

Ethics at the Crossroads: Replies to Koopman, Livingston, and Slater

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AQ1

Apologies first: it took me way too long to reply to the generous commentaries by Koopman, Livingston, and Slater. Many thanks for the prolonged patience, and especially to Jim Goodson who put the whole gig together and never gave up on me. As a partial excuse and happy turnaround, at least on my side, I took the opportunity to keep mulling over the material of the book in the light of their criticisms and insights¹: were I asked to draft a second edition, I would add and twist more than a thing. In what follows, I shall respond to each paper in an order which allows me to address the many related points there raised, so to shape a coherent-enough picture of my renewed reading and use of James's ethics and philosophy overall. Very roughly, my line of defense will touch upon the three intertwined issues of the nature of the political within (and without) James's ethics, the metaphilosophical stakes of his hortatory option, and the experiential quality and breadth of his moral vision. In accounting for these intertwined topics, I shall clarify in which sense do I think we find, in James, a principled secular approach to moral matters, coupled with a recipe and call for an exercise in personal and collective transformation which exceeds the strict boundaries of philosophical discourse – although such ethical practices are indeed fostered by a particular kind of philosophical utterance and context.

1 A similar occasion has been recently offered by another symposium on my book, edited by Marianne Janack, published online in the journal *Syndicate Philosophy*, August 2018 (<https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/ethics-and-philosophical-critique-in-william-james/>).

My take on James, reinforced by the reading of these generous commentaries as well as of the literature that came out since the publication of the book, is of a philosopher who engaged both his academic peers and the society he lived in with an eye to widening the boundaries of philosophical practice as well as making it more incisive so to challenge what culture as a whole might (have) looked like – to him as well as to us, his readers, a century after him and in the wake of him. It was this very task, I contend, that marked the ethical texture of this work, understood as a call for a work of the self on self with the goal of refashioning it for the good. This might well not be the only reading possible, and yet, as I claimed in the book and still do, it represents a most profitable line of interpretation both for making sense of his work as a whole and for putting it to good use.

Colin Koopman raises a very subtle challenge to my reading of James's ethical and political work – or, better, my reading of the ethical and political feature and stakes of his work –, pressing me to take sides in the quarrel between ideal and non-ideal understandings of the ethical and its relation to the political. The issue, itself a hot topic in contemporary ethical and political theory, is presented by Koopman as a quintessential metaphilosophical divide between a conception of moral philosophy as a foundation for political philosophy (of the kind we find, e.g., in the early Rawls), and a conception of political philosophy as irreducible to applied moral philosophy (as suggested, e.g., by the late Bernard Williams). If, according to the former, *moralistic* picture, political philosophy should wait on the hypotheses and results of a somewhat purified moral reflection, conceived as the theory of practice – and in particular as the abstract theory of a highly idealized practice, to be eventually filled with socio-economical details in order to be ready for political speculation and action –, according to the latter, *realistic* picture, political philosophy walks on its own legs and eventually dialogues with moral philosophy about how to best address the difficulties of our practical life without casting theoretical spells on it or building high fences dividing the domain of the ethical from that of the political. As against the primacy of ethics over politics, which the moralistic picture takes as the preferred strategy to ground our associated lives upon principles evident (enough) to every single member partaking to it, the realistic conception sees ethics and politics as parallel if coordinated tasks by means of which dealing with the complexities of our practical lives as they unfold in time. Once set the foundations of our ethical lives straight, the former approach claims, we can then proceed with walking the fraught territory of the political, progressively adding empirical details to already established principles and concepts; by contrast, the latter approach refutes to conceiving the

political reasons and practices we live by as reducible to ethical ones, claiming such assumption to contribute to the very distortion of both domains.

Now, of course, plenty hinges on what one takes both moral and political philosophy to be and do, hence their different couplings. It has to be noticed, in fact, how there are (at least) two orders of issues at stake here, and not just one: the idea that ethics *and* politics should be thought in theoretical (that is, ideal and speculative) or rather non-theoretical (that is, realistic and empirical) terms, and the ways in which, in the light of these different conceptions, one might derive the political from the ethical or rather resist to. The charge raised by Koopman is that, despite my efforts to debunk the picture of ethics as pure and speculative, still I pictured political philosophy as a derivative discipline – or at best left it unclear. I in fact dedicated the best part of the book to the articulation of a heterodox, anti-theoretical picture of ethics to be found in James, and relegated politics to a chapter very much looking like an appendix to the ethical discourse, with apparently no normative status of its own. Hence Koopman's concern that I might still very much flirting with an ethics-first conception, at the expenses of a realistic understanding of the political, despite my best intention to distill, from James, a promising version of an anti-ideal conception of the former (if not of both). Now I see the misdemeanor, thanks to Koopman, but still plead not guilty. Here's why.

What is surely lacking, in my reconstruction, is a proper treatment of James's manifold entries, both within and without the academical perimeter, into the political life of his country and world at-large. That is the topic of the exquisite work by Livingston (2016), which is the definitive reference to, and guide in, such matters to date. Also, Trygve Throntveit, in the other volume discussed in the present symposium (2014), is avid for details about the political side of James in a way I simply am not. Since my book performed – or rather was thought to perform, in its best intentions – a very different task, in it I did not take the full scope of his politics in, nor I came nowhere close to address the subtleties of his ethical entries either. I could in fact be (and actually have been) accused of focusing on a portion of his ethical production to the detriment of others, and that is a fair point since my main focus and interest was to excavate James's meta-moral machinery, which I characterized in terms of a hortatory approach to ethics, rather than showcasing its full scope – actual or potential alike. That being so, my James hardly fills the ethical shoes of the historical one, but this is because I focused on his metaphilosophical revolution rather than on the many ethical features and consequences he himself drew from it or encouraged us to. Included the political features and consequences, of which, indeed, I sampled a few representative effects only, taking the ever-actual issue of war-like sentiments and drives as quintessential of his

anti-imperialistic mindset and progressivist politics. This was partially intentional, in fact, since it was not the full scope of James's politics I wanted to capture, but rather the methodological hinges on which his politics turned. The more so as the methodological axis along which I encouraged to reconsider James's ethics was one which explicitly problematized the idea of philosophical practice as a matter of advancing theories over the good (ethics), power (politics), the beautiful (aesthetics), truth (epistemology) or reality itself (metaphysics), as if there were discrete subject matters waiting to be reflected upon and eventually ranked. The kind of therapeutic and transformative philosophical activity at the heart of James's pragmatism, which I presented as having an ethical feature to it, was rather hinged on the prospect of investigating our ordinary and reflective practices alike with the goal to clarifying them and eventually releasing the felt or hidden tension due to their misrepresentation or disregard.

If that is the case, then, I could have hardly distilled a politics from James's ethics, since his ethics (as well as his politics, etc.) resists categorizations and hence is ill suited to provide foundations of sorts. Rather, I tried to showcase how both his ethics and his politics (as well as his epistemology, if cursorily) rely on a re-orientation of the practical and the speculative dimensions of our activities alike, whose outcome I indeed characterized as a personal and collective exercise in moral exhortation affecting both *ethical conduct* and *political activity* – as the title of Ch. 5 reads. True fact that I, as Koopman stresses, spoke of James as the moral philosopher – as opposed to the moralist, to be noticed –, and not as the political philosopher – as opposed to the politician, even if the matching between these comparative categories is an imperfect one –, but that is because I take the moral/ethical² dimension as the key feature of James's practicalization of thought, language, and experience – including political ones. Ethical transformation is a necessary ingredient for political action, but not because to achieve the latter one must first secure the former: both are necessary ingredients of what I call the “politics of the self”, that is the mobilization of oneself and others through it. My use of the very word “ethical” is much wider and looser than that of those ethics-first approaches which by their own definition see as their mission that of laying the ground for sound political speculation and action. At the heart of the ethical there is, in

2 As a terminological remark, in the book I do not trace any clear-cut distinction between the ethical and the moral, between ethics and morals, of the (very different) sort we find in Hegel, Nietzsche, or Bernard Williams. Following James, ethics captures the reflective, while morals the ordinary, dimension of our engagements with the world and our fellow or foreign beings.

my reading of James, the open-ended work ~~on~~ the self ~~on~~ the self which is the very mark of one's moral as well as political vision and action.

Being it so, my reconstruction of the connection between his ethics and politics simply could not be one of derivation or annexation, but rather of continuity and interplay, although I do prize one kind of primacy to the ethical quite unlike the one dismissed by Koopman, which I perhaps too-quickly labeled as ethical (as distinguished from political) transformation. If, as Koopman also claims and has made clear through his own valuable work on James and political philosophy (2018), the ethical is fraught with history and anthropology, then its commerce with the political (itself dependent on empirical and contingent matters) simply cannot be one of derivation, but rather amount to a (itself constable) difference between individual and collective conduct: a distinction which is *not* one between a purified picture of human beings and a historicized one, but rather between historical human beings engaged in private or rather in public practices, with porous and mobile boundaries separating these domains. Furthermore, this is not to claim that ethics and politics are to be distinguished by the very concepts they employ – and this is perhaps something that Koopman and some realists suggest and hold dear, even if Williams's (1985) criticism of ethics when restricted to such thin ethical concepts as the good or the right at the expense of thick ones such as the virtuous or the unjust would suggest a rich conceptual commerce between ethics and politics rather than their departmentalization –, but rather by their different focus on conduct – if narrow or wide in terms of bodies and practices involved. This is the sense in which, in the book, I was neither interested in marking any primacy between the ethical and the political nor, on the opposite end of the spectrum, in highlighting the irreducibility of one to the other, but rather wanted to suggest how there is a number of metaphilosophical insights – to which, again, I have granted an ethical quality – equally *at work in* his moral as well in his political philosophy: insights which, by their own hortatory (as against prescriptive) nature, should not be *applied* to the various topics and domains covered (say, the ethical, the political, or the epistemological), but rather used as critical devices to noticing and addressing a number of foundational temptations underlying our intellectual and practical lives across the board.

Alex Livingston's allegations, I must admit, are the hardest to meet since I basically agree with his impression that my James is a bit too polished, leaving out the wilder – both in the sense of less canonical and less institutionalized – sides of his philosophy, hence taming the full import of his empiricism so to make it respectable to those very academic circles his was trying to evade or at least unsettle. In turn, this exclusion brought me to neglect an equally

important side of James's pragmatism: namely, his reservations about the full prospects of that very strenuous life he famously encouraged us to experiment with. Together with James's wilder tastes, in fact, it goes his insistence on the perils of ethical transformation understood as an exercise in self-affirmation. This was hardly my intention, and hence Livingston's observations represent an occasion to clarify the extent to which I think James pushed the very boundaries of normalized and institutionalized discourse, qualifying, in so doing, the radical feature of his hortatory option in ethics.

Livingston nicely juxtaposes two features of James's philosophy and persona which have been long thought at odds: namely, his fascination with all things extreme – psychological and societal alike – and his distrust for smooth settlements – ethical as well as epistemological. While the tension between a resolute, promethean side of James and a morbid, mystical one has been nicely captured by a number of scholars (Gale 1999 being perhaps the most iconic) and resisted by others (see, e.g. Cooper 2002), what Livingston notices is a much subtler friction, within his moods and writings, between a call to willful action through which remaking oneself and the world and a longing for risks and crises in which meanings and order are in jeopardy. This “economy of felt cravings” (Livingston's exquisite expression), that is the craving for excitements which are at once liberating and dangerous, lies at the very core of James's quick fascination and deep respect for all things odd and ambiguous, his interest for the liminal as well for the productive strain featuring the yet-not-established and ~~even~~ the mildly perverse. Through the investigation of, and experimentation with, exceptions and exceptional beings James tried to put pressure on the very category of the normal, challenging the standardization of human situations and possibilities. While I think that this deep engagement with the fringes and the turning places of experience and culture features my own reconstruction of James as offered in the book, where James's anti-theoretical approach to ethical and philosophical matters is but an expression of his distrust for certainties and ossified routines, still I have somewhat underplayed the critical strain James put on such ~~notion~~ as conduct and will. If habit lives at the crossroads of familiarization and estrangement, willful action is equally torn between affirmation and withdrawal, between confidence and distrust. In my James, Livingston notices, the reactive nature of human beings is not given full import, and the scale of variation is much more limited than that observed and cherished by James, with deep and perhaps troublesome consequences for my own understanding of hortatory ethics. While this is surely the case, at least on the surface of things, still I think my account is generous enough (though hopefully not sloppy) to welcome this other side of James I left somewhat to the foreground.

Now, a number of texts could be brought to bear on this radical side of James. One piece of work ~~by James~~ I unfortunately omitted from my treatment of his ethics, and which progressively caught my attention and imagination, are his precious (and, yes, very much wild) 1896 *Lowell Lectures on Exceptional Mental States* (Taylor 1982, ed.), in which James showcases the breadth of his intellectual interests and practical investigations, spanning from hypnotism and hysteria to multiple personalities and demoniacal possession. What is key to this operation is twofold: on the one hand James is interested in widening the scope of the intellectually and academically respectable, while on the other he challenges the idea according to which to understand a phenomenon (being it mental, physical, ethical, etc.), one needs to depart from the average and the accepted rather than looking at the surprising and the unexpected. Paying attention, rather than dismissing, the apparently fortuitous and the unregistered is for James key to appreciate not only the variety of natural and human phenomena, but also to put pressure on our expectations with regards to the appropriate manifestation of a given specimen and hence reweaving our conceptual and evaluative landscape altogether. These are the “cranks” James loved but the establishment loathed, since they systematically failed to blend into the system (scientific and social), challenging the intellectual as well as the political boundaries into which the culture of James’s time (and ours) settled itself. It is unsettlement from the margins, rather than confirmation of ~~idealities~~, which James took and invited others to enjoy, with the hope to ameliorate the conditions of the outcasts as well as of the respected members of the community, the sick souls as well as the healthy minded. The point of such investigations being, in fact, not primarily that of having a broader (though *not* more faithful) picture of the existent, but rather that of increasing our capacity for action and interaction: once again, in the terms employed in my book, the radicalization of human experience and the opening up of boundaries is a *practical*, rather than a *metaphysical*, maneuver, a *pragmatic* as opposed to an *ontological* goal. This commitment is quite clear in James’s psychological work as well as in his survey of religious phenomena, where he delved into a wide array of experiences and circumstances hardly explicable by means of the current (even latest) conceptions in order to enrich them and sometimes debunk them, but is also quite pivotal in the ethical case.

Livingston is quite right that my focus on James’s affirmative ethics of self-fashioning only captures one (perhaps brighter) side of that culture of risk, effort, and danger representing his pragmatist reaction to the quest for certainty, stillness, and stability James repelled because of their demoralizing effects on the self and society at large, leaving however outside the other (wilder) side of James which looked for extremes to set such transformative process

in motion. Although I did not foreclose on mavericks and misfits, my depiction of the undisciplined and the unruled might still sound as an acceptable-enough version of that which, in the long run and with some luck, the establishment might well end up crediting and even endorsing, given my emphasis on toleration and sympathy as keys to moral imagination and understanding. Sure morality proceeds through openings and reconstructions, but also through revolutions and crises: breaches and breaks which not only affect the judgment of what and whom falls inside or outside of the moral domain, but also what counts as such in the first place. This is the boundaries-keeping mindset James was interested in debunking, together with the certainty to belong to one such circle. James's craving for moral wilderness came with the chance to lose morality itself, making it almost unrecognizable to oneself and one's peers – and, also and perhaps most importantly, to the academic world. For sure, James sacrificed academic clear-cut morality, and longed for an open-ended exercise in self-fashioning. This is the sense in which I detected, in James, a call for oddity, that is a bet on the productive (as well as destructive) forces inbuilt in our practices and experiments in self- and worldmaking at the expenses of the anxious attempt to rely on established theories and master narratives about what, in its barest contours, the moral life should look like.

If so, I think this option of losing morality altogether is not at all foreign to my account of James, but simply untold and left open to us to explore. If James's is an exhortation to remake the self in ever new fashions, then among the possible (perhaps likely) outcomes would be that of losing morality as we knew it and crafting an entirely new one in its place. The moral exemplars I spoke of might well remain unheard and isolated, unfavored and despised, with no prospect of integration, amicable or otherwise. My emphasis was on the work on the self on self, rather than on the alleged success of this ethical labor: the outcomes will need to be tested by their own practitioners rather than assessed from without or by reference to previous agreements and mores. In the end, we cranks might well remain such, and none the worse for that. If, then, my recounting of James's genuine engagement with lives and concepts in extremis only touched the surface of such realities, with more details of the kind offered by Livingston to fill in, that is because what I tried to do was to make James more alive to us today by picking up, from his work, a methodological line of criticism which however could have picked up in rather different contexts and for different purposes. In the end, what in the book I have tried to do, with James, is to address the academic mindset and sensibility most likely to meet his work with skepticism, rather than appealing to those already less prone to trust institutionalized thinking and practice. My therapeutic James, which I still vindicate, is one which struggles with his own profession and standpoint:

a moral thinker and practitioner struggling against control and necessities. The moral toleration and sympathy I emphasized are not, pace Livingston, the endpoints of moral inquiry – as that would indeed represent an hidden prescriptive premise of his hortatory option where I in fact suggested none –, but rather their starting points and most visible layers: ~~there~~ more there is to radical democratic practices, and hence how moral reflection and conduct shall proceed, should be negotiated in deed rather than specified in advance by means of philosophical theory or ~~even-alleged~~ anthropological evidences.

In this respect, I don't think I have been smuggling in any substantive value or virtue, for example of tolerance or respect over incommensurability. The tragic side of my James, not far from Livingston's, lies exactly in the impossibility to specify in advance the values and projects (if any) we should hold dear if moral at all. Morality is a matter of self-understanding and self-experimentation, with plenty of stepping stones and no resting places. Freedom, if it is a good word at all, means here *not* the guarantee of success through willful action, but rather the impossibility to decide in advance of choice, and hence the commitment to an order which might well fail to come about. Even self-transformation, far from being a prescription carrying normativity on its own sleeves, is an invitation, and exhortation, to see and act oneself otherwise and test such visions and deeds against their consequences. And *this* is exactly what cranks do, for and with themselves and us: not only ~~challenging~~ the details of moral minds, but their very contours. Thanks to Livingston (and others) I now see much more clearly the deep connection between habits (with their perversions) and the willful feature of the modern life. We might be better positioned to resist the various forms of immorality we face (racism, sexism, and abilism, to name but a few) if we picture them as forms of demoralization, that is as instances of our unwillingness to engage ourselves and perhaps most importantly the times we live in. An exercise in which what is asked of us is our readiness to give voice to our own selves as much as to distrust ~~its~~ sayings, especially when running counter to the exceptional and towards the established.

For the past few years Michael Slater has been pushing me, directly and indirectly, to address the religious residuum in James's ethics, which in the book I have tried to compartmentalize and put in a clean-enough box. Much to my unsuccess, apparently, given his reiterated criticism of suchlike attempts. What I now see more clearly than in the past is James's respect for all things religious, even though I am still unconvinced that the most promising way to depict his bodily and spiritual struggle with religious experience is one of a believer – even if a skeptical one. That is, I still think that his was a throughout secular approach to moral matters, and his rather infamous “will to believe” doctrine a

prism through which reading the workings of beliefs and knowledge across the board, and not religious ones only or specifically – a point recently made with great clarity by Madelrieux (2017). Sure there was much indecision in James over these matters, as one might virtually bring the very same evidence to give now a secular and now a religious bent to his writings. Furthermore, James might be said to have adjusted or even changed his views dramatically on such matters over the years, with myself emphasizing his earlier secular sensibility (and distrust for metaphysics more generally) over his later religious (and metaphysical) call. Even if, as Slater and others (think about the work of Wayne Proudfoot and Jeremy Carrette) rightly remarked, in James the association of religious sentiments with metaphysical concerns is not as tight as one might think – and as I probably gave the impression in the book, where I cut short on religion on the premise that it was too much compromised with metaphysics. Slater is also right that my James is one more suited to my own tastes and to those of the western contemporary society, lesser and lesser attached to religious and mystical “overbeliefs” – even if religious sentiments and faith hardly vanished on a global scale, quite the opposite. Still, as I will try to restate, I am firm in treating James as an author for whom religion is a human possibility among others, and a life without faith is not detrimental to one’s moral fiber and social fabric as such – quite the contrary. That was the reason why in the book I said, and still think, that the ethical life is far from being incomplete without religious sympathies and overtones. What is mostly interesting about religious sentiments, and what makes them salient for the ethical discourse (and others as well) is the active and participative nature of believing per se, which features ethical as well as religious (as well as other) practices.

Rather than engaging in a battle of quotations with Slater, one which I would likely lose, I shall here briefly restate why I think James juxtaposed ethics and religion, showcasing their many similarities, without however (ever!) claiming the dependence of the former on the latter. To do that, I shall go back to my metaphilosophical mantra about the anti-theoretical feature of James’s work as a whole, which in the book I presented in much greater detail. This will allow me to reinforce my suggestion that to conceive ethics as depending on religion, or going as far as to depict religious concerns as the very background of ethical reflection and practice, betrays an anxiety to dictate the conditions for (hence foreclose the possibilities of) the ethical life and run the risk to do the same with the religious one. My puzzlement and discomfort with these family of reconstructions does not so much then have to do with the physiology of the religious life, but rather with the pretension to postulate it at the very core of the ethical one, which also runs counter the idea that religious beliefs and sentiments resonates in determined psychological types and are

rather dumb to others. Surely religion was ~~James's great interest~~ throughout his life, also given his family history, but ~~an interest~~, no matter how deep and genuine, does not in itself commit one to the opportunity of its manifestations or at any rate to the conviction that others must be equally impressed by them. An interest in religious phenomena should not force others to align themselves to them or stand in the way of dissent over their validity and worth. Very far from it. The very fact that the religious sentiment, as showcased in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, is as plural in its occurrences and interpretations as it could be should cast a reasonable doubt over such attempts to round off the moral life by reference to it: there is simply too much room for disagreement over what one needs for one's moral life to be healthier and sounder, with appeals to an afterlife or an infinite scale of values or a higher being representing at best hypotheses whose opportunity needed to be tested in practice. If for some of us religious considerations are indeed a spur for overcoming our current difficulties and strengthen our convictions and will, for others no such help is needed, and religious references might actually be detrimental to their conduct and self-conception.

If and in the measure in which the moral life is a matter of self-fashioning rather than of rule-following, the presence of a supernatural presence is one factor among others for making the best of our opportunities. As I have tried to show with reference to the last, rather puzzling section of the essay "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life", when James claims that the higher ethical life (that is a life of resistance and affirmation) is often greatly helped by the *postulation* of an infinite scale of values, one might well read those passages as an attempt to show how our most effective moral resources can be awakened also *without* such reference, hence strengthening the belief that we, together with our peers, are the sole reference to judge what we make of ourselves. If it might be practically true that religion usually performs a catalyst function to our beliefs and commitments, it is equally practically valuable to experiment without such supernatural beliefs and check whether we might be equally able to overcome ourselves. Religion is indeed practically useful, but it might equally become a vestige no longer in need, for some at least and perhaps collectively so. This is no negation of a rich exchange between the ethical and the religious, but rather of their inextricability.

And now, in closing, on the issue of James's alleged consistency, or lack thereof, throughout his writings, about the place of religion in morality. Slater decries that James is hardly consistent in his moral views, as for example when one checks his will to ~~belief~~ conception against the passages on the truthful quality of religious statements featuring *Varieties* – but the same might be said if one contrast passages taken from the same work –, and yet, I contend, the

very issue of the consistency of a position or text turns out being a very different thing if measured in the light of a theoretical conception of philosophy, while another if in the light of an anti-theoretical conception. Slater is engaged in distilling religious (if pragmatic) theories, trying to fix them against ethical ones. His approach to James over these matters, without a doubt one of the most elaborated on the scholarly market, is (still) driven by assumption that, to make sense of what James wrote (about religion, morality, or anything else under the sun), we need to grasp his substantive views on the topic. As against this assumption and working hypothesis, I suggested how an alternative, anti-theoretical approach would suit James and us better: one which takes his work as an invitation to engage in an effort of self-scrutiny and transformation, and in which his views are something to be experimented with themselves. In this light – a rather peculiar one, I admit – James’s writings would be equally distant from normative prescriptions and empirical descriptions. If so, then, the kind of unity and dependability of his views and work as a whole would need to be measured against our own sensibility and capacity to make a good use of what we find in his writings, paying particular attention not only to the rhetoric James employs but also to the contexts of utterance. This is mostly important in the religious case, as religion was one heated battlefield in James’s times between those espousing a scientific mindset and those resisting it. And James was quite mindful to target the angle of his speeches and writings on the audience (most likely) receiving them: his words and reflections on the rationality of religious beliefs or the value of religious conversion would be very different if addressing a group of fervid Christians or rather a turgid scientific circle. Once again, different heads, different reactions, and hence rather different results.

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AUTHOR QUERIES

AUTHOR PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUERIES

AQ1—Please provide the Abstract for the article.