, in order to fully participate in the society, upper and middle classes have to acquire knowledge to give value to their capital 'either by being born into a family already possessing the knowledge or through attendance in formal schooling'. Therefore,

for Yosso (2005; cited in Smith, 2013), people outside the aforementioned classifications need to find means for knowledge acquisition recognized by those in power. Morrice (2007; cited in Smith, 2013) viewed Bourdieu's contribution clarifying to a certain extent 'a societal mechanism that provides opportunities for some and not others'. However, Yosso highlighted that in Bourdieu's social reproduction theory success is attributed solely to upper and middle class values and social structures. By doing so, Bourdieu somehow positioned 'Western middle class social relationships and economic standards' as the desired model for members of any society possibly attainable through 'formal academic knowledge'. What emerged from this positioning was that lower socio-economic classes are assumed to be caught in cultural discrepancies requiring adjustment.

To counter this assumption, Yosso used the critical race theory to sketch six forms of capital inherent to what she termed as 'community cultural wealth': 'aspirational, navigational, social, linguistic, familial, and resistant'. In fact she expanded the understanding of the notion of cultural capital beyond the traditional Bourdieusian one.

For Putnam (1995; cited in Smith, 2013), social capital denoted "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit". Morrice (2007; cited in Smith, 2013) made use of Putnam's 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital in his article regarding refugees in the United Kingdom, where bonding focuses on links within same groups and in closer circles, enabling communities and individuals to 'get by'; and bridging connects to resources that are external to the group, crucial for 'getting ahead'. Smith concluded that Bourdieu's notions on social reproduction and social capital facilitated the interpretation of 'how a lack of particular kinds of knowledge can limit access to higher education and other opportunities available in Western countries'.

1.4.1.2- CULTURAL CAPITAL

Bourdieu depicted cultural capital in its three states: embodied, institutionalized and objectified (Bourdieu, 1986). In order to accumulate cultural capital in its embodied state (culture, cultivation, Bildung), there is an actual process of embodiment entailing 'a labour of inculcation and assimilation' requiring time invested personally by the investor (Moore, 2008; Bourdieu, 1986). Similar to habitus formation, acquired embodied cultural capital implies 'an integration of mind and body harmoniously adapted to specialized habitats (fields) and

transposable beyond them' (Moore, 2008). In the institutionalized state of cultural capital, understood as educational qualification, inherited social capital plays a major role in both supporting its formation and generating economic and social produce from it. Furthermore, through institutional recognition, it becomes possible to compare qualification holders and even to substitute them (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural capital transmission is, according to Bourdieu, 'the best hidden form of hereditary transmission of capital' (*ibidem*).

For Anthias (2009), migrants possess distinct cultural standards defining their migration trajectory and their strategy of social advancement, tightly related to the values they confer 'to education, social capital emanating from ethnic networks, material resources, knowledge and communication, transferable skills and competencies, human capital and so on'. However, she conveyed that culture could be understood as 'a resource or a form of software for dealing with the social world'; though 'not fixed', it 'adapts and changes in different contexts'.

In her article, Erel (2010) contended that 'migrants exercise agency by creating new forms of migration-specific cultural capital' thus rejecting the 'rucksack approaches', commonly found in research in migration and which strongly affirm that cultural capital is transported from the country of origin to the country of settlement. For Erel, the concept of habitus conveys the embodied state of cultural capital including both 'bodily comportment and speaking as markers of distinction'.

While formal education is an integral part of institutionalized cultural capital, informal education passed on in the family, in cultural groups and in political parties, plays an important part in the formation of cultural capital as well. Furthermore the ability to convert into another form of capital is a sign of distinction between cultural capital and ordinary cultural resources. Actually, the former is "both the product of and productive of differentiations of gender, ethnicity, and class within the migrant group'. Therefore it is up to the differentiated migrant groups to validate cultural practices accordingly whether as capital alternative or countering the national belonging cultural setting. However, migrants strive to blend in their cultural capital with the ethnically dominant culture in a receiving society.

To a certain extent, migrants cultural resources such the knowledge of the language in the receiving society can be converted into 'national capital', to legitimize belonging (Hage, 1998). Zhou (2005; cited in Erel, 2010) portrayed 'human capital' as such 'different ethnic groups possess identifiable characteristics, encompassing cultural values, practices, and social networks

that were formed in the homeland and transplanted with minor modifications by immigrants in the new land and there transmitted and perpetuated from generation to generation’.

Cutler *et al.* (2005; cited in Erel, 2010) define ‘ethnic capital’ as ‘the set of individual attributes, cultural norms, and group-specific institutions that contribute to an ethnic group’s economic productivity’. For Erel, the human and ethnic capital approaches to migration do not go through the convertibility process of cultural resources of a certain ethnic group unlike the Bourdieusian approach which gave high importance to that process as a constituent of cultural capital. For Bourdieu and Wacquant (2007; cited in Erel, 2010), the overall capital made up of the interconnectedness and the interaction between the different forms of capital strategizes the employment of the individuals’ capital in the ‘position-taking’ in a given ‘social trajectory’.

Erel further cited the focus on cultural capital’s reproduction of ‘existing hierarchical structures of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital’ in Bourdieu’s *Distinction* (1996) and mentioned Bennett *et al.*’s (2009) critique about overlooking ‘the complex contradictions and dissonances in people’s positioning’. She claimed that specific forms of capital and of fields are intimately related quoting the following statement of Bourdieu and Wacquant (2007): ‘People are at once founded and legitimized to enter the field by their possessing a definite configuration of properties. One of the goals of research is to identify (...) these forms of *specific capital*’. Furthermore, she found that migration in itself interrupts the replication of cultural capital in a linear way due to the change in both ‘conditions of production of habitus and of functioning’ (Bourdieu, 1990; cited in Erel, 2010).

Later on, she continued her analysis referring to the concept of Bourdieu’s state monopoly over symbolic power in that migrants’ cultural capital can be inconsistent with the receiving state’s legitimate symbolic capital. Institutionalized cultural capital, as Bauder (2003; cited in Erel, 2010) put it, might prevent migrants’ cultural capital proper recognition due to the nationally-based protectionism practiced by educational and professional institutions of the receiving country. In addition, in the employment sector of the host state, employers might prevent the entrance of migrants in the job market in the absence of local professional experience, although ‘foreign’ qualifications could be formally accepted.

Thus, in some way, skilled jobs conditions become a property of the ‘national capital’, in other words, granting privileged access to nationals and somehow excluding migrants (Hage, 1998 and Bauder, 2003; cited in Erel, 2010). In this sense, to be able to take part in the ‘locally-

shared professional cultures', migrants are supposed to already share the same embodied cultural capital of nationals to overcome 'professional protectionism practices', which is quite absurd, unless those migrants have a 'transnationally validated institutional cultural capital' favouring them on the basis of their remote and skilful experiences. She expanded the concept with the 'universalized' 'western' cultural capital exemplified with the professional access of Germans in many countries regardless of the local cultural capital. Meanwhile, Third world countries' migrants witnessed a slowing down in their career advancement though possessing 'transnationally validated credentials' (Weiss, 2005; cited in Erel, 2010).

Furthermore, migrants' agency in the formation and the transformation of cultural capital can be evaluated with the Bourdieusian method. The migrant's cultural capital is depicted as 'a treasure chest consisting of language skills, knowledge about customs and lifestyles, professional qualifications, etc'. In the process of migration the cultural capital contained in 'the rucksack' is unloaded in the receiving country and employed in 'bargaining activities with institutions (such as professional bodies or universities) and people (such as employers or managers)' to valorise the components of the migrants' original cultural capital.

Often times, under-valorisation occurs since the rules of the game, as in Kelly and Lusia (2006; cited in Erel, 2010), are not controlled by the migrants themselves. However, migrants can gain new skills in the receiving country and add on to their cultural capital which can be beneficial too in their home country, 'thus negotiating and benefiting from differential 'exchange value' (Bauder, 2003; cited in Erel, 2010) of cultural resources, practices and forms in two national contexts'. It is relevant to say that migrants generate new forms of cultural capital in addition to the unloaded one through using their own resources and through developing new resources thus allowing for rather 'distinct dispositions'. They even seek to validate their cultural capital not only through the dominant culture institutions and people but also through migrants' networks.

Erel then used the term 'migration-specific cultural capital' to explain the distinct features of a migrant cultural capital between origin and residence. Hage (1998) indicated that migrant cultural capital can generate systems of value 'alternative or oppositional to the national capital' recognized by the sending and the receiving states. Moreover, there are gender, class, educational attainment and ethnic membership differentiations within a migrant group cultural

capital which impact the mobilization of both social and cultural capital in Anthias (2007; cited in Erel, 2010).

Erel concluded her article by an interesting observation regarding the migrant dynamics of validation of cultural resources as capital which contribute to ‘new forms of intra-migrant distinction’ suitable ‘for occupational mobility and/or to claim to culturally and politically represent the community’. She proceeded with the idea that the significance and recognition of cultural practices are subject to the context (local, national and transnational) and she highlighted the importance of actors in giving sense to cultural practices to better ‘understand how cultural capital signifies distinction and produces recognizable social identities and positionalities’.

1.4.1.3- HABITUS

Habitus is a third expression of capital. This form does not have a material existence in itself in the world. It consists of attitudes and dispositions. For Bourdieu, habitus is essentially formed through education and within the family (Moore, 2008). Kelly and Lusi (2006; cited in Smoczynski, Fitzgerald and Zarycki, 2016) portrayed habitus as: ‘the collective, learned, system of usually unconscious or implicit rules which shape the value that individuals place on practices, and, therefore, on various forms of capital’.

Additionally, habitus has been described as: ‘revelatory and mystifying, instantly recognizable and difficult to define, straightforward and slippery’ (Maton, 2008).

Bourdieu specified that it is ‘a property of social agents’ involving a ‘structured and structuring structure’. Referring to the meaning of ‘structured’, habitus is governed by the agent’s past and present conditions including education attainment and family upbringing. While for ‘structuring’ it is intended in the sense that habitus contributes in modelling the agent’s present and future practices. Being systematically ordered, the habitus’ ‘structure’ includes an array of dispositions generating perceptions, appreciations and practices (*ibidem*). The habitus is unable to act alone but it provides the principle for the logic of selection: structured and structuring predispositions (Moore, 2008).

Habitus (the dispositions of the agent) combined with capital (position in the field) in the field (the social arena) generate practice (Maton, 2008). In all fields of social practice, a ‘well-formed habitus’ is usually associated to symbolic forms of capital so that those who belong to a

defined group and qualify as having a well-formed habitus are higher in cultural capital. However, no equal value in society is conferred to all habitus and their instances of cultural capital (Moore, 2008).

Furthermore, the Bourdieusian notion of habitus clarifies the idea of bringing the social agents' past into their present circumstances and the way they make choices to act in particular ways. Indeed, making choices is an active and continuing process shaped by past events, nonetheless it depends on the current context (position in a specific social field) then in turn it designs future possibilities. Therefore, habitus' structure is not "set" but rather it evolves, thus qualified as 'durable and transposable but not immutable' (Maton, 2008). Moreover, the social and the individual are linked through habitus since an individual's life course, although particular in its substance, does not stand in the way of sharing a common structure with others who belong to the same social class, gender, ethnicity, etc (*ibidem*).

Habitus is essentially a relational structure between the objective and subjective or "outer" and "inner" through detailing the way social facts become internalized. Also, habitus denotes 'a socialized subjectivity' and 'the social embodied', thus combining objective social structure with subjective personal experiences, as termed by Bourdieu: 'the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality' (*ibidem*).

Bourdieu regarded habitus as a "'unifying principle' which transforms one's position 'into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, practices'" and qualified it as 'inert' and unchanging in nature (cited in Noble, 2013). Nevertheless, he then noted habitus could be also destabilised 'torn by contradiction and internal division, generating suffering'. Therefore the very nature of habitus could be described as 'both functional in familiar contexts and yet cumulative and generative in new circumstances'. It is thus characterized by an important sense of stability and at the same time by a strong dynamism. In effect, the body of the migrant is a concrete manifestation of the rather contradictory nature of habitus since the migrant clearly expresses 'an embodied experience of disorientation and reorientation central to resettlement, and because this experience demonstrates that the body is not simply the repository of social tradition' (Bottomley, 1992; cited in Noble, 2013).

The concept of transnational habitus underlined by Guarnizo (1997; cited in Noble, 2013) attributes to migrants a 'particular set of dualistic dispositions' enabling them to respond to certain circumstances in a relatively designed fashion beyond accepted behavioural or

sociocultural rules. Noble pointed out that although the concept of transnational habitus contains some form of truth that the migrant's habitus is adjusted to fit with the host country conditions, it does not admit to what extent the settlement place is influenced by the presence of migrants.

Noble in his article (2013) focused on Bourdieu's habitus and field viewed from the perspective of migrants resettling in another country who undergo a series of transformation in their original embodied capacities and the creation of new ones however unable to match 'the dispositions of the citizen who 'belongs' by birth'. He built on Bourdieu's assertion about the complicity of habitus and field contending that to better grasp the concept of habitus there is a need to redefine the concept of field and to employ 'a micro-sociological language of 'settings'' for the explanation of migrants' linguistic experience and social behaviour.

The Bourdieusian 'habitus' interpreted as 'system of durable and largely unconscious bodily dispositions which orients human actions', somehow revealed 'how social relations are internalised as 'natural', and how principles of social organisation are embodied such that humans are capable of generating an array of actions requisite to any given social field, embedded in particular forms of physical, linguistic, cultural, social and economic capital'. Habitus then is both 'the embodiment of a socio-structural location' in terms of class, gender or ethnicity, and the abilities creating 'improvised human conduct, the 'practical mastery' in and of social spaces, manifest in our actions, modes of appearance and bearing – posture, manners, ways of speaking – which make social life possible' (Bourdieu, 1991; cited in Noble, 2013).

The concept of 'habitus' further examines the interdependence of social determination and human agency, the individual idiosyncrasies of the socialised body, the inertia and malleability of corporeal capacities, and the relationship between the field-specific nature of competence and the fact that bodies travel across diverse contexts'. Indeed, 'linguistic habitus' in the Bourdieusian understanding stands for positioning language as a 'system of communication and a practice located within relations of power'. He also attributed to language the ability to make up context-specific expressions though it is controlled by a well-defined, sanctioning and censoring 'linguistic market'.

Noble described the situation of the migrant in his case study as having an 'acquired awkwardness beyond the initial experience of disorientation' thus resonating the concept of 'clumsiness' in Bourdieu's socially displaced bachelor peasants. He proceeded by stating that the

migrant did not ‘grow into’ a comfortable state of living in the host country, in other words, the migrant is unable to enjoy a certain level of ‘ontological security’, to trust their surroundings, and is not capable of acting with ease in some social situations (Noble, 2005; cited in Noble, 2013). He later developed the idea that migrants learn to cope with the differences of the new residence and while they strive to make themselves feel at home they get familiarised with some form of disorientation such as having mixed feelings or a sense of ambivalence. One important quote from Noble’s article caught my eye because it reveals somehow how a migrant continues to be rather ‘different’ after many years in the society of residence:

“...What used to make me feel out of place is when jokes are said and I wasn’t able to catch the humour.”

Within a wider society migrants perceive themselves not fully ‘inside’ instead they find themselves naturally inserted in an ethnic group where they can appreciate their existential difference. Noble’s notion of ‘included or inside outsider’ remarkably portrays the very existence of many migrants in host societies. Those migrants, when returning to the homeland, discover that they have ‘become a particular kind of difference’. Thus they acquired a new habitus, an ethnicised habitus positioning them within the host society. Getting back to Bourdieu’s habitus, Noble compared disorientation and reorientation to the ‘tormented habitus’ of displaced bachelor peasants in a modernising world. In Noble’s opinion the torment becomes an integral part of the ethnicised habitus through the learning of the difference of difference in the migrant’s own perception of being an ethnic member inside of a larger dominant society.

1.4.2- BOURDIEU’S CONCEPT OF FIELD

‘A capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field’. For Bourdieu the field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions’ (Tabar *et al.*, 2010). It is where the capital comes into play. It is the dimension where the exchange or conversion of capital can happen. Moreover it is the playground where capital can grow or even can vanish. As per Bourdieu, it is the social space where events, transactions and interactions took place (Thomson, 2008). I would say that a field resembles to a house where family members interconnect and where abstract or concrete exchanges take place.

The French word ‘le champ’ used by Bourdieu has multiple meanings ‘area of land, a battle field and a field of knowledge’. Moreover, the field is somehow perceived as an ‘arena of struggle with two distinct dimensions’. One dimension is to amass valued capital or to transform one form of capital to another more valued form. The other dimension concerns the ‘struggle for symbolic capital’, or ‘over the right to monopolise the legitimate definition of what is the most legitimate form of capital for a particular field’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; cited in Tabar and Maalouf, 2016). Hence, the Bourdieusian social field comprised the social agents’ positions and their interactions within the boundaries of the field in question (*ibidem*).

Moreover, the field comprises social agents who dominate and others who are dominated. This space is driven by a continuum of unequal relationships where social actors struggle for its transformation or preservation. Accordingly, social actors compete using the power at their disposal to position themselves in the field and to determine their strategies to remain in the game. Consequently, Bourdieu posited that fields are ‘sites of struggle’ and that the game played in a field has no end and no winner, leading for a possible change at any moment (*ibidem*).

Through the process of transubstantiation, fields of symbolic capital are structured similarly to the structure of the economic field. Indeed, as per Bourdieu, it is based on “interest” that the system of social domination and subordination constituted within and through these symbolic relations is legitimized. Additionally, relations of class and power are reproduced in each field of symbolic capital in the same way, thus reproducing social inequality (Moore, 2008).

There is a dynamic interplay between field and capital, where field is viewed as both means of production of a given symbolic capital and a regulator of the social distribution of that same capital, and capital understood as the “energy” that drives the development of a specific field through time (Moore, 2008).

Thomson (2008) conveyed that Bourdieu’s capital, habitus and field methodology is of combining this interdependent trio with each component constructing the other without primacy, dominance or causality. In addition, social agents compete in the social fields employing various tactics to maintain or to improve their position in those fields. Indeed, capital represents both the process within a field and its product. Eventually, social field players are already advantaged if they possess some capital right from the start because it is within that field that the capital is reproduced. And these players would be fortunate enough to accumulate more capital and enhance their position in the field. As for the field of power or the social world as understood by

Bourdieu, it comprises multiple fields, among which some are dominant and others are subordinate rendering the game played in one field dependent from another (*ibidem*).

Kivisto and LaVecchia-Mikkola asserted that migrants live in a ‘distinct social field inherently conducive to feelings of dual ambivalence’ towards both the country of origin and the host country (2013). For Erel (2010), the field is ‘a space of potential and active forces’ designed to maintain or convert the structure of these forces.

The field dynamics are of power relations. A field can be a battlefield where opinions can intersect or where social individuals or groups compete to excel in a certain task or even bond to realize a certain kind of achievement whether intellectual (embodied) or machinery useful for society (objectified). Tabar (2016) reasons that the power positions in a field are unequal allowing for a differentiation in the access to the field capital. He further continues that the field is like a battleground with ‘two distinct dimensions’: the first one is the accumulation of valued capital or the convertibility of a type of capital into a more valued one, and the second one is the ‘struggle for symbolic power’, which in turn is concerned with the monopoly over the legitimisation of the most relevant type of capital in a given field. Thus there seems to be in a field both ‘a struggle for valued resources and a struggle over defining what [are] valued resources.’ Furthermore, for Bourdieu exchange rates of capital between fields are controlled by the state with reference to a specific ‘field of power’.

Subsequently, Tabar elaborates on the concept of diasporic field that with the engagement of a migrant’s social or economic capital within the diasporic field the migrant would win a power position in that very field and that this same position ‘would be in line with its potential value following conversion into diasporic capital’.

When defining what they termed ‘ethnic field’, Tabar and his co-authors (2010) referred to it as ‘the specific and distinct ensemble of relations that regulate and define so-called ethnic communities’. It is ‘a structured and a structuring reality’. In their understanding, ‘ethnic community’ was a loose or tight ‘network of networks based on complex migration and settlement histories, in which both a high degree of overlap exists between categories and the ways they are translated into practices, identities and institutions and also a degree or demarcation’. In addition, ethnicity consists of a relational category linking the migrant’s national origin with the settlement country’s nationality.

Hence, it is comprised in a large field of national belonging, although in complex relation with it and with other ethnicities contained in it as well. Accordingly, they highlighted that ‘in the process of migration and settlement, the physical and cultural capital of the person shifts from its location in a specific national field, through its recasting as “migrant” and then, for some, to a relatively settled position as a specific ethnicity amongst a wider field of ethnicities’ (Tabar *et al.*, 2010). For Grove and Zwi, when talking about refugees and asylum seekers, the concept of ‘Othering’ was principally underlined as a process of marginalisation, disempowerment and social exclusion, thus creating a separation between ‘us’ (the national) and ‘them’ (the ‘othered’) (2006).

Hage conveyed that, in the imaginary of the nationalist, home entails both ‘an image of a nation that is one’s own and an image of self that occupies a privileged position vis-à-vis the nation, a privileged mode of inhabiting it’, thus treating ‘the other’ as an object to be managed by positioning or removing accordingly (1998). Eventually, Guia understood nativism as a particular construction of nationalism and described it as a mechanism used to sketch the frontiers between ‘us’ (natives) and ‘them’ (immigrants) and to explain the protection of privilege for a particular group (2016).

For Noble (2013), when shifting to the Bourdieusian spatial dimensions of habitus, in other words the field, he described it as ‘a relatively autonomous network of objective relations between positions, a social space of institutions and forces with its own forms of cultural and social capital’. In addition, Bourdieu put emphasis on ‘the ‘ontological complicity’ of the habitus with the ‘field in which’ it is positioned’.

Thus as an ‘open concept’ with a relational nature, the field is not reducible to a simple positioning but rather a dynamic one, through the struggles and processes of differentiation between agents who build up capital in diverse ways. Fields can be adjacent or even overlap ‘and turn into each other in a kind of four-dimensional social space’. Accordingly, being ‘ethnic’ entails operating within a specific ethnic community field but also within the field of national belonging.

1.5- CONCLUSION

After reviewing some of the state of the art literature on international migration, on Bourdieu's 'thinking tools' (capital, habitus and field) and on their use in migration studies, I elaborate the core research questions of this thesis:

- 1- What forms of capital do Iraqi migrants use in a host society?
- 2- How do their employed capitals translate into networking strategies to enhance their position in that society?

For this reason, I have chosen two case studies for the empirical application of the Bourdieusian theoretical framework in the migration sphere. My study subjects are Iraqi migrants and I am interested in finding out what kinds of capital they tend to use in the receiving country and how the capitals engaged can define their networking strategies in order to situate themselves whether in the Lebanese national field or in the Finnish national field. It is relevant to say that the contexts are quite dissimilar therefore the strategies are expected to differ.

In the following chapter, I will try to explain in details the Lebanese context and the Iraqi population residing there through the accounts of my informants. Indeed the interviewees are mostly Iraqis but also non-Iraqis in direct contact with the aforementioned population through church activities or social and humanitarian services.

CHAPTER 2: LEBANON HOSTING IRAQI MIGRANTS

2.1- INTRODUCTION

Lebanon is a small Western Asian less developed country on the Mediterranean coast (surface area: 10,452 km²)⁵ located in the Middle East area, with a total population estimated at 5,851 million people, considering the zero-migration variant which assumes that international migration for Lebanon is set to zero starting 2010-2015.⁶ This small State was described as ‘an archetypical example of a country that holds reservations about hosting migrants and refugees’ (Tabar, 2010). In addition, Lebanon is among the developing countries which host about 86 per cent of the world’s refugees, as of 2013, who were displaced to a neighbouring country in the global South (Sherwood, 2014; cited in Arar, 2016).

Below is the international migrant stock for Lebanon between 1990 and 2015 at mid-year by top five migrant-originating countries (Table 1). The size of migrant population by country of origin, particularly in 2015, varied approximately between 3,000 from Sri Lanka and 1,200,000 from Syrian Arab Republic. Five years earlier in 2010, figures for Syrian nationals were much lower, thus a tremendous increase in the figures is most probably due to the Syrian conflict which started in 2011⁷. Indeed the Syrian Arab Republic is the sole neighbouring country having direct land borders with Lebanon, with the exception of the southern frontier separating between the Lebanese territory and the occupied Palestinian territory.

As for Palestinian nationals, they have been residing in Lebanon since 1948 as permanent refugees having no right to claim for the Lebanese citizenship. Their elevated number that has reached 500,000 reflects the protracted situation they have been living in, ever since they fled from Palestine. All Palestinian new-borns from the post-*Nakba* generations remain Palestinian by identity.

⁵ UN data <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=LEBANON> (last visited 28 January 2021).

⁶ UNDESA United Nations Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml>, *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision* (last visited on 28 January 2021).

⁷ Syrian nationals are considered persons of concern or displaced, “*Nazeh*” in the Arabic terminology means “displaced”. The only people who are formally recognized as having the status of refugee in Lebanon are the born Palestinians. They are registered at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).

Iraqi nationals - an estimated 50,000 of whom arrived to Lebanon in 2007 (Leenders, 2009) - also substantially increased in size after the onset of religious turmoil in the last decade. Iraqis are only recognized as refugees by the UNHCR not by the Lebanese authorities that consider them illegal migrants (*ibidem*). They fled from persecution to reach a relatively safer Lebanon. Other top ranking nationalities are Egypt and Sri Lanka, as the basis of low skilled migrant workforce in Lebanon. Also below is the trend of migration to Lebanon as country of destination from Arab Syrian Republic, State of Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and Sri Lanka (Figure 1). The line representing Arab Syrian Republic rose sharply after the year 2010 indicating that Syrians constitute the biggest migrant population in Lebanon in comparison with the other four represented nationalities (Al Rahi, 2017).

It is noteworthy to mention that Syrian Arab Republic, State of Palestine and Iraq are entirely located within the same geographical region as Lebanon. Actually the Middle East is an ever boiling conflict zone, especially after the contested creation of the State of Israel and the induced flight of Palestinian nationals to neighbouring countries, for instance Lebanon. Indeed, earlier in 2007, the Middle East region was host to a quarter of the world's refugees, principally from Iraq (Leenders, 2009). Moreover, the Lebanese nation-state offers no political or economic guarantees to arriving migrants. Most of the settled migrants in its territory seem to be forced migrants (displaced, refugees, people of concern).

With a small surface area (10,452 km²), this less developed country had an international migrant stock of circa 34% from total population for the year 2015, with almost 33% from the international migrant stock were refugees (Syrian Arab Republic, State of Palestine and Iraq).

More than one million Syrian *de facto* refugees were living in Lebanon according to the figures of the year 2016 registered in the Population Statistics of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR)⁸. Lebanon had adhered neither to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor to its 1967 Protocol (Tabar, 2010). Furthermore, it asserted its position as a transit country or 'a layover until refugees may be resettled elsewhere' (*ibidem*). Lebanon, a country of five million people, had the highest per-capita concentration of refugees worldwide,⁹ where one person out of

⁸http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern (last visited on 28 January 2021).

⁹ The country was hosting around 1.2 million registered Syrian refugees, some 320.000 unregistered, 30.675 registered Palestinian refugees from Syria, 6.000 Iraqi refugees and nearly 280.000 refugees from Palestine (IRC and ECHO data, 2016).

four was a refugee (ECHO, 2017).¹⁰ The State operated in collaboration with UNHCR to facilitate the temporary stay of refugees through memoranda of understanding with various ministries of the Lebanese government.

During mass influx to Lebanon, the government responded to such emergencies with a “no camp policy”, namely without setting up formal refugee camps, thus avoiding a long-term allocation or a protracted situation, as with the Palestinian refugees – who still remain as one of the greatest unsolved problems of this century and one of the most unclear and less debated issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In fact, forced migration had a significant impact on the economic, political and social agendas of Lebanon as well as on the Lebanese civil society. Like other Middle Eastern States, Lebanon embraced a humanitarian-and-security-oriented approach to the refugee crisis. The humanitarian approach limited support for the incoming refugees to the provision of minimum shelter, food, healthcare and education. The security-based approach considered all refugees as potential threats to stability (Yahya, 2015).

TABLE 1

*INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK AT MID-YEAR BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FOR MIGRATION INTO LEBANON
(1990 - 2015)*

Country of origin	Year					
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Syrian Arab Republic	23,553	24,856	26,159	23,419	20,679	1,255,494
State of Palestine	389,171	428,088	467,005	498,778	530,550	515,550
Iraq	11,774	18,572	25,369	84,380	143,391	120,668
Egypt	78,308	104,377	130,459	114,723	99,001	83,312
Sri Lanka	5,054	5,965	6,876	5,382	3,887	3,271

¹⁰ European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) (2017). *Lebanon: Syria Crisis* https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/lebanon_syrian_crisis_en.pdf (last visited on 28 January 2021).




FIG. 1 — *The International Migrant Stock at mid-year by top 5 countries of origin for migration into Lebanon (1990 - 2015).*

The geographical distance from country of origin to country of destination was somewhat a key determinant to the choice of refugee population more than to that of those economically motivated, with geographical vicinity possibly explaining why a large size of Syrian nationals had chosen to flee to Lebanon as closest safe country. However, in the case of Iraq as a migrant-originating country, Iraqi migrants had a different choice. Hence we could not rely solely on the 2015 figures for Iraqis which indicated two countries of destination within the same geographical region out of the first five chosen ones (Appendix 1).

2.2- FIELD RESEARCH IN LEBANON: METHODOLOGY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

It was really challenging to conduct research in Lebanon due to several constraints. It was a relatively short period (December 2017 and mid-January 2018) to be able to establish more contact with a bigger number of Iraqis, although I was personally able to meet with fifty Iraqi individuals by filling a preliminary questionnaire written in Arabic, identifying myself as a PhD researcher which served for screening the sample.

The work was divided in two practical phases: the first one was to interview Iraqis and to observe closely their interaction with their Lebanese counterparts; and the second phase was to interview non-Iraqi people in charge of support activities provided for Iraqi households.

Filling the questionnaire with Iraqi individuals was the first step done together on the spot with the ones who agreed to take part in the study in different locations such as: Bikfaya, Fanar, Jdeideh, Sid El Bouchrieh (Matn district); Jounieh and Maameltein (Kesserwan district); and Ain El Remmaneh (Baabda district) - all districts are within Mount-Lebanon governorate. I found my interviewees at the Chaldean Eparchy Mother of Divine Mercy Centre in Sid El Bouchrieh, the Paulist Institution School rented by An-Nawras Centre part of Prodes NGO in Jounieh, and the Women Empowerment Centre of Amel Foundation in Ain El Remmaneh. In addition, I performed home visits accompanied by a nun who was in contact with Iraqi children because of the weekly catechesis and educational activity she was in charge of at the premises of the monastery of '*Sainte Famille Française*' in Fanar. She knew their families thus she served as a link in the first visits. She also introduced me to an Iraqi informant who in turn accompanied me during other visits in the area of Jdeideh and Sid El Bouchrieh. I also had another Iraqi informant whom I met through a friend working at the An-Nawras Centre project. The informant accompanied me during home visits in the aerea of Jounieh and Maameltein.

It is important to say that most of the Iraqis I met were Christians, only four out of fifty were Muslims. This was also one limitation of the field research probably due to the geographical area of the sampling which is populated mainly by Lebanese Christians.

Then as a second step, in-depth semi-structured interviews followed either on the spot after the first screening or on appointment through home visits. Using a snowball sampling technique to meet with Iraqis bearing in mind that this could produce a bias because it deals with specific segments of a community (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003), I managed to establish some sort of a trust bond which allowed me to interview twenty two individuals representing their household (out of the total fifty who filled in the preliminary questionnaire), using the interactional model of interviewing. This allowed me to extract meaningful information, characteristic of narrative practice (Holstein and Gubrium, 2016). Indeed, Eastmond reported that narratives allow ‘people themselves, as ‘experiencing subjects’, (to) make sense of violence and turbulent change’ (2007). Jacobsen and Landau asserted that ‘in-depth interviews are essentially exploratory conversations between subject and researcher’ (2003).

Most of my interviews started after several visits and establishing contact with the working staff: for the Divine Mercy Centre at least three visits during weekly working hours and for An-Nawras Centre frequent visits on Saturdays to their rented premises during children’s activities and adult language activities for participant observation in addition to attending the Christmas party there with them. I also went twice to the Women Empowerment Centre of Amel Foundation in Ain El Remmaneh. I was able to side talk with Iraqis to introduce myself as a PhD researcher and to create contact for further meetings. Once people got to familiarize with my face as a researcher, conversations were carried out smoothly. Certainly their expectations were to receive help but when I explained clearly the purpose of the study as a dissertation to conclude my doctoral university studies, some were a bit reluctant to participate in the screening questionnaire.

Home visits on appointment turned to be very effective, because people were expecting us - the informant and I in most of the cases. They even were very welcoming and offered coffee, cake, cookies, glass of water, etc... Sign of warmth and generosity of Iraqis. Arabic was used for interviewing the Iraqi respondents. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded with the exception of two as per the interviewees’ requests.

Many of the questions I asked focused on the existing social networks in the country of origin, the networks in the host country and the networks in the countries abroad. So, responses basically dwelled on the idea that Iraqis who were now living in Lebanon desire to secure a

better future to themselves and to their children, if any, in one of the countries where a next of kin had already settled through the resettlement programme or even through church, or individual or even group sponsorship for Iraqi refugee families. They precluded the thought of extending their stay in Lebanon and they absolutely expressed their refusal to return to Iraq stating that it was obvious that the country would never return to what it was one day: safe, secure and friendly to Christian minorities.

Keeping in mind that UNHCR and countries of resettlement offer limited quotas, some are advantaged while others remain in a state of endless waiting. Extended families are sometimes scattered around the world: Canada, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and even Australia. Not one brother or sister live in the same country and this is really sad. This first generation of refugee migrants experiences great difficulties because they are already uprooted and deprived of their family ties and traditional gatherings. The only way they could connect is through phone calls or internet video calls. They still can practice their own language, the only transferable cultural heritage they are able to preserve.

Unlike in the case of Iraqi refugees who had escaped to Jordan between 2009 and 2010 and who practiced 'strategic anonymity' (Arar, 2016) by carefully 'withholding information to maintain security of oneself and one's family', Iraqi refugees displaced to Lebanon were clearly using their personal information such as region of provenance and religious affiliation to claim protection and assistance.

To better understand the Iraqi situation in Lebanon, I had an official meeting with the 'Senior Resettlement Officer' and the 'Head of Field Office Mount Lebanon' at the UNHCR Beirut Office to have a clear picture about the Iraqi refugee population registered with the UNHCR. The interview was not tape-recorded and was done in English but I was allowed to take notes. I also had the chance to dialogue in Arabic with the Director of the Chaldean Eparchy Mother of Divine Mercy Centre, the Media and Communication Manager at the Chaldean Eparchy and the Iraqi Parish priest who was in charge of the religious services and who, by the way, was not a refugee. All three permitted tape-recording. I also spoke in Arabic to a member of An-Nawras Centre in Charge of the foreign language teaching activity provided to Iraqis who also allowed tape-recording. Last, I spoke with the head of the Women Empowerment Centre of

Amel Foundation at Ain El Remmaneh who preferred to speak in English but agreed on tape-recording.

After finishing all the interviews, it was clear to me that Iraqi refugees in Lebanon are in a state of waiting. The vast majority of the Iraqi interviewees expressed the will to leave for resettlement in countries where their family members had already settled. Not a single person selected the possibility to return back to Iraq. They recalled unpleasant incidents and persecution, peril, bloodshed, explosions, destruction and terror. They perceived their stay as a transitional phase which was prolonged by major countries' decisions to hold back the resettlement such as the United States and denials of access to Iraqi nationals due to the shrinking of quota allotted to them and the expansion of the quota allocated to Syrian nationals. Iraqis' narratives about the UNHCR's treatment contained a sort of resentment because they seemed to believe that their files were piled up and had been put aside to leave room for Syrian resettlement cases. Iraqi families living in Lebanon feared of the prolonged waiting time which could leave them hanging on a thin line, thus causing irreversible transformation in the family dynamics with children becoming breadwinners and unemployed parents leading to some sort of a threatened parental authority.

2.3- NON-IRAQI ACCOUNTS ON IRAQIS' CAPITALS AT PLAY IN THE LEBANESE FIELD

In the following, I collected some excerpts from the interviews I performed with Non-Iraqis directly involved with Iraqi migrant population in Lebanon. The excerpts refer to the various forms of Iraqi migrant capitals engaged in the Lebanese national field and the degree of involvement of these capitals in the relative Lebanese sub-fields as shown below.

2.3.1- An-Nawras representative:

The quotation of An-Nawras representative is a clear statement of how Iraqis' employ their acquired social capital in Lebanon and their existing social capital abroad to add on to their linguistic capital a language useful when their desire to leave Lebanon becomes actualized. This

could be seen as a strategy to improve their chances of travelling abroad once they are allowed to leave:

“(…) Father (…), parishioner of Saint Helen and Constantine Melkite church in Jounieh, gave us a list of all the families including the number of children they have and their current addresses. The visits served for moral support and friendship not for financial assistance (…). The idea of giving free basic language courses emerged during those visits when Iraqi households expressed their intention to travel abroad to join family mainly in Australia, Canada (…) but they were not language proficient enough since Iraqi adults had gotten their education essentially in Arabic back in Iraq. Children instead were able to learn foreign languages at school in Lebanon (…) scheduled the courses for Saturdays. Classes were divided in levels advanced, intermediate and beginner for both English and French languages according to the language proficiency of the attendees. Lessons were given exclusively for adults while children followed catechesis (…)”

2.3.2- UNHCR Officers:

In UNHCR’s Senior Resettlement Officer and Head of Field Office Mount Lebanon’s statements, it seemed clear that Iraqis’ economic capital served to enter Lebanon legally but once they used up their savings and overstayed their entry visa, they remained unprotected. However their religious capital - in this case we are talking about Iraqi Christian minorities - constituted some sort of protection and guarantee for them not to get in trouble with the Lebanese authorities. In other words, their original religious capital matches strategically with one of the many religious fields existing in the Lebanese national field. So in some way although they are not integrated in the Lebanese society they are still shielded by their religious affiliation:

“(…) Majority are documented and have entered legally (…) Iraqi refugees are less vulnerable in terms of socio-economic vulnerability (…) but more vulnerable in terms of protection (…) Iraqis are unable to unite amongst themselves, they have issues of distrust. There are no community leaders between refugees since there is difficulty in communication through leadership. They always lived in an urban situation. They have political religious affiliations. The background of the majority is Christian. They come from religious minorities because of the religious make-up of Lebanon (…)”

The important Iraqi social capital embodied in networks of kinship and friendship abroad was weakened by new immigration policies in some major receiving States as the UNHCR officials explain in the following:

“(…) Iraqis arrived in substantial numbers (to Lebanon) starting from the year 2007 and the large majority left to the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other European countries. In Canada and Australia, the private sponsorship programme worked during 2009 and 2010 but the numbers significantly decreased due to quotas. Quotas are shrinking since the election of Trump in the US. Australia as well has been shrinking the sponsorship programme. There is discontent because of the quota shrinking and UNHCR cannot process cases. On a yearly basis, UNHCR sets the global resettlement needs in collaboration with countries (...) Iraqis were hit hard by the new US policy on resettlement. There are smaller quotas for Iraqis. Sometimes they express an absolute refusal to travel to other countries because of the hope of reaching mainly the US.”

In addition to the limited resettlement options for Iraqis, they seem to have recourse to their social capital abroad through pre-existing social networks in third countries although the networks' efficiency had relatively decreased as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless they had never stopped trying because their goal was to higher their chances of settling in a foreign country as noted in the account of UNHCR's officer:

“UNHCR does counselling to Iraqis who protest and express their discontent whenever there are problems in resettlement to explain what the reality is. Resettlement is not a guarantee (...) The Iraqis put their eggs in more than one basket, in other words, they continue with resettlement programme but find other opportunities also like private sponsorship to Canada or Australia. (...) Their options are very minimal. The voluntary return, maybe, is happening but with no UNHCR involvement (...)”.

2.3.3- Director of MDMC:

The following quotation from the Director of the Chaldean Eparchy Mother of Divine Mercy Centre in Sid El Bouchrieh contains some interesting information regarding the positive role of Iraqi religious capital - Christian faith - intertwining with the social capital consisting of the connections they built with each other practically through living in the same neighbourhood and with their relations with Lebanese 'Chaldean' Christians, essentially based on receiving numerous types of assistance. Here again the religious capital determines the strategy adopted in making valuable linkages with people sharing the same religious background belonging to the Lebanese national field without necessarily having Iraqis as active players in the field:

“In July 2015, Archbishop (...) inaugurated the centre “Mother of Divine Mercy”. Its mission focuses on registration and assistance of Iraqi refugees (...) from 9.30am till 1pm on weekdays, and

weekends off. (...) Actually, a substantial number of Iraqis are mainly concentrated in Sid El Bouchrieh, Jdeideh and Dekwaneh. (...) Each family has a unique file number written on a blue card. Each family member receives personal medical assistance, while food assistance is given per family. The social assistance is assessed on a case basis for instance if there are multiple disabilities in the family, each disabled person receives individual assistance. As medical assistance, we pay a threshold of {...} US dollars coverage for medication per month at an authorised pharmacy and we also pay a threshold of {...} US dollars for Laboratory and Radiology tests (...) In other words, Iraqis registered in our centre receive an official paper from us to get the medication or to have blood tests or other. The beneficiaries are registered Iraqi Christians. Registration in our centre is open for all Christian Iraqis adding to Chaldeans we accept Syriac Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Assyrians, Armenians, Protestants, Latin Catholics. Once registered, they receive a file number and a blue card and thus can access all the services (...)"

With regards to their situation of unlawfulness in the Lebanese society, the Director of the centre explained that, legally speaking, Iraqis had overstayed their visas thus they might be at risk of detention but the Chaldean Catholic Church provided some sort of immunity or protection for Iraqis. Here again I highlight the contradictory game of inclusion and exclusion in the Lebanese national field and I stress on the positive role played by their religious capital as a guarantor for protection against involuntary repatriation. Iraqis are not positioned as insiders in the Lebanese national field by their own choice but they are not entirely excluded from it. Their religious capital again strengthens their situation even though it is marginal as in the excerpt below:

"(...) It is difficult to collaborate with the Lebanese government since it does not recognize Iraqis as refugees because they did not cross land border. They entered Lebanon through the airport then they overstayed their two month-tourist visas. So they are considered illegal residents. (...) If Iraqis were to be arrested and detained they could be deported. In early 2015, there were reported cases of extradition. Therefore, we made an informal deal with the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security to stop deportation. They cannot obtain a legal residence permit because it would cancel their refugee status recognition at the UNHCR. We tried to collaborate with the UNHCR, but it turned out to be really difficult to work together since the UN Refugee Agency has its own agenda and has different priorities than ours. (...)"

In addition to the so called deal with the Lebanese Government, there seems to be an interesting collaboration between the Churches of Christian minorities in Lebanon as an

inclusionary process for those Iraqi families staying loyal to their faith. I underline here the importance of their religious capital as a necessary condition to receive aid:

“(...) We have established an unofficial agreement between churches to cooperate indirectly in helping the Iraqi families (...)”

Now for Iraqi Chaldeans only, the church somehow controls their entry and their exit from Lebanon since it dispenses all the necessary documents related to their religious affiliation. Therefore the religious capital in this case is crucial in the Iraqi Chaldeans’ future movements whether abroad or back to Iraq, as stated below:

“(...) Usually, Chaldeans refer to their church. If they are sick or detained or expelled, we are informed. They also need their church documents whenever they are about to travel. We provide the authentication of religious certificates with the official seal of the Eparchy: baptism, celibacy, marriage... Normally, when a Chaldean resides in a given country for a period exceeding six months, he follows the Eparchy of the country where he is currently living. So if any Chaldean Iraqi wants to leave Lebanon after two years, he needs to authenticate his church documents to submit them in another Eparchy in a different country. For instance, some Iraqis returned to Iraq without notifying us themselves, nevertheless we were informed by the Eparchy in Iraq... Iraqi Chaldeans who are enrolled in the Resettlement programme of UNHCR always inform us about their travel plans (...)”

On the chances of increasing their economic capital in Lebanon, I noticed from the account of the Director of the centre that Iraqi families suffer from scarce employment opportunities and from an irreversible transformation in the breadwinning role traditionally assumed to be for the man in the family, the father, especially in the Iraqi patriarchal society. Here, changes penetrate as well the cultural capital because the parental authority is somewhat distorted as the narrative conveys below:

“(...) Children between thirteen and eighteen are not going to school because they are working. We face the problem of Iraqi child labour since most of the parents over forty years of age are unemployed. Iraqi refugees above forty cannot access the Lebanese labour market: females have more chances to work as shop-sellers or as craft-workers than males who in turn suffer from unemployment in 99% of the cases. The male working age category is between thirteen and thirty-seven approximately. Conflicts between parents and their children are increasing because of employment opportunities; while the mother and father are staying at home, children are becoming breadwinners. The patriarchal society that once existed in Iraq in terms of economic subsistence has completely

disappeared in Lebanon. This is an important change in the family dynamics which should not be neglected (...)"

Another aspect relative to the economic capital is the prevalence of the former over the religious capital ready to convert due to the protracted situation of being a refugee in a problematic country like Lebanon. Indeed, if Lebanese nationals already suffer a great deal from the lack of services and from unemployment, then the Iraqi subsistence strategy could be legitimate to some extent. In the following quotation I draw attention on how important assistance is for Iraqi refugees and here I mean not only food but also cash:

"(...) There is even a change in terms of religious belonging due to this prolonged refugee situation. The number of Iraqi refugees who were attracted by Evangelical churches has tripled since the latter offer them more assistance. We have noticed that Iraqis coming to the centre sometimes call our priest 'Pastor' instead of 'Father', because they seem to have gained this from frequently going to the Protestant churches... However, there are Neo-Evangelical Churches scattered in the streets of Beirut financed from the United States. These are not even recognized by the Lebanese government, I call them 'shops'; they seem to attract Iraqi people more because they offer a lot of assistance mainly cash (...) Numerous Neo-Evangelical churches gain the children by paying to the parents. That is their marketing strategy (...)"

Now turning to the element of instability in the Iraqi lives in Lebanon, here is a fine example of why Iraqi refugees never engage in long term activities because they are in a state of waiting to travel as the quotation of the Director of the centre shows:

"(...) We had tried earlier handicraft activities but Iraqi women do not enrol in long-term projects because their life is unstable. Most of them change houses and jobs frequently. For example, if we propose an English language course for one month a lot of Iraqis would enrol but if we propose another course with a three-month duration there would be less people interested. They are afraid of committing in long-term activities because they are in a state of waiting. They never know when they are going to receive the call to travel. Their children are sometimes not going to school because of this 'waiting to travel' situation. Therefore children started working instead of learning at school which constitutes somehow a form of commitment (...)"

This last extract from the interview with the Director of the centre is about the enhancement of Iraqi professional skills that could be inserted under the realm of cultural capital as self-improvement perhaps efficient in the Lebanese job market and probably transferable once abroad:

“(…) We are working in collaboration with AVSI Foundation (Associazione Volontari Servizio Internazionale), IOCC (International Orthodox Christian Charities) and IBC (International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation) which provide vocational training programmes: hairdressing, other (…). We only advertise these programmes upon request from these organisations. Through the communication on our Facebook page, Iraqi people can contact them directly. For example, we received a call today that there is still place for five people in a computer training course. These vocational trainings are free and open to all, refugees and host community. They are usually addressed to people between fifteen and thirty-five years of age. People who work in day time can benefit from the evening courses between 6pm and 8pm. While the morning courses are addressed to unemployed persons. We always receive reports from those organisations regarding the participation of Iraqis in the vocational trainings.”

2.3.4- Head of Amel’s WEC:

I now turn to a citation from the interview performed with the Head of Amel’s Women Empowerment Centre in Ain El Remmaneh where social cohesion between Iraqi and non-Iraqi women is highlighted as an important asset of the centre’s mission:

“(…) We started working from 2007 with Iraqi refugees because of the need for humanitarian work. In 2011, we got a project for Syrian refugees also due to the crisis. Now we accept from all nationalities since ‘Amel’ (Foundation) is non-sectarian. We have also Lebanese who are part of the host community and we should accept them. This is how we encourage the social cohesion and building relations between refugees and the host community (…).”

As the title shows the centre’s projects aim to encourage Iraqi women refugees along with other women to gain a skill that enables them to be productive and autonomous, thus enhancing their cultural capital which in turn could influence positively on their economic capital. These quotations below give detailed ideas about practical ways to do so:

“(…) We provide women empowerment project of vocational training language classes: Arabic literacy class, English (…), and computer learning (…), and life skills: hairdressing, make-up, nails, recycling, accessories, patch work, sewing, crochet, embroidery (…).”

“(…) Here everyone helps everyone else. In other words, each class completes the other. For example, one class makes a crochet on a pillow, the sewing class then finishes the job. They complete each other to have an item. Accessories have a line called “Man hiya: who is she?” formed by a group

of ladies or 'production group' working together to make accessories such as scarves, bags, clutches and sometimes aprons. Then we send those items to the shop of "Minna: from us" at Amel's headquarters. Every three months, they get a small incentive as an encouragement (...)"

"(...) We also have a catering group from people in the cooking class who have gained good skills. We make catering and get orders mainly for trainings, we prepare breakfast and lunch breaks. Catering is occasional (...) We try to help the ladies in need to have money attending here in the centre through participating in the production group or in the catering group if they are able to cook and follow me as head of catering. So if we have catering for certain training, the money received is distributed to the ladies after paying the fixed costs. It is a form of cash; sometimes they get paid more than {...} Lebanese pounds on a weekly basis. It is not because they are refugees that they should be paid around {...} Lebanese pounds, no we do not use such a policy with them. They get paid really well on daily basis for catering (...) When we started to have catering twice per week and sometimes they received more than {...} US dollars in a month, even in their lifetime they never had one penny, they started to tell that it is the first time we feel we are standing next to our men. Actually one of them told me 'now I am feeling that I gained the respect of my husband, as simple as that, and we were thinking to go back to the land although the situation is still bad, I feel I am doing something' (here the nationality of the woman refugee is not specified) (...) This is the way we work in this centre to make women here 'income generators' through their skills (...)"

Since the Lebanese society is hosting refugees from multiple nationalities, this does not mean that all refugees think or behave the same. Indeed the cultural capital is specific to every population and it can even change within the same nation because of the dynamic relations that exist between the various forms of capital. For instance Iraqi Christians have a different religious capital than Iraqi Muslims, thus there might be as well a different cultural capital or even a completely different linguistic capital for instance. In this extract of the interview with the Head of the Women Empowerment Centre I notice clearly the perception of the dissimilarity of cultural capitals between refugees as follows:

"(...) Iraqi society is much different than Syrian society. Iraqis have knowledge and university education; they have birth control. In other words, most of Iraqis who are refugees here have two, three or maximum four children (...)"

"(...) Some of the Iraqi ladies got married with Lebanese men and entered to the Lebanese society. Their situation is never the same. For example, they do not find jobs because they do not have residency papers. Most of them are graduates from university (...)"

2.3.5- Priest at MDMC:

Exceptionally, the priest I interviewed is Iraqi from Baghdad. He is in Lebanon for study purposes and is appointed by the Lebanese Chaldean Church to support Iraqi refugees spiritually. Thus I inserted the excerpt under the non-Iraqi accounts. Here again the Iraqi religious capital works in favour for their presence in the Lebanese society, granting them access to freely practice their Christian faith in Lebanese churches as shown below:

“(…) The spiritual needs of Iraqi families are the same needs as any faithful Christian. Nevertheless, their needs are more psychological than spiritual emerging from the state of waiting, the blurry situation they are living in and the economic difficulties in Lebanon, causing problems within the families and affecting their spiritual life (...) {...} we do not have our own Chaldean church here in this area. Our Archbishop agreed with the Melkite Archbishop and the parish priest to allow us to use the Greek Catholic church of Saint Elias in Dekwaneh (...) On a personal level, my work is really limited. Nevertheless, the Eparchy offers a lot to the Iraqis in addition to the numerous associations and organizations assisting Iraqi families.”

2.3.6- MDMC Media and Communication Manager:

The last interview I had with a non-Iraqi informant was with the Media and Communication Manager of the Chaldean Eparchy of Beirut. From the citations below, Iraqi religious capital positions Iraqi migrants in a marginal protected sphere on the edges of the Lebanese national field due to their belonging to an ethnic and religious minority group and due to the already known restrictions of the country regarding hosting refugees:

“(…)We use our Facebook page “Chaldean Parish of Saint Joseph-Lebanon/Mother of Divine Mercy Centre” addressed to Iraqi refugees exclusively and specialized in advertisements only. Iraqis have in possession numbered cards therefore they follow the news on our page concerning services available in our centre. Ads include the service provided on a specific date and chosen numbers to benefit from that service on that day: distribution of food boxes, cash assistance for rent, reception for medical file assistance (...)

(...) We use the WhatsApp messaging for the cash assistance for rent. We also use speed dial and SMS messaging sometimes. We respond as well to messages of Iraqis on our Facebook page “Chaldean Parish of Saint Joseph-Lebanon/Mother of Divine Mercy Centre”. We also have a Hotline 24 over 24 so that Iraqis who encounter problems or get detained could urgently contact us (...)

(...) UNHCR would not register an Iraqi as a refugee if he is in possession of a legal residence permit in Lebanon. Iraqis consider Lebanon as a transit country. They cannot stay first because they do not want to stay; second this country does not grant asylum; third, they face a lot of economic difficulties here. If an Iraqi really wants to stay in Lebanon he should get a legal residence (...)

(...) We have Mr (...) delegated by the Eparchy to follow Iraqi cases of detention or other issues regarding illegality. He retired from working at the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security a while ago. He is a Lebanese Chaldean. He is a volunteer. He helps Iraqis according to the reason of detention. If it is a legal residence issue, (...) strives to get them out within three to fifteen days depending when we were informed about the detention. However, if it is a theft, the Iraqi should serve the sentence (...)

(...) We try to ease their situation here in Lebanon as much as possible because we have limited resources and we cannot give full assistance. In the end, the Chaldean Church in Lebanon is really small therefore we work on specific projects (...)."

2.4- IRAQI MIGRANTS' ACCOUNTS ON CAPITALS AT PLAY IN THE LEBANESE FIELD

All accounts are parts of the semi-structured interviews performed with Iraqi respondents in Mount-Lebanon region. The below selected paragraphs are most pertinent to the purposes of the research. The letters used here have nothing to do with the initials of my interviewees, for instance A is the first letter of the alphabet and L stands for Lebanon. I was careful not to give specific details regarding age and specific religious confession as well as village or city names back in Iraq to safeguard the principle of anonymity. It is relevant to say that my interlocutors were mostly women, perhaps due to the facts that I conducted the vast majority of my meetings at their homes and that, being a female myself, women were more prone to talk to me than men, given that the latter were in some cases not physically present at the moment of the interview.

2.4.1- Lady AL:

The extract below is from an interview with a young Iraqi Christian woman, married with two kids. She was a teacher in her home country. Her husband's cultural capital as teacher back in Iraq was operationalized into economic capital while still there. But now in Lebanon both

cultural capitals, his and hers are undervalued and cannot convert to economic capital thus they are living in economic hardship due to the exclusionary process in the Lebanese formal employment sector in education:

“(...) The boy only goes to school. The girl cannot go because of our economic situation. The schools are really expensive here (...) I teach her at home on a daily basis. I follow my own programme. I taught her letters and words in Arabic, French and in English. She knows a lot. We are registered as refugees at the UNHCR with my children and sister... I tried to find work myself but I didn't find any or the work offered to me is not suitable for me because I am asked to stay till 5 or 6pm and my son gets out from school at 3pm (...) My husband was a teacher in Iraq, he used to send us money to live and to pay the rent. When my husband first came with us he didn't claim asylum at the UNHCR so he could travel to Iraq and come back to Lebanon freely. This month he came to Lebanon and asked for asylum but now he is trying to find work so he could stay with the children here (...) I miss teaching because I really like working with children. I didn't find any work as a teacher here (...) We are tired of waiting here in Lebanon and from the delay in processing our application. We are facing difficult living conditions. We are searching for a cheaper apartment to rent (...) so all our money goes to pay the rent (...) I prefer to live with my children in security and away from explosions. I thank God, although we are living in difficult economic conditions here in Lebanon, at least it is a secure country (...)”

When talking about her family, she mapped where her siblings' countries of settlement are so to potentiate her social capital through social networks abroad but not inside Lebanon. This constitutes an implicit motivation to plan for a future travel abroad so they could join family members and secure a better life for themselves and for their children, as in the following excerpts:

“(...) My sister here with me is single. One sister is a nun in Australia, she is not a refugee. One sister is married in USA as refugee. One sister is in Denmark with her family as refugee. I have a sister with her family in Germany as refugee. I have a brother with his family as refugee in Finland. And two brothers in Iraq, one married and one not married; they live in (...) (Central Iraq); they are employees. Every two months they take some days off and go visit my father in Northern Iraq. They came to Lebanon multiple times. They are waiting for retirement. They are employees in the public sector. They have had many years of service. So they are waiting a couple more years to leave and to claim for asylum. My father is 75 years-old. Now he is not working anymore. Three years ago he used to work in the land. We talk to my father on a daily basis through phone calls. (...)”

(...) My sisters who are refugees abroad and my brother who lives in Finland as a refugee were resettled through the UNHCR (office) in Jordan. One of my sisters spent seven or eight years in Jordan before resettlement, and the others four to five years, and another sister seven years until they were accepted in the resettlement programme. (...) We are always in contact through phone calls on a daily basis. (...) We also use video calls over the internet. I hope we could travel to Australia to join my sister who is a nun there, although now the possibility to travel to Australia has been withheld. Whenever we arrive there I would like to continue with higher education to find something suitable for me to work. I do not want to work in whatever is available because I like studying a lot. Once there, I will register in a university or a school. My sister, the nun in Australia, is sponsoring us to join her there. But now Australia has stopped even the sponsorship programme. We are not enrolled in the UNHCR resettlement programme until today. We still hope to go to Australia because we do not want to go anywhere but there, God willing (...) We prefer to go to Australia where they value people and the children can be raised well and go to good schools while in Iraq there is no satisfactory education, it is all false (...)"

The religious capital of this woman is the only form of capital empowering her, even though she remains on the margins of the Lebanese national field in the quote that follows:

(...) I am really satisfied here in Lebanon at least in terms of praying, thank God. In Iraq, just after five minutes from entering the church, we start hearing voices and we get frightened or worried that they might enter or blow us. There is always a situation of fear and terror. We cannot practice our rituals adequately (...) Here in Lebanon, thank God, my children participate in the religious group for children 'Fersan Al Azraa' (Knights of the Virgin Mary) at Saint Anthony's church and I go to the church of Saint Rita close by on a daily basis; I am really persistent in prayer and I am a member in the Immaculate Conception fraternity (...)"

2.4.2- Lady BL:

Now this is another young Iraqi Christian woman, also married with two kids. She narrates below how they used their economic capital to reach Lebanon and got advice from her family who had arrived earlier. It is noteworthy to say that bonding social capital in this case played a major role upon their arrival. She also mentioned that their religious capital could assist them somehow in the Lebanese national field:

“(...) we booked tickets to Lebanon then travelled from the (...) airport to the airport of Lebanon. We did not have any money in our pockets; I only had golden jewellery that I had to sell to buy the tickets to Lebanon and we had very little money left. So we decided to travel to Lebanon because it is a Christian country and we heard from members of my family who arrived to Lebanon before us that

there are work opportunities so we could be able to work and support ourselves. We (herself with husband and two children) stayed with my family (her brother and wife, sister, other brother and mother) who already had rented an apartment here in Lebanon. We used to pay altogether {...} US dollars adding expenses the amount would reach {...} US dollars that we divide between us so we could pay. The apartment was big enough. (...) We stayed together for more than a year and a half (...)

Regarding her social networking with Lebanese people, she showed that it was not so successful in enhancing their economic capital due to some limitations imposed by the informal employment sector in Lebanon:

(...) I have Lebanese friends. Some Lebanese are very good and some are very bad. The problem with work opportunities here is the long shifts and the low wages. A year and a half ago, I was working in bakery for 'Mana'ish' (...), so the last month I was working there they did not pay me my salary. I was moving with my husband who found a job as a janitor in a building. Now after nearly two years, I once went to claim for the salary they did not give me the money. They are good people but I am ashamed of going to ask again about the money, so I will forget about it (...)

When listing her options to stay in Lebanon, to return to Iraq or to move abroad, she intentionally put the blame on her religious capital which in this case is viewed as an impediment for resettlement possibilities through the UNHCR official channel. This quotation marks the aforementioned statement as follows:

(...) We do not want to return to Iraq unless we would be already settled in the US or in Canada; we would only go to visit Iraq and see our relatives, but to live in Iraq it is out of the question. My husband and I lost hope from travelling with the UNHCR because yesterday some Iraqis went to renew their papers, the officers told them not to come back anymore because there is nothing available for Iraqis. (...) We do not know what reasons are behind that. They say no country is ready to receive us, Iraqi Christians, is that possible? We thought that it might be because of our own religious leaders; they go to Australia, Canada and the US and say that the Iraqi Christian refugees should not immigrate; they need to go back to their country because they are indigenous. Then what's the benefit from being indigenous if we cannot live in security? Why should we go back to Iraq when we are already living in difficult conditions here in Lebanon? (...) The church does not really help or offers very little assistance. The only good assistance we are getting is from the Arabic Evangelical Church "Jesus Light of the World" every two months. Our own church helps us every four months with a food box half of it is not eatable because the items are in a bad condition so we throw them away. It is very hard for us to stay in Lebanon (...)."

2.4.3- Lady CL:

The following excerpt is from an old Iraqi Christian lady. She was widowed during Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. One of her sons arrived to Lebanon in an earlier phase and so she and her other children followed tail later on in the same year 2014. Basically, the initial family's economic capital (Iraqi state monthly allowance and jewellery) with the exception of the abandoned house in Iraq, although put a play in the Lebanese national field, is not sufficient enough to survive the regretful living conditions they face in Lebanon. So her son had to find a low paid job to regenerate some extra economic capital. She somehow managed to create some friendly connections with their Lebanese neighbours. Nevertheless, another important capital at play is kinship ties abroad to push towards leaving Lebanon. Indeed, her first son who preceded them in coming to Lebanon travelled with his family to Australia and joined his maternal aunt already there:

“(...) We are not comfortable and we are facing difficult conditions. I am from Nineveh Valley from (...) district from the village of (...). I came to Lebanon with my daughter and son. I am a widow. My husband was a martyr, it has been thirty years he's dead during the war between Iraq and Iran in 1987 (...) my other son was here before us with his family (...). My son (the one who came with her) got married here in Lebanon with an Iraqi girl (...) we are registered in UNHCR and our file is being reviewed for resettlement. We would like to travel abroad because I have practically nobody there (in Iraq). I had a house there; it is still there. It was not completely destroyed but emptied from furniture even the doors were removed, so now it is abandoned (...) My son works here in Lebanon and receives from {...} to {...} US dollars monthly it depends if he works overtime (...). It is really hard to live here. I had golden jewellery which I had to sell to live decently. We do not receive any cash assistance (from Lebanon). We pay the rent from the money I got from selling my jewellery and from the money I still receive every two months {...} US dollars as allowance (from Iraq) for my late husband who was a martyr. But I need to pay my medication because I had an open heart surgery here in Lebanon. I have good relations with Lebanese people in the neighbourhood where we live. We talk to them regularly (...) my son who is married travelled to Australia and we want to go to Australia to join him and my sister who is there too.”

2.4.4- Lady DL:

The following account is from an Iraqi Christian old lady living with her son and wife along with their two children, in Lebanon since autumn 2014. The meeting was held in the

presence of her son and her daughter-in-law. The lady is separated from her husband many years ago. According to her story, he was still living in Central Iraq with his sister at the time of the interview. She actually suffered a brain stroke years ago thus had some speech difficulties. Therefore, her son was sometimes responding on her behalf. After more than a year, they followed her married daughter with her family who came and settled in Lebanon. This family's religious capital is variegated since each member belongs to a different confession from the Christian minorities of Iraq.

Connections with relatives in Iraq still exist, aside her ex-husband, especially with her sister and family in Central Iraq. Nevertheless, she also has family connections abroad scattered in many areas of the world. She and her family temporarily settled in Lebanon for quite some time now, so their original economic capital (mainly savings) is depleted. Hence, her son had to find work to support the family. Although they receive assistance from two different churches, it is never enough to cover their needs. Here, the convertibility of the religious capital into a form of economic capital was possible but not sufficient. In terms of employment, the son's cultural capital (education in Iraq) did not provide him with a better paid job in Lebanon. Rather it was his religious capital (being a member of the Focolari Movement) which worked in his favour to find an income-generating job in pastry making.

“(…) My daughter and family were here before us, (the husband) working as a janitor in the town of Rabweh (Lebanon). They had arrived a year and 10 months before us (….) I am (Christian confession 1), my son is (Christian confession 2). (….) His wife is (Christian confession 3). I am separated from my husband since 1990. He still lives in (….) (Central Iraq) with his sister but in another zone where he is not threatened. Our relation with him is weak. We only talk with each other once a year. My sister and her family are still living in (….) (Central Iraq) and they live in constant fear. Our house was hit by an explosive in 2010 and was partly destroyed and the glass was completely crushed. My son's car was also damaged metal and glass. Also our rooftop was targeted by a missile. It has been 3 years and 2 months that we are in Lebanon (….) my nephews (her sister's children) and my other nephews (her brothers' children) live abroad spread between Australia, Germany and Jordan. My brother has been living in the US for forty years now (….) my house is still there (in Iraq) but it is abandoned in the hands of the terrorists (….) my daughter and her husband travelled to Lebanon and from Lebanon they went to the US (….)

(….) My son makes pastry at IRAP (Institut de Rééducation Audio-Phonétique) in Ain Aar (….) He commutes by bus to his work. The salary is acceptable. We used our savings which are now

depleted. So he pays the rent. Sometimes we borrow money and have debts to pay to cover the other expenses. Cash assistance is very little from Mother of Divine Mercy Centre and Food assistance is also very little from the (...) church (...) we carry a blue card from the church *Tashil Amr* (Laissez passer) from the (...) Eparchy in Bouchrieh (...) My son back in Iraq used to work as a public sector employee in repairing medical equipment both mechanical and electronic. He also was a catechist in the church and member of the Focolari Movement (...), the director of IRAP recruited my son this year. She is a member in the Focolari movement too. He used to work as a janitor in Rabweh then a transporter in a company in Mansourieh for two years but had a problem with his back. He is a graduate from the medical technical institute (...) my son does not want to rely on anyone and burden anybody. He has a good serious relation with his colleagues at work as if they were family (...).”

2.4.5- Lady EL:

This excerpt describes the different forms of capital used by a young Iraqi Christian separated woman who was waiting for resettlement through UNHCR at the time of the interview. She had been living in Lebanon since autumn 2013. Although the resettlement country chosen by UNHCR for her is not where her family or friends networks are established, she believes that her religious capital would contribute to making her settle in the US and at a later stage find some work. Because of her prolonged stay in Lebanon she was able to develop local connections with few Lebanese people. She still has a sister back in Iraq but not for long, as she expects, due to the harsh reality for Christian minorities in Central Iraq. To enhance her economic capital, she found a low skilled work in the informal sector to provide for her daily necessities.

“(...) I have a sister and a brother in Canada, and another brother in Australia, all refugees. I am registered at the UNHCR and was selected for the resettlement programme to go to the US. I still have one final interview to start the process (...) I have one dear friend in Canada and we are always in contact. I would like to reach the US, lead a stable life, learn the language and find work. I agree to go to the US because I had the choice to say yes or no, nothing is compulsory. I have Lebanese friends especially my neighbours and my colleagues here at work. I have been living in Lebanon for 4 years and 4 months. (...) I am here with my sister and her family and we are registered at the UNHCR and all the others are abroad. Each has a different file at UNHCR. All relatives have left Iraq, and if there were still some they would be counted on fingers. (...) My sister lives in (...) (Central Iraq) and life over there is really hard: you cannot go out freely; you cannot go to the market; you cannot go to work; you cannot go to church feeling at ease (...)

(...) Traditional feasts and social gatherings are the same, that's what my siblings abroad tell me, praise be to God. Losing the land does not have a major impact because all the people we used to know and our relatives are already abroad and there are churches exclusively for Iraqis having an Iraqi priest and the holy mass is celebrated in Iraqi (...) I am working in Lebanon so I can survive. My situation is not legal in Lebanon. Nevertheless, if you stay away from trouble, you do not have to deal with the Lebanese authorities nor with the General Security. I hold a card from the (...) Eparchy. When I first arrived to Lebanon there were more opportunities to work for everybody, but after the invasion of ISIS many people fled to Lebanon so it became harder to find work. Even if you find work, it is not the way you expect it to be. It is hard. Where we live all the Lebanese like us and they do not make us feel different and even here at work (...).”

2.4.6- Lady FL:

In the below quotation the interviewee is an Iraqi Muslim married woman who arrived to Lebanon in 2005 through crossing land borders with Syria. Her story is quite different from other women respondents who in most cases arrived to Lebanon starting late 2013. On one hand, to arrive to Lebanon she had to rely on her father's contacts in Lebanon. On the other hand, she had to renounce on her traditional role as an Iraqi conservative wife, thus her cultural capital was due to change over time although she was still religiously and officially attached to her husband, but only on paper as it shows from her narrative. She somehow described the Lebanese society as a much more tolerant society with respect to freedom of women. She was able to generate income through working, in addition to the financial support she obtained from her family members. Her protracted situation as a refugee is partly due to her unresolved social status as she explained in the extract below. Nevertheless, she expressed a satisfactory relative integration within the Lebanese national field, even if her position as a refugee keeps her at the margins of the Lebanese social field. When it comes to her children, she certainly encourages them to travel outside Lebanon to secure a better future:

“(...) I left Iraq and stayed in Syria for six months but I could not tolerate living there so I came to Lebanon through smuggling via van (...) My father's friend (in Lebanon) had prepared for us a cheap apartment to live in, with my children (...) I was born and raised in a society where women cannot work and it was difficult, not from my own family but from my husband. I got married in Iraq and I was allowed neither to continue studying at the university nor to work (...) I feel satisfied here in Lebanon, praise be to God, all is well. (...) My father is wealthy; he has a house and a factory. He currently sends me money to survive here. About my husband, (...), I was not supposed to leave Iraq

but I left Iraq because my elder son got kidnapped (...) they asked for {...} US dollars as ransom. We provided the money on the same day and got our son back but I could not stay in the house anymore. My father asked me to stay and told me that he would employ a guardian to guarantee our security. I simply wanted to leave because I had had an abortion prior to my first child so I was not ready to lose any of my sons. My husband did not accept. He totally refused to leave because he had his work and house. But finally I convinced him that I would go to Syria. In Syria, I felt much discriminated although I was spending my money and had my own stuff with me. (...)

(...) My father advised me to go to Beirut because it is a nice city and people are good there. My father used to come to Bhamdoun and Aley like many Iraqis did and he had friends there. My husband did not accept (...) he said he cannot join us. So I came to Beirut, but from that moment on, my husband and I are not separated but each one is living his own life. I do not contact him now that he might be married to another. He did not want to divorce me. Even if I get a divorce from him, I will never get married again. My sons meet him because he now comes here ever since Iraqis got the possibility to have a two months visa to Lebanon. My sons are ok with this arrangement (...). The UNHCR told me that I should get a divorce to be able to travel but my husband did not accept. My situation is on hold because, although I am registered at the UNHCR, my marital status is not allowing me to go ahead with the travel plans. My husband currently lives in Iraq. I heard rumours that he is married to a Syrian woman but I cannot believe everything I hear (...) it is impossible for my sons to go back to Iraq. I would rather feed them onion and bread here than take them back there. First, the Iraq I left years ago is not the same Iraq as today, it is really backward (...) I cannot take my children back there after being taught in highly renowned schools and universities (...)

(...) I started with a little job and now I have different tasks to do. The salary I get helps paying my expenses (...) I volunteered at the UNHCR as officer to meet with Iraqi refugees and report their cases to the UNHCR. I receive little money for that service. So my time is full. My brother in Germany helped me in paying the education fees for my elder son. And my father helped me a lot too. I have Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi friends and they are really helpful. Some have already left Lebanon. We keep good contact with each other (...) even if go to Iraq I would have friends there; my old friends at school back in Iraq still keep contact with me. The only concern (preventing her) from getting back to Iraq is the sake of my sons. Wherever I go it is for the sake of my children (...) my sister in England does not go to Iraq because her husband does not let her (...) She left to England during the Gulf war in 1991. Her husband was really brilliant in his university and was threatened of being killed by Saddam regime. So they escaped to Jordan and then travelled to England not as refugees. Now he is a hospital director in England. I connect with my family through phone calls, social media and Skype. I have not seen my family face to face since 2005. Nothing can substitute meeting them in person (...) What really hurts me is that my mother passed away and I was not able to see her and that I cannot see my father because he is sick and he cannot move (...) We are ten girls

and three boys. I have two brothers in Germany, one sister in England and the others are all in Iraq (...).”

2.4.7- Man AL:

This young Iraqi Muslim man from Central Iraq arrived in 2014. He was single at the time of the interview. Surprisingly, unlike all other interviewees, he expressed his desire to stay in Lebanon though he was aware that it is impossible to apply for asylum in the Lebanese State. He extended his personal connections with Lebanese counterparts in the hope of increasing his chances in staying. He enhanced both his cultural and economic capitals through getting involved in a number of jobs to make money but also to add on to his skills:

“(...) Everything was ok in Iraq except for one thing: there was no moral support and no motivation for me to succeed. Life was fine, I had work, education and good social relations. Nevertheless, I took the risk because for me what was missing was a person to motivate me and to agree with me, not to make me fail (...) I had a strange feeling when I arrived to Beirut airport that that's the place where I can feel at ease. I encountered a lot of difficulties in Lebanon, but finally I am staying here. I am now registered at the UNHCR although I have a principle in life that I never want to be a refugee especially in Arab countries. I felt that a neighbouring country like Lebanon can be my country too. So I would not be accepted as a refugee but as a guest. Therefore, I was an illegal resident and I did not register at the UNHCR for a long time but then I thought I need to register for protection because I have no legal residence. So I registered at the UNHCR only for legal protection, I do not want to travel abroad. I think of myself as a peculiarly adventurous person who would like to be successful. (...)

(...) I have distant relatives abroad but I have more friends abroad, some are refugees in the US and others in Germany and Canada for study and work purposes. (...) I want to live in Lebanon. I do not want to return to Iraq. I am not relying on the UNHCR or anyone to help me get a legal residence. They might help and I am thankful for that. But above all, I rely on myself and I provide everything for myself. Neither The UNHCR nor anybody else had given me a house or a book to read or even responsibility over something. I am providing everything for myself, so I do not need anyone, unless the legal protection. I am thinking in 2018 to apply for a legal residence for study purposes so I can regularize my stay in Lebanon, I don't know, that might be the solution (...) I have realized here many things: I have written two books, developed many skills and got various certificates in different fields. My life in Lebanon certainly helped me develop myself. The jobs I have done here simply contributed to my self-achievement. I have a family now in Lebanon, brothers and friends. I have built everything. When I first came I did not know anybody (...) I know a lot of people and I have very close friends so

I do not feel as a foreigner here. I have a personal conviction regarding religion: I do not like it when we inherit religion for example if my parents are Christians, I am a Christian; or if my parents are Muslims, I am a Muslim. I read a lot to the point that I reached a conviction that there are no religions, religions are only one. Religion is a mirror that got broken into pieces. And the pieces are mirrors too and every piece is right. If you put them back together they will form one religion. So I reached this conviction but I am no Marx or Sartre to establish a theory (...) it has been 4 years I did not go to Iraq. I would like to go visit Iraq this year when I regularize my stay in Lebanon because I have a small family there: my mother and two sisters, my father is dead (...).”

2.4.8- Lady GL:

The respondent in the below extract is an Iraqi Christian mother of five, despite the fact that the questionnaire was originally filled with her elder son, a young Iraqi in his early twenties. The interview was held in the house, in the presence of all family members. They come from a village in the Nineveh Valley. They arrived to Lebanon in late 2014. The husband only intervened shortly at the end. They seemed to have an important social capital abroad, especially from the husband’s side in the US. They still had a house back in the village in Iraq (as economic capital) at the time of the interview. But they needed to make money to respond to their everyday needs in Lebanon. Furthermore, the woman managed to create some relatively strong connections with some Lebanese women. This mother, ultimately, used her own family’s regretful life events (embodied cultural capital) to envisage a better future away from Iraq for her children to prevent them from any potential risky situation:

“(...) We are registered at the UNHCR (in Lebanon) (...) we thought that ISIS would leave in a week or so. When ISIS arrived to (Nineveh Valley) (...) the priest alerted us to run away from our village (...) because ISIS was about to enter it. (...). We rented a house there and paid {...} US dollars per month. We stayed in that house for two and a half or three months as internally displaced. The siblings and mother of my husband in the US were really frightened for us since my husband owned a truck and was working in food transportation on the road. His mother had left long time ago to the US to join her daughter who was pregnant at that time. She had come to Lebanon in the phase between 2003 and 2011 and now she had American citizenship. However my husband liked Iraq and did not want to leave before. My father was kidnapped in (...) (Central Iraq). From that moment on, my husband got afraid because he frequently moved on the road with his truck. Then my husband decided to leave Iraq. My mother, my father and my brother were all dead. All together were dead in the same period. (...). We sold our car and stuff and were leaving Iraq. But then my husband heard that life abroad is really bad. So we bought new stuff and a new car and settled back in (...) (Nineveh

Valley). Then ISIS came and we left. We had decided to leave even before ISIS came. My mother used to tell us to leave and that there was no point staying in Iraq before she died. The kidnappers of my father had called my mother and had asked for {...} US dollars to release him. (...). After two or three days, we knew that they blew up his car (...). Maybe my father knew that his car was loaded with explosives, so he parked away from people to prevent harm to others, he was the only one killed in the blast. (...). And we never got his body back. (...) I have very painful memories in Iraq especially when I lost both of my parents. I lived in conditions nobody else lived. My children should not grow up in Iraq to be able to have a brighter future. (...) We love Iraq and we wish to go back but there is no stability in the country. (...)

(...) Life in Lebanon is only a transitory phase for us but it is exhausting us a lot. I work and my two sons work too. My husband did not find any work because he is a bit old. I have a few Lebanese friends. I consider some like sisters but others not too much. (...) We own a house in Iraq so if my husband did not like living abroad I will go back with him and my younger son and leave the others who are old enough abroad, since my husband loves Iraq. I myself do not like to return to Iraq honestly because of the events that happened. Whenever I go abroad, I do not think I would go back to Iraq.

Husband: We had a Muslim neighbour and we used to assist him. He lived from the assistance he got from people of (...). When we Christians left the village, he stole everything in our shop (...).”

2.4.9- Lady HL:

This quotation is from a female Iraqi Christian mother of four who had been living in Lebanon for more than two years with her family. The social networks of this family extend in Iraq and abroad. Though, in Lebanon, the husband’s circle of friends is strictly Iraqi, the wife instead connected with some of the Lebanese living in the same building.

“(...) My brother, my sister and my cousins (maternal aunt) are still in Iraq. My husband's siblings are still there too. We also have friends there. (...) my husband's relatives are in Iraq as well. However they never tried to leave Iraq because they are in another region, ISIS did not reach their region. First we were displaced internally to their region (...) (Northern Iraq) and remained a year there. Then we decided to travel abroad because there was no work and my children were not going to school. (...) I owned two houses in Iraq one was fully furnished and the other was still under construction. But the completed house is now destroyed and no one is taking care of it, there are neither doors nor windows or furniture. We are from the village of (...) in the district of (...) (Nineveh Valley). (...) We have

been displaced twice in Iraq. We were first living in (...) in Southern Iraq. When the sectarian war started there, we escaped to Northern Iraq to our village and we lived in the house of my husband's parents in 2006. How many times do we need to start over? When we were in (...) (Southern Iraq), a gang robbed our money, car and everything. We had nothing left. My husband says he cannot start over another time. He simply does not have the energy to do so. (...) We do not think of prolonging our stay in Lebanon but it seems that the UNHCR is currently not processing Iraqi refugee applications to travel abroad. When we go there to ask about our files they respond that there are no travel programmes for Iraqis available. So we tried our luck with a sponsorship. My brother initiated an application to sponsor us to Australia but we got rejected after a year and a half of waiting. (...)

(...) My husband cannot work because he is sick. (...) He did not cope much with the situation in Lebanon because the children are supporting the family at the moment. He only has Iraqi friends. He agrees to travel abroad to give a better future to our children. Two of my children work but the situation is hard. I have Lebanese friends in the building, my neighbours in the first and third floors. We like each other and they are really good. They are kind with us. Our future plan is to travel abroad. It does not matter where, to any country willing to receive us through the UNHCR since the sponsorship is not a hundred per cent guaranteed. There is a proverb stating that a bird in the hand is better than ten on the tree, in other words what is important is to have a secure plan although I know that the UNHCR has nothing available right now or it is really difficult. Whether to the US or Australia I do not mind because I have brothers and sisters in both countries (...)."

2.4.10- Lady IL:

The following excerpt pertains to an Iraqi Christian lady in her late fifties. She is single and suffers from a physical disability. She came to Lebanon with her brother and his family in late 2014. Her teaching career ended prior to her coming to Lebanon, nevertheless she tried to put her initial cultural capital at play in the Lebanese field but it was unsuccessful as she described it below. Her social networks are mostly concentrated on kinship especially that she is living with her brother and family, in addition to her siblings back in Iraq and her relatives abroad, not to mention a few friends abroad as well. Perhaps her disability prevents her from meeting with Lebanese people since she rarely goes out, except those who come to visit them at home:

“(...) I have semi-paralysis in my legs since 1998. I came to Lebanon (...) to get treatment and to register for resettlement with the UNHCR. They gave us an appointment at UNHCR for the

resettlement programme. We told them we have relatives in the US and in Germany. They proposed to resettle us in Canada but my brother is sick and was under treatment so his medical file went to the physician for control. After reviewing my brother's case, the physician refused to process our application therefore we got rejected. Then after six months, they proposed France as a resettlement country but we have nobody there and we would be on our own, so this time we refused. At the moment, we are waiting for a third option from the UNHCR's resettlement programme as a last resort. My sister-in-law and her children are abroad. Her husband, my brother (another one), has been kidnapped in Iraq since 2006 and we do not know until now where he might be. We asked about him everywhere in centres and we even asked the Americans who were present in 2006 but we never got an answer. His wife and children went to the US between 2010 and 2011. I have my niece (daughter of the brother she lives with) in the US as well. And my nephews (sons of her sister) are in Germany as refugees. I have a friend in Denmark and another friend in Germany. We keep in contact through Facebook. I was a teacher in Iraq and went for early retirement because of my sickness. Currently I don't work (...) I still have my elder sister in (...) (Nineveh Valley) and another sister in (...) (Central Iraq). We often call each other by phone. (...)

(...) My main concern is the treatment. (...) I do not possess my own house but we have the old family house which is partially destroyed, it is abandoned. Even if my sisters went to check on it, they cannot do anything about it. (...) Since I suffer from a medical condition, I rarely go out so I only have the registration document from the UNHCR. I used to teach children in Iraq. In Lebanon, I went one time to a nearby dispensary and talked to a nun there asking her to send me some children so I could work as a private lessons teacher, but she never called me back. I remain at home and do not go out to grocery shops or anywhere, my sister-in-law and my brother take care of that. The neighbours come to visit us and they are really good and kind with us. (...)"

2.4.11- Man BL:

The following is a short extract from an Iraqi Christian married man in his early fifties. His economic capital (savings) was used to provide for the family and now his children were working to be able to afford a decent living in Lebanon. To enhance their economic capital, the children became the principal breadwinners causing transformation in the traditional cultural capital to adapt in the Lebanese national field. The man here underlines the importance of the family's accumulated social capital abroad for a desired future resettlement project in a third country, hopefully achievable through the UNHCR:

“(...) It has been three years and four months that we are here in Lebanon. (...) Our house is not destroyed in Iraq but it is abandoned. Sometimes, my brother-in-law who is our neighbour takes care

of the house. (...) My children work and provide for us because we have already used our savings. If there were no UNHCR office here in Lebanon, I would not have stayed so long, I want to go abroad. I have no Lebanese friends. My friends are Iraqis living in Lebanon. (...) I have two daughters abroad. One went to the US as family reunification to join her husband and the other went with her family to Germany as refugees. My wife has a brother living in Australia for twenty years now and a lot of cousins there too. She also has two brothers and two sisters in the US.”

2.4.12- Man CL:

Below is the account of an Iraqi Christian married man in his early seventies. He had arrived to Lebanon in the summer of 2016 along with his family and his brother and own family to register at the UNHCR office in Beirut. The family’s social network extends to different areas of the world, for a potential future resettlement plan, even if in Lebanon resettlement is limited for Iraqis, at least for this old man. The man’s religious capital in Iraq was for him both a curse and a blessing, while in Lebanon his religious affiliation served for protection and as a possibly winning card for resettlement options:

“(…) My sister's wife is in Australia and her other sister is in Sweden. My own brother, who is younger than me, went to Australia as a refugee. Two brothers-in-law are in the US (...) the whole village of (...) (Nineveh Valley) was damaged and my house was completely destroyed, turned into dust. No possible return there (for him). I prefer to go to hell but not there. All my relatives from (...) (village) left, part of them came to Lebanon. Some went to Jordan and others to Turkey to register at the UNHCR offices. Now (...) (village) is emptied of its people. The probability of return to (...) (village) is very unlikely because the entire village was ruined even after twenty years the reconstruction would not be completed. (...) My house was not only turned to ruins but to dust. Life in Lebanon is hard but we manage: I receive a retirement salary of about {...} US dollars (from Iraq); my daughter works and my sister-in-law (brother's wife) helps out, God is generous, so we survive.(...)

(...) Nowadays, all the Iraqis who are working in Lebanon are being forced to stop... I have a disabled son (...) and the younger son (...) is searching for work but did not find any. We have Lebanese neighbours, some are really polite and others not so much. I have no Lebanese friends. My friends are Iraqis living in Lebanon and registered at the UNHCR. (...) We were held hostages under ISIS control my disabled son and myself along with twenty other persons because we were not able to flee from (...) (village) on time. (...) They used to give us food once every three days. We could not shave our beards or cut our hair... And they threatened us to convert to Islam (...) They kept threatening to kill us (...) We stayed in captivity for about a month (...) Then they told us that our

village would be completely destroyed and that it would become a battlefield, that if we stay we would be killed and if we leave it is on our own responsibility. If we got killed on the way, it is not their problem. So we ran away (...) to finally arrive to the borders of (...) (Kurdish autonomous district). The Peshmerga (Kurdish army) in (...) welcomed us and took us to the city of (...) where we met the Bishop. Some asked to stay in the church but I wanted to go to (...) to join my family who were staying with relatives. (...). Each time I remember what happened, I thank the Lord for saving me. (...) I have a document from the Eparchy of (...) (in Kurdish autonomous district) that I was held hostage by ISIS. So I have presented a photocopy of that document to the UNHCR to be added to my file. My sister's wife in Australia filled a sponsorship application for us but we were rejected. We might renew the sponsorship application in 2018 because our economic situation here in Lebanon is not stable. How can I return to Iraq when everything I owned is gone? (...)"

2.4.13- Man DL:

The following account pertains to an Iraqi Christian married man in his late forties and having health problems. He came from Central Iraq with his family in the summer of 2014. He still has strong kinship ties in Iraq. Nevertheless he created strong local connections with Lebanese counterparts. The women in the family became the breadwinners thus converting the Iraqi patriarchal cultural capital into a modern one so to transform it to tangible economic capital for the family's subsistence:

"(...) I was subject to threat many times, it was a sectarian conflict and now I have a displaced identity card from one region to another in Iraq (...) in (...) (Central Iraq), the threats were to kick the minorities out of their region or pay a tax to gangs who controlled that region, militias, during the American rule and the presence of Al Qaeda before ISIS. They used to put explosions in churches (...). I was displaced with my family in 2006 for two years then returned to my region and waited for the situation to improve but other problems happened later on. I still have my father, my brother and my sister in the same region in (...) (Central Iraq) because if they leave, the house would be taken. (...) They are trying to survive in Iraq, if they had money they would come here for sure. We talk together over the phone (...) I have a congenital malformation in my leg (...) I used to be a driver back in Iraq but here people will not hire me because of my malformation and of my age too. I receive assistance from the Eparchy. My wife and daughter both work. My son used to work but the police forbade him to continue working since Iraqis are being fought a lot lately not having legal residence. (...) The women in our home are working in a small factory. My Lebanese neighbour likes me a lot. Once I was really sick, so my neighbours took me to Saint Joseph's hospital on their guarantee since I have no medical coverage... They are my friends and they helped me a lot. For instance, I rented a house and when my savings were depleted they found me a job as a janitor without a pay but with free

accommodation composed of a room and a bathroom. I also do not pay any bills. (...) Each time we go to the UNHCR office, they reply that there are no opportunities available for Iraqis. My case as a disabled should be a priority at the UNHCR... During my stay in Lebanon I had asthma (...) my breathing condition sometimes requires Oxygen at hospital due to the high level of humidity here in Lebanon. The doctor told me that the weather in Iraq is dry which suits better for my health than Lebanon. He suggested for me to move to the mountains, but I cannot because my children will not be able to find work there. Here in the city it is easier because I have friends and relatives. (...) The medical shoe that I wear for my foot is really expensive. The Iraqi government used to provide me with this shoe and it cost less. In Iraq I had a special needs card and they used to give me a monthly allowance of {...} US dollars, but it has been three years that it is cut off.”

2.4.14- Man EL:

This brief excerpt belongs to an Iraqi man in his late fifties. He is a married Christian. He fled with his family because of discrimination and disrespect for religious minorities, as he put it below. The family relied on the economic capital generated by their son-in-law to provide their basic needs. The man’s relations are stronger with his fellow Iraqi Christians than with the Lebanese people. His kinship ties are well established abroad, thus he awaits temporarily in Lebanon with his family for a possible resettlement through the UNHCR programme.

“(…) We left Iraq because of the discriminatory situations there. There is no respect for religious minorities. (...) My house is not destroyed but abandoned. (...) Life is really hard there. (...) We are partly coping with the situation in Lebanon for pure economic reasons, we as refugees have weak economic potentials here. Our relations with Lebanese are good but I personally have no Lebanese friends. My friends are Iraqi Christians living in Lebanon. My son-in-law lives with us in the same house. He works and provides for us. Our legal situation is not regular, but we are registered at the UNHCR. I have a brother in Germany, a sister in Sweden, a sister in the US and two sisters along with my mother in Canada.”

2.4.15- Man FL:

This is a young single Iraqi Christian man in his twenties. He is a breadwinner in his family composed of three brothers and a paternal aunt. Clearly, the religious capital of this young man was converted to a major source of economic capital in the Lebanese national field. In addition, though he has got strong kinship ties in Iraq he managed to develop a good network within the Lebanese society but he somehow relies on the existing network abroad, mainly in Australia, for the family’s future plans:

“(…) I work at the Bible Society's warehouse. I also work as catechist for children at 'Fondation Raoul-Follereau'. My brother and I support the family. We are only two people working in the family. Sometimes, we receive money from our relatives in Australia. (…) My father, my uncle and my aunts are back in Iraq. My mother passed away. My father is married to another woman and has a son. (…) I am still in contact with them. (…) I am not facing any trouble with the Lebanese authorities, thank God. So far, I haven't encountered any legal problems, I only hold a document that I am registered at the UNHCR. I am able to work without trouble. I have a few Lebanese friends who are my colleagues at work. We have good relations. Somehow they are like my brothers. (…) My brother and I pay the rent and my aunt too. We receive some cash assistance, but not that much. I consider our economic situation as average. We are waiting to be resettled through UNHCR as one family with my aunt who is appointed as our legal guardian. I will never travel on my own and leave my family. This is impossible! If it happens that our file gets blocked at the UNHCR, I would travel with my family abroad on our own expenses. I would try to borrow some money and even be in debt just to travel. Remaining in Lebanon is not an option, nor returning to Iraq is. The only thing keeping us here is waiting for the processing of our application.”

2.4.16- Lady JL:

This interviewee is a young single Iraqi Muslim woman living with her parents and brother in Lebanon since 2016. The economic capital of this family is particularly linked with the kinship ties in Iraq as a major source of income to afford living in Lebanon. Furthermore, the young lady managed to transform her acquired social capital in the Lebanese context into another source of economic subsistence. Their religious capital did not protect the family from becoming victims of threat back in Iraq, while in Lebanon it helped them settle among Lebanese who share the same religious affiliation:

“(…) We have been threatened from government militias (…). In Iraq, there were demonstrations to claim for public assignments, water and electricity provisions, also for the improvement of the living conditions in the country. The security situation in Iraq is bad: kidnapping, corruption, rape among other problems. (…) We are threatened by militias that if we go back they would kill us or kidnap us. We have documents that prove these threats. They sent us threat letters. They also came to our house and used gunshots to terrorize us. (…) We filed a complaint at the police (in Iraq) and we have the report with us. We still have our relatives in Iraq, my aunt and my uncles (mother's siblings) and we contact them through WhatsApp. They are staying there because they are not threatened. My family is the only one threatened (…). It is because my father and brothers participated in the demonstrations. They were university graduates but were unemployed. They were asking for public assignments, electricity and water provisions and for health services because the health sector

in Iraq was deteriorating because of the unavailability of medication and hospitals, the spread of diseases (...) we sold everything we had and gave back the house keys to the landlord (rented house). We left only with our clothes in the luggage and we were moving from one place to another, we did not settle in one place. Now we have settled in one place here in Lebanon. We are not doing fine in Lebanon. The situation is really hard. Nobody is working and my father is sick. The cost of living is high and medication is expensive. (...) We ask for money from our relatives and our friends. I borrow money from my friend and she gives me a sum until I am able to give it back to her. Our relatives send us money but not regularly. We do not receive any cash assistance. The UNHCR office does not help us at all. We are only registered there and we have an open file.

(...) I have two brothers. One is still in Iraq; he is married. He lives in (...) (Central Iraq) in the same zone where we were threatened. He was threatened too but he moved from one place to another so they would not follow him. He got registered with us at UNHCR. In case we were to travel abroad he would have to come with us. He is registered here in Lebanon but he remains in Iraq. Last year he came one month and then went back. He did not come back here again. He is still registered at UNHCR alone, without his wife, since he does not have any children yet. My other brother tried to search for work here but he did not find any because he is Iraqi and people could not understand his language (Iraqi dialect). Therefore nobody accepted to hire him. I have Iraqi and Lebanese friends here (...). They are like sisters to me. From the beginning, my other brother stayed in Iraq. He did not come with us. He only came to see us then went back. He works there as a teacher in a school (...). When he came to Lebanon, he entered with a visa from Beirut airport for one month then returned to Iraq. My friends (...) help me out with the money, I borrow from them then when possible I give them the money back. We are staying in Lebanon for the moment but we would like from the UNHCR to process our file quickly (...). My mother is also sick (...) she needs treatment and she cannot work.”

2.4.17- Lady KL:

This below quotation is from an Iraqi Muslim woman in her forties coming from Central Iraq. She was previously married to a Lebanese then got divorced. Later on, she got married again but this time with an Iraqi Muslim refugee. Her case is really particular because she arrived to Lebanon in the late 1990s smuggled through land border with Syria and stayed in Lebanon for quite some time now. She spoke Lebanese dialect really well during the time of interview. Her Iraqi cultural capital had been gradually ‘Lebanized’ as she explained below. Yet, her religious embodied capital still mattered for her, as in the Muslim dress-code the black gown is typical attire worn by women from her region of provenance. She gave much importance to her friendship ties in the US for a possible resettlement option:

“(…) I left Iraq in June 1998 with some people by car through (…) Syria and arrived to Lebanon. The people who came with me registered at the UNHCR and left but I did not because I met a Lebanese and married him. I wanted to marry so I could find a house to live in. Then after (…) years I got a divorce. After that, I married an Iraqi. I came to Lebanon because in Iraq we (women) were not able to study or go out, we lived in injustice and oppression. I ran away from my brothers, my father had a weak personality and had no authority at home. My brothers were very cruel. (…) What can I say? It was a situation of ignorance and backwardness. Therefore I escaped from them. I have been in Lebanon for approximately twenty years. (…) So I lived with my first husband. He was violent, he broke my fingers then he broke my shoulder and there are photos to document this. (…) I stayed with him because we had three little children. (…) My children love me but they are helpless, their father controls them and they have a step-mother at home. If we travel (with her current Iraqi husband and little daughter) and settle abroad I will take my children (from her Lebanese ex-husband) to live with us. Here I cannot take care of them because the living conditions are hard and I cannot handle their expenses and school tuitions. (…)”

(…) I do not remember any Iraqi tradition, I live as a Lebanese. My husband works. (…) My (current) husband came in 2007 as a university student. He was not in the military forces. He was young when he came to Lebanon. There is an age difference between us. I am older than him. However, he has no problem with that. Now he is not studying at the university because our living conditions are hard... (…) Now he is a refugee (registered at the UNHCR) and he works in a restaurant. He supports us and we live a modest life better than nothing. Life is nice in Lebanon but it is expensive, nevertheless it is much better than living in Iraq. I have Lebanese friends, they are like family (...) We are enrolled in the resettlement programme to the US and everything was going well until Trump administration took over and made some major decisions regarding immigration, our file was rejected. So we asked to be resettled in another country but the officer at the UNHCR told us we could appeal because we still have a chance to go to the US. It has been four months that we appealed. When we used to have interviews at the embassy or at the UNHCR (...) I used to take off my black gown. The gown is cheap and I can wear whatever cloth underneath. The gown was not the problem at the UNHCR because I used to take it off. We want to go to the US, first, to be secure and secure a future for our daughter. Second, my husband wants to go back to university because his friends are all there. He had studied management and economy. We also have an Iraqi lady friend in California who offered to help us; she can sponsor us and she has no problem in doing that (...).”

2.4.18- Man GL:

The following excerpt is from an Iraqi Christian family man in his early fifties who arrived to Lebanon in the summer of 2014. Both the social capital abroad and the religious

capital play a relevant role in providing economic capital necessary for temporary subsistence, in addition to his son's work in the informal labour Lebanese market. The Iraqi cultural traits combined with limited socializing with their Lebanese neighbours prevent them from getting in trouble while temporarily staying in Lebanon:

“(…) to join my sons who were here in Lebanon before me; they secured the place where we live now (….) they (his two sons) are now resettled in the US where they joined my mother and brothers. I am registered at the UNHCR but have no legal residence in Lebanon. I still have only two sisters in Northern Iraq with their families. (….) We had the family house there (in Central Iraq) that belonged to my father. The house is still there but I do not know anything about its condition because I left it with all the furniture inside. I had a profession and a shop. I left everything and the stuff count nothing for me. We live here receiving assistance because nobody accepts to hire me since I am old. I tried but it did not work. I have my son who works in Lebanon and sometimes my sons abroad send us money. We receive assistance only from the church, but nothing from the UNHCR. I am sick and I take medication (….) Our savings, that I was able to bring with me, are now depleted. My son did not find work easily and it is not regular. He works on a daily basis and the wage is really low. (….) We have no Lebanese friends but since we are friendly and we like to mingle, we never had problems with them. There is mutual respect between our neighbours and us but no more than that. (….) We are waiting to travel abroad through any possible legal way either to the US or to Canada, any travel plan that we would be able to afford financially, not because we hate Lebanon. We want to go to the US because my family is there and my sons too. I want to see my sons get married and reunite with my family.”

2.4.19- Couple AL:

The below account is from an Iraqi Christian couple living in Lebanon since late summer of 2014. The woman was answering more than her husband who, in turn, was intervening when he felt like doing so. This couple's social capital is mainly concentrated on relatives in Australia who are trying to help them in their travel plans. Their religious capital serves for protection in case of trouble in Lebanon. It is noteworthy to say that their children became the principal breadwinners of the family thus contributing to their current economic capital and causing most likely an irreversible transformation in their Iraqi cultural capital commonly described as patriarchal:

Wife: “(…) we came to Lebanon as a transit country to travel abroad. My brother-in-law was here before us with his family (….) So we came to join them. (….) My mother-in-law and daughter-in-law

still live in Iraq. My father-in-law is deceased. We cannot go back to visit them because we would not be allowed to re-enter Lebanon, they would stamp 'rejected entry' on our passports. They are living from the retirement salary of my late father-in-law. (...) We were living in a house owned by my husband's family. We did not pay any rent. (...)The house contains dug tunnels. These tunnels were loaded with explosives. Only our house was booby-trapped. When they discovered the booby traps they removed them but the three tunnels were not closed. So now the house is abandoned... My husband was an employee in the Ministry of water resources. He had a car and had to sell it (...). We even left money and some golden jewellery in the closet when we had to escape quickly. (...)

(...) We have no legal residence in Lebanon but we have a document from our Eparchy which prevents us somehow from having trouble with the Lebanese authorities. Work is not easy to find. (...) My step-son, the eldest of our children, works as a ladies' hairdresser. My daughter has just started working at present. The salaries they receive are not enough to cover our expenses. We receive cash assistance from Makhzoumi Association (...) a monthly sum of {...} Lebanese pounds. The problem here is paying the rent and the food expenses.

Husband: We had paid {...} US dollars for a whole year then we talked to the landlord to lower it to {...} US dollars because we cannot afford anymore. (...)

Wife: We do not have good relations with the Lebanese. They do not respect anyone. Very few Lebanese are good. We have few Iraqi friends, especially my sister-in-law and her family (...). We often visit each other. We have my parents in Australia and some other relatives in Canada. We would like to join them.

Husband: For the time being, the UNHCR says our file is not enrolled in the resettlement programme (...) we have tried sponsorship to Australia, my brother -in-law was our sponsor twice and once we tried without a sponsor... All three times we got rejected in two years. We have newly applied for a fourth sponsorship, but now my mother-in-law is our sponsor. Even if we would stay ten years more in Lebanon, we will not return to Iraq we rather want to go abroad (...)"

2.4.20- Lady LL:

This last quotation is from a young Iraqi Christian lady in her thirties from Central Iraq. She is married but had no children up until the time of the interview. She is highly educated with a University degree in economics. She arrived with her husband to Lebanon during autumn 2016. Her social capital is mainly concentrated in kinship ties in Iraq and abroad in different areas of the world, especially Australia and Canada where the networks were employed for a possible resettlement but so far they failed to make it happen. In Lebanon instead she only mentioned

weak ties with some Lebanese women. Their religious capital was principally the reason of their flight from Iraq. In Lebanon instead it helped them get some assistance and protection from the church:

“(…) We still have my parents and my husband's parents back in Iraq (Northern Iraq). (…) In the beginning of 2016, some people wanted to take over my husband's turnery shop. My father-in-law did not accept to give them the shop. So they threatened both my husband and my father-in-law. Then they kidnapped my husband for two days and asked for {…} US dollars ransom. They got the money then released my husband with one condition that is for us to leave Iraq, leave everything: our house, the shop and do not stay in Iraq anymore. (…) My husband's parents were also threatened. They came to Lebanon and tried the tough life here. However, since they are old and they cannot live in another country beside Iraq, they preferred to let their son, my husband, live his life and went back to Iraq. My father-in-law wanted what is best for us, my husband and I, that's why they went back to Iraq. Our house and stuff are abandoned in (…) (Central Iraq) because my husband's parents cannot go back there. There is no law or order. The government does not intervene. The strong rule the weak. They took everything (…) these armed militias in Iraq are part of the government. When we went to the police to file a complaint, they said they cannot do anything for us because our place is not supposed to be there as Christians. (…) We were only able to sell the car so we could travel. (…)

(…) We have a document from our church and another document from the UNHCR but no legal residence. When the Lebanese authorities stop us on the road we show them these documents to facilitate our movement (…) my husband did not find a job easily here. Nonetheless, he started working in the laundry shop close by a month ago. (…) I have no Lebanese friends. I met a few ladies and we only exchanged hellos and a few words. So my relation with them is shallow. I have basically lived on my own with my husband ever since we came to Lebanon. (…) I consider myself a bit distant. Some Lebanese treat us well but others do not do so. (…) One major reason for them (her husband's parents) to return to Iraq was the high cost of living here in Lebanon. (…) We needed the UNHCR document, first, so we could be able to move with some level of freedom in Lebanon, and, second, so we could get treatment in case of sickness or food assistance. Though, the UNHCR does not cover the hospital expenses unless in rare cases for Iraqis (…). If it were not for the miscarriage I had here in Lebanon they would not have given me a document from the UNHCR. I had a pregnancy which lasted 4 and a half months and I needed to be admitted to hospital. We needed some coverage from the UNHCR because the hospital expenses are tremendous. My parents did not leave Iraq. They live in (…) (Northern Iraq) and were not displaced from a village to another. (…) I had two miscarriages, one in Iraq when my husband was kidnapped and the other here in Lebanon. (…) I have my uncle and my aunt (paternal) as well as my uncle (maternal) in the US. I also have an (maternal) aunt in Germany, and three (maternal) uncles: one in Switzerland, another in Sweden and

the third in Canada. `My husband's uncles are in Australia (maternal and paternal). All had left a long time ago. We want to leave Lebanon and settle in another country. With the UNHCR, the situation seems really difficult for Iraqis who are left out from the resettlement programme. (...) We are trying to apply for church sponsorship or five persons' sponsorship to Canada. (...) We are still in the process of gathering information about sponsorship to Canada but we have not applied yet. However we are thinking of this project because we have no other options. We had also tried three times sponsorship to Australia but we got rejected (...).”

2.5- RESULTS DISCUSSION

Going through the ethnographic observations which I was able to collect in limited occasions and from the above interview quotations of both Non-Iraqi and Iraqi interlocutors, I highlight below multiple aspects pertinent to the Bourdieusian approach which I adopted for the study. I particularly scrutinize the game of Iraqi migrant capitals (and *habitus*) within the Lebanese national field, their convertibility and their impact on the positionality of those migrants in the aforementioned field.

First, I view Iraqi migrants as bench players who are publicly excluded from the official game happening within the Lebanese national field of power, but are minimally included in little shadowed games within some particular Lebanese sub-fields (Thomson, 2008). The mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion reflect the Iraqi migrants' ambiguous status in the host national field as sometimes in and sometimes out, but never as key players as in the case of Lebanese citizens, somehow advantaged in their own field (Hage, 1998).

Indeed, their legal status (political capital: refugee-like denomination), for instance, interplays between the political and the social fields, working in their favour when it comes to protection granted by the UNHCR - as a structured agency in the international field of power, acting at the same time beyond the Lebanese national field but in consistency with the sovereignty of the Lebanese State – and as an auto-exclusionary mechanism preventing them from actively participating in the official social game. In other words, if they apply for a legal residence permit in Lebanon they lose the protection they obtained from UNHCR, thus they lose the possibility to resettle in a safe third country and their asylum claim would be automatically rejected. Therefore, by fate but also by choice, they continue to live in limbo in Lebanon until

further notice. In this case, I would allow myself to term this process as ‘conscious marginalization’ because it is neither forcibly compulsory nor entirely optional.

Furthermore, I found out that multiple forms of capital played an important role in the positionality of Iraqi migrants at the margins of the Lebanese national field of power. It is true that capitals interlace within different fields and can convert into a different form of capital to produce an effective power needed in a certain field (Bourdieu, 1986). As a host society, the Lebanese social field - within the wider national field – allowed for Iraqi migrants to relatively interact with the locals using their basic accumulated economic capital (savings or jewellery brought along from Iraq) since they had to rent apartments – sometimes already furnished – amidst Lebanese. Some Iraqis even managed to create friendship ties with their Lebanese neighbours, thereby accumulating social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Moore, 2008).

In addition to the basic economic capital, as the most regularly used form of initial capital to actively participate in the exchanges happening within the Lebanese social dimension, Iraqis also have a newly accumulated economic capital which is a product of cash assistance from local organizations or churches, received from abroad, or, even, from a low- waged job in the Lebanese informal labour market.

While keeping their position as Iraqi temporary migrants, I noticed that the religious capital was vital for their peaceful coexistence with the Lebanese since it matched with the multitude of religious capitals already existing in Lebanon (Zaman, 2016), without forgetting the extra-document for protection - the blue card – obtained from churches which came in handy to prevent trouble with Lebanese authorities in addition to the aid and assistance received from Church charities (Chatelard, 2003). It also had an effective role in selecting the place of residence, for instance Iraqi Christians tended to live in Christian areas conventionally known as such; in specific streets where other Iraqis were already living; and close to the minority church they belong to.

On one hand, the ethnic field mattered less to proceed with the game in the Lebanese national field since the host society’s construct builds more on religious affiliation than on ethnicity. On the other hand, it had an impact on accumulating social capital through bonding ties with their co-nationals who happened to be living a similar situation in Lebanon (Kindler & Wójcikowska-Baniak, 2019). Moreover, the linguistic capital was somehow an active strategy

employed in the interaction with the Lebanese - Iraqis' official language is Arabic, even if many spoke 'Surath'¹¹ among each other.

Regarding the Iraqi cultural capital, in its embodied form or *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1986; Maton, 2008), I noticed that, up to a certain extent, some radical changes had occurred in the traditional patriarchal breadwinning function within the family, since most men were even unable to find low-waged jobs. Thus they were either relying on their wives or on their children working in the Lebanese informal labour market sector. Some were somehow lucky to work and provide for their women and children maintaining the patriarchal ideal rather intact. Habitus can indeed grow to encompass newer dispositions and customs over time especially that it goes along with present circumstances of a migrant. Indeed it evolves and is not immutable (Maton, 2008).

Reviewing the social capital of Iraqi migrants residing in Lebanon, I can assert that this type of capital intertwines with the other forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986) to make the lives of Iraqis somewhat easier in the Lebanese field. Family ties back in the country of origin play a major role in supporting the migratory process of some Iraqi households or individuals in concern. In other words, they either provided money prior to the departure of the migrants or are still remotely providing for them while temporarily staying in Lebanon. Similarly, kinship and friendship ties abroad are providing financial support or helping in the realization of a resettlement project in a safe third country as final destination, for example through sponsorship programmes. As Chatelard put it (2003), Iraqi migrants rely on kinship and religious ties for further mobilisation since these ties 'already gained a transnational dimension'.

I also view the social relations they created with Lebanese people as a product of the state of waiting which in some cases exceeded four years (with the exception of the two quoted cases above ten years). These connections vary from weak to strong depending on the degree of familiarity between the two parties - Iraqi and Lebanese - and the amount and type of help Lebanese offer to Iraqis, being already renowned for their hospitality and generosity, not to mention the common religious denominator which is key to a possibly burgeoning successful relationship between them, temporary as their situation in Lebanon or lasting according to the nature of bond, the harmony between the parties and their will to proceed beyond geographical

¹¹ Modernized form of spoken Aramaic commonly used by Iraqi Christians who are ethnically considered as Assiro-Chaldeans not Arabs.

borders through the use of the latest communication technologies which link the world in an instant.

2.6- CONCLUSION

Iraqis who settled momentarily in Lebanon know that they are in a transit country and are in a state of waiting. So the strategies they adopt are conditioned by the time they are spending in the Lebanese society. Therefore, they engage in relations with locals according to their primary needs, in other words, they knit networks ranging from simple acquaintances to dear friends. As they are hospitable by nature but careful by experience, they tend to be selective in opening up to the Lebanese because unfortunately many of the latter took advantage of the former, in particular in the work environment.

Nevertheless, the religiosity factor contributed to flourishing neighbourly and friendly relations. Strategically speaking, their main concern is to travel abroad to join family and relatives and start a decent life free of threat and potential sectarian conflicts.

Therefore, the necessary social networking tactics they engage in are:

- an international connection through UNHCR opening up to third countries' embassies and diplomats in charge of quota refugee selection for resettlement options;
- an international connection through family and friends abroad (not in Iraq), in particular for sponsorship programmes and for financial support;
- an international connection with family members who stayed in Iraq for emotional attachment and for financial support in some cases (mostly unilateral from Iraq to Lebanon);
- a local religious connection with the churches of Lebanon both for protection and assistance;
- an international religious connection for possible sponsorship programmes abroad;
- a local connection with Lebanese for fulfilling their daily needs of accommodation, food and the necessary requirements in addition to the provision of a possible work opportunity to generate income for subsistence;

- last but not least, a local connection with fellow Iraqis who also live in Lebanon waiting for travel - this last connection is basically a form of living in diaspora-like setting having the same cultural heritage and similar concerns but also sharing a brighter vision of the future in the hope of resettlement.

The next chapter, I study Iraqi migrants in Finland which constitutes a totally different context barely comparable with the Lebanese context (I will explain the reasons in the last chapter). I use the same Bourdieusian approach to interpret the game of Iraqi capitals in the Finnish national field.

CHAPTER 3: FINLAND HOSTING IRAQI MIGRANTS

3.1- INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, Finland has become a significant migrant destination since the late 1990s, with arrival of the privileged ‘Ingrian’ returnees of Finnish descent from the former Soviet Union territories (Heikkilä, 2017; Sarvimäki, 2011; Koikkalainen, Tammilehto, Kangas, Katisko, Koskinen and Suikkanen, 2011; Koivukangas, 2003; Pitkänen and Kouki, 2002; Valtonen, 2001), and the different ethnic groups of refugees through the resettlement programme of UNHCR (Valtonen, 1998). Indeed in 1968, Finland ratified both the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. In addition, it joined the European Union as a Member State in 1995 (Heikkilä, 2017; Koivukangas, 2003; Pitkänen and Kouki, 2002). Then, it quickly introduced an annual quota for refugee resettlement (Wahlbeck, 2018). Although Finland’s population is somehow ‘ethnically homogeneous than in most other European countries’ (Heikkilä, 2005), it comprises its own ethnic Finnish minorities. However, these minorities still share with all the Finns a Finnish identity which is ‘based on the idea of Finland’s unique landscape, culture, and history and on the particular characteristics of Finnish people’ (Aslama and Pantti, 2007).

Indeed, it was more of an emigration country with a substantial number of Finnish citizens emigrating to work in the nearby Sweden (Koikkalainen *et al.*, 2011; Heikkilä, 2005). With a population estimate at 5.5 million and a surface area of 338,440 km², with the majority of inhabitants populating the southern regions (Määttä and Laitinen, 2014), Finland is viewed as one of the less populated countries in the European Union (Wahlbeck, 2018). In the 1990s, due to the economic recession and the elevated unemployment rate, the Finnish natives saw that refugees were stealing their jobs (Sourander, 2003).

Aside the freedom of mobility in European Union and the migration from other European countries for marriage (Heikkilä, 2015) or for work, in the last few years adding to quota refugees, Finland received important flows of asylum seekers through illicit border crossing from Sweden.

In the summer of 2015, 32,746 asylum seekers had arrived to Finland, and though the number is small when comparing to other European countries, nonetheless the Finnish

government had never witnessed such numbers before (Heikkilä, 2017). In fact, the European Agenda on Migration had anticipated earlier in the spring of 2015 an emergency response system for the temporary distribution scheme of persons necessitating international protection among EU Member States in the face of the escalating Syrian refugee crisis (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport, 2015). Those flows had embraced people from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria (Heleniak, 2018). But what was really unexpected was the number of Iraqi asylum seekers that reached at that time 20,485 (Tanner, 2016). They were both Kurds and Arabs (Jauhiainen, 2017).

By 31 December 2016, there were 9,532¹² Iraqi foreign citizens living permanently in Finland. Indeed, Iraqis had formed a well-established refugee community in Finland since their early arrivals in the 1990s (Heikkilä and Peltonen, 2002). Nevertheless, Iraqis had the highest unemployment rate as registered for primary activity in an immigrant group for the year 2015 (Heikkilä, 2017). The attractiveness of Finland as a reputed welfare state granting accessibility to benefits and services, as well as the good standard of basic social security, contributed in some way through social media to the asylum seekers' choice of final destination (Wahlbeck, 2018; Koikkalainen *et al.*, 2011).

Though the Finnish society is gradually shifting towards multiculturalism (Pitkänen and Kouki, 2002; Koivukangas, 2003) and the diversification of ethnic communities, there remains an undeniable constituent of the Finnish nationalist ideology represented by the 'True Finns' - a right-wing populist party - participating in the coalition which shaped the government during the refugee crisis and pushed towards more restrictive asylum policy measures. This party regards 'Finnishness' as strength and as a 'cultural capital which should be capitalized upon and not dissipated' (Wahlbeck, 2018; Horsti, 2017; Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015; Arter, 2010). Guia described True Finns as 'the nativist Finns Party' who should be necessarily recognized as the natural majority, as the native descendants of the Finnish soil' (2016). On the issue of nationalism, De Genova pointed out in his article that 'the 'new' European nativists authorize themselves to deliberate over the problem of 'immigration'', and he continued that for them the inclusion of those migrants is strictly related to the subordination of their labour achieved only through subjugation to exclusionary and racist campaigns (2010).

There are internal differences between the Iraqi communities residing in Finland. In addition to the Kurds, the biggest Iraqi group comprises Arab Muslims. Nevertheless, there are

¹² See Statistics Finland 2016 on website <https://www.stat.fi> (last visited on 28 January 2021).

also Iraqi Christians and Iraqi Mandeans actively present in the Finnish society (La Vecchia-Mikkola, 2013). Indeed, Muslims came to Finland as refugees or asylum seekers mostly due to constant warfare zones in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa (Huttunen and Juntunen, 2018).

Since the early 1990s, many Muslim migrants settled in Turku and numbers grew over the years with the arrival of new Muslim refugees (Martikainen, 2000). In fact, the city of Turku is located in South Western Finland. It was Finland's old capital centuries ago, but it ceded its place to Helsinki in the 1800s (*ibidem*). It gained the privilege of becoming the European Capital of Culture for the year 2011 (Varna, 2013). It is also an important Finnish international city closely connected to Sweden through maritime connections and dockyard, but also through the important cultural ties with the Turku Swedish-speaking minority (Martikainen, 2000).

Traditionally, "the Lutheran Church was the only official religion in Finland" (*ibidem*). But this has now changed with the multicultural Finland. The Finnish society is much more secular than religiously conservative. Actually, religion in Finland is thought of as a private matter (Croucher, Aalto, Hirvonen and Sommier, 2013). The Finnish State is ranked as a 'developed' Nordic country perhaps relatively less economically powerful than its neighbouring states, Norway and Sweden. Nonetheless, the Nordic region, as a whole, seems to be significantly attractive in terms of global mobility, since its welfare states offer an array of 'social activism oriented towards increasing egalitarianism in society' (Wrede and Näre, 2013).

Even if Finland has a different history than the other Nordic neighbouring countries, in the last migrant wave it responded in a similar way to the refugee crisis by opening borders and by hosting many asylum seekers. In the Finnish state, migration issues are dealt with according to the regulations set in the 2004 Aliens Act¹³, which purpose is to promote managed immigration and provision of international protection and respect to human rights in accordance with international agreements. However, the Finnish government recently tightened its immigration policies through amendments of the Aliens Act in 2016 (Wahlbeck, 2018; Gauffin and Lyytinen, 2017; Horsti 2017).

Hostility to migrants also increased in Finland, a country with little experience of mass immigration and which currently endures economic difficulties. The anti-immigration sentiment

¹³ For text: Aliens Act <http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2004/en20040301> (last visited on 28 January 2021).

caused in some way tighter restrictions on asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia because of the improved security situation in the three countries (Tanner, 2016).

The official objective of Finnish migration policy is to promote integration (Horsti, 2017). Therefore, in one way or another, the Finnish society integrates migrant communities by ‘cultural adaptation in a multicultural context’ (Solivetti, 2010). It is relevant to say that, since 1998, Finland supports the educational rights of immigrant children to mother tongue education for the purposes of strengthening ‘multicultural identity’ and ‘functional bilingualism’ of students (Tørslev and Rothe Børsch, 2017). Moreover, the mediatised reputation of Finland, as an easily giving residence permits country, fashioned its way into the minds of Iraqis to flee from Iraq.

Accordingly, they keep choosing the distant Finland as a welfare country where they would be provided with services and subsidies that simply do not exist back in Iraq. Hence, for Iraqi refugees, Finland is mainly a country of resettlement and a final destination. Whether through the resettlement programme of UNHCR or through smuggling channels, many Iraqis entered the city of Turku. Although those people belong to the same country of origin, they do not come from the same Iraqi regions or have the same religious affiliations. Religious belonging is an essential component to understand the network formation for Iraqis.

3.2- FIELD RESEARCH IN FINLAND: METHODOLOGY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

I chose to observe and interview Iraqis in the Finnish city of Turku which hosts a relevant number of Iraqi migrants. I knew from the beginning that the Iraqis who reside in Turku and suburbs are different from those encountered in Lebanon. Indeed, they were refugees, asylum seekers, legal residents or even already Finnish citizens. This was rather challenging for me.

During the winter of 2018 and for a three-month period, the Migration Institute of Finland, located in the heart of Turku, hosted me as a PhD visiting researcher. I used the office premises to conduct most of my interviews. I faced a number of constraints while performing my

field research namely: the Finnish cold weather, my personal health condition, the reluctance of some of the interviewees to show up or even to answer their phone, and the limited time to perform more research through participant observation and to make more interviews. Although the language was not a barrier - using Arabic - but still trust was not fully granted after shortly meeting potential Iraqi informants for the first time. So I needed to make myself seen and establish some sort of bonding which I call 'Middle Eastern mates' sharing common culinary traditions or other stuff like political and religious views.

I adopted an ethnographic approach to reach out for the Iraqi migrants, although the period of study was relatively short. Indeed, I attended several events that included Iraqi migrants, or even, exclusive events for Iraqis and here are some of those events: 'We see you' campaign event; 'Islam ja minnä' (Islam and I) event at the Institute; an evening at the 'Good Will Centre'; Zumba class at the 'Good Will Centre'; International Women's evening at the Lutheran Church; International café at the Lutheran Church; 'DaisyLadies' Association day visit; Oriental Christians Association gathering; Mass with Oriental Christians; Sunday Celebration in Finnish at the Pentecostal Church. All of these places and events were extremely beneficial for my observations and for establishing contact with Iraqis for the first time prior to the interview or even meeting with them again afterwards.

Then, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews using the interactional model of interviewing which turned out to be very effective. Through the interview, I was able to pull out a meaning-making conversation which is a site of narrative practice (Holstein and Gubrium, 2016). It is worth mentioning that, as a field of knowledge production, narrative offers a possibility to study the meanings which actors attribute to their own experiences (Eastmond, 2007).

For interviewing, I used Arabic (mother tongue) to talk to Iraqis. Although the Lebanese dialect is not the same as Iraqi dialect but we were able to communicate really well together. Then while transcribing the contents, I translated them to English. One interviewee preferred talking in English through the conversation. I was allowed to tape-record all the interviews.

For participant observation, I was invited to a gathering held at the Oriental Christians Association at the premise in Varissuo. Iraqi Christians mostly met together there and exchanged

conversations, played bingo, ate biscuits and sweets while drinking coffee or tea and listening to Iraqi folkloric music. The language they used while talking to each other was not Arabic. They referred to it as ‘Surath’ which is equivalent to Assyrian or Aramaic, as they explained to me. Another time I attended holy mass with them at the Catholic Church of Turku where half of the prayers were in Arabic and the rest were in Assyrian.

I also attended gatherings arranged by the Lutheran Church called ‘Evening cafés’ where asylum seekers and/or refugees who had now become Christian Lutheran converts were present, either Iraqi Arabs or from other nationalities. They were eating snacks and having coffee and tea together, playing pool and mingling with each other.

I was also once invited to attend at the Pentecostal Church the Sunday celebration in Finnish. I noticed there that the Iraqi converts were seated in the back of the hall along with the Pastor in charge of them. Some were using headphones to listen to the translation available in English in the translation booth.

Another event was organized at the Good Will Centre where many Iraqis sit together to talk, eat and drink hot beverages. Although this place had some sort of a Christian orientation but not every Iraqi there was a convert. In fact, there were some Iraqi Muslims, however I did not know about it until later when someone told me about it. After the end of the mingling time, what followed was Bible story telling for those who wished to attend it, and there was a Finnish pastor reading from the Bible in Finnish and next to him was sitting an Iraqi Christian (originally Christian, not a convert) translating to the audience in Arabic.

In the three months I spent in Turku, I was only able to interview twenty Iraqi individuals. Some were already Finnish citizens, others were recognized as refugees with a residence permit, some were residents through family reunification and some were still asylum seekers waiting to regularize their stay in Finland.

Then I wanted to understand how the Finnish society responded to Iraqis. So I managed to interview some people from the Finnish civil society: the co-founder of the Finnish association ‘We see you’ helping asylum seekers; the representative of a private company called ‘Entry Education’ – she was in charge of a programme called ‘Kotosib’ addressed to immigrants entering the job market; and the director of ‘DaisyLadies’ Association for foreign women

empowerment. I also met with pastors from the Lutheran Church and from the Pentecostal Church. All of these interviews were conducted in English and tape-recording was allowed.

In addition, I was also able to discuss research on Iraqis with Finnish scholars residing in Helsinki. They had similar research regarding Iraqi waves of asylum seeking in Finland, whether in Turku or in Helsinki.

The staff and fellow researchers at the Migration Institute of Finland showed their support and offered some tips about how to find Iraqi respondents and what to do on my free time.

Questions in the in-depth semi-structured interviews focused on understanding how Iraqis interacted with each other in Turku; if they formed a sole community because of their Iraqi nationality or if they assembled in sectarian communities strictly connected to the same religious group. Some questions looked at whether Iraqis were keeping contact with the motherland Iraq and their connections with the Finns. Other questions regarded the barriers Iraqis might face while dealing with Finnish people.

First, I thought of the theory of social networks and the cumulative causation (Massey et al, 1993). The theory states that people move because of the emulation of others and because of economic incentives provided abroad. However, in the case of asylum seeking and the refugee situation, the push factors are quite diverse but the pull factors sometimes could be similar. The return options are reduced but the remittances to the family who stayed in the country of origin can bring good economic performance to the household in general. Cases differ in terms of collective persecution or individual persecution, whether based on political opinion or belonging to a religious minority. The claim for international protection can be guaranteed for proven life threatening situations.

Then, I referred to the Bourdieusian theory of capital, habitus and field interplay (Bourdieu, 1986). So I focused on the forms of capital Iraqi migrants used in the Finnish national field. This allowed me to determine the strategies Iraqi migrants used to situate themselves in the Finnish national field.

From sectarian conflicts in the homeland or even political persecution, newly arrived Iraqi asylum seekers appeared to have similar components to the migrants of earlier waves. But the latter had a different configuration from this recent population of newcomers. Between reasons of leaving the homeland and reasons of choosing the country of asylum, the asylum seekers seemed to be quite informed of the situation of asylum in Finland as a receiving country. The ones who arrived through smuggling channels looked like they adopted the same strategy, especially the ones arriving in the summer of 2015. They had a lot of commonalities: predominantly males; age range between twenties and thirties; family financial support from the country of origin to make the trip...

It is important to highlight that many Iraqis living in Turku arrived in the 1990s escaping the Gulf war, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait followed by Desert Storm. Then after the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003, new waves of refugees were generated due to escalating violence and the emergence of ethnic tensions and sectarian clashes (La Vecchia-Mikkola 2013; Galletti, 2011; Yacoub, 2006; Sirkeci, 2005; Chatelard, 2003).

Hence, in the following section I display the narratives of Non-Iraqi interviewees to better understand how the Finnish society in Turku embraced all Iraqi migrants living there.

3.3 – NON-IRAQI ACCOUNTS ON IRAQIS’ CAPITALS AT PLAY IN THE FINNISH FIELD

I displayed in the paragraphs below important quotations from the interviews I conducted with Non-Iraqis directly involved with Iraqi migrant population in Finland. All interviews were done in English whether at the Migration Institute of Finland or at the workplace of the interviewee. I underlined the types of capitals which were employed in the Finnish national field to define mainly the networking strategies, the positionality and the level of inclusion or exclusion of the Iraqi migrants as agents in Finland as host society.

3.3.1- Co-founder of ‘We see you’¹⁴

The following quotations are from the co-founder of ‘We see you’ who is a young Swedish-speaking female Finn. ‘We see you’ started as a campaign on Facebook as a response to the mass refugee flow in the summer of 2015 faced by the Finnish society. It was primarily directed to support the rights of asylum seekers in claiming asylum in Finland. It also organized social events to allow locals to get together with asylum seekers and to establish connections.

The action was induced by Finnish highly educated agents. Basically, the social capital of Iraqi asylum seekers was put at play in the Finnish dominant social field, triggering in a way, in the Swedish-speaking Finnish community in particular, a mechanism of desired - but not yet achieved - inclusion expressed by the former in the face of precautionary exclusion adopted by other Finnish social players. This contributed to the accumulation of a new social capital for the Iraqi migrants expressed in consolidated friendship ties with some Finns who could probably help them in the asylum process but also make them more visible and more welcome through future projects in collaboration with the municipal council of Turku:

(...) we formed like this group of mainly actually PhD students and staff who wanted to be somehow involved and then we organized one event for asylum seekers. And after that the group sort of started consisting of both asylum seekers and students and staff (...) to get to know each other (...) It was just to meet (...) just to sort of organize (...) a seminar called ‘starting your life in Finland’ (...) where we had people from Iraq who had come a bit before could come and they told about their experiences and sort of gave advice to newcomers (...) we did do a lot of social events and we became friends. I mean that’s how the group is today, that we’re friends (...)

(...) ‘We see you’ comes from: ‘We’ as kind of people living in Finland see the decision makers/the politicians (...) asking the decision makers to take responsibility and to ensure that the processes work well (...) at the same time, because we knew at that point that many people got negative decisions, we saw it in our friends how they changed from having a lot of hope (...) to then sort of be back in a situation where they don’t know if they can stay, so it was also ‘We see you’ as in we see decision makers and asylum seekers. And also because we knew that many asylum seekers lived in kind of faraway reception centres where they might not have seen that many Finnish people, like regularly at least, or that they felt quite alone, that it’s also kind of an online platform for coming together in that sense (...)

¹⁴ See Facebook page: ‘We see you’. Website: <https://weseeyoufinland.wordpress.com> (last visited on 28 January 2021).

(...) we have been wondering also because we have been quite a Swedish speaking campaign, in the sense that all of us (...) like the group who were active from the start, our language is Swedish like the language that we communicate with each other, and of course like on the Facebook page we share a lot of Swedish media news, partly because Swedish is our language but also because (...) the Swedish speaking media in Finland writes much more about the asylum politics and situation than the Finnish. (...) Like ours is maybe the quite Swedish speaking and also that we have a lot of cultural things in our campaigning, like that we on one hand it is about a political goal and political lobbying, but it is also bringing people together through different forms of culture also raising awareness to different forms of culture (...)

(...) I would say like yes it is about inclusion, it is about doing things together but it's more broadly about society in that sense (...) it's not only about kind of helping asylum seekers but it's more about like creating a kind of society where people meet (...) 'We see you' goes back to like what has happened since 2015, (...) most people do have connections and friends and networks because they have been here for more than two years, two and a half years. Also maybe that the campaign builds on friendships who are that kind of existed already before the campaign, here in Turku partly from the 'Åbo Akademi' group and in other places based on like people just knowing each other. (...)

. (...) So yes there has been a lot of like assisting, assisting with the cases, just kind of reading through a person's decision and interview and comparing to see if he says something that does not make sense or something like that; helping with like if something has happened during the time they have been in Finland then to help with like adding it to their case or if they have to make a complete new case if it has already gone through the process; also going with people when they get their negative decisions; going with people to see their lawyers; going with people to various kinds of like meetings with authorities where we have also noticed that it is good to have somebody there who knows the process (...) all the papers that they have from their interviews and also the decision are in Finnish. So, most people are not able to read their own decisions. And they get told like they have at least one meeting where an interpreter reviews it (...)

(...) Then unfortunately I must say because we had, last summer we had some very active Iraqi guys who I think, at least, some of them have lost hope in that sense that they don't believe, they don't believe that things will get better and they are really tired. I mean, I guess also from like personally getting negative decisions and such. They are still here, yes. (...) We have Iraqis on board, yes. (...) We have actually been thinking now because we have had this cooperation with the city council for almost a year, that when it is Ramadan that we would organize like one of these 'Iftar' meals and invite the politicians and to use that just as a kind of honour (...) Because it is important for those people, I know it is important for the ones who do Ramadan and that especially kind of eating together during Ramadan is important. Yes and that's how like our guys have also explained that it is about unity and coming together. So to invite the city council to that and to just have like a meal together,

share that, talk a little bit about maybe like life of Muslims in Finland but also to just sort of come together as people (...).

3.3.2- Programme Coordinator of ‘Entry Education’¹⁵ Private Company

These extracts below come from the interview with the Programme Coordinator of ‘Entry Education’. She is a young Muslim woman half-Iraqi and half-Finnish. She is married to a relative of hers, an Iraqi Muslim who came to Finland through family reunification. I did not meet the husband as part of the Iraqi group. Thus, I included her interviewee, with the non-Iraqi group because she was born Finnish having an Iraqi father who arrived to Finland for marriage purpose in the early 1970s. Her contribution explained how the cultural capital in its institutionalized form (education and skills), the acquired linguistic capital, and, to some extent, the religious capital of Iraqi migrants, especially those who already obtained a residence permit - regardless of its type, could serve the migrant to accumulate economic capital and thus engage actively in the game played in the wide Finnish national field which encompasses the Finnish economic field. She also highlighted in her accounts that both public and private dimensions in the Finnish national field work together to include the Iraqi residents by making use of their accumulated cultural capital translated in competences and skills to enhance the production cycle in the Finnish economic field:

(...) It is an employment programme for all foreigners about (...) what is needed to enrol with it is to have the residence permit. So we have, we do have a lot of refugee backgrounds but unfortunately, they need to have it, yes just for the procedure to apply there. But we are helping them to get employed, at the same time we teach them the language if they still don’t know it (...) for all (both genders) and from anywhere background. It is very international. (...) this is private sector (...) the programme’s name is ‘Kotosib’ (...) so it is like immigration programme, immigration for work this is our idea (...) according to their requisites but within limits of course. It is what we have to offer. (...)

(...) Finnish is the primary language and official, but we use English as well (...) When they come to us they should at least know little bit either Finnish or English. (...) Mostly how they come is they join us and we make a three months agreement that they are with us for three months. Most of them join the daily courses, the daily language (...). It is for free and it is for the unemployed people who

¹⁵ See Website kotosib.fi (last visited on 28 January 2021).

are officially registered as unemployed so they get the unemployment benefit (...) from 'Kela' (the Social Insurance Institution of Finland) or from the union whatever it is. (...) The criteria must be: foreigner without a Finnish nationality/citizenship and unemployed, officially unemployed, and in the working age category (...) seventeen to sixty-three years. (...) It is kind of a recruiting agency for the companies: actually yes we are working between the employee and the employer so we are helping them both (...) to have some kind of basic knowledge of whether English or Finnish and to be able to write with Latin letters. (...)

(...) Most of our clients come from the unemployment office. They, for example, talk with them and recommend them to apply to us or send to them advertisement of us. Or like today we had info by the unemployment office, few of their workers came with a group, they had invited a group of unemployed people to us so we presented our programme to them and directly we gave them a form to fill if they wanted to apply to us. So they fill it, they are in place. And/or one can also apply through the website there is an open application as well, so this is very much used as well. (...)

(...) We do have a lot of them (Iraqis) coming. (...) They are quite many and they are all the time coming and most of them (...) they have the residence permit that is one of the requirements in order to apply to us. Many of them are from 2015. (...) There is as well female which is very welcomed (...) (Iraqi males) they are more (...) Now I am talking only about the Iraqis (...) just now today there were some young females as well and they were the ones who contacted me (...) I talk to them on a private matter (...) they tell me and when they apply to us there are some certain questions as well. There are questions about educational background, working background. (...) they have to fill all those questions and (...) all about their previous working life - if that exists, and education. And also basis of why they came here, they have to also fill what was the basis. Most of them are either family, family reasons or asylum seekers. Few of them only have been working previously in Iraq. Many of them were housewives probably or it's just young girls by then (...) and not many of them are highly educated. (...) they don't have much background (...)

(...) if we see that a person is a Muslim visibly (mainly female) (...) First we start from what's their desirable work, what they would like to work (...) and we try to help them with that, and, of course, we know that if there is some bar work or something, of course we don't offer them a work in a bar or something. But otherwise everything is open to them and I personally want to encourage them into any kind of work, to be active as females, I want to support them as much as possible and then to refer them to the employers. (...) I know that there are some for women like me (wearing headscarf) there are some jobs, some areas, some limitations, mostly they are at customer service fields, something like that. (...)

(...) We give also computer lessons. We help them (...) to write or to update their CVs using the computers; write applications; learn basic computer skills and so on. We help them also, we help in anything that helps them to get employed. Daily courses are from Mondays to Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays are off, yes. Four hours of computer lessons and four hours of continuous language course plus they have some homework, yes. (...)

3.3.3- Female Pastor - Pentecostal Church

The accounts of this female pastor from the Pentecostal Church, who is a Finnish-speaking Finn, tackle mainly the issue of converting the religious capital in favour of creating social networks between Iraqi migrants and Christian Finns, but also in favour of getting assistance in the asylum process of those who still are in that phase or even getting other types of assistance. It is a form of inclusion in the Finnish religious sub-field inside of the Finnish national field of power. Although asylum seekers remain bench players in the Finnish game of power positions, they participate in little games played in some sub-fields, according to the established rules which stipulate who is in and who is out.

I tried to underscore the community factor that renders Iraqi converts unite in the face of Muslim Iraqis who, in turn, form another community struggling for dominance in the larger field of Arab Iraqi migrants. I also noticed here the issue of Arab identity which is usually interlinked with Islamic religion and now is in struggle. Indeed the formation of a new religious capital seems to be wiping off completely or - I argue - putting in a hidden box in a storage room for a possible future use, the old religious capital, the cultural heritage and the Iraqi traditional habitus ?!

(...) I was in centre in 2015 and then I met two Iraqis, in the city centre (...) and they touched me and they came with me to the church and then I just get to know them and I spent (...) a lot of time with them. And I had no idea to start like working (with) Iraqis but then one of them converted to Christianity after four or five months. And then the friends of him knew that (...) they knew that they can trust me and his friends and friends (of) friends. (...) So it was not my intention to start to work with Iraqis or refugees. It was God's plan. (...)

(...) Two guys moved to Helsinki because they were afraid to live here in Turku, just because here are so many Muslims. (...) This is I think the worst place for persecution (...).

(...) we have this kind of fellowship that we spend time together. And in my team, I have those interpreters, and then there are: one couple with us Finnish couple, and then two Finnish ladies and one Finnish man and, now, came another Finnish man to our group. So we have (...) very warm fellowship with them and spend time with them. And I'm especially I know every one of them. If they come to the group they first need to meet me. And I need to check are they honest; (...) are they really interested in Christianity or are they spies? This is possible (...) Because of course they want to know who are Christian here - The Muslims. Yes, they are now afraid to come here because everyone must come first to me (...) the head of this Arabic group (...) All of them are males (...)

(...) For instance we had yesterday a Finnish meeting. There was English interpretation not Arabic, but here (...) there were maybe twenty to thirty boys. And after that we had a meeting, Arabic meeting so translated to Arabic, and we prayed a lot and talked about Holy Spirit. (...) So, they are active. So we arrange three times a week Arabic lessons or Arabic meetings, and then are these Finnish meetings on Sunday and prayer meetings Finnish on Wednesday (...) they come there and enjoy the atmosphere (...) The atmosphere means a lot when they see that there is love and care and Holy Spirit gives that because we are followers of Jesus. (...)

(...) Many are still on the process (still asylum seekers) (...) we (church) give the certificates and Baptism certificates and certificates of how active they have been in church. If they go to court, (...) they have lawyers here in Finland. (...) Finland gives them lawyers and I contact the lawyers. I know the system now quite well and I have been three times in the court witnessing for them. So we take care of them because that was (what) Jesus said if they are hungry you didn't give them food, if they are without clothes you didn't give them clothes (...) If they are in need we need to help them. That's Christian love. (...) And for instance, if they are looking for apartment then other people help them. And I have said that I help you (the Iraqis) with these religious things, with Christian things and also with lawyers. (...)

(...) I know that there are some Islam people who just try to just try to take them back. For instance they give them work and they get some money from that and then they try to take them. I know this, I know this system. And there is a danger. I mean it is the same in a Finnish people. Not everyone who have come to church and been baptized, not everyone after ten years are Jesus followers. (...) I want them to feel free here with us because the Islam background is so hard, (...) is so heavy and they have been treated so badly. So there is a big difference between Islam and Christianity and now I can see that they are growing. (...) Many of them are preaching to their friends and they have been (...) persecuted (...) in closed circles and it is nice because I myself I have done it, so one after other. (...)

(...) There have been some people who understood that Christianity is not their thing. And because also they noticed that I really check that they are real. I know that there is some people who just came to get the paper (...).

The Finnish meeting (...) there is English translation. (...) You get a better picture from our church if you come to the Finnish meeting because then you see the integration. (...)

3.3.4- Director of 'DaisyLadies ry'¹⁶

This lady is the founder and director of 'DaisyLadies' Association for women empowerment. She is in her early seventies. She is originally a Muslim Turk. She was married with a Finn long time ago but at the time of the interview she was already divorced from him. In her quotations, I examined the networking between women foreigners residing in Turku among themselves and then with the Finns. The exchange in cultural capitals in the forms of traditions and culinary customs, the acquisition of linguistic capital, all of which contribute to the relatively recent image of Finland as a multicultural society encouraging integration by cultural adaptation:

(...) in 2000, I start to talk with the ladies or the ladies start to talk with me, the foreign ladies that 'life is getting too hard here and what can we do together?' And all together we decided let's found some association, ladies association, just for the ladies and start working. (...) We found the Association. I gave the name 'DaisyLadies' and we were I think four in the beginning. And it grow (grew) (...) Now we are many (...) hundreds in the association (...).

(...) Ladies (...) active and they have to know what's going around in their society because they are the key for the society (...). Mothers are very (...) important in their society because mother opens the door and growing of children. (...) So if you focus the mother, the lady, so I think we can, we do a lot of good thing for the society. And this is the one of the biggest reason why I want to work just only with the women. (...)

(...) Iraqi ladies they are cooking. They are very (...) good cook because like they are good what they are doing it back home. I mean they are mother(s), they know how to work in family. They are growing their children. They are cleaning their house. They are cooking for whole family (...) they have a lot of neighbours. They know how to get along with their neighbours and like this visiting each other and then sharing all the joys and the sadness. They are very (...) good for that. And in those society, we live in the society together not like in Finland, person alone. (...) We live in a society. (...) We are family. (...)

¹⁶ See Website: <http://daisyladies.fi/fi/> (last visited on 28 January 2021).

(...) as long as I am leading (...) this is very important in that first we will find out what the ladies are good at. And after that we'll try to move them to Finnish society that the Finnish society will accept their handworks, doing the things: this (...) handicraft or cooking or so (...) For example I cook Turkish food but maybe I make it less spicy (...) But in Finland people use this kind of things, people like that kind of things, so just orient to moderate those things. So we are teaching here. And then we are telling them that there are what kind of different of profession here in Finland, because it's not like their country, woman doesn't go to work that easily. And then the value, woman's value in Iraq and in Finland it's completely different. In Finland we give value such the ladies that they study very good (well), and they are working. But in Iraqi countries I think the most important valuable thing is that she is a good mother and wife. (...) That is a very delicate point which we try to make them smoothly, you know (...)

(...) In this house in one day thirty-five to forty-five maybe fifty people are coming every day. (...) Legal (resident) or non-legal (asylum seeker) they are very much welcome because, in my opinion, they are the one who badly need it to be somewhere, to do something, to learn something, share something, get friend. (...) they come in the morning 9 o'clock, and who comes first cooks the coffee and then we sit drink tea and coffee and we start talk what is today's programme is. And after that we listen news, we talk about what is happening in Finland, in whole world. (...) Everything is in Finnish. If you don't understand nothing then there somebody is allowed to translate to friend that understand. And after that 10 o'clock start the Finnish languages. We have lot of classes. Teachers are doing those levels: some are writing; some are starting in the beginning; some just conversation. And then in the same time we have (...) Computer courses. (...) And then the sawing (sewing); handicraft. (...) And then we have this 'Coffee Daisy', some goes kitchen start cook for to the lunch. And every day we have different country's food here. (...)

(...) Once in a month we have ladies' day: we are doing 'Falafel' eating that and then the dancing, making tattoos 'Hennas', cutting the hair, taking all the hair off. And lot of things, we are having a fun. (...) They are all together. (...) Integration for the foreigners integration for the Finnish people. They have to integrate. (...) It's not only me I'm coming in this society, I will integrate here. You supposed to integrate me too. I mean I give it I take it, same thing the other one give it and take it. Because this is which I understand integration. (...)

3.3.5- Female Pastor - Lutheran Church

This is a female pastor from the Lutheran Church who is a Swedish-speaking Finn. In the below excerpts, she explained her role in assisting asylum seekers in the process of asylum, regardless of them converting or not. She also described the tight cooperation with the Finnish Red Cross in the emergency response to the refugee crisis

through large scale social activities. Then, she went into the conversion process adopted in the Lutheran Church and the common understanding reached between their Church and the Finnish Immigration services “Migri” in the investigation regarding Iraqi asylum seekers who converted to Christianity.

Clearly, Iraqi migrants accumulated an important social capital through converting their old religious capital into a new religious one more adequate to the local Finnish society that, in turn, was offering help in their asylum process. It is somehow a relative inclusion in the Finnish religious sub-field, the Lutheran one, which allowed Iraqis to enter the game but with certain limitations such as the language barrier, the time span and the insertion in a specific group - the Arabic-speaking one, with the presence of translators or the use of English in some cases - in order to become fully immersed in the active life of the church as a whole later on.

Here also, I noticed from the pastor’s quotations the formation of a sub-ethnic community which is somehow detached from Arab Iraqi Muslim community and the very existence of it is being challenged by the former. So now we have an Arab Iraqi converts Lutheran community protected by the dominant Finnish Lutheran community and fought by the Arab Iraqi Muslim community.

What is interesting as well is that there’s an important involvement of Swedish-speaking Finns and of women volunteering to assist Iraqi asylum seekers:

(...) The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland came out with a Church Asylum Guidelines because (...) people coming to churches asking for church asylum. (...) we don’t do missionary work especially in the refugee centre here in ‘Pansio’ because that’s actually our clear line we’ve agreed with the (Finnish) Red Cross that we’re not trying to convert people there, but through our work helping asylum seekers, we’ve had many people who’ve gotten interested in Christianity and then have come to our church and asked about conversion. (...) One of the guidelines of this church asylum thing is to say straight in the beginning that this is not related to conversion in any way; we will help you no matter what is your faith and we are going to help regardless. (...)

(...) But then in 2015, this massive flow of refugees came to Finland and because we have this refugee camp in ‘Pansio’ which is the area of our church (...) we have a church café nearby that cooked meals for them in cooperation with the Red Cross we arranged it. We have very good working relationship with them. So we arranged that we would, for example, for a few months we did, was it dinner, for a specific part of their camp because their kitchen was not able to, and then we had a major

clothing recycling centre in this same church café which is near the refugee camp, where we would get all the Red Cross clothing donations that they received around Finland and we would sort them out and hand them out to the refugees. (...) And doing that, we came into contact with a lot of the refugees who were mainly from Iraq (...)

(...) Church law dictates that confirmation classes should be about three months before baptism. (...) we find that this is also helps with Migri because then Migri also knows that what is our system that we don't just baptize people for knowing them one day which some free churches do, but that we actually have like class system where people know what they're getting into before they get baptized.(...)

(...) So then after or inside the first six months, we got the first few Iraqi men who started talking about conversion into Christianity. (...). Usually they all had some sort of contact with Christianity that, for example, they had had friends who were Christian or they had lived in a town where there were both of Christians and Muslims living together. (...) They came to us. (...)

(...) The translators, once we get into confirmation classes, had to be Christian because the concepts were too difficult otherwise and we wanted to be sure the translation was correct. And from that first class of Arabic speaking people who converted into Christianity we then later got our future translators because many of them did speak English. (...)

(...) I would say that the ones who are attracted to Christianity are probably from the modern side of the population in Iraq (...) Moderate yes and or they were so frightened by the extremism that that has made them sort of hate Muslim extremism. (...) Perhaps that they come into contact with our church at all means that they are attracted by the western lifestyle and they want to know what's going on with Christianity and so on. (...)

(...) So the first problems they (new converts) encountered were other Muslims and the sort of hate and isolation they got from them. So that's the first problems we experienced overall with our new Christians (...) especially the Iraqis. (...) as soon as they became Christians they started getting threats from other Iraqis at the refugee camp in Pansio. So very early on there was a guy who was beaten up. (...) Well bibles were stolen and crosses were torn from people's necks and there were a lot of threats going on. (...)

(...) So a lot of the Iraqis started to get negative decisions and that's when I started to more closely working with the asylum cases (...) then the Finnish system started to sort of pull in, making it more and more difficult to get asylum in Finland. So in the beginning we could help them more and even if they got negative (...) now the help we give them is, for example, go to the interview with them as support persons (...). And also once the first negatives came and then there were appeals then our church's followed of course like certificates of this person's Christianity, or like if they were active in

our church, do we know them personally and so on. (...) I'd say that there's been a lot of work done by the Council of churches in Finland, Ecumenical Council of churches, who've contacted 'Migri', who've had translation report lists for example. (...) So our church has done a lot of influence in work on a couple of specific individual cases. And then the Ecumenical Council of Finland has done work on sort of a larger, all converted Christians, they've worked together with 'Migri', they've had training sessions with 'Migri' about specifically the terms people use for Christianity and so on. So perhaps the level of knowledge of Christianity with the translators has gone up a little bit (...) And then it's important that you have a spokesperson with you in the interview (...) So then we've asked for example volunteers (as spokesperson) and work together with 'Kaikki Naisten Talo', the house for all women here in Turku (...) Swedish-speaking Finns clearly are overrepresented in this group of people who want to help refugees compared with the Finnish. (...)

(...) Iraqis were often young men so we thought that maybe (male pastor) is a better sort of role model for them anyway. (...) We have a separate baptism class and a separate bible group, because baptism class is sort of basic Christianity that we go over and over again because new people come (...) And by now the translators we used in our church are either people who converted early on and are good in language, or they're people who are born Christians and who help us with translation, for example Catholics. (...) Well by now we have such a lot of Arabic programming in our church. (...) The problem is that Finnish is so hard that really you have to get in to a class where you can learn Finnish several hours a day to learn Finnish. (...) We've had Finnish classes (...) that we helped, we had like retired Finnish teachers teach but they learned like such basic Finnish there because it was still once a week or twice a week that they wouldn't be able to practice their faith in that language. (...) Quite a lot of people have learned English during their stay here (...)

3.3.6- Male Pastor - Lutheran Church

The below citations are from a Swedish-speaking Finnish male pastor from the Lutheran Church. At the time of the interview, he was married and had four children.

He was the one who started the coffee place next to 'Pansio' reception centre during the substantial refugee inflow to Turku in the summer of 2015. He stated that he was the person directly in charge of the conversion process of the Iraqi migrants who were predominantly males.

I noticed in the pastor's quotations that the conversion of the Iraqis' original religious capital had caused some sort of damage to their cultural capital as in heritage and traditions, but also as sort of a disruption in their social capital back in the homeland, especially when he talked about cutting ties with the family and the relatives. So, Iraqi migrants, through converting their religious capital, are taking the risk of losing the

capitals they had accumulated at the country of origin. The question is that whether the convertibility is temporary and reversible or permanent and irreversible?!

It is obvious that Iraqi convert asylum seekers bond together creating a closed auto-protective community to counter the relatively dominant Iraqi Muslim community of citizens, residents and newcomers. So their social capital is a horizontal link among Iraqi converts themselves and a vertical link with the Finnish agents of the Lutheran local church.

In the end, I underlined another assertion that Swedish-speaking Finns seemed to be more tolerant and welcoming to the Iraqi newcomers, perhaps due to their position as a Finnish minority group in the Finnish national field:

(...) I arranged coffee place close to the reception camp in 'Pansio' 2015 that with my wife and I went also sometimes over to the reception camp and spoke with the refugees. It was when it came very much refugees in one time and every all places was like full and it was like little bit a chaotic situation in the reception camp. (...) It was my own initiative, our church works quite much like that. It's like if you have an idea you can present it to the church (...)

(...) Most of those people that came 2015 (...) they were Arabs so it was like the main part and that's also the main part that we have get now contact within the church even if there is other nationalities also (...) most of the Arabs was from Iraq but also some from Syria. But Iraq, Iraqi (Iraqi) is like the biggest one group that has been now like involved in our work and all the contacts we have with refugees before it was like more different in nationalities, and so but the biggest group is Iraqians (Iraqis). (...)

(...) I wanted to build a peaceful relationship so they could get to know Finnish people, they could get to know the church, they could get to know us (...) and we could get to know them. (...)

(...) So I was very amazed when the first one (...) wanted to speak like very secretly with me like because he was afraid of the other Muslim. (...). If they want to convert they are afraid that the other one will do something bad to them. It's the basic thing and they're also very afraid of that the other one will tell their families in their homeland. (...) And then I began to teach him and then they became like always like it's almost every week someone came like 'I want to become a Christian'. So I did not like invite anyone (...) everyone came like you know one by one (...) they just think they just begin by themselves to think that this is nice people, this is what this is Christianity. (...) The Iraqians (Iraqis) they're like one type they're like in a way very open and they like to speak, (...) they're very curious (...) for them it's easy to like get a conversation. (...) What they're afraid of is that their family will put them out because in that culture (...) then they are without protection. Their families

and their like relatives and their friends are the ones that belong to their group and they are like the ones that defending them and if they're outside from that group they are themselves and no one is defending (...)

(...) the Arabic people in the church they have very, they are like a group in the church that they protect each other, they take care of each other. So it's like they have changed (...) from one group to another group. (...) it's like that because the Muslims (...) push them out; they don't belong to that group anymore. So for the Arabic people it seems like a very big step to convert because it's like (...) they cut off all their history, their family, their culture, their religion like everything (...) some families reject them like you know totally; some families are like you know parents (...) always love their kids anyway, so they have like some kind of contact but secretly and they're like the parents are afraid that you know like that other people will know that they are converted (...) because if you leave Islam, you cannot be a part of the community anymore. (...)

(...) Many (...) come as in the time they are waiting for the decision, and that is also like ok it's a nice thing they want to become Christian, but it's also one thing that because we have also this rule that three months teaching before we can baptize anyone, at least three months before we baptize anyone in the Finnish Lutheran Church (...). And that is a good thing also in that way because in that time you can also a little bit like look, but even if it's a quite short time you can a little bit look like are they serious or not serious with this thing (...) that has also been a political problem because the immigration service say (...) that many of those converts (...) convert just to get asylum, to use it as a way to get asylum.(...) But we (...) cannot say like what is the truth about everyone, I mean because we cannot read people's hearts. I mean God can tell it but we cannot. (...)

(...) My main responsibility is with these converted and I have baptized most of them (...) because most of them are males and that is also why it's better for me to take care of them. (...) Maybe Swedish-speaking culture is more open yes, and also especially when it comes to refugees and other nationalities, and so the Swedish-speaking have maybe also (...) felt that we are a minority and we feel, we have felt a little bit like, you know, we have to speak up for ourselves. When it comes to other nationalities so we have like more maybe understanding of what it means to be a person in a minority or a person outside (...).

3.4 – IRAQI MIGRANTS' ACCOUNTS ON CAPITALS AT PLAY IN THE FINNISH FIELD

As in the previous chapter regarding the Lebanese field, the following paragraphs belong to some of the semi-structured interviews conducted with Iraqi people in the city of Turku, all in

Arabic except for one in English. I selected quotations that are most relevant to the study. The letters used here have nothing to do with the initials of my interviewees, for instance A is the first letter of the alphabet and F stands for Finland. With respect to the privacy of personal data, I omitted all precise information that might disclose the identity of my respondents in the matters of age and specific religious confession as well as village or city back in Iraq, although I kept religion as it constitutes an important factor in the migration choices and area of provenance in general to relatively situate the causes of the flight. In this context, most of the participants were men. I interviewed the vast majority at the office of the Migration Institute of Finland. Perhaps, me being a Lebanese Christian female allowed the creation of a trust bond and lessened, to a certain extent, the formal character of the place of the interview, particularly those performed at the institute. I conducted the other interviews in a workplace, or a gathering place or simply in a café.

3.4.1- Lady AF:

This is an Iraqi Muslim married woman from Central Iraq. She arrived to Finland in 1995 through the UNHCR after being detained in a Russian camp, since she had left Iraq from persecution under the Saddam regime via smuggling. Through the UNHCR resettlement programme, she was able to formally receive the recognition as a refugee and after many years she is now a Finnish citizen.

She had strong friendships with Iraqis who shared her same belief as a Muslim and living in Turku. Thus, she put at play her initial religious capital for the accumulation of a new social capital, in addition to an old social capital represented by strong family ties that she maintained with her siblings back in Iraq, mainly through internet and communication technologies. However, her connections with Finns remained formal and limited.

She developed her linguistic capital which contributed probably to the acquisition of the Finnish citizenship, useful for the integration in the Finnish national field as in the below citations:

(...) I was with my three children (...) my husband was not detained; he was in Russia, but me and the children we were in detention in the camp (...) When I came to Finland I applied for family reunification to bring my husband here (...) he came and brought another woman with him (...). Ever since he came we got divorced. (...)

(...) My parents are dead and my brothers and sisters are still in Iraq, in (Central Iraq) (...)

(...) I have friends (...) around five are very close (...) Iraqis and non-Iraqis. (...) The Finnish friends are not many. I mean a limited number (...) my relationship with them is formal. I mean I have no strong relationships with them. (...) With the Iraqis it is strong (...) both with men and women. My female friends and their husbands are close to me (...). I mean the women here (workplace) I mean I haven't got any outside here. (...)

(...) I used to be a preschool teacher in Iraq. (...) Now I work here at the kitchen (...) the food, the 'kahvi' (coffee). (...)

(...) I speak Arabic (Iraqi dialect) and Finnish. (...) I read Arabic and Finnish (...) I have the Finnish citizenship. (...)

(...) I love Iraq and I like to go back to live in Iraq with my relatives and my brothers and sisters but the situation, you know (...) and second we are used to live here (...). For my children, the situation here is better. (...) I had delivered my youngest son in Russia, I was pregnant when we left Iraq (...) I only have my relatives in Iraq and yes I speak with them over WhatsApp (...) My new husband bought me a new phone (...).

3.4.2- Lady BF:

This is another Iraqi Muslim married woman also coming from Central Iraq. She arrived to Finland in 2001 through family reunification. Her husband had arrived first through a smuggling channel and claimed political asylum in Finland. She is now a Finnish citizen.

She had strong friendships with a Palestinian woman and with her Finnish female neighbour, not so influenced by her religious capital to bond with others. In addition, her social capital stretched in Finland through some relatives and friends at her workplace. Kinship ties were strengthened through yearly visits to Iraq. She also had a sibling living in another European country.

She was already an active player in the Finnish national field of power, exercising her rights and duties as a citizen and benefiting from the welfare services in Finland, although she had desired to benefit from similar services in Iraq. Her initial educational capital could not convert to economic capital in the new Finnish setting probably due to her son's chronic illness. Nevertheless, she received subsidies from the Finnish government through caring for her sick child as in the following extracts:

(...) I have four children (...) all of them go to school (...) I have my cousin, the son of my maternal uncle, and my other cousin, the daughter of my maternal uncle (living in Finland) (...) my husband is my relative. (...)

(...) All of my family and relatives are still in Iraq. My father is dead, only my mother and brothers and sisters. I have just one brother in Austria but all the others are in Iraq, three brothers and two sisters there (...)

(...) I usually do not mingle a lot, (...) here (workplace) and the ones I know, approximately more than five friends. (...) They are Iraqis and there is one female Palestinian friend. (...) I have not asked them if they are also refugees, but surely no not from my religious affiliation, it is normal they are from other religious affiliations. (...) I have one female Finnish friend, my neighbour, who stays besides me. (...)

(...) We visit Iraq every year (...) I would like to (settle back in Iraq) but there is no cure there for my son. (...) He has a rare disease. (...) It is hereditary (...) his medication is not available (in Iraq). Even here, in Finland, his medication is not available they bring it from London. (...) His treatment is done at home but the medication is not available in Iraq and the government pays for it (in Finland). (...) So that's why we just go to Iraq for a visit to change some air (for a change) and come back; we take all his medication with us in a bag dedicated for that (...)

(...) I was a Mathematics teacher in Iraq only for one year before we left, in the public sector (...) I work with my son because he is sick (in Finland), since the government here, there is work 'omaista toki' that means taking care of a sick child. He goes to school but after school I take care of him because they have this system (...) they call it disability (...) they consider this as white work. (...)

(...) I speak Arabic, Finnish and English (...) I read all three (...) I write in Arabic, little English and in Finnish more important for schools, documents or other (...).

3.4.3- Lady CF:

Here is an Iraqi Muslim lady also from Central Iraq. She arrived to Finland in 2009 through family reunification. Her husband had fled three years earlier from Iraq due to multiple killing threats to highly educated persons, after the fall of the Saddam regime. He had reached Finland via smuggling. They are now Finnish citizens.

In constructing her new social capital, she excluded having any Finns in her circle of friends. She had a strong friendship with a Lebanese woman from the same religious affiliation. She also had friendly relations with her Iraqi female colleagues who shared her same religious affiliation too. Back in Iraq, she kept strong family ties since she travelled there practically every year.

Her initial cultural capital as an Iraqi Arab, in its embodied form or habitus, was being challenged with the development of a new form of Finnish habitus, especially when she explicitly expressed her worry about the true ethnic identity of her elder son.

The husband's initial cultural capital allowed him to accumulate more capital in terms of education in Finland. However, he was struggling to convert it into economic capital in the Finnish national field. Therefore, as the wife explained below, they might transfer this institutionalized form of cultural capital in another country, possibly where they already have family networks - the US - after the completion of the husband's doctoral studies. Perhaps, the convertibility of educational cultural capital into economic capital would be more possible there.

As for her own initial educational cultural capital, she managed to finish high school but did not attend any university degrees because of the Iraqi cultural heritage viewing women more as housewives than labourers. Nonetheless, she had a modest profession in Iraq which she continued to practice in Finland in a very limited context, generating a small economic capital, as described in the excerpts below:

(...) I have three children. (...) They go to school. (...)

I have no relatives in Finland (...) In Iraq I have my mother and my sister, my maternal uncles and my paternal uncles as well. (...) My dad passed away when I was a child. (...)

(...) I have friends whom I met here (workplace); I know them it's been four months mainly all the Iraqi ladies; and I have one close female friend, she is Lebanese (...) she is (Muslim confession) too. She lives here (Turku). (...) I have no Finnish friends (...)

(...) I am facing a bit of trouble with my elder son but with the others I have no problem because they are still very young (...) I mean I am keeping him in Finland but his culture should be Iraqi and Arab, the same goes to his manners. So it is a bit hard, I am clarifying this to him, but bit by bit. (...)

(...) It is possible for us to transfer to another country but not to Iraq for the moment because it is hard (...) we go there for a visit. We go almost every year there. I mean I go personally every year but the children not always (...) My husband does not like to go there (to Iraq) because all his family is abroad (...) His parents and his two brothers are in the United States (...). It is possible because for my husband it is not easy to find work here (...) If he finds work even in another country it will be normal to transfer even if it's in another continent. (...) He did not finish his doctoral programme yet (...) he is still studying at 'Åbo Akademi' a doctorate in (specialization). He had a Master's degree

in Iraq and was assigned as university teacher, and when he came here he started his doctoral programme. (...)

(...) I got married then I became a housewife. (...) I finished high school but I did not continue for higher education. (...) I was working as a (women) hairdresser at home (...) as a free profession. (...) I still practice the same profession but only at home and not so frequent (...) only for my female friends and some other people. (...)

3.4.4- Lady DF:

Now, this is an Iraqi Muslim lady also from Central Iraq. She arrived to Finland in 1997 through the UNHCR resettlement programme, after living for seven years in a camp in Saudi Arabia with her family at a young age. Then after years in Finland, she got married with an Iraqi asylum seeker from the same religious affiliation who had claimed asylum in another Nordic country, after the fall of the Saddam regime.

Her social capital extended between family networks in Finland, in Iraq and in the US. She also had some weak ties with some Finns and moderate ties with Iraqis, namely the ladies who worked with her and shared her same cultural and religious capitals. Among those Iraqi ladies, she developed a stronger connection with one in particular.

Arriving as a minor to Finland with health conditions, she was not able to accumulate the necessary linguistic capital to apply for the Finnish citizenship and fully participate as a key player in the Finnish social field. Thus, she only received a permanent residence. She had an initial economic capital - a house - back in Iraq, useful for her yearly visit to Iraq.

Her husband became a Finnish citizen and he was the one generating economic capital through work in the Finnish national field. Below are some quotations from the interview:

(...) We are six girls and three boys but not all of us left. We left as four girls, three boys and my mother and my father. (...) The other two were married (...) I am the youngest. (...)

We arrived to Finland by plane through the Resettlement plan of UNHCR. (...) Only my brother and I arrived here along with my mother and father, so four. We were the youngest in the family, my brother and I. (...) My mother and my father passed away. My brothers and sisters got married (...) One brother is in Helsinki. Another one is in Lahti and the other in Turku. (...) Two sisters went back to Iraq and one is in the United States. (...) When we were in Saudi Arabia she got married and went to the United States (...)

(...) I am a legal resident. I hold the permanent residence (...) I did not enter any courses, just one course so my Finnish language was not so strong at first. (...) I was sick before I got married. My health conditions did not allow me. (...) I had an operation. (...)

(...) I go there (Iraq) once or twice a year approximately, depends on the situation. I go there for my children not for me. I go to Iraq so my husband's family gets to see the children. (...)

(...) I have friends (...) from outside and some here (workplace) too. (...) I have some Finnish friends but not close friends. (...) I know them like acquaintance. (...) With the Iraqis it is a regular friendship, a moderate relationship (...) it is hard to consider them as sisters. I have only one, (female friend) who is close to me. (...)

(...) I speak Arabic and Finnish, no English. (...) I read and write Arabic and Finnish. (...) In Finland, it's not that there is no communication but you know communication requires a strong language. I haven't got a strong language (...)

(...) My husband is Iraqi. He left Iraq through smuggling. He was living in Norway. He was smuggled to Norway due to the situation that occurred after the fall of Saddam, because there was execution on identity (...) He was an asylum seeker but did not get the residence. So he came here and we got married. (...) They gave him a legal residence on the basis that I had a child. (...) My husband has the Finnish citizenship because he works and my children have it too (...).

3.4.5- Lady EF:

This last Iraqi Muslim lady, also from Central Iraq, came to Finland in 2006 through family reunification. Her husband had arrived to Finland many years before her through UNHCR resettlement programme from Afghanistan in 1987. He was married to a Finnish woman but then got a divorce. Currently, all members of the family (husband and children including her) hold a permanent residence in Finland.

Basically, her social capital comprised her own family network back in Iraq and her husband's family network in Iraq and in other Nordic countries. She also built new relations with co-nationals who lived in Turku and shared the same values and religious affiliation. She closely bonded with a Moroccan woman and got friendly connections with some Finnish ladies. However, her new social capital had a gender-oriented trait and this is probably connected to her habitus as an Iraqi Muslim woman.

The husband's cultural capital in terms of writing skills in Finland did not contribute for a more convenient job in the Finnish labour market. Instead of working in journalism, he was

working as a bus driver. Nevertheless, what was more important for him in the Finnish national field was the production of income as a form of economic capital.

The wife, instead, chose to view the Finnish society as a host rather than a home. Therefore, she seemed more like a bench player than an active player in the Finnish game, at least while she was staying at home raising the children and when she explicitly shared her feeling of belonging entirely to Iraq. It is clear that being a religiously committed and a traditional Iraqi housewife had reasonably affected her position in the Finnish national field. Indeed, her Iraqi cultural heritage and her religious capital influenced the way she raised her children at home transmitting to them the Arab Muslim identity since their father was described as rather secular.

Later on, though, she seemed to have gotten engaged in accumulating linguistic capital in order to apply for Finnish citizenship to enhance her position in the future within the Finnish national field as follows:

(...) My husband was a journalist and he was against Saddam regime. (...) He had applied to the UNHCR (...) so he came to Turku in Finland. (...). He stayed here living alone then after a year or so he got married to a Finnish woman and he's got four children from her. But they did not remain together because neither the customs and traditions nor religion allowed it. (...) In 2004, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, he went for the first time to Iraq. (...) So he wanted to get married. (...) He was a friend of my uncle, so they used to come to our house. (...) He saw for instance the way we live (...) and liked to marry from our environment because we are a conservative family, we do not meet people. (...) We got married in Iraq and had my daughter in Iraq. He was working on the family reunification application during my pregnancy. (...)

(...) He does not have the Finnish citizenship. He has a permanent residence permit because his plan was to return to Iraq because he has properties in Iraq, agricultural lands (...). He is a secular educated man, a journalist, writer and poet. (...) Now my husband works as a bus driver. (...) He is not religiously committed, I am committed. (...) since I arrived here till now I stayed home taking care of the children because I was getting pregnant and delivering (...) so I didn't learn Finnish except for one time I enrolled in a course for one year but I am getting along fine with it. (...)

(...) My mother, my father, my sister, my brothers all are in Iraq. (...) My husband's family is also in Iraq except for his two brothers in Sweden and his two sisters in Denmark (...) I have friends in Finland. They are many but the closest ones are five persons and I have a Moroccan female friend whom I consider a special friend (...) they are mostly women. (...) I have good relations with Finnish

people (...) I have two Finnish female friends. We have a good relationship, they come to my house to eat and talk together. It's only courtesy visits because of the children. (...)

(...) My children are studying at school, they are still young. (...) We all have a permanent residence permit. (...) My children are raised as Arabs hundred per cent at home. (...) They were all born here (Finland) (...) except for the older daughter who was born in Iraq and the other four, three sons and one daughter were born here. (...)

(...) Finland does not compensate for me. (...) It is a host country which offers a comfortable living and provides safety but I belong to Iraq in mould and heart and in body and mind. (...)

(...) I am now training in sewing and learning Finnish language (...) I speak Finnish, Arabic and a bit of English at least some words that I understand (...) I read Finnish and Arabic and I write the same, Arabic and Finnish (...)

3.4.6- Man AF:

Here is a young Iraqi man from Nineveh Valley. He is single. He did not recognize himself as a Muslim as stated below. He came to Finland through smuggling channels in late 2013. Eventually, he got the refugee status in 2014 and, at the time of the interview, he was holding a residence permit. He fled from the worsening security situation in Iraq and the concomitant killing of journalists, even before ISIS insurgence.

His institutionalized cultural capital through higher education and his linguistic capital - although he did not acquire the desired level of Finnish language to apply for citizenship yet – allowed him somehow to enhance his position in the Finnish national field of power.

Indeed, he had already obtained a residence permit and was receiving economic subsidies from the government in return of accumulating working experiences through multiple training settings. Hence, he widened his social capital and created beneficial networks with fellow Iraqis, with some Finns and even with foreigners living in Finland. Adding to this new social capital, he kept strong ties with his family members back in Iraq and with his siblings in other European countries mainly through internet technologies.

Describing his relation with Finnish people, he indicated that it is more of an acquaintance than a friendship. Although it is friendly but there is very little exchange in

conversation. In any case, this pushed him to adapt his cultural habitus to the new environment.

Ultimately, he somehow integrated in the Finnish social world by being already partially detached from Iraqi religious and embodied cultural heritage, as well as through cultural adaptation and openness to other migrants residing in Finland, as seen in the below extracts:

(...) I don't belong to any religious affiliation, I take what is useful for me from all the religions
(...) Well even before the arrival of Daesh (ISIS), the security situation was already bad at times even worse than while Daesh was present, and because of my work as a journalist (...) Honestly we do not get threats in the media field we are directly killed (...)

(...) I studied translation (...) from English to Arabic and from Arabic to English, the two languages at the Faculty of Letters of (name of city) University (...) I was working in the media field
(...) I got some courses of journalism at the channel. (...)

(...) I remained five to six months as an asylum seeker before I got the refugee recognition. (...)

(...) I have two of my brothers, who arrived lately: one in Belgium and the other in Switzerland; they left Iraq during Daesh ruling. (...) We are all eleven (...) three girls and eight boys. (...) My parents are alive. (...) I am in contact with them through Facebook mainly. (...) I use WhatsApp sometimes with my brother in Switzerland. (...)

I have friends actually (...) not many, very few, less than ten people, Iraqis I mean (...) they are refugees. (...) They belong to Islam I mean (...) I met them here (...) they arrived after me. The Iraqi friends, I can trust them at least. (...) I have friends from Latin America not refugees, they are residents here. Also I have from Germany. (...) I have also a friend from Spain, she is among the people whom I trust; I consider her like my Iraqi friends (...) this Spanish girl I trust her like she trusts me, I talk to her and she talks to me. (...) I have Finnish acquaintances not really considered as friends. (...) My relation with them (Finns) is determined within the concept of friendship found here unlike the concept of friendship that we have. (...) I mean, for example, I don't call them on the phone. I use their way, with friendliness. (...) They invited me to an event, for example Mid-Summer event or Finland's Independence day or Mid-Winter event; they even create their own events to meet together, so we meet and there is music and Karaoke at home, they sing and stuff. (...) Dialogue is scarce but this is their concept of friendship. (...) This is the concept available for us to meet together (...)

(...) Well I want the citizenship of course and I have applied for the permanent residence. (...) Then for the citizenship, it is after I adjust the language. (...) I speak Arabic and English. I also can manage with a bit of Finnish and a bit of Polish because I had a Polish girlfriend (...) in the past (...) she was here in Finland and we used to always visit each other, from time to time. (...)

(...) Currently, I have here what is known as training, paid training (...). First I had training in the Library of Turku then training in an online radio. (...) It's from three to six months. I try to create a network in every place I train. (...) It is paid in addition to a basic salary. Surely there is a basic salary {...} Euro and this training work adds to the basic salary {...} Euro... (...) They (government) pay the rent, the electricity bill (...) the health services (...) I mean all the necessary things even they pay the Sauna (...) I rented the place on my own and they pay the rent. (...)

3.4.7- Man BF:

The account below is also from a young single Muslim man from Central Iraq. He arrived to Finland in 2015 through smuggling channels, during the mass inflow of migrants reaching Europe. He fled from fear of being killed since his ideas as media professional did not match with the religiously and politically-oriented social fabric of Iraq. This man is highly educated. He already got a residence permit and was actively participating in the awareness campaigns which put together Finns and asylum seekers, specifically Iraqis.

His cultural capital encompasses a mutable and transformable habitus enriched with dispositions acquired from the Arab Oriental Iraqi society and family transmitted values, but inculcating with westernized ideas of feminism which somehow oppose the traditional Iraqi Muslim habitus. He was still trying to integrate in the Finnish society through cultural adaptation. However, although this young migrant explicitly manifested his willingness to enter in a relationship with Finnish people, he presented some sort of a 'tormented habitus', looking at his apparently evolving habitus in a totally new setting but rather truly stuck in the dispositions and attitudes he acquired outside Finland, whether in Iraq or in India.

Thus, I underlined the struggle during the accumulation of a new social capital in the Finnish social field. Indeed there seemed to be a challenge in his relations with Finns between a dominating Finnish culture and a dominated Arab Iraqi Muslim migrant culture. This prevented somehow the true cultural exchange and acceptance of the other, but also weakened the bond between the Iraqi migrant and the Finnish friend. The below citations can give a clearer picture of the abovementioned struggle:

(...) I graduated from the faculty of Letters Department of English language so I worked directly (...) presenter on TV. (...) I was a media professional (...) I was a young Iraqi Muslim man (...) very active in the feminist movement, and at the same time, I had some debatable ideas about the existing religious details in some governments (...). So, I had some trouble in the media field, both sectarian and political. (...)

(...) Then I got the opportunity to travel so I left and went to study in India (...) Master's degree in English language - (specialization name) (...) and at the same time I was studying there political sciences. (...) I was working there too. I worked as a chef in a restaurant. I also worked as an interpreter in two hospitals from Arabic into English, because the majority of the patients came from Iraq, from Qatar, from Saudi Arabia. (...) I have a certificate of a higher diploma in Human Rights, International Law, International Relations (...)

I returned to Iraq (...) I claimed some rights. I mean I had a lot of changes in thoughts, so I faced some problems in our region because our region is very tribal and I did not (...) any opportunities, so I applied to the District (Kurdistan). (...) I was the best university teacher in the District as an Arab and they rewarded me with a laptop. (...). Daesh (ISIS) started at the end of 2013. I was visiting my parents (Central Iraq). (...) The visit means that I am bringing money to my parents. (...) I stayed in Kurdistan until the situation became very exhausting (...) 2015 was the worst year. (...)

(...) When I first came (to Finland) (...) I was still at the camp. (...) So a lot of people used to come to us from the University, so they saw my English language they said it was nice and very excellent, I see it as limited. But they saw that I had degrees and that I was a teacher so they said 'why don't you come to give a lecture?' So, I started giving lectures in the camp about media information, political sciences, integration, religion (...) So I tried as much as possible, even partially, to change this point of view about us Iraqi young men in a particular way, and about asylum seekers in a general way. Then I started writing articles. I have a blog in a Swedish Finnish journal in Swedish language but I write in my blog in English. (...)

(...) There is one point that really bothers me that they call us immigrants and they call the others who are Europeans or non-Europeans, coming from other places, they call them expats. This has a certain type of superior and inferior. (...)

(...) Then, I saw that the Finnish society is very nice, it only needs a certain person to make it understand who an Iraqi is, what the Iraqi society is or (...) the oriental society, the oriental person, the concept there, the customs, the cultures, the traditions. (...)

(...) I had an experience with a Finnish woman, but it was a failed experience maybe it is because of me or maybe it is because of her, because I am not from the kind of people thirsty for sex or just showing off to be social and go out. I want a person that I choose. (...) I choose the person not the person chooses me and manipulates me. I am ultimately an oriental man, it is true that I am civilized (...) we got separated and now there is a friendship between us and respect, but the culture was quite

different than my culture so we reached a point when she could not tolerate my culture although I did tolerate hers. (...)

(...) I have a lot of friendships with Finnish people but it has limits (...) I had an experience with a Finnish family. So this experience made me focus on the details of my relations with others because here (...) I don't like to come to a country I don't like to be forced to learn all its traditions, its language, and they don't take anything from my traditions. (...) the type you should behave like the Finns behave, but when I behave as an Iraqi in terms of traditions and culture you reject this (...)

(...) I have a lot of refugees (friends) from Afghanistan, from Iran, from Africa. (...) We can call it brotherhood (...) strong to a certain extent because I am from the type of people who does not give blind trust to any person, but I lived with them in an apartment for two years (...)

(...) It is true that I acclimatize and I integrate in the society, but it is not necessary to abandon my customs and traditions. (...) I always talk to the Finnish people about the harmony in the family, the social nucleus (...) I always talk to them about taking care of their mother and their father, our customs and traditions. (...) I feel myself as integrated but I would like to possess the language only for the citizenship. (...)

3.4.8- Man CF:

The following excerpt belongs to a single Muslim man in his twenties from Central Iraq. He preferred talking in English during the interview. He came to Finland in the summer of 2015 also via smuggling, with the massive arrivals of migrants to the European continent. Previously, this young man had lived abroad in two different Arab countries for work as a trader with his father, but then, when he returned to Iraq, the security situation in the country was worsening so he decided to leave following his friends to Europe, and particularly one friend already settled in Finland. Later on, he converted to a Lutheran Christian. At the time of the interview, he was still an asylum seeker and had already received three negative decisions from the Finnish migration services 'Migri'.

I noticed that the social capital of this young Iraqi asylum seeker evolved quickly in the Finnish context creating friendships with the Finns, with the foreigners, and with Iraqi co-nationals, to a certain extent, since he was excluded (both his auto-exclusion and their rejection) from the Iraqi Muslim community in Turku. He even created networks

with people who have different sexual orientations, a category of people principally inadmissible in the traditional and conservative Muslim Iraq.

He accumulated linguistic capital to enhance his networking tactics in the Finnish social world. Thus, even if he is legally not yet fully immersed in the Finnish national field, he seemed as an active player in the local Lutheran church field.

On one hand, the transformation of his original religious capital into a new one affected his initial social capital: it inevitably created a partial cut in the ties with the family in Iraq and it seriously affected his traditional Islamic cultural heritage when he deliberately embodied this conversion through getting a tattoo of the cross (clear Christian symbol) on his chest. On the other hand, the new religious capital is providing him with church protection and support.

Ultimately, as an Iraqi asylum seeker and for reasons beyond his control, he was still struggling to achieve the desired full entry into the Finnish national field, although he made a strenuous effort and engaged all types of capital to enter the game, as he explicitly put it in the last quotation.

(...) I chose Finland because one of my friend, he called me and he said 'hey, come here bro' (...) he is from Iraq. (...) my best friend, he is now in Helsinki yes, it was a different situation he came before me and he got all the papers (...) 2014, yes (...)

(...) I have friends thousands even more yes, ten per cent they are from Iraq and ten per cent they are foreigners like and eighty per cent they are Finnish and Swedish (...) most of them are Christians and Jewish and some are Muslims. (...) And also I have a Lobnanian (Lebanese) friend (...) born in Sweden. (...) I have a lot of friends, they are gays and lesbians. (...)

(...) I speak, read and write Arabic of course yes there (church) translating yes English and Finnish. (...) I learned more Finnish or studied Finnish at the reception centre, I was the only one because they didn't accept me in (...) language schools because they said I should have residence permission. (...) I was studying at home four hours and five hours at school. (...) Because I'm a talented person (...) I would like to know everything (...) I'm the only one who was helping to translate in Finnish like for six months (...) also that's the reason why I am speaking very well right now Finnish. And it helped me (...) because I like this community, culture. (...) I like people (...)

(...) Beginning 2017 and three months studying Bible School, then I believed in Jesus as a Lord and Saviour and I (got) baptized. (...) I'm the kid of the church, 'ana ibn al kanissa' (I am the church's son) and twenty four seven I'm like active there. (...) I've been like almost one and a half

year living with Finnish family, yes. (...) They belong to the church but just 'Mummu' (grandmother in Finnish) my step- grandmother. (...) She is yes religious (...).

(...) He (his father) threatened me (...) he say like 'ana metbarri minnak' (I deny knowing you) (...) my father when he saw my Instagram page I put my picture, my cross (tattoo on the chest), he got confirmed that I'm Christian. (...) I'm afraid about my mom and because I don't want to lose her, because she's always in touch with me. (...) she (mother) say(s) 'whatever you want to be you will be, you will stay in my heart and my son'. (...) Actually my father said to mom that 'I will know that you are in touch with him' (...) he will divorce her or something (...) Three months ago he (father) sent some message on WhatsApp that 'you are an infidel' (...) 'you are not my kid, you are not my son' stuff like that. (...) Actually I got attacked from Arabs, Muslims (in Turku) (...) I've been attacked because of my Christianity (...) they hate me (...)

(...) I'm still an asylum seeker (...) in between first of 2017 (...) I asked for asylum and they gave me a negative (decision) after a few months. Then I (...) appealed to the court again I put some new information for new application. Then they reconfirmed it to Immigration Services, then I went back to immigration and they made my interview then I got again negative. Then by 2017, I became Christian. (...) and at that time another appeal (...) almost one year I've been waiting my decision they got me a negative and they were like 'ok put on some new story' stuff like that just like teasing me. (...) They (Migri) want more proofs and I have a lot of proofs that I'm not a fake. I'm not a fake Christian. (...) In the beginning I said that I'm a gay, yes. I pretend that but they said they didn't believe, 'you are faking'; then when I became a Christian I told them truth (...).

(...) why I love Finnish friends, because like they are ready to hell (offer maximum help) with me like just imagine that two of my best friends they promised me to marry me, girls, yes to marry me to get that citizenship or permission or something like that (...)

(...) They (church) are by my side they'll never give up with me. (...) I will appeal again, no one will deport me because church is scratching my back, support me. (...)

(...) I don't want to leave Finland (...) Finland is my country. (...) I feel that, you know, I have a new life. I have good hope. I have a goal. I have dreams and I will achieve them and I'm dedicated. I'm experienced (...) I mean the motivation is strong, you know, it cost big money and it cost me a lot to learn this language (...) It's really challenge, it's something big (...).

3.4.9- Man DF:

The underneath quotations are also from an Iraqi young man in his twenties, Muslim by identification but not by belief since his parents were atheists, as he asserted. He came from Central Iraq, smuggled to Finland in the summer of 2015 during the massive migrant flows to Europe. He fled from killing threats in Iraq. He later converted to a

Pentecostal Christian. At the time of the interview, he was still an asylum seeker and had already received two negative decisions from the Finnish migration services 'Migri'.

I highlighted here the transformative dynamics in this young man's religious capital. Undoubtedly, the conversion to Christianity led to some serious repercussions on this migrant's life. On one hand, it induced in Finland a negative perception by Iraqi Muslim migrants who did not convert, thus questioning the validity of his identity as an Iraqi Arab. On the other hand, it caused an unavoidable separation from his family members in Iraq, which was not a voluntary banning from their side, but as a preventive measure, both sides had to cut ties to avoid possible threats to the family.

What is noticeable as well is that now his new social world is strictly governed by his new religious capital. In other words, it is exclusively within the church's field that he activates his social networking strategy, in a way to prevent himself from getting in trouble with the Iraqi Muslim community and to secure protection and support of the Iraqi and the Finnish members of the church.

The initial linguistic capital was put at play for him to assume some responsibility as a teacher for fellow Iraqi members in the church and to communicate with the Finns. Nevertheless, the accumulation of a new linguistic capital requires time but also regularity in his legal status, i.e. to be recognized as a refugee in order to enrol in a Finnish language school.

Regarding his 'coming to faith in Christ' experience, I argue that through listening to a testimony which solicited the memory of regretful life events in his past, and through the somewhat present better off situation of the preacher in question, the former internalized an external event favouring the formation of a set of new dispositions in the Iraqi migrant's habitus that was already mutating through time and space. After all, the habitus is regulated by both the capital and the field: in this case, the religious capital of the migrant was not bound to any initial positive impact from Islam as a religion - since he described himself and his family below as atheists. Eventually, the Finnish field, where the game was played, had an ideal Christian trait.

(...) It was because of religion because my parents were not Muslims, you could say they were atheists (...) I was personally under threat not only my parents. (...) My family is still in Iraq. (...) My mother, my brother and two sisters (...) But I don't know anything about them (...) I can neither

contact them nor they can contact me (...) they are threatened because of me, from my relatives and the militias. (...)

(...) I am here alone (...) I am an asylum seeker and I have no residence permit. (...) When I first arrived I had few Muslim friends (...) but now no because they basically reject me personally. (...)

(...) I started believing (...) in December 2016 (...) he (pastor) used to come to the camp (in Laitila) but I could not understand him because he used to speak in Finnish. (...) I did not think of the existence of God. (...) One of these times, he invited me (to church) and at that time there was a Moroccan preacher who speaks Arabic from a Muslim background. (...) So, he started to talk about Christ and about his own experience and what he was before. (...) When he talked about how his life was back in Morocco, because I faced similar situations as the ones he faced, for example, when he talked about threats because I was exposed to threats, when he was laughed at I also was laughed at, he was hit and I was hit too (...) I felt that something really touched me, but I didn't know what it was and I felt relaxed. (...) I told him about my situation before. (...) then I started crying. (...) So, at the very moment he hugged me with joy and said to me that the Lord has called me to believe in Him; (...) he had told me before I left to pray before I sleep. (...) Really, Christ came to me in the same night. (...) Even in the dream, I was investigating because I asked Him 'who are you?' He answered me 'I am the same one you prayed for'. (...) I knew that He was Christ. (...)

(...) I used to go to the church there but then I moved here due to the circumstances I faced in the camp (in Laitila), because I got beaten (...) when they knew that I believed in Christ (...) The Iraqi Muslims (...) I came to this church here (in Turku) and I met with the female pastor, the Finnish people and the Iraqi group (...) I got baptized from the beginning in this church (...).

(...) I was studying technical academy (vocational) electrical elevators sector (in Iraq) (...) I used to work during the off days in a restaurant (...) I am not currently working. (...) I teach at the church (...) I translate from English to Arabic to the Iraqis. (...) I am learning (Finnish) from the people who are in the church. (...) I can read Finnish but I don't know what it means (...) and I can't translate it (...) I know how to read the letters. (...) As for my Iraqi friends, they are exclusively Christian and my Finnish friends are also exclusively Christian (...) my relationship with them is very strong, even the Finnish I consider them as my brothers and sisters. (...) I met with them through the church of course. (...) There is an international meeting (at church), it is for all nationalities (...) it is for everybody not only for youth. (...) Since I speak English, I can go with them and I have a strong relation in that section there. So I like to be all the time at church. (...) I have some Finnish people very close to me and I have Iraqi people very close to me too (...) from my age group, but the pastors are older than me (...)

(...) The Arabs were a bit distant from the Finns (...) they weren't mingling together (...). There was a bit of mingling but not so strong because any new persons (Arabs) who come are inserted directly in the Arab group, so they only know the female pastor and the Finnish people who serve in

the Arab group. (...) But with time, when they start to know, like for instance, we have started to sing hymns on Wednesday which is an appointment for prayer in Finnish and we started to take part at the Finnish meetings. (...) So now there is a fusion between Arabs and Finns. (...) Every Sunday at 11am (...) it is certainly in Finnish but there is English interpretation (...) directly after the end of the mass, we have approximately fifteen minutes to sit with the Finnish people, drink coffee with them and chat with them because we practically know all the Finnish people (at church) by now, and they also know us somehow. (...)

(...) There is one Finnish girl very (...) close to me. I consider her as my sister, because ever since I first entered the church we have a strong relationship. So what to say, I agreed with her and told her: 'Teach me two Finnish words every day'. (...) I see her most of the time at church. (...)

(...) I got a rejection then after that I got re-interviewed (...) I asked for appeal, then after that I got re-interviewed to review the documents, then I got an interview. (...) And I got a second rejection (negative decision) and currently I am waiting. (...) But this time the interview will be from the court I guess (...).

3.4.10- Man EF:

Here is a highly educated young Iraqi man coming from Central Iraq. He is a Muslim. He was smuggled from Turkey through Europe, during the migrant wave in late summer 2015, to reach Finland as a final destination. He fled from killing threats from a militia after he had refused to join them. He later got married with a Finnish woman to obtain a residence permit and stay in Finland.

It is obvious that this highly educated young man employed his internet skills to select the country of destination prior to making the journey, as many others did.

When it comes to social bonds, I noticed some interesting networks he was involved in. Surely he kept strong ties with his family back in Iraq.

Then in Finland, he put into play his linguistic capital in the social field thus producing a new social capital. In other words, he hooked up with a Finnish girl who later became his wife. Thanks to this marriage, he linked with the wife's family and female friends. He already had Arab male friends (Iraqis and Syrians), met on the way to Finland or at the reception centres. The only challenge was to connect with Finnish males which he precisely regarded as a riddle: Finnish men are only friendly when they are drunk. He described himself as secular, so his religious capital was of minor importance in building connections in Finland.

Being married to a Finn turned out to be extremely beneficial in terms of him becoming an active player in the Finnish national field. Indeed, having obtained a residence permit made things relatively easier.

Somehow, his educational attainment as an engineer, in addition to the language skills and computer skills, allowed him to produce an economic capital, as a first step. Still the requirements of the Finnish system of valorisation are not fully achieved yet. Hence, he stated that he would enrol in a Master's programme and strive to improve his Finnish linguistic skills, as shown in the extracts hereunder:

(...) All of my family is (Muslim confession) but I am secular, exactly. (...) I don't know, because religion did not enter my mind. (...) My father is an engineer and my two sisters are engineers too. So we are four engineers at home; so mom is a housewife and my brother is a sergeant in the police. We are five siblings. (...) I am the youngest. (...) My other sister is an accountant. (...)

(...) we reached a point that in that area (city in Central Iraq) they wanted me to join them in one militia (...)

(...) Well, when I left I was thinking of Germany or Finland, because while I was staying these five days in Turkey I kept searching on the Internet (...) At that time they told me that it was easy to get a residence permit in Finland, (...) let's say that from the Iraqis who came here to Finland, in a general picture, we saw that no one got a rejection (...) there are groups that talk about things (...) groups on Facebook, and let's say in discussions with friends, we talk(...).

(...) We (two Iraqis smuggled with him) went together to the reception centre. We first stayed in a tent (...) At Pansio reception centre because let's say there was no more space only tents (...) around six days or a week. (...) They transferred us to the one at Linnäkatu (...) there was a reception centre behind the police station. (...) We stayed there for about six months. (...) We were together in the same room. (...) We stayed there until they took us to another camp Mantokoti, because they said that this one would be closed (...) I stayed at Mantokoti only three days, but my friends stayed there around six months (...) Well I moved to live with the person who is now my wife. She is Finnish. I met her in October 2015 (...). We got engaged in July 2016. (...) We got married in 2017 in March. (...) It was during a football game at a square in Pansio (...) she came there with her friend to play ball and so we played a game together and it happened. (...) I am currently a legal resident (...) I got a rejection for my asylum claim twice. But my residence permit is on the basis of marriage only. (...) It is given for one year and then renewed. I have it since October 2017. (...)

(...) Everyone (family) is in Iraq, except my elder sister (name) who is in Germany (...). She got married in February. She had been engaged for two years and her fiancé is an Iraqi German. (...) All the others are in (city in Central Iraq). (...)

(...) As guys I have seven or six (friends) most of them are Iraqis and Syrians.(...) Let's say with four of them (Arab friends) they are like my brothers (...) I have a lot of Finnish friends. But as a general picture, the problem here is that we have a lot of female Finnish friends but no male Finnish friends. There is not even one male friend. I don't know the reason for that. (...) Sometimes, when we are in a bar, for example, a drunken guy would come and talk to us: 'how are you?' Only when they get drunk they become sociable. (...) My relation with my wife is very good, we have no problems; (...) her family and relatives are good too. (...) sometimes we go to her parents and spend three days and then come back, other times four days there during the festivities. (...) She is a Master's degree student. She is writing her thesis. She will now be starting work. It is an internship at Åbo Akademi. So it is somehow like work daily from morning till 4pm. She is one year younger than me (...) She is secular too (...).

(...) I speak Arabic, very little Kurdish, English, Finnish basic level (...) I also used to speak basic French, but I have forgotten everything. (...) I read Arabic and English. I don't read Kurdish. I read a little bit of Finnish. I don't read French. (...) I write in Arabic and in English, a little bit of Finnish, no Kurdish nor French. (...)

(...) I want to try to learn the language (Finnish) and I want to attain a Master's degree. (...) The Finnish citizenship is possible yes, it is not a condition. The residence permit is sufficient. (...) I am currently not working. I worked a bit at Åbo Akademi. (...) At first it was voluntary work. We have a group in Åbo Akademi (...) after finishing the voluntary project I was doing data input for the project we worked on. So yes I worked for money with them. (...) I now will receive the unemployment (stipend) (...) from the government from 'Kela' because they have a sort of plan called 'settlement plan' that you need to study anything in Finnish language the first three years, you need to study the language and they give you money (...) Soon, I will be studying and going to school during the day (...).

3.4.11- Man GF:

The below citations pertain to an interview with an Iraqi Christian man in his early sixties coming from Northern Iraq. He was resettled with his family in Finland in 1992 through the UNHCR resettlement programme, after he had been smuggled to Turkey escaping from punishment for deserting the Iraqi army during the Saddam regime. Now he holds the Finnish citizenship. He is a highly educated man working in the health sector as a family doctor.

What is noticeable in his statements is that his social capital was constructed in part from his family members who are present with him in Finland and other family members back in Iraq; another part is formed by Iraqis who share with him the same religious capital and with whom he

established an association, safeguarding the originality of their Christian faith and its particular linguistic and social traits. In other words, symbolic capitals (cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic and social) interplay and become institutionalized through an organization registered in the Finnish national field. A third part of his social capital is strong friendship with Finns, and a fourth part is acquaintance with Iraqis who belong neither to his ethnicity nor to his religious affiliation.

Indeed, as a highly educated Finnish citizen exercising a profession in the Finnish health field, I can qualify him as an important player perhaps central, though neither as a front-liner nor as a defender in the Finnish social world, but definitely not a bench player. He assumed the responsibility of leader in an ethnic and religious community within the Finnish national field. Nevertheless he did not identify himself as a Finn but as an Iraqi Christian who is really attached to his ethnicity - not an Arab - and to his mother tongue - 'Surath' not Arabic.

(...) One of my sisters came here later with her family. (...) I have my three other sisters and their families back in Iraq, and their children are all married too. I am their youngest brother. I had one brother who mysteriously passed away in London. (...)

(...) I was specializing in paediatrics on my third year, but when the war started I left the specialization and I came to Finland. Here I am a family doctor. (...) Through my profession, I met a lot of (Iraqi) Kurds and Arabs (Muslim confessions). (...) I avoid meeting with Arab Iraqis. (...)

(...) My friends are only these people here in the Association. The older members are around thirty persons. The total members of the Association are more than seventy. They are all Iraqis and they were unequivocally refugees. All are from the same (Christian confession) except for three families who are from (another Christian confession). We have a strong relation. (...)

(...) I have acquaintance but due to the different cultural heritage, I mean in the Orient the religion somehow defines some particular issues. (...) For instance, I behave differently than Kurds or Muslims since I am a Christian. Therefore I have some courtesy relations, but up to a certain extent and not so strong. I do not invite anyone to my house unless I know they are Christian. (...)

(...) I have Finnish friends. They are more than siblings to me. (...) I have a strong connection with a Finnish family whom I consider more than a brother and a sister to me. We meet with them constantly once a month, either at our house or at theirs. (...) I encourage my sons to commit to Finnish conservative girls... My daughter currently is in a relationship with a Finnish teacher. (...) He is secular. But my son's fiancé is registered at our Association and she teaches children. (...) She is a Finnish Christian. (...) I consider myself Iraqi and my wife too but my children are Finns. (...) I want to stay here in Finland but my children are free to do whatever they like. (...)

(...) I speak Arabic, Kurdish, English, Finnish and ‘Surath’. (...) I also understand Persian, but I do not speak it (...) I read Arabic, Kurdish, English and Finnish, but I can hardly read ‘Surath’ because I honestly forgot it. (...) We speak ‘Surath’ at home, but no Arabic at all. (...) My children did not learn any Arabic. (...)

(...) I am committed to the Latin Church once a week, and once a month (another Christian Confession) service. (...)

(...) The ‘Oriental Christians Association’ started in Varissuo two years ago in 2016 to preserve the linguistic, religious and social specificity of Oriental Christianity, briefly speaking. (...) We are seventy-two persons, all are hundred per cent from Iraqi origin. (...) We have catechesis with Father (name of Priest) (...). Sometimes we have lectures. (...) Then we have gatherings (...) we meet to talk, to spend time and to get to know each other’s news. Then when there are death cases in the family we meet too to have coffee together (...); in the events of marriage, first communion, baptism (...). We meet every Saturday and we communicate together through WhatsApp, Viber and email. (...) I am the president of the Association and there is an administrative board in charge of the executive part which is communication with Finnish entities, booking halls, organizing parties and meeting with Finns, sometimes inviting them over as well. (...) All halls used for weekly gathering are free of charge, while we pay a symbolic sum for party halls to the Lutheran church (...) for cleaning after the parties held for religious celebrations Christmas, Easter (...). The Association is for both men and women. There is a choir of young people, boys and girls who chant together. (...) The Association is registered as a social organization in the government. (...)

3.4.12- Man HF:

Found beneath are quotations from an interview with an Iraqi Christian man from Central Iraq. He is in his forties. He reached Finland in 2006 with his brother’s family, through Syria by multiple smuggling channels - forged documents for travelling by plane and illegal land and sea border crossings. They had escaped from Iraq because of the onset of explosions and sectarian clashes, in addition to the mounting climate of insecurity after the fall of the Saddam regime. Currently he is married with two children and holds the Finnish citizenship.

When it comes to social capital, it seems obvious that having a family member in the host society can pretty much make things easier to newcomers. In the case of this Iraqi migrant, the main strong network is family which played an important role in the making of the trip. Then there are relatives in Finland and in Sweden which facilitated somehow the smuggling route (details were omitted to avoid disclosing personal information).

Moreover, the presence of an Iraqi Christian community in Oulu also allowed him to connect with other men and to obtain information regarding language acquisition and citizenship application. So practically, he was motivated to learn the Finnish language to enhance his position inside of the Finnish national field. He then put at play his newly acquired linguistic capital that turned out to be very beneficial in networking with Finns for friendship or for work, thus gaining more social capital and generating economic capital. Although he wanted to anticipate the Finnish citizenship acquisition, he had to slow down a bit due to Finnish citizenship regulations.

Now, the move to Turku made him lose some of the advantages he had in Oulu in terms of employment. Nonetheless, this time too, his linguistic capital rescued the economic situation in some way, but also contributed to build new connections with Finns and others.

As for his religious capital, it also played a role in connecting with other Iraqi Christians, but did not prevent him from making friendly relations or acquaintances with Christian Finns or any other nationality regardless of religious affiliation.

(...) I was living in my brother's house with his wife and kids. I wasn't married at that time. (...) We Christians have no tribes, nobody to back us. (...) If we'd be attacked nobody would assist us (...). We decided to sell the house that we inherited from my parents who were already dead at that time because we wanted to travel. (...) I have a missing brother. (...) My sisters were married in Iraq. (...) My elder sister was here in Finland since 2000 before us. She first came to Oulu as a visitor to her pregnant daughter already married to an Iraqi relative living in Finland. Then she decided to stay and had a hard time to get the residence permit. But then, she asked for family reunification to bring her other children and husband who joined her later in 2002. (...) It is easier to have somebody in a place where you want to travel. (...)

(...) I have my nieces (daughters of sister) in Sweden. (...) My female cousin is also in Sweden. (...) The residence permit in Finland was easier at that time. (...). We got it after ten months, then we asked for my brother who was in Turkey for family reunification. He arrived after three months to Finland. (...) Now, I have a wife and two children both born here. I was single when I arrived to Finland. (...)

(...) I was probably a particular case in Oulu. When I arrived to Oulu, I met a lot of Iraqi Christian people. (...) I did not want to stay. I stayed one year without wanting to learn how to say hello in Finnish. I thought that, after having safely deposited my brother's wife and children, I would leave. (...) After I got the residence permit, I met there some Iraqi Christian men who told me not to

dream about receiving the citizenship. (...) They said that I should not even think of doing the language test. (...) I am a person who deliberately searches for hard stuff. (...) So I registered in the language course that lasted nine months (...) on a daily basis from 8 AM to 2 PM. Then, within the nine months, I did not need the help of a translator when consulting public services. (...) Although my understanding of the language had not reached even fifty per cent, (...) I was able to organize myself and understand the general topic that any office employee might discuss with me at the public services or at the police or anywhere (...) After nine months, I had been there for one year and nine months I went for another five months to strengthen the language. Now, two years and four months completed, I registered at a technical school to get a technical certificate. (...) At that time, I did the citizenship exam. (...) It was really hard (...) I was able to succeed at the exam. (...) But when I got the certificate, I went to ask about the citizenship application they said 'you are not entitled for citizenship because you haven't been a resident for four years yet'. (...)

(...) I easily worked with the Finns. (...) I was a refugee with a residence permit. (...) I worked in a Finnish company (...) which in twenty years had no refugee working there. I was the first refugee to work there. It was in Oulu. I worked there four months training then with a permanent contract from 2009, after I had finished my studies. (...)

(...) In 2010, I went to Syria and got married there and applied for family reunification. I received the Finnish citizenship early 2011. (...) Actually, my wife has a permanent residence permit. (...) She is finding it hard to integrate with Finnish people. (...) The children receive the citizenship automatically in case one of the parents has it already. (...)

(...) We came to Turku in 2013. (...) My sister and her husband moved from Oulu to Helsinki a year ago. Their children who are married are also in Helsinki. (...) My brother and his family are here with us in Turku. (...) No family member of mine had stayed in Iraq. (...). I still have very few dear friends in Iraq. (...)

(...) Colleagues are not like friends (...) I have acquaintances but not like brothers (...) I have acquaintances from multiple nationalities (...). Some are Iraqi refugees. They are not necessarily from the same religion because I don't really search for that. (...) Others are basically Finns. They are Christians but they are like passing friends. (...). They are Christians, but not hundred per cent from the religious type. (...)

(...) I had many jobs in Iraq. (...) For instance I used to work in a golden jewellery shop with a Lebanese diamond expert. He used to live in Iraq since 1974 but now he lives in Lebanon and we are still in contact. His wife is an Iraqi Christian. (...) Then I worked in sanitary repair. (...) Life over there required that. (...) In Oulu, I used to work as a driver of a big truck distributing cleaning products and stuff, in the company with a permanent contract. (...) When I first came to Turku, I tried to find the same type of jobs but I couldn't find any. (...) For a while I worked as an interpreter for

one and a half to two years, first as a volunteer interpreter then as interpreter in a public service with a contract. (...) I am starting a new job as a driver and a maintenance guy in an elderly home. (...) I still work as a freelance interpreter from time to time. (...)

(...) I pray once a week in church, surely. I am a board member of the 'Oriental Christians Association'. (...) I speak Aramaic or 'Surath' as mother tongue, Arabic also as mother tongue. I am very weak in English. I also speak Finnish. I read and write only Arabic and Finnish. (...) I prefer for my children to get acquainted with good people (...) because life here is different. (...)

3.4.13- Man IF:

The following quotations are taken from an interview with an Iraqi man belonging to a religious minority group from Central Iraq. He is in his early fifties. He resettled with his family in Finland in 1995 through the UNHCR, after six months stay in Amman, Jordan. They had fled from Iraq because of political and religious persecution. As a Finnish citizen with an Iraqi background, he talked about the challenges they faced as a family to integrate in the Finnish society.

This man's social capital is concentrated in Finland, since all of his family had already moved there as well. Moreover, the network of friends that he created around him included mostly Finns and a few selected Iraqis.

Since he was already a full-fledged citizen, he was employing all types of capital accumulated over time within the Finnish national field of power. So he had economic capital in the form of asset (the house) and the stipend as a salesman in a private company, in exchange he paid taxes to the Finnish government and participated in assistance programmes. He also had shaped a Finnish political capital through voting for his favourite politicians in the elections.

Furthermore, the acquisition of a new linguistic capital (the Finnish language) turned out to be very useful for social bonding with Finns and for the integration process in the Finnish society. When it comes to his initial religious capital, and since he belonged to a minority group, he adapted it to function somehow in a Finnish Christian field which relatively shares a similar belief.

Moving to the cultural capital which comprises the habitus, he was rather selective in choosing what suited most to his existing system of preferences, adopting new cultural traits from the Finnish culture and rejecting others which basically cannot substitute the good traits he kept from his Iraqi cultural heritage.

Ultimately, I would say that his integration in Finland followed the model of cultural adaptation, considering that the host country shifted progressively from being a dominant culture society to a multicultural society, up to a certain extent.

(...) I am here with my family composed of my wife and two sons. (...) I am a Finnish citizen since 2003 and all my family got the citizenship as well. (...) My sister-in-law lives with her family in Lahti. (...) My father is in another town alone because my mother died (...) One of my sisters is married in another town, Lojma. (...) My mother died in Turku and was buried here as a dignified human being. (...)

(...) I have no one back in Iraq, not even a friend because my friends were Christians (many confessions). They left and my relatives left too. (...) I have friends in Finland. My Iraqi friends are less than five, while my Finnish friends are many. (...). These Iraqi friends were formerly refugees, none from my same religion, they are Christians and Muslims. (...) I have good relations with the Iraqis but I don't consider them as brothers. I have strong ties with the Finnish friends. (...) I have a very dear Russian friend; he is married to a Finn, she is our friend too. My ties with some Finnish friends are very strong. It's stronger than family ties more than brothers: we sleep over and they sleep over; we go together to the summer cottage; we travel together (...)

(...) I bought a house in Finland. (...) Finland is my country and I am really attached to it. (...) My family and I feel that we are Finnish. We pay taxes, we are involved in assistance programmes, we participate in the elections and we choose the government that represent us. I am hundred per cent Finnish. (...) I feel that Finland is my home and my nation. (...)

(...) I used to be a goldsmith, working with golden jewellery, and I owned a store to sell gold as a private business. (...) I also used to be an employee in the public sector in the military manufacturing, electrical maintenance section (in Iraq) (...) In Finland I am salesman in (name) private company (...)

(...) I am not a religious person. (...) I go to Christian churches from time to time with my wife. My wife sings at the Baptist Church choir (...). I speak Arabic, English, Finnish and I speak very little Aramaic (...) I read Arabic, English and Finnish (...) I write Arabic, English and Finnish. (...)

(...) My son is married to a Finn and I would have Finnish gran children. My other son is thinking of marrying a Finn too. (...) My whole thinking, my whole ambition, the intention in my mind was to save my sons from religious segregation and I was able to achieve it here. (...) I had another desire to fulfil when I arrived here (in Finland) (...) I wished that my sons would marry Finnish women because I appreciate diversification. (...) If, let's say, my sons were to marry (from same religious

minority group) women, they would have lived in a closed society (...) So when my son got to know that girl at university and she became his girlfriend then his wife, that made me really happy because I appreciate diversification (...)

(...) In Finland, there is security, social relations, friends, you could easily have Finnish friends (...) It depends on the language, if you are talking in English and the Finnish person's English is not so good, so they become shy to talk to you; but if you are using Finnish language even for about thirty per cent they would welcome you (...). My wife goes out with her Finnish friend to yoga class. (...) So honestly, we did not feel any different from them. (...) But you need to know the language to be able to talk together. I had English and Arabic languages from before, but my neighbours did not speak any English therefore it was difficult. Once we learnt Finnish, I now go out with my friends at work normally, and my wife goes with them too and I trust them. (...) My wife works in the kindergarten (...) with Finnish and foreign kids. (...)

(...) Some of the Finnish culture I refuse it, I mean my wife, my sons and myself. For instance, drinking alcohol, Finnish people drink until they pass out, they even pee on themselves while sleeping; I don't like that. (...) They have a ninety-five per cent divorce rate, I refuse that. (...) They have children's autonomy but they don't have warmth in the care for children. (...) Thus I only adopt the good things from the Finnish culture and I keep good things from my own culture. My culture has tenderness; it has the Middle Eastern cuisine (...) I don't like the Finnish cuisine. (...) Our social relations, we are very sociable, our blood is warm (...) and we maintain strong relations. (...) My relationship with my sons is an intimate relationship. (...) To love, to kiss, to hug the child or play with the child they don't have this, they consider it as harassment. So you are not obliged to embrace the things they have. (...) What I admired most in the Finnish and European cultures is that they build up the child's personality. (...) I appreciated that a lot. I raised my sons based on two cultures. (...) My sons consider themselves more Finnish except for the skin colour. (...)

3.4.14- Man JF:

Here are citations from an Iraqi Muslim man from Central Iraq. He is in his late fifties. He arrived with his family to Finland in late 1998 through the UNHCR resettlement programme, after staying more than three years in Damascus in Syria. They had fled from Iraq because he was an active member of a political party opposing the Saddam regime. He is currently a Finnish citizen.

What is certain is that the social capital of this Iraqi migrant is based on strong family ties living in the same area in Finland. Practically, all of his family members already resided in a Turku suburb. They had gradually arrived through various channels, except for one brother who

stayed in Iraq and with whom the migrant in question kept a strong connection nurtured by yearly visits to the home country, aside communication technologies, of course.

Then, another form of social capital is the wide circle of friends he accumulated whether Iraqis or Finnish, having connections with variable strengths from acquaintance to very close friends.

Moving to his initial cultural capital, he described himself as secular and as having been raised in a moderate fashion. Therefore, he and his wife were able to transmit secularity to their children. They kept an important trait from the Iraqi culture which is manifest in talking together at home mainly in Arabic. Moreover, he identified himself as an Iraqi holding a Finnish citizenship.

Hence, in the Finnish national field, he is an active participant in all dimensions of the field but belonging to an ethnic sub-community composed of Iraqi Arab secular members. Indeed, his Arab moderate attitude contributed to the fact that he assumed the responsibility of becoming the leader of an Iraqi Arab social organisation with a secular orientation.

Furthermore, he acquired a new linguistic capital which allowed him to combine it with his initial educational attainment (journalism) to work as a research assistant in projects written in Finnish regarding the Iraqi community. Thus, he was able to produce economic capital.

As seen below, all capitals were engaged in the game played within the Finnish national field to position this Iraqi man as rightful citizen. Through cultural adaptation, he had successfully integrated in the Finnish society and had positively contributed through his research work to remove barriers between Iraqi migrants and Finnish natives, as follows:

(...) Now I have three children: one was born in (city in Central Iraq) and the two others were born in Finland. (...) In Finland, I have my three brothers, my sister and my mother. Two brothers were here before us. (...) They came illegally through Estonia after being one year imprisoned in 1994. Then I came here with my younger brother at the same time. (...) After the sectarian events in 2009, my sister came here with her family (...) through UNHCR from Syria. My mother and my father came in 2006 but he died here later in Finland (...) (...) All the family is communist. We are five males and one female. (...) My elder brother is still in (city in Central Iraq). We still have our parents' house as our property. (...) All the family is in Turku in the area of Varissuo (Turku suburb) (...). The closest people to me are my brothers. (...)

(...) I have a lot of friends. (...) I have around fifteen to twenty friends who are very close and the majority are Iraqi. But there are some Finnish as well. (...) We have Finnish women friends and other friends from the area. (...) My Iraqi friends were all refugees before and now they are citizens. (...) I have some from the newcomers who rather have a troubled and unstable situation. So the relationship has not taken its full course because basically he is in the camp. He cannot meet with me on daily basis (...) thus I cannot consider him my friend but there is a relation, (...) it is an acquaintance. (...) The religious affiliation does not matter at all. (...) I have a good relation with some Finnish friends. (...)

(...) I have both Iraqi and Finnish passports. (...) I go to Iraq each year and stay there for approximately one month. I remain longer in Finland because of the family and my work sometimes. (...) I have a spiritual connection with Iraq; the only thing that is holding me here in Finland is my family. (...) I stay there with my brother. (...) We do it in turn, in the sense that my wife travels (to Iraq) every two years or three years. (...) By the way, I do not belong to two countries. I have two citizenships but I belong to one country (...) Iraq but I hold two citizenships. (...)

(...) I am a secular person; I respect religious rituals but I do not practice them. (...) I am non-religious. (...) My children are also secular. (...) Basically, even in Iraq, my wife did not wear a headscarf. (...) As I told you before we are mainly an open-minded family. (...) So, we were raised in Iraq in a secular fashion so we are doing the same with our children. (...) We raised them to be moderate not as extremists, whether towards religious commitment or towards being very liberal. (...) Honestly, after many years and until this moment, there are a lot of Finnish traditions that we really are unaware of. (...) It is hard. I mean living in Turku is different than living in Lapland. (...)

(...) Well, here we have associations and organisations that are sponsored by Finnish entities, so I am in charge of the 'Iraqi House' in Varissuo. (...) It has a secular orientation. (...) It is the Iraqi Finnish cultural association (...) established in 1997; (...) it used to embrace all Iraqi groups in general; but the problem is that, after 2003 with the repercussions of the situation in Iraq, it started to have an effect on members here in Finland. (...) Now it shrunk because of sectarian groupings. (...) Even our activities now are limited within 'Sondip' which is the union of associations. (...) We participate in their activities. (...) We meet four times a year. (...) We write in Arabic. (...) We are all Arabs. (...) The name of the organisation was selected only to attract the Finnish society. (...)

(...) I have a technical diploma in technology and mechanics. (...) I did not work. I graduated in 1982; I was about to be arrested so I hid for two years. After that I was caught. (...). By then, there was a war with Iran. So, all the men were called to the battlefronts. (...) And when I was in Damascus I took a course in Journalism. (...) I worked as a research assistant for three to four years on a project (...) I rely on money from the projects as income. (...) By the way, I am a Human Rights activist and

member at the Human Rights Organization in Berlin headquarters. (...) We had a book published in 2007 in Finnish (...) It was field work dedicated to the people in Iraq. (...)

(...) In addition to Arabic, I speak Finnish and English to some extent. I also read and write the same languages. (...). So with the passing of time, (...) we improved ourselves a bit in the language, you know the language is not easy at all (...). In addition, we had arrived to Finland already old and for an old person it is difficult to learn. (...) So far, our language did not reach a level that allows us to enter discussions or seminars but we manage. (...) My children speak Arabic really well, but they find it hard to read and write. At home we speak everything in Arabic. (...).

3.5- RESULTS DISCUSSION

Similarly to what I had done for the chapter regarding Iraqi migrants in the Lebanese host society, I tried to use the same steps to better explain the game of Iraqi capitals inside of the Finnish national field. To start with, I reviewed all ethnographic observations collected during my stay in the city of Turku regarding the Iraqi interaction with the local community. Indeed, many Iraqis had already settled long time ago in Turku, or at least the vast majority had their homes in Varissuo, the most foreign-populated suburb of Turku (Huttunen and Juntunen, 2018, Juntunen 2009).

From the interviews with Non-Iraqi and Iraqi interlocutors, and following the Bourdieusian approach regarding the practice as a result of the relation between the dispositions (habitus), the position (capital) and the social arena (field) (Maton, 2008), I interpreted the practice as the strategy that Iraqi migrants put at play to enhance their status in the Finnish society.

Thus, unlike in the Lebanese society, here the Iraqis came to stay. In other words, willingly or unwillingly, they invested a lot to settle in Finland. Furthermore, and since Iraqis are no longer estranged in Finland, I argue that it is according to the migrants' category that one should understand the type of strategy selected.

So when looking at the Iraqis I met, I can somehow classify them in three large categories: the first includes the Iraqis of the 1990s who basically by now should be Finnish citizens, with some exceptions encountered in a few interviewees; the second embraces the Iraqis

arriving after the fall of Saddam regime as of 2003 and these can either be Finnish citizens or permanent residents; and the third is the Iraqis who left Iraq as of 2013, and in this case they can be either residents or asylum seekers.

As a generalized pattern, the ones who are citizens had already acquired the linguistic capital; had established connections with Finns which ranged from strong to weak, so they were able to accumulate a social capital useful in the Finnish national field; had found jobs in the Finnish labour market, thus were able to produce economic capital; had developed a new habitus or contributed to the evolution of their old habitus; and maybe learned a new skill or obtained a degree, possibly after they had been granted access to higher education, thus they amassed significant cultural capital. In my opinion, this category has the most favourable characteristics to become a powerful player in the Finnish national field.

Yet, here I argue that initial symbolic capitals of the Iraqi (cultural and religious) can be decisive whether to advance in the game, to keep steady or to withdraw. One thing they cannot reach due to their ethnic capital and their skin colour - though they obtained full rights as citizens in the secular and recently multicultural Finland - is that they would never be looked at as natives or would gain the 'Finnishness' attribute (Määttä and Laitinen, 2014). Nevertheless, this category of migrants already achieved an advanced level of integration in the Finnish society, typically referring to their adaptation processes (Erdal and Oeppen, 2013).

Now for those who held a residence permit, I explain that subcategories emerge according to the duration and the type of permit. For instance, the permit of a recognized refugee differs from the one of a family reunification in terms of benefits but also in terms of duration. Still, both have access to the Finnish national field with some limitations. I view Iraqis here as a half-way players. If we imagine the Finnish national field as football field and the Iraqi resident as a player at the back but who is carefully approaching to the centre with the ball but cannot kick it, because the one who is in the lead – the citizen - simply takes the ball from in between his feet and shoots the goal. I meant to regard the goal as an achievement which only the citizen is capable of doing, for example a certain job opportunity.

There are usually two choices here: either you sit back or you go forth, meaning some Iraqis chose to remain permanent residents for a long time and were satisfied somehow about it, while others employed a lot of energy in accumulating the necessary linguistic capital as a key requisite to evolve and increase their chances in succeeding the Finnish language exam to get the

citizenship. The latter could integrate while holding their culture of origin and adjusting to the new culture, and thus have a bicultural identity which entails a feeling of both being ‘part of an ethnic group and part of the larger society’ (Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind and Vedder, 2001).

Lastly, I detected three strategies for those who were still asylum seekers to define whether they would be able to enter the Finnish national field. I started with the ones who sought to conversion of their religious capital as means to overcome exclusion and to be admitted inside the system, because so far they were still marginalized. Nevertheless, this strategy could not guarantee success. Then, another strategy was to marry a Finnish citizen, which turned out to be successful because it allowed inclusion but the success in this case is temporary as is the residence permit. However, that would give a chance to the Iraqi to improve his position in the Finnish field through activating his newly acquired capitals for a possible shift upward, i.e. permanent residence or even citizenship. The last option would be to appeal after several asylum claims and present a new case with any event that could support a positive decision or else become “new paperless people” (Jauhiainen et al, 2017). This is definitely not what an Iraqi would opt for unless he reached desperation. None of my respondents was in the aforementioned state, up until the time of the interviews.

It is relevant to say that, in the case of Iraqi asylum seekers who arrived to Finland in the 2015 mass inflows to Europe, the Finnish regulations were modified to make the asylum process harder and to decrease the attractiveness of Finland’s reputation in easily granting asylum.

3.6- CONCLUSION

There are multiple Iraqi communities already present in Finland since the early 1990s. Some are ethnic religious communities such as the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi Arabs which comprise the Shiites and the Sunnis, the Iraqi Christians and the Iraqi Mandeans. These communities as, Juntunen (2009) termed it, live together in ‘diasporic silences’ to prevent the transferability of old Iraqi sectarian clashes in the new Finnish setting. Now, with the newcomers of 2015, the situation is rather different because of the characteristics of the newly arrived Iraqis: mostly young men, predominantly Muslim, fleeing from instability, probably well informed of the already existing Iraqi diaspora in Finland. So a new community of Iraqi Arab Christian Converts

was born and the very existence of this community is debatable especially within the Iraqi Arab Muslim community.

It appeared clear to me that conversion, as a strategic way to obtain recognition as refugees from the Finnish migration services offered no guarantees to the Iraqi asylum seekers. On one hand, it positively contributed to the amassing of new social capital especially through the churches' networks that assist in the asylum process and help in learning the Finnish language, hence, building a new linguistic capital in addition to formation of a new religious capital and a new habitus as part of cultural capital. On the other hand, it created a new divide between the Iraqi Arabs originally Muslim and the Iraqi Arab Christian Converts, so that the old sectarian clashes between Sunnis and Shiites back in Iraq translate into a 'cold war' between original Muslims and new Converts in the quiet Finnish scene, manifest through verbal threats and sometimes physical aggression, as in some narratives above.

To sum up, Iraqis in Finland engage in social networking as follows:

- an international connection with family members who stayed in Iraq through frequent travelling or through internet and communication technologies;
- an international connection with family and friends abroad (not in Iraq), also through travelling and through internet and communication technologies;
- a local connection with Iraqi co-nationals living in Finland, preferably from same religious affiliation;
- a local connection with Finnish people in civil society, social events, labour market;
- a local religious connection with the churches of Finland for protection and assistance, especially for Iraqi converts who could still be asylum seekers;
- and a local connection, mostly gender-based, between an Iraqi male and a Finnish female for the purpose of marriage to regularise their stay and get a valid residence permit.

In the next chapter, I review both cases of Iraqi migrants in Lebanon and in Finland and elaborate my conclusive remarks.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After reviewing the literature regarding international migration patterns, then looking at the theories of perpetuation with a particular emphasis on network theory, I shifted to the Bourdieusian conceptualization of capital, habitus and field. I used these useful Bourdieusian tools' interplay through transposing it, in particular in the context of forced migration, through empirical testing of the networking strategies of Iraqi migrants in two different settings. This research could be perceived in some way as a 'comparative' study since the two host societies, the Lebanese and the Finnish, although presenting major differences as described below, receive migrants from the same sending country.

Indeed, Lebanon, as a transit country, cannot be looked at in the same way as Finland which is a (re)settlement country. It is true that both received waves of Iraqi refugees in their respective societies, however, most Iraqis from earlier waves already left Lebanon to settle in a third country, while in Finland, Iraqis settled and became either permanent residents or Finnish citizens.

Moreover, Iraqi refugees in Lebanon receive minimal assistance from churches or NGOs (non-governmental organisations), nevertheless no services whatsoever are guaranteed by the Lebanese government except when there is funding from abroad for a certain project and the implementation requires the intervention of local authorities. Instead, Finland, as welfare state, offers a stipend to the Iraqi asylum seeker under custody in the reception centres, and then offers subsidies to the recognized refugees.

In reality, most of the Iraqi people who arrived in recent years to Lebanon travelled from Iraq by plane and entered legally through the airport with a valid visa. Then, they overstayed their visa and registered as refugees at the UNHCR to be enrolled in the resettlement programme. Whilst, the ones who recently came to Finland mostly arrived through smuggling channels especially through illicit land border crossing and they claimed asylum from the Finnish authorities.

It goes without saying that, since Lebanon did not ratify the Refugee Convention or its Protocol, the Lebanese State does not run forced migration issues in the same way the Finnish State does. For this reason, UNHCR operating in Lebanon has the authority to recognize the

status of refugee for Iraqis who register their claims in the local office of Beirut, not the Lebanese authorities.

In Finland, things function differently: the Finnish Immigration Services (Migri) is the entity that handles claims and thus can grant or can refuse recognition of refugee status to the Iraqi asylum seeker.

Iraqi migrants are themselves aware that in Lebanon they will not receive any services and that their stay might be prolonged, but they almost never think of settling there. So, as I said earlier, their tactics are not durable, subject to change awaiting a green light from UNHCR or from any embassy that offers sponsorship programmes. Thus, they connect with the Lebanese with some limits. They carefully shape their networks among each other from Iraqi to Iraqi as to create small communities exchanging visits to each other or going to prayer together. Then, with the Lebanese, they engage in relations ranging from simple acquaintances to dear friends. As they are hospitable by nature but careful by experience, they tend to be selective in opening up to the Lebanese, especially that many were exploited in the informal labour market.

The most important capital to enhance their position in the Lebanese national field was the religious capital. In fact, the multi-confessional Lebanese social fabric takes into consideration the Iraqis who belong to religious minorities. Hence, the Lebanese minority churches, for instance, assisted at large the Iraqis. And this capital as well contributed to flourishing neighbourly and friendly relations with the Lebanese population living in the same area. What is more, they are keen to leave from Lebanon as soon as the travel arrangements are completed whether through UNHCR or by means of sponsorship from a family member abroad.

Their social networking strategies can be summed up as follows:

- 1- an international connection through UNHCR, opening up to third countries' embassies and diplomatic representations in charge of quota refugee selection for resettlement options;
- 2- an international connection through family and friends abroad (not in Iraq), in particular for sponsorship programmes and for financial support;
- 3- an international connection with family members who stayed in Iraq for emotional attachment and rarely for financial support (mostly unilateral from Iraq to Lebanon);

- 4- a local religious connection with the churches of Lebanon, both for protection and assistance;
- 5- an international religious connection for possible sponsorship programmes abroad;
- 6- a local connection with Lebanese for fulfilling their daily needs of accommodation, food and the necessary requirements, in addition to the provision of a possible work opportunity to generate income for subsistence;
- 7- finally, a local connection with fellow Iraqis who equally live in Lebanon waiting for travel - this last connection is basically a form of living in diaspora-like setting, having the same cultural heritage and similar concerns but also sharing a brighter vision of the future in the hope of resettlement.

As for the Iraqis who live in Finland, this is a totally different story. Indeed, there are different ethnic Iraqi groups who already live in Finland since the early 1990s. They learned over the years to co-habit together in the same place, without transposing the conflicts of the homeland in their actual social space. As Juntunen puts it in his article of 2009, they live in ‘diasporic silences’ to avoid problems. There are religious communities such as the Iraqi Arabs which are distinct in their Muslim affiliation Shia or Sunni, and there are the Iraqi Christian who came from Iraq as originally Christians and the Iraqi Mandaean. Iraqi Kurds also form an important Iraqi ethnic community residing in Turku.

The refugee flow of 2015 brought predominantly young Iraqi Muslim men, Shiites and Sunnis, probably well informed about the Iraqi diaspora in Finland through social media and communication technologies. With the tightening of asylum policies and the increase in negative decisions, a new community of Iraqi Arab Christian Converts saw the light.

This strategic conversion is debatable and I cannot test if it is successful or not. On one hand, for Iraqi asylum seekers becoming a Christian offered no guarantees of getting a positive decision at the Finnish migration services. On the other hand, it served in the accumulation of a new social capital through the churches. This social capital is beneficial because it enables the Iraqi asylum seeker to receive help in many types, for instance in learning the Finnish language or in having a spokesperson along with them in the asylum process interviews... So, it is then

shaping a new linguistic capital, a new religious capital and a new habitus as part of cultural capital. However, conversion created a divide between the Iraqi newcomers especially living together at the camp, the Iraqi Arab Muslims and the Iraqi Arab Christian Converts. Instead of ‘diasporic silences’ which replaced old sectarian clashes between Sunnis and Shiites back in Iraq, this time I view it as a ‘cold war’ between original Muslims and new Converts in the Finnish social space with vindictive features translated into verbal threats and sometimes physical aggression.

The underneath social networking strategies are adopted by Iraqis in the Finnish national field:

- 1- an international connection with family members who stayed in Iraq, through frequent travelling or through internet and communication technologies;
- 2- an international connection with family and friends abroad (not in Iraq), also through travelling and through internet and communication technologies;
- 3- a local connection with Iraqi co-nationals living in Finland, preferably from same religious affiliation;
- 4- a local connection with Finnish people in civil society, social events, labour market;
- 5- a local religious connection with the churches of Finland for protection and assistance, especially for Iraqi converts who could still be asylum seekers;
- 6- and a local connection, mostly gender-based, between an Iraqi male and a Finnish female for the purpose of marriage to regularise their stay and get a valid residence permit.

To conclude, I used Bourdieu’s tools (capital, habitus and field) to explain how different network formations could take place and could improve the position of a migrant in a host society’s national field of power. I understood that strategies employed could condition the migrant but that also these strategies could be conditioned by the migrant. In other words, taking

the example from the case study about Iraqi migrants in the Finnish society: if a migrant learns Finnish, then the Finnish language would be useful for them to improve their links with the Finnish people in several ways; but if the migrant does not learn Finnish, then, right from the beginning, their networking strategy with Finns would be limited in some way and not very effective.

Considering the dynamic relational nature of the Bourdieusian trio, their interdependence and their co-construction, any change in one of its components would have an effect on the other two components. In the case of Iraqi migrants, already there are major changes happening: the new national field in the transit country (Lebanon) or settlement country (Finland) is really different from the old national field in the country of origin (Iraq). Thus, the old capitals (economic and symbolic) are partly lost or they partly undergo a transformation leading to the production of new capitals. The accumulation and reproduction of new capitals require time and readily dispositions. Henceforth, the habitus of Iraqi migrants also evolves and mutates according to the new field, nevertheless, it still keeps features from the past in the form of traditions and customs that are not immediately forgotten. And this is the case of many Iraqis living in Finland who still hang on to Iraqi heritage but also embrace the Finnish lifestyle in many aspects of their lives.

Also, adopting Bourdieu's theoretical framework in the context of migration is not uncommon. Indeed, as detailed in the literature review, few scholars attempted to use one component of the famous trio 'capital, field and habitus' to explain some of the migration dynamics. I, myself, wanted to stress on the interdependent and co-constructive relation that combines the three concepts, taking into account their active characteristic which renders the task more difficult. Nonetheless, I was somehow able to understand the strategies emanating from the interplay of migrants' various capitals within the wide national field of power and the effect of habitus in the choices they were making.

To end, it would be interesting to scrutinize in future studies how field, capital and habitus can play a major role in the integration of different migrant categories in a given society. This leaves room to more research to understand the dispositions of the migrants and the relative changes that might occur with time, and perhaps put more emphasis on the role of a migrant's habitus...

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MIGRANT STOCK BY TOP TEN COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION AT MID- YEAR IN 2015

APPENDIX 1

IRAQ

Country of destination	2015
Syrian Arab Republic	253,609
United States of America	175,566
Sweden	133,118
Lebanon	120,668
Germany	115,041
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	85,523
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	80,939
Libya	68,477
Israel	67,791
Australia	62,790

APPENDIX 2

STATE OF PALESTINE

Country of destination	2015
Jordan	2,142,755
Lebanon	515,550
Libya	286,136
Syrian Arab Republic	238,809
Egypt	150,486
Algeria	56,961
United Arab Emirates	54,006
United States of America	36,221
Kuwait	14,253
Iraq	12,051

APPENDIX 3

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Country of destination	2015
Turkey	1,568,494
Lebanon	1,255,494
Jordan	700,266
Saudi Arabia	623,247
Iraq	246,556
Egypt	146,837
United States of America	69,459
Sweden	69,199
Germany	53,099
United Arab Emirates	35,196