THE MIGRATION CONFERENCE 2020

THE MIGRATION CONFERENCE 2020 PROCEEDINGS: Migration and Integration

Compiled by
Ibrahim Sirkeci and Merita Zulfiu Alili

UNIVERSITETI I EVROPËS JUGLINDORE
УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ НА ЈУГОИСТОЧНА ЕВРОПА
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The Migration Conference 2020 Proceedings
Migration and Integration

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Proceedings

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FOREWORD: THE MIGRATION CONFERENCE 2020 AMID HAVOC CAUSED BY COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Ibrahim Sirkeci and Merita Zulfiu Alili

The COVID-19 Pandemic caused a great deal of stress and changed our work and private lives forever. Given the volume of infected cases and the death toll since March 2020, the pandemic touched pretty much everybody's life one way or another. We have seen friends and family falling ill and hospitalised as well as some seeing the worst. Universities and the teaching and research profession in general changed forever and it is already clear there is no going back. The "new normal" will hardly look like what we remember doing a year ago.

The Migration Conferences started in 2011 and this year, we were supposed to meet in Tetovo enjoy hearing each other's research and celebrate with fine drinks on the foothills of Šar Mountain and above the Pena River. Yet, we had to settle with dry virtual space offered by MS Teams. It is likely that from now on we will use more of these virtual spaces but the general feeling is that what is virtual is far from replacing the in person meetings and exchanges we used to enjoy for the last 9 years. Hopefully we will be able to meet somewhere nice to continue our tradition of a "nice conference for nice people and by nice people". We do hope the participants of the TMC2020 have enjoyed the event despite the technological shortcomings and the difficulties caused by time zone differences.

In TMC2020, we have hosted 331 paper presentations in 81 parallel sessions, 2 plenary sessions and 1 policy roundtable. Due to technical difficulties and time zone differences, there were about a dozen sessions cancelled. To underline the importance of equality and acknowledge many brilliant female colleagues in Migration Studies, we have decided to have an all women line up for keynote speeches at plenary sessions this year. Martina Cvajner (University of Trento, Italy), Jelena Dzankic (European University Institute, Italy), Nissa Finney (University of St Andrews, UK), and Elli Heikkilä (Migration Institute of Finland, Finland) have brought new perspectives covering some key debates in the field. The policy roundtable on the final day bridged views from the Global South and the North as we have entertained intriguing interventions by Agnes Igoye from Ministry of Internal Affairs, Uganda, Helén Nilsson from Nordic Council of Ministers Office in Lithuania, Giuseppe Brescia, MP from Member of Italian Chamber of Deputies, and Jeffrey Cohen from Ohio State University, USA.

In this compilation of the conference proceedings, we have brought together a selection of short full papers. For various reasons, not all papers presented are included in this volume. These papers are rather work in progress and the aim here is to register these works at an early stage and entice further scholarly exchange. Hopefuly, we will be able to read them in full length and in more mature state in journals and edited books in coming months and years.

We would like to invite all practitioners, researchers, students and scholars to the next edition of The Migration Conference. **TMC 2021 London** will be hosted by The Ming-Ai Institute from **6 to 10 July 2021**. We are preparing for a face to face conference hoping the COVID-19 crisis will be over by then. However, if necessary, we will host it again on MS Teams.

Looking forward to seeing many of you at TMC 2021 London.

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WHEN ART CONTRIBUTES TO THE INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES THROUGH INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: AN ILLUSTRATION WITH THE DOCUMENTARY FILM "EN COURS".

Cecilia Brassier-Rodrigues

Introduction

In 2018, four European higher education institutions have come up with the idea of promoting the integration of refugees through education. For one year, they assigned courses to refugees, recruited on the basis of their skills and expertise, the vast majority of whom had not previously worked in the country. During one year, five refugees taught at the University of Clermont Auvergne (UCA). In order to keep a record of this experience, the communication service of UCA made a documentary film : « En cours »[1]. It highlights the daily life of the refugee teachers throughout the year to illustrate their integration. During the filming, a form of exchange and sharing was created between the teacher-refugees, the film director and the project coordinator around a common object: the documentary. It was together that the script was written. On the basis of the discourse of the film's stakeholders (director and teacher-refugees), combining participant observation and semi-directive interviews, we will examine the place of documentary filmmaking as a tool for intercultural mediation.

The documentary film, a tool for intercultural mediation

The media are involved in migrants' integration. They can intervene before arrival in the host society and play a preparatory role (Belabdi 2011). They can also contribute to integration when migrants are already on the territory, mainly in three ways (Bérubé 2009: 185): "as an agent of information, as an agent of linguistic immersion and as an agent of socialisation". Moreover, since integration is a reciprocal process and the host society has a role to play in integration, the media also intervene at this level, in particular by playing on the image and representation of migrant populations. In recent years, this has resulted in particular in the transmission of prejudices and stereotypes. In the case of the documentary created around the coLAB project, we will show how not only the three roles of the media in the integration of migrants defined by Farrah Bérubé (2009) are fulfilled, but also how the film positions integration in this reciprocal process in a positive way. In doing so, it takes part in the intercultural mediation process, which consists in "establishing (or re-establishing) sociability links between people from different cultures" (Plivard 2010: 23).

Considering the role of information transmission first, the preparation of the documentary allowed the refugees to acquire a better knowledge of the host society and in particular of its social practices. The film director and the viewers are also involved. "How to present oneself in front of the other, what subjects to talk about and how to talk about them, what distance to respect, what gestures to adopt? "are questions that the teacher-refugees asked themselves at the start of the project and which were answered during the preparation of the documentary. With the preparation of the lessons, they had wondered about pedagogical practices, about the relationship with the students. With the film, they asked themselves about the uses and social practices of the host society because its members would be the spectators. As for the film director, because he also asked questions, because he observed,

[1] https://en-cours.uca.fr/film-documentaire-en-cours-184096.kjsp

he completed his theoretical knowledge of the migration issue and the situation of refugees. And the audience will gain knowledge through the screening and the debate. Therefore, the role of socialisation agent exists: social links have already been created between the filmed, the filmmaker and the coordinator. Links will be created, thanks to the emotional function of the film, between the filmed and the spectator. And this was made possible because the film acted as a joint project: everyone had the same objective and together they had to achieve it. Only the role of language immersion agent benefited the refugees more, since the discussions with the director gave them the opportunity to practice the language during the preparation and filming. This will also be the case when they take part in discussions after the screening.

The documentary made around the coLAB project helps to tell the story of the integration of refugees into society. By examining the way in which intercultural communication gradually developed during preparation and filming, we showed how the film participates in a mediation mechanism in its "creative" component (Six 1990). It involves "the elaboration of the social bond between different actors or between actors and objects in order to compensate for non-existent or imperfect forms of communication" (Ghosn 2015: 29), it creates new links that did not previously exist between people or groups from which both sides benefit (Sani 2015) and indeed it contributes to the integration of refugees. On the one hand through the reflexivity that it has helped to create among them, which echoes the definition of mediation as "a process that promotes the emancipation of the person through speaking out" (Caune 2010: 3). On the other hand, thanks to the communication, which gradually developed during the filming between the director and the teacher-refugees, and which will be possible during the screening between the latter and the spectators.

In this mediation process, human intervention is fundamental. The mediator is the one who creates the conditions for exchanges to take place and for links to develop, whether or not they have already existed. He or she must be able to "develop a capacity for distancing himself or herself, allowing not only to be aware that the other person may be the bearer of different values but also to take a step back from his or her own frames of reference" (Plivard 2010: 23-26). In the coLAB project, occupying "the position of a third party and the role of bridge between different cultural universes" (Cohen-Emerique and Fayman 2005: 171), the project coordinator assumed the role of intercultural mediator. In turn, he was the one who listened, reassured, questioned, accompanied and discussed with one or the other. He is also the one who organised the first meetings and initiated contacts. He is the one who has accompanied the process of reflexivity among the refugees, who has led them to ask questions about themselves and others, to reconsider their place in society. He intervened directly with the refugees and the director. He created bridges between them, enabling them to develop communication. He also created bridges between the refugees and the host society, enabling them to understand a certain number of codes, practices and customs. He is the one who will not (or hardly) appear in the film, but without him the film would not have existed. He gave meaning to the making of the documentary, transforming it into a common object around which intercultural communication could develop. He is at the heart of the device whose hybridity is revealed: technical device and human intervention participate in intercultural mediation, confirming the role of mediation as a "human and technical facilitator" (Rouzé 2010: 10).

Integration is a social process, it is impacted by the measures put in place by public policies, which play an important role in the journey of refugees (Frattini 2017; Kreienbrink 2017). However, while reception programmes include language courses and support towards employment, they do not include (or include few) opportunities for intercultural encounters. In this article, we have approached documentary film as a tool for such encounters and have shown how participating in its production has a positive impact on the integration of refugees. We also stressed the importance of the human

factor and the role of the mediator. This paves the way for the invention of original intercultural mediation schemes, complementing the classic schemes involving social workers. This is all the more important since mediation can be considered "a determining factor in social integration policies and is necessary both to enable foreign citizens to exercise their rights and enjoy the same opportunities as native citizens, and to foster cultural integration through reciprocal knowledge and exchange between different cultures" (Sani 2015: 2582).

Conclusion

The documentary film has become the thread of a European project on the integration of refugees through education. For a few months, it brought together refugee-teachers, the film director and the coordinator around a common goal, beyond the teaching experience inherent in participating in coLAB project. The documentary will propose a new form of representation of refugees in the media, which is known to play an important role in the process of intercultural communication (Larrazet and Rigoni 2014) and in the integration of migrants (Bérubé 2009). However, in its construction phase, it is a reflection on the part of teacher-refugees on their own integration that has taken place. Initially, it was the desire to pass on a message to the spectators, which encouraged them to participate in the film. Then, the preparation and shooting stages created spaces for discussion, meetings and exchanges between the director, the teacher-refugees and the coordinator. They created the conditions for intercultural communication and the development of pluralist integration based on a common language, recognition of cultural differences and reciprocity of exchanges. In the end, the documentary genre reveals all its relevance in the role of intercultural mediator as its approach makes it possible to analyse and deepen exchanges.

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NATIONAL AND SKIN COLOUR IDENTITY IN ART EVALUATION

Giovanni Perillo and Stefano Mastandrea

According to Vygotskij (1934), individuals are placed within a social fabric or "context" and, consequently, a study of human behavior cannot be disconnected from the social fabric.

The action of the context on psychological development is visible from the process of internalization of activities (beliefs, values, knowledge, skills, structured relationships, ways and symbolic systems), functional to the development of social life, and to the mediation processes among people.

The culture in which we grow, live, the cultural and discursive practices that we employ and generate, participate in determining the way we organize and live reality.

We could identify culture with the power of mediation of meaning.

For this reason, it is necessary to highlight the participation of culture in the "construction" of reality, through the real material effects that cultural practices generate.

Indeed, cultural studies, Grossberg (2002) argues, look at culture as the site of production and struggle for power, not necessarily understood as the domain of one or something over another, but as the articulation of an unequal relationship of forces in the interest of different segments of the population.

Investigation of cultural practices and contexts, therefore, examine questions of ideology, representation, identity and subjectivity. Identity is positioned on the boundaries, until it sometimes takes the form with the *'hyphen*', as in the case of the *'hyphenated self*' of those who are 'Afro-American' or 'Catholic-Communist'"; deriving this theory of "*dialogical self*" (Hermans, 2001) from the notion of "extended self" and the concepts of "multivocality" and "polyphony" of Bachtin (1929).

Grossberg sees in the struggle for "culture" the action of behavior, in particular the different subordinate fragments of the population and the role played by discoursive practices in defining the mechanism that regulates and controls behavior.

Cultural and discursive practices nurture and identify the cultural values that articulate worldview and language, and determine membership in a particular cultural community.

In his theory of social identity, Tajfel (1981 [1985:384]) defines social identity as "that part of an individual's self-image that derives from his awareness of belonging to a social group combined with the value and emotional significance attributed to that belonging".

The interaction patterns of different cultures show an identity positioning and the link with power relationships in the recognition process.

Starting from this assumption, the salient question about identity: "Who am I?" changes into: "Where do I place myself?", on the bases of the evaluating of the subject positioning in the discoursive practices that the culture of belonging (from time to time) makes available; or in a conception of the self as a dialogical self, on the bases of the evaluating of "dynamic multiplicity of positions-ego or voices in the landscape of the mind" (Hermans & Di Maggio, 2007).

"The 'struggle for meaning' that identifies relationships between people (and groups) is driven by

the purpose of making a certain version of the world worth sharing" (Mininni, 2013:74).

This struggle for meaning causes "reality effects" not only in interpersonal relationships, but also in social relationships that define "the identity profiles of entire political, economic, ethnic, religious communities, etc." (ibid.:42).

The categorical organizations, *ingroups* and *outgroups*, influence the ways in which reality works or can be interpreted, underestimating often specific categorial organizations compared to the overestimation of the dominant group.

The conventions at the basis of this orientation, often reproduced by educational, religious, political and informative bodies, could inform social practices also in the artistic field.

The role of social identity in the appreciation of Art[1]

In the article *Liking for Abstract and Representational Art: National Identity as an Art Appreciation Heuristic*, Mastandrea et al. (2019) argue that the topic of an artist as part of an *ingroup* or an *outgroup* was not investigated in the study of individual and social factors that influence attitudes in interaction with an artwork.

This topic deals with the "social psychological perspective that focuses on how our conception of who we are is grounded in social categories; specifically, we draw on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see also Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Hogg, 2018; Hogg, Abrams, & Brewer, 2017)" (Mastandrea *et al.*, 2019).

Mastandrea et al. (2019) argue that people internalize the defining attributes of social groups and categories they belong to in order to construct a socially shared sense of self and identity. These group membership-based social identities are, when activated, important guides for our perceptions and expectations of the world, and importantly for our own attitudes and behavior.

Brewer & Campbell (1976) claim that people are deeply ethnocentric and therefore evaluete their group (or members of it) and the identity they associate with it more favourably than the *outgroup*.

If there is a conflict situation or the *outgroup* is perceived as a threat, there is the possibility that a prejudice may occur, that the *outgroup* may be discriminated against, that it may degenerate into destructive behavior towards the *outgroup* (e.g., Mummendey & Otten, 1998).

Although research has focused on how social identity dynamics affect how favorably we evaluate and how much we like specific *ingroup* and *outgroup* individuals (e.g., Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005; Hogg, 1993), it has not explored how we evaluate material artifacts that are or can be associated with one's ingroup or with an *outgroup*. Such artifacts can include a painting or other work of art, or a venue where art is displayed.

The appreciation of a work of art could be influenced by social categorizations and identities, especially for people who are not familiar with that work of art.

This reasoning rests on uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007, 2012, 2015), which argues that uncertainty about oneself or one's identity is aversive but easily resolved by group identification.

Uncertainty of oneself feeds, automatically or consciously, a heuristic judgment that helps to form an opinion about an artwork, which is based on reassuring social identity.

To explore this idea the social identity the research group of Mastandrea chose specifically

[1] The bibliographical references in this paragraph are taken from Mastandrea *et al.* (2019)

A

acrylic on canvas, 140 × 140 cm.

B

acrylic on canvas, 140 × 140 cm.

American and Italian national identity. The chose of national identity was made because it is a type of identity that is relatively central to most people's sense of self, and the natural context in which most people view artwork is pervaded by salient nationality cues.

The aim of the study was to show that national identity (American vs. Italian) can function as a heuristic to help people decide how much they like specific pieces of art, and that this may occur only when people are uncertain about how they feel about their attitudes towards art. That study demonstrated how *ingroup* bias drove people preferred artwork created by a national *ingroup* artist than by a national *outgroup* artist.

The different perception of an artwork with skin colours

On the difference in perception of a stimulus (artwork), especially when influenced by social categorizations of *ingroups vs. outgroups*, and on the social consequences including negative attitudes that affect the evaluation and aesthetic appreciation of artworks, Perillo (2020) conducted the *Skin Colours Test II* research.

To conduct the experiment, two paintings were created, each with nine equal coloured squares: one with light skin colours and the other with dark colours.

The light skin colours were found on the Internet and belong to photos of 9 famous people of diverse African and Asian nationalities. Dark skin colours were taken from photos of tanned Italian people.

A sample of people were asked to assign their aesthetic preference to one of the two paintings and to motivate this choice, but the people were not aware that the colors were based on human skin.

Later, the people were informed about the nature of the colours.

The people were then given the chance to either confirm their choice or to change it, but they had to give a reason either way.

At the end of this phase, the photos with name and nationality were shown to the people.

The underlying question of the study was: what would happen if the interacting subjects learnt that

the light colours do not belong to Italian people, but rather to African and Asian, and that the dark colours belong to tanned Italians? This experiment also serves as a control theme for the *Skin Colours Test*. If darker skin were to be less preferred, when the nature of the colours is revealed, would it be less preferred even when the nationality of the subjects from which the colours are taken is revealed? In other words, are the skin colours similar to one's own that motivate the choice?, or is the social categorization and therefore the nationality, the diversity associated with colours?

Many people activated a process of recognition of an element of social identification, which reveals the superiority of the group they belong to and to which others can hope to join, to become like "us, white people", "Italians".

In some cases, the social group is identified in the light skin colour: M 10 confirms "because I am white and I like the colour of my skin.

In other cases, the social group is identified in the nationality: F 10 "I confirm B because it is my complexion. I change my choice because they are not like us, they are not Italians"; F 9 "I change my choice because I like Italy and I would like to always be Italian"; M 8 "I confirm B because some people with dark skin always ask for money and I am afraid sometimes. I change my choice because even if they have dark skin they are Italian".

Conclusion

The results of the two researches presented in this article also arise questions about practical implications of research in this direction.

For example, if social identity does influence art appreciation, as we propose, then museums and art galleries might consider how their design and display features match the social identity characteristics of their visitors?; or, perhaps preferably, might they deemphasize social identity cues so that the art is evaluated on the basis of its intrinsic properties?

Related to this latter point, it would be valuable to investigate how art-related cues such as the art itself, artistic styles, and museum design and presentation (Mastandrea & Umilta`, 2016) prime social identity dynamics that influence how people evaluate and feel about specific pieces of art and art venues.

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THE AUTOETHNOGRAPHER AS MIGRANT ARTIST: PRACTICING ART AND ETHNOGRPHY ON THE RESEARCH FIELD

Persefoni Myrtsou

Introduction

In this paper I talk about my autoethnographic research as both a migrant artist and an ethnographer working on the subject of artists' migration. In particular, I elucidate the connections between my artistic practice and ethnographic research as they have complemented each other during my fieldwork. Such connections have been first thematised by Hal Foster (1995). Foster acknowledges the "ethnographic turn" in contemporary art, which encouraged socially-engaged forms of art. At the same time, however, Foster finds the fascination of artists with anthropology and the everyday unsubstantiated, and deems related approaches to be "pseudo-ethnographic". He argues that some artists use "ethnographic self-fashioning" and "self-othering" in order to benefit from being associated with a fashionable disadvantaged minority culture or group. So, for Foster the artist as ethnographer appears as an impossible position to occupy.

While Foster may be right about some artistic strategies that use ethnographic self-fashioning of the artists for their own benefit, I believe that artistic practice and ethnography are not as dysfunctional a combination as Foster suggests. Some forms of art require the artist to take on the position of the ethnographer/researcher of the social environment, using reliable techniques of investigation and understanding. At the same time, some ethnographic fields require the ethnographer to engage in self-critical and self-transcending performative acts, which can be seen as artistic practice. In my research on artists' migration in Berlin, Athens and Istanbul, I have observed and documented the convergences of my artistic and ethnographic practices, and understood that their boundaries often became burry.

In what follows, I indicate and discuss these convergences in the context of a performance art project that I have developed while conducting fieldwork. The project involves the conception of a fictional persona/alter-ego; a nationalist feminist, queer-looking activist entrepreneur woman from Turkey, Ayşenur. As an interdisciplinary hybrid consisting of my ethnographic and artistic practice, the persona reflects all at once

- the effect of the research field on my artistic work,
- my confrontations with complex power dynamics in the field as an artist, researcher, and woman, and
- my embodied understanding of a social phenomenon that I am part of, i.e. the phenomenon of artists' migration, through practicing art on the research field.

All three locations of my research -Istanbul, Athens and Berlin- constitute critical parts of my biography. I was born and raised in Thessaloniki, in Northern Greece. At the age of 22 I moved to Berlin to study. It was in Berlin that I established the first meaningful connections with Turkish-speaking people. As a grandchild of Christian refugees from the 1923 post-war population exchange between Greece and Turkey, my family's spatial and linguistic connection to the place of origin of my grandparents was intentionally discontinued. My first friends in Berlin were two Northern Cypriots, whom I saw as exotic creatures from a region that largely remains a contested subject for many Greeks.

I started learning Turkish in Berlin and made my first experiences about Turkey through Berlin's migrants. A few years later, I first visited Istanbul and since then I have been traveling back and forth between all three countries. In Istanbul I also met my partner with whom I later had a son. As my research was progressing and I embraced geographical multi-sitedness in my methodology, I moved for 6 months to Athens to continue my research on artists' migration. In Athens, despite the linguistic and cultural familiarity, I encountered an illusionary feeling of homecoming. Having a partner in Istanbul, Athens seemed less of a homecoming than what I expected. I realized that my movement on these geopolitical and cultural coordinates between Greece, Turkey and Germany, and between migration, memory and research did not fit the discourses of homecoming or belonging. I would rather describe it as a process of multiple and continuously renewed ethnographic *orientations* (Ahmed 2006) and strategic artistic *becomings* (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2008) in the research field.

Ayşenur[1], my Turkish alter-ego and fictional persona, was born in 2016. I performed as her in different venues in Greece and Germany and gradually she turned into an art project that documented the different phases of my autoethnographic journey and the mutations between my artistic and ethnographic personality. Ayşenur is a Turkish feminist entrepreneur, Islamic activist, art critic, independent researcher, mother and ethnic drag queen. Aysenur's performances pertain, among others to identity politics, global art world, religiosity, political realities in Turkey and the Global South, border ideologies, child-raising practices, queer motherhood, environmentalism and political correctness. In her performative neo-Orientalist spectacles, she typically exposes and disrupts contradictory thought paradigms: ambiguous embodiments of queerness, marginal Islamic feminisms, and sexualized femininity transfigure into culturalist totalitarian fantasies, Neo-Ottoman exceptionalism, and romantic notions of non-Western resistance. Her actions take place in such diverse settings as conferences, museums, streets, art events, churches, and governmental buildings. She thus challenges the perceived conceptions of academic, artist, activist, feminist, Islamist, citizen, woman, and mother (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. The work "Smash Orientalism (and Edward Said)" visually encapsulates the persona of Ayşenur.

[1] Ayşenur was inspired by the female members of a well-known Islamic cult in Turkey, who, because of their revealing outfits, sexualised bodies and indulgence to music and dance, were criticised and mocked by Islamists and Secularists alike for not keeping up the outward Islamic practices and appearances.

I participated as Ayşenur in art events mainly in Greece and Germany and started observing the research fields from the perspective of my embodied persona and as a migrant artist myself. During the period I was conducting research in Athens, Greece was viewed as a symbol of resistance against the neoliberal policies of Western European oligarchs. The discourse of the heroic "Global South" was curatorially embraced by a number of contemporary art events that were taking place at the time. In April 2016, I performed "Perspectives more Southern than the Southern Ones" [2] (Fig. 2) at the Athens Biennale "OMONOIA". In the performance Ayşenur critically reflected upon this perceived heroic image of the autonomous, resisting "Global South" and questioned the post-modern fetish of arts and social sciences to find the ultimate object of controversial history.

Figure 2. Stills from the video documentation of the performance "Perspectives more Southern than the Southern ones".

[2] Watch the performance documentation here: https://vimeo.com/234504594 (access password: ayse), retrieved 30/08/20. The performance took place on 19th of April 2016 at the 6th Athenian Biennale OMONOIA, in the framework of GOMENES project. See http://nettingthework.com/GOMENES-project-presentation, retrieved 30/08/20.

Through the use of satire, drag, and political commenting, I have come to understand critical socio-political and historical facets of the research field I was occupying while at the same time observing my own place and role in it. Through strategic *self-orientalising* of my body as a "more Southern" body that the bodies of the predominantly Greek audience at the Biennale, as a "Turkish body", a "more othered" Other than the Greek Other via-à-vis Western Europeans, I have *oriented* myself towards my experience and connection with Turkey and *disoriented* myself from my seemingly familiar context of Greece. This aesthetic and conceptual *(dis)orientation* and *queering* of my multi-sited nomadic identity as an artist and ethnographer, allowed me to gain a necessary critical (auto)ethnographic distance from what is seemingly known to me.

Rooke (2009:157) calls for the benefits of the "inconvenience of moving within and between categories in research, slipping out the comfortable identities" and embracing the "queerness" of situations, the instability and challenges of identity-shifting in the field. Becoming Ayşenur help me unsettle myself from comfort zones. By tactically appropriating crucial aspects of contemporary Turkishness in terms of political discourse (such as the clash between Islamists and Republicans and the rise of Neo-Ottomanism) and in terms of appearance (such as a sexualized Middle Eastern femininity and self-Orientalism) and by strategically queering them aesthetically in my art project, I intended to de-familiarise myself from my assumed identity positions (a Southern European, white-looking, female, liberal, academic etc.), and to develop mechanisms of understanding, reconciling and even empathizing with people and situations in my research field that may clash with who I am and with what I believe.

Ayşenur exists on the geopolitical and cultural entanglements of the research field and of my biography. Embodying her allowed me to perform and test multiple consciousness as part of my research; to be an artist and researcher on the move; from place to place, from language to language,

from identity to identity, from body to body, from one role to another. She embodies an attempt to artistically produce the queerness of the research field by questioning the very idea of what we believe to be familiar and self-explanatory in autoethnographic research. Such performative actions on the research field transform the researcher's "body into a site of scholarly awareness and corporeal literacy" (Spry 2001) and aim to push the traditional academic boundaries.

Last but not least, becoming Ayşenur allowed me to come into terms with my familial biography and with its geopolitical and historical oxymora; this embodied way of understanding my research field offered me a chance to invent an identity and find a place for my own new cosmopolitan Greek-Turkish family, with my son and partner, beyond the torment of nationalism, intolerance and enmity. So, maybe all us social researchers need some sort of Ayşenur, some sort of new body for ourselves to test the ways we perceive and the ways we are perceived, to reinvent our biographies and our academic agency.

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

TELLING THE TROUBLES WE'VE SEEN: EFFECTS & METHODS OF INTERCULTURAL MULTILINGUAL WRITING IN "MIGRATION SOCIETY"

Sarah Rehm and Tellyourtruth

Writing across Cultures

Telling, talking about and writing on experiences of migration, war and flight, means in process to create a space of protection. Also in an inner sense, influencing emotions and feeling of life, or from the perspective from outside, watching, what is happening to others: with empathy, migration is understood as life changing happening. It is internal sense an from the perspective from outside with empathy a changing event and, communicated with one another, harbors the chance of belonging, placeless and free. When the telling of the others begins, we change and with our imagination reality is changing.

The intercultural literary project TELLYOURTRUTH (TYT) builds the basic of my research, with theories of creative writing, biography work, migration and education studies. From 2015 I was writing with people with and without background of migration and flight to gain together a voice on subject of migration. The project took place in Dresden in Germany, a city with problems to open up to world, and a few times in a refugee camp in Greece. The goal is to analyse the past of the project to move it forward.

Intercultural writing creatively, literarily and (auto)biographically takes up the movement from the closed to an open society. Change creates space for literature and the language of migration. In a society in which migration is getting its natural peaceful sence, literature itself becomes a flexible space for language, independent from origin, passport and finances. It harbors a complex enabling of "integration / inclusion" while these terms are questioned. The network of the migration language begins.

Migration and Society

79,5 Million people were forcibly displaced worldwide at end of 2019 as result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or other events. (cf. UNHCR 2020) New conditions bring new knowledge, experience, language, perspectives. The transgression of spatial boundaries happens in societies believed to be coded. The social meaning of borders changing. Migration is a changing element for global society. (cf. Mecheril, 2016: 9/10) When "migration society" (Mecheril, 2016: 12-15) is created, it changes parts of past society by challenging, demanding conflict and questioning the established. Awareness of migration is growing, also with arrival of more refugees than ever in Saxony and its main city Dresden in former east of Germany. Reality of people with problems to open up to world struggling with the opening of wall in 1990 broke in 2015, when Saxony registered 28317 asylum seekers, after 2305 in 2010. The number shrank till 2019 to 7535 due to closure of borders. (cf. BAMF 2019: Asylinfo Sachsen) People speaking out against asylum seekers remain many, to see at election of city council of Dresden in 2019: right-wing party AfD, founded 2013, became third strongest force experiencing 10 profit compared to 2014. (cf. Stadt Dresden, 2014, 2019) At elections for Europe 2019

AfD became strongest force with 19,8 % and voter turnout of 68,6 %. (cf. Stadt Dresden, 2019). This is still shocking.

Germany has an institutional problem with racism that medias transport. Reflecting riots in August 2015 in Heidenau against opening a refugee shelter there, which were clearly condemned, the problem becomes large as one for individuals, which was not the 'middle' of society. The government's reasoning is adopted, refugee movements must be managed at European level. Against this background tightening of asylum law is seen as understandable. It is implicitly assumed it was a causal link between presence of refugees and emergence of racism. (cf. Jäger & Wamper 2017, 88) Opinions on questions of whether foreigners "only (are) here to take advantage of our welfare state and if "the Federal Republic has been infiltrated by many foreigners" differ widely (cf. Brahler & Decker 2018, 73, 74). Xenophobia is expressed most strongly and affects a quarter of approx. 2000 respondents, in East Germany 8% more. (ibid.: 88) Statements "Muslims should be prohibited from immigrating to Germany" and "due to many Muslims I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country" experienced at least 10% increase in 2014-2018, stand at approx 50% in west, 55% in east Germany; last statement rose by 20% in the east. (ibid.: 102)

The devaluation of asylum seekers is high, the view the state should not be generous with asylum applications is represented with 79,1%, that "most asylum seekers do not really fear being persecuted in their country" with 61,5% (ibid. 105,106). Seeing all of those results brings up questions on the society.

Does over half of German population not have any idea why migration and flight happen? How comes this personal ignorance? Wilhelm Heitmeyer's uses for a basic assumption as to how the devaluation of social groups comes the theory of the economization of the social as a process in the "unsecured decade" to investigate the emptying of democracy and anomie (cf. Heitmeyer 2012: 15, quoted in Biesecker, Wichterich, Winterfeld 2012: 21). It is emphasized the past decade had been marked by lack of security and directionlessness in sense of a lack of social vision, in which weak social groups have one ideology of inequality and psychological and physical injuries. Exciting signal events are described and discussed in terms of their importance for group-related enmity. (cf. Heitmeyer 2012: 18-20) What exactly is insecure?

It might be that the results, the answers, the fear of the people come from pure imaginations and inexperience about origins and consequences of war, real dictatorships, forced migration and flight.

The Need for Stories

It needs first the narration of the others and new contexts for those who tell of true events and the connection of this narrative with empathy and an individual view of the migration. Migration society requires communication spaces educating people about the individual truth of refugees, circumstances of migration, conditions of dictatorships. It wants networks, where people from different backgrounds and classes meet. So that, with the telling of the others, the idea of a priority of content of a national, ethno-culturally coded we can change. (cf. Behr & Kulucatan 2020, 163, 167).

When such stories are told, the field of language gets extended, cooperates with multilingualism, breacks up power relationsships and supports individually. In this context literature and poesy provide the chance to arrive in the presence, to understand the past, to accept the story and to find one's voice and vision.

The migration society moves and changes in various aspects. Worldwide exchange of people of different origins and cultures in different fields is inspiring. It touches in many ways individual experience. Societies moved by migration change towards each other also in emotional, artistic,

linguistic fields. Migration is not only changing centers of life in geographical, cultural, social sense. It is a phenomenon challenging people in personality: emotionally, spiritually, linguistically. Migration can be strong source for literature.

In 1990s the self-image (of the Swedes) changed as knowledge arrived many ethnic groups were now at home in Sweden. They asked for "immigration literature" that reflected this, for "immigration authors". (Nilsson 2010, quoted to Tilbe & Khalil: 2019: 74) "Immigration literature" can be seen as discourse in which both fictional and non-fictional texts form a cycle with a subversive quality to challenge rigid identity constructions. Not to forget the problematic aspect immigration literature is inseparable from the racialized body of an immigration author connected. A subversive act of an "immigrant writer" writing an "immigration novel" leads to an assessment of the same as immigrant. (Gokieli 2017 quoted to Tilbe & Khalil 2019). In an open letter, Jonas H. Khemiri, famous writer with migration background, suggests: "I am writing to you with a simple request , Beatrice Ask [former Justice Minister]. I want us to change our skin and our experiences. Come on. Let's just do it. " (Khemiri 2013, quoted to Tilbe&Khalil 2019: 75).

"Refugees always have their luggage with them." (Kermani 2016: 72) The extremely intense state of migration, including the journey, the (inner) movement, means crossing borders, also inner boundaries. This inner phenomen of migration has something poetic about the human element that can be taken up in narration, in literature. This kind of poetical narration is to expect in the next few years more and more.

"I just want to be free" by Filimon Mebrhatom got released by end of August 2020: an authentic report, true story about how a refugee from Eritrea continued to fight for a future after being oppressed, imprisone, escaping. The preface is written by the captain of rescue ship "Lifeline", founded in Dresden by a group of activists, to set an example against emerging nationalism and started in winter 2015 first as "Dresden-Balkan-Konvoi" in backyard space of an cultural center. Claus-Peter Reisch says:

"It is remarkable to learn the reasons why people flee their home countries. [...] He describes his experiences with the emotions of a person affected, and he was really very lucky in misfortune. He survived." (Mebrhatom 2020, 4, 6)

Behind this book, an example of a voice on migration, is a vision to really teach what it means to escape from war or the force in a brutal military service. The twenty year old author says in his preface*:*

"After arriving in Germany in the winter of 2014, I kept writing down passages from my escape. First in my mother tongue Tigrinya, then more and more in German. It was incredibly difficult for me to think back on the terrible experiences, but at the same time writing was a kind of therapy for me. In this way I was able to process what I had experienced, and it seemed to me as if I could shed some of my pain from the written expression. (Mebrhatom 2020, 9)

When migration and literature meet, there is chance of understanding, finding ways of communications across borders and formats to tell against political silence, independent of usual report.

The question arises as to how power relations could be broken up when literature by authors with and without a migration background about migration would emerge. Writers might "exchange skin and experiences" (cf. Khemiri 2013) and stand up for hybridity and transculturality. These might be new forms of prerequisite for communication in the migration society. Hybrid identities deviate from the "ideal type of unquestionable national-ethno-cultural belonging" (cf. Mecheril 2009: 9), which definition is composed of what we were assigned nationally, ethnically and culturally. Do we want to

keep this running?

Identities and Writing

It is time to step out of imagined spaces with a new connection and language. Those old spaces were nations, cultures, material belonging in which persons are expected to fit inrelationship t, as it is politically comfortable. Identities moving in migration society irritate “because their o the context of belonging remains ambiguous within the framework of the dominant order of belonging." (cf. Mecheril, 2009: 9).

The “inner experience” of migration through the crisis of the “I” and the dependence on the “other” enable to “feel migration” without experience or transgressing visible boundaries. Empathy brings about a change in the imagination of “we” and we win. Literary writing is a framework that acts empathetically and independently from origin, race and finances. It creates a space for dialogue and new belonging.

As a cultural scientist, traveler and writer, after attempts to oppose the presence of the movement of rightists, which got its official center in Dresden, where I residenced, I felt my responsibility to create something positive for exchange, growth and peace: an intercultural literary project. **TELLYOURTRUTH creates a space for people** to support, to tell. In workshops we shared experiences, transformed it and wrote stories. We translated and presented it at readings, latest ones at Goethe-Institut. The aim was to support processes of self-healing in emerging migration society.

The effectiveness of poetry therapy (reading) is based on the power literature has, to help individuals to understand, to liberate theirselves emotionally”(cf. Morrison 1969, quoted to Orth & Petzold 2009, 35/36)

Writing literature, in exchange, in relation to experience, has more direct healing, integrating effects than reading. Writing and literature crosses borders as well as migration. It creates an idependent kind of belonging. "Literature is home, which becomes more important when other homes disappear or are destroyed." (Reich& Muzur 2018, blurb) "Languages, borders, documents. All of this restricts, presses, excludes. Holes have to be tapped in walls, stories have to be told and hands reached through the holes." (ibid. 13) Poetry is not determined by class, race or gender, although part of experience is different depending on life. One part is common to all. Poetry is there for everyone. (cf. Petzold & Orth 2009, 12)

People from different backgrounds gain a voice on subject of migration. It takes a conscious confrontation where “migration [...] characterizes the permanent change in the center of life that goes hand in hand with a change in the social network (Berry 1988, quoted to Zimmermann 2012: 19).

The trauma of migration or flight is often inexpressible due to break-offs and fears. It takes time to be taken and spoken out. It is to create an outlook for the future. Some search, while learning a new language, a way to express their experiences intuitivly. Psychotraumas are emotional wounds caused by extreme stress. Usually injuries heal again after a certain time. As with physical, it can be with psychological injuries lead to complications in wound healing, because psychological wounds can become infected. Careful mental wound care is necessary, to promote the healing process. (cf. Ruf 2016, 17) It is part of life experience of many people that not only pleasant experiences contribute to progress of their biographical development. Often it is precisely those painful experiences that advance one inwardly. Coping positively with traumatic experiences can lead to personality maturation. Science speaks of “post-traumatic growth” (Hausmann 2006, Cullberg 2008, Tedeschi & Calhoun 1998, quoted to Ruf 2016, 61).

A space is needed that enables language to be gained for needed post-traumatic growth.

Safe Space of Writing

TYT as a project of writing therapy and dealing with migration creates intercultural literature and has the effect of gaining language for the unspoken, the unspeakable believed, which creates new connections and connects wound. The project - multilingual workshops for creative, autobiografical and literary writing, creates a shelter in the migration society through telling, exchanging and writing experiences of migration, war and flight. In this safe place shared experiences are transformed and can be found in written stories or poems; the texts are translated and presented together . A complex process takes place which is not perfect, which is creative. It is multilingual, artistical and a lots of aspects can be questioned.

As safe place is described in anthropological emergency pedagogy following the thoughts about "correcting traumatic experiences", a house that a children draws, and the drawing is a self-projection. Building tree houses i.e. can then help create new protective layers for the child. (Ruf 2016, 1364)

In a similar space, writers look at the past at home, stages of life, dare the present, perceive their condition in the now. The three-step past-present-future in prose is a possibility of autobiographical literary writing, or poetry. Through conversation, memory and awareness raising, the writing tool can light up a vision so that writers and listeners move towards future. The process of biography work is loosened up by exercises for creative, fantastic, poetic writing. Writers playfully experience “not to be alone” with their story (Orth & Petzold 2009: 243). Writing is a gentle way; the writing area offers protection for authentic experience.

As part of this process I research what I call “migration language”, which is based on empathic, multilingual and intercultural exchange. My research includes the work on interviews held with former participants, regarding their literary texts (poetry, prose), based on experiences. My research question is, which aspects make it possible to create a space of protection, arriving and belonging. What motivates participants for speaking out, so personal truth on migration is told? Which effects on telling and writing they experienced? How can writing be a healing factor in a fragmented life? I research, how structure and methods can be developed and improved. Has „integration“ an appropriate meaning in migration society?

The jointly created writing space opens a meeting. The main topic of migration deals not only with geographical or refugee background, even if refugees predominantly use the opportunity to participate. Migration is meant that occurs internally or across previous borders. Migration can be felt moving from village to city, from west to east in Germany, leaving a relationship, starting new life in any way, just when one feels foreign or on migration. The project is based on the literary nature of the internal and external migrant experience. E.g. participants from Syria and Germany learn about unknowns from each other. Expression and exchange grow through the biographies of individual people, their origins, their visions. Prejudices are cleared up, boundaries are overcome, a space for encounter, even reconciliation is possible.

Transforming Power

The relationship between poetry and migration transforms migration experiences. I resaerch for the interface where poetry is created in relation to migration. Migration can be transformed there. The state of migration as a border crossing carries poetry and, conversely, writing provides support. It helps to become conscious and supports the transformation of perspective. Memory is personal and can change, it is possible that you see the same experience very differently at different times. (cf. Barrington 2004, 60).

Writing supports the approach to one's own truth, that is not forgotten and needs to be worked through. What does it make for peace, illuminating migration by power of literature from all sides? Stories from people with and without migration background reflect each other, through reflexion we understand migration exists naturally as soon as its meaning can be, not to be forced and to be possible freely, what is a vision. The inner process migration makes is powerful and can be positively transformed in this process.

After a migration, flight, liberation or change, a determination can be dissolved, a narrative rewritten and a life started anew, at least with new hope. Literary writing, like migration, moves cultural, personal, intellectual, emotional boundaries in many layers; accordingly it supports new flexible, independent forms of society. Language makes people into people. (cf. Orth & Petzold 2009, 22)

The multilingual intercultural space creates new modules of belonging with the tools of writing and conversation and thus resembles the phenomenon of migration. Experiences of migration and moving orders of belonging are placed in the space of discussion. Poetry becomes a space of belonging.

Stronger power than in herbs and stones lies in the word, and with all peoples blessings or fight result from it. Power and speech are connected with the forms of poetry. (cf. Orth & Petzold 2009, 22)

A process of healing through intercultural, multilingual joint writing, is initiated in the intercultural society.

If we knew more about what others know, if we could make this knowledge available to others in stories told together, then knowledge would awaken empathy here and there and empathy would awaken action, but action would not become knowledge let it become useless (Reich and Muzur, 2018, 12)

In the multilingualism and reconciliation of migration society, „natio-ethno-cultural contexts of belonging (Mecheril 2003, Kap. 1) are reinterpreted into an independent space. People reach freedom with their narration by gaining agency on levels of "membership", "effectiveness" "connectedness" (ibid) creating individual belonging. Discriminating people on migration background can be counteracted by integrating projects like TYT into society to provide it to schools, organizations, companies to strengthen the intercultural perspective. For support courage for the migration society and against institutional racism.

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

GENÇ SURİYELİ GÖÇMENLERİN GÖÇ SİNEMASINA BAKIŞ AÇILARI ÜZERİNE NİTELİKSEL BİR İNCELEME: İZMİR ÖRNEĞİ

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Giriş

Araştırmanın konusu; ilgili uluslararası kurumlarca genç olarak tanımlanan yaş grubundaki Suriyeli göçmenlerin sinema ve göç sinemasını takip eğilimlerini etkileyen faktörlerin incelenmesi, göç sinemasına ilişkin gözlemleri ve eleştirilerinden oluşmaktadır. Araştırmanın amacı; genç göçmenlerin sinema ve göç sinemasını takibini etkileyen faktörlerin incelenmesi, göç sinemasının genç göçmenlerce takip edilebilirliğinin ve genç göçmenlerin göç sineması üzerine bakış açılarının ortaya konması olmuştur. Düzensiz göçü konu alan sinema filmlerinin genç göçmenlerin düzensiz göç fikrine etkilerinin araştırılması, çalışmanın bir diğer amacını oluşturmuştur. Araştırmanın soruları;

Genç Suriyeli göçmenlerin genel sinema takip trendlerinin incelenmesi,
Genç Suriyeli göçmenlerin göç sinemasına olan ilgi düzeyleri,
Göç sinemasının gündelik hayattaki duygu ve düşüncelerine olan etkileri,
Göçmenlerin göç sinemasını takip etmelerinde cinsiyetin rolü,
Göçmenlerin göç sinemasını takip etmelerinde sosyo-ekonomik ve kültürel konumun tespiti,
Göçmenlerin göç sinemasını takip etmede kullandığı araçlar ve bunların nedenselliğinin analizi şeklinde gelişmiştir.

Araştırmanın önemi; konu ve mekân/yer başlıkları olmak üzere iki temel başlık çerçevesinde özetlenebilecektir. Hakim literatür yaklaşımından farklı olarak; göç sinemasının iletişim dilinin tahlilinden ziyade sinema ve göç sinemasına göçmen odaklı yaklaşım geliştirilmesi, araştırmanın konu bakımından özgünlüğünü meydana getirmektedir. Araştırmanın öneminin yer boyutu ise saha çalışmasının hayata geçirildiği İzmir şehrinin bu konudaki özgünlüğünden kaynaklanmıştır. İzmir; yaşam tarzı göçleri, uluslararası öğrenci göçleri, yardımcı ev hizmetleri alanındaki göçler, geçici koruma altındaki Suriyeliler ve düzensiz göç hareketleri olmak üzere farklılaşan uluslararası göç akışlarına aynı anda ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Şehrin ve şehir hinterlandına dâhil kıyı kesimlerinin Avrupa'ya yönelik düzensiz göç rotalarından birisi olması, yer boyutunun belirleyici bir diğer önemini oluşturmuştur. Bu bağlamda İzmir'deki Suriyeli genç göçmenlerin sinema ve göç sineması ile olan ilişkilerinin; kendilerinin sosyo-kültürel entegrasyonlarına olan etkisinin tespiti, çalışmanın özgün yönleri arasında yer alacaktır. Çalışma ilgili yönleriyle literatüre katkı sağlamaya adaydır.

Araştırmanın yönteminde literatür araştırması ve niteliksel saha çalışmasından istifade edilmiştir. Araştırma kapsamında 12'si erkek ve 7'si kadın olmak üzere toplam 19 kişi ile yüz yüze görüşmeler

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gerçekleştirilmiştir. Katılımcılarla yapılan görüşmede yarı yapılandırılmış mülakat teknikleri kullanılmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler Eğitim, Bilim ve Kültür Örgütü (UNESCO)'nun demografik tasnifinden yola çıkarak, 15-25 yaş arası olan genç Suriyeliler görüşmelerin odağını oluşturmuştur. İlgili saha çalışması, 2019 yılının Ekim ve Kasım aylarında İzmir'de gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Suriye'den Türkiye'ye Yönelik Göç Hareketlerinin Onuncu Yılına Doğru

Suriye'den Türkiye'ye yönelik 2011 sonrası göç hareketlerinin gelişiminde Arap Baharı olayları önemli bir yere sahip olmuştur. Suriye'deki iç karışıklık ile birlikte ülkeden Türkiye'ye yönelik ilk göç hareketi, 29 Nisan 2011 tarihinde Hatay'ın Yayladağı ilçesi Cilvegözü sınır kapısından 252 kişinin giriş yapması ile gerçekleşmiştir. Sürecin başlangıcı itibariyle Türkiye'de "misafir" olarak nitelendirilen Suriyelilerin geçici bir süre için Türkiye'ye geldikleri düşüncesi yaygın bir kanaat olarak belirmiştir. Bu bağlamda Suriye'den Türkiye'ye yönelik göç hareketlerinde uzun bir süre açık kapı politikası takip edilmiş ve geri göndermeme ilkesi çerçevesinde Türkiye'ye yönelen Suriyeliler kabul edilmiştir (Kirişçi ve Karaca, 2015: 307- 309). 2014 yılında Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği çerçevesinde geçici koruma statüsü verilen Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler; sürecin belirsizliği, sayının hızlı artışı ve dış politikanın süreç içerisindeki etkisi gibi çeşitli tartışmalar bağlamında Türkiye siyasetinin önemli gündem maddeleri arasına girmeye başlamıştır. (İçduygu, 2017: 29-39).

İlk göç hareketini takiben 9. yılın geride bırakıldığı 2020 yılı Temmuz ayı itibariyle Türkiye'deki geçici koruma altındaki Suriyeli sayısı 3.594.981 olurken, 146.316 Suriyelinin yaşadığı İzmir Türkiye'de en çok Suriyeli'nin yaşadığı 8. Şehir olmuştur. Türkiye genelinde yerleşik konumda bulunan geçici koruma altındaki Suriyelilerin 752.604'ü çalışmanın inceleme dahilinde bulunan 15-24 yaş arası genç nüfustan oluşmuştur (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü [GİGM], 2020).

Göç ve Sinema İlişkisine Özet Bir Bakış

Göçmenlerin yaşadıkları zorluklar, yalnızlık ve yabancılaşma duyguları, göçün sebep olduğu sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasal problemler evrensel bir dil olan sinema aracılığıyla kitlelere aktarılmaktadır (Rotha, 1968: 341-343). Göçmenin beyazperdede kimliğinin ve belleğinin yansımalarının görülmesinin yanı sıra, sinema bu süreci göç hareketinin dışında kalan kesimlere iletme misyonunun bileşenleri arasında yer almaktadır. Sinema aracılığıyla; göç olgusu ve göç süreciyle meydana gelen travmatik hadiseler, ulusal ve uluslararası kamuoyunun dikkatine sunulmaktadır (Kofman vd., 2000: 14). Göç olgusu sinema aracılığıyla konu özelindeki toplumsal hafızanın oluşmasını desteklemektedir. Göç süreci ve sorunlar hakkında farkındalık yaratılması ilgili sinema türünde başat amaçlar arasında yer almaktadır. Bununla birlikte öznenin göç süreci ile ilgili çok sayıda sinema yapımıyla karşılaşılmasına rağmen, beyazperdede göçmenin geri dönüşüne ilişkin eser sayısının azlığı konu özelindeki dikkat çekici bir vakıadır (Mukherjee, 2012: 406).

Sinema, süreç içerisinde dünyada birbirine entegre, çok kültürlü, çok merkezli ve çok dilli bir kültürel kimliğin üretim, tüketim ve temsili noktasında önemli bir araç olabilmektedir. Göç sineması da göçün çok aktörlü, çok kültürlü yapısından etkilenerek, ulusal sinemanın sınırlarının ötesine geçen ve göç hareketlerinden beslenen kültürel bir mecradır (Higbee & Lim, 2010). Evrensel bir kültürel faaliyet olarak göç sineması; heterojen kültürel kimliklerin etkileşimini inceleyerek, değişik kültürlerden gelen göçmenlere ilişkin önyargı ve basmakalıp söylemlerin en aza indirilmesi amacını taşımaktadır (Moorti, 2003: 359). Göç sineması çok dilliliği ile ön plana çıkmaktadır (Naficy, 2001: 24). Bir filmde birden çok dilde konuşan insanlar vardır. Ana dilinden farklı bir dile sahip ülkeye göç eden göçmenlerin yaşamlarının ele alındığı göç sinemasında göçmenler ve yerleşikler arasında meydana gelen kültür teması ve çatışması göç sinemasının öne çıkan temaları arasında yer almaktadır (Berger & Komori, 2010: 8). Ayrıca göçmenlerin günlük hayatlarında önemli bir mesele olan toplumla iletişim problemi yine göç

sineması aracılığıyla gözler önüne serilmektedir. Göç sinemasında yersizlik-yurtsuzluk temasının hâkim olduğu gözlemlenmekte ve göçmenlerin karşılaşmış oldukları zorluklara dikkat çekilmektedir (Naficy, 2001: 29, 33, 229).

İzmir Alan Verileri

Çalışmada; göçmenlerin sinema ve göç sinemasını takip eğilimlerinde sosyo-ekonomik durum, kültürel konum, cinsiyet, dil yeterliliği ve kişisel ilgi düzeylerinin etkili olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda ekonomik durumun sinema takibini ve sinema takip platformlarının tercihini doğrudan etkilediği tespit edilmiştir. Görüşme yapılan Suriyeli göçmenlerin çoğunluğunun hayatlarını idame etmek için ailelerinden yahut herhangi bir kurumdan yeterli destek sağlayamadıkları ve en önemli gelir kalemlerinin kayıt dışı istihdam edildikleri iş sahalarından doğduğu müşahede edilmiştir. Öte yandan ikincil sektör olarak ele alınan iş kollarında istihdam edilen göçmenlerin sinemaya ulaşım imkânları, maddi zorlukların yanı sıra belirsiz ve dar izin imkânları sebebiyle zaman kısıtı ile de karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Bahsi geçen zorluklar genç Suriyeli göçmenlerin sinema ve göç sineması takip platformlarını doğrudan etkileyen bir muhteva içermektedir. Öyle ki tartışılan faktörlerden dolayı sinema salonlarında film takibinin zorluğundan kaynaklı olarak, ev ortamında televizyon aracılığıyla filmlere erişim öncelikli tercih yöntemi olarak sivrilmiştir. Görüşmecilerden altısının evinde internet imkânı olduğu not edilirken, ilgili yöntem diğer güçlü takip platformlarının zemini oluşturmuştur.

Genç Suriyelilerin sinema takiplerinde bir diğer belirleyici etmenin dil faktörü olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Türkçeye hâkimiyet; sinemayı sinema salonunda takibi kolaylaştırıcı bir etmen olurken, dil yeterliliğinin sağlanamadığı durumlarda sinemanın evden ve anadil üzerinden takip edilmeye çalışıldığı müşahede edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda çalışmaya katılan görüşmecilerden Türkmen kökenlilerin ve Türkçe hâkimiyeti yüksek göçmenlerin sinema salonunda sinema takibi konusunda avantaja sahip oldukları anlaşılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, görüşmecilerin bilhassa kapalı alan olarak tabir ettikleri alışveriş merkezi içerisindeki sinema salonlarında, film önü ve arasında Arapça/Kürtçe diyalog kurmaları durumunda "rahatsız edici" olarak nitelendirdikleri "bakış ve yönelimlerle" karşılaşmış olduklarını belirtmeleri önem arz etmiştir. Bu meyanda dikkat çekici bir başka örnek ise görüşmecilerden üçünün sinema bileti temini esnasında sınırlı Türkçe yeterlilikleri nedeniyle maruz kaldıklarını belirtmiş oldukları ırkçı yaklaşım olmuştur. Bahsi geçen görüşmeciler kendilerine bilet satılmak istenilmediğini belirtmiş ve rahatsız edici üslup nedeniyle ilerleyen dönemlerde ve farklılaşan zaman dilimlerinde sinema salonuna gitmeme duygusu taşıdıklarını aktarmışlardır.

Cinsiyetin sinema takibinde bir diğer belirleyici etmen olduğu ve kadın göçmenlerin sinema ve göç sineması takibinde dezavantajlı bir konumda bulundukları bulgusuna ulaşılmıştır. Kadınlara toplumsal hayatta biçilen cinsiyet rollerinin mültecilik hali ile birleşen yapısı, genç kadın görüşmecilerin iki farklı faktör çerçevesinde güçlü bir dezavantajlılık yaşadıklarını göstermiştir. Ailelerin genç kadın görüşmecilere yüklemiş oldukları ev işlerinin ağır sorumlulukları ve dış dünya ile temas kurma sürecindeki kültürel normlarla bağlantılı kısıtlar ve baskılar ilgili grubun sinemaya ulaşımındaki önemli engeller olarak sivrilmiştir. Tartışılan grubun sinema filmlerinin ev ortamından takibi konusunda da kısıtlara tabi olmaları, araştırmanın dikkat çekici bulguları arasında yer bulmuştur. Genç Suriyeli kadınların sinemaya ev ortamından ulaşma araçlarının kontrolünün aile bireylerinden yaşça büyük olanlarında bulunduğunu belirtmeleri ve diğer teknolojik aletlere erişim konusundaki ekonomik yoksunluklarını vurgulamış olmaları dikkat çekmiştir. İş hayatındaki Suriyeli genç kadın görüşmecilerden dil konusunda bir kısıt yaşamayanların da sinemaya erişim imkânlarının sınırlı olduğu tespit edilmiştir. İlgili grup içerisinde yer alan kadın görüşmecilerin ailelerin müdahaleci yönelimleri ve belirsiz izin durumları nedeniyle sinema salonunda sinemaya ulaşamadıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Bahsi

geçen grubun üyelerinin ancak istisnai olarak sinema salonuna gidebildikleri ve bu durumun ailenin erkek üyelerinin iştiraki ile gerçekleştiği anlaşılmıştır. Bununla birlikte eğitimin, hem erkek hem kadın görüşmecilerin sinema ve sosyal faaliyetleri takibindeki olumlu etkisi dikkat çekici bir mahiyet taşımıştır. Üniversiteli görüşmecilerin; şehirdeki çeşitli kültür merkezleri ve film gösterim imkânını haiz organizasyonlar üzerinden sinemaya ulaşım imkânı yarattıkları not edilmiştir.

Araştırmada göçmenlerin sinema etkisi üzerinden düzensiz göç fikrine bir yönelim göstermedikleri ancak düzensiz göç düşüncesine sahip olan az sayıdaki genç göçmenin, düzensiz göçü konu edinen yapımları göç sineması unsurları arasında öncüllediği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Göçmenlerin göç sürecinde karşılaştıkları zorlukların beyaz perdeye aktarılışında göçmen odaklı bakışın yeterince yer bulmaması, göçmenlerin rahatsızlık bildirdikleri faktörlerin başında gelmiştir. Görüşmecilerin önemli bir bölümünün göç sinemasına olan takip eğilimlerine karşın, görüşmecilerden biri kadın ikisi erkek olmak üzere üçü, Suriye, göç ve göçmen konulu filmlerden bilinçli bir tercih ile uzak kaldıklarını aktarmışlardır. Bahsi geçen görüşmecilerin ortak özelliklerinden ilki; terk edilen köken ülke Suriye'de çekirdek aile üyelerini yitirmek olarak belirmiştir. İkinci müşterek özellik ise göçmenlerin zorlu göç süreçlerinin belleklerinde devamlılık arz eden güçlü travmatik etki ve anıları olmuştur. Tartışılan faktörlerin yanı sıra sinema ve göç sinemasını takipte en etkili faktörlerin başında kişisel ilgi düzeyi gelmiştir. Ekonomik imkânı dar ve sinema takibi konusunda zaman kısıtına sahip görüşmecilerden birisinin; Türkiye'nin kültürel kodlarını anlayabilmek amacıyla 2000 yılından bu yana gişede başarı yakalayan yahut ödül alan tüm yerli filmleri izlemeye çalıştığını belirtmesi bu bağlamda önem arz etmiştir. Bir başka görüşmecinin ise Türk sinemasında geçmişten bugüne Suriyelilerin ne şekilde ele alındığını gözlemleyebilmek amacıyla dar imkânlarına karşın Türk sineması arşivinde "Suriye ve Suriyeli yansımalarını" takip etmesi konu özelinde ele alınabilecek bir başka örnek olmuştur.

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TRANSLANGUAGING AS A POSITIVE MIGRATION EFFECT IN THE HOME COUNTRY

Veronika Kareva

Introduction

The language of the host country is crucial for the integration of migrants (Garcia, 2017) and the concept of translanguaging and translanguaging pedagogy is getting a more prominent role in the integration processes (Duarte, 2019). First mentioned in 1980s by Williams and Whithal, referring to a pedagogical practice that uses both English and Welsh for teaching a particular lesson (Cenoz and Gorter, 1997), translanguaging is now widely used in the western societies for accommodating linguistically diverse students. Garcia (2017) claims that, "because it gives the agency to speakers, translanguaging is a most promising theory for the language education of adult migrants" (p.19). There are many advantages of a translanguaging pedagogy at different levels of school performance for both migrant and minority languages and some of them include protecting and promoting minority languages, raising confidence and motivation, maximizing learning literacy skills, higher cognitive engagement in content-matter learning, etc. (Duarte, 2018). However, very little or almost nothing is known about the benefits of translanguaging if applied in the migrating countries. For an illustration, instead of speaking the languages of the people that they are surrounded by, young generations In North Macedonia use English for communication among each other because there is hostility towards the local languages. Thus, young Albanians in North Macedonia do not speak Macedonian and vice versa. The same is the situation in Kosovo with Serbian language. We believe that if translanguaging pedagogy with all the relevant information and feedback about its application in more developed countries is used in the migrating countries' educational system, it will have a positive effect and contribute towards integration processes in the home country. The integration culture acquired in this way can be transferred and lead to more successful assimilation in case of migration.

The aim of this paper is to examine if the experiences with translanguaging as a way of integration in language education, can have a positive influence when applied back in the migrating (home) countries. This is especially relevant for the multicultural countries in the Western Balkans that are affected by migration not only because of economic reasons, but also because of the instability and conflicts between the different nationalities. Our hypothesis is that translanguaging in the English classroom contributes towards better acceptance of the native language of the other nationality. Additional hypothesis is that translanguaging in the English classroom leads to development of integration culture. We refer to translanguaging as it has been defined by Canagarajah (2011, p. 401): "the ability of multilingual speakers to shuttle between languages, treating the diverse languages that form their repertoire as an integrated system". The following section presents some findings from the existing literature about the influence of translanguaging practice on language and cultural integration.

Literature Review

The concept of translanguaging and its application in language education is based on the ideas of Cummins (2001, in Conteh, 2018) about common underlying proficiency and linguistic interdependence which stresses the positive benefits of transfer in language learning. However, Conteh

(2018) claims that the emphasis of research in this field has been on understanding processes of interaction rather than the pedagogic potential. Nowadays, the literature treats translanguaging as an umbrella term referring to pedagogical strategies used to learn languages based on the learners' whole linguistic repertoire; to spontaneous multilingual practices and to the way those practices are used in a pedagogical way (Cenoz and Gorter, 2017).

In the era of globalization and migration, there is almost no classroom that is monolingual or monodialectal. As Kleyn points out, teachers should uncover the multilingualism of their classrooms to make visible the range of language practices that students have. "When these multilingual practices are being made to be a natural part of their learning environment, they enrich the children's education". (Kleyn, 2016, p. 203). Speaking about translanguaging in the English classroom, Kersten and Ludwig (2018) argue that it is relevant because it creates the space and the opportunity for learners to reflect on their own (trans) language practices inside and outside the classroom. This contributes to raising the learners' metalinguistic awareness and equipping them with communicative and meaning creating strategies that are increasingly useful in today's multilingual world. Duarte (2018) shows how official translanguaging can acknowledge different languages and incorporate them into classroom routines. Her study indicates that translanguaging enables pupils to actively use their dynamic plurilingual practices for learning. The same author encourages teachers to develop their own translanguaging experiments.

Translanguaging as a pedagogical tool is faced with one big challenge which lies in the fact that it questions the well-established monolingual tradition in language learning. The use of L1 (the mother tongue) has always been associated with the old grammar translation method and is therefore avoided in modern language classrooms. Nonetheless, Cenoz and Gorter (2017) conclude that "translanguaging is more natural than language separation because multilinguals process language and communicate by using the resources at their disposal "(p. 319). Some good results associated with translanguaging pedagogy have been reported by these authors although they do point out that further research is needed in this direction.

Methodology

In order to find out if translanguaging has a positive influence in the migrating countries, we have examined its application in the English classroom. Our hypothesis is that translanguaging in the English classroom contributes towards better acceptance of the native language of the other nationality. Additional hypothesis is that translanguaging in the English classroom leads to development of integration culture. For testing the hypotheses, a questionnaire (Appendix 1) was distributed to sixty (60) university students from Kosovo and North Macedonia, attending the first and second cycle study programs in Business and Economics and English language and literature at the South East European University (SEEU) in North Macedonia. More exactly, 17 were from Kosovo and 43 were from North Macedonia: 39 with Albanian and 4 with Macedonian nationality. By selecting this sample, we could check the perceptions of the students from two countries that encounter another language besides English, on a daily basis. These two countries have been faced with migration for decades and there have been ethnic conflicts in both of them. Interviews with University and highs school English teachers were also part of the study.

Discussion

Only one student from Kosovo reported speaking Serbian. However, all 17 thought that it would be useful to speak it. The situation with native speakers of Albanian in North Macedonia was different: only 2 students said that they did not speak any other language than English while the rest (37) said

that they spoke Macedonian. All of them thought that knowledge of Macedonian was very useful and vice versa: native Macedonian speakers wanted to be able to speak Albanian.

The answers about the use of more languages (translanguaging) when learning another language were almost identical when the local languages and English were in question. Majority of students would prefer to be taught the local languages by a native speaker of their own language who could make use of both languages. Significant majority of students believed that it would be beneficial to use both their mother tongue and another language they spoke when being taught English:

> It is not bad for the teacher to use Albanian and Macedonian when you learn English, because in that way you understand things better and you can pick up words from the other language – student X

University and high school teachers seemed to be influenced by 'mainstream' language pedagogy regarding the use of L1 (Graham and Cook, 2012). They claimed that they avoided the L1 as much as they could.

> Personally, I avoid using Macedonian or some phrases in Albanian in English classroom. I agree that the students might react positively to that, but it might also give this wrong impression that L1 is OK and appropriate – Teacher 1

One University English professor, who taught a mixed group with Albanian and Macedonian students, had a good experience with the use of local languages (translanguaging) while teaching English. She said that she had been practicing that and "it makes students feel good" (Teacher 2).

Conclusions and recommendations

Despite the limited scope of the research, it can be concluded that translanguaging has positive effects when applied in the English classroom. Students like this approach. It contributes to creating a positive classroom climate in which everybody feels equal and closer to their peers and the teacher. Efforts should be made to create mixed and multilingual English classrooms in migrating countries that resemble the classrooms in the destination countries. English teachers should be encouraged to rethink their attitude about the use of other languages while teaching. Future research might be focused on providing more information about achieving some balance between the technique English only and the use of other languages.

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Appendix 1.

Student questionnaire

Please fill in the following information:

Country _____

Mother tongue (L1) _____

List any language(s) that you speak, other than English _____

Students from Kosovo:

Do you think it would be useful for you to speak Serbian language? Yes/No (Circle one)

If yes, do you think an Albanian speaking professor (who speaks Serbian fluently) will be more successful as a teacher of Serbian than a non-Albanian speaking professor (because of the knowledge of both languages and possibility to use them for instruction) Yes/No (Circle one)

Students from Macedonia:

Albanian as a mother tongue:

Do you think that it is useful for you to speak Macedonian? Yes/No (Circle one)

Do you think that if your professor in primary and secondary schools were Albanian (speaking Macedonian fluently), it would have been easier for you to learn the language (because of the knowledge of both languages and possibility to use them for instruction) Yes/No (Circle one)

Macedonian as a mother tongue:

Do you think that it is useful for you to speak Albanian? Yes/No (Circle one)

Do you think that it will be easier for you to learn Albanian if your teacher is a Macedonian native who speaks Albanian well? Yes/No

All students

Please explain in a few words how you feel when the language professor in your class uses more languages when explaining words or concepts or when giving instructions. For example, if your English professor uses Albanian and Macedonian occasionally?

ON THE WAY TO VALUE INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL EXPERIENCES - PREPAMOBIE AT THE HEART OF STUDENT MOBILITY

Cecilia Brassier-Rodrigues

Introduction

The international mobility of students has been very successful in recent years. Travel for the privileged young people of the 18th century has become more democratic. France is the leading country of origin of European students in Erasmus mobility, with a 37% increase in outgoing students between 2010 and 2015 (Campus France, 2017). Financial aid as well as the legislative and institutional context partly explain this phenomenon. Moreover, profiles of young people who can speak several languages and work in multicultural contexts are appreciated by organizations. The immersion in an intercultural environment promotes the acquisition of academic and non-academic skills, thus strengthening the employability of graduates. Numerous scientific works have reported on this (Brandenburg, 2014; Potts, 2015; Tarrant et al, 2014). Abroad, students have a social life in a culturally different environment, which leads them to experience new situations in daily academic and/or professional life, giving them the opportunity to deploy intercultural competences (Deardorff, 2006) that are transversal skills valued by the labour market. These include relational skills, interaction management skills, organisational skills, the ability to manage emotions and show empathy, attitudes, etc. In recent years, tools measuring the achievements of international mobility have been developed. They help young people to position themselves before leaving and then on their return, so that they can assess their progress in terms of skills. And yet, despite these positive developments in taking mobility into account, we note that students who go abroad do not sufficiently value all of their acquired experience.

We propose in this paper to discuss how to support students in the valorisation of their international mobility. In order to do so, we will present the PREPAMOBIE tool (for *PREPAration de la MOBilité Internationale des Etudiants)*. The objective of this programme is to prepare any student going abroad for an internship or a semester of study for international mobility first, and then to enhance the value of their stay. To do this, a completely distance-learning support module has been offered to students since October 2019. It consists of three steps: preparation for mobility before departure, collaborative activities during the immersive experience, and an analysis of the skills developed on their return. In this paper, we will explain how the practical implementation of this programme accompanies the valorisation of the student's mobility which is currently underdeveloped.

A lack of valorisation of their international mobility by students

The skills developed by students during academic (semesters of study) or professional (internships) periods abroad have been the subject of significant research in recent years (Brandenburg et al., 2014; Potts, 2015; Tarrant et al., 2014). In addition to language skills, cross-cutting skills have been identified even if they suffer from a lack of recognition (Blons-Pierre, 2016) and a lack of valorisation (Brassier-Rodrigues, 2016). These competences are highlighted in a few reference frameworks such as the AKI reference framework (for *Acquis de la Mobilité Internationale*) which results from a European project funded by the Erasmus+ Youth Agency and which contributes to identifying and valuing transversal competences developed in international mobility by young people aged 18 to 30 (AKI European

Project, 2016[1]). This reference framework, and the associated questionnaire, make it possible to assess the degree of competence in five areas: open-mindedness, adaptation to change, interpersonal skills, sense of responsibility and self-confidence.

The deployment of skills related to the student's life skills reinforces the understanding of mobility as a movement of both body and mind. By choosing to study or do an internship abroad, the student engages in a process of personal discovery, which will lead him/her to better analyse his/her own culture and get to know him/herself better through confrontation with a different culture (Hedjerassi & Razafindrazaka, 2008; Pleyers & Guillaume, 2008). Nevertheless, the reflective practice that this process induces is not spontaneous. It assumes "a distance and critical look at one's own functioning, but also an individual and collective analysis of actions and decisions taken in the course of action" (Lafortune, 2011, p. 3). It should allow students "to deconstruct their evidence, to rethink the relationship between the self and the other and to experience identity mobility" (Gohard-Radenkovic, 2009, p. 10). In fact, to deploy its full potential, this reflexive attitude must be guided. It must not only be prepared before departure, but it must be accompanied during the immersion phase and until the student's return. However, the preparation for the immersive experience and its enhancement upon return suffer from a lack of guidance.

Faced with this observation, a module to prepare for international mobility, entirely delivered at a distance, has been developed at the University of Clermont Auvergne. Funded by the Learn'in Auvergne programme as part of the I-Site Clermont, the aim of the PREPAMOBIE programme[2] is to prepare for international mobility first, and then to make the most of their stay, for any student going abroad for an internship or a semester of study.

Presentation of the PREPAMOBIE programme to help students to enhance their international mobility.

PREPAMOBIE assists students who go on study or work placement mobility throughout their cultural immersion: before, during and after the experience abroad. The presentation in Figure 1 highlights the way this support has been built, combining theoretical contributions and practical situations, by proposing the student to first become aware of and then say what he or she has experienced during the experience.

Figure 1. The 9 steps of the PREPAMOBIE programme to support international mobility

BEFORE THE MOBILITY
1. To be completed by the student : (1) Questionnaire on departure motivations, (2) Submission of the CV, (3) Competency Self-Assessment Questionnaire
2. Theoretical contributions : Preparation for intercultural encounters, awareness of transversal competences linked to international mobility.
3. Evaluation by the student of three learning blogs in order to identify their strengths and weaknesses in terms of reflective analysis.
4. Results of the self-assessment carried out and discovery, interpretation of the results by the student and choice of three skills on which he/she wishes to progress during the immersion phase
DURING THE MOBIITY
5. Writing a learning blog with predefined parts : (1) Preparing for departure, (2) The stay (places, environments, contexts), (3) The activities carried out during the stay, (4) Skills developed during the stay, (5) The local educational culture, (6) The return

[1] https://www.aki-mobility.org/en/home-page/

[2] This project was financed by the French government IDEX-ISITE initiative 16-IDEX-0001 (CAP 20-25).

6. Collection of learning traces on the skills developed (photos, videos, documents, etc.) and filing of evidence to justify progress on these three selected competencies.
AFTER THE MOBILITY
7. To be completed by the student : (1) Modification of the CV in order to highlight the skills deployed, (2) Competency Self-Assessment Questionnaire
8. Obtaining the results of the second self-evaluation carried out and comparing them with the first results
9. Access to an online platform with a proposal of tools to enhance mobility (new forms of CVs, networks) and testimonials from professionals talking about how international mobility is seen in companies .

The objective of PREPAMOBIE is to allow students to first become aware of what they have learned, then to verbalize it and to value this learning. Throughout the module, the student has the possibility to contact a teacher for further information.

Conclusion: The Evaluation Of The Gains Offered By The Prepamobie Scheme To The Students

PREPAMOBIE was offered to students for the first time in October 2019. 49 students registered. An evaluation questionnaire was filled in anonymously by the students on their return from the mobility. The first results reveal several interesting facts. The pre-departure preparation step enabled the participants to approach their mobility in a more comprehensive way. Many confessed that they had only thought about the practical aspect of mobility (accommodation, living on site, etc.) without preparing for the cultural encounter they were going to experience and the change of environment it might bring, and without considering that they would be able to develop skills other than language skills. Most of the time they had been waiting for this trip since the beginning of their studies, thinking that this motivation and desire would be enough. During the mobility, the fact that they had to provide evidence of changes in certain skills did not necessarily lead students to do unplanned activities; however, it made them want to talk about them and make them more meaningful. For example, participating in the activities offered by the Erasmus Student Network (ESN) helps students to develop their sociability, curiosity, etc. Writing the blog was considered to be the most interesting activity: it allowed students to maintain relations with their relatives in France, but also to tell about mobility, to narrate it with details. On their return, they feel more ready to make the link between their experience and the skills they have acquired. These initial results are exploratory, but they confirm the interest of guiding students in preparing and then promoting their mobility. This support should even be offered as soon as the student starts a degree which may lead him/her to international mobility as the preparation step is long. In this sense, internationalisation at home, designed as educational activities encouraging intercultural encounters and simulations, could usefully complete the preparation for physical mobility, also contributing to the development of hybrid mobility, the interest of which has been revealed by the recent health crisis.

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NİTELİKLİ SURIYELI GÖÇMEN İŞGÜCÜ AĞLARININ SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ SERMAYE YÖNÜNDEN ANALİZİ: BURSA İLİ ÖRNEĞİ

Mustafa Kemal Şan[1], Hüsna Ergün[2]

Giriş

Göçmenlerin en temel fizyolojik ihtiyaçlarının giderilmesi ve kendilerini güvende hissetmeleri toplumsal yaşantıya adapte olmaları ve hayat kaliteleri açısından önem taşımaktadır. Bu sorunsala yönelik işgücü ihtiyacı ve serbest piyasa anlayışı bir nevi manevra alanı sunmuş olsa da göçmenlere yönelik ucuz iş gücü anlayışının yer aldığını söylemek olanaklı görünmektedir. Bu durum ise göçmenlerin işgücü piyasasındaki yeri ve etkisinin olumlu veya olumsuz olduğuna yönelik birçok tartışmanın olmasını sağlamıştır. Özellikle iş gücü piyasasına göçmenlerin nasıl dahil oldukları ve bu süreci hangi aracı organlarla gerçekleştirdikleri önemli bir konu başlığı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu süreçte yararlandıkları kaynakların neler olduğu, sosyal ve beşeri sermayenin iş gücü piyasasına dahil olmaları açısından katkısının ne düzeyde bulunduğu sosyal sermaye tartışmalarının Türkiye özelindeki yansımaları açısından önemli bir konu başlığıdır. Bu çalışmada göçmen gruplarının serbest piyasa içerisinde yer almasını sağlayan etmenlerin neler olduğu araştırılarak toplumsala dahil olmalarında sosyal ve beşeri sermayenin etkisi incelenip bu süreçteki işlevleri incelenmiştir.

Beşeri Sermayenin ve Sosyal Sermayenin Toplumsal Gelişmeye Etkisi

Ülkelerin büyümelerine olanak tanıyan ve hızlandıran unsurun en önemlisi o ülkelerin sahip olmuş oldukları insan gücü ile ilintilidir. Özellikle nitelikli iş gücü potansiyelinin iktisadi kalkınma açısından kullanılması beşeri sermayenin ülkelerin gelişimlerini sağlamaları açısından ne kadar önemli bir noktada durduğunu göstermektedir. Bu noktada klasik iktisatçılar büyümeyi emek gücü, sermaye birikimi, doğal kaynaklar ve girişim potansiyeli bağlamında ele alırken bu etmenler neticesinde de büyümenin gerçekleşeceğini ileri sürmüş olsalar da, beşeri sermayenin önemi iktisat teorileri alanında yaşanan kuramsal değişimlerle anlaşılmıştır. Ekonomik olanın gelişimi sosyal olandan ayrı düşünülemeyeceği tezi ile yeni bir görüş sunan *İçsel Büyüme Teorisi* bizleri beşeri sermeyenin önemi ile karşı karşıya getirmiştir (Atamtürk,2007:91). Bu noktada beşeri sermaye fiziksel sermayenin üretim sürecine katkı sağlayan bir olgu olarak kabul edilmiş bulunmaktadır. Yumuşak'ın belirttiği gibi beşeri sermayenin gelişimini etkileyen ve birbirinin içerisine geçmiş halde bulunun birçok etmen bulunmaktadır (2010:11). Beşeri sermayenin yanında toplumsal gelişmeyi etkileyen bir diğer unsur ise sosyal sermayedir.

Sosyal sermaye tartışmaları içerisinde Field'ın belirttiği Tocqueville bireyselleşen Amerikalıların demokrasik ve ekonomik alanda nasıl bir araya geldiklerini araştırırken bu durumu *"birlik olma sanatı"* olarak değerlendirmiştir aynı zamanda sosyal sermaye kavramsallaştırmasını ileri sürmese de sosyal sermaye anlayışının temelinde yer alan kuvvetli ilişkiler ağının demokratik ve ekonomik alandaki işlevini Amerika örnekleminde göstermiştir (2008:7-8). Bu noktada Fukuyama'nın aktardığı gibi sivil topluluğun önemini anlayan Tocqueville, Amerikan toplumu özelinde bireyselleşmenin getirmiş olduğu toplumsal ilişkileri yok edici özelliğinin sivil topluluklar ile giderildiğini belirterek ortak amaç ve payda

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doğrultusunda bir araya geldiklerini vurgulamaktadır (2015:288). Şan'ın tespitiyle sosyal sermaye toplumun sağlıklı işlemesine katkı sağlayan iletişim ağlarının güçlü olduğu toplumların bir özelliği olarak görülmektedir.(2007:71). Sosyal sermaye birikimi toplumsal güven ve işbirliği bağlamında çıkmasından hareketle ani ve beklenmedik kitlesel göç karşısında toplumsalın sosyal ve beşeri sermaye yönünden nasıl etkilenecek oldukları yerli halk için önem arz etmekle birlikte göç eden toplulukların da kendi beşeri ve sosyal sermaye ağlarını nasıl kurdukları ve bu sermayeyi artı değere çevirmeyi başarıp başaramadıkları ise önemli bir konudur.

Araştırmanın Yöntemi

Araştırma Bursa ilinde yaşayan Suriyeli mültecilerle kartopu örnekle tekniği ile seçilen toplamda 25 kişi ile 17 yarı yapılandırılmış mülakat ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Görüşmeler sonucunda elde edilen veriler betimsel analiz yaklaşımı ve yorumlama tekniği kullanılarak Sosyal Sermaye ve Beşeri Sermaye kriterleri bağlamında iki ana başlık altında incelenmiştir.

Bulgular ve Yorum;

Beşeri Sermaye Kaynağı Olarak Göç ve İşgücü Transferi

Beşeri sermaye kaynağı olarak görülen göç hadisesinin beşeri sermaye haline gelebilmesi için işlevsel kılınması gerekmektedir. Bu noktada göç alan ülkelerin beşeri sermaye kaynaklarına entegre olabilecek nüfusa yönelik politikalar geliştirilmesi hem göçmenler açısından hem de ev sahibi toplumun ekonomik kalkınması açısından önemli bir başlık olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Mecik'in belirttiği gibi göç ile birlikte açığa çıkan iş gücü potansiyelinin kullanımı beşeri sermayenin de aktif bir biçimde gelişmesini sağlayıcı bir araç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır (2010:35)Yaptığımız araştırmada elde edilen bulgular bu perspektiften hareket edilerek beşeri sermayenin göçmenler açısından ne düzeyde olduğu ve işlevselliği aynı zamanda işgücü piyasası içeresinde yer almalarının nasıl açığa çıktığı incelenmiştir. İlk olarak örneklem içeresinde kadın ve erkek katılımcıların dağılımına baktığımızda;



Katılımcıların %52'si erkek olup %48'i kadındır. İlk etapta vasıflı bireylerin cinsiyet dağılımının erkekler özelinde daha fazla olacağı beklentisi taşınmış bulunsa da yapılan görüşmelerde eğitim öğretim açısından kadınların da eğitim alanında aktif olarak yer aldıkları anlaşılmıştır. Smith vasıflı göçmenlerin beşeri sermaye açısından etkin kullanımının özellikle maddi bağlamda kazanç sağladığını aynı zamanda toplumsal bağlamda da yaralı olduğunu ifade etmektedir (Awan,2012).Diğer tabloda ise vasıflı

göçmenlerin meslek dağılımına yer verilmiştir.



Smith üretken olan emeğin satılabilir bir özellik taşıdığını ve üretken emeğin avukatlık, doktorluk, öğretmenlik gibi profesyonel meslek kollarını kapsadığını belirterek göçmenlerin sahip olmuş oldukları dezavantajlılıklarını "Telafi Prensibi" ile elde etmiş oldukları eğitim sayesinde aşabileceklerini ve bu yolla da beşeri sermayeye katkıda bulanabileceklerini öne sürmektedir (Akt. Tepecik,2019:12, Çömlekçi,1971:4).Vasıflı Suriyeli göçmenlerin Telafi prensibinden hareketle kendi eğitimsel bagajlarını ne derece aktif kullandıklarını sorguladığımızda ise aşağıdaki tabloyu incelememiz gerekmektedir.



Tablodan hareketle Suriyeli göçmenlerin kendi eğitim alanında çalışma oranı çalışmayan ve alan dışında istihdam olan bireylere göre daha az istihdam edilmiş oldukları anlaşılmaktadır. Bu noktada ise alan dışı istihdama neden olan etmelerin neler olduğunu ifade ettiğimizde ise denklik problemi, fırsat eşitsizliği, ucuz işgücü beklentisi, vasıflı göçmenlerin istihdamına yönelik politika eksikliği gibi birçok sorunsalın bulunduğu yapılan mülakatlarda tespit edilmiştir. Meslek alanında çalışma imkanı elde etmiş kişilerin özelliklerine baktığımızda ise 4 katılımcının İlahiyat mezunu olup kuran kurslarında Arapça eğitmenliği yaptığı diğer 1 katılımcının ise mühendislik alanında kendi girişimleriyle (sahip olmuş olduğu network ve maddi güç ile orantılı olarak) iş gücü ağına dahil olduğu ve 1 katılımcının ise Türkiye'de üniversiteye devam edip staj yaptığı kurumda kurmuş olduğu ilişkiler neticesinde asgari ücretle çalışmaya devam ettiği belirlenmiştir. Bu noktada vasıflı göçmenlerin iş gücü ağına katılımlarının sorunlu bir alan olduğu ve nitelik altı işlerde çalıştıkları aynı zamanda sosyal güvenceden yoksun oldukları saptanmıştır. Bu durum neticesinde hem göçmenler açısından hem de ev sahibi toplum açısından beşeri sermaye kaynaklarının işlevsel kullanılmadığı ve alanda ciddi bir politika eksikliği olduğu kanaatine ulaşılmıştır.

Sosyal Sermayenin Göçmelerin Toplumsala ve İş Gücü Piyasasına Dahil Olmalarındaki Etkisi

Yapılan araştırmada göçmenlerin sahip olmuş oldukları sosyal sermaye rezervlerinin göç eylemine katılmada, yaşam yeri seçiminde, iş bulma sürecinde, toplumsala dahil olma düzeylerinde belirleyici olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Bu noktadan hareket edilerek yukarıda ifade edilen süreçlerin nasıl açığa çıktığı sosyal sermaye açısından aşağıda incelenmiştir.

Sosyal Sermaye Kaynaklarının Göç Sürecine Etkisi;

Göç sürecinin nasıl ortaya çıktığı ve sürecin hangi aracı organlar vasıtasıyla sağlandığını incelediğimizde sosyal sermaye açısından göçmenlerin sahip olmuş oldukları network vasıtasıyla göç kararını aldıkları ve yerleşim yeri açısından da akrabalık bağları ve tanıdık kimse bağlantılarının etkileyici olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Araştırmaya katılanlar *"Bize kendinizi tanıtabilir misiniz? Göç sürecinizi anlatabilir misiniz?"* şeklinde soru yöneltilmiştir.

8.Katılımcı, Erkek, Yaş 24;

"Direk İzmir'e geldik çünkü abimin işi uu abim bizden önce geldi, medresede çalışıyor medresede Arapça kursu, dini şeyler öğretiyor. İlk o geldi arkadaşları tarafından sonra biz onla kaltıldık."

11.Katılımcı,Kadın, Yaş 29;

"Abim burdaydı bize ev buldu, biz ilk önce Antep'e gittik ama bir hafta kaldım ablam yanında sonra buraya taşınmışam yani."

17.Katlımcı, Erkek, Yaş 27;

"Üç sene oldu ben ve karım geldik . Akrabalar var benim amcamın oğlu şimdi Avrupa'ya gitti o çağırdı beni buraya Bursa'ya."

Kaya'nın belirttiği gibi sosyal sermaye türleri açısından göçmenlerin göç kararlarını etkileyen ve yaşam yer seçiminde etkili olan etmenlerin aile, yakın arkadaş ile kurulan irtibat ile dar bir çerçevede gerçekleşmesi *"bağlayıcı sosyal sermaye"* türü olarak kabul edilmektedir (2011:33). Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye'ye göç etme kararını vermeleri hususunda sosyal sermaye açısından *"bağlayıcı sosyal sermaye"* kaynaklarından mültecilerin daha fazla istifade ettiği anlaşılmıştır.

Sosyal Sermaye Kaynaklarının İş Gücü Piyasasına Dahil Olmadaki Etkisi

Putman'a (2000) göre Sosyal sermaye bileşenleri bağlayıcı, köprü kurucu ve birleştirici sosyal sermaye şeklinde ortaya çıkmaktadır (Sizer, 2019: 39). İş gücü piyasasına katılımlarında hangi sosyal sermaye çeşitlerinden yaraladıklarını incelemek amacıyla katılımcılara *"Eğitiminiz ve çalışma hayatınızla ilgili mevcut durumunuzu değerlendirir misiniz?"* sorusu yönlendirilmiştir.

11.Katılımcı, Kadın, Yaş 29;

"Şimdi eşim eczacıda çalışıyordu şimdi buraya geldi ne ehliyet vardı ne dil biliyordu, komşu çağırdı, komuşumla Hal'e gitti. Çünkü burda birgün çalışmazsan fena olur. Tamam dedi ben bu işe alışıcam dedi. Ondan sonra devam etti."

Ekşi'nin de belirttiği gibi köprüleyen sosyal sermaye daha önce ilişki içeresinde olunmaya ağa girmek ve bu ağ içeresinde edindiği yer ile birlikte fırsatlardan yararlanma imkânı elde etme özelliğini barındırmaktadır (2009:50-51). Görüşmeye katlan 11. görüşmecinin daha önce dahil olmadığı sosyal bir ağ olan Türklerle kurmuş olduğu komşuluk ilişkilerine dahil olması neticesinde köprüleyen sosyal sermaye vasıtasıyla kendisine bir istihdam alanı elde ettiği anlaşılmıştır.

23.Katılımcı, Kadın, Yaş 40;

"İş yok,ben avkuatım Halepten. Ama burada avukat kayıt yok. Bura da kayıt yok yani avukatlar kayıt yok. Burada ben Arapça öğretmen, abim de Arapça öğretmen aldı beni, sadece bir camide ben çalışıyorum amma maaş yok."

23.Katılımcının iş gücü piyasasına katılım sürecinde bağlayıcı sosyal sermaye rezervinden yaralandığı anlaşılmaktadır. Putman'ın da ifade ettiği gibi bu sosyal sermaye çeşidinde birey kendi iç grup dinamiklerinden yararlanarak benzer sosyolojik konumdan hareketle kendisine bir alan açmaktadır. (Field, 2008: 92).Yapılan araştırmada göçmelerin birleştirici sosyal sermaye türünü aktif kullanmadıkları, kurumsal yapıdan ve siyasi katılımdan uzak konumda yer aldıkları anlaşılmıştır. Politik seçkinlerle halk arasında irtibatın iş gücü piyasasının fırsatlarını yaratan bir işlevde olmadığı anlaşılmıştır.

Sonuç ve Değerlendirme

Göç ve mültecilik bireyin statüsünü olumsuz etkileyen bir işlevle kendisini gösterirken bir taraftan da bireylerin edinmiş oldukları sosyal ve beşeri sermaye kaynaklarını da etkilemektedir. Yapılan araştırmada vasıflı göçmenlerin beşeri sermaye kaynaklarını kullanabilecekleri etkin bir politikanın olmadığı anlaşılmıştır. Suriyeli mülteciler içerisinde mühendislik ve tıp alanındaki lisanslansa sahip olanların toplumsala ve iş gücü piyasasına dahil olmada diğer mültecilere nazaran daha avantajlı konumda yer aldıkları belirlenmiştir. Özellikle eczacı, avukat olan kişilerin ise denklik problemi yaşayarak alan dışı ve nitelik altı çalışma koşullarına entegre olmalarının sebebinin ise alandaki politika eksikliğinden kaynaklandığı anlaşılmıştır. Göçmenlerin yerleşim yeri seçme, iş gücü piyasasına katılım süreçleri ele alındığında ise beşeri sermaye rezervlerinin yanında bu rezervin aktif hale gelebilmesinin yolunun ise sosyal sermaye kaynaklarından yararlanma ile doğru orantılı olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Son tahlilde vasıflı göçmenlerin aracı kurumlarla ve politika yapıcılarla etkileşim halinde olamadıkları ve alanda istihdam politikalarına yönelik ve denkliğin iş piyasasına yansıması konusunda sorunlar yaşadıkları anlaşılmıştır. En az iki dil bilen göçmenlerin aldıkları eğitim de göz önüne alındığında beşeri ve sosyal sermaye ağlarına dahil olmada yaşadıkları sorunların giderilmesinin önem arz ettiği

anlaşılmaktadır. Sosyal ve beşeri sermayenin aktif kullanımının nitelikli Suriyeli mültecilerin Türk ana akımına dahil olmadaki süreçlerine katkı sağlayacağı kanaatine ulaşılmıştır.

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SKILLED IMMIGRANTS IN BRAZIL: PROFILE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) OCCUPATIONS

Renan Gadoni Canaan

Introduction

Human capital is essential for economic development, since skilled[1] professionals – in particular, workers in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields – increase economic productivity (Walsh 2015). There are two ways to increase STEM human capital in a country: high levels of investment in education, and talent attraction and retention. As investment in education only yields results in the long term, the strategy for meeting short-term needs to increase human capital involves building a foreign workforce, and many countries already rely on immigrants as an important portion of their skilled workforces (OECD 2015).

The relative lack of human capital in Brazil is a major barrier to economic development (BNDES 2018), with the country facing frequent shortages of talent (MANPOWERSGROUP 2015). Consequently, the attraction of STEM migrants could be a short-term and partial solution to this problem (Ruediger et al. 2015). Thus, our paper contributes to the economic literature on immigration in various ways. There are no studies on immigrants in STEM occupations in Brazil, and in this article, for the first time, we shed light on this issue. Descriptive statistics are used to assess the demographic, human capital and occupational characteristics of those immigrants to Brazil who work in STEM occupations. Moreover, as income is a major measure of workers’ performance in the economic literature on immigrant management, we aim to address key factors that determine earnings by immigrants in STEM occupations.

Methodology

Primary data comes from the Brazilian Annual Social Information Report-RAIS (MTE 2017)[2]. Keeping with Picot and Hue (2018), the study population contains individuals who were aged 25–54. The population included only those immigrants who had arrived prior to 2017, since new arrivals mid-year could not yet report a full annual income.

The classification of STEM occupations follows the methods used by international studies (Boyd and Tian, 2017). Each occupation has a corresponding Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) code, which can be matched and converted to the Brazilian Occupation Classification (CBO)[3] through a common code, the ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations).

OLS Analysis for Key Factors in Earnings

Table 1. Regressors for OLS model for immigrants’ earnings in STEM occupations in Brazil, 2017.

[1] Keeping with Simoes (2018), qualified professionals are defined as workers who hold at least a bachelor’s degree.
[2] Database available at: < http://pdet.mte.gov.br>.
[3] The CBO is the classification used in the RAIS survey for occupations.

Characteristics	Variable	Type	Categories
Demographic	Gender	Dummy	Male, Female
	Race	Dummy	Indigenous, black, white, yellow, brown, others.
	Metropolitan Region	Dummy	Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Brasilia, Others.
	Origin Continent	Dummy	Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, Mercosur, North America, Others.
	Years in Brazil	Continuous	
	Years in Brazil Squared	Continuous	
Human capital	Education Degree	Dummy	Bachelor, Master, Doctorate
	On-the-job time (months)	Continuous	
	On-the-job time squared	Continuous	
	Age	Continuous	
	Age Squared	Continuous	
Occupational	Occupation category	Dummy	Managerial, Technical

The linear correlation analysis was performed using ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis. The dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings (Boyd and Tian 2017). Moreover, earnings were divided by the number of hours worked to adjust to differences in working hours. The regressors consist of demographic, human capital and occupational variables (table 2).

OLS Analysis for Discrepancies between Earnings

For the OLS analysis regarding discrepancies between immigrants and native-born Brazilians, the differences in earnings were assessed through the dummy variable "immigrant". Analysis was performed with four different models: (1) unadjusted, (2) adjusted for demographic characteristics. (3) adjusted for demographic and human capital characteristics, and (4), adjusted for demographic, human capital and occupational characteristics.

Results and Discussion

The Landscape of Skilled Immigrants in STEM Occupations

Skilled immigrants represent only a small portion of those working in STEM occupations in Brazil, at 0.86%. However, their average earnings are 49.6% higher than those of their Brazilian counterparts (R$13,247.35 and R$8,852.80, respectively). The main characteristics of STEM-occupation immigrants are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Characteristics for skilled immigrants and native-born Brazilians in STEM occupations in Brazil, 2017.

	Immigrants	Natives
TOTAL NUMBER	3,924	451,172
AVERAGE MONTHLY EARNING	R$13247.35	R$8852.80
SEX	100.0%	100.0%
Male	82.3%	77.1%
Female	17.7%	22.9%
AVERAGE AGE	38.88	36.23
METROPOLITAN REGIONS	100.0%	100.0%
Belo Horizonte	4.2%	5.6%
Porto Alegre	3.7%	3.1%
Rio de Janeiro	14.3%	9.7%
Sao Paulo	36.5%	30.7%
Brasilia	2.4%	3.7%
Others	39.0%	47.2%
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	100.0%	100.0%
Bachelor's degree	89.6%	95.8%
Master's Degree	6.2%	3.2%
PhD degree	4.2%	1.0%
ORIGIN CONTINENT	3924	
Asia	559	
Europe	1088	
Latin-America[4]	992	
Mercosur	470	
Africa	103	
North America	113	
Naturalized citizens of Brazil	230	
Others	369	
RACE	100.0%	100.0%
Brown	14.1%	20.0%
White	62.2%	68.9%
Yellow	9.3%	1.8%
Black	2.4%	2.3%
Indigenous	0.8%	0.2%
non-declared	11.3%	6.9%
OCCUPATION	100.0%	100.0%
technical	77.6%	91.4%

[4] Excluding Mercosur countries: Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.

managerial	22.4%	8.6%

Key Factors Defining Earnings of Immigrants

OLS analysis shows that demographic, human capital and occupational characteristics have important effects on earnings by immigrants in STEM occupations in Brazil in 2017 (table 3).

Demographic factors: In Brazil, a consensus has emerged that racial discrimination affects earnings, even among professionals with the same education and demographic characteristics (Stamm and De Castro 2017). Our analysis showed a significant discrepancy in earnings among races, with self-declared "white" and "yellow" employees earning 51.5% and 60.0% more than the self-declared "black" (table 3). As discussed by Cavalcanti, Oliveira and Macedo (2018), immigrants are affected by this racial hierarchy as much as native-born Brazilians and are thus subjected to a historical system of discrimination in the workforce.

Moreover, many studies point to gender discrimination as a major factor in the pay gap between men and women (Matos and Machado 2006; Stamm and Castro 2017). Results demonstrate that there is evidence of a discrepancy in earnings between male and female immigrants in STEM jobs. Gender discrimination appears to be a key factor in determining income among these professionals, as women earn 14.6% less than men (Table 3). Therefore, just as native-born Brazilians, immigrants in STEM occupations appear to face the same discrimination based on gender.

Table 3. Earnings differentials, in percentage, for immigrants in STEM occupations in Brazil.

RACE	
Black	(rg[5])
Indigenous	(ns[6])
White	51.5
Yellow	60.0
Brown	46.1
GENDER	
Male	(rg)
Female	-14.6
CONTINENT OF ORIGIN	
Africa	(rg)
Asia	81.9
Europe	55.7
Latin America	(ns)
Mercosur	37.9
Naturalized citizens of Brazil	(ns)
North America	93.9
Others	64.7
METROPOLITAN REGION	

[5]Reference group.
[6]Differences between the regression coefficients are not statistically different and deviations are not reported

Porto Alegre	(rg)
Belo Horizonte	(ns)
Brasilia	61.0
Rio de Janeiro	80.7
Sao Paulo	27.0
Other regions	(ns)
AGE	11.4
AGE SQUARED	-0.1
TIME ON THE JOB	6.6E-03
TIME ON THE JOB SQUARED	-1.1E-07
EDUCATION LEVEL	
Bachelor	(rg)
Master	(ns)
Doctorate	37.0
OCCUPATION CATEGORY	
Stem technical occupation	(rg)
Stem managerial occupation	60.9
YEARS IN BRAZIL	-2.9
YEARS IN BRAZIL SQUARED	4.3E-02

Occupational Factor: According to the 2010 Brazilian Occupation Classification, STEM jobs may be divided into two categories: (1) technical and (2) Managerial (MTE 2010). The activities of the first category require a Level-4 designation according to the ISCO-88, which denotes a high level of qualification. Those in the second category, although not receiving a specific level in ISCO-88, can also be deemed highly qualified as a result of their elevated status and usually high earnings (MTE 2010). OLS corroborates this observation, since immigrants that occupy a managerial position earn 60.9% more than other STEM immigrants. Thus, occupational role seems to be one of the most important factors defining income among immigrants in STEM occupations in Brazil.

Income Differentials between Immigrants and Natives in STEM Occupations

According to the unadjusted model on income differentials (Model 1), immigrants earn 11.9% more than their native-born counterparts (table 4). Discrepancies can also be observed when demographic characteristics are controlled (Model 2) and human capital variables are controlled (Model 3): immigrants still earn more than their Brazilian counterparts (6.5% and 2.7%, respectively). However, when the variable for occupation is controlled, the results demonstrate no significant differences between the incomes of immigrants and native-born Brazilians in STEM occupations. This indicates that part of the discrepancy may be explained by the fact that a greater proportion of immigrants occupy a managerial STEM job (22.4% against 8.6% for natives, Table 2), and that managerial jobs are top-status positions that command higher pay. This convergence of earnings between natives and foreigners, indicating a lack of discrimination, may be seen as a positive factor for attracting more STEM migrants to Brazil and retaining them in the country.

Table 4. Monthly earnings differentials, in percentage, between native-born Brazilians and

immigrants in STEM occupations in Brazil, 2017.

	Immigrants	Natives
Model 1 (unadjusted)	+11.86	(rg)
Model 2	+6.47	(rg)
Model 3	+2.66	(rg)
Model 4	(ns)	(rg)

Conclusions

Demographic variables are important factors defining income among immigrants in STEM occupations in Brazil. Immigrants, just like native-born Brazilians, face a historical system of discrimination based on gender and ethnoracial hierarchies in the workforce. Moreover, human capital characteristics such as education level, age and time on the job, and occupational role also have important effects on earnings of those professionals.

Immigrants have higher average earnings compared to native-born Brazilians in STEM occupations. Part of the discrepancy in earnings may be explained by the fact that a greater proportion of immigrants occupy a managerial STEM job, which are top-status positions that command higher pay. The convergence of earnings between natives and foreigners, indicating a lack of discrimination, may be seen as a positive factor for attracting and retaining more STEM talents to Brazil.

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WHAT ARE THE RETURN PROPENSITIES OF NIGERIAN MEDICAL DOCTORS IN THE UK?

Mohammed Abdullahi

Migration management and research are becoming an essential area of study in many countries (Debnath 2016). The reasons why people move to, or from, a particular geographical place have been extensively studied within migration research (Crush 2019). Recent scholarship has shifted to return migration, its consequences on both the micro and macro levels, and its impact on the receiving and sending countries (Sveinsson 2015; Thomas 2018).

The healthcare human resource crisis is one of the most pressing global health issues of our time (Crush 2019). World Health Organization (WHO 2019) workforce projections suggest that by 2030, there will be a shortfall of about 18 million healthcare workers worldwide. Asia and Africa are the continents predicted to have the largest shortfalls, as many of their doctors are migrating to High Income Countries (HICs) (WHO 2019). This shortfall is already evident: Duvivier et al. (2017) have estimated that around one-fifth of African-born doctors are working in HICs, and some African countries lose up to 70% of their health workforce to these countries.

The WHO suggests the desirable doctor–population ratio is 1:1,000 (Kumar and Pal 2018). Thus, with a population of over 200 million citizens in Nigeria (World Bank 2020), the country needs at least 200,000 doctors; other reports state that Nigeria needs at least 237,000 doctors (Ighobor 2017). However, only about 75,000 doctors were registered with the Medical Council of Nigeria in January 2020 (Ezigbo 2020) and in 2018, around 33,000 of Nigeria's registered doctors were practising abroad (Ihua 2018); with just under one in five of these (6,974 in 2019) working in the UK (African watch 2019).

The cost of training African doctors who have migrated to HICs was estimated to be $2 billion in 2010 (Arnold and Lewinsohn 2010). In response, this study has been criticised as fundamentally flawed, as it fails to account for the contributions that the doctors make to their countries through human capital gain and remittances sent home (Azose and Raftery 2019). Crush (2019) stated that African doctors in HICs, such as the United States and Canada, remitted more than double the cost of their education to their home countries.

The OECD (2017) defines return migration as the process of returning to the country of birth after living in another country for at least three consecutive months. Return migration could be temporary or permanent (Crush 2019). The process of return migration is complex, dynamic and influenced by several determinants (Adzei and Sakyi 2014). People migrate for different reasons, and their return intentions are influenced by different factors (Duvivier et al. 2017). Some migrants have the intention to return, some have rejected it and others see it as an illusion that is uncertain or unthinkable (Azose and Raftery 2019). Despite the importance of return migration to both the receiving and sending countries, estimates of migration flows in Nigeria, and within Africa as a whole, are still imprecise.

Theoretical approaches to return migration

Migration theories suggest various reasons why people may return. For example, the Neoclassical Economists consider that migration occurs due to wage differentials between sending and receiving countries. Therefore, return migration occurs as a miscalculation of the costs or failure to maximize expected higher income, as migration is intended to be permanent (Stark 1991). In contrast, the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) sees return migration as a rational, foreseen and planned component of the migration process (Cassorino 2004). In a successful migration experience, the migrant achieves the anticipated economic resources and human capital (skills, experiences and knowledge) then returns home (Stark 1991). Both economic theories have been criticised for not considering the non-economic reasons for return migration, an issue that has been addressed by the structural approach.

The structural approach emphasizes the significance of social and institutional factors in both the receiving and sending country, rather than simply focussing on the experiences of the individual migrant (Mamattah 2006). Within this approach, the work of Cerase (1974) has been seminal in providing a typology covering the ways in which structural factors and individual aspirations come together to provide reasons for return. These are return of failure, conservatism, retirement and innovation. Cerase (1974) suggests that the 'return of failure' occurs when migrants cannot integrate into the society of the host country and return home as a result. 'Return of conservatism' is a return that was planned before emigrating with the aim of saving money during the migration period to be used upon return. 'Return of retirement' occurs when the migrant returns to the home country after completing their working life. Finally, 'return of innovation' occurs when a well-integrated migrant abroad returns and uses their accrued skills to implement a new business or plan (Cerase 1974).

It is therefore logical to assume that some of the factors that motivated the migrants' decision to depart their home countries will also influence their inclination to return home (Debnath 2016). For example, if a migrant's initial decision to migrate was motivated by poor working conditions or pay, the return decision will take into account those same initial factors that propelled their migration. Consequently, it is crucial to understand the factors influencing the return decision-making process, in order to establish the return propensities of Nigerian doctors in the UK. My research hopes to fill this gap by using a multimethod approach, to capture in detail the return intentions of Nigerian doctors in the UK. It is envisaged that this knowledge will allow for the development of necessary return migration and reintegration policies for the returnees.

Methodology

I will adopt a multimethod approach of data collection, which is endorsed as appropriate for investigating complex social phenomena (Creswell 2011) such as migration (Crush 2019). Data will be collected from Nigerian doctors in the UK, with the Medical Association of Nigerians Across Great Britain (MANSAG) acting as a gatekeeper. MANSAG has over 3,000 registered doctors, who are all able to practise in Nigeria; I have been granted access by the association.

Creswell (2014) states that one of the benefits of multimethod research is that it enables a researcher to obtain a comprehensive answer to the problem investigated. Davis et al. (2011:472) have highlighted that the use of multimethod research helps in covering the lapses of different individual methods. However, Creswell (2014) warns that carrying out multimethod research has time and cost implications. I have taken various steps to mitigate these limitations by negotiating access to my participants through a key gatekeeper early in my research.

It was decided that a three-stage multimethod approach will be used, namely: an online survey,

focus groups, and semi-structured interviews.

Online Survey

An online survey, which is the first stage of my research, is a method of data collection which involves giving a structured questionnaire to a selected audience to complete over the internet. MANSAG has agreed to distribute a link to my survey through their members' mailing list. If the response rate is low, I will also use snowball sampling from some respondents to increase response numbers or, alternatively, post the survey on LinkedIn. I require a minimum response number of 200 to allow me conduct simple descriptive analysis. I will then invite the survey respondents to participate in either focus groups or interviews.

Online surveys are a cost-effective way of collecting data from a large number of respondents. However, Bryman and Bell (2007) identify the difficulty of engaging participants online and knowing if the right person is answering the survey. I hope to engage my participants by asking questions which relate to their specific experiences; hence, they will be able to immediately understand the survey's relevance to them. Also, by collecting statistical data with a few mandatory write-in answers, making it straightforward to answer. The survey should take around thirty minutes to complete.

I will be using Qualtrics because it allows for the completion of survey via multiple platforms, such as mobile phones, tablets and laptops, and has the ability to be completed in a single attempt or to be saved and completed at a later time. This feature will be useful for my participants who are busy doctors and might need to complete the survey in stages. Qualtrics has a built-in email distribution capability to send reminders to non-responders and a thank-you message to responders. Following the data collection with Qualtrics, the data will be exported into SPSS, to conduct a simple descriptive analysis of the survey.

Thereafter, I will select those who are interested in returning home to participate in a focus group, as they are the primary target of this research.

Focus groups

I will conduct not more than five online focus groups of 8-10 participants in each, drawn from the survey. Online focus groups use the internet to collect oral or text-based data. Text-based focus groups are suitable for the current study because of cost-effectiveness, ensuring participants' anonymity, and reducing the possibility of 'group speak' (Saunders et al. 2018). Group speak is a concern when investigating something like return migration where there may be certain community consensuses around its desirability or otherwise.

Saunders et al. (2018) identify the difficulties of engaging the participants and the possibility for technical difficulties as drawbacks of an online focus group. I hope to resolve these limitations by ensuring that all participants have an understanding of the purpose and protocols of the focus group; I will use a range of visual stimuli, such as online polls, to engage participants. Purposive sampling will capture diversity in age, gender, marital status, specialism, tribe, length of stay in the UK, etc. However, I recognise that it may be difficult to meet all the sample quotas, given how busy doctors are.

I will be using VisionsLive platform for the focus group; this platform works like an instant messaging service, by allowing free-flowing discussion between the participants and the researcher. For the data analysis, VisionsLive transcribes data automatically, and the transcribed data will then be entered into NVivo for further qualitative analysis. From the survey and focus groups, I will then invite interested doctors to carry out a face-to-face or telephone interview.

Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interview is a method of data collection which combines pre-determined and prompting questions. This approach will allow me to explore in detail the attitudes, values, beliefs, and lived experiences of the doctors, therefore allowing me to gain more detailed information, by prompting the interviewee if something interesting or important is said that had not been considered by myself (Creswell 2014). A maximum of 20 semi-structured interviews will be conducted with doctors considering returning to Nigeria. I consider 20 interviews to be an optimum number to include doctors with different personal and migratory characteristics, considering that I have also conducted some surveys and focus groups as part of my research.

The limitations of interviewing as identified by Creswell (2014) are: the inability to generalise findings, due to the personal nature of content, and the difficulty in the analysis, as it can be challenging to decide what is and is not relevant. The interviews will be transcribed verbatim, coded and then analysed using the framework approach (FA) in NVivo. FA is a qualitative data analysis technique that uses a systematic structure to manage, analyse and identify themes in a large volume of text (Hackett and Strickland 2018). The FA is suitable for policy development research requiring a highly structured systematic approach.

Conclusion

Upon the completion of this research, I hope that the findings would highlight the factors and conditions necessary to facilitate the return migration of Nigerian doctors in the UK. These findings would be useful in the development of return migration strategies for Nigerian doctors.

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

İLKÖĞRETİM VE ORTA ÖĞRETİM ÖĞRETMENLERİNİN YABANCI UYRUKLU ÖĞRENCİLERE YÖNELİK TUTUMLARI (ÇORUM İL MERKEZİ ÖRNEĞİ)

Yakup Çoştu[1], Macid Yilmaz[2], İsmail Bulut[3]

Giriş

Ortadoğu kaynaklı göç nedeniyle ülkemize gelen göçmenlerin bir kısmı sınır boylarında kamplara yerleştirilmiş, büyük çoğunluğu ise ülke geneline dağıtılmıştır. Ülke geneline dağıtılan göçmenler, bir taraftan yerleştikleri şehirlerin sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik ve dinsel görünümünün çeşitlenmesini, diğer taraftan ise yerleşikler açısından yeni toplumsal tecrübelerin kazanılmasını sağlamışlardır.

Ülkemize yönelik göç dalgalarından Çorum ili de etkilenmiştir. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü'nün yayınladığı istatistiklere göre 09.01.2020 tarihi itibariye Çorum'da geçici koruma kapsamında 2.825 Suriyeli bulunmaktadır. İkamet izni ile Çorum'da yaşayan göçmen sayısı 2.470 kişidir. Uluslararası koruma kapsamında yer alan ve uluslararası koruma arayan göçmen sayısı ise 11.200'dür. Bu sayının 10500'ünü Iraklılar oluşturmaktadır. Uluslararası koruma kapsamında yer alan ya da uluslararası koruma arayan diğer 700 yabancı ise Afganistan, İran ve Pakistan uyruklulardır.

Sosyal uyum konusunda genellikle azınlık olanların, çoğunluğa göre şekillenmiş toplum kurallarını ve yaşam biçimini öğrenmesi gerektiği şeklinde bir kabul bulunmaktadır. Bu da, sosyal uyumun, sadece sonradan gelen yabancıları ilgilendiren bir durum olduğu algısını doğurabilmektedir. Hâlbuki uyum çift taraflı bir süreci barındırmaktadır. Azınlık olanların çoğunluğa uyum sağlaması, çoğunluğunda azınlık olanın farklılıklarını benimsemesi ve kabullenmesi beklenir.

Sayıları her geçen gün artan okul çağındaki yabancı öğrencilerin Türk eğitim sistemi ve toplumsal yaşamda karşılaştıkları sorunlar, uyum konusunun bir boyutunu oluşturmaktadır. Uyum konusunun başka bir boyutunu da, bu öğrencilere eğitim ve öğretim hizmeti sunan okul yöneticileri ve öğretmenlerin yaklaşımı, iletişim, uyum ve yeterlik düzeylerdir.

Buna göre bu çalışmanın amacı, Çorum İl merkezindeki ilkokul, ortaokul ve liselerde eğitim-öğretim gören yabancı uyruklu öğrencilere yönelik, bu okullarda görev yapan öğretmenlerin genel tutumlarını belirlemektir. Bu kapsamda, Çorum İl merkezinde göre yapan ilkokul, ortaokul ve lise öğretmenlerinin sınıflarındaki yabancı uyruklu öğrencilere yönelik iletişim, uyum ve yeterlik düzeylerini tespit etme amaçlı nicel bir saha araştırması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Böylece yabancı öğrencilerin Türk toplumuna genel uyum süreçlerinde, okul ortamından ve görevlilerden kaynaklanan sorunların tespiti ve çözüm önerileri üzerinde durulmuştur.

Yabancı Öğrencilere Yönelik Öğretmen Tutumlarının Çeşitli Değişkenler Açısından İncelenmesi

Kendi anavatanlarının dışında azınlık olarak bulunan göçmenlerin, ev sahibi topluma uyum sağlama süreçleri sosyal bilimciler tarafından ele alınan önemli araştırma konuları arasında yer almaktadır.

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Özellikle, genç kuşak göçmenlerin sosyal ve kültürel uyumu konusuna, okullaşma ve dil öğrenimi son derece önemli hususlardır. Bu genç kuşakların, çoğunluk toplumu içerisinde başarılı bir uyum sağlayabilmelerinin yollarından biri okullaşma oranıyla doğrudan irtibatlıdır.

Çorum il merkezinde MEB'e bağlı okulöncesi, ilkokul, ortaokul ve liselerde 3,400'e yakın yabancı öğrenci eğitim görmektedir. Bu öğrencilerin Türk eğitim sistemi ve toplumsal yaşamına uyum süreçleri, yaşadıkları sorunlar gibi vb. hususlar uyum konusunun bir boyutunu oluşturmaktadır. Uyum konusunun başka bir boyutunu da, bu öğrencilere eğitim ve öğretim hizmeti sunan okul yöneticileri ve öğretmenlerin yaklaşımı, iletişim ve yeterlik düzeylerdir.

Bu araştırmanın temel konusu, Çorum il merkezi örneğinde yabancıların uyum sürecinde, yerleşiklerin ne kadar hazır olduğunu tespit etmektir. Bu yanıyla araştırma ilgili göç yazınındaki yaklaşım/araştırmalardan farklılaşmaktadır. Araştırmanın temel problemi ise, Çorum İl merkezinde okullarda (İlkokul, Ortaokul, Lise) eğitim-öğretim alan yabancı uyruklu öğrencilere yönelik, görev yapan öğretmenlerin genel tutumunun (iletişim, uyum ve yeterlik düzeylerini) belirlenmesidir.

Araştırmanın yöntemi olarak, açıklayıcı yaklaşım esas alınmıştır. Açıklayıcı yaklaşım kapsamında nicel veri toplama (anket, ölçek) ve betimsel analiz teknikleri kullanılmıştır. Veri toplama aracı olarak, bağımsız değişken olarak örneklemin demografik özelliklerini (cinsiyet, yaş, görev yeri, hizmet yılı vb.) belirlemek üzere tarafımızdan oluşturulan anket ile bağımlı değişken olarak ise Sağlam ve Kanbur (2017)'un geliştirdiği "Mülteci Öğrenci Tutum Ölçeği" (MÖTÖ) kullanılmıştır. Bu ölçek; iletişim, uyum ve yeterlik olmak üzere üç alt boyutlu olarak tasarlanmıştır. Ölçekten alınan puanın yüksekliği, mülteci öğrencilere yönelik tutumun pozitifliğine işaret etmektedir. Ölçeğin güvenirliğine ilişkin olarak iç tutarlıklık katsayısı (Alpha) .91 olarak hesaplanmıştır. Bu değer, ölçeği oluşturan maddelerin birbirleriyle tutarlı olduğunu göstermektedir (Sağlam ve Kanbur, 2017).

Saha çalışması, Çorum İl Valiliğinden 08.03.2019 tarihinde alınan iznin akabinde Nisan-Haziran 2019 tarihlerinde gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Araştırmanın evrenini, Çorum İl merkezinde İl Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğüne bağlı ilkokul, ortaokul ve liselerde eğitim-öğretim gören yabancı uyruklu öğrencilerin bulunduğu okullar oluşturmaktadır. İl Mili Eğitim Müdürlüğü verilerinde, otuz ve üstü yabancı öğrenci bulunan, on üç İlkokul, on iki ortaokul ve üç lise bulunmaktadır. Araştırma evreni söz konusu bu okullarda okuyan ve sınıfında en az bir yabancı uyruklu öğrenci bulunan öğretmenlerden oluşmaktadır. Sınıfında yabancı uyruklu öğrenci bulunmayan öğretmenler evren dışında tutulmuştur.

Bulgular ve Yorum

Nisan-Haziran 2019 tarihleri arasında saha çalışması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Saha araştırmasında, sınıfında en az bir ve üstü yabancı öğrenci bulunan İlkokullarda 266, Ortaokullarda 237 ve Liselerde 101 öğretmen örneklem grubunu oluşturmuştur.

Çorum il genelinde Milli Eğitime bağlı okullarda (ana sınıfı, ilkokul, ortaokul ve lise) okuyan yabancı öğrenci sayısı toplam 3374'tür. Bu öğrencilerin % 84,14'ü Irak kökenli, % 11,17's, Suriye kökenli öğrencilerden oluşurken, % 4,68'i ise diğer milletlere yabancı öğrenci bulunmaktadır. Diğer milletlere mensup olanlar çerisinde ise, yoğunluk sırasına göre Afganistan, İran, Azerbaycan, Almanya, Mısır, Filistin, Kırgızistan, Türkmenistan, Yemen, Rusya Federasyonu, Kazakistan, Ukrayna ve Çin yer almaktadır (Çorum Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü, 2019).

Tablo 1'de 2016-2019 yılları arasında Çorum il merkezinde eğitim-öğretime devam eden yabancı uyruklu öğrencilerin sayıları yer almaktadır. Yabancı öğrencilerin okullaşma oranı yılara göre değiştiği görülmektedir. Çorum İl Merkezinde yerleşik yabancı göçmenlerin okul çağındaki kayıtlı çocukların sayısı göçmen nüfusunun yaklaşık % 27'sine denk gelmektedir. 2011 yılından itibaren Çorum İl

merkezinde yerleşik olan göçmenlerin nüfusu yeni doğanlarla her geçen gün daha da artmaktadır. Bu nedenle, genç göçmenlerin yerleşik topluma uyum süreçlerinde okullaşma oranı son derece önem arz etmektedir. Çünkü dezavantajlı kesim olarak nitelendirilen bu kesimin eğitim sistemi içerisinde yer almaları, onlara verilen eğitimci desteği ve ilgisi gibi birçok faktörün göçmen çocukların yaşadıkları topluma uyumunu kolaylaştırmaktadır (Çalhan & Kolukırık, 2020).

Tablo 1. Eğitim-Öğretim Yılına Göre Çorum İl Geneli Yabancı Öğrenci Dağılımı*

Eğitim Öğretim Yılı/Sınıf	Okul Öncesi	İlkokul	Ortaokul	Lise	Genel Toplam
2019 Yılı*	146 % 4,33	1803 % 53, 44	1075 % 31,86	350 % 10,37	3374 % 100
2018/2019	130 % 3,87	1820 % 54,22	1078 % 32,11	329 % 9,80	3357 % 100
2017/2018	103 % 3,70	1560 % 56,09	834 % 29,99	284 % 10,21	2781 % 100
2016/2017	55 % 3,44	906 %56,63	478 % 29,88	161 % 10,06	1600 % 100

* 19.02.2019 tarihi itibariyle (Çorum Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü, 2019)

Tablo 2. Çorum İl Geneli Yabancı Öğrenci Devam/Sürekli Devamsızlık Dağılımı

Öğrenim Seviyesi	Cinsiyet	Devam Eden	Sürekli Devamsız	Toplam	Genel Toplam
Ana Sınıfı	Kız	36 % 3,03	18 % 5,08	54 % 3,50	124 % 3,71
	Erkek	51 % 3,91	19 % 3,83	70 % 3,89	
İlkokul	Kız	702 % 59,14	121 % 34,18	823 % 53,41	1729 % 51,74
	Erkek	774 % 59,31	132 % 26,61	906 % 50,31	
Ortaokul	Kız	348 % 29,32	138 % 38,98	486 % 31,54	1134 % 33,93
	Erkek	384 % 29,43	264 % 53,23	648 % 35,98	
Lise	Kız	101 % 8,51	77 % 21,75	178 % 11,55	355 % 10,62
	Erkek	96 % 7,36	81 % 16,33	177 % 9,83	
Toplam	Kız	1187 % 100	354 % 100	1541 % 100	3342 % 100
	Erkek	1305 % 100	496 % 100	1801 % 100	

(Çorum Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü, 2019)

Yukarıda tablo 2'de ise, 24.05.2019 tarihi itibariyle Çorum il merkezinde eğitim gören yabancı uyruklu öğrencilerin okula devam/sürekli devamsızlık dağılımı yer almaktadır. Bu verilere göre, yabancı uyruklu öğrencilerin tüm eğitim kademelerinde yaklaşık yarısının sürekli devamsız olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu devamsızlık durumunun çeşitli nedenleri olabilir. Saha izlenimlerimizde göçmen

öğrencilerin devamsızlığında, ailenin okula göndermemesi, çalışma durumu, okul ortamından memnun olmama, akran zorbalığı vb. gibi çeşitli nedenlerin ön plana çıktığı gözlemlenmiştir. Çalhan ve Kolukırık'ın çalışmasında da benzer bir bulguya rastlanmış ve bu öğrencilerin öğretmenlerine göre, çocukların aile geçimine katkı sağlama amaçlı çalışmalarının okullaşma oranları üzerinde olumsuz bir etkisi vardır. Öyle ki çalışan erkek çocuklarının büyük bir kısmı okula kayıtlı görünseler dahi, dersleri düzenli olarak takip edememekte ve sık sık devamsızlık yapmaktadır (Çalhan & Kolukırık, 2020).

Çakırer-Özservet'e göre ise okullaşma ve eğitim konusu sadece göçmen çocuklar için değil tüm göçmenler için önemli bir sorun alanı olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu nedenle okuldaki verilen eğitime her göçmen öğrencinin katılımı esas alınmalı ve devlet okullarında göçmen çocukları eğitime katmak üzere farklı projeler geliştirilmelidir (Çakırer-Özservet, 2015). Aynı şekilde Erdoğan'ın Suriyeli çocuklar üzerinde yaptığı bir çalışmada, Türkiye'deki Suriyeli göçmenlerin yaşadığı en önemli sorunun çocukların eğitime ulaşmama hususuna dikkat çekilmektedir. Nitekim bazı okul yöneticilerinin ve öğretmenlerin Suriyeli mülteci çocukların devlet okullarında eğitim almaları ile ilgili çeşitli nedenlerden dolayı olumsuz tutum içinde oldukları da tespit edilmiştir (Erdoğan, 2015). Apak ise çalışmasında mülteci ebeveynlerin büyük bir kısmının, çocuklarının eğitimden uzak kalmalarından endişe duyduklarını ifade etmektedir. (Apak, 2014)

Tablo 3. Öğretmenlerin Cinsiyetlerine Göre Yabancı Öğrencilere Yönelik Tutumları

Boyutlar	Cinsiyet	N	X	S	sd	t	p
İletişim	Kadın	251	33,62	5,88	602	1,99	0,04
	Erkek	353	34,57	5,69			
Uyum	Kadın	251	21,29	4,73	602	1,36	0,17
	Erkek	353	21,84	4,92			
Yeterlik	Kadın	251	9,55	2,52	602	1,85	0,06
	Erkek	353	9,95	2,62			
Toplam	Kadın	251	64,46	11,65	602	1,93	0,05
	Erkek	353	66,35	11,92			

Tablo 3'de, örnekleme alınan öğretmenlerin cinsiyetlerine göre sınıflarındaki yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutumlarına ilişkin yapılan istatistiksel analiz (t testi) sonuçları yer almaktadır. Buna göre, ölçeğin iletişim alt boyutunda ($p=0,04$, $p<0,05$) erkek öğretmenler lehine anlamlı bir farklılaşma görülürken, uyum ($p=0,17$, $p>0,05$) ve yeterlik ($p=0,06$, $p>0,06$) alt boyunlarında ise değişkenler arasında anlamlı bir farklılaşma tespit edilememiştir.

İletişim alt boyutu sonuçlarına göre, erkek öğretmenlerin kadın öğretmenlere göre sınıflarındaki yabancı öğrencilerle iletişim düzeyi daha pozitif olduğu anlaşılmaktadır.

Ölçek toplamı açısından ise ($p=0,05$), erkek öğretmenlerin yabancı uyruklu öğrencilere yönelik tutum puan ortalamaları kadın öğretmenlere oranla kısmen daha yüksek tespit edilmiştir. Bu sonuca göre, erkek öğretmenlerin yabancı uyruklu öğrencilere genel tutum düzeyi daha pozitif olduğu ifade edilebilir.

Sağlam ve Kanbur'un çalışmasında ise, araştırmaya katılan öğretmenlerin cinsiyetlerine göre mülteci öğrencilere yönelik tutumlarında iletişim ve uyum alt boyutları ile ölçek toplamında anlamlı bir farklılaşma tespit edilememiş, yeterlik boyutunda ise erkek öğretmenler lehine anlamlı bir farklılaşma saptanmıştır. Bu durum erkek öğretmenlerin kadın öğretmenlere göre mülteci öğrencilere yönelik kendilerini daha yeterli olarak gördükleri şeklinde yorumlanmıştır (Sağlam & Kanbur, 2017).

Tablo 4. Öğretmenlerin Yaşlarına Göre Yabancı Öğrencilere Yönelik Tutumları

Boyutlar	Yaş	N	X	S	sd	F	P	Grup ar. fark
İletişim	18-30 yaş	25	33,32	5,49	2/601	2,96	0,05	--
	31-50 yaş	469	33,94	5,72				--
	51 ve üstü	110	35,35	6,03				--
Uyum	18-30 yaş	25	20,28	3,90	27601	3,88	0,02	a
	31-50 yaş	469	21,43	4,78				ab
	51 ve üstü	110	22,66	5,16				b
Yeterlik	18-30 yaş	25	9,00	2,88	2/601	2,70	0,06	a
	31-50 yaş	469	9,72	2,51				ab
	51 ve üstü	110	10,20	2,80				b
Toplam	18-30 yaş	25	62,60	10,80	2/601	3,95	0,02	a
	31-50 yaş	469	65,10	11,60				ab
	51 ve üstü	110	68,22	12,69				b

Örnekleme alınan öğretmenlerin yaşlarına göre sınıflarındaki yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutumlarına ilişkin yapılan istatistiksel analiz sonuçlarına göre: Ölçeğin iletişim alt boyutunda ($p=0,05$, $p=0,05$) 51 ve üstü yaş gurubu öğretmenlerin tutum puan ortalamaları, 18-30 yaş ile 31-50 yaş arası öğretmenlere oranla daha yüksektir. Uyum alt boyutundan elde edilen puan ortalamalarında ise ($p=0,02$, $p<0,05$) önemli düzeyde anlamlı bir farklılaşma tespit edilmiştir. Yapılan Tukey HSD testi sonucuna göre ise, farklılaşma 18-30 yaş ($X=20,28$) ile 51 ve üstü yaş ($X=22,66$) arasında gözlemlenmiştir. Yeterlik alt boyutundan elde edilen puan ortalamalarında ise ($p=0,06$, $p>0,05$) anlamlı bir farklılaşma tespit edilememiştir.

Ölçek toplam puan açısından ise, öğretmenlerin yaşlarına göre yabancı uyruklu öğrencilere yönelik tutum puan ortalamalarında ($p=0,02$, $p<0,05$) yüksek düzeyde anlamlı bir farklılaşma tespit edilmiştir. Yapılan Tukey HSD testi sonucuna göre farklılaşma 18-30 yaş ($X=62,60$) ile 51 ve üstü yaş ($X=68,22$) arasında gözlemlenmiştir. Bu sonuçlara göre, öğretmenlerin yaşları ilerledikçe, yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutum düzeyleri paralel bir biçimde artmaktadır.

Aşağıda tablo 5'te öğretmenlerin görevdeki hizmet yıllarına göre yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutum düzeylerine ilişkin veriler yer almaktadır. Öğretmenlerin hizmet yıllarına göre yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutum düzeyleri arasında, ölçeğin iletişim, uyum ve yeterlik alt boyutları ile genel tutum puan ortalamalarında, ($p=0,00$, $p<0,05$) yüksek düzeyde farklılaşma tespit edilmiştir. Yapılan Tukey HSD testi sonucuna göre ise farklılaşma sadece uyum alt boyutunda istatistiksel olarak tespit edilmiş ve buna göre, hizmet yılı 6-10 arası olan öğretmenler ile 21-25 yıl ile 25 ve üstü hizmet yılına sahip öğretmenler arasında anlamlı bir farklılaşma tespit edilmiştir.

Bu veriler, görevdeki hizmet yılı artan öğretmenlerin yabancı uyruklu öğrencilere yönelik tutumları pozitif yöne arttığını göstermektedir. Bir önceki tablo 4'teki bulgular ile tablo 5'deki bulguların birbirini desteklediği görülmektedir. Öğretmenin yaşı ile hizmet yılı doğru orantılıdır. Yaş ilerledikçe hizmet yılı da artmaktadır. Her iki tablodaki verilerde göstermektedir ki, mesleki tecrübenin artışı genel olarak öğrencilere özel olarak ta yabancı öğrencilere yönelik iletişim, uyum ve yeterlik düzeylerine pozitif yönde bir etki meydana getirmektedir. Öğretmenin mesleki ve pedagojik deneyiminin hizmet kalitesine yansıdığı bu durum Yaşar ve Amaç'ın yaptığı benzer bir çalışmada da vurgulanmaktadır (Yaşar & Amaç, 2018).

Tablo 5. Öğretmenlerin Hizmet Yıllarına Göre Yabancı Öğrencilere Yönelik Tutumları

Boyutlar	Hizmet Yılı	N	X	S	sd	F	P	Grup ar. fark
İletişim	1-5 Yıl	19	32,79	5,80	5/598	4,75	0,00	--
	6-10 Yıl	64	32,70	6,17				--
	11-15 Yıl	90	32,54	5,41				--
	16-20 Yıl	111	33,65	6,20				--
	21-25 Yıl	186	35,17	5,20				--
	25 Yıl ve üstü	134	35,22	5,86				--
Uyum	1-5 Yıl	19	20,11	4,42	5/598	5,57	0,00	ab
	6-10 Yıl	64	19,78	4,39				a
	11-15 Yıl	90	20,30	4,38				ab
	16-20 Yıl	111	21,60	4,97				ab
	21-25 Yıl	186	22,51	4,75				b
	25 Yıl ve üstü	134	22,34	5,03				b
Yeterlik	1-5 Yıl	19	8,84	3,30	5/598	3,24	0,00	--
	6-10 Yıl	64	9,27	2,41				--
	11-15 Yıl	90	9,12	2,24				--
	16-20 Yıl	111	9,87	2,54				--
	21-25 Yıl	186	10,03	2,57				--
	25 Yıl ve üstü	134	10,18	2,72				--
Toplam	1-5 Yıl	19	61,74	12,39	5/598	5,75	0,00	--
	6-10 Yıl	64	61,75	11,57				--
	11-15 Yıl	90	61,97	10,74				--
	16-20 Yıl	111	65,13	12,10				--
	21-25 Yıl	186	67,70	11,05				--
	25 Yıl ve üstü	134	67,73	12,38				--

Aşağıdaki Tablo 6'da örnekleme alınan öğretmenlerin görev yaptıkları okul türüne göre sınıflarındaki yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutumlarına ilişkin yapılan istatistiksel analiz sonuçlarına göre: Görev yapılan okul türüne göre, ölçeğin iletişim (p=0,00, p<0,01), uyum (p=0,00, p<0,01), yeterlik (p=0,00, p<0,01) ve ölçek toplam puan (p=0,00, p<0,01), ortalamalarında yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutumda yüksek düzeyde anlamlı bir farklılaşma tespit edilmiştir. Tukey HSD testi sonucuna göre farklılaşma her üç okul türünde de tespit edilmiştir. Buna göre, düşükten yükseğe doğru yabancı uyruklu öğlencilere yönelik iletişim, uyum, yeterlik ve ölçek toplam puan ortalamaları sırasıyla Ortaokul, Lise ve İlkokul öğretmenlerinde tespit edilmiştir. Bu verilere göre, ortaokul öğretmenlerinin yabancı öğrencilere yönelik tutum düzeyleri daha düşük iken, ilkokul öğretmenlerinin ise daha yüksek olduğu görülmektedir. Bu durum göçmen öğrencilerin sahip oldukları yaş gruplarıyla açıklanabilir. Zira yaş küçüldükçe katıldıkları topluma uyum sağlama becerilerinin daha hızlı olduğu varsayılabilir. Ayrıca öğrencilerin yaşının yanı sıra ilkokul öğretmenlerinin okul-veli ilişkisini kurmada daha başarılı olmalarıyla açıklamak mümkündür. İmamoğlu ve Çalışkan'ın çalışmasında ise benzer bir durum vurgulanmakta ve sınıf düzeyi düştükçe öğrencilerin aldıkları Türkçe derslerinin katkısıyla çevresi ve öğretmenlerle iletişimini güçlendirdiği tespiti yapılmaktadır (İmamoğlu & Çalışkan, 2017).

Tablo 6. Öğretmenlerin Görev Yelerine Göre Yabancı Öğrencilere Yönelik Tutumları

Boyutlar	Görev Yeri	N	X	S	sd	F	P	Grup ar. fark.
İletişim	İlkokul	266	36,12	5,19	2/601	33,96	0,00	a
	Ortaokul	237	32,08	6,08				b
	Lise	101	33,93	4,77				c
Uyum	İlkokul	266	23,07	5,09	27601	27,03	0,00	a
	Ortaokul	237	20,01	4,61				b
	Lise	101	21,51	3,34				c
Yeterlik	İlkokul	266	10,32	2,58	2/601	11,35	0,00	a
	Ortaokul	237	9,24	2,49				b
	Lise	101	9,64	2,55				b
Toplam	İlkokul	266	69,51	11,35	2/601	33,14	0,00	a
	Ortaokul	237	61,34	11,86				b
	Lise	101	65,09	9,31				c

Sonuç

Eğitim göçmenler için yeni sosyal ortamlara ve hayat şartlarına uyum sağlamanın ve geçmişin travmatik anılarından uzaklaşmanın önemli bir aracıdır. Göçmen öğrencilerin okulda korunma ve eğitim fırsatlarından yararlandırılması için alınan ya da alınması gereken önlemler artırılsa da hala onlar için eğitimden yararlanmalarının önünde birçok zorluk vardır. Türkiye eğitim sistemi için göçmen öğrenciler konusu, artık göz ardı edilemez bir gerçek haline dönüşmüştür. Fakat Milli Eğitim Bakanlığının bu duruma hazırlıklı olmamasından dolayı hem okulların ve hem de öğretmenlerin hazır bulunuşluklarında birtakım sorunlarla karşılaşılmaktadır. Türkiye'de yürütülen bilimsel çalışmalar çoğunlukla göçmen/mülteci gözüyle yaşanan sorunları betimlemek ve çözüm üretmek şeklinde iken, eğitimin önemli bir boyutunda yer alan öğretmenlerin konuya nasıl yaklaştıkları ve hangi tutumlara sahip oldukları derinlemesine araştırılmaya ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Çorum il merkezinde yürütülen bu araştırmada, öğretmenlerin göçmen öğrencilerle dil ve kültürel açıdan çeşitli sorunlar yaşamasına rağmen pozitif tavır takınarak konuya duyarlı oldukları, öğrencilerin okula devam problemini çözemediklerini, sorunlarla baş etmede ve etkili öğretim konusunda mesleki kıdemlerinin belirleyici faktör olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca göçmen öğrencilere karşı tutum açısında öğretmenin cinsiyetinin farklılık yaratmadığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Elbette göçmen öğrencilere yönelik öğretmen tutumlarındaki farklılıklar sadece bunlarla sınırlı olmayıp, öğretmenlerin sınıf yönetiminde baş etme becerileri, eğitsel temasın/birlikteliğin süresi, devletin sunduğu sosyo-politik destek ve kültürel karşılaşmadaki tutumlar gibi çeşitli faktörler uyum sürecini etkilemektedir. Tüm bunlara rağmen öğretmenlerin büyük bir bölümü, göçmen öğrencilere yönelik okulda verilen eğitimin onları geleceğe taşıyacak bir etkiye sahip olduğu ve toplumla sağlıklı bir bağ kurabilmeleri için köprü olduğu bilincindedirler.

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SURİYELİ ÇOCUKLARIN EĞİTİM SÜRECİNDE YAŞADIKLARI DENEYİMLERİN ANALİZİ: KIZILTEPE'DE BİR SAHA ARAŞTIRMASININ SONUÇLARI ÜZERİNE

Abdurrahman Abay[1] and Fuat Güllüpınar[2]

Giriş

Eğitim hakkı ile ilgili ilk düzenleme 1948 tarihli İnsan Hakları Evrensel Bildirgesinin içinde yer almıştır. Bildirgenin 26. Maddesine göre *"Herkesin eğitim hakkı vardır. Eğitim hiç olmazsa ilk ve temel eğitim evrelerinde parasız olmalıdır. İlköğretim eğitimi zorunludur. Teknik ve mesleki eğitimden herkes yararlanabilmeli ve yükseköğretim, başarıya göre, herkese tam bir eşitlikle açık olmalıdır."* Aynı maddenin ikinci fıkrasına ise eğitimin amacı vurgulanmıştır. Buna göre *"Eğitim, insan kişiliğinin tam gelişmesini, insan haklarıyla temel özgürlüklere saygının güçlenmesini amaç olarak almalıdır. Eğitim bütün uluslar, ırklar ve dini topluluklar arasında anlayış, hoşgörü ve dostluğu güçlendirmeli ve Birleşmiş Milletler' in barışın sürdürülmesi yolundaki çalışmalarını geliştirmelidir"* (BMGK, 1948).

Resmi rakamlara göre Türkiye'de sığınan Suriyelilerin sayısı üç buçuk milyonu aşmış ve bu gene bunların yarısına yakını çocuklardan oluşmaktadır. Bu çocukların 1,189,697'si okul çağında çocuklardan oluşmaktadır(GİGM, 2020). Göç çalışmaları, uzun süreli krizlerde göçmenlerin büyük bir kısmını kriz bitse bile ülkelerine geri dönmediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Suriye krizinin de yaklaşık on yıldır devam ettiği düşünüldüğünde Suriyeli sığınmacıların geri dönmeyecekleri üzerinden politikalar yürütmenin daha doğru olacağını söylemek mümkündür. Yukarıda da değindiğimiz gibi hem temel bir insan hakkı olarak hem de gelecekte ortaya çıkabilecek ekonomik, sosyal ve güvenlik risklerini önlemek adına Türkiye ve uluslararası kuruluşlar Suriyeli göçmenlere yönelik olarak çeşitli programlar yürütmektedir. Sayı olarak Suriyeli nüfusun üçte birinden fazlasını oluşturan eğitim çağındaki Suriyeli çocukların eğitimi, bu programlar arasında en fazla önem ve kaynak ayrılması gerek kısmı oluşturmaktadır.

Afet ve Acil Durumlarda Eğitim: Zorluklar, İlkeler ve Faydalar

Afetlerde (deprem, sel ve tusunami vb. doğal afetler veya savaş, iç karışıklıklar veya çatışmalardan kaynaklı göçler gibi insanın sebep olduğu durumlar) eğitim, afetten etkilenmiş bireylerin hayatta kalmalarını ve hayatlarına kaldıkları yerden devam etmelerine olanak veren eğitimlerdir (UNESCO, 2016: 1). Gerçekleştirilen bu eğitimler afetler ortaya çıkmaya başladığı andan itibaren başlayıp afetin etkileri ortadan kalkana kadar devam eden eğitimlerdir. Afetin niteliğine göre bu eğitimler değişkenlik gösterebilmektedir. Mesela söz konusu afet kalınan yerin değişmesine sebep olmadıysa orada yapılacak olan altyapı yatırımı ve yeni okulların yapılması eğitimin devamlılığı için yeterliyken, başka bir ülkeye göç ile sonuçlanan afetlerde eğimin devam etme süreci çok daha karmaşık hale gelmektedir (Yavuz ve Mızrak, 2016).

Türmen (2012:16), doğal afetlerin temel eğitim hakkının kullanılması için elverişsiz şartlar oluşturduğunu, çocukların uzun dönemler kamplarda hayatlarını devam ettirmek durumunda

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kaldıklarını ve bundan dolayı düzenlenen insani yardım programlarında çocukların eğitimine öncelik verilmesinin en temel nokta olduğunu belirtmiştir. Ayrıca afet bölgelerinde hayatını sürdürenlerle alakalı, afetlerden korunma programları düzenlenirken, bu programlarının en temel noktalarından birinin çocuğun eğitim hakkı olması gerektiğini ifade etmiştir. Afet durumunda verilecek eğitimin şu özellikleri taşıması gerektiğini belirtmiştir.

- *Verilecek olan eğitimin içeriğinin çocuğa değişen ve olumsuz şartlardaki günlük yaşamında kullanabileceği bilgiler sunması,*
- *Eğitimin erişilebilir olması, (verilecek olan eğitimin yakın bir yerde ve ücretsiz bir şekilde sağlanması ayrıca sağlıklı bir ortamda ve şiddet içermemesi)*
- *Eğitim verecek olan öğretmenlerin çocukların ihtiyaçlarının bilincinde olacak ve onların ihtiyaçlarını karşılayacak kapasitede olması,*
- *Değişkenlik gösterebilecek durumlara ve ortamlara uygun bir eğitim olması, (taşımalı eğitim, uzaktan eğitim gibi.)*
- *Evrensel insan haklarına uygun ve insan onuru ile bağdaşan bir eğitim olması (ayrımcılık, önyargı ve şiddet gibi durumları içermeme).*

Afet zamanlarında eğitim toplumsal barışa katkıda bulunur ve bireyler arasında sosyal dayanışmayı ve dirençliliği artırır (UNESCO, 2015). Nicolai (2003:110) çalışmasında, afet zamanlarında eğitimin sürmesinin üç temel faydasından bahseder. Bunlardan ilki; çocukların bir gelecek olduğuna inanması ve buna hazırlanması, ikincisi eğitimin çocuklar için bir psiko-sosyal destek olması ve sonuncusu da toplumun yeniden yapılanmasına aracılık etmesidir. Bunların yanında acil durumlarda eğitimin çocuklara diğer katkıları da şu şekilde sıralanabilir (Sinclair, 2007: 52'den akt. Yavuz ve Mızrak, 2016);

- *Eğitim süreci ile yaşanan olumsuzluklardan kaynaklı olarak ortaya çıkan psikolojik travmaların etkisi azalır ve çocukta normallik duygularının oluşması sağlanır,*
- *Eğitim süreci, çocuğun kırılmış olan umutlarının yeniden yeşermesini sağlar,*
- *Güven duygusunun hakim olduğu alanlarda hayata geçirilen sosyal aktiviteler sayesinde duygusal ve psikolojik travmalar yaşamış olan çocuklara psikososyal destek sağlanmış olur.*
- *Çocukların terör ve suç çetelerinin eline düşmesini veya bu tarz örgütlere yönelmesini engeller.*

Yukarıda sayılan katkıların yanında eğitim, farklı kültürlerden olan insanların kaynaşmasını sağlamakta ve sığınmacıların yalnızlık ve yabancılık duyguları içinde hissetme ve kültürel problemlerini de azaltmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada Suriye'den Türkiye'ye gelip halen Mardin'in Kızıltepe ilçesinde yaşayan eğitim çağındaki Suriyeli çocukların eğitimde yaşadığı sıkıntılar incelenecektir.

Yöntem

Araştırmanın çalışma grubunu, Suriye'den Türkiye'ye göç etmiş ve halen Mardin ilinin Kızıltepe İlçesi'nde yaşamlarını sürdüren eğitim çağındaki 20(3'ü mezun) öğrenci, 6 Suriyeli veli, Kızıltepe'de Suriyeli öğrencilerin öğrenimlerine devam ettiği okullardaki 5 öğretmen, 3 okul müdürü, 2 Müdür yardımcısı, 3 Suriyeli gönüllü eğitici (Koordinatör), 2 il milli eğitim yöneticisi (2 il milli eğitim şube müdürü) ve Kızıltepe'de aktif bir şekilde hizmet veren 4 sivil toplum örgütü(2 sendika, 2 yardım derneği) yöneticisi olmak üzere toplam 45 kişi oluşturmaktadır.Araştırmada öncelikle konu ile ilgili literatür taranmış ve verileri katılımcılardan en uygun şekilde toplamak maksadıyla yarı yapılandırılmış görüşme formları geliştirilmiştir. Formların geliştirilmesinden sonra gerekli yasal izinler alınıp Kızıltepe'de yaşayan eğitim çağındaki çocuklarla, Suriyeli ailelerle, Suriyeli çocukların derslerine giren öğretmenlerle, Suriyeli koordinatörler ve okul müdürleriyle ayrıca il milli eğitim yöneticileri, vakıf ve

sivil toplum örgütleriyle yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler yapılmıştır.

Bulgular ve Yorum

Tablo 1. Suriyeli Veli ve Çocukların Yaşadıkları Genel Problemler

Görüşler	Çocuk	Veli	Frekans
Suriyeli Olma Üzerinden yargılama/Önyargı	16	5	21
İletişim sorunu	17	0	17
Yalnızlık	12	4	16
Yabancılık	12	3	15
İşsizlik	5	1	6
Vatandaşlık kimliğinin olmaması	4	2	6
Barınma sorunu	2	2	4
Beslenme, giyim veya ev eşyası eksikliği	2	0	2
Sağlık Sorunu	1	1	2
Herhangi bir sorunumuz yok	1	1	2

Tablo 1'de dikkat çeken bir diğer nokta ise iletişim de yaşadıkları sorun ile ilgili. 20 çocuktan 17'si iletişim sıkıntısı yaşadığını ifade ederken velilerden hiçbiri bu sorunu dile getirmemiştir. Bunun temel sebebi ise çocukların okullarda Türkçe ile eğitim görmeleri ve Türkçeyi yeterince bilmemeleridir. Dışarda ise genellikle Kürtçe ile iletişim kurulduğu için çok fazla problem yaşamamaktadırlar. Veliler genel olarak dışarı ile iletişim halinde oldukları için iletişim konusunda bir problem yaşamamaktadırlar. Okula veli ziyaretine gittiklerinde de Kürtçe bilen hocaların veya öğrencilerin tercümanlığıyla bu sıkıntının ortadan kalktığını ifade etmişlerdir. Yukarıdaki sorunların yanında, toplumda yabancılık ve yalnızlık çekme, işsizlik, vatandaşlık kimliğinin olmaması, barınma sorunu ve sağlık sorunları Suriyelilerin yaşadığı diğer sorunlardır.

Tablo 2. Okulda Yaşanan Sorunlara Dair Katılımcıların Görüşleri

Görüşler	Çocuk	Veli	Öğrt.	koor.	Yön.	F
Dil(iletişim) Sorunu	18	5	5	3	4	35
Derslerde başarısızlık/anlamada güçlük	10	1	4	1	4	20
Dışlanma/Önyargılar	8	1	1	3	2	15
Öğretmenlerin ilgisiz olması/Göz Ardı Edilme	3	6	1	2	0	12
Okul kültürüne uyum sorunu	3	1	1	0	5	10
Kaynaklara Ulaşma (Roman-öykü-şiir-fikir)	5	1	0	1	1	8
Maddi sorunlar	3	0	0	1	1	5
Yalnızlık ve sessizlik	2	1	1	0	1	5
Yabancılık ve utangaçlık	3	0	0	1	1	5
Öğrencilerin Hazırbulunuşluluklarının tespit edilmeden eğitime dahil edilmesi	1	0	1	1	1	4
Yabancı bir sisteme maruz kalmak	2	0	0	1	1	4
Suriyeli öğrencilerin notlarının düşürülmesi	0	1	0	1	0	2
Psikolojik Sorunlar	0	1	0	0	0	1
Misafir olmak(belirsizlik)	1	0	0	0	0	1
Eşitliğin olmaması	0	1	0	0	0	1

Tablo 2'deki verilere göre, okulda yaşanan sorunlardan en çok ön plana çıkanı dil(iletişim) sorunudur. 20 çocuktan 18'i, 6 veliden 5'i ayrıca araştırmaya katılan öğretmen, koordinatör ve yöneticilerin neredeyse hepsi bu sorunun en öncelikli sorun olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Çocuklar dil farklılığından dolayı, günlük konuşmada büyük bir sıkıntı yaşamasa da, okuduğunu anlama noktasında hala sıkıntı yaşadıklarını ifade etmişlerdir. Öğretmenler, Koordinatörler ve yöneticiler de bu konuda

benzer bir durumu ifade edip, bu temel sorunun aslında diğer bütün sorunların kaynağı noktasında olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir. Tabloya göre katılımcılardan 15'i Suriyeli öğrencilerin yaşadıkları sorunlar arasında dilin yanında dışlanma ve önyargı olduğunu da ifade ettiler.

Tartışma ve Sonuç

Araştırma sonucu elde edilen verilere göre Kızıltepe'de yaşayan Suriyeli sığınmacıların en temel sorunu Suriyeli olmak üzerinden karşılaştıkları önyargılar ve kurulan iletişim dilidir. Durumları, bakış açıları veya fikirleri ne olursa olsun bu insanlar neredeyse gittikleri her yerde Suriye'den geldikleri için üzerlerine yapışmış bu etiketle dışlanma ile karşı karşıya kalıyor veya onlarla bu etiket üzerinden iletişim kuruluyor. Farklı bir ilişki kurma şansı bırakmayan bu bakış açısı Suriyelilerin kendileri açısından gördükleri en önemli sorun olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Özellikle çocukların ve gençlerin kendileri ile iletişim kurulduğunda hitap olarak isimleri yerine sürekli "Suri" diye çağrılmasından büyük üzüntü yaşadıklarını ve bu durumun çocukların ve gençlerin hayata karşı olumlu bir bakış açısı geliştirmelerinin önündeki en büyük engel olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bunun yanında bir diğer temel sorun da iletişim sorunu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Gençlerin ve çocukların yaşadıkları bu sorundan kaynaklı olarak yaşamlarının zorlaştığını, kendilerini ifade etmekte sorun yaşadıklarını ve bu durumun kendilerini yalnızlık ve yabancılık duygusu içine ittiğini ifade edebiliriz. Çünkü bu durum çocukların ve gençlerin kendilerini toplum içinde var etmesini ve toplumda bir yer edinmesine engel olmaktadır. Bu durum çocukların kendi geçmişlerinden uzaklaşmasına ve uyruklarıyla yaşanan sorun arasında bağ kurmalarına sebep olmaktadır.

Araştırma sonucu ortaya çıkan ve yukarıda bahsettiğimiz sorunların dışındaki bir diğer önemli sorun ise araştırmamızın da temelini oluşturan okul çağındaki Suriyeli çocukların eğitimi sorunudur. Bu sorun, Türkiye genelinde olduğu gibi, Türkiye'nin tüm illerinde yaşayan Suriyelilerin çözülmesi gereken en temel sorunların başında gelmektedir. Savaşın çıktığı ilk zamanlar bu sürecin çok uzun sürmeyeceği ve Türkiye'ye göç eden Suriyelilerin kısa bir zaman içinde ülkelerine dönecekleri hesapları üzerinden kısa vadeli politikalar sadece kampta kalan çocuklara yönelik hazırlanmıştır. Ancak savaşın kısa zaman içinde bitmeyeceği anlaşılınca Suriyeli çocukların eğitimi üzerine politikalar üretilmeye başlanmıştır. Öncelikle barınma merkezlerinde daha sonrasında ise farklı farklı illerde açılan Geçici Eğitim Merkezlerinde, Suriyeli çocuklara kendi dil ve müfredatlarına uygun eğitim verilmeye başlanmıştır. Ancak bu merkezlerde eğitimine devam eden Suriyeli öğrenciler, Türkiye'de bulunan okul çağındaki Suriyeli çocukların yaklaşık %30'unu teşkil etmektedir. Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğünün 2016 verilerine göre bu oran %13 iken 2017 yılında yaklaşık %30 olmuştur. Daha sonraki süreçte ise Suriyeli öğrenciler Türk Eğitim Sistemine dahil edilerek Geçici Eğitim Merkezleri kademeli olarak kapatılmıştır. 2018-2019 eğitim öğretim yılında kayıtlı Suriyeli sayısı %61,25'e ulaşmıştır. Yapılan tüm çalışmalara rağmen okula erişemeyen eğitim çağındaki Suriyelilerin sayısı %40'a yakındır. Mardin İl Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü'nden alınan verilere göre Kızıltepe'de eğitim çağında yaklaşık 8800 Suriyeli çocuk olmasına rağmen bunlardan sadece 3626 tanesi yani %41'e yakını okula devam edebilmektedir. Bu çocukların %60'a yakını eğitim ve öğretim faaliyetlerinden yararlanamamaktadır.

Dil problemi Suriyeli öğrencilerin okul tercihlerini de etkilemektedir. Suriyeli öğrencilerin genellikle imam hatip liselerini tercih ettikleri bu tercihlerinin de temel sebebinin bu liselerde Arapça dil eğitimi verilmesi ve derslerin bir kısmının Arapça olmasından kaynaklı olduğu görülmüştür. Özer, Komşuoğlu ve Ateşok (2016, s. 94)'da yaptıkları çalışmada, Dil konusunun okul tercihine yansıdığını, ailelerin iletişim kurabilecekleri ve kayıt sürecinde yardım alabilecekleri Arapça bilen yöneticilerin olduğu okulları daha fazla tercih ettiklerinin görüldüğünü ifade etmeleri bu durumu destekler niteliktedir. Bu durum öğrenci açısından dil probleminin çok büyük olduğunu ve bir an önce çözülmesi gerektiğini bir kez daha karşımıza çıkarmaktadır. Öğrenci yaşadığı bir sıkıntı sebebiyle var olan seçeneklere çok fazla

bakmadan sadece bu problemini bir nebze de olsa çözecek okula yöneliyor. Bunun yanında bu okulların tercih edilmesinde maddi sorun ve okulun eve yakın olması da bir etken olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Araştırmada elde edilen bulgulara göre, eğitime dahil olan Suriyeli öğrencilerin yabancılık, yalnızlık, dışlanma ve derslerde yeterli verimi almamalarından dolayı başarısızlık gibi sorunlar yaşadıkları sonucuna varılırken, okulun bu öğrencilere arkadaşlık, sosyal ortam, yeni bir kültür tanıma psikolojik sorunlardan uzaklaşma ve kurtulma gibi birçok alanda katkı sağladığı sonucuna da varılmıştır. Bu sorunların giderilmesi ve okulların katkısının artırılması için yöneticiler, öğretmenler ve koordinatörler tarafından öğrencilere maddi yardımda bulunma, Türkçe dil kurslarının verilmesi, eğitim dilinin Arapça olması ve öğretmenlerin daha ilgili olması gibi istekler doğrultusunda çeşitli tedbirler alınmaya çalışılmış ancak bu tedbirler okulun şartları ve imkanlarının el vermemesi sebebiyle kısmen faydalı olmuştur.

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

GLOBAL HEATING. THE NEXT FACTOR BEHIND MASS MIGRATION TO EUROPE

Răzvan Dacian Cârciumaru

Climate change has brought about permanent changes in the geological, biological and ecological systems of the Earth (Sarkar & Sensarma, 2019). These changes have led to large-scale environmental risks to human health, such as extreme weather, global spread of infectious diseases, stress for food-producing systems, increased fire danger in forest areas, loss of biodiversity and ozone depletion. (Fujimori et al., 2019; Hasegawa et al., 2018).

To date, a neglected aspect of the debate on climate change consists of conducting minimal research on the impact of climate change on health, societal change, security, economic growth, migration, food supply and public goods (such as drinking water), rather than on geophysical changes related to global heating (Fujimori et al., 2019). Many studies, however, suggest that the current and future impact of climate change on human society is and will continue to be largely negative (Thornton, 2012).

Most often the current climate change is characterized as anthropogenic. Climate variability and change are also occurring naturally, but in regard to the latest changes in the natural habitat, the concept of climate change is to a great extent associated with anthropogenic climate effects especially referring to global heating (Arenilla & Rada, 2020).

Global heating and the related increase in climate temperature have a cascading effect on the plants and animals of affected regions and habitats. Impacts may include an increase in CO_2, change in the pH of water, and possibly death of species (Martel, Mailhot, Brissette, & Caya, 2018). These factors often cause physiological stress and challenges to native organisms in an ecosystem. Warmer or colder conditions of the environment can create opportunities for non-native terrestrial and marine organisms to migrate and establish in new zones, making them compete with established native species within the same habitat (Chan et al., 2019). Non-native plants are far more adaptable than the others, aspect that may contribute to their capacity to invade and take over the ecosystem in which they were introduced.

Due to warming and shifts in precipitation an a global level, the effects of climate change on humans are now visible worldwide (Sévellec & Drijfhout, 2018). Regional impacts of climate change are now observable on all continents and especially on the ocean regions, with low-latitude and with less developed areas, that are facing the greatest risk. The Arctic, Africa, small islands, and Asian mega deltas are most likely to be affected by future climate change. (Ullah, Nagelkerken, Goldenberg, & Fordham, 2018).

Human impacts include both the direct effects of extreme weather, leading to injury and loss of life, as well as indirect effects, such as undernutrition brought on by crop failures (Hasegawa et al., 2018; Ullah et al., 2018). Various infectious diseases, such as malaria or dengue fever, which affects children most severely, are more easily transmitted during a warmer climate. Young children are the foremost susceptible to food shortages, and alongside older people, to extreme heat (Sarkar & Sensarma, 2019).

The WHO has classified human health impacts from global climate change as the greatest threat to global health within the 21st century. It is estimated that, by mid-century, global climate change is going to be liable for well over 500,000 additional deaths globally per annum due to undernutrition, heat stress, and disease alone (Fujimori et al., 2019).

Climate change has likely already increased global economic inequality, and is projected to continue doing so (Rashid, 2020). Most of the severe impacts are expected to occur in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia, where existing poverty is already exacerbated. The World Bank estimates that global climate change could drive over 120 million people into poverty by 2030. Current inequalities between men and women, between rich and poor, and between different ethnicities are observed to worsen as a consequence of climate variability and climate change (Stover, 2019).

Most of the adverse effects of global climate change are experienced by poor, low-income communities round the world, who have much higher levels of vulnerability to environmental determinants of health, wealth and other factors and far lower levels available to deal with environmental change. Among vulnerable communities, there`s usually a rise in climate-sensitive diseases, like childhood diarrhea, dengue, malaria and pneumonia.

Most of the key vulnerabilities to global climate change are associated with climate phenomena that exceed the difference thresholds; (Smith, Schellnhuber, & Mirza, 2001) such as extreme weather events or abrupt climate change, also as limited access to resources (institutional, technical, financial, human) to cope.

Global climate change is serving, in some cases, as a threat multiplier. The phenomenon has the potential to exacerbate existing tensions or create new ones. (Mayowa, 2019) It can serve often as a catalyst for violent conflicts and a threat to international security. A meta-analysis of over 50 quantitative studies examining the link between climate and conflict found that for every 1 standard deviation (1σ) climate change to warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall, median estimates indicate that the frequency of interpersonal violence increases by 4% and the frequency of intergroup conflict increases by 14% (Hsiang & Burke, 2013; Vincze, Borcia, & Harlander, 2017).

It is expected that 22% of major cities will have climatic conditions that do not exist in any city at present. In year 2050, the city of London will have a climate similar to Melbourne.(Change, 2018)

A changing climate thus affects the preliminary conditions of population health: clean air and water, sufficient food, natural constraints on infectious disease agents and the adequacy and security of the shelter. A warmer and more variable climate leads to higher levels of air pollutants.(Sévellec & Drijfhout, 2018)

Changes in temperature, precipitation and seasonality compromise agricultural production in many regions, including in some least developed countries, thus endangering the health and growth of children and general health and functional capacity of adults.

Therefore, in summary, global warming, alongside changes in food and water supply (system), will indirectly cause increases in a number of adverse health outcomes, including injury, diarrhea, malnutrition, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, transmitted through water and bug diseases (Invest, 2018).

Environmental migrants or climate refugees are persons that are forced to leave their home due to sudden or long-term changes in their local environment, that compromise their well-being or their livelihood (Constantinescu, 2014). Such changes are maintained to incorporate increased droughts, desertification, interruption of seasonal weather patterns (i.e. monsoons) and sea level rise. As a result, climate refugees may prefer to flee or migrate to a different country or migrate internally to their own

country.(Invest, 2018)

Despite the issues in formulating a consistent and clear definition of “environmental migration”, such a concept experienced significant growth in 2019, becoming a worldwide concern (Bongaarts, 2019). Meanwhile, decision-makers, environmental and social scientists, are trying to conceptualize the potential social effects of global climate change and general environmental degradation (Wilkinson, 2016).

Climate refugees do not fit into a legal definition of a refugee. Not all climate refugees migrate from their home country, when they are only traveling to their home country (Piguet, 2012). Moreover, refugees do not leave their homes because of fear that they will be persecuted or because of "widespread violence or events that seriously disturb public order." Even though the definition of who is a refugee has been extended since its first international and legally mandatory definition in 1951 persons who are forced to flee due to environmental changes are not yet offered the same legal protection as refugees (Naser, 2011).

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) had proposed the subsequent definition for environmental migrants: " Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes within the environment which adversely affect their life or living conditions, are forced to leave their habitual residence or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either in their country or abroad" (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). (IOM’s Department of International Cooperation and Partnerships, 2011)

Climate refugees or climate migrants are a lot of environmental migrants who have had to escape "due to sudden or gradual changes within the natural environment associated with a minimum of one among the three impacts of climate change: water level rise, extreme weather events, drought and lack of water " (World Health Organization, 2011).

Based on the research made by the International Organization for Migration (International Organization for Migration, 2009), Fabrice Renaud (Renaud, Dun, Warner, & Bogardi, 2011) proposed three types of environmental migrants, which later were adopted by the Directorate General for Internal Affairs, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, of the European Parliament (Kraler, Cernei, & Noack, 2011b).

In the document prepared for the European Parliament (Kraler, Cernei, & Noack, 2011a), we can find the following categories:

- Environmental Emergency Migrants: Persons fleeing temporarily due to an environmental disaster or sudden environmental event. (Examples: someone forced to go away due to an earthquake tsunami, hurricane, etc.);
- Forced environmental migrants: people that have to leave due to deteriorating environmental conditions. (Example: someone forced to go away due to a slow deterioration of their environment, like deforestation, coastal damage, etc.) (Burkett, 2011);
- Environmentally motivated migrants, also referred to as environmentally induced economic migrants: people that prefer to leave to avoid potential future problems. (Example: someone leaving due to the decrease in productivity of crops caused by desert) (Abhayapala et al., 2018).

Effective policies that take into account models and predictive measures on climate change are essential for preparing and managing incidence changes and restoring diseases (Leighton, Shen, Warner, Wendeler, & Brach, 2011; Meyer, 2018). As climate change continues to change where disease is prevalent, harmonizing multi-scale surveillance systems will be vital to improving evidence-based control and decision-making (Mayowa, 2019).

Implementation of vaccination and other preventive measures, as well as increased community education, awareness and education of the impact of the disease and other adverse health events among public decision makers will help prepare and combat disease rates and changes (National Vaccine Advisory, 2013).

Climate-induced migration is an extremely complex issue that needs to be understood as part of the dynamics of global migration (Wilkinson, 2016). Migration usually has multiple causes, and environmental factors are interwoven with other social and economic factors, which themselves can be influenced by environmental changes (Sarkar & Sensarma, 2019).

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

SECOND GENERATION IDENTITIES AMONG YOUTH WITH ALBANIAN HERITAGE IN MULTIETHNIC SOUTH TYROL

Sabrina Colombo

Introduction

South Tyrol is a small autonomous province in the north-east part of Italy, bordering with Austria and Switzerland. From approximately the 15th century until 1918, South Tyrol was part of Tirol under the Hapsburg empire. After the WW I, on the 10th September 1919, the Treaty of Saint-Germain established the annexation of South Tyrol to Italy (Steiniger, 2003). The shifting of the borders caused dissatisfaction among the population made up mostly of German-speakers and a minority of Ladin[1] speakers. Under the Fascism regime began a forced Italianization of the area: the German language was banned from public offices and schools, and an "Option Agreement" was signed by Mussolini and Hitler in 1939 giving to German speakers the possibility to leave South Tyrol and migrate to German-speaking countries or live in Italy and becoming Italian citizenships. After the end of the WW II in 1946 the Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi and the Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber signed a Protection Treaty (First Autonomy Statute) in the Paris Treaty. A Second Autonomy Statute was issued in 1971 to give more autonomy to the Province and more protection to the minorities respecting their languages and cultures (Lantschner, 2008). The Autonomy guarantees that the school education is provided in the mother tongue of the child. Thus, the educational system in South Tyrol is divided according to the instruction languages and there are German, Italian and Ladin schools. (D.P.R. No. 670 of 31 August 1972, Art. 19). On the other hand, this protection also causes a society division (Zinn, 2018).

Until the early 1990s, the province of Bolzano was a land of emigration, but the rapid transformation of the economic situation and geopolitical events such as the Balkan war (1991-2001), the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the economic crisis in the post-communist Albania in 1991, has turned South Tyrol into a migration land. Nowadays Albanians represent the largest migrant community in this region (ASTAT, 2019), albeit most of them are naturalized Italians. Due to the institutionalized boundaries between the three[2] ethnic groups who, according to Carlà's words, are 'living apart in the same room' (Wisthaler, 2015, p.2), at political level migrants are perceived as a threat for the "diversity" they bring with generating fear that the *balance* between the autochthonous groups can be in danger and making a possible integration of new comers more difficult (Jeram, van der Zwet & Verena Wisthaler, 2016).

The challenge that children whose parents have a migrant background and live in the Province is a complex one. Not only they are negotiating between the values, traditions, language, and education transmitted by the family as well as by the receiving society, they have also to face the *cohabitation* with the three ethnic groups.

[1] Ladin is a Romance language of the Rhaeto-Romance subgroup, mainly spoken in the Dolomites Mountain in the Northern Italy in the provinces of South Tyrol, Trentino and Belluno (Pellegrini, 1989).
[2] The research focuses only on Albanian people living in Italian or German-speaking areas.

Although studies on second generations with Albanian origin in Italy have recently been conducted (Vathi, 2015), there are no studies on second generations children in South Tyrol.

So, when I started my PhD in 2018 I decided to focus my investigation on identity issues and questions around belonging and since as a primary school teacher I had pupils from migrant origins a growing interest for how they could negotiate this particular society arose. The choice to investigate the Albanian community is simply linked to their numerical presence in the territory.

This paper, that is part of my doctoral thesis, illustrates how adolescents and emerging adults with Albanian origin shape their identity and how they negotiate them.

From January to November 2019 I conducted 34 in-depth interviews. The main sample is constituted by second generations children (6 males and 8 females) with Albanian heritage, who were born and have grown up in South Tyrol, aged between 14 and 26. Another group is represented by the 1.5 generation children (2 men and 3 women), who migrated during adolescence. Most of them are attending or attended Italian speaking schools. My age range included pupils, people near the end of their studies, in higher education or vocational training, and those already out of school or higher education. In the latter group, most of them were employed and three were looking for the first job after completing education. Among the youngest group only three of them were minors at the time of interview. Further key informants are parents, teachers and other respondents with migration experience from Albania. Since it was also necessary to investigate external influences which could be considered relevant in shaping identity, I decided to also include parents and teachers in the research design. This kind of triangulation was enlightening for some aspects during data analysis.

Since the group of participants is a small one, proportionate to the number of Albanians living in South Tyrol, from the beginning I opted for interviewing as research method, also to get a more intimate and empathic contact to this community. Interviews were recorded and verbatim transcribed. Before I started the field, I prepared personal data questionnaires and interview questions in German and Italian. Questions, just to name a few, were about citizenship, family, school, work, society, intergenerational transmissions, relation to the country of origin and their relatives, and so on. Further data were collected during conversations "outside of the interview setting" or making observations in different circumstances. Everything has been gathered in notes and when possible some pictures or videos have been taken.

1,5 and second-generation respondents were asked to bring with them a picture portraying them alone or with someone, in a past or contemporary moment of their lives. The idea to use a photography in a research interview has two effects: to act as icebreaker so that the interviewer comes closer to the interviewee and evoking to memory past experiences through visuality: "Thus images evoke deeper elements of human consciousness that do words […] (Harper, 2002, p. 13)". Most of the interviews were conducted in Italian, few in German, some respondents of second generations constantly switched between two languages when they missed words in the other language, some of them felt more familiar with the Italian language although they used to attend or were still attending a German-speaking school.

The narratives I collected show that most new generations' participants define themselves as "Italo-Albanesi" or as Italians with Albanian roots, in few words they have a hybrid identity. Many scholars investigating identity's construction by second and third generations children of migrants based their research on the hybridity theory (Asher, 2008; Bretell and Nibbs, 2009; Butcher, 2004; Matsuda, 2001; Moran, 2016; Ngan and Chan, 2012; Wang and Collins, 2016). According to Bhabha (1994), hybridity is not something fixed, but it can fluctuate, is fluid and *in fieri*. It is the result of mixed cultures. In fact, the human history represents a place where human beings and different cultures continuously meet.

Only few participants stated to have Albanian origin, but to not feel any "attachment" to the country of their parents. Although Albanian new generations feel in general closer to the Italian culture for ethnic affinity (Kosta, 2018), in my data I discovered the trend to institutionally assimilate into the "German society" in order to have a wider range of working opportunities (Medda-Windischer & Carlà, 2015). According to the anticipatory socialization of Merton (1949/1968) individuals who do not belong to a group, aim to be part of it and develop therefore strategies of conformity such as learning the local German dialect and attending German-speaking schools. In fact, children and their parents recognize the German-speaking group as the predominant one. The local migration policy and the boundaries between the ethnic groups are considered important but do not represent an obstacle of inclusion; conversely, second generations master this context with a high level of resilience.

In conclusion findings show a positive incorporation of second generations in South Tyrol: they feel full integrated, speak Italian, more and more children speak also German dialect and standard German besides Italian, share time and space with Italian- and German-speaking peers and at the same time they do not deny their Albanian origins.

Since my research based on a little sample of respondents, it would be interesting to conduct further qualitative studies on children of migrants who are born and live in South Tyrol.

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HYBRID ORGANIZING: AN ORGANIZATIONAL EDUCATION COLLECTIVE ACTION APPROACH TO REFUGEES' EMPOWERMENT PROFESSIONALIZATION

Sepideh Abedi Farizani and Susanne Maria Weber

In times of globalization as well as third decade of 21st century, not only complexity and fragmentation have become crucial topics, but also the challenges of forced migration have turned into a discursified problem of major importance. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than two million people have applied as asylum seekers in Europe in 2015 (UNHCR, 2015). At the same time, the number of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim parties worldwide as well as in Europe increased. Research on media and political discourse shows, that media and press bring forth negative news about refugees and migrants, especially around Muslim people (Wodak, 2015). While the term 'refugee crises' was coined by the media and in politics, the debates on intercultural opening of organizations became an academically addressed issue, too (Göhlich, 2012).

This paper addresses the topic of the so called 'refugee crisis' in a Foucauldian discourse perspective on organizing the 'gaze' of and on refugees (Foucault, 1973). It relates to the negative subjectifying 'gaze' of the public and political space on refugees and connects the question of alternative counter strategies of the 'gaze' to organizational educational research strategies (Göhlich et al., 2014; Weber, 2018). This research perspective is interested in educational perspectives on organizing and analyzes organizational learning, too.

The paper suggested here uses a discourse oriented perspective (Foucault, 1980). It asks, how subject positions systematically are shaped within public and organizational discourses and discourses in organizing. Against the negative gaze in the public space, where refugees are presented as a potential risk for the new society, the paper asks for alternative spaces to be created within hybrid organizing. How can a different gaze be created here? In a Foucauldian perspective, the 'gaze' as a systematical relationship of seeing and being seen shapes institutional and public perspectives on refugees. It brings forth the subject position of individuals and collectives (Anton & Peterson, 2003).

How can the negative and systematically marginalized subject position of refugees be shaped not within a gaze of risk, but of resource? How can organizations change and transform this public gaze, which limits labor market integration, too? In a discourse perspective within organizational education, Weber and Wieners (2018) suggest to analyze organizational discourse in a Foucauldian power-knowledge perspective. While the debates on 'intercultural opening' of organizations refer to the negative 'gaze' on refugees, they still may reproduce an objectifying approach on refugees by specifying and objectifying 'the' needs of the 'homogeneous' refugee. In an alternative organizational education approach, the paper suggests the transforming of the 'gaze' on the refugee by not only analyzing but designing a critical (research) perspective on organizing – and of theory and practice of organizational education.

The transformation of the 'gaze' is addressed within and by a train the trainer empowerment professionalization approach of refugees. As a 'train the trainer' approach in the hybrid setting between

formal organizing, non-formal organizing and informal organizing, it is discussed and understood as 'hybrid self-organizing' (Weber, 2020). From an organizational education perspective, 'hybrid self-organizing can become a transformative counter-strategy to the negative public gaze subjectivation of refugees. Instead of this deficient perspective and dynamics, an empowerment approach supports transforming both the gaze on and of the refugee.

Transforming the Gaze on the Refugee -Towards hybrid multilayered (Self-)Organizing

The term 'hybrid' is used in many ways – it can be understood as 'migrating' elements from different spheres to organizational forms (Evers & Ewert, 2010). It can be understood as a temporal dimension, too. According to Borys and Jemison (1987, p.8), "hybrids are often temporary organizations, and/or may involve only limited commitments from the partners. Therefore, stability is not an inherent feature of the hybrid organization, and the hybrid must make special efforts to maintain it." As a temporary organization, a hybrid organizing has to stabilize itself in process. The Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration sees "temporary organizations form for the purpose of accomplishing an ex ante-determined task with a predetermined termination point" (Schüßler, 2016). In this sense, hybrid organizing is understood as projectified organizing. Mainstream organization theory sees temporary organizational settings as still less common than permanent organizations (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995).

In social science discourses, the term 'hybrid' has recently been used especially in the discussion of third sector organizations and the shape of social service organizations (Evers & Ewert, 2010). Here, the combination of professionals and volunteers or of social and economical rationalities has been addressed. Within hybrid organizing, organizational patterns shift from linear, disciplinary, segmented, closed notions to open models (Weber, 2018c). Hybrid arrangements support innovation and enable systemic development and multi-perspectivity (Weber, 2018b). For the development of social innovation, design methodologies and aesthetic approaches gain relevance for the analysis and design of 'hybrid actor' constellations (Weber, 2018c).

In an organizational education perspective, the term 'hybrid self-organizing' integrates three layers of formal, non-formal and informal organizing. The TTT approach connects the potentials of social work organizations and their trained professionals to train refugees to become multiplicators for their peers. In this cascade approach, trained refugees will be able to train other refugees, too. Like this, refugees can self-organize and support themselves and others within the TTT approach. (Weber, 2020; Weber, Klös & Heidelmann, 2019; Weber, Heidelmann & Klös, 2019). In this sense, the TTT approach supports not only collective empowerment, but empowerment professionalization of refugees.

The approach of hybrid organizing with its goals of increasing collective self-empowerment connects to participatory research. Focusing on marginalized voices (Schröer and Wendt, 2018) organizational education action and design research allows to theorize the space of 'hybrid self-organizing'. According to Crenshaw (1989, p. 167), "placing those who currently are marginalized at the center is the most effective way to resist efforts to compartmentalize experiences and undermine potential collective action." Refugees' hybrid organized self-organization can support the organizing of a counter-discourse against the deficit and fragile public 'gaze' on refugees. Organizing here is imagined as an alternative space, gaze and place for refugees in European societies and organizations.

Hybrid design-based social innovation strategies follow open innovation approaches. A discourse oriented perspective will be interested not only in the analysis of given rationalities in the field, but in the goal of collective transformation (Weber, 2018b). An organizational education perspective on

design research strategies focuses on learning, organizational transformation and the creation of alternative futures (Weber, 2018b). Organizational education perspectives connect to action research, too, introduced by Kurt Lewin in the 1940s and 1950s (Lewin, 1946). As well Argyris and his collegues supported the perspective of reflection in action and organizational learning (Schröer and Wendt, 2018).

The Train the trainer model (TTT) (Knowles, 1970) demonstrates the potential of peer-learning. Narrative storytelling, resource based strategies of skill and capabilities development support the life and career path of refugees. Refugees like this become a potential for other refugees and professionalize within this hybrid empowerment professionalization setting. The future alternative model of 'hybrid organizing' and societal inclusion connects the formal, non-formal and informal level of (self-)organization of refugees within an empowerment professionalization framework. As an embedded strategy of organizing it connects to regional partners like city councils, career offices and job centers.

The approach of 'hybrid organizing' applied here, is grounded in aesthetic transformation (Strati, 2000; Weber, 2014; Weber, 2018a). 'Aesthetic' transformation refers to the senses, to art and social aesthetics. It includes ethical, social and political values (Berleant, 2011). Aesthetic transformation is a process of inspiration and influence within art and other areas of knowledge production. The here applied image based approach contributes to image based imagination of the self and to imaginary transformation (Weber, 2018a). Organizational education participatory research supports imagining alternative strategies for Muslim refugees. It supports the transformation of negative subjectivation. It shapes a hybrid space of imagination, where transformative learning becomes possible. This alternative strategy of self-organization and empowerment professionalization can contribute to a collective development of a sense of belonging (Yohani, 2008) and moreover supports inclusion into the new society. In this sense, Aesthetic transformation becomes relevant in an analytical as well as a design-oriented research and organizational transformation approach (Weber, 2014).

Within hybrid organizing, refugees may re-position the defined public deficit subject position into a resource based subject position. In this sense, 'hybrid self-organizing' supports the 'gaze' on the refugee by distancing oneself collectively from the publicly provided subject positions of 'the' refugee. As a counter strategy against exclusion and for inclusion, empowerment professionalization imagines refugees as resourceful persons and collective potential for labor market integration. In this sense, 'Hybrid Organizing' can be understood as an intervention in the 'gaze' and an intervention in (refugee) discourse, too. As discursive as well as visual and in this sense 'viscursive' intervention into visual representation, (Höpflinger, 2014) and self-conceptualization, the approach of hybrid organizing can be seen as organizing a heterotopic space (Foucault, 1997) in the Foucauldian sense, which may not only transform the subject position of refugees, but contribute to further organizational intercultural opening, too.

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THE 28-DAY PROGRAM: A REFUGEE INTEGRATION SUPPORT PROGRAM IN LIVERPOOL, UK

Chien-Yi Chu

Introduction

Europe is not unfamiliar with refugees. Since WWII it has been accepting people fleeing countries for one reason or another but largely looking for better economic and political opportunities. However, since 2015, the issue has become more of a crisis affecting the continent (Trauner, 2016, p. 311; Dustmann et al., 2017, p. 540). In all, refugee integration has proved to be a problem, largely the product of inadequate asylum support systems. Other contributors include, "Brexit," exclusion, xenophobia, anti-migration, and Muslims' "cultural malaise", all of which have become part of a vicious cycle between reliance and independence. I propose an examination of the role that architecture and urban design can play in tackling the refugee crisis in Europe, specifically Liverpool, UK. The paper first analyzes the existing asylum policy in the Netherlands, the UK, and Germany. Next, the 28-DAY program is a refugee integration support program and the focus of study and resolution of this paper. From there the paper will introduce three key spatial and design strategies: the theory of the "dérive;" first proposed and practiced by the situationists in the fifties; second, scale, looking at different sized buildings and functions to weave together personal, social, and psychosocial connections; and third an app with which to assist new arrivals to navigate the city.

Case Study

The attitude of the EU member countries and the UK toward the Refugee Crisis varies because of the differing fallouts from the 2008 economic crisis, including differing speed of economic growth, history and culture. Take the Netherlands, the UK and Germany as examples (Table 1). Because of the unique historical burden of the Nazi regime, the German legal system developed a "liberal" asylum policy which provides the right to asylum for those fleeing political persecution (Ilgit & Klotz, 2018, p. 615). Since 1960, Germany became the largest host country in Europe (Safaya & Cramarenco, 2016) and in 2015, "1.1 million refugees crossed the German border" (Katz et al., 2016, para. 4). Comparing to other couturiers cross the EU, the German model has emerged as one of the more viable solutions (Katz et al., 2016). The "Finding Place" is a collaboration project between the city of Hamburg, MIT's Media Lab, Hafen City University, local communities and individuals. It has successfully housed tens of thousands of refugees and helped them settle (Spreandel, 2018). In the Netherlands and the UK, the story is much different. There the influx of refugees has represented a "race to the bottom," and resulted in conditions that are less than attractive for the refugees. Because of "the lack of welcome of the asylum process, asylum seekers and refugees tend to think they are the population the UK Government does not seek to integrate. Britain retained its ability to make the experience of asylum unpleasant with the aim of encouraging applicants to leave" (Mayblin, 2018, para. 8). That policy operates against integration (Mulvey, 2015). While refugees in the UK are dispersed but remain insecure in their place and position, in the Netherlands they are "secure but segregated" and in both countries, residing in state-provided asylum accommodation is negative related to refugees' mental and physical

health and social network (Bakker et al., 2016). Indeed, the refugee crisis is far from settled. The integration is a non-linear process. It is two-way. The UK government develops one of the most restrictive asylum systems. Refugees live with limited resources to fit in the host community. Most British are not aware of the refugees' challenges, but they see the refugees' "cultural malaise." So, they fear about the refugees. However, Brexit cannot break the vicious cycle.

This paper looks at the UK 28-day grace period, repackaging it in a way that makes it more compact and efficient, to transform the integration into a two-way process. Key to its thesis is the idea that a city is not a neutral background, but an active contributor to social, and in this case, racial connections and integration. By engaging the city physically and experientially, the city embraces symbiosis with the process of assimilation.

Table 1. The asylum support systems in the Netherlands, the UK and Germany

	The Netherlands	**The UK**	**Germany**
National Integration Program	Yes [a]	No [c]	Yes [d] with Multi-layer
Education	Yes [a]	No [c]	Yes [d]
Language course	Yes [a]	No [c]	Yes [d]
Job training	Yes [a]	No [c]	Yes [d]
Institutional knowledge course	Yes [a]	No [c]	Yes [e] with Multi-layer
Access to national coordinated service	Yes [a]	No [c]	Yes [d]
Labor Market			
as Refugees	Full-open [b]	Shortage Occupation List [c]	Full-open [e]
as Asylum seekers	Full-open [b]	No*	Full-open [e]
Waiting period after the asylum application is lodged until allowed to work	6 months [f]	12 months [f]	3 months [f]
Housing			
as Refugees	State-provided housing [a]	No [c]	Suitable Accommodation [h]
as Asylum seekers	Reception Centres [b]	State-provided housing [a]	Accommodation Centres [f]
Area	Rural**	Dispersal***	Distributed****
Welfare Aid			
as Refugees	on the Same Level as for Nationals [b]	on the Same Level as for Nationals*****	on the Same Level as for Nationals [g]
as Asylum seekers	on the Same Level as for Nationals [b]	£ 37.75 per week [c]	on the Same Level as for Nationals [g]

*If asylum seekers have not received a decision on their asylum applications within 12 months then yes.[c]

**Asylum seekers are usually situated in rural areas without choice and are tightly controlled. Privacy and autonomy are limited. Few amount stays with friends or family.[a]
*** Asylum seekers are either dispersed housing complexes in deprived areas across the country where they experience prejudice and isolation or reside with friends and family on a 'subsistence-only' level.[a]
****Refugees are proportionately distributed across German regions according to tax revenues and total population.[c]
*****Beneficiaries face various difficulties in accessing social assistance, outlined in research conducted by the Refugee Council and British Red Cross.[i]

[a] Bakker et al., 2016, pp. 118-132.
[b] Dutch Council for Refugees, n.d.
[c] Doyle, 2014, August.
[d] Hesse et al., 2018.
[e] Katz et al., 2016.
[f] Constant & Zimmermann, 2016.
[g] Infromationsverbund Asyl und Migration, 2020, July 24.
[h] Section 12a(2) Residence Act.
[i] Refugee Council, 2020, March 19.

Purpose

The 28-DAY program seeks to turn what could otherwise remain a nervous and agitated experience into one that is akin to a game, played across streets and parkways, among other urban features. It is dynamic and reacts to the refugee and the host in real time, empowering the city to foster solutions of the refugee problem. The city in this case is seen as an opportunity for chance encounters, each contributing to the pulling of the host and the refugee together.

Asylum seekers in the UK have 28 days to leave the National Asylum Support Service housing after being granted refugee status. Given the inadequacy of the national integration program, some fail to find their way into the community, and are forced to retreat to their ethnic enclaves, slowing the natural transition toward a new life. According to the Refugee Council, "the period of 28 days is remarkably short for anybody to find accommodation and secure financial support, but for those who are often new to the country and therefore unfamiliar with the systems and language, the challenges are multiplies" (Doyle, 2014, p. 25). "Integration has the connotation of harmonization processes within a society between several roles, groups, organizations, or of inclusion of individuals or groups into the society … meaning a two-way process" (Safaya & Cramarenco, 2016, p. 72).

The alternative 28-DAY program of this proposal is designed to transform the two-way process or the vicious cycle into a health cycle. It develops 28 customized itineraries to carry the refugees from place to place to help them become more integrated residents, and to allow them a better distributed understanding of context of the new place, triggering a seamless assimilation process.

Method 1: Dérive

The dérive is the brainchild of the situationists in the 50s and 60s, engaging the city into the solution, seeing in the street and the sidewalks just as much cause for assimilation as the classroom and the home. In this proposal, the dérive is inserted into the UK 28-day period as a way to maximize and diversify the exposure between host and refugees but also to reprogram its agenda to foster mutual forms of appreciation. It offers a fascinating insight into the ways a city can address the problem of assimilation, turning the solution into a kind of game (Wollen, 2001, 131). Its goal of a "playful-constructive" relationship between people and their urban surroundings stands. This was seen to be particularly useful by this proposal addressing the case of the UK where refugees are provided just 28 days to not only get back on their feet financially but also start to assimilate culturally. No time can be wasted, and every minute must point toward that end, including walking and encountering people.

The dérive could provide a solution as a way of thinking whereby streets and sidewalks are treated as active vectors giving host and refugee a natural manner with which to meet and exchange cultural information. "Drifting" is hard to do because it requires active disorientation, an untethering from what grounds us. And "exclusion frequently has a spatial dimension" (Madanipour, 2011, p. 190). Yet there is a utility in this endeavor — to awaken our senses, but also to disturb received sociospatial relationships and to inscribe new and broader terrains of urban inclusivity.…with the dérive, to reflect on the social and psychological factors that imbue places with meaning, including collective memory and personal engagement with the past (Rubin, 2012).

Because of the method of dérive, the interaction between the refugee and the host becomes unconscious, the assimilation process taking place when the refugee has not realized, and a part of the burden of social service institutes distributing to a personal level. When people start to know each other, the fear of rejection and bias would be dissolved on both sides. It is the feeling of empathy, one of the keys to the health cycle of integration. Next, when the refugee and the host dérive in the same spot, they are going to draw their psychogeography together. Recognition of identity-building and transnational activities can bridge with broader social scientific theories of social transformation to reveal both similarities with other mobile populations, and how the restrictions of forced migration and the asylum determination and support systems shape social relationships including leisure time (Lewis, 2015). The process of assimilation might take place during an informal conversation in front of the bookstore. This is a step of building the feeling of belonging, by looking at gradual settlements for social and cultural bonding.

Method 2: Scale

The 28-DAY program entails 28 customized daily tours involving diverse encounters with civic spaces that increase opportunities for personal and social-interaction engagement. It is believed that given the enormity of both the problem of the refugees and the city itself, it is important to approach the solution at multiple scales. It includes encountering and accessing educational institutions, cultural and historical places, public and health institutions, community centers, refugee law firms, non-profit organizations, English clubs, pubs, and other social functions that help facilitate the integration process. Along the way, three categories of spaces come into play: small, medium, and large. Small involves personal interaction; Medium, family lounge-like environments; Large, community gatherings (Diagram1). The relationship between built environment and people can reflect on the social and psychological factors that imbue places with meaning to bond a social and psychological connection. Take the first-day tour as an example. It starts with the big picture of Liverpool by crossing the downtown area, historical area, and classical residential area (Diagram 2). There are 24 potential spots to increase the opportunities to know the city and to interact with local people. Three of them are selected to develop to the next stage of design. The first one is a small space: "unparalleled," a bike rack. Some bikes usually park next to our bikes, but we never get a chance to know the owners.

Diagram 1. Three types of scale related to different social activities and built environments. From left to right: small: bench on the street; medium; local library, and large; city hall.

Diagram 2. The first daily tour of the 28-DAY program. The player would have English classes at Granby Adult Learning Services in the morning, picnic on the lawn for lunch, visiting Jobcentre Plus, IAS Beetham House, and Housing People Building Community in the afternoon, enjoying dinner at Al-Ghzali Centre, a community center in the evening. Along the trip, the player experiences the city by walking, biking and taking public transportation.



Unparalleled bike storage creates a nice space to have a short talk. Now, the new bike storage serves as a cozy zone for bikers to meet other bikers. The new design simply changes the parallel layout of bike storages and sinks the bike's front wheel to lower the height of the bike seat. Next, the medium space: "diagonal" is a mix-used community center that used to be a vacant corner lot. Its programs include a 24-hr outdoor café, an after-school lecture room, a semi-outdoor space for weekly movie night, and/or small performance and/or seasonal community events, and/or large performance, and/or yearly city events and activities. Third, the large space: "center" is a bakery place that used to be a neighborhood park in a quiet community. A bakery can attract passers-by. One of the best ways to know a culture is to enjoy their food. Afternoon tea and picnics are central to British culture, while bread is the main food for middle eastern people. This bakery place is mixed-used to offer a platform for multiple activities. The programs are based on time of day. A space to be used by different generations, at the same place, at either the same time or different time, is one of the best ways for bonding a community (Jacobs, 1961). This spatial program creates opportunities for both the refugee and the host to encounter each other during their daily routines to smooth the process of assimilation.

Method 3: APP

The third method involves an app, personalizing the dynamics of the 28-DAY program, to make the assimilation process more playful, enjoyable, and meaningful. There are three main functions of this app: "Tour Planner," an integration course with AI technology; "Tour Guide," a way-finding program with ARGIS technology; "Tour Recorder," a digital personal resume structured and fashioned along the same lines as social media.

First, "Tour Planner" provides refugees a way to connect them with mainstream services, since "there is no nationwide coordinated service in the UK" (Doyle, 2014, August, p. 23). Once a person creates an account, with AI technology supports, his or her 28-DAY program is launched. It means the daily tour is planned based on the "player's" priority and needs. The course reprograms six major elements of integration (Alastair & Strang, 2008) into four main subjects: English, culture, civil, and "leisure time" (Lewis, 2015, 48). Those classes are free or low-cost courses hosted by voluntary organizations in Liverpool, UK. A core checklist is included which guides the application processes of mainstream benefits, Biometric Residence Permit, and National Insurance Number. It affords essential content and helps refugees during the transition period navigates their progress.

"Tour Guide," with ARGIS technology supports, functions as a way-finding device, not unlike the game "Pokémon Go", turning the role of the refugee into a kind of gamer, looking for places and scenes to capture. Studies prove ARGIS and VRGIS involving physical activity during leisure time would benefit a person's physical and mental health (Kamel Boulos et al., 2017) and improve societal integration (Hitt, 2016, July 16). Through frequently using this app, the more active "players" are, the more familiar they are with the new place, the more interesting their psychogeography maps are, the more opportunities to interact with people are and integrate relations with different cultures.

Third, "Tour Recorder," a platform for players, displays their psychogeography maps. By recording their trips, players show their interaction with the new place. Through drifting in the digital and physical version of Liverpool, the players experience what Sam Roberts, a game creator and academic at the University of Southern California, anticipated: "the digital world and different player motivations across societies, they will change the way we experience and tell stories" (Meier, 2016, July 15). Especially when considering refugee and migrant leisure lives beyond economic and functional spheres can help elucidate the negotiation of hybrid identities in novel surroundings through processes of adaptation, belonging and 'home'-building (Lewis, 2015). The players can still enjoy their life, collect

those good times and share their journey with others in the physical world or cyber world.

Conclusion

The EU is facing a multidimensional crisis (Chopin & Macekm, n.d.) that can only be met by a similarly multidimensional response. This paper looks at three, crossbreeding the fields of architecture, planning and digital technology. The refugee question is just as much about housing and jobs as it is about establishing a sense of security necessary for a lasting and meaningful assimilation. Policy and distribution of refugees across the EU can only go so far. The city can pick up the slack and contribute in ways that makes the mechanism of integration less forced and more a matter of course. Any place in a city can become an integration institution and anyone in a city can play a key role in the integration process. Once underway, the new itinerary need not stay limited to refugees but can be adopted by locals and tourists to know the city.

Next steps include developing and publishing the app, reaching out to organizations for testing this methodology, and practicing the results.

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'IS IT THE LANGUAGE OR SOMETHING ELSE?': NAVIGATING MIGRANT PUPILS' ADVERSITIES IN BAVARIAN PRIMARY SCHOOLS

Hailey Rheault

Introduction

While previous quantitative research indicates that home-school collaboration has a positive influence on educational success of migrant pupils in Germany (Kohl et al., 2015), little is known about the prevalence of such relations when children experience adversities. Where there can be perplexities in differentiating problems caused by migration and/or differing educational structures from actual functional issues, international policymakers advocate that parents can help teachers identify their children's educational needs (Ortiz & Robertson, 2018). Currently, there is a gap in literature which examines migrant parents' roles within such educational decision-making practices from the German context.

In light of Germany's increasingly diverse demographic, policymakers and politicians have ensured that newcomers attend language preparatory schools prior to regular school enrollment (Panagiotopoulou & Rosen, 2018). Such ideals of linguistic assimilation seem to overshadow the need for additional academic supports, as research indicates that little attention is paid to accommodating students' unique learning needs in Bavaria (Scholz et al., 2010). Likewise, studies have questioned whether migrant pupils are likely to be referred for special education supports if they struggle in general schooling (see Gabel et al., 2009), as ethnic minority groups are reportedly overrepresented in segregated schools for language, learning, and social-emotional development (Kemper & Weishaupt, 2011).

Cultural and linguistic assimilation can, likewise, act as conditions for offering "valid" parental engagement (Lareau, 1989), as well as create barriers for those unable to meet the expectations (Schneider & Arnot, 2018). For example, Kohl et al.'s (2015) mixed method study finds that the relationship between parental involvement and teacher's judgements about Turkish migrant children's learning problems is positive and strong, but only when mothers spoke German. Hence, it is important to understand how differing migrant families are supported when problems arise, i.e. not only those of high cultural and social capital. To attain new knowledge on the ways in which such relations might impact practices for deciphering if migrant pupils' issues in school reflect differences in their linguistic and cultural backgrounds or greater learning difficulties, this study investigated:

(a) how parents experience their roles,

(b) how educational professionals perceive parents' roles, and

(c) the implications of respective home-school communication within practices for appropriating educational supports for migrant pupils experiencing academic adversities.

Theoretical Framework

When educational professionals are positioned with authoritative roles of providing information to

listening parents, there is a normative ideal that they must "fix" migrant parents and "teach" them the necessary skills to service the educational needs of their children (Lareau, 1989). According to Harris and Nelsen's (2007) organizational communication theory, such traditional and one-sided interactions can be classified as *linear*, whereby teachers might neglect to check if parents understand school messages or have further questions, problems, or advice (see Klingner & Harry, 2006; Koehler et al., 2017; Schoorman et al., 2011). Without "feedback loops" –adaptive processes which enable systems to generate, utilize, and evaluate both positive and negative information– rational objectives cannot be formed to address incongruencies between the meanings of transactions (Harris & Nelson, 2007, p. 17). With *interactional* communication, there can be feedback and the occurrence of success and failure; however, it resembles a "ping-pong game" of messages exchanged, but not shared.

To support migrant families in school practices, some studies argue that schools must evoke *transactional* dynamics. According to Harris and Nelson (2007), transactional interactions (1) are complex, dynamic, and contextual; (2) have no beginning or end, as they constantly adapt to relationships and goals; and (3) enable individuals to send and receive messages at the same time. By strengthening data collection and information dispersal strategies, Schneider and Arnot's (2018) research in the UK argues that *transactional school-home-school* (TSHS) modelling creates "a circularity of dialogue between school and home, enhances the mutual understanding of teachers and parents, and creates an operational environment for parental engagement" (p. 11).

Furthermore, to empower parents' roles in learning at home, in-school activities, and meetings, schools must be aware of parents' difficulties in engagement and teachers should respectively coordinate their work to deflect communication barriers (see Ozmen et al., 2016). Still, it remains unknown if and how parent-teacher collaboration might enable stronger understandings of children's educational needs.

Method

Through qualitative methods, this research attained an in-depth depiction of the social realities of educational decision-making surrounding migrant pupils and what the processes mean to those involved in natural settings (Tolley et al., 2016). Specifically, an iterative multiple case study design was used, whereby "things" were examined within their context to observe "the subjective meaning that people bring to the situation" (de Vaus, 2001, p. 10). Accordingly, differences and similarities could be observed between the cases, as well as *within* and *across* situations (Yin, 1989).

Units of analysis (cases) were divided by (a) parents of migrant children[1] facing academic adversities (i.e. in speaking, reading, writing, and/or understanding the German language) (n = 5) and (b) teachers (n = 5)[2] who were randomly selected in Bavarian primary schools. Grades 1-3 were chosen, as early education provides the "optimal window" for beginning special school interventions, or measures for addressing students' "failures" (Hibel & Jasper, 2012).

For data collection, semi-structured interviews were conducted to understand the *how* and *why* of interactions and the circumstances of said communication (Van den Hoonaard, 2012). One pilot interview was conducted per case for modifications to the open-ended interview guide. Notably, ethical permission was granted by the regional Education Office to ensure scientific integrity. Likewise, participants' names were changed to pseudonyms for anonymization.

1 Notably, 4 out of the 5 parents coincidentally had post-asylum backgrounds; thus, their burdens were potentially enhanced due to other systemic barriers, discrimination, and resettlement issues.

2 Definite conclusions cannot be drawn as the small number of respondents was not a representative "sample" (Van den Hoonaard, 2012).

After transcribing interviews verbatim, this study used QDA Miner to store and organize the data. With thematic analysis, more-than-once-occurring sequences, conditions, processes, and outcomes, as well as conflicting accounts of processes were analyzed (Miles et al., 2013). In this way, this study could search for stronger social mechanisms and conditions for educational decision-making surrounding struggling migrant pupils.

Findings

Linear Parent-Teacher Relations

Although parent-teacher relationships were overall limited in Bavarian primary schools, parental roles seemed to be more likely supported for those who were perceived as *enabling* to their children's development. In contrast, parents with lower literacy, education, etc. were described as "more difficult" to involve. For example, one teacher addressed how such parents might barge into classrooms instead of making appointments. On the other hand, a Ukrainian mother critiqued how interactions are rarely face-to-face: "You lose time and you can't contact the teacher in the right moment to clarify something

Then there comes a moment where you cannot understand anything" (Ms. Andriychuk).

While yearly parent-teacher meetings seemed to be the only time to provide feedback, schools often lacked translation supports. As a result, parents who did not speak German often relied on their children to translate information. Thus, parental knowledge can be further deduced to the extent of their children's understanding, which is problematic for parents and pupils who experience difficulties with linguistic assimilation.

Misunderstandings about Children's *Adversities*

Various discrepancies seemed to arise when discussing migrant children's academic adversities. While some teachers noted that pupils can "lack motivation to catch up" (Mr. Bachmann), parents argued that various setbacks facing migrant pupils are often overlooked: "The questionnaires come a little difficult for foreigners. Teachers do not ask if they understand or explain how to do the tasks" (Mr. Kahn). Accordingly, this Syrian father shared how he was obliged to register his children in afterschool supports, noting that they might have failed without the homework assistance. Displaying how such community services are neither as helpful nor accessible for everyone in Bavaria, an Iranian father discussed how he was unable to obtain this support for his children. Consequentially, he argued that "homework is the biggest problem … The children learn something, but not enough in school" (Mr. Barzani).

While parents addressed inequities preluding to their isolation and migrant children's adversities in school, teachers seemed to be deficit-model oriented when reflecting on the respective pupils' issues:

> Is it because of not enough medical care in the pregnancy or during the birth? Maybe they do not have books, … enough things to eat or never saw a kindergarten from the inside? It is a fact that a lot of these children *have* learning disabilities and school becomes a parking place for them. A place not to be at home. But they have no possibilities to progress (Ms. Müller).

While other teachers similarly commented: "It is difficult to say where problems lie … If it is the language or something else" (Ms. Schmidt), there was an underlying assumption that adversities were tied to inefficiencies at home. For example, another teacher critiqued: "Parents who do not speak German cannot help their children read, because they cannot do it themselves" (Ms. Fischer).

Absolving the Disconnect in Problem-Solving

When inquiring if students' adversities reflect greater learning difficulties, teachers detailed how they seek the advice of a psychologist for further assessment. Critiquing respective testing, one teacher commented that they do not account for differing backgrounds: "We can't even imagine what the children have experienced. What they saw during war, the trauma" (Ms. Fischer). While some teachers argued that information about children's backgrounds would "perhaps explain the behaviour of the child" (Ms. Weber), they addressed how it is often too difficult to involve parents as they are most likely "strained in how much they can help their children due to other life stresses" (Ms. Schmidt). This exclusion seemed to be harmful for migrant parents, like Mr. Barzani and Mr. Aswad, who lacked guidance for helping their children. Addressing this situation, Ms. Müller commented:

> It could be beneficial to speak with parents to discuss what can be improved and the reasons for the situation… To think, together, about the children and try to understand why there is a problem.

With such partnerships, it seemed as though more cohesive and holistic understandings about children's adversities might transpire.

Discussion

This small qualitative study finds that the extent of value placed on parents' roles seemed to be based on their capacities for linguistic and cultural assimilation in Bavarian primary schools (as seen in Kohl et al., 2015). Rather than critiquing the insufficient school landscapes for intercultural communication, *linear* communication seemed to exacerbate parent-teacher mismatches and mistrust amongst the most marginalized families (Schneider & Arnot, 2018) as well as mutual feelings of "being alone" in addressing the children's adversities. Where parents were knowledgeable about their children's issues and teachers had insecurities in understanding the sources of such "learning problems", the lack of coordination seemed to enable perplexities in understanding what measures could be taken to help children. Therefore, home-school collaboration appeared to be a *missing link* during such decision-making practices.

Implications

Where negative assumptions about families seem to preclude beliefs about the children's adversities being 'too vast' to support within general schooling (Gabel et al., 2009), future research should capture the perspectives of parents caring for children with special educational needs (SENs) and school psychologists to expose potential inequities in SEN designation. While special education referrals in the United States have been criticized for excluding migrant parents (e.g., Klingner & Harry, 2006; Schoorman et al., 2011), this study revealed that remedial interventions prior to SEN identification were seemingly nonexistent in Bavarian primary schools. Rather, marginalized parents became ostracized from practices both *inside* and *outside* of the school and it was assumed amongst teachers that respective children had limited possibilities for progress. Accordingly, this study suggests that *transactional school-home-school* (TSHS) modelling should be implemented to improve cultural sensitivity to ensure that *all* parents can help teachers plan, allocate, and assign appropriate measures for children in need. Furthermore. if such parent-teacher collaboration can minimize the extent to which migrant differences are recognized as "deficits", further researchers and policymakers alike should consider the benefits of TSHS problem-solving within SEN referral practices in Bavaria.

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

REFUGEE AND ASYLUM-SEEKING STUDENTS' EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Jáfia Naftali Câmara

Research Aims

This research study aims to learn about RAS students' experiences and perspectives of education, including to what extent educators consider the wealth of knowledge and lived experiences that refugee students bring with them, as well as, to what extent does their education in England relate to their daily lives, realities, past experiences and future aspirations. An important aim of the present study is to enhance our understanding of how to respond to refugee-background students' educational needs more effectively by using student-generated input. Rather than speaking on their behalf, this research project aims to help amplify their voices. Moreover, this study aims to contribute to academia an interrogation of what constitutes supporting and empowering the education of refugee-background students from a student-perspective, the conflicts between the often-assimilatory nature of education and what constitutes actual inclusion of refugee-background students in education.

Literature Review

There are no clearly defined educational policies for refugee children in the UK, and the main responsibility for their education lies with the local authorities (LA) (Pinson & Arnot, 2010). Structural constraints and various barriers make it more challenging for RAS students to gain access to education and to excel in school both academically and socially. The UK's own target for guaranteeing that RAS children are accessing education, is within a period of 20 days after arriving (UNICEF, 2018). However, not a single region in the UK has successfully met its own 20-school-day target for guaranteeing school places for all the Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Children (UASC) in their care and a quarter of children at the secondary school level have had to wait various months to access education (Gladwell & Chetwynd, 2018). Some of the barriers that delay RAS students' access to education, include the fragmented school admissions system, long waiting lists, language barriers, widespread lack of expertise within schools and local authorities to help provide appropriate educational support to them (Ott and O'Higgins, 2019; Gladwell and Chetwynd, 2018; Madziva and Thondhlana, 2017; Walker, 2011).

Due to the lack of specific educational policy aimed at RAS students, there has been a tendency to categorise and portray them as a homogeneous group. This contributes to their invisibility and ignores their specific educational needs. Once they are enrolled in school, they may face further obstacles such as insufficient English as an Additional Language (EAL) support, social issues, bullying, limited access to full-time 16-18 English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), and lack of trained staff to work with this population (Vandekerckhove and Aarssen, 2020; Morrice et al., 2019a; Morrice et al., 2019b; Gladwell & Chetwynd, 2018; Doyle and O'Toole, 2013). English is a vital tool for RAS children's inclusion and integration in schools and has a critical role in helping them develop social relationships, boost confidence, mitigate isolation, support learning, integration, and belonging (Tip et al., 2019; Madziva and Thondhlana, 2017; Peterson et al., 2017; Court, 2017; Klenk, 2017).

Academic inquiry has generally overlooked the perspectives of RAS students on their educational experiences in England. From assessing the literature in educational research, it has become clear that it has largely ignored their challenges and not considered the unique experiences of RAS students as different from those of other migrant groups (Pastoor, 2015; 2017; Taylor and Sidhu, 2011). This has contributed to a context where there is a lack of policies addressing the "educational disadvantages" faced by young RAS students (ibid). The near invisibility of RAS students in political and academic discourse may pose challenges for their social, cultural, and economic integration. Refugee narratives "do not fit neatly into the established accounts of local integration, and resettlement" but instead, they are "non-linear and complex permutations of migration, exile, and consistently re-imagined futures" (Peterson, 2017). Therefore, more work needs to be done to highlight the specific educational needs of RAS students and the needs of immigrant students in general (Pastoor, 2015; 2017).

Research Methodology

A Critical Interpretivism qualitative research approach based on interviews with students and participatory methods will be used to investigate the experiences and perspectives of newly arrived RAS students. These methods include classroom observations, walking interviews, group discussions, individual interviews, and arts-based participation with PhotoVoice.

Data Collection

I. Classroom observations

At the first stage of data collection, student participants will be shadowed and some of their classes will be observed to get a glimpse into their educational experiences and to start developing themes for the group and individual discussions.

II. Interviews with student participants

a. Walking interviews: These constitute walking with participants around their school to understand the ways in which they experience their school spaces, to learn more about them, the key issues at play there, and their experiences of attending that school (King and Woodroffe, 2017; Hitchings & Jones, 2004). Walking interviews are helpful in gaining insight into how people experience places (van der Vaart et al., 2015; Carpiano, 2009). Walking may help unfold relevant topics for discussion and insights that may have been overlooked otherwise.

b. Semi-structured group interviews: Group interview discussions aiming to bring participants together to talk about their shared and divergent experiences of schooling, any positive and negative experiences they have lived, and come up with possible solutions to issues that may concern them. These will be facilitated through story-reading and storytelling to learn more about participants' experiences and perspectives.

c. Semi-structured individual interviews: Semi-structured individual interviews (SSI) have been adopted as a method in this study because "hearing young people's own views about the processes that help" them settle in school and "the diversity of their experiences" is necessary and important (Hek, 2006).

III. PhotoVoice

The aforementioned interview and discussion methods will be supported with participatory research elements, by using an arts-based participatory research methodology known as, PhotoVoice. It is a participatory research tool where participants take photographs of people, places and things that are meaningful to them (Humpage et al., 2019). The photographs will relate to their life experiences, perspectives, and beliefs on a certain topic. PhotoVoice will provide participants with opportunities to reflect on their social and cultural histories and provide meaning to their lived experiences.

IV. Digital story and presentation to school

Participants will help create a digital story based on their experiences of education and migration to share with the school. A mural with selected photos taken by the students during their PhotoVoice missions will also be showcased at the school.

Conclusions

This research study could enhance our understanding of how to effectively respond to refugee students' educational needs by using student-generated input. Additionally, this study will contribute to academia an interrogation of what constitutes supporting and empowering the education of RAS students from a student-perspective, the conflicts between the often-assimilatory nature of education and what constitutes actual inclusion of RAS students in education. Identifying learning barriers and enhancing students' self-efficacy in education are important ways to help students achieve positive academic outcomes (Lane and Lane, 2001; McKenzie and Schweitzer, 2001).

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INTEGRATION OF HIGHLY EDUCATED SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE UK[1]

Zahide Erdogan

Introduction

After the conflict started in Syria in 2011, more than 6.6 million Syrians have fled abroad mostly to neighbouring countries and around 6 million Syrians displaced internally. Accordingly, local integration emerges as an essential durable solution for refugees. Up to 2014 UK's policy was to support Syria's neighbours financially; however, the Government has pledged to resettle 20.000 Syrian by 2020 "Syrian Vulnerable Person Resettlement Programme" (SVPRP) in 2014 (McGuinness, 2017, s. 3).

Refugee integration in the UK has relatively great significance because the country has a long history of welcoming refugees historically. The UK adopts mainstream policies, however targeted policies applied only from 2000 to 2008. Home Office describes integration as "that takes place when refugees are empowered to achieve their full potential as members of British society, to contribute to the community, and to become fully able to exercise the rights and responsibilities that they share with other residents" (Home Office, 2005).

This paper discusses structural integration of highly educated Syrian refugees in the UK through the lens of Ager and Strang refugee integration framework. The findings show that first phase of integration is structural integration and language skills and higher education (HE) environment facilitate integration. Furthermore, citizenship as a legal status is accepted commonly as one of the most effective way to cope with difficulties despite the substantial rights obtained through the refugee status in the UK.

Method

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 participants (19 interviews were analysed) to gain better understanding of integration problems faced by Syrian refugees in 2019, in the UK. Participants were chosen from Syrian refugees studying at higher education institutions or graduates in the UK. In terms of socio-demographics, participants were equally selected as 10 males and 10 females. Importantly, this research sought to include refugees who were in all devolved authorities. 3 participants were from Wales, 4 from Scotland and 12 from England. There was not any participant from Northern Ireland who meets the criteria. 12 participants arrived in the UK with English language skill, 5 participants did not know English and 2 participants needed to improve language skills. 7 participants have families living in the UK and 12 participants wanted to continue their HE. Thus, the movement of them to the UK can be seen a making choice and demand for higher education was the significant inspiration.

All the interviewers participated higher education including undergraduate degrees and postgraduate degrees (Masters and Doctorates) in the UK. Therefore, refugees have been selected from people who have opportunity to transform their cultural capital into host country's system to evaluate

1 This paper is based on my Ph.D. thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University.

the role of education as a facilitator in the UK. Snowball sampling was chosen to reach participants considering expected difficulties reaching highly educated refugees.

Findings

This section discusses the research findings from the semi-structured interviews with highly educated Syrian refugees in the UK. Different immigration statuses provide different rights associated with them. Accordingly, rights of refugees, asylum seekers and temporariness of refugee status are taken into account to evaluate integration process in the UK. A refugee can be defined as someone whose status recognised under the terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention and an asylum-seeker is someone who is seeking asylum on the basis of his or her claim to be a refugee (Home Office, 2000, 2005). Thus, people who are waiting for Home Office's decision on their case are known as asylum seekers. While asylum seekers do not have right to work, do not claim welfare benefits and family reunification, recognised refugees are able to work, claim support and are entitled to family reunification in the UK. Recognised refugees are granted 5 years limited leave to remain in the UK. Refugees applying citizenship have to pass "Life in the UK" test and language test (Refugee Council, 2019), and have to meet criteria about "good character" requirement (Home Office, 2019). Refugee integration is a devolved matter and it is important to emphasise that there is no UK wide refugee integration strategy.

Before analysing findings, it seems necessary here to clarify what integration is. Integration is a complex, ambiguous term which is widely used and discussed in academia, politics and practice. However there is no consensus on the definition of integration (Ager & Strang, 2008; Castles vd., 2002; Kovacs, 2015; Spencer, 2006). ECRE (2002, s. 4) considers integration as a "dynamic and two-way", "long term" and "multi-dimension process" and UNHCR (2013, s. 14) defines integration "as a dynamic and multifaceted two-way process with three interrelated dimensions: a legal, an economic, social-cultural dimension". Throughout this paper, the term integration is used to refer to structural integration focusing on rights and access to services.

Ager and Strang refugee integration framework for the UK is structured around ten key domains under four categories as "means and markers", "social connection", "facilitators" and "foundation" (Ager & Strang, 2004). When integration is defined as a resettlement process (Kovacs, 2015), then housing, education, health and access to labour market are important indicators to understand structural integration. Most of the refugee situations are not solved quickly, therefore, to find a way to better integrate refugees into the host countries has become more and more important. During the interviews the participants' experience of accessing housing, general health services, higher education and labour market were discussed with facilitators such as language and education together.

Finding and settling into safe and proper housing are the first step towards integrating refugees into the host country. Home Office has implemented dispersal accommodation policy for asylum seekers since 2000, therefore asylum seekers are not able to choose where they live (E. S. Stewart, 2012, s. 26). Local authorities are responsible finding an appropriate house for the refugees under SVPRP. Therefore, participants under SVPRP did not have any difficulties but others had some difficulties such as finding proper house, paying deposit, finding reference. Refugees chose to settle nearby their families, social network and Syrian community.

Primary health services are free for refugees and asylum seekers in the UK. Refugees under SVPRP have had health assessment before entering the UK, but asylum seekers and other refugees have not assessed before arrival (Scholten vd., 2017, s. 52). Refugees under SVPRP learned health system through organizations which help them during resettlement process. Moreover, other refugees learned

access to health system easily through their networks, documents given them, organizations and NGOs by language skills. The other issue about the health system is difficulties to get an appointment with a GP, because the pressure on the health system.

Recognised refugees who continue higher education are eligible for student support and home fee tuition in the UK. However, HE costs are too high for asylum seekers as they are accepted as international students and are not eligible for student support. Research results also highlighted the challenges and facilitators in accessing higher education from the perspectives of the participants. Participants reported struggles in accessing academic guidance, given inaccurate information and lack of knowledge on the UK's education system that hinder the access to the HE. Moreover, facilitators can be listed as financial supports, language and right to work in the UK. In addition to student support for refugees, there are different types of scholarships for asylum seekers or refugees such as sanctuary scholarship, refugee bursary, asylum seeker scholarship, humanitarian scholarship (STAR, 2019). English language proficiency is the key factor in higher education and arriving in the UK with language proficiency can be accepted as one of the most important facilitator of both integration and higher education. Additionally, right to work is reported as a facilitator by the participants who do not claim student support to pay tuition fees and living expenses.

Access to labour market in another vital indicator of structural integration and provide not only economic independence but also can accelerate learning English, building networks and regaining confidence (Cheung & Phillimore, 2014, s. 521). The majority of participants are employed in part-time, temporary and unskilled job under their qualifications. Also, common ethnic networks, friends are important tools to find a job. This finding is consistent with Bloch's (2008) findings which showed the importance of informal networks to find mostly unskilled jobs in the UK. Verkuyten (2016) draws our attention to feeling of relative deprivation of higher educated immigrants because of unequal opportunities especially in relation to level of education and education-integration paradox.

Determining factors accelerating or hindering integration is fundamental to evaluate properly the process of integration of refugees. Ager and Strang (2004) argue that 'language and cultural knowledge' and 'safety and stability" are the facilitators of integration. The majority of the participants reported that language proficiency accelerated labour market integration, completing HE, finding house and learning health system. Additionally, it is important to note that higher education environment was seen as having importance in helping to learn language, to interact with students from different cultures and to integrate into the new societies. When belonging defined as an emotional attachment about feeling safe, most of the participants reported that belong to the UK means feeling secure and being away from religious, cultural, racial harassment in the UK. However, feeling of temporariness resulting from refugee status interrupts sense of permanence and hinders successful integration.

The UK government implements policy of citizenship as a "reward" and "tool" for integration process (Jurado, 2008) and citizenship can be seen as "the end of refugee journey" (Lomba, 2010; E. Stewart & Mulvey, 2014, s. 1028). This research indicates that citizenship has critical importance for participants and is considered as a tool to find a better job, to feel equal and to prevent discrimination in the labour market, to become full member of the society, to travel and to have a passport. Focusing on discrimination in the labour market this research's findings seem to be consistent with Stewart and Mulvey's (2014, s. 1029) research which found that there was widely known perception about employers' reluctance to hire refugees and participants reported that a kind of privilege given to citizens because of temporary nature of refugee status. As a result, citizenship can be accepted as the last phase of integration and the only way to cope with difficulties which refugees faced.

Conclusion

Facilitators of integration and importance of citizenship are discussed in this paper under the concept of structural integration using findings of highly educated Syrian refugees in the UK. The UK's integration policies focus on facilitating structural integration and especially to communicate in English and gain employment are remarkable to achieve full potential of refugees. The result of this study indicates that highly educated Syrian refugees are well integrated structurally, and English language proficiency and higher education environment facilitated structural integration. It should be considered that even highly educated refugees struggle with resettlement despite education and language skill. Furthermore, highly educated refugees are likely to feel relatively deprived despite successful structural integration and education. Citizenship is accepted the only way to feel secure, stable and equal because of temporary nature of refugee status. Furthermore, citizenship can be seen as both reward and tool for integration in the UK.

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AVRUPA'DA MÜSLÜMAN MÜLTECİLERİN ENTEGRASYON SORUNLARI

Erkan Perşembe[1]

Giriş

Yirminci yüzyılın başlarında İngiltere ve Fransa gibi ülkelerin sömürgelerinden Avrupa'ya getirilen göçmenler arasında bulunan Müslüman nüfusun görünürlüğü, zamanla Avrupa ülkelerinin kalkınma projelerinde eksikliğini yoğun olarak hissettikleri işgücü azlığı nedeniyle yakın çevre ülkelerine yönelerek başlayan göç talepleriyle artış göstermiştir. Özellikle Türkiye ağırlıklı Müslüman göçmenlerin varlığı entegrasyon deneyimleri açısından ilginç deneyimler ortaya çıkartmıştır.

Günümüzde Ortadoğu'da ve bazı Müslüman ülkelerde devam eden iç savaşlar nedeniyle başlayan mülteci akınlarının Avrupa ülkelerini hedef alan yoğunlaşması, bölge ülkelerinin tamamını ilgilendiren sorunsal bir yapı oluşturmuştur.

Müslümanların Avrupa'da yarım aşırı aşan göçmenlik deneyimi ve mültecilerle ağırlık kazanan hareketlilikleri, entegrasyon sorunları açısından çoğunlukla sorunlu olarak görülmüştür. Avrupalının zihin dünyasında genellikle uyumsuz aktörler olarak ötekileştirilen Müslümanlara yönelik endişeli tutumlar mülteci kriziyle giderek büyümektedir.

Müslüman mültecilerin Avrupa hedefi ve yaşananlar

İnsanların göç etmelerinin birçok farklı nedeni vardır, bazıları gönüllü olarak göç ederken bazıları zorunluluk nedeniyle göç etmektedir. Zorunlu göç insanların siyasal veya dinsel baskılar, iç savaş ve doğal felaketler gibi nedenlerle yaşadığı coğrafyadan istekleri dışında ayrılmasıyla gündeme gelmektedir. Dünyanın farklı bölgelerinde yirminci yüzyılda yaşanan mülteciler krizi bu yüzyıla da yansıyarak, Ortadoğu ve Avrupa merkezli sorunsal bir konumla insanlığı karşı karşıya getirmiştir.

2011 yılından itibaren Arap dünyasında gelişen halk hareketleri, toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasal anlamda önemli sorunları tetiklemiştir. Genel olarak, demokrasi, ekonomik haklar ve baskıcı yönetimlere karşı özgürlük talepleriyle başlayan isyanlar, zamanla silahlı halk hareketlerine dönüşmüş, Tunus, Mısır, Libya ve Yemen'de yönetim değişikliklerine neden olmuştur. Arap Baharı olarak tanımlanan bu süreçte meydana gelen isyanlar, Suriye'de kalıcı ve uzun süreli bir iç savaşa neden olarak kitlesel göçleri tetiklemiş ve mülteci hareketleri gündeme gelmiştir. Suriye halkının daha güvenli ve iyi bir yaşam için öncelikli olarak sınır ülkeleri Lübnan, Ürdün ve Türkiye topraklarına, zaman içinde ise artan biçimde Avrupa ülkelerine sığınma çabaları ile ortaya çıkan mülteci sorunu, AB içinde çok ciddi bir kriz yönetimi ve koordinasyon sorunlarını beraberinde getirmiştir.

2013 yılında Suriye'den çok büyük bir kitle, 2,5 milyon kişi(ülke nüfusunun %10'u) yerinden edilerek mülteci konumuna düşürülmüştü. Suriye'de hükümete karşı halk ayaklanmasından üç yıl sonra, BMMYK[2] verilerine göre Suriyeli mülteci sayısı 2014 yılında 3 milyona ulaşmıştır. Bu süre zarfında 22 milyon nüfuslu Suriye'de halkın yarısı ya yerinden edilmiş ya da kaybolmuştur (UNHCR,2014,s.2).

Suriye'de rejim gücü ve muhalif gruplar arasındaki çatışmaların yanısıra IŞİD'in 2014 yılından

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itibaren sivillere uyguladığı katliamların tedirginliğini yaşayan birçok insan ülkesinden göç etmiştir. Uluslararası Göç Örgütü'nün verilerine göre, 2015 yılında Suriye kaynaklı mültecilerin sayısı 4,9 milyona yükselirken, bu insanlara yakın ülke konumundaki Türkiye(2,5 milyon), Lübnan(1,1 milyon), Ürdün(628.200), Irak(244.600) ve Mısır(117.600) mülteciye ev sahipliği yapmıştır (IOM,2015,s.8)

Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'da meydana gelen çatışmalar nedeniyle yerinden edilen insanlar ilk olarak yakın ülkelere sığınırken, zamanla İspanya, İtalya ve Yunanistan'a geçerek Avrupa ülkelerinde gelecek umudu için arayışa geçmişlerdi. Mülteci göç hareketlerinin Avrupa'yı etkilemeye başlamasıyla, mülteci krizinin boyutları bütün dünyayı yakından ilgilendiren bir konuma yükselmiştir.

Kuzey Afrika'dan kaçan mültecilerin ilk olarak yöneldiği hedef ülkelerinden biri İtalya'dır. Arap Baharının henüz ilk üç ayında 20.000'den fazla göçmenin İtalya'nın Lampedusa adasına sığınması, İtalya'nın AB ülkelerinden teknik destek ve maddi yardım istemesine neden olmuştur. AB ülkelerinden yük paylaşımı noktasında gerekli desteği alamayan İtalya, bu göçmenlere ikamet izniyle serbest dolaşım hakkı tanıyarak AB ülkelerini çözüme yanaşmaya zorlamıştır. Çoğunluğu Tunuslulardan oluşan göçmenlerin Fransa'ya gitmek istemeleri, İtalya ile Fransa arasında Schengen krizine neden olmuştur(Yılmaz Elmas,2016,s.188)

Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'da meydana gelen çatışmalar nedeniyle milyonlarca insan yerinden edilirken, çatışmalardan kaçan binlerce mülteci Ege ve Akdeniz'i geçerek Avrupa'ya yönelmeye başlamıştı. Avrupa'ya ulaşmak isteyen mülteciler, Türkiye üzerinden kara ve deniz rotasıyla Balkan ülkeleri üzerinden de Avrupa'ya ulaşmayı amaçlamıştır.

Genel olarak, Avrupa'ya yönelik mülteci ve göçmen hareketlerinde üç önemli güzergâh kullanılmaktadır. Bu güzergahlar, 1. Hat; Libya, Tunus ve Mısır'dan yola çıkarak deniz üzerinden İtalya ve Yunanistan'a ulaşmayı amaçlayan, 2. Hat; Fas ve Cezayir'den yola çıkarak deniz üzerinden İspanya veya Fransa'ya ulaşmayı amaçlayan, 3. Hat ise sıklıkla kullanılan Türkiye'den başlayıp hem deniz hem de kara olmak üzere Yunanistan, Arnavutluk, Sırbistan ve Macaristan üzerinden Avrupa içlerine ulaşmayı amaçlayan yollardır (Bayraklı; Keskin, 2015, s.13.)

Avrupa'ya gelen düzensiz göçmenlerin sayısı 2014 yılında 626 bin, 2015 yılında 2,13 milyona yükselmiştir. 2015 yılında düzensiz göçmenlerin en çok bulundukları ülke ise yaklaşık 911 bin ile Yunanistan olurken onu Macaristan (424 bin), Almanya (376 bin), Fransa (109 bin) ve Avusturya(86 bin) ile takip etmektedir. AB genelinde tespit edilen kayıt dışı göçmenlerin yüzde 89'u bu beş ülkede bulunmaktadır (Yıldız Yücel, 2017, s.13)

Başta deniz yolu ile olmak üzere kara yolu üzerinden Avrupa'ya ulaşmak isteyen mülteciler, bu süreçte dramatik olaylarla karşılaşmışlardır. İlk olarak 2013 yılında İtalya'ya yönelen 500 mültecinin bulunduğu teknenin batması sonucu 365 kişi, 2015 yılından 2017 yılına kadar ise 5.083 kişi yaşamını yitirmiştir. (Yıldız Yücel, 2017, s.14)

Avrupa'ya yönelen düzensiz mülteci sayılarında normalin üstünde artışlar yaşanırken 2016 yılından itibaren AB üye ülkelerinde mültecileri engellemek için yeni politikalar gündeme gelmiştir. Macaristan, Sırbistan gibi geçiş ülkeleri sınırına tel örgü inşa ederek Yunanistan rotasından gelen mültecilerin geçişini engellemeye çalışmıştır.

Avrupa'da birçok ülke mültecileri sınırlarından uzak tutmaya çalışırken, Fransa ve Danimarka 2015 yılının başında Paris'te ve Kopenhag'da meydana gelen terör saldırıları sonrası güvenlik kaygıları nedeniyle, Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadoğu'dan gelen mültecileri kabul etmemeye başlamıştı.

2015 yılında Avrupa ülkelerine 1,3 milyondan fazla iltica başvurusu yapılmıştır. İltica başvuruları, Suriye(675.668), Afganistan(406.300) ve Irak(253.558) kökenliler tarafından yapılmakla birlikte F.Almanya(476.510) en fazla iltica başvurusu alan ülke olmuştur. Almanya'yı, Macaristan(177.135),

İsveç(162.450), Avusturya(88.160), İtalya(83.540) ve Fransa(76.165) takip etmektedir. Sığınma başvurusunda bulunanların sayısındaki artış, ülkelerin krize yaklaşımını etkilemiştir (UNHCR,"Global Report 2015", s.84.)

Bu süreç Avrupa kamuoyunu sosyokültürel, ekonomik, hukuki ve siyasal anlamda etkilemiş, AB'nin bütünlüğü açısından da ciddi meydan okumaları beraberinde getirmiştir. F.Almanya ise, AB üyeleri içinde mültecilerin en çok rağbet ettiği ülke olarak sürecin başat unsurlarından biri olarak öne çıkmaktadır.

Almanya'da mültecilere sağlanan olanaklar ve entegrasyon politikaları

Göçün uzun vadede gelişmiş ülkelere olumlu bir yansıması olduğu sıklıkla dile getiriliyor. Nitekim AB ülkeleri her yıl on binlerce kişiyi vatandaşlığa kabul ederek nüfusunu dinamik tutmaya devam ediyor (Yıldız Yücel,2017,s.10)

Mülteci krizinin AB ülkelerinde bugüne kadar gözlemlediğimiz durumunu değerlendirdiğimizde Almanya'nın hem sayısal kabullenme açısından hem de entegrasyon politikaları açısından ön planda olduğunu belirtmeliyiz. Bu nedenle Almanya özelinde Müslüman göçmenlerin entegrasyon pozisyonlarını ele almaya çalışacağız.

Almanya Federal Göç ve İltica Dairesi (Bundesamt Für Migration und Flüchtlinge) verilerine göre, 2015 yılı içinde 476 bin kişi Almanya'da kalabilmek için iltica başvuru yapmış, yüz binlercesini ise yasadışı yollarla giriş yapabilmiştir. İltica başvurularına bakıldığı zaman, 2012'de 77 bin, 2013'te 127 bin, 2014'te ise 202 bin 2015 yılında ise 476 bin kişinin Almanya'da ikamet edebilmek için başvurduğu görülmektedir. Bu rakamlar, Almanya'nın mülteciler için en önemli hedef noktası olduğunu, AB içindeki mültecilerin büyük çoğunluğunun F.Almanya'ya ulaşmak istediğini göstermektedir. F.Almanya'ya 2016 yılında yapılan başvurular incelendiğinde 745.155 gibi yüksek bir rakam görülmektedir (**Bkz.Tablo :1)**

Tablo 1. Almanya Sığınma Başvurusu İstatistikleri

Almanya	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Başvuru	52.235	77.485	126.705	202.645	476.510	745.155	22.560
Kabul edilenler	9.100	17.135	20.125	40.560	140.910	433.905	261.620

Kaynak: Startseite Migrationsbericht der Bundesregierung Migrationsbericht 2018.

AB ülkelerine sığınma başvuruları incelendiğinde başvuruların önemli bir bölümünün Suriye'den gelen insanlar tarafından yapıldığı ve bunların yarısına mültecilik statüsü verildiği görülmektedir. Bu kişilere ait olan ve farklı ülkelerden alınan veriler bu grupta yer alan kişilerin ağırlıklı olarak vasıfsız kişilerden oluştuğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Mülteci krizinin Avrupa'yı etkilemesiyle birlikte Alman politikacılar ve özellikle Başbakan Merkel, bir taraftan soruna çözüm bulmaya çalışırken, öteki taraftan diğer üye ülkelere destek çağrıları yapmıştır. Ancak bazı ülkelerin mültecilere kapıyı tamamen kapatması ve krizin çözümünden kendilerinin sorumlu olmadığını belirtmesi nedeniyle çok fazla destek bulamamıştır. Yine de F.Almanya, mülteci krizine çözüm bulma noktasında diğer ülkelerden farklı bir politika izlemiş ve bu süreçte lider bir rol üstlenmeye çalışmıştır. Avrupa'da birçok ülke, mültecilere sınırlarını kapatırken, Almanya mültecilere yönelik 'açık kapı' politikası izlemiştir(Akın,2017,85).

Mülteciler ilk adım olarak koruma statüsü altında geçici ikamet hakkını Cenevre Mülteci Sözleşmesi kapsamında elde etmektedir. Avrupa Birliği Yeterlilik Direktifi sığınma hakkını elde eden mültecilere en az 3 yıllık ve yenilenebilen oturma izni hakkının verilmesini hüküm altına almıştır. Mültecilerin

otuma izinlerinin süreklilik kazanması için temel dil becerisi ve ülkenin siyasal sistemini bilmesi gibi belirli şeyler hakkında yeterli bilgi sahibi olma şartları aranabilmektedir. Avrupa Birliği Yeterlilik Direktifi doğrultusunda geçici koruma altındaki kişilerin bir yıl için verilen oturma izni daha sonra iki yıl için yenilenebilmektedir.

2015 yılında yoğunlaşan kitlesel mülteci akınıyla birlikte 2016 yılında hükümet tarafından yeni bir entegrasyon yasası üzerinde anlaşmaya varıldı. Bu yasanın amacı F.Almanya'da bulunan sığınmacıların yükümlülüklerini ve sorumluluklarını düzenlemek ve iş bulmalarını sağlayacak düzeyde Almanca öğrenmelerini teşvik ve yaşam giderlerini elde etmelerini sağlamaktı. Bu yasayla birlikte hükümet entegrasyon sürecinin aktif bir katılımcısı oldu. Yasa F.Almanya'ya gelen sığınmacıların dil, iş yaşamı, sosyal ve kültürel uyum gibi birçok kursa katılımının sağlanmasını öngörüyordu. Bununla birlikte sığınmacıların bu kurslara devamlılığı sağlamaması durumunda yapılan yardımlarda kesinti yapılması planlanmıştır (Şimşek;Çorakbatır,2016, s.79).

F.Almanya mültecileri kontrollü bir şekilde kabullenirken 2015 yılında yapılan başvurusu sayısının beklenmedik şekilde artışı olmuştu. Bu dönemde bir milyondan fazla kişi savaş veya zulüm ya da ekonomik nedenlerle Almanya'ya daha iyi hayat şartlarında yaşamak için sığınma başvurusunda bulunmuştu. Almanya bu talepleri karşılamada zorlanmış 2016 yılı itibariyle önceki yıllardan kalan sığınma başvuruları resmi olarak gerçekleşememiştir.(MPC, 2016, s.68-69)

F.Almanya hukuk siteminde sığınmacılar ülkeye giriş yaptıktan sonra karşılama merkezlerine gönderilerek başvuruları alınıp sağlık kontrolü yapılmaktadır. Bu merkezlerde kalma süresi 3 ay olup başvuru yapan sığınmacının hangi karşılama merkezine gönderileceği eyalet kotaları dikkate alınarak belirlenmektedir. Sığınmacıların bu konuda tercih hakkı bulunmamaktadır ve gönderildikleri eyaleti terk etme imkanı da tanınmamaktadır. Sığınma başvurusu sonrası mülteci statüsü kazanan kişiler ise diğer Alman vatandaşlarının sahip olduğu bütün haklardan yararlanma imkanı elde etmektedir.(Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2019 Asyl, Migration und Integration,2019, s.122-139).

F.Almanya'da 10 yıldır sürdürülen mülteciler ve sığınmacıların iş gücü piyasasına entegrasyonu amacı taşıyan iki özel kurumsal program mevcuttur. Bunlar Yeterlilikle Entegrasyon, ve Mülteciler ve Sığınmacıların Entegrasyonu programlarıdır. Bu programların öncelikli amacı istihdam ajansları, iş merkezleri, eğitim merkezleri ve mesleki eğitim araçlarını temin edenlerle etkili bir ağ kurmak, mültecilere ve sığınmacılara yerel düzeyde iş gücü piyasasına erişim imkânı sağlamaktır. Almanya'da on altı eyaletin birçoğu mültecilerin ve sığınmacıların çalışma hayatına entegrasyonuna destek amacıyla kendi program ve araçlarını faaliyete geçirmiştir(MPC, 2016, s.72-73).

Mültecilerin niteliklerine göre iş gücü piyasasında kabul edilme imkanı daha fazla olabilmektedir. Ayrıca diğer önemli ön koşul entegrasyon kursu olarak adlandırılan 600 saat Almanca eğitimi ve 60 saatlik kültür ve politik sisteme ilişkin eğitim aşamalarıdır. Böylece F.Almanya'da geçici koruma ya da mülteci statüsüyle oturma izni alan kişiler çalışma hakkını da kazanmış olurlar.

Almanya, mültecilerin başvurularını hızlı bir şekilde ve yüksek oranlarda karara bağlayan konumuyla en çok sayıda mülteciye ev sahipliği yapmıştır. F.Almanya Göç ve Mülteci Dairesi'ne göre mültecilerin entegrasyonu ve kabulü için harcanan toplam miktar 2015 yılı için 8,3milyar Avro, 2016 yılı için ise 14 milyar Euro'dur(Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2019 Asyl, Migration und Integration,2019, s.71)

Düzensiz göçü engellemeleri yönünde artan kamuoyu baskısı altındaki Avrupalı politikacılar yasa dışı göçü ulusal düzeyde farklı tanımlamakta ve soruna ilişkin çeşitli politikalar üretmektedir. Schengen bölgesindeki iç sınırların kaldırılmasının ardından dış sınırların güvenliğini sağlamak için iş birliği yapan Avrupa devletleri, Avrupa Birliği Sınır Güvenliği Birimi aracılığıyla AB'ye yönelik düzensiz göçle mücadele etmeye çalışmaktadır(Yıldız,2017,11).

AB ülkelerinin birçoğunda gözlemlenen mültecilere karşı tepkisel tutumların F.Almanya'da da arttığı görülmektedir. Ocak 2016 yılında yapılan bir ankete göre, Almanların % 40'ı mültecileri Alman kültürüne yönelik bir tehdit olarak görmüş, % 62'si mültecilerin suç oranlarını yükselteceğini ifade etmiştir. Bu durum hükümetin, mülteciler politikasını savunmasını zorlaştırmıştır(Zick,2017,s.46-48).

AB ülkelerinde, mülteci sorununa yönelik toplumsal tepkiler Müslüman göçmenlere yönelik eskiden beri devam eden islamofobik refleksleri harekete geçirmektedir. Avrupa parlamentolarında giderek büyüyen aşırı sağ partiler artık Müslümanlara karşı AB ülkelerinin genelinde yaygınlaşan hoşgörüsüzlüğün boyutlarını göstermektedir. Konunun diğer dramatik yönü ise son yıllarda Müslümanlara yönelik ırkçı saldırıların da artış göstermesidir(UHİM, 2015). Bu gelişmelere bakıldığında, Avrupa'nın geleceğinde Müslümanları zor günlerin beklediğini tahmin edebiliriz.

F.Almanya seçimlerinde, Almanya için Alternatif Partisi"nin (AfD), neredeyse tüm partilerin seçmenlerinden tepki oyları alması, göçmen karşıtı hareketlerin büyüyen tabanı hakkında önemli bir veridir. 2014 yılında Avrupa parlemento seçiminde % 7.1 oy alabilen AfD, son eyalet seçim dönemlerinde Saksonya'da yüzde 27,5, Brandenburg'da yüzde 23,5 ile seçimlerden ikinci parti olarak çıkmayı başarmıştı.(DW,2019).

Sonuç

Avrupa'da günümüzde 15 milyona yakın Müslüman nüfusun yaşadığı tahmin edilmektedir(Rohe, 2015,s.78) Göçmenlerin değişik dönemlerde farklı statülerde var olduğu AB ülkeleri, son on yılda mülteci sorunlarıyla yüz yüze gelmiştir. 2020 yılı içinde dünyada yaşanan COVİD-19 Pandemi süreciyle birlikte ekonomik ve toplumsal yönden ciddi sıkıntılarla karşılaşan AB ülkelerinin, mültecilere karşı aldığı önleyici tedbirler sıkılaşmıştır. Bu süreçte bu ülkelerde yaşayan Müslümanlar için giderek daha zor süreçler yaşayabileceklerini tahmin ediyorum.

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

JEWISH REFUGEES COMING FROM GERMANY: A STUDY OF NON-MEMBER INVOLVEMENT IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (SHORT PAPER)

Saskia Millmann[1]

League mandate and activity on minority protection

The minority protection system was one of the novelties of the Covenant, the founding treaty of the League. Nevertheless, it was not a universal system. The Committee on New States and for the Protection of Minorities only proposed to establish treaties for certain, mostly newly established, states. Germany, even though it changed its borders after the War, was only included with Upper Silesia.[2] The *modus operandi* of this system enabled private individuals to submit petitions regarding the violation of minority rights to the League Council.[3] In one prominent case concerning the anti-Jewish legislation in Upper Silesia, the topic of Germany's antisemitic legislation was dealt with by the League Council. Unfortunately, the same was not possible for Germany's mistreatment of its Jewish citizens within the country itself. Germany was not forced to sign a treaty on minority rights due to its "high standard in respect to equal citizenship".[4] Indeed, German Jews did not have any minority rights within the German constitution because they were given equal rights (Jewish emancipation) in the German Empire in 1870. This technicality was used as an argument, or rather an excuse, to stay quiet on the matter; furthermore, Germany claimed her internal treatment of Jews were part of the *domaine réservé* and consequently off-limits for any state to comment on.[5]

Nevertheless, the focus of this paper will be the League's reaction and involvement to Jewish refugees coming from Germany, and in particular, how non-members of the League were involved in the matter.

Early Jewish persecution in Germany and migration starting in 1933

The thematic constellation of Jewish persecution, flight, and migration from Germany after the coming into power of the National Socialists has been broadly researched to this date.[6] Within the first few

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[2] Specifically for the protection of Jewish minority rights in Upper Silesia under Nazi rule see: Brendan Karch, 'A Jewish "Nature Preserve": League of Nations Minority Protections in Nazi Upper Silesia, 1933–1937' (2013) 46 Central European History 124.
[3] Roser Cussó, 'The League of Nations and Minorities: The Non-Receivability of "Non-Treaty" Petitions' (2018) 26 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1, 2; See also Graf for an excellent and detailled analysis of the petition system in relation to Jewish minority rights in Upper Silesia: Philipp Graf, *Die Bernheim-Petition 1933. Jüdische Politik in Der Zwischenkriegszeit* (Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht 2008).
[4] Norman Bentwich, 'The League of Nations and Racial Persecution in Germany' (1933) 19 Transactions of the Grotius Society 75, 78.
[5] Fritz Kieffer, *Judenverfolgung in Deutschland - Eine Innere Angelegenheit?* (Franz Steiner Verlag 2002) 42f; For a detailed overview of what would have given the League a mandate to debate and act on the matter nevertheless, see: Bentwich (n 4) 83 f.
[6] Wolfgang Benz, 'Die Jüdische Emigration' in Claus-Dieter Krohn and others (eds), *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933-1945* (2nd edn, 2008); David Jünger, *Jahre Der Ungewissheit. Emigrationspläne Deutscher Juden 1933-1938* (2016); Claus-Dieter Krohn and Andere, 'Zufluchtsländer: Arbeits-Und Lebensbedingungen Im Exil' in Claus-Dieter Krohn and others (eds), *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933-1945* (2nd edn); Jürgen Matthäus, 'Abwehr, Ausharren, Flucht. Der Centralverein Deutscher Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens Und Die Emigration Bis Zur "Reichskristallnacht"' in Claus-Dieter Krohn, Erwin Rotermund and Andere (eds), *Jüdische Emigration zwischen Assimilation und Verfolgung, Akkulturation und jüdische Identität* (2001); Herbert A Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration From Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (I)' (1980) 25 The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 313; Herbert A Strauss, 'Introductions. Jews in German History:Persecution,

weeks, the National Socialists enacted numerous anti-Jewish laws, slowly barring Jewish Germans from public spaces, prohibiting them from working in certain professions, and restricted Jewish students' admission to schools and universities.[7] In 1933 alone, 37.000-38.000 racially persecuted citizens left Germany. In the coming years many more followed. In total, the number of German racially-persecuted refugees ranged between 257.000 and 278.000.[8]

The 'Jewish problem'

Due to the vast numbers of Jewish refugees leaving Germany, neighbouring countries quickly declared a refugee crisis. However, these states, as well as the League as an organisation, did not want to criticise Germany for its internal political decisions openly. League functionaries made sure to only debate the matter as a technical problem which was underlined when the Assembly adopted the resolution in question on 11 October 1933. This resolution requested the Council to nominate a High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and other) while making clear that there would be no funding coming from the League.[9] The German delegation had made sure that this condition would apply, otherwise, they would have voted against the establishment – a move that would have immediately killed the project due to the unanimity voting requirement.[10]

Even after Germany's departure from the League, the status of the High Commissioner was not initially changed. The Commission did not have the mandate to colonize groups of refugees. Consequently, the only organisations with the resources and abilities to help relocate refugees were private organisations. The Commission did, however, negotiate with Governments, co-ordinated the relief work of many private organisations, and participated in private fundraising.[11]

Early on, in 1935 Chairman Lord Cecil confirmed the non-political stance and made it clear, that the Commission was only concerned with the hardship the victims of national socialism were facing – not with the causes of it.[12] Expectedly, the Commission followed the general *raison d'être* of the League to not interfere in internal affairs regardless of how

The first High Commissioner and American national James G. McDonald also negotiated with non-member states (including Germany) to try to ease the suffering of the refugees.[13] Particularly non-member states overseas were McDonald's focus when trying to negotiate resettling and working permits for Jewish refugees coming from Germany. Examples thereof are the United States or Brazil. After McDonald's resignation in December 1935, the resettlement project was, however, seized. Nevertheless, the League changed her stance after this and offered financial and logistical support to

Emigration, Acculturation' in Herbert A Strauss, Werner Röder and Andere (eds), *International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigrés 1933-1945* (1983).

[7] Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich ["Ermächtigungsgesetz"], 24. März 1933, RGBl, Bd. 1933, Teil I, Nr. 25, S. 141; 'Gesetz Zur Wiederherstellung Des Berufsbeamtentums Vom 7. April 1933, RBGl. I. S. 175' (1933) RBGl. I. S. 175; Gesetz über die Zulassung zu Rechtsanwaltschaft, 7. April 1933, RGBl 1933, Teil I 1, S. 188; Verordnung über die Zulassung von Ärzten zur Tätigkeit bei den Krankenkassen, 22. April 1933, RGBl 1933, Teil I, S. 222; Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen, 24. April 1933, RGBl 1933, Teil I, Nr. 43, S. 225.

[8] Strauss, 'Introductions. Jews in German History:Persecution, Emigration, Acculturation' (n 6).

[9] 'Document C.586.1933'; See also: 'Third Meeting (Public, Then Private), Held on 12 October 1933' (1933) 14 League of Nations Official Journal 1610, 1616 f.

[10] Art. 5(1) Covenant of the League of Nations (adopted 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920) 108 LNTS, 188. The French and the Dutch also insisted on these conditions, because they did not want to anger Germany by interfering it its internal affairs. See also: Monty N Penkower, 'Honorable Failures Against Nazi Germany: McDonald's Letter of Resignation and the Petition in Its Support' (2010) 30 Modern Judaism 247, 254

[11] The Office of the High Commissioner, 'Fourth Meeting of the Governing Body of the High Commission for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, July 17th 1935' 6.

[12] ibid 5.

[13] See: James G McDonald, *Advocate for the Doomed: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1932 - 1935* (Richard Breitman, Barbara McDonald Stewart and Severin Hochberg eds, Indiana Univ Press [u.a] 2007).

the successor Sir Neill Malcolm. It furthermore also invited various non-members as well as members to partake in an Inter-Governmental Conference. Ultimately, the High Commission was dissolved on 31 December 1938.[14]

Outlook

The full paper and presentation will give some insight into how vital a formal membership was for participation within the League of Nations and look more closely at the specific work of the High Commission and non-member cooperation in regard to the Jewish refugees. It will further analyse archival evidence collected for this case study, and finally, it will conclude with an assessment of how much engagement and influence of non-member states were present and possible within the League of Nations.

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

TRENDS OF MIGRATION OF SALONIKAN JEWRY IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

Yitzchak Kerem

Salonikan Jewry dispersed greatly throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The paper will focus on periodization and settlement patterns. From 1840 to the end of the 19th century, Salonikan families came with capital, merchandise, and established businesses and institutions in the Old City of Jerusalem and expanded settlement to new neighborhoods in the Western part of the city. At the end of the 19th century and first decade of the 20th century as the Ottoman empire was disbanding, in the face of economic and political uncertainty, and the possibility of forced conscription in light of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, Salonikan Jewish migration ensued to the United States, and much less to Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. When Salonika became Greek, in 1912, migration continued to the USA and England due to Greek troop violence, the large 1917 fire leaving 55,000 Jews homeless and the Venizelos regime shafting the Jews on indemnities, and a 1920 separate electoral college to block Jewish weight in national elections. The 1924-5 anti-Sabbath legislation prompted migration to Eretz-Israel, and after the 1931 anti-Semitic Campbell riots, 15,000 Jews migrated to Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles, France, and 18,000 Jews to Tel Aviv, and Haifa. In the Holocaust 54,000 of 56,000 Jews were annihilated in Auschwitz, Treblinka, and elsewhere. After the war, 4 illegal immigration boats took Salonikan and Greek survivors to Eretz-Israel in 1945-6, and after 3 years of civil war, in 1951 the United States enabled Greek survivors migrate to United States without being included in the Greek quota.

Eretz-Israel

Beginning in the 1840s Salonikan Jews, in families, with religious motivations of living their lives in the Holy Land, migrated to Jerusalem. They came to the Old City of Jerusalem with intentions of leading productive economic lives and strengthening the Jewish Yishuv. Families like Ginio, Nessim, Sarfati, and Elazar came with merchandise and established businesses. They also occupied key positions in the Sephardic community and in 1854 a group of 10 Salonikan Jews established the Misgav Ladach society as a havura (society) for Torah study, philanthropy, and founded a hospital as an alternative to Protestant missionary hospitals (Kashani 1976). From the Old City they were pioneers in settling outside the Old City walls in Mishkenot Sha'ananim and Yamin Moshe, and later in Ohel Moshe in the new western city of Jerusalem.

Salonikan Jews had begun moving to the land of Israel n the nineteenth century. Since the Sephardim had become accustomed to their new home in Salonika, immigration was primarily religious in nature. Before the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Salonika and the territory of Palestine were both under the same jurisdiction, thus making migration easier. The 1840s saw the main migrations from Salonika to the land of Israel, in particular to Jerusalem. In Jerusalem, Salonikan families settled in the Old City and lived in the courtyards. During this time period, the Ottomans did not allow Jews to own land, but did allow them to rent courtyards. Traditionally, Sephardic life was built around courtyards, and the Salonikan Sephardim brought this tradition to the Old City. Families like Marash

and Gino set up businesses, and the latter were noted wine merchants. The Yehoshua families of Salonica were public figures. Gavriel Yehoshua was Rosh Av Beit Din of Jerusalem, his son Yaakov was a prominent historian of Sephardic life in Jerusalem (Yehoshua 1971), and grandson A.B. Yehoshua of Haifa is a prominent contemporary Israeli author. Avraham Ashkenazi, who came to Israel from Larissa, at age nine, became the Rishon LeTzion, the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, from 1869 to 1880.

Unlike after the expulsion from Spain when the Ottoman Empire welcomed Jews to Salonika; starting in 1881, the Ottomans limited Jewish immigration with edicts and prohibitions. However, Jews successfully found means to bypass them. It was after the reunification of Greece that *aliyah* (immigration to the Holy Land) gained momentum.

In 1913, a group of Salonikan young men made aliya to Jerusalem where they studied education at the Lemel school (Kerem 1994, 528). They established the Salonikan commune and each became a personality in the evolving Jewish Yishuv; David Benveniste in education, became a famous geographer and historian on Salonikan Jewry, and head of the Street Names committee for the Jerusalem Municipality for many decades, Natan Shalem was a pioneering professor of geography, and Dead Sea Kibbutz Kfar Shalem is named after him. Moshe Attias in Judeo-Spanish literature researching Judeo-Spanish romances, and worked for the Jerusalem Municipality, and Baruch Ouziel in Sephardic folklore, in Judaizing the port in Haifa, and in the Knesset as the head of the Education Committee from the General Zionist Party. Salonikan law student Asher Mallah in 1908 attained a *firman* from the Sultan to get land in Haifa and permission to build the Technion. Yitzhak Molho in 1919 met with the King of Greece to try to establish a Jewish army in Eretz-Israel and soon afterward established movie theaters and distributed American films in Jerusalem.

In 1920, Moshe and Angel Carasso came and bought land in Tel Aviv and created the Salonica-Israel Limited Company, which invested in buying land in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area. The Asia Minor refugees arriving in Salonika after 1922 reduced the Jewish population from a majority to a quarter and brought with them a vehement anti-Semitic outlook. The Jews lost control of the port, and the Greek newspaper Makedonia incited against the Jews (Kerem 2009, 364-369).

In 1924 in south Tel Aviv, the Florentin quarter, was founded. It was named after contractor Shmuel Florentin, who established the neighborhood and was the leader of the Salonika-Palestina Association, which encouraged Salonikan Jews to buy plots in south Tel Aviv, to migrate there with their families, and set up businesses in the area (Kerem 1994, 528). Many Salonikans began buying lots in Southern Tel Aviv at this time when intentional anti-Semitic legislation in 1924-1925 in Greece banned work on Sunday, which traditionally was a work day for the Jews, and compelled Jews to either break the Sabbath in order to work a six-day work week or forfeit a days work each week. Cousin David Florentin, was an avid Salonikan Zionist who encouraged aliya, was considered the leader of the Salonikans in Tel Aviv, which, together with his pioneering activities for developing the city, earned him the nickname 'David Palestina' and died in 1940 in Tel Aviv.

1931 there were riots in half the city against the Jews, and the Jewish Campbell neighborhood of port workers and fishermen was burned to the ground. From 1932 to 1938, some 15,000-18,000 Salonikan Jews migrated to Palestine/Eretz-Israel; which they viewed as their major alternative and identified primarily with urban and general Zionism (Recanati 2017, 232-234). They came as tourists and stayed. Most lived in the Florentin and Shapira Quarters of south Tel Aviv. Most of the working class immigrants settled in the Florentin neighborhood. Three hundred port workers came to Haifa in 1933 to lay a Jewish base for the port. Salonikan Jews were amongst other Greek Jews that founded

the moshav Tzur Moshe in 1937. Leon Recanati, former Salonika Jewish community president, established in Tel Aviv a bank for Salonikan and Sephardic Jews which later became the below-mentioned Israel Discount Bank. His brother Avraham, former deputy mayor of Salonika, was a local leader of the Mizrahi religious Zionist movement and the nationalist Zionist Betar youth movement in Salonika and tried to merge both movements, and was active in distributing immigration certificates. He also was a leader in the Greek Zionist Federation and a world Revisionist Zionist leader (Recanati 2017, 135-138). He was in the First Knesset with the establishment of the Jewish state as a Herut representative.

After making aliyah in 1934, Avraham Recanati played an important role in supporting Greek immigrants upon their arrival to the land of Israel (Recanati 1986, 511-524)..In order to increase Aliyah, the Federation sought alternative measures to help hundreds immigrate. Salonikans made aliyah in illegal ways through fictitious marriages and adoptions – with the cooperation of Greek authorities who provided documentation (Kerem 1994, 528). Many youth traveled to Israel in groups as tourist – both on their own and sent by the group Maccabi – and remained. In 1931 Keren Ha-Yesod began an initiative to rebury Moshe Konfinas, Greek parliamentarian and organizer of Greek Jewish agricultural settlement un the Sharon region, in Tel Aviv. Over 350 Jews came for his funeral and stayed. Many of these newly arrived Jews settled in Florentin in Tel Aviv (Kerem 2002, 181-191).

Salonikans helped establish Tel Aviv and the Judaization of ports in the land of Israel. While the first seamen who made aliyah settled in Akko and Haifa during the 1930s, it became clear that Arab opposition was fierce. Furthermore, during the Arab riots and boycott of the Jewish Yishuv in 1936, the Arabs closed the ports of Jaffa to Jewish seamen as well as to immigration. These events dramatically highlighted the need for a Jewish port. And in the same year, the Salonikans began building a port in Tel Aviv. Their efforts were relatively limited, as during this time the British Mandatory government wanted to appease the Arabs who strongly opposed a Jewish port next to Jaffa. Finally, with little equipment and few boats, the Tel Aviv port was opened in 1936. Jews slowly started to remove the embargo. A clubhouse for fishermen was built in Tel Aviv, and named after the above fervent Salonikan Zionist leader David Florentin (Recanati 1972: 366-371). In 1938,in the midst of the 1936-1939 riots Haifa's ports, there was a lot of work in Tel Aviv; a fact which boded well for those trying to establish a Jewish port there. Shipping companies began moving from Haifa to Tel Aviv; the port in Haifa was only rejuvenated after World War II.

The new immigrants retained a sense of community in the land of Israel and particularly in Tel Aviv in the Florentin neighborhood as well as in other neighborhoods. Through their savvy business sense and dedication, many Salonikans were able to create jobs for their fellow Sephardim as well as lasting institutions. One of the most well known of these is the Israel Discount Bank, which was started in 1935 by the above Leon Recanati, Moshe Carasso, Yitzhak Aroesti, and Joseph Alvo (Kerem 1994a, 528). The bank provided jobs for thousands of Greek Jews and after the creation of the State of Israel, it became an important economic institution for the fledgling country.

After the Holocaust, some 1,000-2,000 Salonikan survivors settled in the Tel Aviv area. Most of the men had been deported to Auschwitz/Birkenau and later the Warsaw Ghetto. After returning to Greece, which after the Holocaust seemed like a nightmare and living graveyard to the survivors, Eretz-Israel was their only option albeit illegally, but community members had migrated to the old Yishuv for almost 500 years; it was a tangible migratory option. Four illegal immigration boats brought Salonikan and Greek Jews to Eretz-Israel in 1945-6. The passengers of the last boat the Henrietta Szold on August 12, 1946 fought the British in Haifa Bay and were deported to Cyprus. In December they were permitted to migrate with certificates.

United States

As the Ottoman Empire was breaking up in the late 19th and early 20th century, Salonikans began to migrate to the United States (Naar 2007, 445), and Latin America in lesser numbers. These motivations were for economic betterment and prosperity. The Salonikans established the Sephardic Brotherhood initially as a burial society, but it evolved into the umbrella organization of the Sephardim and Eastern Jews in the New York area (Naar 2009, 73). The organization had 3,000 Salonikan members in addition to the other Balkan Sephardim and Jews from the Arab world. The Salonikans wanted to unite the Sephardi, but insisted on control and thus divided the Sephardim; hindering them from developing Jewish schools and strong Sephardic alliances. The Salonikans established synagogues in New Brunswick, New Jersey, the Lowe East Side, Harlem, the Bronx, and in the Midwest in Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and in the West Coast in Los Angeles (Papo 1987, 269-300). In New Jersey, numerous Salonikans were of socialist background and worked at the Michelin tire factory in Rariton, NJ, but their socialism faded rapidly (Naar 2009, 68). The community was also actively Zionist and conscious of Sephardic identity, and supported a Judeo-Spanish press.

Salonikan and Greek Jews who returned to their homes in Greece after the Holocaust, had to fight in the Greek army for 3 years in the Greek Civil War against the Communists in the mountains. In 1951 the United states allowed them to migrate to the United states as Holocaust survivors from Greece and not part of the general Greek quota. Naturally, they were eager to take advantage of the opportunity for more normal lives without mandatory military service. Some 1-2,000 Salonikan Jews migrated to the USA. In Queens, New York, they established their own synagogue, and in Los Angeles, they supplemented the Salonikan Wilshire Boulevard Tifereth Israel synagogue, and there established their own card club. Enclaves of Salonikan survivors also settled in Detroit, Montreal, Chicago, and Seattle.

France

Salonikans since the mid-19th century had been exposed to European modernization and French education. The Jewish Salonikans sympathized with the ideals of the French Revolution of liberty, equality, and fraternity. They admired French literature, and spoke French in public in Salonika as their primary external language; while retaining Judeo-Spanish at home. Salonika had an active Alliance Israelite Universelle French Jewish school system since 1873 with some 8 schools with more than 6,000 pupils.

With the advent of modern French Jewish and general French education in the Ottoman Empire and the modern nation states of the Balkans in the second half of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century, migration to France was an attraction for Jews from Salonika and other parts of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The educational system of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, Lycee Francaise, and the Catholic Freres and Soeurs created a new middle and upper class of Sephardi Jews educated in the free professions, and Western European commerce, who viewed France as a beacon of liberalism and opportunity. France also attracted the poor and lower classes of Balkan Jews, who also learned spoken French in the street, in work, and within the Jewish communities and similarly were lured to France with its financial opportunities.

In the 1920s and 1930s more than 15,000 Salonikan Jews migrated to France and had enclaves in Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles. In Paris, the poor lived in the 11th arrondissement, the middle class lived in the 9th arrondissement, and the 16th arrondissement was a home for the affluent and the wealthy. Salonikan Jews established synagogues in the 9th and 11th districts, and a three story card club in the 16th district.

In Paris, the first Ottoman Jews from Istanbul, Salonika, and Izmir settled in the 11th arrondissement in the Roquette quarter. However, their organization l'Association cultuelle orientale Israelite de Paris was established in 1909 in faubourg Montmartre since the officers who were large-scale wholesalers lived in the latter quarter (Benveniste 1989). In 1913 a synagogue was established on rue Popincourt in the 11th district. Most of these Jews were poor. The Ozer Dalim assisted the poor, and Oel Moshe, founded in 1924 by soldiers who fought in WWI, was a burial society. The Association de la Jeunesse Sepharadite de Paris, created in 1930, had a branch on Boulevard Voltaire. Rue Sedaine was a center for commerce and had numerous fabric stores owned by Balkan Sephardim. Middle class Salonikans settled in the 9th arrondissement around rue Lafayette in the 1920s and onward (Benveniste 1990, 211-218). They established synagogues on rue Cadet and near the train station on Rue St. Lazare. The youth group Bene-Mizrah was founded in 1925 on rue Richer in the 9th district. In 1930, the rabbi of the Portuguese synagogue on rue Buffault created the organization Protection de l'Enfance Sepharadite. In a rare instance of Sephardi unification, in 1930, the l'Association Cultuelle Sephardite de Paris was formed when three organizations merged: l'Association cultuelle orientale, l'Association salonicienne, and l'Association des Levantins, who were centered in the 10th district. It was headed by the Chief Sephardi Rabbi N. J. Ovadia (Benveniste 1999, 168-175).. The affluent Jews, mostly Salonikans lived in the 16th district, and many of them had fashion houses on Avenue Victor Hugo near Champs Elysee. The Salonikan Jews also had a three-floor card game and dinner club in that vicinity. The Salonikan Sephardic leaders, Edgar Abravanel and Dr. Vidal Modiano, were active in the 1930s and afterward in the World Sephardi Federation. Modiano would be the leader of French Jewry in the 1960s. Egyptian Jews, many of whom were of Greek and Turkish origin or extraction, began migrating to Paris by the thousands in 1956, settled in the 9th arrondissement, and established a synagogue there also.

In 1940, the Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews, who mostly were in Paris, but they also were situated in Marseilles, Toulouse, and Lyons in sizeable numbers, numbered some 35,000, about 10% of French Jewry. The Salonikans numbered some 15,000, and the Turkish Jews numbered between 10-15,000.

The Nazis sought to eradicate this community and deportations of Salonikan Jews to Auschwitz were organized by the Nazis in Marseilles and Paris between July and November 1942 (six months before the first deportations of Salonikan Jewry in Salonika in mid-March 1943) (Azses 2006, 219-253).

There were two major deportations of Salonikan Jewry in France in an effort to annihilate the Jews of this special Sephardi community. The first deportation took place in Paris in November 1942; almost half a year before the first deportation in Salonika. On November 5, 1942, 1,060 Greek Jews were arrested in the Paris area. On November 9th, 896 Sephardi Jews, mostly Salonikans, were deported from Drancy to Auschwitz (Amipaz-Silber 1995, 158). In the same deportation there were 47 Turkish Jews and 28 Jews from elsewhere in the Mediterranean. In the transport from Drancy to the Sobibor death camp on March 23, 1943, there were 997 people; mostly Salonikan Jews; but also families from Xanthi, Greece, and Jews from Algeria. Some 10,000 Sephardi Jews were sent from Drancy to Auschwitz from March 27, 1942 until August 17, 1944. Most of them were Greek Jews.

Numerous Salonikan Jews resisted in the south of France, and Eric Allatini and his wife were caught, and never returned from the death camps (Amipaz-Silber 1995, 200).

Conclusion

Salonikan Jewry migrated to the Holy land as families in the mid and latter 19th century. As economic and political turmoil confronted the Ottoman Empire, at the beginning of the 20th century Salonikan Jews began to migrate to New York and elsewhere in the USA as well as England. In

response to hostile Greek rule in 1912, migration continued into the 1910s and the 1920s to Eretz-Israel. In the 1930s, as agitation increased due to the Asia Minor refugees and the massive 1931 Campbeell riots, mass migration ensued to France and Tel Aviv. Most of Salonikan Jewry was annihilated in the Holocaust, but illegal migration to Eretz-Israel was in motion in 1943-1944 and then when survivors returned from the camps in 1945-46. After 1951, Greek migration to the USA emerged when Greek Holocaust victims could migrate outside of the Greek quota.

In the USA Salonikan Jewry organized for burial and in small congregations outside of New York throughout the country. In Paris, the poor Salonikan Jews settled in the 11th arrondissement and the middle class in the 9th arrandissement. In both districts they established Salonikan synagogues. The wealthy settled in the 16th arrondissement, but were not religious.They also settled in Lyons, and Marseilles. Most of the Salonikan and Greek Jews were deported to Auschwitz from France and did not return. In Eretz Israel between the two world wars, Salonikan settlement was significant in Jerusalem as pioneers in Sephardic culture, and general education. In the 1930s, the Salonikan Jews established themselves in the Florentin and Shapira neighborhoods, set up synagogues, self-help societies, and a dynamic club. With the Holocaust survivors, they set up significant cultural and commemoration organizations, research initiatives, and Sephardic Holocaust commemoration.

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NEUTRALISING "DIFFERENCE BY SILENCE", "CHOOSING TO REMAIN PERIPHERAL": XENOPHOBIA, MARGINALIZATION AND DEATH IN ITALIAN SCOTTISH MIGRANT NARRATIVES OF WORLD WAR II

Manuela D'Amore

Introduction

My grandmother had shown a considerable foresight. […] Her constant mantras were: 'Never speak loudly in Italian; we are guests in this country'; 'Learn from those you see around you'; and 'Please, please take British citizenship'. She as did many others, knew how important it was for Italians to be as invisible as possible… to be aware at all times that they were incomers; that things could turn at any time. As she put it: *Di lavor in n'ora*, God works in an hour. And on the night of the tenth of June, he did. On the eleventh of June, and all through the following night, every Italian household across Scotland and Britain was raided by police. (Pia, 2017, p. 32)

Taken from Anne Pia's *Language of My Choosing. The Candid Life-Memoir of an Italian Scot*, this passage clearly refers to the tragic events of 10th of June 1940. Mussolini had just declared war on Britain, so the War Cabinet immediately took severe measures against the Italian migrant community in the country. Joe Pieri, a first-generation Italian Scot and the author of several memoirs and autobiographies, confirms that the effects of the government's nationalistic policy were more strongly felt in Scotland than in the rest of the country (Pieri, 2005, pp. 93–94). Major cities such as Edinburgh and Glasgow were struck by rioting and violent episodes, which clearly shows that the region had long been pervaded by a deep anti-Italian sentiment.

Italian Scottish narratives explain that this sentiment had both religious and economic roots (Contini, 2006, pp. 252-254; Pia, 2017, p. 32). The immigrants' determination to continue to follow Catholicism and their popular traditions had hindered their integration process, and in particular their success in the catering industry had never been accepted by the local population (Colpi, 2015). It was clear that Churchill's order "Collar the lot!" would dramatically increase the level of tension between the two communities.

In point of fact, as soon as they were officially labelled as "enemy aliens", they were spied on, insulted and persecuted. Evidence of the strict measures that were adopted by the British government to prevent the formation of a "Fifth Column" – also the presumed Fascists' 'survival techniques' – can be found not only in a few dense historical accounts (Sponza, 2000; Chappell, 2017), but also in migrant literary works. Written by authors such as the above-mentioned Joe Pieri, Ann Marie Di Mambro, Anne Pia and Mary Contini, these works provide a vivid description of the British persecution and deportation of the Italians, while ideally contributing to the 1940-2020 celebrations in the UK.

From *Italophobia* to Deportation and Death: Silence and Resilience as 'Survival Techniques'

We shall thus start from Lucio Sponza's account of the Cabinet meeting of 11 June 1940. Following Italy's entry into the war, Churchill had already instructed the Home Secretary to proceed to a 'round

up' of male Italians between 16 and 70 years, to the internment or deportation of 1,500 "professing Fascists" (Sponza, 1993, pp. 125–127), also, most importantly, to numerous "aliens restrictions" (Ugolini, 1991, p. 119). Imposing strong limitations on individual liberties, these latter immediately resulted in the reduction of Italian shopkeepers' working hours, which made the entire community poorer and more isolated.

Despite the sudden changes in these men's and women's lives, Italian Scottish narratives generally focus on the tragic events of the night of 10th June 1940. The police raided most urban centres in the region and made hundreds of arrests; as for Italian shops and businesses, they were severely damaged or destroyed. First performed at the Traverse Theatre in Edinburgh in 1990, and published for a larger public in 2002, Ann Marie Di Mambro's *Tally's Blood* re-enacts the terror that most Italians experienced as "enemy aliens" in Scotland. Verbal violence and racism were of course part of those nightmarish hours:

> MOB: Get the bastard. Waste the place. Fascist pigs. Greasy Tallies. / ROSINELLA: (*Whispers*) Massimo … please … don't do anything. Please, please. (*Jeers continue.*) / MOB: Come out and fight, you bastarding Tally! / ROSINELLA: Oh Sant' Antonio. San Giuseppe. (*Massimo makes to go to the door.*) / MASSIMO: I can't just stand here and do nothing. / ROSINELLA: Massimo … no! Don't leave us. (*She holds on to his arm as the mob breaks into front shop: we see their silhouettes carrying sticks and stones. We see and hear the smashing up and the jeers*) / […] / MASSIMO: I need to go. I need to see what they've done to my shop. / […] / (*Massimo returns, looking defeated*) Eight years' work gone in eight minutes.
>
> (Di Mambro, 2002, pp. 65–66)

This extract – which is taken from Act I, scene 12 – is probably one of the most powerful literary representations of the sudden change in the Italians' condition of life. For Pieri, they had always been «the Pakistani immigrants of [their] day» (1997, chapter 1, para. 18), but now – at the outbreak of a new world war – they were victims of aggressions and racist slurs such as «Tally Bastards» (Pieri, 1997, chapter 2, para. 5), «Italian traitors» (Contini, 2006, p. 360) or «dirty Ities» (Pia, 2017, p. 32). Sadly enough, the British police never lifted a finger to protect them (Pieri, 1997, chapter 3, para. 10; Di Mambro, 2002, p. 67).

Thus, following the government's new "alien restrictions", most Italian men were arrested and deported to the Isle of Man, to Canada or Australia. Again, the pain and sense of terror that they felt is represented in Joe Pieri's *Isle of the Displaced: An Italian Scot's Memoirs of Internment in the Second World War* (1997). The following extract shows that the whole Italian migrant community shared his same experience:

> 'Are you Joe Pieri?' I could not deny it. 'Get some things together and come with us'. On the night of June 10 there was hardly a family of Italian origin in Britain, irrespective of social status or political leanings, which did not suffer the summary arrest of their men in the age bracket intended [from 16 to 70] and indeed in some cases outside it.
>
> (Pieri, 1997, chapter 3, para. 16)

A first-generation Italian Scot, Pieri also wrote about the years he spent as an internee on the Ile Saint Hélène in Canada. His detailed account includes the descriptions of the prison of the Police Station in Maitland Street in Glasgow, of the war camps of Woodhouselea in Scotland and of Warth Mill in the North of England, also it recounts his exhausting transoceanic journey on *The Ettrick*. Rewriting his own story fifty years later, he finally considered himself lucky: *The Ettrick* had left the port of Liverpool on 2nd July 1940 – only one day after the tragic sinking of the *Arandora Star* – and

he, together with the other 1,500 internees, had finally reached Camp 43 in Canada.

Today very few scholarly studies are dedicated to British PoW camps (Sutherland & Sutherland, 2012; Hollingsbee, 2014). This part of the twentieth century seems to have been deleted from official reports, which shows that migrant literature can also reveal the darkest sides and events of the Second World War. The tragedy of the *Arandora Star* is one of them: Anne Marie Di Mambro included it in her play on the Pedreschi family; more recently Anne Pia's *Language of My Choosing: The Candid Life-Memoir of an Italian Scot* (2017) has included the figure Emilio Rossi, the author's grandfather, who drowned after a German U-boat spotted the *Arandora Star* and fired.

Although Pia never knew her grandfather, she used poetry to remember the 446 Italian migrants who lost their lives "off the West Coast of Ireland" (2017, p. 43; see also Paolini, 2015). The following lines are taken from the poem titled *Italian Odyssey*:

> Mother for all ages, taking to her belly, / all seven hundred… sellers of ham, sweeties and flowers, / her dance room is soft with boys and men / the air stale with uncertainty.
>
> Then at some time around seven am, / a last fling of a passing German boat / a torpedo, the spider's bite / a danse macabre in full fatal swing, / the sliding slowing / he holds a brother, a first in twenty years, / 'Jump! Jump', / but there had been no sea in Lazio, / he stands erect, overcoated, elegantly poised.
>
> The stranger's arrival is swift.
>
> (Pia, 2017, p. 43)

Italian Scottish migrant literature is generally made up of 'hybrid' forms of prose: the reason Pieri, Contini and Pia generally combine prose with verse, pictures, drawings and Italian recipes is that they want to share their true perceptions of their origins and show the strategies that their community adopted to survive in the war years. As Ann Marie Di Mambro shows in *Tally's Blood*, the Italians had always followed the rules and urged the younger generations to speak only English (Di Mambro, 2002, pp. 24–25); as for Joe Pieri, he claims that in 1940-1945 its members hid themselves in suburban areas, while continuing to work hard in their chip shops, cafés and restaurants. Although there were subtle forms of «xenophobia that pricked the skin a little» (Pieri, 1997, chapter 2, par. 7), they «[i]nstincively knew it was safer to give their captors least cause to react, not to let them know what they were thinking" (Contini, 2006, pp. 381–382).

«Neutralis[ing] difference by silence […] and choosing to remain peripheral» (Pia, 2017, p. 60) was thus Italian immigrants' only way to 'survive'. As prisoners of war, on the contrary, they were strong enough to create a sense of community within the British camps, which greatly helped them to defend their rights and to live a sustainable life. Pieri in particular always believed that his experience in Camp 43 had positively contributed to his personal growth even from a purely cultural point of view (1997, chapter 15; see also D'Amore, 2020, in press).

Aftermath and Conclusion

However traumatic, the end of World War II unexpectedly caused a considerable improvement of Italian migrants' conditions of life in Scotland. Pieri and Pia confirm that, due to the painful experiences that they shared with the local population, in 1943-1945 there was a growing sense of social unity (Pieri,

2005, pp. 132–133). From that moment on, cultural and linguistic difference became an added value. The following extract is taken from Pia's *Language of My Choosing*:

> I am grateful to a friend, Beth, who, when I told her about this book, said, 'I sometimes wonder that the Scottish Italian community wanted to stay on here post war. I remember my mum talking about the horror of what was done [and] I am glad the Italian Scots did stay. Scotland is greatly enriched by the Italian community'
>
> (Pia, 2017, p. 41)

Rich in socio-historical significance, Italian Scottish migrant writing now deserves full recognition. Its 'hybrid' literary prose and verse have revived some of the darkest memories of the 20th century, while showing that the new generation of Italian Scots could finally feel accepted and socially integrated. In post-Brexit times, authors such as Joe Pieri, Ann Marie Di Mambro, Anne Pia and Mary Contini will continue to promote respect for transcultural otherness in Britain and on the Old Continent.

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GÖÇ EDEN SÖZCÜKLER

Mehmet Azimli

İslam medeniyetinden Batı dillerine göç eden birçok kelime bulunmaktadır. Müslümanlar Endülüs'ü[1] ve Sicilya'yı[2] fethettikten sonra doğudaki bilgiyi Avrupa'ya tanıtarak, buraları bir ilim merkezi ve bilimin batıya aktarılmasında bir köprü vazifesi görmesini sağlamışlardır.[3] Batılılar bundan faydalanmak ve Arapça öğrenmek için Avrupa'dan birçok insan eğitim görmek üzere bu bölgelere akın etmişlerdir. Bu süreçte hakim bilim dili Arapça'dan Batı dillerine bir çok kelime geçmiştir.[4] Örneğin sadece İspanyolca'da 7 bin kadar Arapça kökenli kelime bulunmaktadır.

Bir diğer misal verirsek; bugünkü Sicilya'da kullanılan dilde binlerce Arapça kelime bulunduğu gibi, yakındaki ada olan Malta adasında ise halen Arapçanın bir lehçesi konuşulmaktadır. Batı dillerine geçen Arapça kelimelerin bir kısmı medeniyet üstünlüğünden dolayı kullanılan eşyanın isimleri, bir kısmı da çeşitli alanlardaki ilmi terimlerdir.[5] Bu bilim ve sanat transferi sırasında Arapçanın özellikle hakim olduğu bölgeler olan güney İspanya ve İtalya'da etkisi dikkat çekicidir.[6]

Günlük hayattaki İtalyanca'daki kelimelerden ve isimlerde kullanılan nispet "ya"sından da anlaşılabilir. Ayrıca misal olarak, transfer olmuş kelimelerden bazılarını verebiliriz. Zehra (gül) kelimesinden zagara, merc (çayır) margin, şebeke (ağ) kelimesinden sciabica, rıtl (ölçü) kelimesinden rotolo, kantar kelimesinden cantaro, kafiz (ölçü) kelimesinden cafizu, ğuraf (oda) kelimesinden garaffu, divan kelimesinden dohana, kabil (kablo) kelimesinden cable, funduk (otel) kelimesinden fondaco, defter kelimesinden defetari, kelimeleri Sicilya'da kullanılmaktadır. Bu konuda gerek yer isimlerinden gerek şahıs isimlerinden birçok örnek verilebilir. [7]

Kelime göçünün önemini öğrenmek istiyorsak; İngilizce'de bulunan Arapça kökenli sözcüklere bakmamız meseleyi anlamamıza yardımcı olacaktır. Batı dillerine geçen kelimelerin bir kısmı medeniyet üstünlüğünden dolayı kullanılan eşyanın isimlerinin bir kısmı da çeşitli alanlardaki ilmi terimledir. Endülüs ve Sicilya'da Müslümanlar hâkimiyetlerini kaybettikten sonra bile İslam medeniyeti etkisi sönmemiş günümüze kadar bu etkiyi sürdürmüştür. Mimari, kılık-kıyafet gibi konuşma diline de tesirleri yansımıştır. Doğu medeniyetinin Batı medeniyeti üzerindeki etkileri başta İngilizce, İspanyolca, İtalyanca gibi Avrupa dillerine geçen Arapça kökenli sözcükler üzerinde çok rahat görülebilir. Bugün Dünya dili olan İngilizceye baktığımızda kimya ve astronomi, matematik kavramları, ticari kavramlar, meyve ve ağaç isimleri ve birçok eşyanın Arapçadan geçtiğini görüyoruz.

Örneğin; X sembolü

10. yüzyıl İslam alimlerinin matematik üzerinde uğraşırken, çözmeye çalıştıkları değişkenler için Türkçede "bilinmeyen" anlamına gelen "şey" sözcüğünü kullanmış olmalarıdır. İslam coğrafyasından

[1] S. M. İmamuddin, *Endülüs Siyasi Tarihi*, çev. Yusuf Yazar, Ankara 1990, 29.
[2] İhsan Abbas, *el-Arabu fi Sıkıllıyye*, Beyrut 1975, 34.
[3] Abdurrahman Bedevi, *Batı Düşüncesinin Oluşumunda İslam'ın Rolü,* çev. Muharrem Tan, İstanbul 2002, 12.
[4] Bkz. Ahmet Tevfik el-Medeni, İşraku Envaru'l-Medeniyyetu'l-İslamiyye Ala Avrupa Min Ceziretu's-Sıkılliyye, Cezair, 1980, IV, 346.
[5] Haydar Bammat, *Garp Medeniyetinin Kuruluşunda Müslümanların Rolü*, çev. Avni İlhan, İstanbul 1966, 69.
[6] Otto Spies, *Doğu Kültürünün Avrupa Üzerindeki Tesirleri*, çev. Neşet Ersoy, ATO Dergisi İlave Yayınları, No: 8, Ankara 1974, 6,7.
[7] Mehmet Azimli, Tarih Okumaları, Ankara 2016, 98.

gelen bilimi Avrupa dillerine çevirmeye çalışan Orta Çağ İspanyol alimleri, "şey" sözcüğünü İspanyolcaya çevirmekte zorlanmışlardır, çünkü "ş" sesi İspanyolcada bulunmamaktadır. Buna bir süre çözüm bulamayan alimler, nihayetinde klasik Yunan dilinden "kai" bağlacını (görselde görülüyor: ϰ) veya "chi" (χ\chi*χ* veya χ) harfini ödünç almışlardır. Görebileceğiniz gibi kai bağlacı da, Yunancada eğik bir xx*x* harfi gibi yazılmaktadır.

İşte "şey" sözcüğünün İspanyolcaya doğrudan çevrilememesi, klasik Yunancadaki kai harfinin İngilizceye çevrilirken görünümünden ötürü xx*x* olarak alınmasıyla matematiğin meşhur "bilinmeyen sembolü" ortaya çıkmıştır.[8]

Şehir isimleri; Porto, Madrit, Malaga, Bari, Fatıma, Nezare gibi örnekler etkinin gücünü gösteriyor. Bu bildirimizde İngilizceyi esas alarak bilinenlerin dışında kendi tesbit edebildiğimiz bazı kelimelerin tahlillerini yapmak istiyoruz. Bunu yaparken semantik açıdan diğer batı dillerine de zaman zaman müracaat edeceğiz.

الضامن Admin moderatör-garantör yönetici

فرج, fortune, com-fort, unfortunately-birlikte rahatlık

وجه, face, facebook-yüz

برك, park- berketme, tutma, engelleme

كروان, caravan-kervan, ardı ardına eklenen

وستار vestiyer- vestiyer

الوعيد avoid- kaçınma, korkutma

زن jinokoloji- kadın, kadınla ilgili bilim

صراط Street-cadde

توام twin- ikiz

كهف cave- mağara

فردوس paradise-cennet

جنس jeans-asil

بي by, by bus =bi'l-hafile- ile

مقاليد quality-kalite

حبل cablo-kablo

روى river-nehir

شريف sheriff-şerif, lider

هو he- o

فتر after- sonra

جلس close-oturum, celse, culus, klozet

كفر discovery- örten, kafir

ارزل العمر alzimer- unutkanlık yaşı

[8] https://evrimagaci.org/matematikteki-bilinmeyen-olarak-kullanilan-x-harfi-nereden-geliyor-4883

قلوب club- kalplerin birleştiği yer

تا to… farsça- e.. kadar

از as farsça- gibi

ضعف Deaf, deafly- sakat oyuncular

رفض refute refuge-dışlanan muhacir, Rafizi

ثمن Somon- besleyici

نصر nasara insurance- yardımeden garantör teşkilat

مِنْوال minval- meanwhile- bu konu etrafında

مَالٌ أَمْوَالٌ mal, emval mall- eşyanın satıldığı yer

جمع cemea come küme, topluluk

غلاف ğalefe glove kılıf

سِمْسِم semsem, sisame susam

اخْرُجْ uhruc Exit hruc-malta- çıkış

عبس abese Abuse , asık surat

قضاء el kaza Accident, aniden olan kaza

تَارْزِي Terzi, Dress terzi

اِقْلِيم İklim klima- iklim klima

Daru sına arsenal ataruzana darsena, gemi yapım yeri

عَافِيَة Afiyet Appetite afiyet

حِرْفَةٌ Hirfet craft carpet- yetenek maharet halı

ورَاء verae, Over- ötesi

جُرْمٌ cürüm, criminal- suç

رِزق rızk, risco, risque- kontrol edilemeyen gelişme, nasip

سَفَرٌ sefer (İbranice) zıfr- sıfır

penç(farsça) pounc- beş, pençe, pençşenbe, kedi patisi

Pide- Pizza

Avariyye, Average ortalama hesap Arapçada yiyecek vergisi

مخزن mehazin Magazin – depo, Rus blokunda halen dükkan ve depo olarak kullanılıyor

مَاكِنَةٌ Min kanet, machine Makine

عبد abd obed itaat

شرب scrub-şurup

Kil clay, çamur

şımarık Smart

daring farsça During-esnasında

سَبْت sebt Samedi ctesi

إليز جنة Cennetül Elize Şanzelize Elize'nin Bahçesi

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ETHIOPIAN-ISRAELI WOMEN IN ACADEMIA: A GENDER EQUALITY PLAN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE[1]PROJECT

Adi Binhas[2] and Hana Himi[3]

Colonial imagery as the precondition of possibility.

`People here, when they hear about Colombian women they think about whores´4. -

Dana Colombian woman. 30 years old. 19 years residing in Spain-

Latino migrant women exist in a given state of things, that is, a postcolonial[5] global order. It would make no sense to even speak about Latin America or Europe outside the socio-historical process that led to the building of these geo-cultural regions and the identities that developed in between them. The migratory experiences of Latin American women are affected by macro-politics since they are conditioned by the particular way in which they are represented in the collective imagery of the countries they migrate to. These `national imageries are colonial because they relate to the colonialism imposed by Europeans, and notably Spanish and Portuguese, on the landscapes and the people of (present day) South America (Quijano, 2014).

The main characteristics of Latin American migratory flows, their direction South-North, their growing feminization as more women face the adventure of migration on their own, their very pre-determined opportunities of incorporation in the labour markets of destination countries… have all to do with the economic neoliberal turn (Sassen, 2003), but also with the sexist/racist stereotypes associated to Latino women's identity from the dominant discourse of the 'white mythologies' (Young, 2004).

History is incorporated (Bourdieu, 2004 [1980]) in the bodies of Latino migrant women as they are marked by coloniality. There is a link between situations of exploitation that Latin American migrant women currently face in European receiving societies and the exploitation they suffered during Colonial times (Quijano, 2014). It is not by chance that *Latinas* are 'seen' as hypersexualized brown skinned women, working either as submissive domestic employees or often, as prostitutes. Names have

[1] The mentioned project 'CHANGE - CHAlleNging Gender (In)Equality in science and research' has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 787177. The project is coordinated by the Interdisciplinary Research Centre for Technology, Work and Culture - IFZ (Austria), further partners are: Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen (Germany), Universidade De Aveiro (Portugal), Zilinska Univerzita V Ziline (Slovakia), Nacionalni Institut za Biologijo (Slovenia), Fraunhofer Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung der Angewandten Forschung E.V. (Germany), Beit Berl College (Israel). More details can be found here: https://www.change-h2020.eu.

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[4] All the verbatim quotes in this paper are excerpts from the interviews conducted with Latino migrant women in Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom between 2017 and 2019. Original quotes in Spanish and Portuguese have been translated into English by the authors; the brevity of the paper does not allow for the inclusion of the quotations in the original languages which detracts from the richness of the participants' expression.

[5] The term 'postcolonial' is used here in the way that Stuart Hall (2008) does, 'post' means a continuity, never a rupture.

meaning and have consequences (Crenshaw, 1989).

> *I suffer racism, not only because I am Black, but because I belong to a 'special class of Blacks'. I am a Brazilian and here that means that I am hot and ready for having sex with no matter who, because of course if I am here it is because I am a prostitute looking for a British husband to get me the papers […] I teach at University but that does not fit with what people expect of Brazilian women, so when I tell them they simply cannot believe it.* - Catarina, Brazilian woman. 36 years old. 7 years residing in the United Kingdom.

Dirty jobs

In the capitalist world, who you are is defined by what you do, the identity of the self and the group is produced and reproduced through the daily performance of paid and unpaid work (Sennett, 2000). The activities that racialized women were forced to carry out in the *casa grande*[6] as domestic servants, are currently reproduced in the figure of the migrant domestic worker that makes up the global care chains (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003), or rather, 'racialised care chains'. She is also obliged to clean the dirt of rich others, to look after their children to the detriment of her own children; forced to sell her love and attention to the Capital in exchange for her survival and that of those she has 'left behind'. The sexual accessibility to the bodies of Black, Indian and Mestizo women that white men enjoyed in the colonial context - implicit in the master / servant contract (Davis, 1983) -, the social legitimacy to harass, rape and mistreat them, till lingers in Western societies when dealing with Latina women, in and out of the sex industry.

Ideas about the 'natural' exploitability of Latinas were born from the hierarchies that colonialism spread among people through the constructs of races and then, nations (Segato, 2015). Underlying public attitudes towards Latino migrant women, there is an echo of a 'collective right of appropriation' from the European receiving societies over these women and over the products[7] of their work, related to the extreme inequality distinctive of the colonial system.

> *Because they see you come from abroad, they think they have the right to exploit you, that they can do to you no matter what, that one has to stand everything - Diana, Colombian woman. 32 years old. 13 years residing in Spain.*

Hospitality establishments, cleaning and domestic services, and prostitution are fundamentally the working sectors where many Latin American women fall when they migrate to Portugal, Spain or the United Kingdom (McIlwaine et al. 2011; Oso y Catarino, 2013). In the best of the cases, they can also be found leading small businesses related to beauty or hairdressing, but no other opportunity seems to be open to them, regardless of their educational background, professional training, or time of residence. The fact that many women are systematically ascribed to these jobs, is an issue of race and gender (and of class certainly) that is embodied in their passports. A participant expressed it in these words:

[6] The spanish expression to refer the master´s house.

[7] When referring to women's production, it is important to note that, in recent times with the emergence of the neoliberal regime, again the sons and daughters of impoverishment women can be appropriate by powerful others, sold and bought in the global markets, in what it is euphemistically called surrogate motherhood.

> *In Brazil I was a nurse, I worked in public health System. Here I do domestic work. That´s the way it is… I have no papers; I do not exist here […] I live terrified by the idea of being deported.*
>
> *-Teresa, 37 years old, 2 years in the Portugal.*

For Latin American women, there are some borders within migration processes that are even harder to cross than those of the nation-state, and the hardest one seems to be that imposed by the colonial identity.

Love/sex trade

What occurs in the labour market also happens in the sex/love sphere. The position that Latino women are ascribed, from the publicity of prostitution houses to the privacy of the married couple's bedroom, is meditated by their colonial identities.

As Adriana Piscitelli (2008) calls it, the "ethnic sex appeal" built in the intersectionality of nationality, race, gender and sexuality results in a 'naturalized attribute' that is very appreciated by Western men who consume women through prostitution. However, it is also a very valued attribute in the marriage market as these women are expected to "combine sensuality with other features, performing the image of the sweet spouses, domestic, willing of motherhood' so that 'men understand the relation with those women as an opportunity for recreating old patterns of masculinity with the additional advantage of profiting of a particular style of sexuality" (Piscitelli, 2008, p.269).

Hence, Latin American women are seen as 'husband stealers' by many local women, thereupon, they are always under suspicion. If they start a romantic relationship with a local man, it is common to discover concerns among the man's friends and family in relation to the sincerity of the woman's intentions. They are accused of having hidden interests, usually of economic or legal nature.

> *When my mum started dating my father, I think my father's family didn't like it that much, in the village as it is a small place you can imagine what they said… that my father had met my mother in a club […] when my brother was born things got better but we don't visit them so often anyway. -Mariela, Colombian woman. 30 years old. 19 years residing in Spain.*

In addition, for these migrant women, finding 'true love' during the migration project is usually a shared hope. In this sense migrant and local women are alike; neither the local, nor the migrants are able to escape the patriarchal myth of romantic love (Jonasdottir, 1993). But again the particular situation of these women can lead them to become trapped in an abusive relationship with local men, whom, furthermore, they also tend to consider less sexist than the men in their countries of origin.

These women usually migrate alone and though they may have children, they are usually single or divorced (Oso & Catarino, 2013; França y Padilla, 2018). For many of them migration is also an opportunity to evade a failed relationship and the wish of being loved, especially in the loneliness that marks this kind of migration pattern, might become a trap.

A relationship with local men can improve migrant women's situation in some aspects. Sometimes

the rapport to men is the only way to fulfil certain kinds of needs; as Mercedes Jabardo once affirmed[8] "only women with great amounts of power can avoid having a husband or children". But for migrant women it is even more dangerous than for locals to engage with men, cases of gender violence in mixed relationships are not the exception, and to flee from an abusive relationship is more difficult for migrant women who do not have their rights recognised, even when they have a regular status, and, above all, when colonial imagery operates through all the spheres of society to justify violence against *Latinas*, or in the best of the cases to discredit them.

Despite Latino migrant women make up different strategies to resist the stereotypes that constrain their daily experiences in Western societies, agency, as it is described in the fashionable discourses that abound in current gender studies, is hard to put into play in 'real life'. Though it occurs, women´ resistance is always limited by powerful structures and the improvements they get are marked by extraordinary amounts of suffering.

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SAFE MOTHERHOOD AND SAFE FERTILITY AMONG TURKEY'S SYRIAN WOMEN

H. Yaprak Civelek* and Dicle Koylan**

Introduction

In the twentieth century, various opinions on birth phenomenon are encountered including views that saw birth practices and belief as reflections of undisputedly accepted cultural patterns, but also views, who defined birth as a field in which the production, reproduction and resilience of culture emerge and the need to evaluate all these historically within the context of a unique political and economic relations, appear. (Van Hollen , 1994) However, birth in its simplest form is a phenomenon. Fertility simply refers to the frequency of live births. Consequently, the issue of "safety" based on birth, fertility and motherhood came to the fore.

"Safety" which is established through pregnancy, birth and motherhood, is about achieving a success because performing quality care during childbirth, prenatal and postnatal care guarantees the emergence of a healthy generation of a nation. (Erkaya-Balsoy, 2015). The patriarchal planning that proceeds in this way, continues to present motherhood as a "sacred achievement", fulfilling a necessity in reinforcement for the continuity of "national" domain of existence in every date and condition. The individual production that motherhood naturally includes is considered as the long-term guarantee of the sustainability of the nation's geography, population and identity. (Civelek, 2019). Undoubtedly, Anatolia is a cultural geography where all these approaches are generally active; the processes of childbearing and raising children is determined and dominated by patriarchal dialogues based directly on the ancestry and dignity of the man / husband. (Civelek, 2015).

It is known historically that fertility declines in the population are perceived as shrinkage of national wealth and domination areas. Fertility has declined in the western world for an average of sixty years. In recent years, demographers have drawn attention to the conditions created by aging (aging), which is the result of the decrease in birth and the increasing life expectancy at birth, and as a result, warnings about future anxiety in political discourse have increased. One of the solutions here can be seen as filling the demographic gap by accepting international immigrants, in some sense, supporting immigrant mothers.

However we observe that the European Union countries and others show resistance especially at the borders against the asylum seekers and refugees who come to their border en masse due to the war and conflict environments in the countries of origin. The basis of this resistance is the treatment based on the holiness and sustainability of the 'national' field. These groups that Noji sees (2000:25) as the most helpless, vulnerable and precarious groups of immigrants, after leaving their homeland, they are constantly exposed to risks in terms of living conditions, marginalization, sexual abuse, chronic diseases and health services.

As for the Republic of Turkey, aiming to raise the citizen who cares about Turkish identity,

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tradition, national symbols and nationality, power discourse to increase the number of children is in the foreground. Following the admission of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey, *(We should also indicate that Syrian immigrants in Turkey are not in refugee status but given temporary protection status as forced immigrant)* although it is thought that they can integrate with Turkish society since they are actually Muslim and they are considered within the scope of patriarchal discourse, the rates do not indicate that.

In Turkey, only 13 percent of the population believes that the Syrian forced immigrants could integrate into society, Demir (2015:11,12,22). About 60 percent of Turkish citizens see these forced migrants as a problem for the preservation of their culture. The fact that they are considered as excess baggage in terms of health and education services, economic concerns, the spread of the Arabic language, security concerns, depreciatory comments on their high fertility, and criticism of the domestic population's foreign migration policies have a big share on this percentage. And this perception sufficiently hinders the visibility of common religious and cultural features. (Demir, 2015: 13-15, Civelek, 2019: 400, 410).

It is also necessary to draw attention to the vulnerability of immigrants and refugees to citizenship rights. And according to Foucault "immigrants deprived of citizenship rights were inevitably perceived as a foreign body that had to be "assimilated" or expelled, depending on the situation." (Foucault, 2002: 174-175). When it comes to the status, fertility and fertility preference of the Syrian woman, it is twice as sensitive and difficult battleground in the face of a common consciousness devoted to the decisive link between birth and the nation.

The supportive indicators for the argument of this study are provided by Turkey Demographic and Health Survey - Syrian Migrant Sample (TDHS-2018-SMS) held by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies in 2018. [1]The data is based on face to face interviews with 2.216 married women who are between 15-49 in total, coming from 1.826 Syrian households established in the camps or out of the camps. It is necessary to evaluate the fertility experiences of the Syrian female population without detaching them from the effects of migration.

When talking about the phenomenon of immigration, it is impossible not to mention the fact of insecurity. Granville-Chapman demonstrates that refugee women, due to the fear of the perpetrators, their families or possible reaction from the community and due to their insecurity that they will be treated fairly and properly by authorities, hide their experiments. It is not always easy to find out real experiments that Syrian refugee women are having.

Number of Syrian women in Turkey, constitute 46 percent of the current total number of refugees(1,653,597) according to figures Association for Refugees[2]. Approximately 1.8 of the Syrians live in camps. The rate of women of reproductive age (15-49) in the total number of women is 49.2 percent. The rate of Syrian children under the age of 10 is 29 percent.

Among Syrian immigrant women, those registered legally with temporary protection status can benefit from the services provided by public hospitals free of charge. According to Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD)'s data, more than 30 percent of these immigrant women, some of them in deprivation areas that can lead to abuse, cannot receive health services because they are illegal, as a result of being informal. (Genç ve Öztürk, 2016:75-85).

We know that in 2016 the Migrant Health Centers established in regions where the refugee population is more than 20,000 , are working to facilitate access to health services. In these centers,

[1] Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tnsa2018/rapor/2018_TDHS_SR.pdf
[2] Association for Refugees , https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/

one of the main services is determined as woman-birth-child and doctor, midwife, nurses and other support staff were assigned.

In this study, we have tried to use the examination and discussion opportunity provided by TDHS-2018's the fertility and maternal and child health data on Syrian women within the scope of safe motherhood. In the published report, safe motherhood with the variables of women who received antenatal care from a doctor, births at home, women who gave birth with the help of a doctor, women who received postpartum care within four hours after birth[3] are presented. We have also considered the issues of maternal and child health assessment in the context of the number of births, fertility rate, breastfeeding, maternal nutritional status and social conditions as determinants of a safe maternity cycle, especially after forced migration.

In fact, safe motherhood is one of the main concepts of reproductive health, and it corresponds to a holistic care provided to ensure that all women of reproductive age have a healthy and safe experience in all stages of pregnancy and childbearing. Using family planning methods, being pregnant, birth and motherhood are culturally determined areas of experience. Living these experiences as a Syrian migrant under high fertility rates in a challenge increases the likelihood of double labeling. Understanding how much the required level of well-being and to what extent daily life supports women through reproductive health is the idea that determines the methodology of this study. It should be accepted that the subject cannot be completed with positive science discussions in a purely medical or purely demographic perspective, but requires an interdisciplinary imagination.

TDHS-2018, Safe Fertility and Safe Motherhood Evaluations Based on Syrian Immigrant Sample (SIS)

According to the research report (2019), 78 percent of Syrian migrant women who answered the questions are married. 96 percent of them live outside the camps. During the study, the rate of women between the ages of 20-24 who declared that they were married before the age of 18 or lived with a spouse is approximately 45 percent. 19 percent of married women between the ages of 15-49 have dropped out of primary school or have no education at all. 47 percent of them were primary school graduates, and 14 percent were high school and above graduates. In general, the average education period of Syrian women participating in the research is between 5 and 9 years. One of the touching results of the research is that birth intervals do not differ according to the education level of the mother. The birth intervals of women with no education or who have not completed primary school and women with high school or higher degree are almost the same; It has been calculated as 28 years. When the median age at first birth is calculated between the ages of 25-49, it shows that Syrian women are generally being mothers at the age of 21. Birth intervals are essential as they carry the risk of maternal and infant deaths to higher levels if they involve short periods, so they are considered as an element for safe motherhood. Approximately 38 percent of Syrian children were born at intervals shorter than 24 months, defined as critical.[4] In this study, we establish our argument by participating in the idea of separating safe fertility, from safe motherhood but we believe that it would be a mistake to completely deny the determinant relationship between safe fertility and safe motherhood. The primary reason that reveals the need to be treated separately is the need to evaluate the combination of migration and fertility as a different experience. For example, according to Ihlamur-Öner (2014), the impact of emigration on women is vital because their mental health is badly affected by forced migration and the obstacles they face in accessing health services bring many risks related to pregnancy.

[3] Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, p.XV http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tnsa2018/rapor/2018_TDHS_SR.pdf
[4] http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tnsa2018/rapor/2018_TDHS_SR.pdf,

Determining birth intervals depending on the social, cultural, environmental and political conditions that affect pregnancy itself is also an important issue. The most special environmental condition here is undoubtedly the existence of a complex re-socialization area brought about by being a forced migrant; It is a life style that can be based on social acceptance and conflict at the same time in a mutual relationship with the local population.

For the number of births, as the data show, when we consider the nearly ten-year period, it is possible to say that Syrian women give at least 230 to 240 births each year. The average number of surviving children of women who are currently married is 3. It has been understood that only 3 percent of women in the 45-49 age group have no live births. The total fertility rate is 5.3 children per woman between the ages of 15-49, and it is understood that there are mostly wanted pregnancies. The baby mortality rate is 22 for every thousand babies, and the under-five age mortality rate is 27, and of course these values indicate high mortality levels that require regulation and intervention. Thus, safe immigrant women births and motherhood practices open up a new area of medical liability and obligation for a state with new material, physical, socio-cultural factors. According to Orgel and Aydin, Syrian women in Turkey have problems integrating with the daily life of the local community and health can be an effective means of reaching these women because they have significant problems with motherhood especially at a young age and losing a baby.[5] As a matter of fact, according to the SIS report, the decrease in early childhood mortality compared to five years ago can be explained by the improvement in access to prenatal and postnatal health services and activities.

The process of accessing health services and activities should be evaluated within the processes we have explained as socialization and integration in sociology. The main approach in this evaluation is that it should be informed the migrant women at risk of pregnancy or already pregnant, about face to face and attentive health services. According to Fitzgerald (1995), for a woman, the stress, uncertainty and ignorance brought about by an emigration experience indicates an environment of cultural rupture. In such a rupture or a sense of emptiness how strong and healthy transition can be guaranteed within the "liminality" which is well-known expression of Van Gennep (1960) and Turner (1987) At this point, we can easily observe that liminality - state of being neither here nor there - can be established in two ways: The first difficult rite of passage is the migration itself, the second is the pregnancy process. The subject under the pressure of two transitions at the same time is actually alone with a communitas with limitations.

According to the results of the SIS, most of the Syrian women of reproductive age who had a live birth in the last five years before the study received quality prenatal care, 7 percent could not receive this care for their last birth. While most births take place in medical establishments, 69 percent of newborns were able to receive care within the first two days after birth. When we look at these numbers in terms of the above ideas, we can understand that the sterile environment, which is the representation area of social integration or being an 'average person', is still striving to progress towards identification and communication, in a sense, in reaching health institutions and services by migrant women. However, we can say that they have not reached the same level yet in terms of postnatal care, especially newborn care. The fact that there are deficiencies in high fertility, high infant mortality and prenatal post-maintenance, keeps safe fertility level on debate.

Our argument that we've tried to develop above considering Syrian high birth and infant mortality in Turkey, surplus of adolescent birth, is the necessity of transforming strange, threshold and anxiety environment in which Syrian women in Turkey have been experiencing at every stage of birth, to an

[5] www.sivilsayfalar.org/2019/05/18/kadin-doktorlardan-gebelik-okuluyla-entegrasyon/

ideal,sterilized and holistic environment.

In TNSA-SIS, 2018 report, we see that while 43 percent of women of reproductive age use any contraceptive method at the time of the research, only 24 percent of them use modern methods. On the other hand, more than 20 percent of women do not want another child for two reasons, such as opening the gap and ending giving birth, but they not protected by any method. This high rate which is determined as the *unmet need for family planning* by demographers, is generally associated with the difficulty in accessing family planning services.

Women received prenatal care to a large extent, and had a satisfactory high rate of birth experiences with a doctor compared to home births. However, we also see a decline in postnatal care among women who have given birth in the last two years. 20 percent of babies are below 2.5 kg. However, when the mothers were asked about their personal perception of the weight of their babies, 8 percent defined their baby as "very small" and 15 percent as "smaller than average".

Regarding mother's nutrition, 60 percent of Syrian migrant women were stated to be overweight or obese, and 43 percent were in the underweight category according to body-mass index (BMI). Especially 92 percent of women in their late reproductive years are overweight. The report clearly shows that women face a lack of energy and malnutrition due to inadequate food intake, unequal distribution of food within the household, poor food storage and cooking condtions, food taboos, infectious diseases and neglect. Undoubtedly, this situation puts the healthy and long-term experiences of fertility and motherhood practices at risk.

As can be seen, both safe fertility and safe motherhood for forced-migrant women are ultimately affected by the political, social, cultural and psychological determinants they are in. Their reproductive health is also determined within the limitations of a liminal life brought about by forced migration. Effective delivery of reproductive health services, formation of dialogues on gynecological diseases, pregnancy and childbirth care are extremely important for this vulnerable population. So with the safe motherhood issue among Syrian immigrant women in Turkey, healthcare professionals should act away from marginalization but with transcultural service knowledge and understanding.

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THE PERCEPTION OF KOREAN SOCIETY TOWARDS FEMALE MIGRANTS OF CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES

Jungmin lee

Introduction

The local autonomous entity started to organize the marriage for bachelors from a rural area in the early '90s in Korea. The government encouraged them to get married to women from Southeast Asian countries including Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia to support the group of bachelors to keep their legacy and to foster the population increase in the rural area. Since then, a large number of women flushed into South Korean society and this new tendency yields the social phenomenon from cross-border marriage. According to the *Korean Social Trend 2008*, cross-border marriage had faced the turning point in 1992 when the establishment of diplomatic tied between South Korea and China (Yoon, 2008) [1]. Especially, the *choseonjok*, , Chinese ethnic minority group, immigrated to South Korea to being married Korean bachelors. After the 2000s, the number of cross-border marriages had significantly increased and the countries of origin of the immigrant women had also diversified. In 2005, cross-border marriages composed 13.6% (Korea National Statistical Office, 2019)[2] of the overall marriages in Korea. The media started to cover cross-border marriage as a subject of social issue in the Korean society. The problem of buying a bride, domestic violence, the integration problem of foreign women, and running away after obtaining Korean citizenship have been stereotyped and portrayed through the media. Until now, the dysfunctional aspects of cross-border marriage have been highlighted more than its proper functional aspects. These biased media outlets are not the recent tendency but developed and continued during the history of cross-border marriages in Korea. This marriage started after the Korean War when the U.S Army base stationed in Korea. The military camp town had been constructed and the Korean residents in camp town relied economically on this army base. The women in economic crisis were flushed into this town for prostitution, and were called *yanggongju* (western princess). For them, marrying an American soldier was one of the approaches to escape from their difficult economic situation. According to the *Korea Social Trend 2008*, from 1950 to 1964, around 6000 Korean women had emigrated to the U.S as brides of American soldiers (Yoon, 2008)3. The news media focused on the situation after this marriage and how they are miserable in their marriage life with foreign husbands by representing there situation as "lost their hope and return to their land." (Chosun Ilbo 23rd July 1954)4. Since the Korean War to today, the media does not concentrate on the cross-border marriage itself but rather emphasizes the representation of the women who choose to emigrate/immigrate to other countries. In the context of this social phenomenon, by chronologically

[1] Yoon In-Jin. (2008). Growth of International Migration Population: a foreign worker and Married Immigrants In National statistical Office, annual report, *Social Trend 2008,* p.27 Retrieved from http://kostat.go.kr/sri/srikor/srikor_pbl/3/index.board
[2] Korea National Statistical Office (2019), *Dynamic Statistics of Multicultural Population 2018*, Retrieved from https://www.kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/kor_nw/1/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=378479
[3] Yoon In-Jin. (2008). Growth of International Migration Population: a foreign worker and Married Immigrants In National statistical Office, annual report, *Social Trend 2008,* p.27 Retrieved from http://kostat.go.kr/sri/srikor/srikor_pbl/3/index.board
[4] Anonymous. (1954, 23 July). The Crowd Leaves to Other Countries to Find Unknown Happiness, *The Chosun Daily*. Retrieved from https://newslibrary.chosun.com/view/article_view.html?id=975719540723m10221&set_date=19540723&page_no=2

analyzing the articles of media; Korean daily newspaper Chosun Ilbo (The Chosun Daily), from 1952 to today, this paper defines how the media outlet represents the female migrants of cross-border marriages in Korean society.

Cross-border marriages after the Korean War

Compared to other countries, the ethnic homogeneity is considered as an essential notion in Korean society. Passing through the history of invasions and the war in Korea, from the Japanese colonial era to the division of Korea into the north and south, the word *Minjok* (ethnicity in Korean) carries a strong meaning that has kept Koreans unified and solidarized during times of national crisis. Ethnic Homogeneity is of fundamental identity of Koreans; an identity that helped rally the nation and its people in times of invasion and war.

This particular significance of ethnicity is also found in the news report about the current situation of the cross-border marriage. It described the reason of this type of marriage as " The children and women who lost the homeland that fed, clothed and took care of them are leaving in a strange place trying to find a new protector, new parents, new husband and looking for the unknown happiness after Korean war" (Chosun Ilbo 23 July 1954). In this sentence, we can see the women's position under the two perspectives, ethnicity and patriarchy. First of all, women are described under the patriarchy perspective and they were put into the same position as children who need someone to take care of them. The leading subject as a protector is the homeland, parents, and the husband. On the contrary, women are not independent entities who compose the nation and family, but they are subordinate beings, positioned under the influence of their husbands. Secondary, the article utilizes the term "homeland (*Choguk* in Korean)" instead of the nation. This term connotes importance of one's ethnicity. The Korean dictionary defines homeland as "the land where the ancestor lived from generation to generation"[5] ("Documentation," n.d.). But the act of looking for a new husband and parents gives an image of a traitor of their own ethnicity. And also, the frustration of post-colonial era and post Korean war had been emerged. The homeland had been identified with husbands and parents. The frustration of nation which could not protect their own people had been transmitted to the frustration that men couldn't protect their wives. They, however, blamed the Korean women in cross-border marriage about this frustration and the crisis of the position of Korean men. This blame is represented as "vain women" and they warn about the failure of cross-border marriage (Chosun Ilbo 17 November 1953) [6]. These negative descriptions of Korean women had been presented continuously from the Korean War to the 1990s when the new tendency of cross-border marriage appeared.

Buying a bride

Before the 1990s, the articles about cross-border marriage had been represented with the frame of divorce, deprivation, prostitution, and crime. But after the 1990s, the radical change of socio-economic states brought the change in the distribution of population between urban and rural regions. The bachelors were faced with a phenomenon of Korean women avoiding marriage with them. This contributed greatly to cross-border marriage. As Korean bachelors in the rural areas struggled with their socioeconomic status within the Korean society, we can assume that the Korean bachelors might have received social bias just like how the Korean female migrants did. With this, there was a shift in

[5] Documentation (n.d.). *Dictionary of Korean Standard Language* Retrieved from https://stdict.korean.go.kr/search/searchView.do

[6] Anonymous, *Chosun Ilbo* 17 November 1953, The Report of Growing Number of Cross-border Marriage introduces the phenomenon of cross-border marriage and described the women as below:
"Since the independence of Korea, the U.S Army substantially influenced Korean Women. After Korean war, this phenomenon increased and there are a lot of women who live together with American soldiers in Korea or who go to America. So the majority of them are in a miserable situation losing their hope and come back to their land. So those vain women should be realized."

how the media portrayed men who chose foreign women as their wives, and these women immigrants were highlighted more than their husbands.

The bias toward Korean women in cross-border marriage had been shifted onto female immigrants. In the beginning, the majority number of women were from China. But the marriage market had been expanded in the 2000s, the nationality had been diversified. From 2003, marriage between Korean and Vietnamese increased sharply6 and marriage broker agencies were drawn greatly to the cross-border marriage market. This led to the emergence of marriage brokers helping men purchase a bride for get married. The women were treated as an imported product. The news report of "The Era of 10% Cross-border marriage" (Chosun Ilbo 22 March. 2005) covers the tough life of Vietnamese women in Korea. In this report, migrant women as a purchased object are represented as "The in-laws don't trust 100% the bride whom the husband paid for (Chosun Ilbo 22 March 2005)7". Additionally, the women are classified by their origins with distinct features. For example, in the report about the increasing rate of marriage with Vietnamese, the given reason for this tendency was: "The Vietnamese women are obedient and can easily fit into Korean Culture Culture That's why people prefer Vietnamese. Also, a lot of marriage agencies are focusing on the Vietnamese market"[8]. (Chosun Ilbo, 21 October 2004). The patriarchy perspective still functioning as criteria for choosing their wives. This perspective is important to maintain traditional family modality in rural areas. To keep their legacy and manage their family efficiently, obedience is an important quality they seek for. There is a clear disparity between husband and wife within the structure of a family with female migrants positioned inferior to their husbands.

After the Multicultural Families Support Act had been enacted in 2008, the descriptions of female migrants as a purchased object were decreased. Now, the media shares the efforts of the government and the local communities trying to integrate those women into Korean society. Nonetheless, they still emphasis more the economic situation and social position of immigrant women than those of their husbands.

From the 1950s, female migrants in the Korean society were an expression of frustration during the post-colonial era. Today, the migrant women reflect crisis of rural area in industrialization. The female migrants are the reflection of crisis and frustration of critical situations in socio-economic changes. Therefore, these migrant women were targeted for blame. Negative repeated media exposure led to the development of a biased social perception on them.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "BELONGINGNESS" IN THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS: A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION ON REFUGEES' SOCIAL INCLUSION FROM A CROSS-REGIONAL PERSPECTIV

Aoi Mochizuki

Introduction

The large-scale displacement of Syrian refugees that has occurred due to the Syrian Civil War since 2011 has had a huge impact globally. Currently, according to UNHCR statistics, more than 5.6 million refugees have been forced to escape to various parts of the world, including neighboring countries of Syria. The largest host country for Syrian refugees is Turkey, where around 3.6 million Syrian refugees have lived. Lebanon (around 884,000 people) and Jordan (around 658,000 people) have also become major host countries for Syrian refugees. Refugees are still unable to return to their homeland and are forced to endure daily difficulties in host societies.

There are various evacuation destinations, and people are scattered all over the world by being dependent on the connection of their belongingness such as relatives, lineage, religion and ethnicity to decide their destination. It is not just the Middle East that has been affected by the huge flow of Syrian refugees. From around 2014 to around 2016, a large number of refugees headed for Europe, which became a social problem called the "refugee crisis." In the European Union (EU), Germany and Sweden, which have accepted a number of refugees and asylum seekers historically, made a declaration to welcome Syrian refugees from a humanitarian perspective in the autumn of 2015. On the other hand, many countries, especially EU member states in Eastern Europe, have shown a passive response to accepting newcomers, and this conflict has shaken the solidarity of the EU over sharing the burden of accepting refugees. In addition, the rise of Islamophobia and the extension of far-right political parties proclaiming an anti-immigrant stance have become serious social problems in many European countries.

In this way, the Syrian refugee problem has often been dealt with as a very political issue, so there are big differences in refugee policies from country to country. The living environment of the host society depends largely on the immigration and refugee policies of the government. Many researchers have discussed the Syrian refugee problem from various research fields and research angles. What needs to be discussed is the question of what facilitates the social integration of migrants in general and refugees in particular. In the discussion of refugee acceptance, differences in the characteristics of the host societies have not been deeply studied.

Eghdamian (2016) argued that Syrian refugees who belong to religious minority groups experience difficulty and isolation stemming from their religious identity while living in their host society in the Middle East, that is, Jordan. From the perspective of "belongingness," for Syrian refugees, most of whom belong to Muslim groups, it is crucial that their cultural and religious belongingness is guaranteed in the host country, as an important issue for their survival. In this report, I will introduce the cases of Germany and Sweden, which are the major host countries of Syrian refugees in Europe, and the case of Jordan to deepen the discussion of the Syrian refugee crisis from a cross-regional perspective.

Additionally, I will focus on the relationship between immigration and refugee policies in each country, as well as the welfare state regimes.

Koopmans (2010) compared European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) to analyze how their respective integration policies and welfare regimes influence immigrants' social integration. According to him, in countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, which have a well-developed welfare state and adopt multiculturalism, separation of residence has occurred between immigrants and locals. Based on such research results, the validity of multiculturalism has been questioned.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I investigate how Syrian refugees survive and rebuild their lives in their host societies. Second, I focus on the issues related to their belongingness as crucial issues Syrian refugees have faced. These discussions are based on qualitative research. Between 2017 and 2019, I conducted fieldwork in six major host countries (Jordan, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK) and interviewed Syrian people living in these countries' urban areas, mosque officials and NGOs.

Refugees' social inclusion and belongingness (1): The case of Jordan

Most Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, have not ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Refugee Convention). Refugees who have fled to these countries are therefore left in an unstable legal position, unable to apply for treaty recognition under the convention. Although the UNHCR cooperates with such host countries to provide all kinds of assistance for refugees, there are still many problems to tackle within the Middle East, such as creating refugee legal status and offering work qualifications. In other words, there is no official regional refugee protection system, despite many refugees having fled to this area. Although the Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries was signed by the Arab League in 1994 to build a refugee support system in the Middle East, it is a still-pending treaty.

Furthermore, the reason the refugee problem in the Middle East is complicated is that there are many urban refugees. Unlike refugees living in camps, being managed by international organizations and NGOs, refugees living in urban areas have become a part of the host society, and it is difficult to get a picture of their reality and the dynamics of their daily lives. In recent years, the UNHCR and others have come up with policies that try to consider urban refugees, but refugees are not fully provided with sufficient support because the number of refugees is very large, and not all refugees are registered with the UNHCR. As a result, many urban refugees in the Middle East have lived for a long time without access to stable legal status, employment, educational opportunities, health care and social security.

This report is based on a field survey in Amman, the capital of Jordan. From the results of the survey, it is clear that religious ties, especially to Islam, have functioned as a complementary support for rebuilding the base of existence for Syrian refugees in Amman. For example, Shaikh (a senior personality in the locality) performs refugee-support activities in the region and helps refugees stabilize their spirits through religious practices.

Refugees' social inclusion and belongingness (2): The cases of Germany and Sweden

On the other hand, Germany and Sweden have developed welfare regimes and have historically accepted many refugees. These two countries also showed a positive attitude toward accepting Syrian refugees during the refugee crisis. However, is it possible to think of these two countries as refugee-

friendly countries? Similar to what Koopmans (2010) pointed out, my field survey results show a difference in the separation of residential areas between Berlin and Stockholm. How can this be explained?

To answer the questions, first, I focused on the historical formation of the two countries' immigration and refugee systems. By clarifying the immigration policies of Germany and Sweden since World War II, this paper described the differences in the modern-day character of the host societies between both countries. Next, it showed the regional efforts to include refugees in host societies using the results of the field survey. The efforts are due to cultural and religious belongingness. Here, it is pointed out that around 2015, the mosque engaged in refugee support activities as part of activities aimed at cooperation and dialogue between regions.

Conclusion

In this paper, I considered the social inclusion of refugees from the cases of three countries. Although the paper describes that refugee belongingness is a key element, it became clear that religious belongingness, such as Islamic solidarity, plays a complementary role in the scene of refugee support. Above all, in Jordan, where government support is inadequate, Islamic complementation plays a major role.

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

THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES AND WESTERN BALKANS: MAIN COOPERATION AREAS ON MIGRATION ISSUES

Baya Amouri*

Introduction

In recent years, there has been growing recognition that effective management of international migration and its impact defies unilateral action.[1] Despite the differences existing between the regions, the Visegrád Group (V4 group, consisting of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and western Balkans countries could be considered as partners rather than rivals when it comes to dealing with migration issues.[2] The cooperation between the regions is old, but the European Migrant crisis that accelerated in 2015 created a new ground of cooperation. The paper will be conducted in an empirical qualitative manner based on the official approaches of the V4 Group and western Balkans countries towards the European migrant crisis. In doing so, it will cover the official documents includes the period from early 2014 to November 2019.

First, the paper will give a general overview of the V4 Group's approach to the European migrant crisis. The group stood against the open-door migration policy, which is based mainly on the protection of external borders. From the V4 group's perspective, this can only be achieved with closer cooperation with the western Balkan countries. Indeed, the so-called 'Western Balkan route' is composed of two migratory flows: one from the Western Balkan countries themselves and another of migrants having entered the EU (Bulgaria or Greece) via Turkey by land or sea. While this route includes several countries like Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, the paper will concentrate exclusively on Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia Slovenia, and Serbia.

Second, the paper will demonstrate the various approaches adopted by the Western Balkan countries to deal with the European migrant crisis. The findings show that the EU-western Balkans countries' response differs from the non-EU-Western Balkans countries. In the context of the highly differentiated and fragmented approaches landscape, the V4 group saw on the cooperation with the Western Balkans countries a key solution to overcome the migration issues. For this reason, the paper, in its third part, will draw attention to some of the cooperation aspects between the V4 countries and the western Balkans.

The Visegrád Group's Approach to European Migrant Crisis

Despite the undeniable existence of a common migration policyconcerns and interests, which function as strong link bonding the V4's member states, one could also identify a series of different approaches. However, in the present paper, the difference between the four countries will be neglected, and the V4 group will be seen as a unified collation, because it is mainly the only group within the EU

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[1] Martin, S. (2011). International cooperation and international migration. In: Hansen, R., Koehler, j., Money, J. (ed.) *Migration, Nation-States, and International Cooperation.* London: Routledge,128-131.

[2] Liptáková, J. (2009) The strategic importance of V4. *SME* [online]. Available at: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/other-articles/the-strategic-importance (Accessed: 7 August 2020).

that adopts an anti-migration policy.[3]The V4 group's approach basically stood against the open-door policy.

Accordingly, the migration policy of the V4 group in the context of the migration crisis can be summed up in three main points. First, the V4's migration policy was standing against internal border closing and against the idea of a mini-Schengen.[4] Second, the group advocated the reform of the Dublin Regulation and promote the concept of "flexibility" or "effective solidarity" as a comprehensive strategy for asylum and refugee in the V4 group in particular and in the EU in general. Initially, the V4 group is in favour of maintaining the voluntary nature of EU solidarity and the creation of other alternatives to manage the migration crisis.[5] Third, the V4 group's migration policy was based on the protection of the external borders of the Schengen area. In this context, the group has repeatedly stressed that it is necessary to bolster the cooperation with Western Balkan countries in the area of migration.
It is worth noting that, the V4 countries were conscious that the issues arising from the European migrant crisis cannot be solved without cooperation with the countries that are part of the so-called Balkan migration route.

Before demonstrating the main cooperation areas on migration issues existing between the two regions, the V4 countries and the western Balkans, it is worth looking briefly at the Western Balkan countries' approaches in the context of the crisis.

Western Balkan Countries at the Crux of the European Migrant crisis: One Crisis and Different Approaches

Western Balkan countries have 'felt the weight of the migrant crisis.' Thus, 2015 was a turning point as these countries had to face a massive and unexpected arrival of large numbers of people they had never experienced. This created a sense of powerlessness since the control and management of the large human flows were difficult. That burden was heavy, particularly on four of the countries in the region – Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia – which became a part of the Western Balkan land route for refugee arrival into the EU. At this level, the question arises, how the western Balkan countries handled with the influx**.**

From the very beginning, it's wrong to put all the western Balkan countries in the same basket, keeping in mind that while Croatia and Slovenia are part of the EU, Macedonia and Serbia are not. Thus, the crisis demonstrated that there is a difference between the approaches adopted by the Western Balkans countries. The Position of an EU member state was not the same as non-EU member states.

The Croatian approach

Since the beginning of the European migrant crisis, the Republic of Croatia as a member state on the EU external border was not perceived as a target country but as a transit country.[6] Although there was a lack of political consensus in Croatia as to how to deal with the asylum seekers[7], the Croatian approach revolves, mainly, around a central idea: the responsibility and alignment with EU migration

[3]Nič, M. (2016).The Visegrád Group in the EU: 2016 as a turning-point?. *European View* 15, 281–283.
[4]Szalai, M., Czornai, Z., Graai, N. (2016) *V4 Migration Policy: Conflicting Narratives and Interpretative Frameworks*. Barcelona: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 1-2.
[5]Grimmel, A., & My Giang, S.(2017). *Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis*. New York: Springer International Publishing, 83–84.
[6] Jurlina, P. & Vidović, T. The Wages Of Fear Attitudes Towards Refugees And Migrants In Croatia.(2018). European Web Site on Integration. [online]. Available at: https://www.britishcouncil.pl/sites/default/files/croatia_pop.pdf(Accessed: 8 August 2020).
[7] Buzinkic, E.(2016) The European refugee crisis-the Croatian view. Heinrich Böll Foundation. [online]. Available at: https://eu.boell.org/en/2016/05/26/european-refugee-crisis-croatian-view (Accessed: 9 August 2020).

policy standards**.**[8] Croatia was doing all it could to share the burden and to participate constructively to the European solution, which signified that it referred to EU membership as a framework to deal with the issues resulting from the European migrant crisis.[9]For example, after the closure of the so-called 'Balkan Route*'* on the basis of the agreement between heads of states and governments in March of 2016,[10] Croatia focused on strengthening its border, reception and asylum capacities in order to assure effective control of the longest land border of the European Union.[11]

The Slovenian approach

Slovenia could be perceived as both, a destination country for irregular seasonal migration, and a transit and destination country for asylum seekers and migrants in an irregular situation.[12]Like Croatia, Slovenia was primarily a follower of Europe's migration policies. However, what makes the Slovenian approach, more or less, distinguishable from other countries is its army, which was given more power to face the migrant crisis. The Slovenian Armed Forces were included in this process as support for Civil Protection and Police.[13] Furthermore, Slovenia built a razor-wire fence along its border with Croatia to better control the flow of migrants.[14] Slovenian authorities intended to register every migrant crossing the border with Slovenia and to have control over the movement of migrants in the country.[15] In my view, this is part of the preventive approach adopted by Slovenia. This position is in line with the EU Schengen standards, especially that the fence is located on an internal EU border, and Croatia is not part of the Schengen Zone.

However, the construction of the fence raised tensions with its neighbours, particularly Croatia. To be more precise, the relationship between the two countries comes under tension when Slovenia expressed concerns about the direction of the disorganised migrantion flow to the 'reception points' mutually agreed with Croatia. Slovenia intended to reach a bilateral agreement with Croatia on where that reception would be, which led to some tension. Slovenia blamed Croatian authorities not to cooperate adequately, leaving migrants at non-agreed areas. In the same vein, Croatia sharply criticized Slovenia for building the fence instead of finding ways to find a coordinated response to the refugee crisis.[16]

The Macedonian approach

Macedonia, a non-EU member state, was one of the countries that were majorly affected by the refugee flows towards Europe during the European migrant crisis. Nevertheless, it was not a destination itself, but rather a transit country.[17] Although it is not practically possible for Macedonia to

[8] Croatian National Report On Migration, Sustainability, And Development Of Education (2018).[online]. Available at: https://developtogether.eu/documents/outputs/national-audit-reports/Croatia.pdf (Accessed: 9 August 2020).
[9] Draženović, I., Kunovac, M., - Pripužić, D. (2018) Dynamics and Determinants of Migration – The Case of Croatia and Experience of New EU Member States. [online]. Available at: https://www.hnb.hr/documents/20182/2101832/24-dec-drazenovic-kunovac-pripuzic.pdf (Accessed: 9 August 2020).
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[15] Ducaru, S., Nițu, L., Margvelashvili, M. (2019).*Black Swan Events on NATO's Eastern Flank*. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 81.
[16]McLaughlin, D. (2015)Slovenia riles Croatia with border fence to 'direct' migrants. The Irish Times.[online]. Available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/slovenia-riles-croatia-with-border-fence-to-direct-migrants-1.2425838(Accessed: 13 August 2020).
[17] Macedonia: A transit state for refugees https://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/04/14/macedonia-a-transit-state-for-refugees/

play a leading role in managing this crisis, the Macedonian government made a couple of interventions on its border with Greece, trying to manage and control the flow of refugees as a reaction to criticism and pleas coming from some EU.[18] Already in a deep internal political crisis since 2014, the approach of the Macedonian authorities to the European migrant crisis was disorganised, just like the highly incoherent EU approach to the crisis.[19]

The Serbian approach

Serbia, an EU candidate country since 2012, was among the most affected transit countries on the 'Western Balkan route'. Despite several institutional and legislative deficiencies, the Serbian response to the European migrant crisis has largely been perceived as a positive.[20]Generally speaking, Serbia followed more or less a humanitarian approach.[21] It adopted short-term measures to respond as best as it can. In 2015, the government adopted a plan for addressing the issues related to the mass influx of migrants, aimed at defining the human, financial and other measures, activities and resources needed to ensure migrants with accommodation and access to their rights. The government has shown willingness to follow a common EU approach and take part in the EU quota system for refugees. It also has stressed the need for a uniform regional approach to the definition, rights, and benefits of refugees.[22]

It appears clearly that the responses of the western Balkan countries were diverse. The dynamic is not the same in each country, and the basis for the response to the crisis is not necessarily driven by the same concerns. EU-Western Balkans and non-EU Western Balkan countries do not have the same approaches, strategies, and objectives when it comes to dealing with migration issues. Furthermore, the growing uneasiness in the EU, mutual accusations, pleads for solidarity, and anti-immigrant rhetoric has made the management of the European migrant crisis complicated.[23]For this reason, the V4 group supports the enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkan, particularly Serbia and Macedonia, to build a common security and migration policy. From the V4's perspective, the European migrant crisis cannot be solved without cooperation with the countries that are part of the so-called Balkan migration route.

The Cooperation Reduces the Intensity of Migration Issues

Starting from 2015 the scope of migration affairs cooperation has significantly increased, not just as a matter of bilateral cooperation, but also a regional joint approach of V4 towards Western Balkans. Despite tensions related mainly to the closure of borders,[24] significant efforts have been made by the V4 and western Balkans governments in the wake of the European migrant crisis, to tackle the migration challenge and to preserve the security of their societies.

In 2016, the ministers of interiors from the V4, Slovenia, Serbia, and Macedonia met in Prague and issued a joint declaration on the future cooperation in order to enhance control over migration flows.[25]

[18] Šabić, S.(2017).The Impact of the Refugee Crisis in the Balkans: A Drift Towards Security, *Journal of Regional Security*, 12(1), 53-54.
[19] Ibid.
[20]Vanessa, P.,& Pupavac, M. (2015). By Welcoming Syrian Refugees, Serbs Hope to Salvage Their Reputation. The Conversation [online]. Available at: https://theconversation.com/by-welcoming-syrian-refugees-serbs-hope-to-salvage-their-reputation-47802 (Accessed: 14 August 2020).
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[23]Šabić, S.(2017).*op cit,* 53-54.
[24]e.g., Hungary erected fences and closed its borders both with Serbia (2015); Also, the closure of the Serbian-Croatian border(2015).
[25] Visegrad Group (2016): Joint Declaration of Ministers of Interior, Visegradgroup.eu, 19 January 2016, at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-declaration-of (accessed: 16 December 2019).

Here we will not analyse the bilateral relations deeply but to draw attention to some crucial aspects of foreign policies of the V4 countries towards the Western Balkans.

In terms of contribution to stability and security, one can cite the cooperation with local police. The V4 countries, mainly Hungary, offered support of their police to Macedonia and Serbia to strengthen their capacities to tackle the increasing migration pressure.[26]The cooperation based on human capacities aim to improve the situation at the EU's external borders.

Also, the cooperation between the two regions worked as an important engine in fighting illegal immigration, human trafficking, and other cross-border crime. For this reason, the Visegrád group supports the enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans to build a common security policy. The V4 group are convinced that the EU accession of these countries will contribute to the stability and security of the region and the European Union.[27]

Conclusion

The European migrant crisis brought attention to the fact that the Western Balkan countries shall be involved into the solution of the crisis. The paper finds that the V4 countries' cooperation on migration issues with western Balkans countries, during the European migrant crisis, was important in managing the uncontrolled nature of immigration and its related negative manifestations. However, even though the European migrant crisis provided an excellent opportunity for increasing cooperation, there is only limited progress when it comes to the EU integration process. The closer cooperation on migration issues requires the accession of Western Balkan countries to the EU.[28]

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EXPERIENCES OF REFUGEEHOOD AND POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY: THE CASE OF KURDISH AND LEFT-WING POLITICAL REFUGEES FROM TURKEY IN GREECE

Beja Protner

Introduction

In recent years, forced migration and refugeehood have received increased media, political, and scholarly attention. As large numbers of people have been fleeing from war and destruction in multiple regions, the notion of "refugee crisis" came to rule the public perceptions of contemporary migration to Europe. On the margins of Europe, Greece has become a so-called "hotspot" of migration (Fassin 2016; Carastathis et al. 2018).

In this paper I will consider critical reflections of the anthropologists of migration on the recent boom of refugee studies (see Fassin 2016; Cabot 2019; Ramsay 2019) and position myself critically vis-à-vis the approaches to refugeehood in Greece that are based on the notion of "crisis." I will argue that in order to understand refugeehood, we need to consider specific historically situated positions and subjective experiences of particular groups of refugees, rather than assume a universal "refugee experience" in given structural conditions. Based on my ethnographic research with Kurdish and left-wing political exiles from Turkey in Athens during 2018-2019, I will exemplify the centrality of history and political subjectivity to the experience of refugeehood.

Migration research and the "refugee crisis"

In the years 2015-2016, at the peak of the so-called "migration/refugee crisis," over 800,000 migrants/refugees entered Greece, mostly aiming to continue the travel to Western Europe. However, movement became increasingly difficult, as the countries of the European Union (EU) closed their borders in order to contain unwanted migrants on the margins of Europe, while the external EU borders have become increasingly securitized and outsourced outwards to the so-called "buffer countries" (DeGenova 2017; Oikonomakis 2018). In addition, the EU Dublin Regulation requires asylum seekers to apply for international protection in the country of their first registered entry to the EU territory, which put a great pressure on the countries of the European margins (Cabot 2014, 23; European Parliament 2013). Greece became a "warehouse" for refugees (Rozakou 2017, 45), or an "open prison" (*açık cezaevi*), as my interlocutors called it. Closed borders and notoriously long asylum procedures entrapped people in a condition of ontological uncertainty and "existential waiting" (Hage 2009) in legal and economic precarity, for unpredictable amounts of time. This has caused material difficulties and emotional distress for migrants/refugees. However, as I will show below, it has not created a universal "refugee experience."

Since 2015, there has been an influx of Western and international humanitarian aid organizations, volunteers, solidarity activists, journalists, and researchers into Greece. The anthropologist of migration Heath Cabot (2019) argued that these operate under the same logics of crisis as the European border and asylum regimes. The notion of "crisis" renders an event such as migration as a problem, and implies novelty, exceptionality, and totality. This approach isolates the event from its broader

contexts and draws attention away from historical connections, continuities across categories of people, chronic issues, everyday banalities, and internal differentiations (Roitman 2014; Carastathis et el. 2018; Cabot 2018; 2019; Ramsay 2019). Furthermore, the sense of urgency of the crisis-driven research prioritizes "rapid response" and "social relevance" to the expense of slow and long-term engagement, and deep, nuanced, locally specific, and historically contextualized knowledge. This may result in superficial work that reproduces the fetishized figure of the "refugee" rather than accounting for the complexity, plurality, and contingency of experiences (Cabot 2019; Ramsay 2019).

Wary of these pitfalls, I have positioned my ethnographic research with Kurdish and left-wing political exiles from Turkey in Athens against the backdrops of politics in Turkey and the history of forced migration from Turkey to Greece, in order to offer an analytical lens other than "crisis."

Political violence in Turkey and forced migration to Greece

In recent years, Turkey has witnessed an escalation of political violence and oppression. In 2015, the peace negotiations and the ceasefire between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, PKK) and the Turkish security forces were broken, and the 36 years-lasting armed conflict in the Kurdish region of Turkey re-escalated. Thousands of residents from the war zones became either internally displaced or refugees abroad. At the same time, the persecution of (pro-) Kurdish activists, journalists, artists, and intellectuals throughout the country increased. After the failed military coup of 2016, allegedly attempted by the Islamist Gülenist movement, the crackdown on all kinds of political opposition, including Kurdish and left-wing, intensified. Any kind of public critique of the regime, social projects, and cultural and academic activities have become criminalized (Çelik 2018). Thousands of people, threatened by long-term imprisonment or death due to their political affiliations and activities, have been forced to flee the country.

For Kurdish and left-wing political exiles from Turkey, Greece has been the primary destination. This is not only because of its cultural proximity and geographical accessibility, but also because of political connections on various levels, and the existing social networks and spaces of Turkish and Kurdish exiles in Athens. Forced migration from Turkey to Greece has a long history. It goes back to the Greco-Turkish war (1919-1922) and the subsequent compulsory population exchange between the two countries, determined by the Lausanne Treaty (1923), which together displaced a couple of million Greek Orthodox (*Rum*) people and other non-Muslims. Their "refugee quarters" in Athens were marked by a continuation of Anatolian culture and identity, socioeconomic marginality, and strong left-wing political orientations (Hirschon 1998). Moreover, the collective memory of refugeehood in Greece has arguably contributed to people's empathetic attitudes towards refugees (Cabot 2018; Oikonomakis 2018).

The second large wave of forced migration from Turkey to Greece was triggered by the 1980 coup d'état and the junta's brutal crackdown on Kurdish and left-wing political dissidents. Furthermore, the Kurdish exile to Greece increased after the beginning of the war between the PKK and the Turkish state in 1984 and continued throughout the 1990's, when the state violence against Kurdish population was especially intense. Due to political tensions between Greece and Turkey, the Greek official and public attitudes towards the Kurdish movement and the refugees from Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s were sympathetic. Even today, when the official attitudes are marked by the notion of "crisis," my interlocutors in Athens have been experiencing favorable attitudes of the locals in comparison with other global migrants/refugees. Moreover, there has been a long tradition of alliance between Greek left-wing movements and revolutionary exiles from Turkey (Karakatsanis 2014, 73-75). Although Greece has been considered a "transitional zone" (*geçiş bölgesi*) by most of the exiles due to unbearably

long asylum procedures, the exile community has established local Kurdish/Turkish restaurants, cafés, social hubs, squats, and associations, which offer familiar spaces for socializing and sometimes employment to the newcomers. As I will show below, for the people trapped in Greece by the European migration regime, these are spaces of material and emotional survival.

Political subjectivity and continuities of hope and survival

In Athens, the radical left-wing spaces are also spaces of migrant/refugee solidarity and support. There has been a number of self-organized squatted accommodations, shared by local political groups and migrants of various backgrounds that are sites of communal living and radical politics (Squire 2018; Stavrides 2010).[1] In face of the precarious conditions of refugeehood and financial difficulties, the majority of Kurdish and left-wing political exiles from Turkey live in these squats together with other migrants and local activists. Yet, the concepts of communal living and solidarity are not new to them, but are at the heart of their political subjectivities.

The anthropologists Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman (2000) have defined subjectivity as "the felt interior experience of the person that includes his or her positions in a field of relational power /…/ produced through the experience of violence" (1). In the case of the revolutionary exiles, their experiences of political violence in Turkey and Kurdistan crucially marked their (political) subjectivities (see also Aras 2014; Neyzi and Darıcı 2015). Most of my interlocutors had grown up in places of socioeconomic marginalization, radical politics, and political violence. Those who were members of ethnic/religious minorities, had inherited the collective experiences of massacres and discrimination, transmitted across generations. Many of them have themselves experienced war (as combatants or/and witnesses), imprisonment, torture, internal displacement, and life in "illegality" (hiding from the police). In this sense, they had experienced the precariousness of refugeehood in the country of their citizenship, before actually becoming refugees (see Çelik 2018). Hence, for them, life in what some might call "crisis" has a continuity between the two contexts – persecution in Turkey and exile in Greece – rather than being novel or exceptional.

Moreover, in both contexts, the notion of comradeship (*yoldaşlık*) was essential to their material and emotional survival. Comradeship is a revolutionary concept and praxis that includes shared political commitments and alliance, a shared lifestyle, marked by mutual support, solidarity, and egalitarianism, and a sense of revolutionary hope. In Turkey, *yoldaşlık* is a part of a particular political culture, which, as I learned during my fieldwork, got consolidated in political prisons of the military junta after the 1980 coup d'état. Among Kurdish and left-wing revolutionaries from Turkey, comradeship is an ideal, which is taught and learned in the politicized circles through praxis and through exemplary collective stories about heroes and martyrs, who continued to struggle even under the conditions of brutal torture. They were able to do so due to collaboration, mutual help, sharing of material resources, emotional support, and a strong sense of interdependency and indebtedness.

As my research has shown, these collective narratives and personal experiences of actual imprisonment were instructive for my interlocutors' survival in the "open prison" of Greece, as they called it. My interlocutors often told me that their present life in Greece was not much different from their past life in Turkey. In both contexts, they were living a communal life, which included sharing of accommodation, clothes, food, and money. These comradely practices were performances of a an utopian future-oriented revolutionary hope (see Bloch 1986), which gave them meaning and facilitated my interlocutors' emotional survival in the conditions of spatiotemporal entrapment, ontological uncertainty, and protracted transitionality.

[1] Some of these spaces, such as the squatted "refugee neighbourhood" of Prosfygika, trace their genealogy back to the Asia Minor refugees.

Conclusion

Growing numbers of people today live in a condition of refugeehood. However, in order to move towards an in-depth understanding of this condition in its plurality and complexity, we have to go beyond the frames created by the discourses of "crisis." My ethnographic research with Kurdish and left-wing political exiles in Athens indicates that while the common structural conditions of the European migration regime produce spatiotemporal entrapment and existential waiting, the ways in which refugeehood is experienced is historically contingent and shaped by people's (political) subjectivities.

The contextual and culturally informed analysis of the experiences of revolutionary exiles from Turkey in Athens challenges the crisis-driven approach to migration by rejecting the novelty, exceptionality, and universality of the experience of refugeehood. First, my research points to the long history of forced migration from Turkey to Greece, which has significantly shaped material and social spaces of refugeehood and migrant solidarity in Athens. And second, my deep engagement with my interlocutors' backgrounds and life experiences revealed that there has been a continuity of "refugeehood" as multiple precariousness between the conditions of political violence in Turkey and exile in Greece. In both contexts, my interlocutors' political subjectivities crucially determined their experiences. In particular, the revolutionary notion and praxis of comradeship enabled them to survive materially and preserve emotionally through solidarity, sharing, and mutual support, grounded in the collective narratives of struggle, survival, and martyrdom.

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

COMPARING PRESS COVERAGE ON REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ITALY, SPAIN, AND TURKEY

Deniz Yetkin Aker[1]

Introduction

The media, in general, have the power to frame public policy and discourse about several subjects such as immigrants and refugees (Esses et. All. 2013, p. 520). It provides the information with which citizens shape their understanding of the world and their place within it (Berry et. All. 2015, p.5). For instance, the mass media has an important role in the anxiety of elites and the public toward immigrants and refugees by setting agendas and framing debates (Berry et. All. 2015, p.5).

Focusing on the Western countries, it is seen that in the last 15 years the general image of the immigrants and refugees has become gradually destructive. One of its reasons is that the media generally stresses possible threats that immigrants and refugees may cause to the host societies (Esses et. All. 2013, p. 520). The main reason why the EU leaders are unwilling to take a more significant and consistent approach to the refugee crisis is also about "the high levels of public anxiety about immigration and asylum across Europe" (Berry et. All. 2015, p.5).

As the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) data shows, all around the world there are 70,8 million immigrants in various statuses and the number is increasing every single day. Among these immigrants, 25.9 million of them have refugee status and around 4 million of them are stateless (Erdoğan, 2020, p.4). Since there is a high number of immigrants in various statuses all around the world and the number is increasing every day, and since the mass media has an important role on causing anxiety about migrants and refugees, it is important to analyze the media coverage in the EU and to discuss possible solutions. For this reason, this study aims to focus especially on several Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Italy, and Spain) that are both the sea route to Europe and host countries. It aims to compare these important cases and the main research question of this study is about the differences and similarities in media coverage among Turkey, Italy, and Spain.

Conceptual Framework

According to Habermas, the dynamics of mass communication are determined by the power of the media (2006, p. 415). The media can "select and shape the presentation of, messages" and can influence the agendas and frame public issues (Habermas, 2006, p. 415). The public sphere is at the periphery of the political system and it is "rooted in networks for wild flows of messages—news, reports, commentaries, talks, scenes and images, and shows and movies with an informative, polemical, educational, or entertaining content" (Habermas, 2006, p. 415-16). Such published opinions are derived from several actors such as politicians and pressure groups. The mass media selects and shapes those opinions which are "received by broad and overlapping audiences, camps, subcultures, and so on"

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(Habermas, 2006, p. 415-16).

As an example, Erdoğan's recent study shows that most of the individuals living in the metropolitan cities such as Ankara and İstanbul "know about Syrians from what they see in the media and social media or from their brief encounters in public places" (2020, p.54). In Erdoğan's study, focus group discussion participants are asked several questions such as "whether they had any interactions with Syrians in their daily lives", or "to what extent they interacted with Syrians" and what their observations and experiences are about them (2020, p.54). In the study, the participants from Istanbul and Ankara usually report that they witness Syrians in the streets and public places like shopping malls. More importantly, most of the individuals' ideas about Syrians are affected by media and social media. Under these circumstances, it is important to focus on the mass media and to conduct a content analysis in media coverage.

Kerlinger (2000) defines the content analysis method as "studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner to measure variables" (in Wimmer and Dominick, 2014, p. 159). This study aims to compare three important cases and discuss the differences and similarities in media coverage among Turkey (as a candidate country with a high number of Syrian immigrants), Italy, and Spain (as European countries).

Focusing on the first case, Turkey, it is seen that the country currently hosts more than 3,5 million immigrants from Syria and more than a hundred thousand asylum seekers from other nationalities especially from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Somalia (AIDA and ECRE). According to UNHCR data, more than 3.6 million Syrian immigrants are registered in Turkey (UNHCR). Only in November 2017, Syrians in Turkey exceeds 4% of Turkey's population. This situation causes a serious humanitarian crisis in Turkish history (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 3). These immigrants are likely to stay and more immigrants from Syria can come to Turkey (Yüceşahin and Sirkeci, 2017, p. 228). None the less, studies show that "refugees" in Turkey do not attract the attention of the Turkish media. Besides, refugees are sometimes presented as criminals since the language used in the news includes descriptions such as 'illegal refugees' as well as 'illegally crossing the border' (Erdoğan et. al. 2017, p.17).

In Spain, major changes in patterns of inward migration have been faced over the last few decades. Migration flows reversed from emigration to immigration. According to Fernández (2014) "during the 1990s and 2000s Spain constituted the main entry point of irregular migrants into Europe" (in Berry et. al. 2015, p. 18). As a result of data analysis from the Spanish National Statistics Institute, Reher et al. (2011) argue that "the number of immigrants living in Spain multiplied sixfold between 1996 and 2009, bringing the proportion of immigrants in the Spanish population from under 3% to almost 14%" (in Berry et. al. 2015, p. 18). The 2012 data shows that immigrants come mostly from (in descending order) Romania, Morocco, the United Kingdom, Ecuador, and Colombia (Arroyo Pérez et al. 2014, in Berry et. al. 2015, p. 19).

Even though only (estimated) 5% of migrants use boats to enter Spain, according to research results, it is seen that "images of dangerously overcrowded boats, and stories about migrants crossing the strait, often with tragic consequences, are a key feature of the national media" (Siurana, 2014; Tortajada 2007; Igartua et al 2013, in Berry et. al. 2015, p. 19). Thus, what is common in the Spanish media is that images of migrants crossing the Strait of Gibraltar (or arriving in the Canary Islands) by boat or climbing the fence in Melilla. Several studies suggest that, although in the early 2000s the media discourse about immigrants in Spain has been negative like many other European countries (especially labeling migrants as 'illegals'), in the Spanish press the discourse of racism was "less radical and less widespread than elsewhere in Europe" (Berry et. al. 2015, p. 20).

Italy has been faced with large-scale immigration and has one of the largest foreign-born

populations in the Western world. As a result of the arrival of large numbers of undocumented economic migrants, in Italy, the issue of migration has been politicized since the early 1990s. As an example, instead of promoting integration, public policy has been focused on immigration control (A. Colombo, 2013, in Berry et. al. 2015, p. 22). Focusing on the Italian Media, it can be experienced that public hostility towards migrants has been mostly supported by the media. Besides, elites, such as political and intellectual elites as well as journalists, "have arguably legitimated anti-migrant hostility and ethnic prejudice in several ways, such as the use of threatening language and imagery which evokes war and disease, or the negative labeling of immigrants as 'illegals', 'irregulars' or 'clandestinos'" (Quassoli, 2013; Sciortino & Colombo, 2004; in Berry et. al. 2015, p. 22).

With this high mobility -especially in Mediterranean countries- and negative discourse toward immigrants, this study aims to focus on Turkey, Spain, and Italy to discuss comparatively how immigrants have been presented in the media in those countries. A Turkish sample of news by news articles (on home pages) is generated and analyzed by three main tabloids (Cumhuriyet (left), Vatan (center-liberal), and Yeni Şafak (right)) to compare with the press coverage report results of Italy and Spain prepared for UNHCR and to make a secondary analysis. Since most of the studies and reports about the situation of Syrians in host countries focus on Turkey as well (Sirkeci et. all. 2015, p. 186) it is very important to add Turkey into the picture.

Although there have been several studies focusing on European countries or Turkey, there are only limited attempts to make a comparison among those countries. For instance, Erdoğan and several scholars (2017) focus on Turkey to analyze Turkish media and its perception toward Syrians. According to their study, until 2015 the media discourse on refugees has been negative and the most frequently used phrase was 'illegal immigrants' (according to several agreements (ex. Geneva Convention), it is not illegal to be an asylum seeker or to apply for refugee status). Such a discourse creates a perception as if asylum seekers and immigrants are illegal and criminal (Erdoğan et. al. 2017, p. 18). In her study, Doğutaş stresses that Syrian refugees had appeared on the news that is generally about terrorism, security problems, and crime (Doğutaş, 2019, p.115). Doğanay and Çoban Keneş (2016) aimed to analyze news stories and columns in three national newspapers and their research results show that Syrian refugees are presented as a threat (in Doğutaş, 2019, p.115). On the other hand, Çağlar and Özkır's (2014) study shows that newspapers that are close to the government present Syrian refugees more positively (in Doğutaş, 2019, p.115).

About studies on European countries, Chouliaraki and Stolic (2017), for instance, focus on newspaper headline images among five European countries (Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, and the UK). They aim to a create typology of refugee visibilities (Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017, p. 1163). As a result of empirical analysis (European news between June-December 2015), they categorize that typology of refugee visibilities into five categories such as "visibility as a threat, associated with state security." These five categories of visibility are important for explaining public attitudes towards the vulnerable, nonetheless "they nonetheless ultimately fail to humanize migrants and refugees" (Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017, p. 1163).

Different from the general literature, this study aim analyzes Turkish media and two European (and Mediterranean) countries comparatively to understand how Syrians are represented in a similar period and whether there are any differences in those representations. In the next sections, the first research method of this study will be explained, and preliminary results will be presented.

Research Method

To analyze Turkish media and two European (and Mediterranean) countries comparatively, media content analysis is used, which is a systematic method to study mass media (in Macnamara 2005, p.1). For the Turkish case, three main tabloids -(Cumhuriyet (left), Vatan (center-liberal), and Yeni Şafak (right)- are focused on and a Turkish sample of news by news articles (on home pages) is generated and analyzed. The archive search of these newspapers is conducted by searching with two keywords (Syria and Migra) similar to the UNHCR report. The study focuses mainly on the period between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2014 since, Turkey formalized a temporary protection regime on 22 October 2014 (Erdoğan, 2020, p.5).[2]

Italy and Spain have been main entry points for refugees and migrants who want to enter the EU and especially Italy have a key role "in the search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.5). For this reason, these two case results were selected from the UNHCR report. Thus, in this study, the press coverage report results of Italy and Spain prepared for UNHCR were used to compare Turkish media results and to make a secondary analysis. In the report, five EU states (the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Sweden) news coverages were examined between the years of 2014 and 2015: "The first sample examines a broad cross-section of reporting across 2014 and early 2015. The second sample focuses on a case study of a week's reporting in the wake of the 18 April 2015 boat disaster in the Mediterranean" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.5).

To compare with the Turkish case, similar research questions are asked, and similar keywords were used during Turkish data collection. Since it would be hard for a study to focus on whole themes and question used and analyzed in a detailed report, only the main themes are focused on and applied to the Turkish case:

> What themes are used to describe those trying to enter Turkey?
> Are there any similarities or differences between the cases in terms of humanitarian and threat themes?

Similar to Italy and Spain, to capture media coverage of migration issues in Turkey, migra, or Syria were used as keywords. As Erdoğan and other scholars' study shows (2017, p.17), only a small number of stories were retrieved. For the Turkish case, the sample was driven from three main tabloids Cumhuriyet (left, 14 stories), Vatan (center-liberal, 8 stories), and Yeni Şafak (right, 50 stories). In the report, for the Italian case, the sample was driven from La Reppublica (center left), La Stampa (centrist), and Il Corriere della Sera (centrist), and for the Spanish case, the sample was driven from El Pais (social democrat), ABC (conservative monarchic), and from El Mundo (liberal).

The Results

In the report prepared by Berry and other scholars, firstly, it can be seen that in Italian coverage (50.6%) there have been more humanitarian themes than in Spanish one (32.5 %). The reason is explained as having a "high proportion of stories in the Italian Press which focus directly on the events in the Mediterranean and often report on the experiences of refugees and migrants" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.8). For Italian cases, some of the themes by Italian newspapers can be sorted as Search and Rescue / Aid Supplies, Mafia / Traffic, Political Response / Policy, and Humanitarian (Key Theme). For the Spanish case, some of the themes can be listed as Political Response / Policy Immigration Figures / Levels Search and Rescue / Aid Supplies, Mortality / Mortality Figures Mafia / Traffic, Humanitarian

[2] The mass mobility from Syria had started during the period of law's preparation and the ones came before the law are included in the temporary protection law (Erdoğan, 2020, p.5).

(Elements) Receiving / Rejecting Human Rights, and Humanitarian (Key Theme) Threat to Communities / Cultural Threat.

In the Italian case, the most repeated theme in coverage was 'Search and Rescue/Aid Supplies, which appears in almost "two out of every three stories (La Repubblica 66.9%; Il Corriere della Sera 64.4%; La Stampa 63.5%)" and which is mostly about "factual accounts of the operations of the search and rescue teams" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.94). Even though the percentage in La Repubblica was somewhat lower (43.8%), humanitarian themes (either key theme or elements), in general, is a significant theme. For instance, the reporting of sufferings experienced by refugees in their countries and their (often) traumatic experiences in their journeys (La Repubblica 11.6%; Il Corriere della Sera 14.4%; La Stampa 17.6%) was mostly considerate and humanitarian, "and underlined the need to help the refugees arriving in Italy" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.99).

In the Spanish case, the report shows that the press coverage in Spain is generally factual and focusing mainly on "migration/mortality statistics, or by international political divisions and EU policy debates" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.76). Nevertheless, even these statistics can be selected and shaped to influence the agendas and frame public issues. For instance, according to the report, the most dominant themes, in this case, are about "the political response to the crisis, the rescue of migrants/provision of aid, and migration figures" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.72). The coverage is rather similar in the three selected newspapers, "the most significant difference being the lower prominence of the 'Political Response/Policy' theme in ABC (45.6%), which was present in 70% and 71% stories in El Mundo and El País, respectively" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.72). ABC generally focuses on "mortality rates (44.3%), in comparison to El Mundo (36.7%) and El País (29.7%). The report argues that these differences resulted from ABC's tendency to publish generally news events but little room for policy discussion or analysis (Berry et. al. 2015, p.72). Besides, according to the report, in the coverage, the political debate goes mostly around contradictions among the European Union members "over responsibility for control of the EU's borders, respect for human rights, and the provision of humanitarian aid to migrants" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.72). Lastly, it should be added that for the Spanish case, different themes are generally used together in coverage. For instance, in El País, there have been discussions related to both the themes of security and humanitarian (trafficking/organized crime and the dangerous journeys made by migrants) (Berry et. al. 2015, p.75).

As a result of the data analysis collected for this study, the themes in Turkish newspapers can be categorized as humanitarian, empathy toward immigrants (especially Syrians) and focusing on their problems and ideas, political debate using/abusing the migration issue, search and rescue/aid supplies; support, compliments or complains (mostly the EU and the UN), as well as security and threat theme. The humanitarian theme includes reporting of sufferings experienced by Syrians and other immigrants in their countries and their (often) traumatic experiences in their journeys, monetary aid, and other supports (including statistics), camps, and their life in Turkey (health, camp, food, etc.). The search and rescue/aid supplies theme is mostly about rescue operations (even failed ones) and procedures after the rescue as well as numbers of rescued immigrants. The theme of empathy toward immigrants (especially Syrians) and focusing on their problems/ideas include several discussions and factual news about the problems of immigrants -mostly Syrians- as well as interviews with them. The political debate using/abusing the migration issue includes statements of politicians mostly accusing the ruling party. The theme of support or compliments from the EU/ the UN and the World focuses on, for instance, statements of Turkish politicians or the UN members explaining aids to Turkey and spending or complaining about poor support from the EU. Finally, the security and threat theme focuses on discussions about the cost of immigrants-especially Syrians- to Turkey as being very high.

Table 1. Newspapers and Frequency of the Themes

	Cumhuriyet (14 stories)	Vatan (8 stories)	Yeni Şafak (50 stories)
Humanitarian	3	6	34
Empathy	6	-	16
Political Debates (Abuse)	1	-	-
Search and rescue/aid supplies	1	-	7
Support, compliments, or complaints (mostly the EU and the UN)	1	2	9
Security and Threat theme	-	3	2

The study supports Erdoğan's study results (2017), claiming that immigrants, especially Syrians, are not very visible and the mass media does not discuss much the problems that Syrians encountered in their everyday life. Nevertheless, as Table 1 shows, similar to Italian and Spanish cases, in the Turkish case, the most repeated theme in coverage was humanitarian. As in the Spanish case, sometimes themes are used together in coverage. The selected Turkish newspapers tend to publish statements of politicians, experts as well as other political and international actors in general. For instance, in Vatan (May 2014), the Governor of Gaziantep, Erdal Ata's statement about immigrants is stated as "The people of Gaziantep did their best to meet the needs of the Syrians living in the city." In Cumhuriyet (July 2014), IGAM president Metin Çorabatır's argument is presented as "temporary regulations and regulations will not provide a solution for Syrian refugees living in very bad conditions in metropolitan cities, especially in Istanbul."

In the Turkish case, one theme is very interesting, especially in the newspaper Yeni Şafak: The theme of search and rescue/aid supplies includes conflicting phrases and confusing discourse about irregular migrants. In the coverage, rescue operations and procedures, as well as rescued immigrants, are presented -mostly when they use official statements- by using the word "irregular" and sometimes "illegal." For instance, in Yeni Şafak it is reported in October 2014 that "In 2013, in the Aegean Sea 6,937 irregular migrants were rescued, while 71 migrant smugglers were arrested" and in August 2014 ", in the Aegean Sea, 137 fugitives are rescued." Such confusing statements-presented either intentionally or non-intentionally- could influence the public and could confuse them as well.

Finally, focusing on the report about threat themes, there are minor differences in their frequencies among countries. Contrary to high percentages of humanitarian themes, threat themes in coverage in Turkey, Italy, and Spain are rather low. This is good for social cohesion since such statements-either intentionally or non-intentionally- could influence the public badly. Refugees and migrants are discussed as threats to the nation in 10.1% of articles in Italy, 9.2% in Spain (Berry et. al. 2015, p.8), and 4,55% in Turkey. In Turkey, refugees and migrants are discussed as they could cause several problems such as economic ones. In Italy, on the other hand, stories including threat themes are mostly about the threat to national security (La Repubblica 8.3%; Il Corriere della Sera 14.4%; La Stampa 10.8%) claiming that "amongst the refugees arriving on boats, could be dangerous extremists keen to

infiltrate Europe" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.99). Similarly, in Spain stories did not mostly present migrants as dangers to the countries of destination or as (potential) criminals. For instance, migrants are represented "as threats to national security (5.6% in El Mundo; 5.1% in ABC; 8.7% in El País), as a threat to welfare or benefits (3.3% in El Mundo; 3.8% in ABC; 10.9% in El País), or as a threat to communities or local culture (7.8% in El Mundo; 6.3% in ABC; 8% in El País)" (Berry et. al. 2015, p.74). The argument about migrants being a threat to the welfare system cannot be commonly seen in the Spanish coverage (Berry et. al. 2015, p.75).

Conclusions

The media can influence public policy and discourse about many issues, such as international migration. It is crucial to discuss media coverage especially in the Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Italy, and Spain) that are both the sea route to Europe (such as Italy and Spain) and host countries with a high number of immigrants (such as Turkey).

This paper aims to focus on the years of 2014-2015 (when the temporary protection regime formalized in Turkey) to discuss how immigrants have been presented in the Turkish press and to compare whether there is any difference or similarity between narrative and/or frames in Media in Turkey, Italy and Spain. The study uses both the press coverage report results of Italy and Spain prepared for UNHCR and the Turkish data collected for this study. The report shows that immigrants are visible in the media-sometimes in negative ways (Berry et. al. 2015, p.23). In the Turkish case, similar to Erdoğan's study results (2017), it is seen that the mass media does not discuss much the problems that Syrians encountered in their everyday life. Similar to Italian and Spanish cases, immigrants are presented in the Turkish media sometimes in negative ways. Also, confusing statements exists in Turkish case that could influence the public and could confuse them.

Finally, there is a need to conduct a content analysis on the recent media coverage on international migration in Turkey, Italy, and Spain to analyze recent and massive mobility. To conclude, as Habermas argues, the media can "select and shape the presentation of, messages" and can influence the agendas and frame public issues (2006, p. 415). The mass media can select and shape several ideas that are "received by broad and overlapping audiences, camps, subcultures, and so on" (Habermas, 2006, p. 415-16). For this reason, to increase positive public attitude and peaceful discourse, increasing the positive visibility of immigrants in the media are important to realize.

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REFUGEES ACCESS TO HOUSING IN LISBON AND MILAN. A TALE OF TWO CITIES

Sílvia Cardoso and Giuseppe Gambazza

Introduction

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the "right of housing" is one of the key elements in the integration between host communities and new arrivals, and it includes "security of tenure, availability of services, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location and cultural adequacy" (UNHCR, 2009, p. 4), thus, access to housing is a key-element of refugees' integration.

Departing from a well theoretically and empirically sustained fact that refugees experience many barriers in accessing (private and public) housing in cities across Europe, we take Lisbon and Milan, our cities of living and researching, as the 'ordinary cities' from where we can take on a comparative stance (Bollens, 2007).

'Local turn' perspectives assume the local scale as the main focus of research (Glick-Schiller & Çağlar, 2009; Glorius & Doomernik, 2020), in order to identify socio-territorial characteristics as the key factors in the integration process (Phillips & Robinson, 2015). This theoretical umbrella has been shaping research on housing integration of refugees, as it has favoured the birth of distinctive perspectives which take the phenomenon from different points of view. On one hand, the "structuralist" approach mainly focuses on the factors that limit both access and housing choices (Phillips, 2006). On the other hand, the perspectives interested in understanding the dynamics of immigrants' housing experiences, show how their successes (or failures) in adaptation are related to specific indicators: social networks with members of host society; fluency in host language; identification with host society (Berry, 2006) and related emotional aspects (Diab et al., 2019).

We attempt to address a poorly analysed aspect: how the actors of the host society organise themselves locally to support refugees leaving the institutional reception programmes, intersecting the latter approach with local turn theories. Therefore, we ask: what are the available housing options for refugees in the transition from reception programmes to the real estate market? How can we think housing paths for refugees on a local scale level?

In terms of methodology, we have taken a qualitative research approach, based on semi-directive interviews to a set of key informants in both cities. On both sides, we have interviewed representatives of the host institutions, like NGOs and municipalities, and the spokesmen of refugees' associations.

On a first level of analysis, the results obtained in the interviews were confronted with political discourses, present in both cities, on welcoming refugees. On a second level of analysis, we made the confrontation of the results obtained from the former, to compare the reality of Milan and Lisbon regarding refugees' access to housing.

Housing system for refugees in Milan

The Italian reception system for asylum seekers and refugees consists of two phases. The first phase of reception is mainly managed at the governmental level, through a network of structures responsible

for hosting asylum seekers during the process of defining their legal status. First reception facilities are therefore divided into Hotspots, First Reception Centers (CPA) and Emergency Reception Centers (CAS), accommodating around 90.000 guests[1].

The second phase, called SIPROIMI (Protection system for holders of international protection and for unaccompanied minors) implies instead the cooperation of the Municipality together with third sector entities. This programme, which receives around 30.000 refugees[2], is exclusively addressed to those who benefit from various forms of protection. Access to SIPROIMI is the only condition to be included in the (approximately) 6-months structured integration paths, with the possibility of multiple extensions.

In Milan, in 2018, SIPROIMI arranged 422 places, 80% of which were located in the seven largest reception centres. The remaining 20% of the beneficiaries were placed in several apartments spread over the territory. In spite of the involvement of different local associations, the process of housing integration has not always been successfully completed. In the period considered, almost half of the people decided to leave the integration path without informing the social workers. A large number of "dismissal for untraceability" came to light, which made it hard to evaluate the housing solutions adopted by refugees leaving SIPROIMI: 325 out of 386 left the program (AA.VV., 2018).

At the end of the institutional integration process, refugees usually address members of the inter-ethnic network to which they belong (relatives and friends) or trusted volunteers to find an accommodation. As a result, refugees' destinations look very diversified, even if it rarely ends with a regular rental contract; more often it consists of an informal settlement, sometimes in homeless centers or, in the worst-case scenario, in abandoned places, like buildings or basements.

Housing system for refugees in Lisbon

Portugal does not receive high numbers of asylum requests when compared to Italy or other European countries, in general. Between 2015-2018 the country received around 4,500 'spontaneous asylum seekers', from which, 1,552 came via European Relocation Scheme, from Italy and Greece and 1,010 via Reinstallation Program, from Turkey and Egypt (SEF, 2018).

The year of 2015 is a landmark in the country's history of asylum reception, as before that, the numbers were even few and, consequently - although there was a national effort, at a governmental and legislative level, to converge with European Union's plans for an Common European Asylum System -, the subject of asylum was not present at all in political agendas and public discourse regarding narratives on migration. That year changed this (lack of) public narrative and the effective landscape of the country's asylum system, when the Prime Minister pledged to receive 10,000 refugees (Gomes Ferreira, 2016), the final number ended up being 2,951 people, according to the distribution system designed by the European Commission.

Before 2015, there was just one reception center in the country, managed by the Portuguese Council for Refugees (CPR), an NGO which works in partnership with the national Immigration and Borders Service (SEF) located in the city's periphery where asylum seekers were accommodated while waiting for a final decision from the SEF. The active engagement of Lisbon' Municipality to receive refugees was materialized in the creation of a Municipal Refugees Reception Program and in a (second) reception center, located in the city's urban tissue, with the capacity to accommodate 24 persons. It was in this facility that the Municipal Programme allocated asylum seekers and reinstalled refugees

[1]https://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg18/attachments/upload_file_doc_acquisiti/pdfs/000/001/791/Memorie_Prefetto_Michele_Di_Bari.pdf. Accessed in 14/02/2020.
[2] https://www.siproimi.it/i-numeri-dello-sprar Accessed in 13/07/2020.

coming from the EU programs, in the transition phase from arrival to 'autonomous housing'.

Regarding the passage to autonomous housing, the municipality outsourced to an NGO experienced in housing homeless people, the competence to find temporary autonomous accommodations for refugees in apartments (shared, in the case of single individuals) rented in the private market, with funding from the program.

Since the efforts of these programs were concentrated in finding accommodation solutions in the first phase ('reception' and 'integration'), the 'phasing out' of the program was to follow the same premises than before: regardless of the entry path in the country ('spontaneous', 'relocated' or 'reinstalled'), refugees have to autonomously find solutions in the rental market.

In Portugal, only 2% of housing is public and refugees do not have access to housing programmes as in other EU countries, – meaning being allocated to public and/or social housing. The problems refugees face trying to rent an apartment or a room have been identified prior to 2015: insufficient income to cover rental market prices; lack of a guarantor often required for tenancy, but these problems have been aggravated due to a housing crisis in Lisbon incremented by turistification and financialization of the real estate market, pushing them to an increasingly broad periphery where the same conditions propagate as seismic waves in the renting prices being practiced.

Discussion and Conclusions

The international reports on refugee reception place Italy and Portugal at the top of the world rankings (Wolffhardt et al., 2019). However, with regard to housing, there is no special legislation or rights for refugees in both countries. Consequently, institutional integration paths rarely provide refugees with the necessary tools for housing integration. In Italy, the so-called "Security Decree" (Law 132/2018) ruled out asylum seekers from specific integration pathways, threatening to create a gap in the accommodation pathways for thousands of people. In Portugal the legislation, although considered to be very immigration friendly, does not provide any specific protection regarding housing solutions.

As a result of the lack of central authority, local actors play an important supplementary role. Both in Lisbon and in Milan, voluntary and third sector bodies contribute, also through informal actions, to create a network of relationships, useful to refugees in this transitional housing phase.

In this regard, Milan can rely on a historical heritage of civil society organizations involved in the fight against poverty and social exclusion, both secular and religious (Paniga, 2012). In Lisbon, Santa Casa da Misericordia is a charity institution that works in streaked partnership with the central state and is mainly the one institution, together with the welfare services, to provide rental support in the end of the 18 months program, although finding a house in the rental market is left to the social networks refugees can establish or not (Santinho et al. 2020).

A further problem, shared by both cities, lies in the presence of housing systems dominated by market logic, in which social housing is increasingly marginal. In Milan, the increase in private rental costs (which rose by 105% between 1991 and 2009: Cittalia, 2010) is accompanied by a decrease in social housing, especially for the most fragile people (to whom 20% of the rooms are destined). In addition, current regulations privilege those who have been resident in the territory for at least 5 years, thus excluding refugees from the access list for social housing. However, these rules have recently been judged unconstitutional, with the result that the Region of Lombardy, where Milan is located, will have to reconsider its criteria for its public housing system. In Lisbon asylum housing is shaped, contested and negotiated within the recent cycle of economic crisis and austerity that saw the liberalization of the rental market. Recovery from it, meant turistification and housing financialization with a consequent 'crisis displacement' to the shortage in rental, which, in turn, exacerbated many of

the structural contradictions that mark the housing issue, endemic in a city with very low levels of social and public housing (Allegra & Tulumello, 2019).

Therefore, this comparative study shows how housing integration of refugees is a pending problem waiting that local, national and EU governments will have to address in the coming months. The inadequacy of institutional pathways, the progressive privatization of the housing system and the weaknesses of social housing are only partly mitigated by local actors' efforts. Therefore, the housing integration system needs to be rethought, involving different public and private actors, operating at different scales, including refugees themselves, whose destination in this phase of housing transition is often unknown. In order to achieve this goal, it would be helpful to carry out a further ethnographic study, identifying the opportunities, challenges and expectations of the main players in the difficult process of integration.

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AGENCY, STRUCTURE, AND REFLEXIVITY IN DISPLACEMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON AND GERMANY

Irene Tuzi[1]

Introduction

The concept of 'agency' is a key term in sociology and has a long-standing tradition in the academic debate (Giddens, 1979). Investigating agency and its interplay with 'structure' helps to understand whether human beings are free to act and to make their own choices. Nevertheless, agency is not only observable action per se. It can be conceptualized as a nuanced set of visible and non-visible actions. Anthropologist Naila Kabeer understands agency as "the meaning, motivation and purpose, which individuals bring to their activity" (Kabeer 1999: 438). Agency can take different forms, including resistance, negotiation, bargaining, deception, manipulation, and subversion.

In refugee studies, agency refers to the potential of displaced people to overcome the structures of displacement and gain positive outcomes from a crisis. Making agency central in refugee studies helps to contrast essentialist representations of the refugee as a victim or a passive recipient of relief aid (Essed et al. 2004: 2). The circumstances set by forced migration are particularly significant to observe the interaction between agency and structure, as displacement creates specific social, economic, geographic, political, and legal obstacles for people. Nonetheless, it is perhaps even more noteworthy to notice what happens when people experience a protracted-temporary displacement, which can be conceptualised as a non-structure. How is agency exercised in a non-structure? In what follows, I firstly outline the peculiarity of Syrian refugees' agency in Lebanon and Germany, I then explore how protracted-temporary displacement is experiences by refugees in these two countries, and finally I question whether there is a space for reflexivity in refugeeness.

The specificities of refugee agency

Previous literature has observed that the specificity of refugees' agency is determined by the specificity the structures that people encounter in their condition of displacement (Oskay, 2016; Healey 2006). As a matter of fact, forced migration poses specific social, economic, geographic, political, and legal obstacles to people's everyday life. Some of those being for example the dire living conditions of the refugee camp; people's damaged relationship with their home country (Oskay, 2016: 45); the transformation of social identity when a person 'becomes' a refugee; or their legal status in the country of asylum. However, limiting the analysis to certain structural contexts can be reductive and would exclude other categories of structures. For example, in Lebanon, only a minority of Syrian refugees live in refugee camps (Carpi & Şenoğuz 2019), but this does not mean that they do not experience specific dire living conditions. In Germany, most Syrian nationals have been granted a form of humanitarian protection, but not all of them have a damaged relationship with their home country. For this reason,

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it is crucial to approach forced displacement within a wider perspective, which captures the diversity of the refugee experience. In my observation, as displacement experiences are very diverse for Syrian refugees it is not possible to ascribe the distinctiveness of refugees' agency within specific social, economic, geographic, political, and legal structures. Rather, I consider that what determines the peculiarity of Syrian refugees' agency is the state of temporary-protracted displacement wherein which they act in those two countries. This condition creates a state of 'liminality' (Turner, 1969), a transition from one status to another, which generates "violence, humiliation and reconfiguration" (Turner, 1967). In modern societies this space in the edges of structures "escapes ritual moments and becomes more pervasive, capturing people in a prolonged state of 'in-betweenness' without necessarily providing closure to the period of crisis" (Gold, 2019: 16). In this sense, the condition of liminality functions as a non-structure, because it creates a non-space and non-time that that leaves individuals in a suspended state.

Syrian refugees' protracted-temporary displacement is engendered by the specific legal framework wherein Syrians stand in displacement. In Lebanon, Syrians are not accepted as refugees because the state is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Janmyr, 2017). This is a dimension of temporality because it does not allow resettlement in Lebanon, but at the same time does not offer alternative solution for a safe return to their homes in Syria, or for a resettlement in a third country. Similarly, in Germany, Syrian refugees experience a temporary-protracted displacement as they are mostly granted a subsidiary protection. This is a temporary form of protection that does not ensure the same benefits as the full refugee status, including the right to family reunification. For this reason, the legal and political framework of Germany also holds Syrian refugees in a dimension of temporality, while being in a permanent displacement. In both countries protracted-temporary displacement makes Syrian men and women live "betwixt and between" (Turner, 1967).

This state of liminality is experienced differently by Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Germany. While in Lebanon Syrian participants described this condition as a suspended state connected to feelings of disorientation, bewilderment, and loss (*ḍayā'*), in Germany participants described it as a waiting state experienced with feelings of anticipation (*intiẓār*). In Lebanon, Abū Qāīs, a sixty-years old man from Daraya, expressed his feeling of *ḍāya'* many times in our conversations. After forcibly migrating to Lebanon, in 2013, he was no longer able to provide for his family, as he was doing before in Syria. My fieldnotes provide a photograph of this sense of suspension and disorientation experienced by Abū Qāīs.

> Ward told me that her father often says that he feels like furniture in this house… "I am like a chair," he says. That is not only because he is not working and he feels useless, unable to provide for his family, but also because he is not the centre of the family life anymore. His wife does not sit with him to have lunch anymore, she waits for Ward to come back from work and she eats with her. Ward's mother seems to no longer recognise the authority of her husband, and now appears to account Ward's role of breadwinner in the house[2].

Abū Qāīs felt lost, disoriented, and suspended in a space that he did not recognise as his own. He felt 'like furniture' in the house because he had no space left where to express his gendered identity. He lost his role of patriarch in the family. In this sense, Abū Qāīs remained in-between spaces because unable to gain a new social space.

In Germany, the condition of liminality was distinctively expressed by Abū Moḥammad, a

[2] From *Fieldnotes*. Chtoura, Lebanon, 6 September 2018.

participant from Hama. He arrived in Germany in 2015 and left his wife and children behind, in Syria, in hopes of reuniting with them in the not-too-distant future. Unfortunately, because the process of family reunification can last for many years, he is still waiting today. For this reason, Abū Moḥammad felt suspended in a waiting state (*bintiẓār*), which he experienced with feelings of continuous anticipation (*intiẓār*).

> When I talk to my wife in the evening, we always imagine how our life will be when she comes here. I tell her that we will go to the park to make a BBQ, or to the cinema – we have never been to the cinema together! Oh my God, I cannot wait for her to be here and for our life to finally *start*![3]

This state of temporality within a protracted dimension makes Abū Moḥammad experience a suspended life, because his real life will 'start' only after he will be able to reunite with his wife and children – an event for which Mohammad has no control over.

Is there a space for reflexivity in refugeeness?

Reflexivity is a mediating mechanism between structure and agency (Archer, 2003). It is built on the idea of an inner conversation based on a relation between the individual and the society. Whether this capacity can be applied to refugeeness largely depends on the specific conditions and time in which refugees act. As experiences of displacement are very diverse, it is perhaps not possible to claim that refugees can or cannot practice social reflexivity. In general terms, we could say that the condition of 'bare life' would not allow for reflexivity to take place, as daily survival is prioritised. In this case, basic needs are overriding the inner conversation because there is no capacity to fully elaborate future aspirations, projects, goals, or social circumstances. Nonetheless, because the refugee experience is not monolithic, and the state of liminality functions as a non-time and non-space, I observed various forms of reflexivity in displacement. Among Syrians in Germany, one example was 'religious reflexivity', a form of reinforcement of religious practices and beliefs in a framework of self-construction of a new identity in displacement. In Lebanon, I found reflexivity in people's projections of 'possible selves' (Markus & Nurius, 1986, p. 954), or reflexive projections of new identities that can serve to overcome everyday insecurities and frustrations of life in displacement.

Conclusion

Agency, in displacement, is temporally embedded as it incorporates different elements connected with time, including habitual aspects, the capacity of imagine alternative future possibilities, as well as the capacity of contextualize past habits and future projections (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 962). Placing agency in a temporal framework of analysis helps understand how actors respond to changing circumstances and environments and how they reconstruct their understanding of their experience of displacement. In Lebanon and Germany, Syrian families exercised alternative dimensions of agency to deal with the transformations of gender roles and to renegotiate gender relations. In particular, through the employment of agency, Syrians engendered different varieties of doing gender and family: they rejected traditional gender roles in the private space, while maintaining those roles in the public space; they avoided taking on new gender roles in the public sphere but accepted them in the private space; they performed new gender roles both within the family and within the wider society; and they maintained traditional gender roles both inward and outward.

[3] Interview with Abū Moḥammad, a Syrian refugee man displaced in Germany. March 4, 2019.

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BETWEEN MOBILITY AND LOCALITY: UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT TURKISH TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN GREECE

Pınar Dilan Sönmez

Introduction

From the second half of the 20th century until today, more than five million Turkish citizens immigrated to Europe as a result of particular political and economic reasons. Turkish communities in Western European countries have evolved over the years and gained a diasporic character. During the last decade, a similar process has been observed for the Turkish immigrants in Greece on a small-scale. Concerning this new social phenomenon, this paper seeks to investigate dimensions of this small-scale immigration wave from Turkey to Greece to understand what the push and the pull factors of this immigration wave are and what kind of transnational community is emerging in Greece. This paper also questions whether the Turkish community has the intention of being localized in Greece by evolving a diasporic community. The analysis will be resting upon both the questionnaire which was conducted for profiling the Turkish citizens living in Greece and existing few online sources published as well as personal observations in the field between the years 2011 and 2017.

The concept of diaspora is defined in the Cambridge Dictionary as "the spreading of people from one original country to another country"[1] and the Oxford Dictionary specifies the definition as "the dispersion of the Jews beyond Israel."[2] While the former draws a general frame, the latter refers to a specific group of people for the definition of the concept. What is common to these definitions is that both of them address to a homeland and a dispersion which are indeed depicted as constitutive characters of a diaspora. Many scholars have brought new approaches up during the last three decades and the use of the term of diaspora, as Brubaker notes, has proliferated.[3] Its meaning has been extended to include immigrants, refugees, expatriates, and any other communities living in another country than their country of origin. The complexity of the term's definition and difficulties for setting the criteria of being a diaspora are differently perceived by the scholars in the field. The tendency of diasporization of every dispersed population[4] and crystallization of transnationalism as offspring of globalization have brought the debate on what diaspora and transnationalism are and are not. Considering the fact that both diaspora and transnationalism deal with the people living in another country than their country of origin even though they, in fact, point quite different phenomena, they have been used interchangeably. It has gradually become difficult to distinguish one from the other. Some scholars try to offer an alternative way for looking at transnational formations like Janine Dahinden who links diaspora and transnationalism to each other through the concepts of mobility and locality.[5] In Dahinden's approach, while mobility means the physical movement of people in transnational space,

[1] "Diaspora," Cambridge Dictionary, accessed on December 23, 2017, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/tr/s%C3%B6zl%C3%BCk/ingilizce/diaspora.
[2] "Diaspora," Lexico, accessed on August 8, 2020, https://www.lexico.com/definition/diaspora.
[3] Rogers Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 1.
[4] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora'," 4.
[5] Janine Dahinden, "The Dynamics of Migrants' Transnational Formations: Between Mobility and Locality," in the *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, ed. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008).

being stable and rooted in the country of immigration indicates the locality.[6] In this model, she categorizes transnational communities in four distinct groups: Localized diasporic transnational formations, localized mobile transnational formations, transnational mobiles, and transnational outsiders.[7] Dahinden's standpoint which proposes a continuum of transnational formations between mobility and locality is adopted as the primary approach in this paper since she argues the types of transnational formations more as an evolving processes by opening the question of the applicability of classical diaspora approaches in distinct contexts of the modern era up for discussion.

Turkish Citizens in Greece: A Potential Diasporic Transnationalism?

As neighboring countries that share various common values as well as common history, Greece and Turkey have become the focus of numerous distinct studies. Besides the significant comparative political or historical approaches, during the last decades, various sociological and anthropological researches have been published regarding people who were the subject of population exchange at the beginning of the 20th century or religious minorities. However, the recent movement of Turkish citizens from Turkey to Greece has not been observed yet by many scholars. The process has started in the end of the 2000s, with individual movements for education, family unifications or searching job. According to the Eurostat, 1,330 residence permits for Turkish citizens were issued in 2010, this number increased to 1,788 in 2016 and to 2573 in 2017 by following an upward trend despite the visibility of negative impacts of the economic crisis in Greece.[8] In the 2017 Turkish Constitutional Referendum, there were 10,572 eligible Turkish voters in Greece.[9] To have a functional analysis of this newly emerging transnational community, an online questionnaire was conducted with Turkish citizens currently living in Greece on December 2017 and finalized with 135 unique responses.

Findings of the questionnaire in relation to political context show that the Turkish transnational community in Greece has a particular political orientation and this is the constitutive motive of the immigration. They are young, highly educated, single individuals who left Turkey either immediately or few years after they graduated from university. The members of this community who are mostly from the cities of Western Anatolia locate themselves either on the left side or in the center of the political spectrum. The majority politically define themselves as secular leftists and they socio-economically have middle class or high middle-class background. While only 27.6% of all respondents define themselves as Muslim, 49.6% define as either atheist or non-religious. The ratio of deists with 16.2% is also surprisingly high. Therefore, low level of belief in Islam among the members appears as one of the common characteristics.

Two main reasons for leaving the country of origin that the respondents indicate are respectively political reasons and lifestyle. Based on the statements of different respondents about their reasons for leaving Turkey, it is observed that more than 50% of the respondents showed the current socio-political conditions, government policies, the conservatism of the society, and the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, himself, as the reasons for leaving. On the other hand, it is found that Greece is chosen by the respondents as a country of immigration because of cultural affinity, Greece's proximity to Turkey, job opportunities, and better living conditions. Mixed marriages, job offers and having an abroad experience appear as other important reasons. These results show that while there is a common

[6] Dahinden, "The Dynamics of Migrants' Transnational Formations," 51.
[7] Dahinden, "The Dynamics of Migrants' Transnational Formations," 53.
[8] "Asylum and Managed Migration Data," Eurostat, accessed on August 10, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database.
[9] "What you need to know about the Turkish referendum," DW, accessed on August 8, 2020, http://www.dw.com/en/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-turkish-referendum/a-38353168.

motive for leaving Turkey, reasons for immigration to Greece vary. The respondents prefer to settle in Greece since Greece is found geographically and culturally very close to Turkey but she is socially and politically quite different than Turkey. Therefore, it may be claimed that Greece is actually seen as the 'ideal' Turkey which particularly the people who define themselves secular, leftist, and progressive dream to live in.

Regarding the level of mobility and locality, this research found that 50.9% of the respondents have been in Greece more than 1 year but less than 4 years and thus, it is not possible to mention about an entirely highly localized or highly mobilized community but it is more a mixture of both. In a similar manner, the respondents were also asked to answer how often they visit Turkey and answers strengthened the abovementioned tendency towards locality. They still move back and forth between Turkey and Greece predominantly because of family obligations but they have, at the same time, intended to be localized. Considering the fact that 63.4% of the respondents are unable to speak Greek and are in more frequent contact with their community members than their Greek friends, their attachment with the society and the level of integration seem low. However, the responses also display that this emerging community consists of individuals who have high interest in learning Greek language, are willing to invest in Greece, and even to consider to be a fellow citizen. For instance, 61.6% of the respondents would like to apply for the Greek citizenship in the future.

In addition to that, when they were asked whether they feel Greece is their home, as it is demonstrated below, 82.1% of all respondents consider Greece as their home. The same question was also formulated for Turkey to compare the respondents' attachments with their country of origin and the results reveal that 59.8% of the respondents call Turkey as their home. Even though diasporic understanding of home/homeland may be deconstructed by trying to find different answers to the question of what and where home is,[10] the imagination of home/homeland still matters as an indicator of the sense of belonging and it is also a constitutive part of diaspora identity. When it is compared, the respondents' attachment to Greece as a receiving country seems stronger than their attachment to Turkey. Similarly, while 80,2% of all respondents indicate that they feel happier in Greece than Turkey, 78,2% feel themselves more secure in Greece than Turkey. Within this scope, 41,1% of all respondents underline about their future in Greece that they definitely want to stay and spend their life in Greece and 67,9% mark that they love being in Greece. All these findings reveal that there is a strong tendency of the community members to be localized.

Conclusion

This paper was constructed on two main questions: "What is the reason for this new small-scale immigration wave?" and "what are the characteristics and potentials of this newly emerging Turkish community in Greece?" In this direction, the dynamics of this community was examined to identify its transnational character and potentials to evolve to a diasporic transnational community through the analysis of the questionnaire as well as the contribution of the observations in the field.

Based on the analysis of the questionnaire, it is found that there are three different types of people in the same community and they may be defined as following: *Decisive migrant* who has immigrated to Greece to live permanently; i*nclined indecisive migrant* who has immigrated to Greece with a reason temporarily but voluntarily continued to stay by not being sure about the future and they can also be defined as the mid-group; *reluctant indecisive migrant* who has come to Greece because of an opportunity for a limited period but involuntarily continued to stay by searching new opportunities elsewhere. This

[10] Robin Cohen, "Solid, Ductile, and Liquid: Changing Notions of Homeland and Home in Diaspora Studies," QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS156, 2007, accessed August 8, 2020, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6759343.pdf.

typology shows another challenge to the permanence of the Turkish community in Greece. The mid-group, inclined indecisive migrants, will highly likely determine the future of the community. It seems that according to their prospective activities, the Turkish transnational community would either evolve a localized diasporic transnational formation or lose its potential to become a transnational diaspora. Within this framework, with reference to the Dahinden's typology, the Turkish community in Greece is a localized mobile transnational formation due to the simultaneous existence of the concepts of mobility and locality. As Dahinden describes, immigrants, here, themselves, experience immigration and they still move back and forth between Greece and Turkey keeping their ties strong with the country of origin due to the family obligations, friends, and holidays.[11] They earn money in Greece and through increasing numbers of mixed marriages, start to have a permanent life there. There is an idea of groupness among the immigrants through their ethnic identity and political stances more than religious affiliation and it also makes their adaptation with Greek society easier. Nevertheless, they have not built a strong network with the institutions of Greece yet and their social and political networks in the hosting country still seem weak. In other words, this new emerging transnational community has not been politicized yet in Greece and this is the reason why it is not likely, for the moment, to call this community as a diasporic transnational formation even if it has the potential to evolve in the future.

The permanence of the community highly depends on the political conditions in Turkey. The immigration trend can easily shift in case of the disappearance of political reasons for immigration and returns may start. As another challenge, the relations between Greece and Turkey which are pretty fragile due to many crucial unresolved conflicts should also be taken under consideration whilst analyzing the permanence of the Turkish community in Greece. Last but not least, it is also important to keep in mind the increasing number of asylum applications to Greece from Turkey immediately after the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016 since it is going to have an impact on the structure of the Turkish community in Greece.[12]

In consequence, the outcome of this research presents a very positive tendency towards the community's permanence in Greece despite the socio-political and economic challenges previously referred. It is not possible to predict the future but it is possible to keep observing such formations and their evolution to understand the complex structure of today's world and human networks. When the questionnaire was shared, almost all the respondents were very enthusiastic to be involved in it. One of them wrote that he was very surprised and grateful that someone finally realized them and their existence. I believe, it means a lot. This is just an initial attempt to identify the characteristics of this newly emerging community and it is worth to have further studies.

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[11] Dahinden, "The Dynamics of Migrants' Transnational Formations," 55.

[12] While the number of all asylum applicants from Turkey to Greece was 190 in 2016 and it reached to 1825 in 2017. For more: "Asylum Statistics," Eurostat, accessed on August 8, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Number_of_asylum_applicants:_increase_in_2019.

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

RETURN MIGRATION TENDENCIES OF TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE UK

Tuncay Bilecen[1]

Introduction

The main aim of the study I proposed was to find out the impact of religious/ sectarian, ethnic, and socio-cultural belonging as well as the demographics of the Turkish population living in the UK in their decision to return to their country of origin. A further aim of this study was to investigate the motivation of those who first returned to Turkey and then migrated back into the UK for various reasons.

Within this framework, answers are sought for the following questions:

Is there a relationship between migrants' gender, age distribution, occupation, level of income, and language proficiency and their tendency to return?

Is there a relation between the various economic, political, marital, educational factors and the migrants' move to London in the first place as well as their later wish to return?

Is there a difference between the first- and second-generation migrants in their approach to return?

Is there a meaningful relationship between the ethnic and religious/sectarian identities as well as the migrants' social class and their intentions for repatriation?

Does the social environment of migrants influence their decision to return?
Do social exclusion, discrimination or low and irregular income enforce the wish to return?
Have they secured employment in their home country, will they work in a position or start a business of their own and what kind of a social environment will they live in upon their return?
Do they have any relatives who have returned?
What are the factors for the decision to re-migrate for those who moved to Turkey and later returned to London?

Data and Methodology

The data found in this study is comprised of semi-structured interviews as one of the qualitative research methods, participatory observation and news sources that are published about the community from Turkey residing in London.

A sample of 41 individuals were selected using simple random sampling as well as snowball sampling method, during January and September 2019. While selecting the sample, special attention was paid to obtaining a consistent distribution of class, sectarian and ethnic positions, as well as age and gender.

[1] Assoc.Prof. Kocaeli University. Dr Bilecen has received a research grant from TÜBİTAK (2219 Postdoctoral Study Abroad Scholarship), tuncaybilecen@gmai.com.

Interviews lasted between 40 to 80 minutes. During the recorded interviews, the names of the interviewees were not audiotaped. Instead, each interviewee was assigned a symbolic number from one to 41.Additionally, an extensive review of the literature was carried out. The literature review particularly focused on previous studies about the return migration.

Gender	
Women	22
Men	19
Migration age	
Born in the UK	1
< 18	3
18 – 29	26
30 – 39	5
40 – 49	3
50+	3
Education	
High school	16
University	17
Master	7
PhD	1
Marital Status	
Married	25
Singel	16

As it can be seen the participants of this research has a well-educated background, which means we can regard them as highly-skilled migrants. From 41 interviewers, 19 returned to Turkey but re-migrated to the United Kingdom again for various reasons; 9 immigrants already are in Turkey, and 9 co-live in both countries. Four immigrants in the interview stated that they definitely intend to return to Turkey. After spending an average of 3.3 years in Turkey, interviewers re-migrated to the United Kingdom. The 12 interviewers after spending less time in 2 years, re-migrated to the United Kingdom.

Turkish Community in the UK

Migration from Turkey to the United Kingdom following the labour migration from the countries such as India, Pakistan and Jamaica for about two centuries, the first big migration flow to the United Kingdom come from Ireland, and that was followed by the Jewish migration from Central Europe and the Italian migration from North Italy (King et al., 2008, p. 424). Even though the immigration from Cyprus and Turkey to the United Kingdom continued in the 1970s, migration from Turkey in these years remained extremely limited. For example, it is stated that only 6 thousand people migrated to Britain under the bilateral agreement until 1980 (Karaçay, 2012: 405).

The migration from Turkey to the UK is highly irregular and mostly due to political reasons. In the 90s, migrants who were mostly of Kurdish and the Alevi communities took residence in the Eastern and Northern parts of London whilst the textile industry was dominant. Due to migration taking place from cities such as Maraş, Sivas, Kayseri and Malatya London began to host a remarkable Turkish community (Bilecen&Araz, 2015; Bilecen, 2016; Demir, 2012:824). At this point, transitivity between Kurdish and Alevi identities shouldn't be ignored. This transitivity between ethnicity and sect affects the political manners and behaviours of migrants in Britain.

After the textile industry ended, these people with their accumulated capitals became self-employed. They opened up their own particular small-scale businesses, such as off licence, cafe shops and restaurants. Because of this economic activity, the migrant community have built a strong business network among themselves. These business relations have led the community to form an 'ethnic economy' and thus, actively organised around an informal economic practices. The labour force of these businesses is made up mostly of their own family members, relatives. (Karaosmanoğlu, 2013: 373; Dedeoğlu, 2014; Bilecen, 2016; Enneli et al., 2005).

The population of the immigrants from Turkey, who mainly located in North and East London, continued to grow in the 1990s. Nowadays, Hackney, Haringey, Enfield, Islington, Waltham Forest and Lewisham are the boroughs of London where the immigrants from Turkey mainly reside. According to the 2001 Census data, the population of the Turkish Cypriot community in the United Kingdom was estimated around 120,000. Today, together with the Turkish Cypriots, the estimated population of the immigrants from Turkey is around 300.000 (Sirkeci & Bilecen et al, 2016).

In recent years, it is seen that the number of people who have been applying for the Ankara Agreement visa has increased. According to the Home Office data, 3135 applications were applied for in 2015, 3560 applications in 2016, 5205 applications in 2017 and 7607 applications in 2018. In 2019, this figure is estimated to exceed 8 thousand. Significantly, it is obvious that migrants permitted under the conditions of Ankara agreement differ from the first-generation Turkish immigrants in terms of education, age, the socio-cultural environment and qualification. Therefore, the tendency of return for this group of migrants also differed (Bilecen, 2016; Bilecen, 2020).

Methodological and Theoretical Debates in Return Migration Literature

Literature concerning migration has been eerily quiet when it comes to return migration. One possible explanation for this is that the theoretical and methodological tools of migration studies were not particularly designed for the purpose of comprehending return migration. Another explanation is the lack of academic consensus on how to evaluate return migration. Migration studies traditionally have classified return migrants as "failures," in other words migration studies has been overly focusing on "winners," so much so that it has been overlooking return migration, and tends easily to categorise it as "failure." (Tezcan, 2018) Because migration studies generally focus on onward migration, it can sideline the fact that most migrants either return to their home countries or moving towards a third country (Bijwaard and Doeselaar, 2014).

Return migration is usually defined as migrants returning to their home countries from the countries they have aspired to settle as residents. However, no consensus on the definition exists. In early literature, this issue has been discussed as migrants returning home due to retirement, or due to losing their jobs because of political reasons (Rajan & Akhil, 2019).

It is well-known that international migration statistics suffer from absolute correctness and coherency. Statistics on return migration are weaker; a significant number of countries do not even record the number of return migrants. There is a wide confusion regarding who counts as return migrants. According to King (1978) in many studies, the efforts to explain return migration are insufficient because return can rarely be explained by a single causal factor. In general, these decisions are taken by the unification of a variety of factors.

It is very hard indeed to categorise return under certain headlines. This happens because most of the time even migrants themselves do not know why they want to return, or their reasons for return could be tied up with a variety of personal, psychological, familial, cultural, social, economic, and political reasons. Within this frame, the study and examination of the reasons and forms of migration,

the entry status of countries one migrates to, the migrants' positions within the labour market, their social class, the spatial, financial, political and cultural dynamics of the process of unification, separation, and social exclusion in their home countries (Purkis, Gönger, 2015). Therefore, because return migration literature has to consider a lot of independent and different parameters, it is altogether challenging to categorise these studies.

In migration studies, return migration has been covered and patterned from a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives. A classical approach is to explain migration through push and pull factors. For instance, Gmelch (1983) has considered and categorised the causes of return migration under these terms. If one follows this approach, one sees that while in some cases negative influence and the push factor is effective in the decision to return, in others the positive factors in the home country can have a pull factor. The main push forces can be summarised as political or social pressure in the newly-settled country, a law that limits residency time, insufficient accommodation, lack of economic equality in opportunity (such as not being able to get promotions), and problems regarding adaptation. The pull factors which force one to return can be thought of as that the job market in the home country has developed, force of familial tides (including the expectation to marry and settle), investments in housing, land and work, and hopes of retirement (King, 1978; 176). However, one should be careful not to generalise here, because each state has its own unique political, economic, cultural and bureaucratic conditions.

The neo-classical approach focuses on rational choice and human capital, thereby on certain characteristic features of settled and home countries, on age, level of education, push and pull factors that surround movements of migration (Bailey & Law, 2013; 22) This perspective explains return migration through the prism of cost and benefit and/or unmet wag expectations. Migrants usually settle in other places to maximise their gainings. "Failure" is defined as a situation in which migrants are unable to gain the benefits they thought they could. This interpretation of return migration conceptualises migration as a "one-sided process" as it presupposes that migrants migrate only to permanently settle in their destinations. If life conditions in the newly-settled country are satisfactory, it is illogical to return. In short, in this perspective, those who win stay, and those who fail, return.

In contrast to the neo-classical approach, the new economics of labour perspective that focuses on labour and migration economy views return migration, with regards to work experience and/or lower economic benefits, as a way of maximising economic gainings (Fong, 2012). The new economics of labour model (NELM) sees migration as a process influenced by the economic ups and downs of settled-countries, rather than a personal decision made by household members, it perceives migrations as a strategy of subsistence (Stark, 1995). Thus, NELM sees return migration not as "failure" but as a sign of "success" (Tezcan, 2019: 131).

The view which argues that return migration is part of a process of optimal decision making rests on the presupposition that in their lifespans individuals make strategic decisions to maximise their total benefits (Hamdouch & Wahba, 2015). Migrants who are unable to make psychical or human capital in their new countries come to realise that they can utilise their accumulated gainings to better ends in their home countries. The migrants' savings in their new countries have higher purchase power in their home countries. According to the perspective which views migration as a result of optimal decision-making, individuals are to be perceived as rational economic decision-makers (Kirdar, 2012: 455).

Anthropologically considered, what takes the place of success/failure narratives of return migration is the social and cultural needs that individuals yearn for in their home countries (Fong, 2012).

These varied methodological approaches to migration studies are responses to one another within the contingency of historical conditions. For instance, as a response to the quantity-based and

positivistic approaches, geographers who examined migration in 1970s integrated quality-based ethnographic methods into their studies. Thus, geographical studies that concern migration began to embrace ethnographic studies.

Those who use ethnographic methods criticise quantity-based approaches as determinist and disregardful of the individual's role. Ethnography generally focuses on participant observation, interviews, and various visual interpreters. New digital technologies, digital video recording and other methods, has been used to improve upon this method. According to Noble (2013) what makes ethnography so useful to those who study return migration is its strengths in comprehending variety and hybridity, and its capacity to reveal contingency.

Ethnographic perspectives render life stories a part of the study and thus it allows the participant to connect their past, present and future. This does not necessitate that the participants story ought to be handled chronologically. As interviews which focus on life stories allow for a discussion of a variety of subjects, they give the researches significant room for movement.

Another method used in return migration studies is critical realism. This method significantly allows analysis on multiple levels especially by combining different methodologies together. According to Purkis and Gönder (2015) critical realism opens up a space to examine migration through economic, political, institutional, social, spatial, and gender perspectives. It also helps to test the limits of a specific approach in migration studies in understanding migration.

The "mixed migration" approach in recent years has been quite popular, it allows for a many-sided perspective and seeks to deconstruct binary categories such as inner/outer migration, obligatory/willing migration, political/economic migration, listed/unlisted, formal/informal migration etc. All migration flows have triggering and visible reasons, behind these reasons there could also be a gathering of invisible factors which makes migration unique and worth studying. Therefore, "mixed migration" as a concept, is useful at considering the many-sidedness of migration flows and to evade reductionist views (Purkis, Gönder, 2015; Dişbudak and Purkis, 2015). However, as this approach demolishes categorisations it also makes it harder to find meaningful patterns. In other words, while attempting to deconstruct binaries considering migration, the mixed migration approach risks putting all types of migration into a big whole.

The Research Results

In the context of this theoretical framework when the results of the interviews are examined:

1. "The family factor" and "homeland longing" were the most common reasons among those who have already migrated and who intend to return to their home country. Most of the interviewees stated that they had returned or had the intention of returning because of their longing for their homeland and the relatives they had left behind.
2. Another reason is related to social integration. At this point, factors such as linguistic proficiency, professional qualifications, position in the labour market and the social environment play a key role. Furthermore, failure to adapt to the climate and culture of the host country are also reasons for their return.
3. Especially in the recent years, it has seen that the number of people who have been applying for the Ankara Agreement visa has increased. Among these migrants the reasons for return decision are mainly due to employment / living difficulties related to this type of visa and the problems of adapting to the host country's labour market. Additionally, many of Ankara Agreement Visa holders could not benefit the government COVID -19-aid packet due to their special visa type.

4. When we look at the relationship between age and return, it is seen that the return intention is higher amongst immigrants over 40 years of age. Therefore, I describe that as a middle-age crisis of migrants.
5. Sense of loneliness and nostalgia are the main reasons in terms of return tendency for the first-generation particularly among the middle age migrants.
6. When we look at the relationship between the return and the generations, while the first generation's tendency to return is mainly to do with the loneliness, homesickness, and integration issues; the second generation is returning to Turkey for better career opportunities or/and to do investment.
7. Immigrants who retired in the host country mostly prefer to spend a few months a year in Turkey instead returning permanently.
8. The main reason for re-migration can be economic difficulties. Not being able to find a suitable job or create a viable business in Turkey has encouraged migration back to the UK.
9. Another reason to re-migrate is for a better education and future for their children.
10. There have been a number of migrants who return to the UK having failed to adapt to their home country's social and cultural environment.
11. Political and economic uncertainty, security concerns, and experience of civility in the public sphere are among the other reasons for re-migration.
12. Regarding the decision to return to their home country, no significant conclusions could be reached with regards to gender.
13. It was found that there was situations where all members of the family reached a consensus. In some cases, the inability to reach a mutual decision led to conflict and essentially a geographical separation of families between the UK and Turkey.

Conclusion and Comments

The first generation migrants (the pensioners) spend their time in Turkey for a couple of months however some of them stay as short as a month since there is the fear of losing the social benefits in the UK. The pattern in the return migration for this so-called first generation tend to show similarities.

According to this study, although most participants have the intention of returning to Turkey, they have no concrete plans to do so. Most of the immigrants instead of "definitely going back" prefer to spend a number of months a year in Turkey. This is due to the fact that transportation technology is advanced and cheap and, in addition, today's world is characterised by flexible working conditions especially now after the Covid 19.

In terms of return migration and re-migration, this study reveals that family factor is one of the key reasons rather than the ethnic and sectarian factors. Especially among the immigrants who are over the middle age, the psychological factors which can be expressed as "middle-age crisis" in immigration have significant impact as well as the feeling of nostalgia and loneliness triggering the idea of returning.

As for the gender perspective, we see that some women don't feel free and secure thus do not intend to return to Turkey. On the other hand, in the second generation of women immigrants, the desire to avoid the pressure of the family in London is a reason to return to Turkey.

According to the results of the interviews, the atmosphere of insecurity after the July 15 failed coup attempt has a significant impact on the migration and re-migration decisions. At this point, the

concerns about the future of their children for parents have been effective in their migration decision.

Migration is not a movement from point A to point B. Immigrants are always on the move. Therefore, they make an endless journey between the source country and the destination country. During this journey, they carry their culture, experiences and accumulation.

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RETURN MIGRATION, SOCIAL INTEGRATION, AND BRAIN GAIN: WENZHOU MIGRATION'S RETURN TO CHINA AND RELEVANT POLICIES IN HOST AND HOME COUNTRIES

Libei Wu

Introduction

With the development of transportation and communication technologies around the globe, international migration has become a frequently discussed topic and an accessible possibility for people in developing economies, such as China and India. This growth in the total number of immigrants does not, however, owe itself exclusively to the movement of people from developing to developed countries. Some migrants in developed host countries choose to move back to their home countries because of various incentives and motivations—a phenomenon generally coined as 'return migration'. This paper explores the major causes of return migration as well as its effects on both host and home countries, focusing on migrants from Wenzhou, a coastal city in South China famous for its global entrepreneurship.

With new knowledge, technologies, capital or simply just broader life experiences acquired in host countries, return migrants can bring back innovations to help revitalise their home economy, as well as improve productivity. At the same time, it also suggests unnoticed outflows of talents from host countries. Since China's Reform and Opening-up, many European countries like Spain, Italy, and France have continuously received huge amounts of Chinese migrants, especially from its coastal areas and major cities like Wenzhou, which typifies this pattern with its contribution of an enormous number of emigrants during different periods through Chinese history.[1]

Besides being a common phenomenon among Wenzhou migrants in the decade, return migration is also among the most widely discussed issues related to international migration since the 1980s.[2] As a significant form of migration, return migration is widely observed between the United States, Europe, and less developed regions (Dustmann 1995). Much of past literature uses the term 'return migration' to refer to migrants who move back to the home countries. However, this paper employs the term 'reverse migration' to refer to a narrower range of returnees and therefore to form a more precise conceptualisation of migration. As will be further discussed in the following chapters, these concepts represent two partly overlapping migration groups: in this paper, return migration means the movement conducted by migrants from host to home countries, while reverse migration refers to the return behaviour that migrants give up long-term residential permits of host countries and move back home permanently.

[1.] Though the history of Wenzhou emigration can date to late Qing Dynasty and a large number of Wenzhou people moved out of mainland China before the 1950s, social and economic isolation of the Chinese society owing to ideological differences from the West had blocked most of its population outflow between 1949 and 1978. Strict restrictions on cross-border movements were adopted, while internal controls on population mobility were achieved via strong policies, e.g. household registration and work permits. It was after beginning of China's Reform and Opening-Up policy in 1978 that Wenzhou began to send its migrants abroad again.

[2.] See, Bohning, W.R., 1984. Studies in international labour migration; Glytsos, N.P., 1988. Remittances in temporary migration: A theoretical model and its testing with the Greek-German experience. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 124(3), pp.524-549.

Due to the global economic interactions, an extremely high level of Wenzhou return migration occurred almost simultaneously in Europe and the United States, right after the subprime mortgage crisis between 2007 and 2010. This crisis resulted in widespread bankruptcies and loan shortages for business worldwide. In China, it caused a sharp decline of exports, which was devastating to private economies, especially in the export-oriented provinces of Guangdong and Zhejiang, where Wenzhou is located. The Chinese government, however, adopted a bold 4-trillion-yuan stimulus plan in order to boost its domestic production and consumption. As this episode shows, to explore the causes and consequences of the return migration of the Wenzhou people, we have to simultaneously consider a variety of factors in both the home and destination countries. In particular, three key questions arise: first, under what circumstances large-scale return migration can occur; second, what are the consequences of major waves of return migration; third, whether existing policies are effective in dealing with return migration.

Moreover, cross-country comparison is essential in this study, as different countries attracted different types of migrants from Wenzhou. For example, the Wenzhou migrants in the United States (mainly California in this paper) differ significantly from their fellow countrymen in Spain, the other major host country. Unlike Wenzhou migrants who return to China from Spain, those from California tend to seek business opportunities back in China while keeping their family in the host country. In the process of migration decision-making, human capital factors such as gender, age, wages, education, etc. are of great importance. Migrants without extraordinary wealth or outstanding educational background, in other words, with limited accumulation of human capital, still participate in the process of cross-border movements as a majority, such as many migrants from Wenzhou. Accordingly, to explore the factors behind the decision-making of Wenzhou migrants' return to China could be socio-economically instructive to both the home and host countries.

The first section of this paper surveys basic concepts and theories about migration and return migration to show various factors in migrants' decisions to return home. The following two sections draw upon interviews and published sources to explain a wide range of determinants of return migration to Wenzhounese from California and Spain. The last section examines existing policies and regulations for emigrants and returnees in China at both local and national levels. I also give suggestions for potential new mechanism that would help China better cope with the growing number of return migrants and make fuller use of their human capital in the long run.

The Conceptualisation of Return Migration

Basic Concepts Related to Return Migration

Although the total number of cross-border migrants keep rising since the Second World War and embraces unprecedented booms after dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of Soviet Union, and China's Reform, most international migrants from less developed to developed countries stay temporarily rather than permanently (Hill 1987). Accordingly, temporary migration, namely return migration, has become dominant in the pool of long-term cross-border settlers, while as a high-profile political and social issue, migration therefore constitutes a major topic of multi-disciplinary scholarly dialogue, especially after the European refugee crisis in 2015.

Since the 1980s, Borjas, Cassarino, Dustmann and many other scholars have collectively built a solid foundation for immigration research.[3] However, the inconsistent use of jargon in different

[3]. See, Borjas, G.J., 1985. Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of immigrants. *Journal of labor Economics*, 3(4), pp.463-489. Borjas, G.J., 1994. Ethnicity, neighborhoods, and human capital externalities (No. w4912). *National Bureau of Economic Research*. Borjas, G.J., 1995. The economic benefits from immigration. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(2), pp.3-22. Cassarino, J.P., 2004. *Theorising return migration:*

academic context continues to cause confusion and misunderstanding. For more constructive discussion of issues of international migration, I first clarify definitions of terms used in this paper. I use the term migration to refer to all the individuals who move across borders regardless of their legal status of stay; while immigration and emigration represent the perspectives of host and home countries respectively.[4] Legal immigration or legal migration refer to individuals who stay in host countries with legal long-term (usually more than one year) residential permission. By contrast, illegal immigration or illegal migration refer to individuals who remain unauthorised stay in host countries, disregard of the way they enter those countries.[5] Immigrant candidates are defined as migrants who stay with short-term residential permission and await authorisation for a long-term stay; while those who hold strong motivation like overseas family links can be regarded as potential (e)migrants. Return migration signifies individuals who have first completed emigration and later made return movements from host countries to home countries. This group is also called temporary migration in much of literature from the 1980s to 1990s.[6]

Migration is a dynamic process that involves the movement and nurture of human capital, following changing demands of different labour markets. As an effective method to acquire human capital, return migration has inevitably drawn attention both from academics and policymakers, and thus challenged both home and host governments with request for solutions to subsequent problems arisen along. In this paper, I use r-verse migration as a sub-concept of return migration, rather than using the two terms interchangeably as some authors do. For precise categorisation of migration, it should be worth expounding the relationship between the two concepts.

Reverse Migration and Return Migration

Reverse migration refers to the movement back to home countries conducted by migrants or their offspring with long-term residential permission from their host countries. It can also refer to people who perform such movement. Similar decisions made by immigrant candidates are categorised as return migration. Dustmann (1994a) defines return migration as the return movement before migrants' retirement, no matter whether the migrants stay legally or illegally in host countries. Regardless of the definitions of return migration and reverse migration, the latter has a smaller scale because long-term residential permission places a strict standard on applicants and the process of application is usually cost-consuming. With this narrower range, reverse migration is more likely to occur among first-generation immigrants with successful career achievements and second-generation immigrants with better education and capital.

On the one hand, the successful first-generation immigrants, such as researchers, businessmen, and other professionals, own affluent human capital and are more capable of moving freely for the maximum use of skills to earn higher rewards in home countries (considering the comparative scarcity of their skills and capabilities in less developed countries where they originally come from). Hence, reverse migration can be regarded as a positive selection of migration and brain gain to the home countries since it is an inflow of labour with highly-rewarded skills (Kwok & Leland 1982; Borjas &

The conceptual approach to return migrants revisited. Dustmann, C., 1996. Return migration: the European experience. *Economic Policy*, 11(22), pp.213-250. Dustmann, C., 1997. Return migration, uncertainty and precautionary savings. *Journal of Development Economics*, 52(2), pp.295-316.

[4]. Emigration refers to the natives who conduct movement out of their homes; by contrast, outmigration does not limit the individuals who make movements but widely concludes the behaviour of leaving the current residences.

[5]. In some research papers, irregular migration is used to refer to illegal immigration or migration.

[6]. See, Glytsos, N.P., 1988. Remittances in temporary migration: A theoretical model and its testing with the Greek-German experience. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 124(3), pp.524–549. Dustmann, C., 1993. Earnings adjustment of temporary migrants. *Journal of Population Economics*, 6(2), pp.153-168. Dustmann, C., 1999. Temporary migration, human capital, and language fluency of migrants. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 101(2), pp.297-314.

Bratsberg 1996). On the other hand, it is very likely that the second generation of immigration take advantage of better social resources of education, technologies and commerce to develop their human capital. Researchers empirically examine this positive impact that a well-established education system and social appreciation of education have remarkable implications on the educational performance of second-generation immigrants.[7]

Having been thoroughly analysed with the determinants ranging from the investment of time to acquired skills centred with human capital, return migration is closely related to international study and employment.[8] Some researchers believe that individuals, especially student migrants, choose to learn skills in other countries to acquire higher rewards in their home countries afterwards (Dustmann, Fadlon, & Weiss, 2011). In the perspective of human capital accumulation, return migration is mainly economy-driven. Wage differentials between home and host country are regarded as the crucial factor in self-selective migration behaviours, though de Coulon and Piracha (2005) considers that return migration is negatively selected and return migrants usually earn less than non-migrants. In some cases, environmental factors might have the power to outweigh substantial economic benefits and induce return migration. Family ties, in particular, turn out to be a decisive consideration for return migration, especially for Chinese student migrants born under the one-child policy. No matter whether the migratory flow is positively or negatively selected, return migration always strengthens the characteristics of stayers in host countries, since specific criteria are set for different groups of migration (Borjas & Bratsberg 1996). These conclusions can be instructive to immigration and industrial policies, which always alter the environment of the labour market in host countries. Moreover, uncertainties and consequent risks brought by changes of immigration-related policies also stimulate return migration (Galor & Stark 1991, 1990).

Compared to the return migration, which features more complex and diverse causes such as like taking care of family members left in home countries, reverse migration is primarily determined by economic incentives. For return migration, environmental and cultural factors may play more critical roles. However, most migrants, including numerous refugees, are overall economic migrants in nature. Therefore, behaviours influenced by the possibility of return could result in economic changes in host countries. For example, Dustmann observes that differences on remittances, savings and investments in host countries appear between migrants prone to return and those without return plans (Galor & Stark 1991). Additionally, large-scale return migration could result in a temporary shortage of labour in host countries while cause labour surplus and a series of social problems in home countries.

Wenzhounese Return Migrants from Spain and California

As we discuss in the previous section, return migration is driven by economic factors in most, if not all, cases. The considerable total amount of immigrants in host countries, including legal immigrants (shown in table 1) and illegal stayers whose size is difficult to estimate, makes large-scale return migration possible when the dominant factors of their cross-border behaviour change. Together with continuous adjustments to immigration-related policies in host countries and the rise of China's economic power, the total number of return migrants has soared in the last ten years. It includes a large scale of international Chinese students who choose to go home after a period of study abroad.

7. Betts, J., 1998. *Educational crowding out: do immigrants affect the educational attainment of American minorities?*. Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. and Lanzara, G., 2012. Educational achievement of second-generation immigrants: an international comparison. *Economic Policy*, 27(69), pp.143-185.
8. See, Dustmann, C., 1994. *Return intentions of migrants: theory and evidence (No. 906)*. CEPR Discussion Papers, Dustmann, C., 1995. Savings behavior of return migrants. *Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften*, 115, pp.511-533. Borjas, G.J. and Bratsberg, B., 1994. Who leaves? The outmigration of the foreign-born (No. w4913). *National Bureau of Economic Research*. De Coulon, A. and Piracha, M., 2005. Self-selection and the performance of return migrants: the source country perspective. *Journal of Population Economics*, 18(4), pp.779-807.

Undoubtedly, this number would continue rising due to the huge potential of China's domestic market with growing work opportunities and increasing wages. According to the official statistics published by China's Ministry of Education, the gap between the outflow and inflow of Chinese students has been dramatically decreasing since 2008.[9] With parents' deep pockets and emphasis on better education, Wenzhounese account for a relatively considerable proportion of both the outflow and inflow of Chinese international students.[10]

Table 1. Numbers of Legal Immigration in Spain and California from 1990 to 1999

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Spain*	278,700	360,700	393,100	430,400	461,400	499,800	539,000	609,800	719,600	801,300
California **	186,225	194,317	238,281	247,253	205,872	165,315	199,483	201,666	169,541	161,245

Source: * OECD SOPEMI Report, 2001: 282

** Legal Immigration to California by County, 1984-2016s

Spain: Passive Return Movement of Low-skilled Migration

In the 1980s, the labour shortage in Western Europe was greatly relieved by the influxes of guest workers from countries like Eastern Europe and some adjacent countries like Turkey, and therefore return migration kept occurring among those temporary migrants. However, the strong economy of western Europe still drives migrants from less-developed countries to flood in and settle. At the same time, southern European countries including Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal became new destinations for immigration (Geddes 2003).

Based on the fact of a fast-growing number of immigrants, Spain redefined itself as an immigration country in the 1980s and later adopted a series of policies to deal with its immigration issues, especially after it joined the European Union in 1986 (Geddes 2003). However, compared to Germany and Switzerland, strict control over frontiers has turned out to be less feasible in southern European countries with popular tourist destinations like Spain, France, and Italy, since individuals with the intention of illegal long-term stay can easily cross the border with valid tourist visas. The statistics shows that legally resident foreigners occupy only a tiny percentage of the total population of foreigners in these countries. By contrast, the fact implies a large size of illegal immigrants concentrated not only in many major cities of Western and Southern European countries but also their small towns with potential business opportunities perceived by foreigners. This is especially the case with the Wenzhounese driven by their entrepreneurial spirit and business tradition. Supported by my fieldwork observations and interviews, it is important to point out that the majority of Wenzhou migrants who arrived in host countries from the 1990s to early 2000s were illegal migration at their initial period of stay.

Most migrants move to other countries for better economic gains and higher living standards and accordingly return when the host economy becomes less vigorous or even lacklustre. With a broad base number of immigrants, it is natural that the number of returnees from Europe increases. In terms

9. Minister of Education of the People's Republic of China, *Statistics of Chinese Citizens Studying aboard in 2016* (2016 niandu woguo chuguo liuxue renyuan qingkuang tongji), 1 Mar 2017, http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_fbh/moe_2069/xwfbh_2017n/xwfb_170301/170301_sjtj/201703/t20170301_297676.html. (Accessed on 20 Sept. 2018).
10. Interviews with officials of the Chinese consulates Los Angeles were conducted in June 2018.

of return rate and timing, analysis of return migration from the United States indicates that its immigrants usually make a two-decade period of stay with the return rate of 20 - 30% in general, and this applies particularly to migrants originally from Asian countries with low wage rates (Mayr & Peri, 2008; Warren & Kraly, 1985; Warren & Peck, 1980). Triggered by both the hypothetical twenty-year return timing and China's economic prosperity, return migrants from these countries constitute the majority of China's population influx after the craze of going abroad started predominating in the 1990s and early 2000s. Against this background, Wenzhou migrants do not only act as pioneers and mainstream Chinese immigrants, but also follows the more recent trend of moving home. Information provided by Chinese consulates and relevant literature shows that in the recent decade the total number of Wenzhou return migrants from Spain outnumbers those from California.[11] Compared to Wenzhou migrants who work as engineers in northern California and general clerks in retail stores or wholesale companies in southern California, Wenzhou migrants in Spain shows a considerably higher return rate and more favourable attitude to the idea of the return to China. Wage differentials play a crucial role in this significant divergence.

Unlike their fellow countrymen with a higher education background in northern California, the return of Wenzhou migrants from Spain is more likely to be negatively selective rather than a relocation positively driven by rent-seeking of accumulated human capital. Dustmann (1994) argues that high rewards to human capital in their home countries can be internal motives of return migration. Likewise, other scholars claim that returnees are fully aware of their increased human capital and therefore achieve the maximum utility of their advantages by returning home (Zweig et al. 2006). However, such positive self-selection, represented by inspiring returning-home-with-honour stories, cannot explain the motivation of less-skilled immigrants to move back to their home countries.

Among Wenzhou people abroad, high-skilled migrants stay longer in one place while low-skilled ones make more geographic movements. This pattern makes the Wenzhou migration a unique case among other migrant groups. Gundel and Peters (2008) believe that highly skilled migrants have a higher possibility to re-migrate or return than those relatively less skilled. It does not imply that high-skilled migrants prefer frequent movements, which might be harmful to continual human capital accumulation. Rather, it indicates that highly skilled migrants are more capable of moving freely with better accesses to social resources including information and job opportunities, while low-skilled migrants might get stuck in host places with limited capability to carry on their seeking-for-more-benefits journey.

California: Obvious Divergence Contributed by Different Industries

According to the migratory history of Wenzhou people to California, the majority arrived after 2000 and are known as 'newcomers', many of whom set up their businesses first in China and then moved to the United States mainly for non-commercial purposes. In many cases, their legal status was investment immigrants, which means they have to extend and run businesses there as a compulsory criterion of their legal residence. For these immigrants, any economic fluctuation and policy adjustment in either home or host country could result in return behaviour. As mentioned above, Wenzhou migrants in California might be more sensitive to wages because a sizable amount of Wenzhounese work as employees in big companies or research institutes rather than run their own business.

Regardless of return or not, it is evident that Wenzhou migration in California has sharp internal divergence brought by different industries. Most of Wenzhou migrants assembling in Southern

11. The Chinese consulates in the United States and Spain do not make statistics of Chinese return migration.

California are self-employed in wholesale and retailing businesses. It is similar to their fellow townsmen who almost monopolise Spain's wholesale and retail stores of light industrial goods imported from China. Wenzhounese in northern California follows the pattern adopted by most immigrants there and is concentrated in higher education and the IT industry, in which northern California has a global advantage. Therefore, there are two modes for returnees with work experience from California in general: a high portion of them return and work for big companies or research agencies or do start-ups with the help of preferential policies in high-tech parks set in China's major cities; others set up companies and run business in China while retaining their residence abroad. The latter is called the 'dumbbell mode', which is usually conducted by entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley and the greater Los Angeles Area (Hsu & Saxenian, 2000). It is worth noting that not only the advantage of technology leads the entrepreneurs to take this tactic but also capital obtained in the United States, social connections and the awareness of legislative and political uncertainties on the private property protection in China. Individuals who take this strategy should be categorised more precisely as reverse migration, as defined in section one. Most of them are like sojourners since they usually spend more time in China and regularly visit California for their family and legal residence.

Six interviews of Chinese consulate officials in California show that the estimated proportion of return Chinese students is around 80% and this figure keeps rising due to stricter visa policies, shrinking job opportunities and less-open social environment.[12] Also, individuals who were born under one-child policy are more likely to go home as their parents might wish them to. Compared to Chinese students from other places, international students from Wenzhou are more likely to return, influenced by Wenzhou's regional characteristic of its economic development—family business. It is quite interesting that most of the second generation of Wenzhou migrants tend to inherit their family business and extend it to China for better co-operation. Moreover, political and economic uncertainties continue to be concerns for Wenzhou migrants, resulting in their 'dumbbell mode' return to China. Compared to the Wenzhounese in Spain, better living standards, guaranteed civil rights, and economic prosperity motivate Wenzhou migrants to stay in California rather than move back to China permanently. Like what Dustmann (1997) suggests, the riskier the home-country labour market is perilous, the more possible for migrants to stay in host countries with a 'wait-and-see' attitude.

Why Wenzhou Migrants Return? Social Protection, Changes of Economic Gain, and Superficial Social Integration

As an essential segment part of migration, return migration is endogenously dominated by migration's preferences and motivations dynamically changing with external factors. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) believe that the skill portfolio of stayers is different from the original migrant groups before the process of return migration as an aftermath of that selective nature, according to the research about return migration from the United States. This conclusion hints that the skills of the returnees might match the demand of the labour market in their home countries better, or not suit the labour market of host countries as well as which owned by the stayers. In simple terms, the selectiveness of return migration can be either positive or negative. Moreover, as a mutually selective process like outmigration, return migration is mixed not only with economic factors but also with social ones that are difficult to quantify. For instance, Mexican migrants in the United States choose to return with preferences over climate and lifestyle at home as well as for their families (Cornelius 1981). In this case, wages do not always dominate the return decision, whereas the environment- and culture-related factors do. However, the effects of those factors vary when applying to different immigrant groups.

12. The Interviews with officials of the Chinese consulates in San Francisco and Los Angeles were conducted in June 2017 and June 2018.

Also, migrant decision-making depends on comprehensive and continuous comparisons in a wide range of internal and external conditions. To be more specific, the following analysis will focus on return Wenzhou migration with practical experiences from interviews and relevant research.

Economic Changes Resulting from Social Protection and Industrial Changes

For most economic migrants, how to maximise economic gains by making full of their human capital rules as the primary driver of their behaviours, with the impact brought by economic conditions of host and home countries. Given that human capital is inseparable from its owners, it can be used to measure the value of labour in different markets by calculating and analysing indicators ranging from professional capability, educational qualification, language proficiency to social connection, money capital, and acquired information (Dustmann et al. 2011). Influenced by these indicators, it is clear that individuals tend to relocate themselves to the labour market which can benefit them the most. This is not necessarily associated with the expectation of a higher reward on human capital but could be taken as a passive survival strategy by less-skilled migration, in this context, labour with less human capital.

Although Wenzhou migrants are distributed throughout a wide range of industries, most of them are engaged in the wholesale and retailing sector in which they might gather more advantages from the developed manufacturing sector and prosperous private economy of Wenzhou. This can be easily observed in Spain, France, Italy, New York, Southern California and other Latin American countries that are populated by a large number of Wenzhou migrants. Taking the largest clothing wholesale market in Los Angeles as an example, 'At the very beginning it was ruled by Korean; then came the Guangdong and Wenzhou migrants,' remarked an interviewee who runs clothing business and trades with customers all over the Americas. 'Now you can only find Wenzhou businessmen there, perhaps with few Cantonese.' His story is epitomising the Wenzhou migration's business model: to enter a non-technical or slightly technical industry with their hometown's industrial advantages, then invite or hire fellow townsmen to join the business, and eventually take over the whole industry with agglomeration effects. The concentration of processing and manufacturing sectors in towns and villages of Zhejiang enables Wenzhou businesspeople to focus on the production and sale of specific light industrial goods like small home appliances, lighters, and clothes. Therefore, Wenzhou migrants aspire to keep a close connection with their hometown industries and take advantage of that when leaving Wenzhou for business. With the booming of manufacturing in Zhejiang, Wenzhounese migrants had considerable leverage to run business abroad from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s. Meanwhile, a high accumulation of domestic financial resources and a high level of private economic activity prepared Wenzhounese with capital and social connections for outmigration and encourage superfluous rural labour to seek for potential overseas employment (Foster & Yao 1999).

Reduced Space with Stricter Regulation of Economic Informality (Grey Economy)

Castells and Portes (1989) define economic informality as economic activities that are not regulated by authorities like similar activities under normal circumstance. Economic informality has become 'a distinctive feature of Southern European migrant processes' (Baganha 2000: 170), although that also happens in old immigration countries, particularly in those major cities with convenient living facilities and mature migration networks which can provide necessary shelter and assistance for newcomers (Geddes 2003). The estimated underground economic sizes of Spain and California in table 2 show that the higher proportion the underground economy accounts for in the total GDP of each country. With a considerable scale of informal economic activities, the barrier and limits to enter specific industries are also less for migrants. Therefore, informal economy, in other words, grey economy, has provided migrants with more employment opportunities to earn a living, and space to run businesses

for a steady long-term stay in host countries. Desiring to cut labour costs, small-sized businesses attempt to avoid taxes and social insurance expenses through hiring illegal migration eager for incomes. Accordingly, the lower the degree of economic informality is, the less space is left for illegal immigrants, in this paper, many Wenzhou migrants.

Table 2. Underground economy size of GDP in 2012

	Estimates %(GDP)
Spain	24.6%*
California	5% **

Source: * Ministry of Finance of Spain

** Employment Development Department of State of California and Centre for Continuing Study of the California Economy

The Spanish government's stricter regulations, however, primarily result in return migration among the Wenzhou migrants. Under the pressure from the European Union Commission about economic development and constraining on the increase of illegal immigration, the Spanish government has been working on regulating informal economic activities by frequently inspecting small businesses on their employment and tax situation. The Spanish authority particularly targeted small businesses owned by immigrants in order to reduce the likelihood of sheltering illegal immigrants and provide better social protection over its legal residents. Since tax evasion and illegal employment behaviour are very common among Wenzhou immigrants, a growing panic in this group about being accused, fined, or even put in jail largely contributed to their return decision-making. Additionally, the increased regulations of the economy reduced illegal Wenzhou migrants' employment opportunities and therefore incomes, which in turn overshadowed their expectations for future economic benefits and willingness to stay.

Similarly, at the early period of Wenzhou emigration to California in the 1990s, many businesspeople faced the same situation and thus had to shut down their companies or even escape from the United States to avoid legal liabilities. However, the scale of return migration in California was much smaller because of the narrower space for informal economic activities there. Subsequently, stricter regulations, complete judicial system and the mature commercial environment have gradually helped Wenzhou migrants conduct economic activities with a better legal awareness and led their pace to accord with economic formality and social regularity.

Furthermore, stricter regulations also alter or even lift the standards of employment in host labour markets, which means a changing or higher requirement of skills. Return migration occurs when immigrants could not meet the improved employment requirements. Likewise, adjustments of work visa policies usually cause return migration if that increases the difficulty in obtaining residential permissions. This has become a common concern among international students who tend to stay after graduation. Among immigration in California, H-1b visa remains decisive to their legal employment and stay, and forces people to leave the United States when related policies become less friendly. In Spain, the immigration law implemented in August 2000 banned illegal migrants from accessing civic rights of health, education and politics (Geddes 2003). This move more or less discourages its migrants to stay as well as worries the potential migrants.

Changes of Industries and Economic Gains

As is mentioned above, Wenzhou migrants' businesses to a high degree rely on the industrial edges

back in their hometown. The developed processing and manufacturing sectors, as well as export-driven private economy together, solidify the foundation for Wenzhou migrants' economic activities and facilitate them with a ready-made business model and supply chain. However, new challenges arising within Wenzhou and the recent global industrial shifts have rapidly diminished the original commercial advantages of the Wenzhounese, which caused significant changes to their businesses.

The rise of domestic labour cost and fierce international competitions from the processing and manufacturing sectors of other emerging economies like Vietnam and Thailand cut down the profits of factories and workshops in Zhejiang and resulted in their production reduction, price inflation and bankruptcy. Under this circumstance, Wenzhou migrants engaged in wholesale and retailing are faced with the increase of purchasing cost, reduction of goods types, and the emergence of new rivals, including chain stores in host countries, e-commerce giants such as Alibaba and Amazon, and small overseas online sellers. Well-constructed cross-national logistics systems and rapidly developing e-commerce platforms together diminished the competitiveness of the Wenzhou people who used to run businesses based on China's processing and manufacturing sectors and export services. Moreover, under the agreements between the members of the Universal Postal Union (UPU)[13], as destination countries, developed nations have to cover part of the delivery costs for parcels sent from developing countries. Though the United States intends to renegotiate this clause by threatening to leave UPU, there is no hint that changes would be made to turn this situation around in the short run. Disappearing edges also bring incessant losses of customers and profits looming. Additionally, the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis caused an economic recession in Zhejiang. According to the Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics, the province's quarterly economic growth hit 3.4%, the lowest record since the reform in 1978.[14]

Typically, policies aiming to boost the economy through subsidies to individual businesses or with trade preferences effectively encourage individuals and companies to initiate or continue economic activities even when the economy encounters a downswing (Dustmann 1994a; Hill 1987). Compared to Spain and the United States that suffered much worse from this crisis, the Chinese central government rapidly adopted its 4-trillion-yuan stimulus plan to deal with this economic challenge. When the economic situation faces a severe downturn in host countries while home countries provide preferential aid packages, it is very likely for migrants to return home no matter whether they have obtained legal residential permission in host countries or not (Galor & Stark 1990). But this also gets influenced by the industrial features and business opportunities that remain in host countries.

The industrial distribution of Wenzhou migrants is jointly determined by home industrial advantages and the industrial strengths in host places, and accordingly selects Wenzhou migrants with various characteristics and standards. In California, technology plays a vital role in both immigration and return migration. In Spain, Wenzhou migrants abide by their regional business tradition in wholesale and retailing. To this extent, they have more common features with their fellow townsmen in Southern California, especially the greater Los Angeles area. Meanwhile, in Northern California, precisely the San Francisco Bay area, with the densely concentrated IT companies and higher education institutes, most of the Wenzhou migrants work as engineers or academics rather than self-employed businesspeople. Immigrants with ownership of or access to technologies compare their potential economic gains from the host and home countries and then decide which market they should move to

[13] See Jayme Samldone. Feb 2018. *This Subsidy for China Is Dumb as a Post*, https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-subsidy-for-china-is-dumb-as-a-post-1517963275 (Accessed on 10 Oct. 2018).
[14] Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 7 Jun 2016. The 2009 *Work Report of Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics*. http://tij.zj.gov.cn/art/2016/6/7/art_1525522_21238116.html (Accessed on 10 Oct. 2018).

and invest. Even if the technologies are no longer cutting-edge in host countries, migrants might get motivated to return as long as they are still competitive in home countries (Zweig et al. 2006). It is worth pointing out that Wenzhou businesspeople in the wholesale and retailing industry get inspired and benefit from the technology-oriented economy in California. Unlike the Spanish Wenzhou migrants who are left without options to stay but return home, Wenzhou migrants in California make efforts to upgrade their current business model by inventing new products and switching to e-commerce rather than retreat from the host market. Among 80 interviewees who own businesses in Southern California, one third have developed or plan to reenergise their businesses with new technology for either sales or production, meanwhile around half of them sought commercial extension and cooperation in China with sufficient capital raised in the host country.

Influences from a Superficial Society Integration and Invariable 'Wenzhou Spirit'

Although most of Wenzhou migrants including some asserted 'refugees' are economic migration in nature, non-economic factors, which can be divided into cultural and environmental indexes, still have significant influences throughout their migratory decision-making. In the case of return migration, environmental impacts are comparably minor whereas cultural issues remain prominent in that process.

Highly Closed Immigrant Communities Deeply Rooted in Regional Culture

Due to its geographical environment that consists of mountains, rivers and ocean, Wenzhou was historically isolated from the outside world and formed its unique regional culture, with a reputation of closeness and commerce-orientation. Unlike other traditional agriculture-based regional cultures in China, the closeness of Wenzhou culture does not preclude its residents from establishing economic connections with outsiders. At the same time, their regional culture unites Wenzhounese in businesses with its complicated regional language and commercial trust that relies on the township. This characteristic prevails in Wenzhou migration's fellow-townsmen-first social activities, highly consistent business models, and business cooperation preferences. The strong recognition of Wenzhou identity brings them reliable connections and business information abroad, and the influences continue among the next generation of Wenzhou migration in host countries. However, their preference for social connection also leads to a lower degree of social integration with the local society in host countries. Most of the Wenzhou migrants live a binary migratory life—they keep Wenzhou lifestyle and close connections with Wenzhou migrant communities and their hometown while barely interacting with local communities of their host countries apart from commercial contacts.

In this point, Wenzhou migration challenges the conventional view that social integration prominently impacts immigrants' long-term stay decision. The solidarity of Wenzhou migrant community downplays the importance of integration with the host country as long as the migration still gain economic benefits through the Wenzhou connections. Strong connections with immigrant communities provide Wenzhou migrants with social resources necessary for long-term stays while separating them from the social life of the host countries. For instance, in the 1990s, Wenzhou migrants who first arrived in New York raised funds for the latecomers from Wenzhou who could not afford their travel expenses for smuggling. Even today, they generously share social resources with their townsmen in host countries without any conditions.

Despite the cultural isolation from the local society and the binary migratory life, cultural factors come into effect only if they threaten the core interests of Wenzhou migration—economic gains. When anti-Chinese campaigns in Spain in 2004 caused massive economic loss to Wenzhou migration by burning stores and stopping cooperation with them, many of them either temporarily moved to neighbouring countries or returned home to dodge the limelight and avoid further property loss (Cai

& Lin, 2012). On the one hand, the superficial social integration incurs misunderstandings between Wenzhou migration and the locals, sometimes even resulting in conflicts and hatred between them. On the other hand, the absence of deep communication with the local society makes it easier for Wenzhou migration to make return decisions.

Risk-taking spirit throughout all the stages of Wenzhou migration

Despite the closed nature of their regional culture, Wenzhou migrants' economic success owes itself largely to their risk-taking spirit, which is sometimes called 'Wenzhou Spirit'. The discontent with Wenzhou's underdevelopment and low incomes drive Wenzhounese to move out and strive for better life abroad, even when their poor economic conditions make emigration a risky and costly option for them. Wenzhou migrants are a special group with the reputation of taking risks everywhere for commercial benefits. The Wenzhou spirit inspire them to spread all over the world with their small-scale and household-based businesses. According to an earlier street interview about Wenzhou people's attitude and motivations of outmigration, most of them emphasised 'taking risks' and hold very optimistic expectations about moving abroad, while their primary was always 'to get rich' (Li 2013). The desire for wealth and the risk-taking awareness enables the Wenzhounese to move more frequently and more likely to return home when there are commercial opportunities back in China.

Meanwhile, a widely-accepted opinion among Wenzhou migrants is that the governments in host countries usually have biases against them and want to suppress their economic activities. This consensus is associated with the closed nature of Wenzhou migrant communities and misunderstanding between them and the local societies. Hence, return migration happens when Wenzhou migrants find more opportunities and better policies to run businesses within China. Their risk-taking spirit encourages them to get involved even in economic activities with which they are not very familiar and to quickly switch from one host country to another without excessive concerns.

How China Deals with Large Scale Return Migration with its Current Social Mechanism

While China has been going through an enormous outflow of its population during the reform period, recently it is also faced with a new challenge—how to cope with the growing number of return migrants as well as a substantial increase of immigrants.[15] China has become a popular destination for people seeking for economic interest. But at the same time, it seems that there exists a risk of a massive waste of human capital and potential social chaos due to China's two-dimensional social mechanism that shows all-around concerns on highly-skilled returnees and entrepreneurs with hefty capital but ignores the rest.

Globalisation has dramatically promoted the international population mobility and therefore benefited sending countries when the highly-skilled migrants return with products, information and technologies attained in host countries (Zweig et al. 2006). The Chinese economic reform has brought constant relaxation and encouragement to the outmigration of its citizens for study and short-term work. Meanwhile, the goal set by the Chinese central government in the 1980s about taking foreign universities and companies as incubators for Chinese talents to realise a further leap on the country's technological and economic development has been successfully achieved. In a study of the impact of board directors with overseas experience on the performance of firms in China, researchers reckon that experienced individuals can develop social productivity by efficient transfer of knowledge and

15. These immigrants come especially from African countries, many of this are experience baby booms.

skills (Giannetti, Liao, & Yu, 2015). China's successful twisting of brain drain into this promising brain gain has proved the effectiveness of its policy-making on attracting the return movement of the highly-skilled. As some scholars comment, China is now regaining its lost ground on human capital with the benefits generated by its long-term strategy of cutting down restrictions on its citizens' international mobility (Zweig et al., 2006).

National Strategies and Policy Trends

The obedience of local governments to Beijing has strongly increased in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping made it possible for him to act as a 'lifelong' leader in March 2018 (Buckley & Myers, 2018). The national strategies made by the central government clearly set the direction of local policy trends. Concerning brain gain, China has set up a well-structured system to encourage and reward return migration of people with high-value human capital. In the report of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002, the then leader Jiang Zemin reiterated the significance of talents by promoting the strategy of 'revitalising the country through science and technology', which is now regarded as a political slogan for drawing overseas Chinese to return with technologies. His successors have inherited this slogan and developed it into specific preferential policies for highly skilled returnees.[16] According to National Population Development Plan 2016-2030, the Chinese government deployed the strategy about 'to adopt more positive, open and effective policies to nurture and import international talents'. [17] The simplification of residential permit application, improvement of civil services about residence, tax, insurance, housing and healthcare, and relaxation of the conditions of permanent residence for highly skilled immigrants, have collectively explored the feasibility and practicality of a potential technical immigration system. In the latest report on innovation and entrepreneurship, the Chinese authorities note that 'to attract overseas talents to China' and 'to facilitate the innovation and entrepreneurship activities for returnees and foreign talents'.[18] Combined with the establishment of Chinese National Immigration Administration, this report vividly reveals China's ambitions on technological development and brain gain.

Such strategies and policies together drive a growing number of highly skilled Chinese migrants to return to their home country. Researchers from Tsinghua University show that in recent two decades the number of top experts who chose to move to China has been skyrocketing.[19] One senior Chinese engineer in the Silicon Valley praised China's 'brain gain' strategy on the national level as 'significantly successful and profoundly influential'.[20] Notwithstanding this widely recognised success in brain gain, it is worth noting that the return migration not only consists of professionals, academics, and wealthy entrepreneurs but also workers with relatively low skills and small-scale business-owners. Unlike highly skilled return migrants, they might face the lack of supportive policies for them to settle down in the rapidly changing home society. Though administrative orders for overseas Chinese and return migrants might be made at the local level, there are no official documents released for the relocation and re-integration of low-skilled return migrants so far, despite the introduction in 2004 of the new Measures for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of the Rights

16. See, Jiang, Z., Nov. 2002. Building a well-off society in an all-around way and creating a new situation in the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics - Report at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
17. State Council of the People's Republic of China, 25 Jan 2017. *National Population Development Plan 2016-2030 (guojia renkou fazhan guihua 2016-2030)*, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-01/25/content_5163309.htm (accessed on 6 Oct. 2018).
18 State Council of the People's Republic of China, 26 Sept. 2018. Opinions on Nurturing and Developing Innovation to Make an Updated Version of 'Creativity & Innovation' (guowuyuan guanyu tuidong chuangxin chuangye gaozhiliang fazhan dazao shuangchuang shengjiban de yijian, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-09/26/content_5325472.htm (accessed on 6 Oct. 2018)
19. See, Tang, J., Nov. 2017. *Career Trajectory of Top 10,000 Experts in the World*, http://keg.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/jietang/#research (accessed on 10 Oct. 2018).
20. This interview was conducted in June 2018 in California about Wenzhou migration in the IT industry.

and Interests of Returned Overseas Chinese and Their Family Members.[21] Additionally, the integration of both immigrants and return migrants, as well as their descendants, might pose a new challenge for not only the policymakers but also the whole society. Unlike some other immigration countries with well-established immigrant administration system, China is at the crossroad in terms of how to reshape its social recognition to prepare for this new demographic phenomenon (Dustmann et al. 2012). Therefore, it calls for more contemplation and response about how to tackle problems possibly caused by an increasing number of return migrants and how to further deploy the human capital of them.

Current Measures and Looming Challenges about Return Migration in Wenzhou

According to population data and relevant regulations disclosed by some Zhejiang Provincial government agencies, existing legislation might not be enough to deal with the growing scale of returned overseas Chinese to Zhejiang despite frequent discussion in official media on how to promote the cooperation with this particular group. It is believed that the Zhejiang Provincial government has started paying more attention to its returnees since Zhejiang Overseas Chinese Rights Protection Regulations got approved on 30th September 2018.[22] Consistently with the strategies adopted by the central government, Zhejiang Provincial government leaves a high degree of decision-making power to lower-level local governments in its jurisdiction while trying to co-ordinate legislation work within the province. As the principal sender of emigration in Zhejiang, the Wenzhou city government pays close attention to its migration and have the number of returnees included in its country-level population statistics since 2009. However, the data that ought to be revealed annually online remain missing and might only be available in paper copy.

Although the large-scale emigration results in the loss of labour and human capital in Wenzhou, capital and skills acquired by those emigrants abroad always exceed what they might gain at home (Dustmann et al. 2011). Wenzhou's economic development has greatly benefited from the technologies, products, and remittances brought by its emigrants in other countries. In response to the national strategies of attracting talents to return home with technologies and investments, the Wenzhou government rewards the returnees with preferential policies while encouraging local research institutes and private firms to make similar efforts. Compared to high-skilled return migrants, returned low-skilled migrants in Wenzhou face more hardship because of the lack of policies to help them re-integrate with the rapidly changing home society. This reflects that the low-skilled returnees have not drawn enough attention from the local and central authorities, who largely neglect their contributions to the home economy as self-employed businessmen with accumulated capital and foreign experience as well as cross-cultural social connections and language skills (De Coulon & Piracha 2005).

Return movements conducted by Wenzhou migrants from Europe expose the negative selectiveness of migration itself and await guidance and regulation from the local government. Both the imminency of industrial transformation and expectations on a better utility and redistribution of returned human capital question the effects and efficiency of current administrative implementations. With the flexibility and autonomy of policymaking on its local social problems, the Wenzhou government should come up with more detailed policies to transform the pressure brought by a growing number of returnees into human capital advantages.

[21]. Council of State of the People's Republic of China, 2004. Measures for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China (zhonghua renmin gongheguo guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohu shishi banfa). http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2008-03/28/content_6865.htm (accessed on 6 Sept. 2018).

[22]. Standing Committee of the 13th People's Congress of Zhejiang Province, 2018. *Zhejiang Overseas Chinese Rights Protection Regulations (Zhejiangsheng huaqiao quanyi baohu tiaoli)*. http://www.zjrd.gov.cn/zyfb_1/cwhgg1/201809/t20180930_67022.html (accessed on 1 Nov. 2018).

China's Administrative Efforts on Emigration Protection and Brain Gain and Further Implications

Apart from domestic legislation and regulations concerning the utilisation of human capital, China also makes prominent efforts to maintain intimate relations with overseas Chinese and their societies in the name of people-to-people exchange or diplomatic concern. Targeting at a sustainable brain gain, China has successfully shown its influence in the countries that host a large number of its citizens. China embeds its cultural concept about connections into international activities that involve Chinese individuals and emphasises the Chinese 'identity', with the help of non-governmental organisations supervised by the Chinese authority. These organisations include the Overseas Chinese Federation, associations for promoting the unification of China, Chinese student and scholar unions, township- or industry-based associations for Chinese, and a soaring financial impact brought by Chinese-owned foundations and state-owned giant companies, This contributes to China's quick reactions for the protection of its migrants overseas when emergencies occur, but also strengthens the stereotype of Chinese nationalism representing the traditional ideas of 'nation first, family comes the second' and 'sacrifice individuals for the nation'. However, a considerable recognition gap between the long-established norm of Chinese ethnicity and the modern concept of citizenship among Chinese bureaucrats could result in misconduct on emigration protection in the host countries, hinder a further implementation of China's brain gain strategy, and even invalidate its existing efforts in immigration administration. In this respect, proper instruction of re-naturalisation of reverse migration remains on paper rather than in practice. Meanwhile, the issuance of Chinese permanent residential permission also takes slow pace even though the demand is fast growing.

According to some researchers, a potential return intention can impact on immigrants' behaviours and performance in host countries, such as fewer career investments and more savings.[23] Although human capital carried by migrants can be regarded as part of national strategic resources, the ideal situation is that the cross-border movement of migrants is dominated by the labour market and individuals' life plan. However, the Chinese government's preferential policies towards international Chinese students and other highly skilled Chinese migrants have fostered misunderstandings and suspicions on them in their host countries. In the United States, it is not rare that Chinese migrants get accused of intellectual property stealing or even political meddling. Moreover, American authorities have frequently intervened in commercial or even academic activities conducted by Californian incubators, ventures, or research agencies with Chinese links, particularly those in Silicon Valley. Chinese students and scholars in universities also get influenced by that unfriendly atmosphere, which is reinforced while boosting the popularity of the Yellow Peril[24] originated from colonialism. This has undoubtedly caused panic among Chinese migrants and driven many of them to return with the price of giving up existing career advantages in the United States. Hence, it is vital for China to rethink its measures which are regarded as political infiltration with economic power by those host countries and make proper adjustments with better comprehensive understandings of their local legislation and culture, as well as find a way to resolve the deep-rooted misinterpretation of being viewed as a threat towards the Western countries.

[23]. Galor, O. and Stark, O., 1990. Migrants' savings, the probability of return migration and migrants' performance. *International Economic Review*, pp.463-467; 1991. The probability of return migration, migrants' work effort, and migrants' performance. *Journal of Development Economics*, 35(2), pp.399-405. Dustmann, C., 1994. *Return intentions of migrants: theory and evidence (No. 906)*. CEPR Discussion Papers.

[24]. See Yang, T., 19 Feb 2004. *The Malleable Yet Undying Nature of the Yellow Peril*. https://www.dartmouth.edu/~hist32/History/S22%20-The%20Malleable%20Yet%20Undying%20Nature%20of%20the%20Yellow%20Peril.htm (Accessed on 10 Feb 2019).

Conclusion

The rise of China's economic power has initiated a new era of return migration to China and accordingly enhanced its economic competence with an unprecedented supply of highly skilled labour. Return migration has been closely associated with human capital and brain gain on the ground of national power and international competition. Moreover, the complexity of return migration phenomenon and the diversity of its determinants are interpreted and analysed by researchers and policymakers, to reveal the most relevant factors and shed light on the establishment of coping mechanism as well as the improvement of current legislative and regulatory measures. The variations of determinants in the process of migration decide the direction of population flows and related behaviours. For both traditional and emerging immigration countries, the degree of grey economy plays a decisive role in migrants' decision-making of stay and return. Industrial advantages in home countries provide the emigrants with a solid foundation to compete in the host labour markets. With the case of Wenzhou migration, the developed manufacturing sector in Wenzhou and export-oriented economy in Zhejiang together facilitate their entrepreneurial activities abroad. Moreover, the Wenzhou spirit of risk-taking and desperate desire for wealth, in a word, entrepreneurship, inspire Wenzhounese to migrate to other countries for business and career success. Similarly, it is that the hometown industries support Wenzhou migrants' development in host countries. When those original advantages of hometown industries fade as well as the strict regulations on economic activities squeeze space for Wenzhou migrants, their entrepreneurial spirit drives them to adjust business or career strategies or return to China with accumulated skills and capital.

Despite the possibility to realise their industrial transformation in host countries, for Chinese migrants, the attraction of return home rises with China's promise of economic development and with their preferential policies that reward the returnees with a full range of work and life benefits. This has been proved effective with a remarkable turnaround from brain drain to brain gain in China. However, the focus on highly skilled returnees and lack of policies for other return migrants could incur potential social problems. With policymaking flexibility and resource superiority, China's major cities become the primary beneficiaries of accumulated human capital but leave the local home governments with the challenge of re-integration of other returnees whose movements are based on the negative selectiveness of labour market, such as the Wenzhounese from traditional wholesale and retailing industry. Furthermore, China's aggressive involvement with overseas Chinese societies and inconsiderate extension of its cultural norms in the host countries might put its migrants at a disadvantage and result in more negatively selected return.

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CHANGING PATTERNS OF UKRAINIAN IMMIGRATION IN HUNGARY

Zoltán Csányi

Introduction

Ukrainian contemporary migration has aroused much academic interest, especially since the last decade (see e.g. Bilan, 2017; Lendel, 2016; Malynovska, 2020). The increasing attractiveness of EU destinations mostly of Mediterranean countries and Germany – dominated Ukrainian outmigration during the entire post-Soviet period. While the importance of Eastern and Central European countries in this regard is often taken for granted, their role is not straightforward: while the relative weights of Poland and the Baltic States decreased from 1990 to 2019, that of the Czech Republic and Hungary increased significantly.[1] Still, Poland continues being the home of most Ukrainian expats in the region (almost 220 thousand persons), followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary (approx. 110 and 55 thousand persons respectively).

As regards the latter, two important notes should be made. First, Hungary is not a typical destination for most Ukrainians, but for ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine's Transcarpathia district. Thus, relevant studies emphasize the ethnic character of these migrations (see e.g. Tátrai et al., 2018; Karácsonyi and Kincses, 2020; Gödri and Csányi, 2020). Second, the proximity of Transcarpathia and Hungary in both geographical and historico-cultural terms resulted in particular forms of migration behaviour including transborder commuting, shuttling, seasonal and circular migrations (Malynovska, 2006; Çağlar, 2013;) that often remain invisible for statisticians.

Having in mind these peculiarities – and due to space limitations – the aim of this paper is not more than offering a short overview of most recent data on the immigration from Ukraine as a whole towards Hungary to shed light on how patterns of this migration have been changing in recent years.

Data sources

Official migration data production in Hungary is fully based on registers created by national authorities reflecting the administrative procedures of legal entrance to this country. Such procedures differ across legally defined migrant categories that might change over time. Undoubtedly, the furthest reaching change of Hungarian legislation affecting recent immigration from Ukraine was the *simplified naturalization procedure* for ethnic Hungarians since 2011. While such changes obviously affect patterns of immigration[2], they might also do so with regard to the methods of data production and available variables. Immigration data of third country nationals is based on the registers of residence- and settlement permits issued by the National-Directorate General for Aliens Policing and the address register of the Ministry of Interior, while data on immigrating foreign-born Hungarian citizens is produced using the address register. Since many Ukrainian-born ethnic Hungarians acquired Hungarian citizenship during the last decade before entering the country, data by citizenship might be misleading. For that, a combined view of citizenship and country of birth appear to be most appropriate

[1] All references to migration data in the introduction are based on UNDP migrant stock estimates. (https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp)
[2] For more details, see Gödri and Csányi (2020).

to get a more complete view of Ukrainian immigration in Hungary.

Stocks and flows

Yearly inflows of Ukrainian citizens have been multiplied by almost twenty between 1992 and 2019 (Figure 1). The increasing trend however was not consistent over time: while in the 1990's the size of inflows was growing slowly, moderate up-and-downs characterized it during the 2000's. These were followed by a sharp drop after the 2008 economic downturn that lasted until 2016 when the inflows started to increase at a vertiginous pace. While in 2013 only 558 Ukrainian citizens immigrated, this number was 6,325 in 2017 and 21,185 in 2019. Among the most plausible reasons for this, law amendments of the Hungarian government should be mentioned that facilitated the employment of Ukrainian (and Serbian) citizens under certain conditions as a response to the labour force shortages of the Hungarian economy.

Figure 1. Immigration flows of Ukrainian and Hungarian citizens to Hungary by country of birth, 1992-2019



Source: own elaboration based on HCSO data

A closer look on the countries of birth (available since 2008) reveals that a large share of these people was born in the Soviet Union assumedly before its dissolution, which might indicate a growing average age of immigrating Ukrainian citizens. During the whole period, more than 90% of immigrating Ukrainian citizens were born in Ukraine or the Soviet Union (the highest value was in 2019 with 98.6%). Among them, the share of those born in the Soviet Union exceeded that of the Ukrainian-born, especially in recent years. No further information is available on whether the Soviet Union as country of birth indicates Ukraine's territory of today. On the contrary, we do know that the share of Ukrainian citizens among the immigrants born in the Soviet Union reached 92-93% in the last two years.

As regards immigration flows of ethnic Hungarians, a fast growth is observed right after introducing the simplified naturalisation procedure in 2011. These flows reached their peak in 2015 with 9,106 Ukrainian-born persons. Since then, their number decreased to only 2,675 persons in 2019. At the same time, the number of immigrating Hungarians born in the Soviet Union remained low. A possible interpretation is that ethnic Hungarians – who would have immigrated earlier as Ukrainian citizens – entered during the 2010's as Hungarian citizens. The decreasing trend since 2015 indicates that the Hungarians who wanted so, might have already immigrated.

Figure 2. Stocks of Ukrainian and Hungarian citizens residing in Hungary by country of birth, 1995-2020 (1 January)



Source: own elaboration based on HCSO data

The evolution of the migrant stocks of the same subgroups (Figure 2) reflects similar trends. The number of Ukrainian citizens residing in Hungary moved along the inflows with some years of delay: their number increased from 3,501 in 1995 to 30,316 in 2020. If their number has not been increasing so fast in recent years as their flows would indicate, it is because along with growing immigration, also emigration flows increased. As regards their countries of birth, those born in Ukraine and the Soviet Union constituted about 90% of all Ukrainian residents throughout the whole period (being the highest in 2020 with 97.2%). The share of those born in the Soviet Union has been constantly higher than of the Ukrainian-born since 2012. With regard to the Hungarian citizens born in Ukraine and the Soviet Union, their joint number increased from less than 25 thousand in 2012 to more than 65 thousand in 2020 (out of which approx. 20 and 60 thousand were born in Ukraine). Many of them acquired Hungarian citizenship already residing in the country, while others – taking advantage of the simplified naturalization – immigrated as Hungarian citizens.

Sex, age and geographical distribution

Concerning the distribution by sex, immigration flows of Ukrainian citizens were characterised by a slight female majority during the 1990's, while since the Millennium it is dominated by males, especially in more recent years when their share exceeded 65%. Interestingly, this relation does not necessarily holds among those born in the Soviet Union: there were several years between 2008 and 2016 when more women than men immigrated. Immigration of Hungarian citizens is clearly dominated by males. The same shares of migrant stocks show a quite different picture: Ukrainian citizens residing in Hungary were typically women until 2018. However this might be due to those born in the Soviet Union among which – contrary to the Ukrainian-born – women were overrepresented. Hungarian citizens, especially those born in the Soviet Union were mostly women since 2012.

As regards age, the youngest (less than 14 years) and the oldest (65 years or more) age groups practically disappeared among immigrating Ukrainian citizens, while the shares of those aged 15-39 or 40-64, with some fluctuations, increased in the last decades (up to 65% in case of the former and to 34% among the latter). These figures however differ by country of birth: among Ukrainian-born, the share of the former age group went up to 86% in 2019 (from 63% in 2008), while the share of the

former decreased from 30% to 13% at the same time. Among those born in the Soviet Union both age groups remained at about 50%. Concerning the immigration of Hungarian citizens born in Ukraine, the share of the youngest age group increased from 7% to 16% between 2011 and 2019, while that of those aged 15-39 decreased from 64% to 50%. The shares of the other age groups remained practically constant. The stocks by age groups show similar patterns, except for the Ukrainian citizens born in the Soviet Union, among which the share of the 40-64 age group increased from 37% to 50%, while that of the 15-39 years old decreased from 59% to 46%.

The last decades also resulted in a realignment of the geographical distributions of Ukrainian immigration in Hungary. A clear shift is observable from the Eastern-Hungarian destinations to more developed Central and Western regions of the Hungary. In 1992, the Eastern counties of the Northern Great Plain and Northern-Hungary together attracted 44% of immigrating Ukrainian citizens, while only 21% in 2019. At the same time the weight of Budapest and Pest county increased from 29% to 37%, while that of Western Transdanubia from 3% to 14%. Destinations of immigrating Ukrainian-born Hungarian citizens changed in the same direction between 2012 and 2019: the popularity of Northern Great Plain and Northern-Hungary decreased from 54% to 41%, that of Budapest and Pest county increased slightly from 37% to 39%, while the weight of Western Transdanubia increased from 3% to 8%.

Conclusions

However the short overview provided here serves only as an "appetizer" for further research on the changing patterns of Ukrainian immigration in Hungary, it might be sufficient to call attention to some of its most recent features as regards both its size and composition. While during the 2010's researchers have extensively discussed the changes related to the simplified naturalization, the newer boom of immigrating Ukrainian citizens has received less attention yet. The fact that more Ukrainians appear in statistical data suggests that longer-term migrations substitute temporary ones. Further, the newer inflows challenge the assumption of the ethnic character of Ukrainian immigration in Hungary. Such changes are apparently related to the labour market developments of Hungary that however, due to space limitations, will be discussed in another paper.

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REMITTANCES' IMPACT ON PHILIPPINES HOUSEHOLD

Eugene Agoh, Régine N. Soppo, Vilmantė Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, Irma Banevičienė

Introduction

Migration and remittances has always been an important topic in the Philippines in the last five decades. Philippines' Government initiated the "overseas employment Program" in 1974 with the aim of solving unemployment and aggregate of balance payment issue (Yang, 2005). Philippines is the highest labour exporter among its neighbours in the East and South-East Asia (Pratt, 2018). The amount of remittance received in the Philippine has risen exponentially in the recent years due to the increase in (FFW) moving from low skilled jobs to high skilled jobs in their host countries (McDonald & Valenzuela, 2017). This shift has also contributed to the dramatic increase in remittances compared to the 1970s. Consequently, Filipinos diaspora sent about 34 billion USD as remittances from around the world making Philippines the third highest remittance receiver in the world just behind India and Mexico (Bank, 2019). It represents about 10% of its GDP (Asis, 2017). Even though remittances are considered as a valuable source of income in Philippines, the long term economic effect of these remittances are not evaluated on the household expenditure.

Therefore, the aim of the paper is to overview remittance impact on Philippines' household.

Methods. Scientific literature and statistical data analysis are the main methods used in this study. Seventeen articles on remittances analyses in Philippines were found and made the basis for this study.

Statistical overview of Remittances in Philippines

Philippines is the third biggest remittance receiver in the world (Ong & Imtiaz, 2019). They have been for long the key of Philippines economics resilience (World Bank 2009). Philippines' Government initiated the "overseas employment Program" in 1974 with the aim of solving unemployment and aggregate of balance payment issue (Yang, 2005). With OFWs are approximately 2.3 million (Authority, 2019), which represents around 10 percent of Filipino population for 34 billion USD received in 2018 which is 10 percent of Philippine GDP (Authority, 2019). Philippines is among the largest workforce provider country in the world De Vries (2011). Many studies found that they have a huge impact on Philippine economy through the increase in foreign reserve, poverty reduction and job creation. Remittance is the most important source of foreign exchange in Philippines (ANG, 2009). Serino (2012) analyses the migrant workers performance on the economy from 1977 to 2006 using Cointegration and OLS estimation and found that, on long run, remittances have positive effect on GDP. That is the Philippine GDP increase by 0.018% for each on each 1% increase of remittances.

Considering the amount of remittances that flows in the country especially when compared to the country's GDP(see Figure 1), it is important to note that these remittances in various ways have positive effect on the Philippine's economy as supported by various studies mentioned earlier.

Figure 1. Philippines GDP and Remittance percentage per GDP[1]

[1] Source : World Bank 2019



Literature review of remittances' impact on Philippines household

Remittances received in Philippines are of strategic value and importance because of their size and the number of households that depends on them (Rodriguez, 1996). Depending on how they are provided and how they are used, remittances can boost aggregate demand and output through increased consumption and investment expenditures of recipient households and their multiplier effects (ANG, 2009). Seventeen articles on remittances analyses in Philippines were found and made the basis for this study.

Many studies found that remittances contribute to poverty reduction in Philippines. Yang & Martinez (2005) examines Filipino household, and found that improvement of life standing for family remittance receiver than those who do not receive remittances from their relatives. This can be explained by the remit's currency appreciation. Indeed, according to Yang & Martinez (2005) ten percent improvement in the exchange rate reduce the poverty rate from 0.6 percent in Philippine. This finding has been supported by De Vries (2011), who found that remittances are a fair social balance since it subsequenltly increase the family-receiving purchasing power. Resuts of other studies conducted by Cortes & See (2007), Cabigen & Emile (2006), Arguillas & Williams (2010) are similar as Vries' (2011).

Going deeper on how remittances reduce poverty in Philippines, the additional money that family receiving steadily increase their income. This automatically increase their purchasing power. Yang & Choi demonstrated how remittances sent to Philippines households also contribute to the expansion of consumer market (Yang & Choi, 2007). The expansion of these markets is fuelling the economy in several ways as receiving families consume domestic products that brought about the increase in domestic consumption and domestic sales (Burgess & Haksar, 2005). Cortes & See (2007) while comparing remittances-receiving and non receiving households found that household with more comfort like washing machines, television, fridge are likely to be remittances-receiving family. Tabuga (2007) using the Curry & Sibrián (2003) study, confirmed that remittances-receiving household spend more on consumable goods and leisure. In addition, increase in local consumption stimulate local economy and create new self-employment posibilities at the same time. Yang (2008) also associates receiving income with job, hours and self-employment increasing. Orbreta (2008) while examining the economic impact of remittances on Philippine economy found a net increase in employment, mostly for non-receiving families. However, Cortes, & See (2007) state that it is a decrease in labour participation from Filipino who receive remittance from abroad.

Many studies have been carried out to prove how education can affect the amount of remittances in the Philippines. It is important to mention that Philippine is among countries, which provide educated and skilled workers. Thus, money sent by OFWs is reinvested in the educational sector to ensure young people are better educated and skilled to enable them attract better jobs and opportunities

overseas when they become of age. The exchange rate stock coming from remittances, prolong education attainment of youth people in Philippine and reduces work hours of these children (Yang 2005). Additionally, Fujii (2011), while using simple regression to examine the remittances found out that remittances sent by the OFWs is used for schooling and related educational expenditures. Similarly, Arguillas & Williams (2010) study also supported the above claim that Philippine foreign workers parents have significant impact on their children's education staying in Philippine. However, there is also a decline in education quality, since Filipino teachers are more interested working abroad since rewards are more important than working in their home country (Chong, 2018).

Remittances in the Philippines has significant effect on the health care sector just as seen on education and investment in small businesses (Ang, 2007; Yang & Martinez, 2006). Since almost every receiving family has potentially elderly people that regular need health care, it is fair to agree some of the funds are specifically spent on health care.

Just like there are positive factors associated with migration and remittances (Sevilla, 2016; Burgess & Haksar, 2005), there are findings that remittances also have disadvantages for households. For example, remittances receiving families, where parents stay abroad and children are left alone without proper guardians, may experience stern emotional problems, become dropouts from schools and are more often known to commit crimes (Kone & Özden, 2017; Clemens, Özden & Rapoport, 2015). In addition, Burgess & Haksar (2005), Niimi, Ozden, & Schiff (2010) highlight that because remittances dependency and increase in inequality, and disintegration is seen in the country.

Conclusion

After scientific literature analysis (Yang and Martinez, 2005; deVries, 2011; Cortes and See, 2007; Cabigen and Emile, 2006; Arguillas and Williams, 2010; Tabuga, 2007; Orbreta, 2008; Cortes, and See, 2007 and others) following main findings could be indicated:

- Remittances that families receive steadily increase their income and this automatically increase their purchasing power;
- Remittances improve life standards in comparison with families do not get remittances;
- Remittances decrease poverty. Ten percent improvement in the exchange rate reduce the poverty rate by 0.6 percent;
- Remittances-receiving household spent more on consumable goods (washing machines, television, fridge) and leisure;
- A net increase in employment, mostly for non-receiving families;
- Positive effect between remittances receiving and self-employment;
- Investments to education and health care;
- Growing inequality;
- Children left without parents and their involvement in illegal activities.

Focusing that Philippine receives a large proportion of remittances in their households which play a role in the development of the economy, it is important for policy makers to take into consideration the initiative that will ensure those remittances are utilized as supposed.

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THE 'UNSEEN' IN MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES: THE CASE OF SOUTH ASIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN CAMERON HIGHLANDS, MALAYSIA[1]

Prakash Arunasalam and Thirunaukarasu Subramaniam

Introduction

In migration research involving foreign migrant workers, the often 'seen' aspect is the determinants of migration, migration processes and patterns, income earned and the remittances made. However, there is another dimension of migration and remittances that often receive less or no attention which is the 'unseen' aspect. The 'unseen' aspect is related more to the sacrifices made by foreign migrant workers which underlies the determinants of migration, migration processes and pattern, income earned and remittances made. The sacrifices made by foreign migrant workers often receive less attention in previous studies despite the sacrifices made by them are instrumental to the social and economic well-being of the migrant workers and their families. Foreign migrant workers are willing to make various sacrifices because their goal is to maximize the remittances made to their home countries. The income earned by foreign migrant workers has two main uses namely for expenditure and savings purposes. The savings made while working abroad are the money which is sent by South Asian migrant workers in the present study to their home countries as remittances. This implies that the more the sacrifices are made, the higher will be the amount saved, therefore the higher will be the remittances made to their home countries.

This study attempts to identify those dimensions of sacrifices made by the foreign migrant workers using an in-depth face-to-face interviews as the main method of gathering data. The present study intends to uncover and refine those sacrifices made by foreign migrant workers in a more detailed and systematic manner by looking at various dimensions of sacrifices which was captured loosely in previous studies. Bearing this in mind, the second section of this paper will focus on past studies, the third section covers the conceptual framework used in the present study, the fourth section dwells on the research methodology employed, the fifth section focuses on research findings and discussion and the final section concludes.

Past studies

The aspect of the sacrifices made by foreign migrant workers are less emphasized in previous studies, except for the study done by Subramaniam et al (2011). The authors focused on two dimensions of sacrifice namely 'sacrifice of life comfort' and 'sacrifice of being separated from the loved ones'. The foreign migrants workers are willing to make those sacrifices as they are more concerned in ensuring that remittances are made on a regular basis. Also, the sacrifices made implies that the greater the sacrifice, the higher the amount of remittances sent to their home countries and

[1] This paper was presented in The Migration Conference 2020 held as Online Conference at Tetovo, North Macedonia from 8-11 September 2020 (Session 10A: Remittances and Development).

this in turn enables the family members left behind to have better access to health care, education and improved standard of living.

Tonder & Soontiens (2014) in their research highlighted that migrant worker have to sacrifice a lot of the things that they were used to do and simultaneously take on different roles and different activities. In another study Schwenken & Eberhardt (2008) distinguished women worker going abroad to send remittances to her family is regarded as a good mother who cares for her children by sacrificing herself or she may even consider herself as a 'better mother' than those who stay and do not support towards their children education and health care through remittances. Philam Life BalikBayani Program (n.d) highlighted that Filipinos working overseas are normally away from their families for years before returning home and they miss out on a lot of important family moments and this is regarded as a huge sacrifice, which they are willing to do because they want to provide a good life for their families. Likewise, Garabiles et al (2017) looks at migration of Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs) in the Philippines as a sacrifice that women make to serve their families and migration as impermanent and the sacrifice of being separate is transient and finite.

Appleyard (2001) contended that while labour migration gave access to earnings and empowerment in economic, social and family contexts, the gains too often came with a cost in the form of sacrificed family life, women mistreated through physical or verbal abuses, restricted in their freedom of movement or in contacts with family, and not paid agreed salaries. The decision to migrate may emanate from an autonomous decision to sacrifice short-term individual wellbeing (eg being separated from your loved ones; the alienating experiences of living in a strange society) from the (instrumental) wish to improve the long-term wellbeing of the family (after return or family reunion)(see de Haas, 2014).

Hall et al (2019) succinctly mentioned that remittances sent home are the embodiment of sacrifice by migrant workers. Even though Hall et al (2019) pointed out that appreciation is from the family members, the author observed that being separate from one's family as a form of sacrifice. Xiao (2014) likewise seems to agree that money that was earned from the migration embodied a parents' hardship and sacrifice. Loganathan et al (2019) in a study done in Malaysia mentioned that migrant worker's tendency to prioritise remittance of income over all else, including healthcare and food and the salary is not touched because they want to send the money back for their children's education. ILO (2004; 2010) highlighted that many migrate, often knowing it will involve great personal sacrifice, working in difficult conditions, and tend to spend very little of their earnings so that they can send most of their savings home to their families.

Sacrifice made by children of migrant workers were highlighted by Xiao (2014) and the children acknowledge the significance of their parents' migration as well as learn to appreciate the sacrifices they were making to provide for them. Even though the author stressed that parents' money making as sacrifice and love, the missing dimension in parent-child relations emerges including parents' better care, stricter supervision and education. Another dimension of sacrifice that remains untouched is when a migrant sacrifice themselves in occupations for which they are over-qualified for example, a large number of skilled women migrant workers enter domestic work (see ILO, 2010).

The present study will focus on migrant workers from South Asia who are employed in the agriculture and plantation sectors in Cameron Highlands, Malaysia. South Asian migrant workers in Cameron Highlands, Malaysia in this study hail from two South Asian countries namely Bangladesh and India. Ravenstein's (1885) Laws of Migration proposed that economic factors are the main cause of migration. Undoubtedly, in the present study economic factors remain as the main cause, however the underlying aspect of the economic motivation would be the sacrifices made by the foreign workers

working abroad.

Conceptual framework

A study of the conceptual framework employed in previous studies found that most previous studies only emphasized on push and pull factors, migration processes as well as the effects of migration (see Nurhazani Mohd Shariff & Nur Syafiqah Abd Ghani (2011); Bodvarsson & Van den Berg (2013); Timmerman, Heyse & Van Mol (2010); Nijkamp & Voskuilen (1996). The conceptual framework developed in this study include the drivers and the motivators that encourages economic migrants from South Asia to work in the agriculture and the plantation sector in Malaysia. The underlying motivation of this paper is to probe the 'unseen' aspect of migration and remittances. Maximization of the 'unseen' sacrifices leads to maximum remittances. Every single remittances made by the foreign workers hides a story of sacrifice underneath it. Those sacrifices will be traced from various dimensions as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework – the 'unseen'.



(i) Data collection

The present study uses in-depth face-to-face interview method to collect qualitative data in order

to uncover the 'unseen' aspect in migration and remittances. The in-depth face-to-face interviews used in this study provides us with valuable information regarding the sacrifices made which could be difficult to be obtained through quantitative processes. Previous studies generally do not emphasize on the sacrifices made by foreign workers working in the host countries. The questions posed to the selected informants are based on five aspects of sacrifices namely (a) aspects related to financial sacrifice ; (b) aspects related to family relations sacrifice ; (c) aspects related to sacrificing the comfort of life ; (d) aspects related to daily use sacrifice; and (e) aspects related to social relations sacrifice.

(ii) Data analysis

Data obtained through qualitative methods were analyzed using a thematic analysis approach. Braun and Clarke (2008) and Braun et al (2019) have used thematic analysis approach and this approach is suitable for qualitative data not only in the field of psychology but also beyond the field of psychology. The questions posed to the selected informants are questions that focus on the five aspects of sacrifices.

Research findings and discussion

This section discusses various aspects of the sacrifices made by South Asian migrant workers who are working in the agriculture and plantation sectors in Cameron Highlands. Five main aspects of sacrifices that are considered in this study are: (i) financial sacrifice; (ii) family relations sacrifice; (iii) sacrifice of the comfort of life; (iv) daily use sacrifice; and (v) social relationship sacrifice.

(i) The financial sacrifice – debt and remittances

The first aspect of sacrifice focused in the present study is the financial sacrifice made by South Asian migrant workers who are working in the agriculture and plantation sectors in Cameron Highlands. The financial sacrifices had to be made by South Asian migrant workers as they had to tighten their belts while living in Malaysia as they need to ensure that the debt incurred to enable them to come and work in Malaysia is settled promptly. The following verbatim reveals the extent of the debt burden faced by South Asian migrant workers.

I7 who hails from Bangladesh said;

> "The amount of money I send to Bangladesh is Taka 4000.00 every month. The amount borrowed was Taka 80,000.00 and I only brought Taka 2000.00. Taka 2000.00 which I brought was sufficient as I came with a "Calling Visa". I am not scared because my boss is here. He paid for everything."
>
> [I7, 48, Bangladesh]

I6 from India said;

> "The amount of money that I send to India each month is between MYR700 - MYR900. Before coming to Cameron Highlands, I borrowed from friends, relatives and money lenders a total sum of Rps60,000.00. I had to borrow money because there are no savings. My income here is not enough for food and to send money to my home country."
>
> [I6, 30, India]

I4 said;

> "I borrowed Rps50,000.00. A total of Rps45,000.00 for agent fees and Rps5000.00 for my friend. I came here with Rps2000.00 because I was called by my present employer. Every month I will send Rps4,500.00 to my family through Western

> Union. My income is not enough. I used to work in Dubai, and my paycheck was great. I had to go back to India and come to Malaysia because I do not like Dubai. There were no friends and I disliked it."
>
> [I4, 25, India]

Another informant, I5 who is also from India related howhe has to sacrifice to increase his remittances as follows;

> "The amount to be sent to my home country is MYR1000.00 a month. I borrowed Rps120,000.00. A total of Rps60,000.00 was payment for agent fees and the remainder was for visa fees and plane tickets. I cut down my expenses to increase my savings and remittances."
>
> [I5, 26, India]

From the verbatim, it is evident that remittances need to be made on a regular basis as it enables those left in the home country to settle the debt taken to cover the cost of migration. In terms of remittances, the following verbatim reveals the amount remitted on a regular basis either monthly or quarterly. According to I4 from India;

> "The amount of money I sent to India is not the same every month, sometimes more and sometimes less than MYR1000.00. This is because I would borrow money from my employer for any event or celebration in my home country. I just borrowed MYR4000.00 from my employer in April because my sister was getting married. After that, my employer will deduct from my salary."
>
> [I4, 25, India]

I4 contended further by saying;

> "The quality of life here and in my home country is almost the same. In my home country, I didn't have enough money. My life is rather difficult here because I have to cut down my expenses to settle the debt. The drop in the exchange rate makes the situation even worse and makes me feel the same."
>
> [I4, 25, , India]

The financial sacrifices made by the foreign migrant workers interviewed in the present study who are working in Cameron Highlands, Malaysia has one aim that is to send as much money as possible to their home countries. Firstly, they want to ensure that the debt taken to come to Malaysia is settled the soonest. Secondly, their desire is to save as much money as possible to ensure that their family members will enjoy a better standard of living in their home countries. As such, this requires a financial sacrifice to be made by those foreign migrant workers as they have to cut down on all the unnecessary expenses and even many life pleasures such as going for movie.

(ii) The sacrifice of family relations – separation with the beloved

The sacrifice of family relationship was the greatest sacrifice made by the informants who came to Cameron Highlands for the purpose of earning a living. For married informants. they have to sacrifice family relations as they have to leave their wives and their children. For unmarried informants, they have to sacrifice family relations by leaving their parents or close relatives and friends behind. The following verbatim reveals this aspect of sacrifice.

Several informants expressed their sadness over separtion with the beloved as follows:

"I have a wife, two children, a mother, and a father. I feel sad because I'm separated from my family. I'll call them every day. The only occasion I was unable to attend, was my father's retirement ceremony and prayer for a new house."

[I6, 30, India]

"I have a wife and a child. When I came to Malaysia, my wife was pregnant. I haven't had the chance to see my son's face. I feel sad and want to see the face of my son."

[I8, 46, Bangladesh]

"I have a wife, a son, a daughter and a mother. My father had passed away. After getting the news of my father's death, I tried to return to Bangladesh, but I had no money. My heart is sad."

[I10, 59, Bangladesh]

I9 and I4 shared how they were not able to participate in important family functions such as marriage in the following verbatims;

"My mother and sister always call me. My sister is getting married, I could not attend the ceremony. I do not have money to go back."

[I9, 52, Bangladesh]

"My family members are my mother, father, and sister. I miss them because I haven't seen them for years. I always call them, at least once a day. I am very sad as I was not able to attend the wedding of my sister. I was only able to send MYR4000.00."

[I4, 25, India]

According to I3,

"I have a mother, a younger brother, and a younger sister. I love them and I miss them."

[I3, 30, India]

The sacrifice of family relations is a biggest sacrifice made by migrant workers from South Asia as they made the decision to work in Malaysia. For married informants, they left their wives and children in their home countries. This is an enormous sacrifice made by the migrant workers from South Asia. For the unmarried ones, they sacrifice family relations too because they have to leave their mothers, fathers or siblings in their home countries. Some of the informants have never returned home while working abroad. Even more poignant is when they are unable to attend important ceremonies such as wedding functions of their siblings or the death of their parents or close family members, relatives or friends. Their sacrifices are so significant that most of these ceremonies such as weddings are held using the money these foreign workers earned and remitted, yet they are unable to attend those ceremonies especially wedding events of their close family members which is suppose to be a joyous occasion of gathering.

(iii) The sacrifice of the comfort of life

The third aspect of sacrifice that is examined in the present study will divulge the sacrifices related to the comfort of life. Normally, when one leaves the home country, they will be willing to let go of various comforts they had earlier. This aspect of sacrifice will probe whether the presence of facilities in the host country is better than that of the country of origin. Informant I11 who compared the comfort of accommodation in Cameron Highlands with that of his home country in Bangladesh said;

"Living in my home country is more comfortable and organized. Here the room

which I live in is very narrow and small. Nonetheless, the room, the toilet and showers can be said to be in good condition. "

[I11, 28, Bangladesh]

I2 who hails from India, agreed with the opinion of I11 and stated that;

"The quality of life is better in India. Living in Malaysia is just okay."

[I2, 32, India]

According to another informant, I3, who also hails from India said:

"Living in my home country is very comfortable and good. Here, the room in which I live is very narrow and small. This small space has to be shared with many people."

[I3, 30, India]

Generally the informants in present study agrees that their lives in their home countries are better and they would potentially have made more sacrifices of comfort of life.

(iv) The sacrifice of daily consumption – clothing and food

The sacrifice of daily consumption include various purchases that have to be sacrificed such as purchasing clothes, food, cigarettes and other needs and wants to tighten their belts in order to ensure that as much money can be saved by South Asian migrant workers who are working in Cameron Highlands. The daily consumption involves purchase of clothing and food intake. The following verbatim reveals various aspects related to this aspect of sacrifice.

"I buy things like clothes only when I desperately need it. At first, I just wanted to stifle the desire to buy clothes because I need to send money to my family. But since I was in need of clothes, I had to buy it. "

[I10, 59, Bangladesh]

"In my opinion, I have to sacrifice everyday items such as clothes because, in my country, I often buy clothes because they are cheap. It is expensive here. I am only able to buy at the bundle store."

[I3, 30, India]

There are also informants who highlighted how they missed the food cooked by their family members in the country of origin. I6 who hails from India said;

"I really missed the food my family cooks, because I cook nonchalantly. I cook only to fill my stomach. In India, spices are grounded but here everything is sold in packages. Taste is different. In my home country, my mother and my wife would be cooking. I cook on my own here because food sold in restaurant is expensive and I need to save money."

[I6. 30, India]

According to another informant, I4 who is also from India;

"I miss my favorite food which is my mother's cuisine cooked with love. My mother would grind chillies until smooth for fish and chicken curry. She would choose the right chilli and serve me with love. Unlike in the shop downstairs (the restaurant next to the workplace) sells mainly Indonesian cuisine such as soups. The chicken curry was runny. It doesn't taste like curry. Our cooking taste somewhat like those sold at the restaurant. I have eaten food prepared by my mother for more than 20 years which has made me dislike

other dishes."

He added further by saying;

"Sometimes the income I received is insufficient to buy the things I want, just enough to buy the things I need. As such I need to cut my expenses."

[I4, 25, India]

I1 too felt the same as I6 and I4. He said;

"I cook myself. It is not delicious. I miss my family's cooking. I do not sacrifice everyday stuff because I brought what I need. If I run out of things, I will buy it here. Everything is the same. I will buy it if I need it this month, and next month, I will send more money."

[I4, 46, Bangladesh]

Although sacrifices of daily consumption were made by South Asian migrant workers, their sacrifices are more focused on the use of clothes and food. Most of them will only buy items such as clothing when it is absolutely necessary. As India and Bangladesh are the leading countries for textile exports, the price of clothes is much lower compared to the price in Malaysia. Sacrifice in terms of food consumption is more focused towards cutting expenses on food purchase at restaurants which is less appealing compared to the food consumed in their home countries. The sacrifice of daily consumption ensures that the maximum amount of money is remitted to their home countries.

(v) The sacrifice of social relations

The final aspect of sacrifice investigated in the present study is the sacrifice of social relations. The sacrifice of social relations occurs when an individual moves from one place to another, which causes social relations especially with friends in their home countries to become increasingly distanced. The South Asian migrant workers often reminisced their relationship with friends in their home country as can be seen from the following verbatim. I9, I4 and I8 recalled their social relations in the country of origin as follow;

"I used to play football with my friends in my village."

[I9, 52, Bangladesh]

"I have an Indian friend from the same village who lived here for 3 years. He returned in 2015. I was very sad. Normally, during my free time in India, I bathed in the river and caught fish."

[I4, 25, India]

"I missed my friends in my hometown. We would play whatever we want because we do not have any other work to do. "

[I8, 46, , Bangladesh]

It is interesting to note how I6 relayed his opinion on the sacrifice of social relations made by saying that the separation is meant to be temporary.

"I normally play football with my friends when I was in India. At present, I am separated from my friends in India and this separation is only temporary as I have to work abroad."

[I6, 30, India]

Generally, several informants interviewed in the present study felt that they have sacrificed social relations with friends in their home countries. In Malaysia, social activities such as playing football or

other games have become very limited as they have to devote more time to work. Any opportunities that they have are used wisely by the informants to generate as much income as possible as this is the main motive for their coming to Malaysia. In addition, the debt taken serves as an incentive for them to sacrifice their social activities in order to ensure more income generated and more money remitted.

Conclusion

Five main dimensions of sacrifices made by South Asian migrant workers working in the agriculture and plantation sectors in Malaysia include financial sacrifice, sacrifice of family relationship, sacrifice of daily consumption, sacrifice of the comfort of life and sacrifice of social relations. These sacrifices are made by the South Asian migrant workers to ensure that their family members in their home country will have a better life in the future than their present condition. As almost all informants in the present study came from families of low socio-economic status, they were willing to sacrifice various aspects of their lives to ensure that their family members will be able to experience a better life through the sacrifices they made. Most of the South Asian migrant workers remit their money for various purposes such as wedding need for family members, educational needs of their children or for health care expenses of their elderly family members. The money remitted to the home country is a motivating factor for migrant workers from South Asia to continue to make sacrifices as they fully understand that the sacrifices made are only temporary in nature. The sacrifices made by these foreign migrant workers are often goes 'unseen'.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

Informed Consent

Informed consent was obtained from all the participants included in the study.

Ethical Approval

All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

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APPENDIX 1 INFORMANTS' DETAILS

Informant	Name	Age	Country of Origin
I1	Maydin	46	Bangladesh
I2	Om Prakash	32	India
I3	Sailaj	30	India
I4	Mani	25	India
I5	Devaraja	26	India
I6	Vijaykumar	30	India
I7	Irfhan	48	Bangladesh
I8	Shamsul	46	Bangladesh
I9	Alif	52	Bangladesh
I10	Rahim	59	Bangladesh
I11	Jaswen	28	India

SKOPJE-ISTANBUL: THE POST-COMMUNIST SILKROAD

Ali Pajaziti*

"If the Earth was a single state, Istanbul would be its capital"
Napoleon Bonaparta

"I buy children's clothes in Istanbul since I travel there twice a year."
A RNM citizen

Bal-kan: *Towards Debalkanization*

A few years ago, the world-renowned artist and director Angelina Jolie appeared on stage with a movie, "Land of Blood and Honey" (2011), which talks about the Balkan reality, in particular about the war in Bosnia, described through two Turkish words, such as *bal*-honey and *kan*-blood. These two words speak about both the Balkan good and the Balkanization, about the sociological phenomenon of combative contradiction that has accompanied this region since ancient times, and which was repeated at the end of the last century during a decade-long ordeal.

Balkan is a geographical space, a world of life, which the flow of centuries has brought most tragic stories to, *une civilization par les déchirée conflits*; it is a metaphor of permanent deconstruction, of troubles that have generated a terminological ignominy: *Balkanization* which marks misunderstandings, uncertainties, ethnic and religious antagonisms, the shattering tendencies as the result of exaggerating and excommunicating mythologies against the other and otherness, genocide, culturcide etc. Another feature of inter-Balkan communication is subjectivism, from the political dimension to the scientific rhetoric which must be grounded on impartial exploration and factography. It is a fact that *Pax Balkanica* today remains a verbal image which requires efforts to be built in the future. The corpus of Balkan Muslims, of this "still non-European part of Europe" (P. Rau) made up by Albanians, Bosnians, Turks, Romani's, Pomaks and others, has been going through e real Calvary since 1912, facing the question of physical survival and having been threatened a number of times especially by pan-Slavic and pan-Orthodox tendencies which imagine a pre-Ottoman Balkan. Today, at the time of "Balkan farce" (L. Starova), in this geography dazed by aggressiveness, the islamophobic spirit is present everywhere, from Greece to Serbia, from Macedonia to Bosnia, instilling uncertainty among Muslims in these lands. (Pajaziti, 2013: 125)

Skopje and Istanbul: two cities sharing a single spirit

Skopje is a settlement with dimensions of a global city, in which not only various cultures and ethnic identities meet but which also is a city of historical and civilizing paradigms. It's a city with a notorious

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history of cohabitance and multiculturalism. In fact, it is North Macedonia itself. A capital where roads cross, where interests of rulers clash and where many cultures, traditions and languages melt with each other. (Mehmeti, 2011: 73) Some have called Skopje *l'ombelico del mondo,* kernel of the world and Macedonia, *Catena Mundi*. An academic and politician of Turkey, Davutoglu (2010), described this country as the center and heart of the Balkan.

Together with Sarajevo, Skopje has one of the most beautiful bazaars in the Balkan. One can find there the *qeleshe* (Albanian hat), the headscarf of the Muslim woman, Turkish music and *baklava*, the Torbesh garbanzo roasters and the Gipsy wagoner. "*Deset kebapi ve molam!*" (Ten kebabs please!), "*Simit pogaçë*" (bun pie), "*Buyrum, buyrum!*", "*Sa janë mollat?*" (How much the apples?), "*Kumanovo bus*".... calls *Allahu Ekber, Allahu Ekber*, the sound of the bell of Saint Spas Church are part of the silhouette and live theatre of Skopje.

Skopje has another element by which it can be easily identified, the Stone Bridge, an ancient building which has a specific significance, both for the citizens of this city and for the ones who would come to visit it. A Bosnian philosopher from Macedonia has given a brilliant description of its significance:

> *"Each bridge is a metaphysical miracle, the Skopje one, especially! Passing through the bridge you don't only pass from one side to the other side of the river Vardar. This bridge connects the born and flourished cultures in a place, in the same city, Skopje. Its arks connect Europe and Asia; East and West; Christianity with Islam, getting them close without an example in wordly level. In the same bridge you can find the mihrab with written messages from the Holy Qur'an, and the orthodox priest throws the cross on the river for the epiphany occasion. Because of the Stone Bridge, Vardar is known as the Second Bosphorus as well. Real analysts say a real Bosphorus". (Muhiq, 2017: 29)*

The cultural mosaic called Macedonia, distinguished by "deep diversity" (Taylor, 1994) is a natural state. It is a "civilization corridor" where East and West meet. Skopje is a child of two parents! Today, in 2012, five decades after the catastrophal earthquake, Skopje has dignitarily changed from Kenzo Tange's utopia for an open city towards a divided one. The organic and natural Skopje has been replaced by another, artificial one, the GMC Skopje (genetically modified city), harmful to the social health of its inhabitants. This city has passed through many periods, from Skupi of Titus Livi, first century B.C., the Ottoman Üsküb (1392-1912), the Shkupi of 1912, Skoplje (between the two world wars), the Bulgarian Skopia of WW2 and the Skopje/Shkupi of the communism and transition periods. Once the pride of the Dardans, today the "stolen city" (Буѓевац et. al., 2010), overcome by urban delirium and collective political neurosis, by the ideology of alexandrist nationalism (although nations did not exist in the time of Alexander and mobility and pluralism were dominant) that damaged the view of this pearl of the Balkan.

Like any other city, Skopje maintains relations with other cities, from which it learns about the good ways of managing communal/municipal affairs, and to which it offers its own experiences, having established with some of them fraternal relations as well: Bradford, Dijon, Dresden, Tempe, Waremme, Nanchang, Suez, Pittsburg, Ljubljana, Saragossa, Istanbul, etc.

The latter, Istanbul, is a city with which Skopje has a strong spiritual and (infra)structural connection. Istanbul is a metropolitan megacity of universal proportions, something beyond a city, a world in itself, a universe, the center of the world.

"Istanbul is in many ways the capital of human civilizations. It has inherited the best of the Roman, the Byzantine, the Islamic, and modern civilizations. Istanbul has preserved so much of so many human traditions that every step you take in this city, you are stepping on the remnants of some civilization." (Khan, 2015) Although Istanbul has lost its attribute of being a capital city, it represents

the largest city in Turkey based on its number of inhabitants, and has managed to maintain its primacy as the ideological, cultural, economic and commercial center of this country. (DİA, 2001: 242)

Various studies and analyses qualify this city as a special urban unit, containing features of a global culture and representing different historical stratifications. Tourism, spirituality, investment opportunities or political networking, Istanbul has something to offer to everyone. Professor Khan of the University of Delaware links this city to its enormous value it gives to the Islamic culture:

"I have visited many great Muslim cities: New Delhi, Cairo, Casa Blanca, Marrakech, Mecca, Medina, Dubai, Doha, Amman, Tunis, to name but a few. None is like Istanbul. Those cities remind me of the past and lost glory of Islam, Istanbul alone promises a bright future. Dubai and Doha are rich and thriving, but neither is what Ibn Khaldun might call as *khalb al-Hadharah* – the heart of civilization." (Khan, 2015)

The United Nations spokesperson has invited state leaders to help in establishing a new world capital, i.e. the proclamation of the capital of the world: Istanbul! Richard Falk, emphasizes that Istanbul meets all the criteria to become the capital of the world, as it is "one of the most favorite touristic spots in the world", representing "a safe and acceptable place to hold delicate diplomatic meetings at a global level". It has also gained the appreciation of great economic and political development, at a time when many other countries, although superpowers, have lost it. Falk claims that Turkey harmoniously combines and parallels the religious and the secular element, surpassing many other countries. (www.kosovapress.com).

The Albanians' perception of the Turks and Turkey

Balkan Muslims cultivate a special sympathy for Turkey, the Turks and Istanbul as the spiritual capital of Turkey. Albanians are no exception to this approach. This picture has been confirmed by a scientific research, which concluded that Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania express sympathy for Turkey. Respondents from all three countries have positive sentiments toward Turkey, considering it as "a friendly state" (60.6% of responents in Albania, 53% of respondents in Kosova and 27.7% of respondents in Macedonia). When we consider the number of Turkish respondents in Macedonia, the number of those who see Turkey as fatherland in Macedonia is natural (41.2%). If we add to these numbers the percentage of those who see this country and "big brother", we can conclude that the perception on Turkey is positive. (TDBB, 2009)[1]

Another study confirms this picture. Seen in general, this study shows that Albanians, be they in Montenegro, Kosova, Macedonia or Albania, have sympathy towards Turkey. But mostly it can be observed in Kosova where such sympathy has grown from 83% to 96%. In Macedonia this percentage was 75% in 2008, 85% in 2009 and 70% in 2010. (Koha, 2011)

Respondents from Macedonia have visited Turkey most (83%), followed by those from Albania (29.8%) and from Kosova (24.8%). Albanians visit Turkey for tourism mostly, while respondents from Macedonia have more reasons, like visiting their relations (32.3%), while those from Kosova and Albania are more active in business (20%). Respondents from Albania also visit Turkey for educatin (4%) while others don't (0%). (TDBB, 2009)

Cities are geographic spaces, memory and emotional emblems that draw people to themselves. In the question about the aesthetic aspect, which means about the most beautiful city, the most mentioned city (among Sarajevo, Tirana, Skopje, Belgrade, Sofia, Athens, Prizren, Ohrid, Prishtina, Thesalonika, Dubrovnik) is Istanbul (first in Albania, second in Kosova and third in Macedonia).

[1] , p. 44.

Table 1. Which is the most beautiful city in Balkan?

Macedonia	Sarajevo (25.8%)	Skopje (19.5%)	Istanbul (8.8%)
Albania	Istanbul (27.7%)	Tirana (12.4%)	Athens (10.9%)
Kosova	Tirana (19.1%)	Istanbul (16%)	Prishtina (16%)

(Bulut & Idriz, eds., 2012:73-87).

Many famous Balkan people live and work in Turkey, among them Albanians, such as the Skopje basketball coach Oktay Mahmudi, the young Kosovan basketball player Kenan Spahi, Osman Cedi, the artist Almeda Abazi, etc., who create a strong emotional connection between the Balkans and Turkey.

The post-communist silk road: Skopje – Istanbul

A note from a Croatian portal speaks about the rising popularity of Turkey in recent years: "Probably the trance after the Turkish soap operas is not fading; that is why the request for plane tickets to Istanbul is increasing".

During my three-cycle study period in the authentic capital of Turkey, Istanbul, travel was a ritual in itself. This trip has always been mysterious, providing a special impression, a specific experience, which the person from the Balkans does not experience when going elsewhere, to another world metropolis.

We have been following the trends in the relationships between Turkey and Macedonia or rather between Istanbul and Skopje, and vice versa for the last 30 years, and we have seen that this connection is getting stronger and stronger. At the beginning of the transition, the people from the Balkans in general and all Balkan Muslims, especially those from Macedonia, had a destination to survive in a state of uncertainty created after the fall of Yugoslavia. The bankrupt economy pushed people to look for alternatives to survival and Istanbul turned into a huge bazaar where people bought items so as to sell them in their homeland, from needles to huge machines. Travel agencies such as Vardar, Yadran, Drina, Hisar, Şampiyon Hersekli, Interturizm, Ekspres, Sava, Alpar, and Istanbul Seyahat have become images of the mentality of waking up at the former Topkapi bus station or the magnificent one at Esenler today. THY and Pegasus represent the two symbols of air travel to and from this megalopolis.

Meanwhile, Turkey is present in the Balkans and in Macedonia through its economic and cultural investments (Ramstore, TAV, Halkbank, TIKA, Yunus Emre, Maarif International Schools...). The construction of the largest private residential complex in Skopje by the Turkish company Cevahir Holding has strengthened the cooperation between Macedonia and Turkey and has encouraged the economic development in the capital of the Republic of Macedonia. Eser Cevahir, a board member of Cevahir Holding, told *SETimes* that the company's main aim is to bring new projects to new markets. "Macedonia is an emerging market economy and has good relations with Turkey. The advantage that Macedonia offers us emerges from its location as a gateway to Europe without visa requirements," Cevahir said. The residential complex is located in the *Aerodrom* neighborhood in Skopje.

It covers 280,000 square meters and consists of four 42-storey buildings, 130m high and a business and commercial center. (www.setimes.com)

It is not only people from Skopje or the citizens of Macedonia who travel to Istanbul. There is also frequent attendance in the opposite direction, especially in the last decade when Skopje and other attractive points in Macedonia have almost been occupied by Turkish tourists, from Skopje Castle to Matka to Ohrid. According to the data from the State Statistical Office, most tourists from Turkey

come to Macedonia in organized groups through agencies, while the main reasons include: a stay which is a part of a longer trip, business reasons (Statistical Review, 2010:31), and they stay about 4.16 days or 3.24 nights on average in R.M. (Statistical Review, 2010:45).

The empirical study: Findings and interpretations

To empirically illustrate the post-communist relations Skopje-Istanbul, we conducted an interview with 24 citizens from Skopje and the surrounding area whom we asked five questions, aiming to detect their attitude towards the Turkish and global metropolis and the reasons of such high attendance of this megalopolis. The research was conducted in October 2019.

a) Regarding the first question (***What does Istanbul symbolize for you?***) the respondents gave the following answers: "It's a cultural, economic and industrial center. ... a symbol of multiculturalism, a city that never rests (#1), "a tourist center" (#4), a place of history, mentioned even by the Prophet Muhammad (#5), a city of global importance, a cultural, educational, and business center "(#6),"a center of the world and civilizations, a crossroads of cultures, religions and great empires "(#7), an important political and economic decision-making center; a symbol of religious heritage for the peoples of the Balkans" (#8),"the best destination for spiritual, business, real metropolis"(# 9)," "the epicenter of Islam" (#14) "megalopolis that connects the Orient with the Occident, the old with the new, the history with the future ... the center of contemporary, secular Turkey, with an extremely important political, economic, social and in particular cultural role, regionally but also globally" (# 16).

b) It is interesting that all the interviewees had already visited Istanbul, and the reasons for the congested visits after 1990 onwards are as follows: "There are lots of things to do there, there is what to see and what to feel" (#1), "beauty of the city ... people are hospitable, especially when they realize that we are from the Balkans "(#2), "beautiful environment, Islamic spirit, there is a lot to see, a place with a lot of history "(#3), "trade, hospitality "(#4), " trade, family ties, mosque"(# 5)," culture, architecture, strategic position ... simply a city you cannot resist" (#6), "great artistic deeds"(#7), "appearance, dynamism, comfort of this amazing city"(#8), "fashion, halal, salep and history"(#9), "similarity of mentality, abundance, opportunities it offers"(#10), bilateral ties RNM-Turkey, connection point of production centers of the Far East and local-Turkish ones" (#11), "cozy atmosphere, family, religion" (#12), mosques, culture, shopping malls" (#13), "the largest and cheapest market" (#15), "religious feelings and architecture, cuisine" (#20), "affordable prices, quality, transportation" (#21), "businesses with Arab countries whereupon Istanbul is a bridge of communication, increase of Turkish investments in RMV " (# 22), "feeling at home" (#23), etc.

c) When asked if the respondents see things in common between Skopje and Istanbul, which is one of the hypotheses of this paper, we find that the based on the realized research, there is a strong similarity between these two cities. Among our interview recordings are: "culture, bridges erected by the Ottoman Empire, approximately the same cuisine" (#2), "Skopje for me is little Istanbul, the bazaar, and the mosques of Skopje make this place the sister of Istanbul "(#3), "architecture, people with family ties living in these two cities" (#4), "The Old Bazaar of Skopje is a sister of the Kapali Bazaar, numerous mosques, historical objects, religion as a bridge between the two nations, the Turkish and the Albanian" (#5), "Skopje being the suburb of Istanbul ..." (#6), "both cities are the

crossroads of cultures, civilizations and history" (#8), "the similar atmosphere" (#12), "the northern part of Skopje and the bazaar are miniatures and minimal reflections of Istanbul" (#17), the architectural style in the old part of Skopje, the clutter created in the Old Bazaar and Bitpazar, the chaos in the traffic, and of course, the consumption of Turkish tea and coffee" (#22), etc.

An ethnic Macedonian said the following:

"Skopje and Istanbul are capital cities of both countries and friendly cultures, respectively. Since 2003 they have officially been fraternal cities. Macedonia, on the one hand, occupies an important place in the memory and identity of contemporary Turkey. Macedonia is the birthplace of Ataturk's father. On the other hand, from 1992 onwards, Turkey has pursued a very principled and stabilizing policy towards Macedonia and the Balkans in general. Istanbul is home to many Turkish Muhajirs and Albanians from Macedonia. These political and especially cultural-identity exhaustions make the communication between the two cities bilateral and open." (#16)

a) Among the drivers of businesses done with Turkey are the following: "Turkey's growth" (#10), competitive prices, market size/variety of goods, optimal quality over price paid, sincerity/reliability/good trade ethics of Turkish vendors, religious proximity - when we go to Istanbul we feel at home, even better" (# 8), "there is no deception as before, the Turkish mentality has changed (#10), "Istanbul and Turkey are a regional economic and trade center. Trade in textiles and recently also in technical goods, plays an important role in the relations between the two countries and cities" (# 16), "sincerity has improved" (#21), "a huge market, many businessmen speak Turkish and besides, the mentality, as a result of the Islamic religion, is somewhat similar." (#22)

Table 1. Reasons for visiting Istanbul by Macedonian citizens

Religious	**Cultural-historical**	**Economic**	**Political**
Islam	Language	Competitive prices	Stabilizing politics in the Balkans
Mosques	Bazaar	Market/trade ethics	Transition
Halal	Cuisine	Trade center	Bilateral ties Turkey – RNM
Spirituality	Historic monuments	Product variety	
Sacral buildings	Turkish coffee and tea	Transport	
	Architecture	Textile	
	Oriental culture	Turkish investments	
	Center of civilizations	Tourism	

Conclusions

The most organic connection between two areas, cities or countries is a sociological and cultural truth. The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, especially those of the Islamic religious background (affiliation), have always felt warmth and sympathy for a cosmopolitan city such as Istanbul. The spirit of this city, in one way or another, has been present in peoples' lives in the Balkans in general and the Albanians' in particular. Although post-Ottoman regimes have tried to stifle this spirit and separate the man of national culture from this imperial city, they have not succeeded. This can be clearly seen by the enthusiasm with which they recaptured and reembraced Istanbul after the collapse of the socialist system. Since then, almost everyone from Skopje has visited this icon of urbanism and millennial culture.

Based on the conducted research, we have reached to the following conclusions:

- The cultural aspect is the strongest element that encourages the citizens of RNM to visit Istanbul. Among the most influential cultural elements is religion, followed by architecture, gastronomic culture and others.
- The Skopje-Istanbul road is heavily frequented by Albanians, Turks and Bosniaks. This must be the result of a religious connection.
- Respondents relate the rise of Turkey as a crucial factor to the more frequent visits of Istanbul.
- There are positive findings regarding the quality of Turkish products (now no one hides Turkish goods anymore; instead, they say: "I only have Turkish goods or goods from Turkey" (#21); changes in the business ethics among the Turks who were previously described as fraudsters, swindlers, etc.
- Students from RNM in Istanbul and Turkish students in Skopje can take an advantage of the advancement of cooperation between these two cities.

Fairs, cultural days, Istanbul Week in Skopje and Skopje Week in Istanbul would be events that would deepen the cooperation between these two cities.

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THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON MIGRANTS' MENTAL HEALTH AND EMOTIONAL WELLBEING: A CASE STUDY OF 25 FILIPINO MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Natalia Sali

Introduction

Migration is not merely an economic undertaking but has social and emotional components. Its complexity results to some factors that can be associated with mental health and emotional wellbeing. With the increasing number of international migrants which was estimated at 272 million as of 2019 (UN-DESA 2019), this study was able to achieve an in-depth appreciation of the migration phenomenon as experienced by a small group of Filipino migrants.

An international migrant is any "any person who is outside a state of which they are a citizen or national, or, in the case of a stateless person, their state of birth or habitual residence" (UNHR 2019:14). There are different types of migrants including those who came to the country legally, forced migrants such as refugees and asylum seekers, and undocumented or irregular migrants (Castles et al. 2020). The United Kingdom is 5th country of destination with 8.8 million international migrants as of 2017 and of those, 153,000 are Filipino migrants (ONS 2019).

Filipino migration has been the Philippine government's strategy to address the economic crisis (Rodriguez 2010). The demand for Filipino workers with skills in certain professions grew steadily and increased the number of women migrants in jobs like domestic help, nursing and other health jobs in the early 80's (Choy 2010). Filipino migrants migrate for social and economic reasons (Alonso-Garbayo and Maben 2009) including pursuing employment and opportunity for professional growth (Marsella and Ring 2003, Chen et al. 2009, Ronquillo et al. 2011).

Objectives, participants and methodology

This study explored the lived experience of 25 respondents and how migration impacted on their mental health and emotional wellbeing. The respondents were selected using snowball sampling and came from nine places in the UK. They were between 21 and 55 years old, of which 15 were females and 10 males. Twenty-two have college degrees gained in the Philippines whilst three were finishing university in the UK. They have been in the UK for between 10 and 30 years.

This study used case study approach which is about exploring the how and why questions (Yin 2009). The approach is particularly useful in obtaining an in-depth appreciation of an issue, event or phenomenon of interest, in its natural real-life context (Crowe et al. 2011).

Findings and Discussion

Mental health has been defined as "a state of wellbeing in which every individual realises his or her own potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make contribution to her or his community" (WHO 2015). It was said that the social perspective of mental health focuses on the impact of social circumstances on mental health or illness (Rogers and Pilgrim 2014).

Migrants' views on culture, mental health, and emotional wellbeing

This study showed some social factors that could be associated with mental health including aspects related to the migrants' social roles. As migrants performed different roles in the family, both experienced and perceived failure to perform those roles became a source of stress. It can be said that the positive and negative view of mental health are associated with the ability to perform their social roles – e.g. by being the provider and being fit parents.

Whilst they have positive view of mental health, there were also concepts associated with mental ill-health which were associated with stigma and family shame. The failure in performing social roles appeared to be the primary source of stress whereas the ability to perform their social roles give them the sense of satisfaction and a boost to their self-esteem. Their view of mental ill-health corresponded with helplessness and the reliance of the person on the support of others (usually family members). Since the respondents viewed challenges as normal part of daily life, the only difference between their view of positive mental health and mental ill-health was the person's ability to cope.

Work-related factors are associated with the performance of the migrants' 'provider' role

Issues arising from employment including difficulty in finding jobs or threats to their legal status resulted in a sense of fear and frustration which became a source of stress for some. A possible explanation was the value they put on their ascribed role as a provider, which was also the primary motivation for migration. This finding supports a few other studies that failure to send remittances impact on mental health (e.g. Akuie 2005; Shooshtari et al. 2014).

Migrants who are married to non-Filipinos had to explain the reasons for sending money to the Philippines. Though there was no account of serious marital disputes, arguments between partners happen and this contributes to the migrants' stress. Similar finding was reported in a study with Filipina women married to Australian men where women migrants experienced depression as the financial obligation contributed to marital conflicts (Woelz-Stirling et al. 2000).

Lastly, dissatisfaction and loss of status due to menial jobs became sources of stress. Similar findings were reported about Filipinos in the US about job related stress and adverse impact on mental health (De Castro, Rue, and Takeuchi 2010; Reid 2012). On the contrary, Filipinos with better job satisfaction reported lesser depressive symptoms (Mossakowski 2007).

Migration and gender

Most of the women respondents were the first to migrate to other countries and the UK. This reflects what had been said about the increasing number of women in international migration (UN Migration Report 2017). Similarly, daughters felt a stronger sense of obligation compared to sons (e.g. Parennas 2001, Constable 2003, Cruz 2006) and that women are more committed to family and marriage (Constable 2003). However, caution should be taken as this study also showed that both female and male migrants felt the obligation to provide for the family. They considered themselves to be in a better position to do so, regardless of their gender.

Fulfilling the provider's role could be attributed to Filipino values of showing gratitude, sense of indebtedness, and looking after each other. This was referred to as '*utang na loob*' or sense of indebtedness which was considered as the core of Filipino tradition (Reyes 2015). Migrants, both males and females, considered sending remittances as a way of paying back past favours. It appears that a deep sense of obligation could explain the association between work-related stress and their mental health experience.

Theories that underpin Filipino migration

It appears that no single migration theory could explain Filipino migration. It could be noted that some elements in Stark and Bloom's (1985) human behaviour model of migration reflects the experience of the respondents. For example, the theory is characterised by heavy reliance on network and kinship capital which helps the economic performance of migrants. The experience of all respondents showed strong kinship and close family ties where the family took part in decisions made, shared the costs of travel, and offered social support at the post-migration stage. However, an aspect that needs a nuanced discussion is the nature of relationship which Stark and Bloom (1985) referred to as *binding* and *beneficial*. As this study found, the family shared the costs and returns of migration and these mitigated as well as exacerbated the impact on the migrants' mental health and emotional wellbeing. It can be argued that the relationship was not always *beneficial*.

Forms of social capital and ways of coping

Resilience is a set of individual qualities that allow one to thrive despite significant challenges and to draw on resources in order to produce desired outcomes (Connor and Davidson 2003, Yee et al. 2007). Migrants performed practical steps to earn extra income and to get better-paying jobs and those provided a boost to their self-esteem and compensated for their absence and inability to personally care for their sick relatives. The ability to send remittances of money helped in maintaining family pride and the sense of fulfilment migrants. Those findings support other studies where sending remittances increases interpersonal resources which help the cope with emotional and psychological stresses (Alcantara et al. 2015) and adds prestige (Holst, Schafer, and Schrooten 2012). It does not only serve economic value but also signify the status and role held by migrants (Carling 2014) that balances or even outweighs the stress they feel (Connor 2016).

The family and social networks as forms of social capital

The Filipino migrants' family served as a social capital as it enabled the migrants' social identity in the original country. This finding supports the concept of living a dual life in the country of origin and in the new country (Portes 1998).

Social networks could be considered as another form of social capital. According to Bourdieu (1997), social capital accrued within durable networks of people with strong relationships and shared interests. Respondents felt safe and at ease in sharing their problems with their all-Filipino groups and were able to seek and offer support including financial, assistance with childcare, job referrals, and advice, and prayers. The strength of co-ethnic ties was also found in Filipino migrants in the US, where salient ethnicity provided better psychological coping resource and were less likely to self-report experiences of racial/ethnic discrimination in their lifetime (Mossakowski 2007). Social support was found to be stronger when members have common context, problems, social, religious and cultural background (Zaleska, Brabcova, and Vackova 2014).

Church groups as social capital

Respondents drew strength not only from having faith in God but also by being members of church groups, resulting to resilience in dealing with feeling of loneliness and sadness. Respondents with experience of depression sought emotional and social support from their church instead of formal health services. Previous studies also found that belonging to a group is both a protective factor as well as offers support for adjustment in the new country (Straiton, Ledesma, and Donnelly 2017) and that church helps in coping with psychosocial distress (see Parennas 2001; Pe-pua 2003; Asis, Huang, and Yeo 2004; Nakonz and Shik 2009; Trovao, Ramalho, and David 2017).

Interestingly, the respondents' social groups and church groups overlap. The same finding was reported by Nakonz and Shik (2009) where religious coping becomes social rather than purely spiritual. Filipinos in Japan and in Australia also found that the church has dual role – for worship and as informal employment agency and for social interaction that acts *"home away from home"* (Mateo 2000).

Social connectedness, social identity, and the new technology

The new technology and new channels of communication reinforced the interaction and enabled the migrants to perform their different roles whilst being away from home. Migrants could participate in rituals and stay connected with family, friends and colleagues. Previous studies also found that parents could supervise their children (Fresnoza-Frot 2009), attain certain level of intimacy (Viruell-Fuentes 2017), and connect with elderly parents and sick relatives, thereby giving them a sense of power (Madianou 2012). Filipinos in Australia reported that mobile communication compensates for physical absence and constructs a sense of co-presence (Cabalquinto 2018).

Conclusion

Migrants were not simply migrants but were also parents, siblings, and relatives, which entail certain expectations. Any disruption in the performance of those roles contributed to emotional problems. The economic and psychic costs of migration could be attributed to the values and beliefs on the importance of family relationships and the ascribed social roles. With a cultural lens, this study provided an insight on how mental health and emotional wellbeing were conceptualised by migrants, including how they viewed the impact of mental health within Filipino cultural context.

The role of the family has evolved but remained crucial throughout the migration process, from being the motivation for migration to performing active roles as the migrants settle in the new country. The definition of the family could be revisited to move away from the socio-legal construct of nuclear family, and instead consider the expanded membership and kinship.

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

CARING FOR ELDERLY PARENTS IN JAPAN WHILE LIVING ABROAD: TRANSNATIONALISM, MOBILITIES, AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES

Yana Yovcheva

Introduction

When the words 'care' and 'transnational migration' are used in one sentence, what typically comes to mind are migrants – usually women – who move to another country in order to care for children or elderly people there because the latter's own family are in a more advantageous position and have other priorities. In view of the constantly increasing movement of foreign health, residential and domestic care workers to rapidly-aging upper- and middle-income countries, researchers have developed the concept of global care chains (Hochschild 2000, Parreñas 2005, Yeates 2009). Defined as "a series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring" (Hochschild 2000: 131), the chain extracts physical and emotional labor upwards to the Global North (or, the core), leaving the Global South (or, the periphery) as a reservoir of care workers (Yeates 2009, Raghuram, Bornat & Henry 2011). These chains "cascade downwards and incorporate labor that at each stage is remunerated to lesser extent" (Kofman & Raghuram 2012: 8). For instance, a woman in a poor country migrates from the big city to a wealthy country to work as a domestic maid; she, in turn, relies on another woman from the countryside to migrate to the big city to care for her children and/or elderly parents in her absence; she, in turn, relies on (female) relatives to care for her own children and/or elderly parents back in the countryside. As Ormond & Toyota (2018) point out, care deficits are passed downward in distinctly gendered, racialized and classed manners.

This theoretical framework, however, operates under the assumption that care needs in wealthy countries are necessarily met by care givers from poorer countries and that the only migration that happens in the context of care is in order to provide it. Little, if any, attention has been given by migration scholars to the scenario where citizens of wealthy countries migrate away from them and find themselves in the position to have to care for their elderly parents across borders in a context where immigrant care labor is not readily available to compensate for the adult children's physical absence. This kind of scenario is very much the case with Japanese migrants residing in the West who have elderly parents back in Japan. Drawing on a series of qualitative interviews with Japanese respondents in Austria and Bulgaria, this paper explores Japanese migrants' care practices and the impact of those practices on their lives in the host countries.

The paper begins with an overview of elderly care in Japan, covering state policies (including the government's historical and contemporary involvement with the issue) as well as the recent phenomenon of retirement abroad. After a brief look at the demographic profile of migrants who care for parents back in Japan, it discusses the care practices Japanese migrants engage in, the types of support provided, and finally the various kinds of impact care has on migrants' lives in the host country.

Elderly care in Japan

Historical overview

Coming only second after Monaco, Japan is the oldest nation in the world, with a median age of 44 years (Pilling 2014). This is due to both low fertility rates – currently hovering around 1.4 children per woman, and long life expectancy – 80 for men, 86 for women, 83.4 on average (Pilling 2014, Marlow 2015). By 2016, the population aged 65 years and older already exceeded a quarter of the total, at 26.5% (Kavedzija 2018), and is forecast to reach 40% by 2060 (Marlow 2015), while the population aged 75 and above is about 13% (Suzuki 2017), and is forecast to reach 27% by 2060 (Marlow 2015). The absolute number of elderly people in Japan is expected to soon level off, but the proportion of the young population is declining rapidly, thus putting a greater burden on fewer children to care for parents.

Who gets to care for the elderly in Japan has long been a question of cultural norms and tradition cleverly manipulated by successive governments. According to the stereotype, dedicated and responsible adult children were/are expected to look after dependent older parents within extended family living arrangements. It was enshrined in the Meiji Civil Code in the late 19th century, which stipulated that the eldest son was responsible for the parents (though in reality it was his wife doing the job), in return inheriting the family's assets. This remained the logic behind elderly care in Japan throughout most of the 20th century. (Hayashi 2011).

State involvement in care for the elderly was virtually non-existent until 1874, when the first poor relief legislation started offering minimal help (in the form of food) to the over-70s lacking any family support. The 1929 Public Relief Act lowered the age limit to 65 and introduced 'indoor' assistance, in addition to the construction of a few public almhouses – yet in the following years only a few thousand older people (out of 3.2 million over-65s) were aided. The 1950 National Assistance Act mandated that local authorities provide old people's institutions for those unable to live independently (on the basis of means- and needs-assessments of applicants and their families), but public assistance remained supplementary to family support. As economic recovery was the national priority in the first years after WWII, public welfare services for the 'unproductive' were seen as something of far less importance. Some progress was made with the 1963 Elderly Welfare Act, which introduces nursing homes for the elderly population not covered by previous provisions. Still, the shame and stigma attached to being left uncared for by family members and depending on public welfare[1] remained a deterrent for potential applicants. In the early 1960s, 80% of Japan's elderly still lived with their families, regardless of their medical needs. A universal health care insurance system was introduced in 1961, but it only covered half of medical costs, leaving many without access to medicines and treatment. Instead, family members were expected to bear with the elderly person's condition, and that often led to resentment, neglect, abuse, and even suicide. (Ibid.)

Fortunately for both the elderly and their families, 'social hospitalization' became possible in 1973 with the provision of free healthcare for most over-70s. While public nursing homes (then the only alternative to 24-hour family care for bedridden or frail people) were few and required means- and needs-assessment, hospitals were many and required no means-testing and little needs-assessment – thus entailed no welfare stigma. By 1980, there were 80,000 bedridden or frail old people in nursing homes vs. 432,000 who required social care but little or no medical treatment, staying at hospitals for

[1] This kind of situation was routinely associated with the notion of *Obasuteyama*, or "granny-dump mountain", related to the ancient practice of abandoning older people in the mountain so they would not be a burden for the family – a symbol of family neglect, failure of filial piety, abandonment and shame.

103 days on average, virtually living there. The latter constituted nearly 4% of the over-65 population. (Ibid.)

However, as the per capita costs at hospitals were two to three times higher than at nursing homes and welfare expenditures were skyrocketing, the government took aim at social hospitalization. With the Elderly Health Act of 1982, it was abolished and small user fees were introduced as disincentives. Furthermore, efforts were made to force hospitals to target those patients deemed to be socially hospitalized and discharge them to their families or to local authorities. The families of such patients were condemned as irresponsible and uncaring. Meanwhile, the government retained supplementary and means-tested measures for nursing-home admission. Thus, the family continued to be seen as the primary source of care, and institutionalization as a last resort. Still, as hospitals remained the only stigma-free places where elderly patients could be cared for professionally, the end of the century saw some 275,000 older people socially hospitalized, at the cost of two billion yen. (Ibid.)

As Japanese society has been undergoing various transformations, family relations have changed, and so have the conditions for elderly care within the family. While nearly 80% of Japanese seniors were living with a child in 1960, currently only about 41% do. Furthermore, after decades of opting out of a career after giving birth, and staying home to look after children and parents-in-law, women are now being encouraged by the government to re-enter the work force – something that is hoped to boost Japan's declining labor numbers, but also makes it more difficult for women to act as full-time caregivers. (Marlow 2015).

Current policy framework

The Long-Term Care Insurance

Although successive Japanese administrations in the second half of the 20th century continued to insist that families should be the primary care providers for the elderly, the imminent ageing problem did not escape their attention. Nursing homes were established and a system of home helpers introduced as far back as the early 1960s. In the 1970s, benefits for retirees were more than doubled and a system of virtually free healthcare for older people was established through the so-called 'social hospitalization'. In 1990, the government introduced the "Gold Plan", expanding long-term care services. Ten years later, it imposed mandatory insurance for long-term care. (Pilling 2014).

With the Long-Term Care Insurance (hereinafter LTCI), everyone starts paying into the system at age 40 and is eligible to receive benefits after 65, or earlier in the case of illness. Currently, around six million people are enrolled in LTCI. When they apply, applicants are interviewed by a municipal employee who feeds the resulting information into an algorithm that assigns the person a care level. That, in turn, is analyzed by an expert committee of welfare workers. A care plan is then drawn up, allowing the patient to choose between competing institutions and service providers offering everything from home visits, bathing and help getting groceries to paying for short stays in hospitals or long-term residence in nursing homes and specialized group homes for dementia patients. (Marlow 2015).

Universal healthcare in Japan means medical and care services are available for all citizens — rich or poor — equally through social insurance methods which clarify the relationship between service provisions and burdens: 50% comes from insurance premiums, and the rest is shared equally by national and local governments; premiums and out-of-pocket co-payments are fixed by the government (30% of service cost till the age 70; 10-20% between age 70 to 74; and 10% for "late elderly" meaning age 75 and above; higher income elderly pay a maximum of 30%). (Suzuki 2017).

The LTCI system covers up to $2,900 a month in services, as opposed to cash payment, and it saves

money by providing options other than full-on institutionalization (Marlow 2015). Additionally, new high level medical treatments that may cost over 80 million yen a year (about US$80,000) can be mostly subsidized by the government (Suzuki 2017).

In Japan, it has been the local (both prefectural and municipal) government which actually manages the public insurances. A 2016 revision by the "Act Securing Hometown Medical and Long-Term Care, etc." tried to promote integrated service delivery to include both medical and LTC for those ages 65 and above. Each municipality established several community centers at each middle or primary school district, so the elderly living nearby can easily tap into the needed services. (Ibid.)

As a result of these and other adaptations, Japan has struck a reasonable balance between providing care and controlling costs. Spending on healthcare per capita is among the lowest of advanced nations, though outcomes are among the best. That is partly down to Japanese people's lifestyle. But the government's adaptability to new challenges related to changes in the demand may also be seen as a key factor in the success story of Japanese healthcare. Every two years, the government renegotiates reimbursement fees with doctors, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies, routinely imposing restraints or reductions. Primary care is given priority over specialist treatment: the Japanese visit the doctor far more often than Americans but receive far fewer surgical interventions. (Pilling 2014).

Immigrant labor

The ageing of Japanese society means not only a larger number of elderly in need of care, but also a smaller number of working-age caregivers. By 2012, the country was already facing a shortage of care laborers of about 400,000 to 600,000, and, as a result, more than half of nursing homes had to downsize despite increasing demand (Zhang et al. 2012). While Western nations in similar circumstances have turned to immigrant labor – with established government programs for recruiting the best and brightest medical professionals from abroad, alongside less formal schemes providing employment for domestic carers, Japan's resistance to go that way lasted until 2005, when "the range of areas in which foreign workers could work was broadened beyond those deemed to be specialized skills" (Ford & Kawashima 2013: 430).

In the most ethnically homogenous country in the developed world, where non-Japanese are less than 2% of the total population, allowing foreigners into the labor force in general is a sensitive topic (Oi 2015). Japanese national identity continues to revolve around the "homogenous group ideology", and despite nearly 30 years of experience with (limited numbers of) foreign workers, ethnic diversity is not something that the general population, and especially the older generations, feel comfortable with (ibid.). The apprehension regarding allowing foreign workers into the care sector in particular may have to do with some further considerations. While manufacturing, the IT sector, and other industries may be indifferent to the ethnicity (which in Japan is typically equated to cultural and linguistic identity) and lenient about the Japanese-language proficiency of their workers, care provision requires the kind of human interaction where language fluency and cultural sensitivity are likely to be seen by the Japanese (both patients and medical workers) as things of utmost importance – even more so than in other service sectors.

Despite such concerns, the Japanese government did eventually give in to pressures from hospitals and residential care homes to boost the number of medical and care workers in the country by importing foreign labor. The Japan Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2006, allowing the entry of 400 nurses and 600 carers within two years after the scheme was launched. The Japan Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2007, allowing 200 nurses and 300 carers per year for two years. Similar agreements followed with Vietnam (in 2009) and India (in 2011).

(Ford & Kawashima 2013).

However, "problems in the design and implementation of the foreign care worker scheme […] resulted in an uneven quality of training and the deskilling and exploitation of foreign nurses" and that had a negative impact "not only on the experience of individual [foreign] workers, but also on their colleagues and their employers and on the vitality of the […] scheme itself" (ibid: 431). Japanese language training was left to the hospitals / residential care facilities and many of them simply did not have the capacity to conduct it properly, while foreign nurses were often expected to do double shifts and that left them with little time to study for the notoriously difficult national exam (Ford & Kawashima 2013). From 2008, when the government started allowing foreign nurses and care workers in, to 2015, only 304 people had managed to pass this exam (Oi 2015). Furthermore, while preparing for the exam, fully qualified foreign nurses were actually assigned to work as assistant nurses – bathing, clothing and feeding patients – and were, respectively, receiving lower salaries (Ford & Kawashima 2013). To top all that, foreign medical workers were initially required to go home after three to five years (Oi 2015). All of that was rather demotivating. By July 2010, 17 Indonesian candidates had left Japan prematurely (Ford & Kawashima 2013).

Technologies

Parallel to the foreign care worker scheme, the Japanese government is also willing to invest in the development of care-giving robots. Robotics has always been a Japanese forte, and – unlike in the West, where artificial intelligence is generally viewed with deep suspicion and robots tend to be given tasks that humans do not want to do – most Japanese have no qualms with living alongside and being cared for by robots. Currently, there is a wide range of prototypes – from robot suits to help rehabilitation to fully functional humanoids to converse with, to robot pets intended to alleviate anxiety, stress, depression, and generally aid the mental state of elderly patients – but their commercialization is still difficult to realize due to high costs. (Marlow 2015).

Other recent policy connecting healthcare with technology includes the current administration's initiative to invest in the development of experimental regenerative medicine and cell therapy, among other new medical technologies. The hope is that through the quick commercialization of these, the Japanese government would be able to save money on future health care costs while encouraging the creation of a valuable new industry (ibid.).

Retirement abroad

The rapidly ageing society in Japan has generated "anxiety about the long-term viability of the post-war social welfare system", in view of the fact that there is a shortage of young workers willing and able to support the aged, and "the individual burden of medical expenses is increasing while pension amounts are limited" (Ono 2008: 152). Fearing the situation may get worse, a growing number of Japanese pensioners choose to move overseas to stretch their pensions and savings, while securing reliable health care. (Zhang et al. 2012).

Other than the need for health care, Japanese people's longevity – with an average of 74.5 years of healthy life (Pilling 2014) – also means a considerable amount of free time which retirees may want to fill with activities that bring a sense of satisfaction, a meaningful existence, self-actualization, *ikigai* (or 'what makes a life worth living', per Matthews 1996, cited in Ono 2008) – while staying within the means of their pensions. Retiring abroad offers a chance to do just that, and is thus "not only a socio-economic but also a cultural phenomenon" (Ono 2008: 153). More affluent people may choose to retire as early as their 50s to enjoy the full range of opportunities at a foreign destination while still healthy. Some bring their much older parents (often in their late 80s or even 90s) along, so the latter

can be cared for by local care givers for a modest amount of money, thus providing the still younger retirees the freedom to explore what speaks to their heart's desire (Zhang et al. 2012).

Retirees' individual agency would, of course, be insufficient to make things happen, unless it operates within a structural context that facilitates and even encourages international retirement migration. As with Westerners' residential tourism (US citizens in Latin America, North and West Europeans in the Mediterranean), Japanese pensioners' "retirement tsunami" (Zhang et al. 2012: 712) to Southeast Asia (mostly Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, but more recently also Indonesia, Taiwan, and parts of China), Hawaii and Australia has been possible thanks to efforts from state institutions and non-state actors both in Japan and in the destination countries.

From the Japanese side, steps have been taken by both the government and the private sector to procure favorable conditions for Japanese pensioners in the host countries. In 2003, then-Finance Minster Masajuro Shiokawa, himself an 81-year-old senior, suggested at a meeting of Asian finance ministers that Japan may "dispatch" some of its pensioners to nursing homes in the Philippines. Japanese corporations have built nursing homes in the island nation, while nursing homes in Japan have actively lobbied the Japanese government "to extend the elderly long-term care scheme to cover the costs of overseas retirement life" (Zhang et al. 2012: 713).

In fact, the Japanese government started promoting overseas retirement to its citizens as early as 1986 with the Silver Columbia Plan '92 – as a way to live a prosperous second life. The project aimed to build 'overseas *ikigai* towns' or 'Japanese villages' with a lower cost of living, better climate and living environments (Ono 2008). This was a continuation of a stream of policies that began in the 1970s "to inject a sense of social and external creativity through the spread of leisure activities into the work-centered culture that developed in Japan's post-war economic expansion" (ibid.: 153).

As the plan received serious criticism (both at home and abroad) that Japan was aiming to export its elderly, authorization was transferred to the private sector, although the government continued to supervise it. In its reformed version, it presented retirement migration as long-stay international tourism. Since the late 1990s, a host of non-profit and social organizations have been established to promote long-stay tourism, thus helping increase its development, social penetration, and acceptance. The Japanese mass media have also had an active role in promoting it, with magazines and TV shows featuring materials about it on a regular basis, emphasizing the economic aspects and the pursuit of *ikigai* as incentives. Last but not least, travel agencies have introduced a variety of packages, while real estate agencies lure potential customers with 'property pornography'. (Ibid.)

Destination-country governments and private sector actors, for their part, have also been eager to appeal to Japanese (and other affluent) retirees. The retirement industry in Southeast Asia is in fact pursued as a national development strategy by the states in the region (Toyota 2010, cited in Zhang et al. 2012). Policies to attract pensioners from Japan and other developed countries went through two phases. First, the Philippines set up the Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authorities in 1985, followed by Malaysia introducing its Silver Hair Program in 1996, and Thailand (specifically their Ministry of Commerce) initiating their Long-stay and Health Care Project in 1998. Those initial projects turned out to be not very popular among foreign retirees, so a second phase started in the early 2000s, when all three of the above-mentioned countries introduced much more aggressive policies. In 2001, the Thai government set up a national committee to strengthen coordination between the ministries of tourism, public health, commerce, industry and foreign affairs. In 2002, Malaysia reformed its Silver Hair Program into the Malaysia My Second Home (MMSH) Program, with a strong emphasis on encouraging pensioners to buy properties – as a result of which more than 15,000 foreign retirees had enrolled by 2010. In 2006, then-Philippine President Arroyo appointed a 'retirement czar' (as the public

media labeled him) and called the retirement industry in the Philippines a "flagship program of the Philippine Government for the twenty-first century and beyond", which resulted in a total of 18,267 foreign retirees enrolled in the program by 2012. The three major destinations have consciously competed with each other for foreign retirees (e.g., by relaxing visa regulations), as the latter are seen as "conducive for stable and sustainable development in a time of economic uncertainty" (Zhang et al. 2012: 713-714).

All of these developments have made it possible for Japanese pensioners to realize later-life personal projects that fit their physical, intellectual and spiritual needs. For some, retiring abroad has allowed them a relaxed life in the South, full of lazy strolls in the sun, good food and good company. For others – a pursuit of *ikigai,* complete with various activities that keep their minds busy and hearts fulfilled. Another group sees it as a natural extension of a previous expatriate experience, while for many it provides affordable healthcare. (Ono 2008).

Still, retirement abroad does not seem to be the right solution for everyone. While it may indeed be cheaper than life in Japan, to some it may feel like too much of an adventure – particularly to those who need extensive care and cannot imagine receiving it from non-Japanese people in a non-Japanese environment. However, the alternative back home is by no means a panacea. While the LTCI is considered to be generally working, there are quite a few regional variations in the way patients' needs are graded, the facilities that are available, the degree of involvement of the private and non-governmental sector, and ultimately the level of care (Marlow 2015). That, in turn, affects the burden on family caregivers. And when the latter happen to be living abroad, the situation often gets even more complicated. The following sections discuss who these migrant family caregivers are, the care practices they engage in, and the effect those practices have on migrants' lives in their host countries.

Demographic profile of Japanese migrants caring for parents back home

By October 2017, there were 1,351,970 Japanese living abroad. Back in 1989, when official statistics first became publicly available, the total worldwide was barely over half a million - 586,972 (MOFA 2018). How Japanese emigration has changed in these almost three decades – in both quantity and quality – is a topic that deserves a separate discussion. What is of interest here is how many of the people who currently live or have previously lived abroad have been in the situation of caring for elderly parents back home – and what their experiences have been like.

By definition, the elderly population includes people age 65 or over, although those who are in actual need of care may in fact be older – especially in the case of Japan, where people tend to stay healthy for another decade on average. Most of them have middle-aged adult children (from 45 to 65), although some of those children may be a bit younger or older. How many of today's Japanese migrants belong to this age cohort is difficult to tell, as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not keep score of personal details like that until a few years ago.

Needless to say, without conducting a detailed investigation, there is no way to generalize not only about the kind of background they came from at the point of settling abroad, but also about what they do now in their host countries. Although it is safe to assume that, upon leaving Japan, most people who dare to venture abroad or are sent by a Japanese employer are/were at least middle class, it is difficult to speculate about the financial situation and other circumstances both of the migrants and of their parents as the years go by.

While the majority of Japanese expats three decades ago were Japanese company employees, and only a limited number were university students and lifestyle migrants, today the balance is reversed, especially in places like Western Europe and Oceania. Currently, it is mostly students and lifestyle

migrants in these regions, and only a few Japanese corporate soldiers, in addition to the growing number of people working for international or local employers (particularly those who have studied abroad and have simply stayed on).

Today's Japanese migrants who belong to the age cohort most likely to have elderly parents back in Japan may in fact be quite a diverse group, occupationally speaking. Some are the university students of the 1980s and 1990s who have fully integrated into the host society. Others – professionals who landed jobs abroad directly from Japan and are now more or less well-settled in their new home. Others – early retirees who may or may not have previously lived outside Japan, and have just embarked on an adventure abroad as lifestyle migrants. Yet others – current and former Japanese corporate employees dispatched overseas (with or without their spouses) who have experienced life abroad for years.

The respondents who agreed to participate in this research all come from different social backgrounds, had different reasons to settle abroad, have different professions now (if they are still working), a different connection to their parents back home and the world outside their host country, and a different set of means to provide care. Several of them are early retirees who have enjoyed the first part of their later life in a destination country of their choice (Austria and Bulgaria, respectively). Some of those are a bit more affluent and have not only the time, but also the money to travel, spend time with their parents, and help with any material needs. Others are forced to be more frugal, as their pensions barely cover their expenses in the host country, and respectively are not in a position to travel back to Japan as frequently. The rest are people who are still working – most as self-employed, some as company employees. While some of these might have the financial means to help from a distance, they tend to have less time and more obligations in their host countries. In any case, how adult children care for their parents back home while themselves living abroad appears to be a function of the child-parent relationship, the parent's needs, and the child's means.

Care practices across borders

Keeping in touch

While keeping in touch with family back home can be said to be a universal migrant practice, doing so with elderly parents tends to be done mostly to sustain the parents' psychological wellbeing, but also to check on their physical health.

> We talk [on the phone] regularly. I ask her how she felt the last few days and she tells me about that annoying neighbor, about her aching hip, about the stew she cooked yesterday. Nothing important happens in her life that she feels is worth talking about, but [talking] helps lift her spirits. Also, I get to know if she needs anything – and if I have to find time and money to visit Japan soon. (Ayako2 on her communication with her 76 year-old mother)

Some migrants call their parents every day, others exchange regular emails and/or text messages, yet others hardly send much more than season's greetings – depending on the quality of the relationship with their parents and the parents' perceived needs. Kayo and her mother, who have always been very close, exchange emails every day. Michiko, whose mother disapproved of her move to Austria and continues to criticize her life choices even now, does send the occasional email to inquire about her mother's health, but admits that it is her brother in Japan who usually nudges her to do so. Toshiaki, whose brother lives near their parents' place and regularly visits, does not find it necessary to call or email, but occasionally sends postcards.

[2] All names used in this paper are pseudonyms.

For as long as the parents are physically autonomous, calling, texting and emailing appear to be sufficient for the migrants to know that everything is alright. But once the elderly person starts having health problems – including loss of hearing and/or vision, which prevents them from effectively communicating – the migrants start to worry. This is where they either start planning for more frequent visits to Japan or start relying on their siblings to physically care for the parents and keep the migrants informed.

Most of the respondents in this research who are old enough to have parents in need of care are from a generation of Japanese that typically have at least one sibling, and that sibling typically lives in Japan. Whether migrants can rely on their siblings depends on the siblings' personal circumstances as well as their connection to the parents and the migrants, but in many cases has to do with gender. More on that later on.

Visits back home

Visits home range from hardly ever to once a month, depending on the relationship between migrants and their parents, the parents' condition, and migrants' ability to travel (which is related to their financial situation, employment, or other obligations in the host country). The Suzuki's, for instance, are well-heeled young retirees who have not only the time, but also the money to go back to Japan two to three times a year for a few weeks each time (up from once a year 10 years ago), as their parents are nearing 80 and starting to have health issues. Kayo, on the other hand, has not been back in over 17 years, as she is financially struggling, but also because her mother is a young retiree in good shape who insist that she does not need her daughter's physical presence. Other migrants split time between the host country and Japan equally – half a year in one place and half a year in the other – but that, admittedly, requires a bit more spare time and fewer obligations in the host country.

When the parents are relatively physically autonomous and mentally fit, migrants do not spend more than a couple of weeks in Japan per visit – also because, in the case of people who are still working, that is the length of their paid holidays. In most cases, they just spend quality time with the parents, maybe do some chores (from something as simple as vacuuming the carpets to major repair works around the house) or help the parents do paperwork (e.g., to do with paying taxes).

If the parents' condition requires more intensive care, the children could find themselves not only flying to Japan more frequently, but also dealing with healthcare providers and other institutions in Japan, as the parent might have to enter a care facility. Sachiko, for instance, has decided that she has to travel to Japan every month to spend 10 days with her mother who refused to be placed in a care facility, and go back to Austria for the remaining 20 days. Mariko, on the other hand, only spends the winter months in Japan since her mother agreed to enter an elderly care home after suffering an injury.

However, once visits stop being sufficient, migrants are forced to consider more radical solutions.

Radical solutions

When the situation is so serious that the migrants see no other way than to move in with their parents, they are faced with the choice either to move back to Japan themselves or to bring the parents to the host country – and thus stop "having [their] mind in two places", as Kazuo put it. What they choose depends not only on their own circumstances, but also on the urgency of the situation.

For instance, when Haruka learned that her mother had suddenly fallen ill, she realized she did not have the time to deal with Austrian immigration bureaucracy to bring her mother to Austria, so she moved her entire family to Japan instead. It helped that her originally Austrian husband had taken Japanese citizenship and their children were minors, so entry and settlement in Japan went smoothly.

In most cases, however, the deterioration of the parents' health is more gradual and migrants have more time to plan. Several of my respondents – all of them married to Austrians, with Austrian children, and well integrated into Austrian society – decided that it would be best to move their parents to Austria where the whole family could care for them. It did take much effort to finalize the paperwork, but in the end the migrants finally "had peace of mind".

Types of support

Financial support is rarely necessary, as the parents who are now in their 70s to 90s belong to a generation that saw Japan become one of the wealthiest nations in the world and are themselves relatively well off – unlike some of their children. Migrants, however, do provide emotional, material and physical support in different forms. Emotional support – mostly by keeping in touch from a distance or, when visiting home, by spending time together. Material support – by doing chores and paperwork, and dealing with Japanese institutions when visiting home. And physical support – mostly when the parents' worsened condition has necessitated moving in together.

The impact of caring for parents back home on migrants' lives

As stated earlier, Japanese migrants rarely need to support their parents financially. However, trips to Japan cost money, and the more serious the parents' health condition is, the more frequent the trips. This can put a strain on the migrant's family budget and eventually force the migrant to opt for a radical solution – e.g., to bring the parent to the host country, as was the case with Mitsue.

Needless to say, having parents in need of care thousands of miles away can in itself be mentally taxing. But care can take a toll on migrants' mental wellbeing, especially when they choose to move in with the parents or to visit them in Japan much more frequently, as this typically requires a total overhaul of the migrants' lives. This is related to changes not only in migrants' living arrangements, but also their social and professional lives. Sachiko, for instance, had to move to a different city in Austria and change careers in order to be able to fly more often to Japan, and with that, lost her social circle. Mitsue, after bringing her mother to Austria, had to cut her working hours and virtually stop meeting friends, in order to be able to spend more time with her mother. For both women, these changes brought a lot of stress, and also affected their relationships with friends, relatives, immediate families.

These are, of course, extreme cases – when the parents' condition is already serious. But even when the parents are still relatively healthy and thus do not require frequent visits or moving in together, migrants are still painfully aware of the potential changes they may have to make to their lives should anything happen. "If anything happens" was a common phrase used by my respondents to signify a potential twist in the narratives of their lives. It was used mostly by younger respondents (in their 30s and 40s) – that is, people whose parents are still not in need of care but are expected to be one day. Migrants who are perfectly well integrated into their host societies and have no intention of going back to Japan still declare a readiness to do so (permanently or not), if necessary.

Related to this is migrants' understanding of the role of their Japanese citizenship. As Ai explained:

> If mother has to enter a care facility, it would be inconvenient not to have Japanese citizenship. A lot of paperwork would have to be done, and it would be difficult to do if I switch to Austrian [citizenship].

This is why, for many of them, keeping their Japanese citizenship appears to be important, even if their whole lives have little or nothing to do with Japan – because as Japanese citizens, it would be easier for them to deal with the healthcare system and various other institutions in Japan, or simply

spend as much time in Japan as necessary (without needing a visa).

Sticking to Japanese citizenship may have its advantages in Japan, but it could definitely be an inconvenience in Europe. For those who are not yet permanent residents it means regular trips to the Immigration Bureau to renew their visas. However, the bigger problem for some is their inability to have an active voice in their host country. As Natsuko put it:

> I'd like to be able to vote and take part in local policy decision-making – about things that concern my children. But I'm a foreigner and I can't.

Regardless of which part of life in the host country is affected the most by (the prospects of) care for their parents, migrants agree that their filial obligations inevitably have an impact on their lives from the micro to the macro level – from everyday practices to long-term strategies. These strategies concern not only their finances, but also their professional and social life, as well as their political standing in the host country.

Notes on gender

As can be seen in the last sections, the majority of respondents who shared their experiences of caring for their parents were women. This does not mean that Japanese men living abroad never find themselves caring for their parents across borders, but seems reflective of a general trend. If there are two adult children, a sister and a brother, who have to decide who is going to care for the parents, it is usually the sister who considers herself responsible – regardless of who lives abroad. As Tomoko explained:

> I might have to go back to Japan one day because it is a daughter's duty. I wouldn't want to burden my sister-in-law. Besides, my brother wouldn't even dare ask her. She has a job and two kids to raise.

She does not even mention the possibility of her brother caring for the parents, although he lives in Japan. Instead, she sympathizes with her sister-in-law. Similarly, Sayaka, whose parents are already in need of physical care, tries to find the time and money to visit them two to three times a year, because she considers her brother, who lives in Japan, "unreliable". As can be expected, these regular visits affect her family, social, and professional life in the host country.

When the siblings are of the same gender, things are slightly different. When one sister lives abroad and one in Japan, the one in Japan typically cares for the parents, while the migrant only visits occasionally and regularly keeps in touch with the parents. When one brother lives abroad and the other in Japan, the one in Japan cares for the parents, while the migrant may or may not visit, but keeps in touch.

Conclusion

Care in the context of transnational migration is often assumed to be provided by migrants from poor countries who move to wealthier countries to work as medical personnel or domestic workers, while leaving behind their families to be cared for by relatives or other people in the country of origin. However, migrants from wealthier countries can also find themselves in the position to have to care – for their families – across borders, without the help of immigrant labor. The case of Japanese migrants residing in Europe provide one such example.

Care for elderly parents in Japan has traditionally been the responsibility of their adult children – the family of the first son, to be precise. This was enshrined in law, and although social hospitalization became possible in the 1970s, not caring for one's parents continued to be stigmatized throughout the 20th century.

The Long-term Care Insurance introduced in 2000 socialized elderly care and can be credited for largely removing the stigma. It is designed to provide universal healthcare to rich and poor alike (patients only pay 10% to 30% of the bill) and is meant to cover both medical and social needs. However, the shortage of personnel expected to provide the care meant that Japan had to find ways to compensate for it. Reluctance to import immigrant labor lasted well into the 2000s, but finally gave way to agreements with Southeast Asian governments according to which hundreds of foreign nurses were to enter the Japanese labor market each year. Apart from foreign nurses, the Japanese government has also invested in innovative technologies such as robotics (to meet some of elderly people's social needs) and stem-cell research.

Alongside care within Japan, retirement abroad (mostly to Southeast Asia) has emerged as a solution to Japanese elderly people's needs – both medical and social. Specialized medical care provided by trained local personnel is possible at a fraction of the cost in Japan, and a rich social and cultural life is within reach for the still healthy while staying within the means of pensions.

Regardless of the above mentioned options, many adult children still consider themselves responsible for meeting the needs of their elderly parents. When the children happen to live abroad, however, care provision becomes a bit more complicated.

Logistically, care practices across borders include keeping in touch, visits to Japan, and – in extreme cases – moving in together. Through these, however, migrants provide important types of support – emotional, material, and sometimes physical.

The impact of caring for parents back home on migrants' lives cannot be underestimated. Often, care across borders strains migrants' family budgets. It can take a serious toll on migrants' mental wellbeing, not to mention their social life and careers. In view of their role as care givers, Japanese migrants engage in transnational practices and occasional mobilities, but also in long-term strategies. These strategies concern not only their finances, but also their professional and social life, as well as their political standing in the host country.

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ANATOMY OF A MISFIT: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION STATISTICS

Ahmad Wali Ahmad-Yar and Tuba Bircan

Introduction

Although many national states, international organisations e.g. the United Nations (UN), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and NGOs, have been collecting data on international migration, the gaps in data persisted for many decades. In the recent years, there have been, to some extent, improvements in the availability, quality and comparability of data on international migration [1]. The UN gathered and made the estimates of migrant stock disaggregated by age, sex, origin and destination available for over 230 countries and areas in the world, covering from 1990 to 2019 [2]. Additionally, the European Commission and the Council agreed on an action plan in 2005 to take measures to improve the common analysis of migratory phenomena in all their aspects such as reinforcing the collection, provision, exchange and efficient use of up to date information and data [3].

Inadequate data will not only hinder decision-makers around the world to develop effective policies but will also lead to miscalculations and make it difficult to navigate. The improvement of the quality of international migration data has been demanded by the international organisations, NGOs and national authorities, researchers and policymakers. The UN, for example, in its 2016 Secretary-General's report explicitly stresses on bridging the gaps in data besides highlighting the insufficiency of data on migration [4]. Shortcoming in migration data result in a huge amount of existing data with very little possibility for national governments and international organisations to utilise them and understand current migration dynamics and draw relevant migration policies [2], [5]. Furthermore, in order to draw empirically informed migration policies and prevent prejudice and stereotyping, there is a need for timely accessible, reliable and relevant data on migration [6].

Long-lasting Challenges with Migration Statistics

Despite the inevitable efforts by national governments and international organisations, the improvements in international migration data have not been a success. The existence of notable gaps in migration data has been broadly discussed in a scattered fashion in the work of almost every scholar and practitioner of the topic. Although the efforts to some extent brought to the attention of national states the importance of statistical data on migration, the changes failed to tackle the issue of incompatibility of the data and countries kept their national definitions, most often not compatible with the UN's 1998 recommendations [7].

A significant share of the existing statistics that are collected by the national governments are not compatible with the UN recommended standards and therefore it makes it difficult to project rigorous information on migrations. The incompatibility could be in various aspects of the data. Gathering the data under inconsistent definitions and measures challenges the comparability and harmonisation of the data [2], [8]–[18]. Population totals and inclusion of populations based on varying demographic characteristics is another reason for incompatibility of the existing data [9], [15], [18], [19]. Varying data collection methodologies and coverage at the national and regional levels are also a substantial driving force in making the data incompatible [5], [9], [18], [20].

Access to the data and dissemination is another obstacle on the way towards adequate migration statistics. The UN recommendations encourage states and statistical institutions to take the advantage of the advances in information technology in making the data publicly available [18]. Moreover, accessibility is not merely about not sharing the data, but unwillingness to collect timely data for the purpose of research and policy [21]. Additionally, restrictions imposed by countries' data protection regulations partially limits the access to micro-data and administrative data [9]. In many instances, the data are not disseminated and tabulated with useful details [2], [12], [13].

The differences in data collection at regional and global levels are immense. Politically and economically challenged countries, especially in Africa and Asia are not able to gather statistics on immigrations and emigrations [19]. The imbalances in data collection across regions complicates the calculation and measurement of cross-regional and interregional migrations [22].

However, to date, there is no systematic study investigating international migration data literature and statistical data sources in order to conceptualise the gaps and directly investigate the data sources for the gaps. Thus, the ultimate objective of this paper is twofold, first to conduct a systematic review of the most relevant literature on migration statistics to identify and conceptualise the gaps within the existing literature and second to review the most relevant international migration statistical data sources.

Data and Methodology

We conduct a systematic review of the existing literature and data sources. Systematic reviews are widely used for knowledge synthesis in medicine [23], however, in recent years it is also used to harmonise research evidence in social and political sciences [24]–[27]. For the purpose of this paper, we use the definition of systematic review by Berrang-Ford et al [8], Cooper et al [28], and Gough et al [29] where "*a systematic review refers to a focused review of the literature that seeks to answer a specific research question using pre-defined eligibility criteria for documents and explicitly outlined and reproducible methods*". However, since the objective of the paper is twofold, first to identify and conceptualise the gaps in literature and second to review the existing data based on the gaps identified in the first step, we conduct a two-step systematic review. The first step follows the PRISMA systematic review guidelines from Moher et al [30], where the researchers should follow the guidelines described in the PRISMA statement.

The second step of our research is looking into the gaps directly in the statistical data-sources to evaluate the quality of the data based on the gaps identified within the literature in the first step of this research. However, the existing review methodologies do not offer a particular *modus operandi* for reviewing statistical data-sources and data portals. Therefore, we extend the systematic review methodology in this dimension, not only for the purpose of this study but also for utilisation in future research. We specify that in order to review the gaps in statistical data sources and portals, it is important to (i) define and specify the gaps (ii) identify the specific data-sources and (iii) establish a repository of the meta-data of the chosen datasets. Defining and specifying the gaps will help to have clear objectives during the reviewing process and the identified gaps could be used as tools to investigate the data sources. For this paper, the first step of the research will define and specify the gaps. Predetermining the specific statistical data-sources for the review will prevent the overlaps in the process and clarifies for the readers the scope of the review. In the statistical data, metadata is the key to understand and navigate the data, therefore while reviewing the data-sources it's crucial to consider reviewing the metadata as well.

Review strategy

The first step of the review followed the PRISMA guideline on gathering and classifying the literature (Figure 1). The main databases used for search was Google Scholar, IMISCOE Migration Research Hub, and Web of Science. A total of 942 articles, books, book chapters, official documents, policy papers and reports were gathered. After the process of the records screening, duplicates removing, and assessing the full articles for eligibility based on the criteria described in previous section, a total of 76 items were selected for conducting the full review. Subsequently, the qualitative analysis software Atlas.ti (version 8.4.4) was used to compare and categorise the gaps.

The second step of the review, which was aiming at reviewing the statistical data sources, followed the guidelines on systematic review of statistical data sources developed in the previous section. First a wide range of private, governmental and international data sources (websites and data-portals) that provide statistics on migration were identified and five namely the UN DESA, UNHCR, IOM, OECD and Eurostat were selected for the review. The reason for selecting these specific data sources was that they provide data as publicly available, authorised institutions and they receive their data from official sources such as national and local governments. The data sources and the meta-data provided for each dataset was evaluated based on the gaps identified in the first step of the review.

Figure 2. PRISMA (2009) systematic review flow diagram



Sources for international migration statistics

Several international and regional organisations gather empirical data on international migrants. The United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs (UN DESA), OECD, Eurostat, the World Bank, UNICEF, McKinsey & Company, Economist Intelligence Unit and other UN agencies are among the most prominent data providers. In 2015, the IOM established the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC). The IOM's GMDAC work closely with other agencies that are collecting data on migration such as the European Commission's Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD), UN DESA, World Bank, UNICEF, McKinsey & Company, Economist Intelligence Unit, and the OECD to improve the collection, analysis and use of migration data for informed policies and programmes. The GMDAC hosts the "Migration Data Portal" which aims at gathering the data that are scattered across different organisations and agencies. The portal does not collect the data by itself, but serves as a single access point to timely, comprehensive and reliable migration statistics for policy makers, national statistics officers, journalists and the general public [2]. While the GMDAC's Migration Data Portal is considered to be a great development towards data harmonisation, the gaps in international migration data remains highly problematic [6].

The quality and accuracy of the data made available by these organisations are often questioned by the scholars and end users of the data. Hence we will investigate the gaps in data sources based on the classifications in the previous section. For the current study, we choose the UN DESA, OECD, Eurostat, IOM and the UNHCR data sources to review.

Results and gap assessment

We reviewed the selected studies to investigate what the scholars and practitioners describe as gaps, where the data is short and what type of data are needed for future research. The scholars and institutional officials discussed the gaps in data based on their disciplinary focus and institutional work process in ad hoc basis. This means that the gaps in data are discussed in a scattered fashion across the literature from various disciplines and fields of the study. We analysed all the criticism on the data within the studies and tried to understand the rationalities behind the critiques. Figure 2 shows that out of 916 cases of the gaps discussed in the literature, 611 referred to the definitions and measures, 113 to demographic characteristics, 101 to drivers and reasons, 48 to geographic coverage and 43 to timeliness of the data.

Figure 3. code frequency chart based on Atlas.ti (8.4) analysis.



Table 1 shows the results of the manual review of the literature and in line with the previous results. We classified the studies to scientific articles, UN and other official reports, books and chapters in books, conference proceedings and methodological and expert workshop's reports. We sorted the gaps in five categories including (i) definitions and measurements, (ii) drivers or reasons behind migration, (iii) geographic coverage of the data (iv) gaps in demographic characteristics and (v) the time lag in availability of data. The results of the review of the international migration statistical sources show that the gaps exist in almost all of the sources under study. Given the categories above, the extent and level of the gaps varies across the data sources.

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MIGRATION DETENTION OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN EUROPE

Aikaterini Togia

Introduction

This paper will present the current international, European and EU law that regulates the deprivation of liberty of unaccompanied minors in the immigration context. Moreover, the present paper will refer to key judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the detention of unaccompanied minors, according to which it was found violations against Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 5 par. 1 (right to liberty and security) and par. 4 (right to have a lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court) of the European Convention of Human Rights. Finally, it will be given an overview of immigration detention of unaccompanied minors in Greece.

Subheading

According to Art. 37 of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, a child shall only be detained as a measure of last resort, for the shortest appropriate period of time.

Further, Article 5 (1) of the ECHR provides that no one shall be deprived of his liberty, setting out the grounds under which detention is permissible, including the case to prevent an unauthorised entry or to facilitate removal of an alien. It must also be noted that the ECtHR held that the detention is not permissible if it cannot be based on any of the provided grounds.

According to Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU everyone has the right to liberty. Moreover, the EU asylum acquis prohibits the detention of a person for the sole reason that he or she has lodged an asylum application[1] or is subject to Dublin procedures[2]. However, detention is allowed under EU law in certain conditions. More specifically Article 8 (3) of the Reception Conditions Directive establishes an exhaustive list of six grounds under which the detention of an applicant for international protection is permissible after an individual assessment of each case and if other, less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively[3].

Besides that, detention is permitted according to Article 28 of the Dublin Regulation, in case of a significant risk of absconding only after an individual assessment of the case and if other, less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively. Furthermore, article 15 (1) of the Return Directive permits the detention of irregularly staying third-country nationals only if they are subject to return procedures.

Regarding the detention of unaccompanied minors Article 11 of the Reception Conditions Directive provides the requirements concerning the detention of vulnerable persons, and unaccompanied minors in particular. More specifically, in Article 11(3) it is provided that unaccompanied minors shall be detained only in exceptional circumstances. In addition, all efforts shall

[1] Reception Conditions Directive, Article 8 (1); Asylum Procedures Directive, Article 26.
[2] Dublin Regulation, Article 28 (1).
[3] Reception Conditions Directive, Article 8 (2).

be made to release the detained unaccompanied minor as soon as possible. Unaccompanied minors shall never be detained in prison accommodation. As far as possible, unaccompanied minors shall be provided with accommodation in institutions provided with personnel and facilities which take into account the needs of persons of their age. Where unaccompanied minors are detained, member states shall ensure that they are accommodated separately from adults.

Moreover, according to article 17 of the Return Directive the detention measures of unaccompanied minors within the return procedure context should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.

Even though it is accepted that detention of unaccompanied children should only be used as a measure of last resort, the EU law does not expressly prohibit the detention of unaccompanied children. Subsequently, immigration detention of unaccompanied children is a widespread practice in EU member states and therefore unaccompanied minors are detained for various purposes (identification purposes, to analyze their legal status, to assess their bonds with adults accompanying them, to assess their age, etc.).

On the other hand, the ECtHR has repeatedly ruled that there were violations against Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), in cases of poor detention conditions that they undermine human dignity, especially given the vulnerability of unaccompanied children.

Furthermore, the ECtHR argues that in cases of detained unaccompanied minors the vulnerability of children and best interests of the child principle must prevail. In particular, the ECtHR has ruled that the state must give consideration to the best interests of the minor or his individual situation by exploring all alternatives to detention. In case the state does not do so, then the detention of a child will be considered arbitrary and a violation of their rights to liberty and security (Article 5 par. 1 and par. 4 ECHR).

It is also noteworthy that the ECtHR considers that children in detention are extremely vulnerable due to the inherently intimidating nature of detention which may endanger their development and cause them stress and anxiety. Moreover, it should be noted that the ECtHR requires that in the case of unaccompanied children, authorities must ensure that the child receives proper counseling and educational assistance from a qualified person specially assigned to them.

It is also interesting to mention that the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No. 6 states that: "In application of article 37 of the Convention and the principle of the best interests of the child, unaccompanied or separated children should not, as a general rule, be detained. Detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied or separated, or on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof. Where detention is exceptionally justified for other reasons, it shall be conducted in accordance with article 37(b) of the Convention that requires detention to conform to the law of the relevant country and only to be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time."

Since 2015, has been noticed that the detention of children in migration, in particular to facilitate their return, has been on the rise. According to available data, in 2015-2016, detention of unaccompanied children pending removal was allowed in 19 EU Member States. In 2019, in some EU Member States, including France, Greece and Malta, the use and length of child detention was increasing.

In particular, in Greece as a rule unaccompanied children should not be detained but only in very exceptional cases as a last resort solution in order to ensure that they are safely referred to an appropriate accommodation facility for minors. The child could be detained for up to 25 days and

exceptionally for 20 more days (Art. 48 of L. 4636/2019). In practice, unaccompanied children are detained on the basis of the pre-removal or asylum detention provisions and on the basis of the "protective custody" (Art. 118 of P.D. 141/1991). Since the available accommodation facilities for unaccompanied children is limited, children have been detained in hotspots or police cells, in inadequate conditions, often for a long time "under protective custody", while waiting to be transferred to a specialized accommodation facility. It is interesting to mention that "protective custody" had not been designed for the purposes unaccompanied migrant minors in mind and is imposed as a protective measure for the unaccompanied minors who are pending to be transferred to a specialized accommodation facility. Besides that, "protective custody" is not subjected to a maximum time limit. As a result, unaccompanied minors are staying under "protective custody" in police cells or at Reception and Identification Centers for a limitless time, which in some cases has reached up to 10 months. It is noted that at the end of July 2020, there were 4.558 unaccompanied children in Greece, out of these, 193 were kept under "protective custody".

Furthermore, the CPT (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) in its report of 2018 mentioned that unaccompanied children under "protective custody" were allegedly detained in this facility.

The ECtHR found that detention conditions for unaccompanied children under "protective custody" in police stations in Greece amounted to degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. Besides that, the ECtHR considers that the automatic placement of unaccompanied minors under "protective custody" in police facilities, without first assessing the best interest of the child violated Article 5(1) of the ECHR.

Taking the above into consideration it is certain that the detention of unaccompanied children is widespread in EU member states. However, it is crucial when the competent authorities deal with unaccompanied children in the immigration context to take into consideration their inherent vulnerability, to consider their best interest and to ensure the use of alternative measures to detention.

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YOUTH MIGRATION IN RUSSIA AND NEIGHBORING STATES OF THE EURASIAN SPACE

Vladimir Iontsev and Alexander Subbotin

Introduction

The future of any state including the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and other states in Russia's influence zone, depends on young people, their way of life and attitudes. The best young men and women are often taken away by "brain drain", but the "iron curtain" is useless since the experience of studying and working abroad can help to work in one's home state (Iontsev et al. 2017). Also, if a migrant returns, marrying a foreigner will at least to some extent improve the demographic situation in the country (Uzkaya 2018: 248, 257). Therefore, studying the migration of young people and how to regulate its flows is an extremely crucial issue.

Quantities of young people in the Eurasian space

Nowadays the age of adulthood is constantly being moved forward (reaching 35 years) not only by young people themselves, but also by scientists. The reasons for it are both parental overprotection and human evolution. However, we will consider people aged 15 to 29 since this interval is more often taken into account for calculating statistical indicators of this population segment. According to them, only a fifth of the Russian population can be considered youth: according to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service Rosstat, its share was quite low in 1995, rose slightly afterwards and then fell again. The main reason for this decrease, along with migration, is the decline in the birth rate in almost all countries of the Eurasian Union after the collapse of the USSR. Over this time Kyrgyzstan has ranked first in terms of the share of young people in the total population (30.2% in 2011 and 26.8% at the beginning of 2017), followed by Kazakhstan, Armenia and Russia. Before 2015 Belarus had occupied the last place, but has been sharing it with Russia since then.

It should be noted that by the beginning of the XXI century, independent states of the world with their different levels and rates of socio-economic growth and capacity of national labour markets had become influenced by migration interdependence as a resource for development. Based on this Dr. A. Borisova writes about repetitive migration trends, especially noticeable among young people who strive for a career in more economically developed regions (Borisova 2019: 601-602). It is worth noting that 80% of migrants in the Eurasian space are working age population, about a third of whom are people aged 15 to 29, more often males. The majority of them tend to be moving to Russia, which is why over the recent years there has been a noticeable "rejuvenating" trend. Since 2007 the 18 to 29 age group prevails over that between 30 and 39 (Kirov 2019: 45). Geographical location, historical and potential family ties, as well as no language barrier make Russia an appealing place, a center of attraction for migrants from neighboring countries. The decline in the size of working age population contributes to the use of foreign labour, while educational migration helps to both promote a positive image of the Russian Federation among returning graduates and develop tolerance in the intra-university environment. To some extent marriages between immigrants and local people and family immigration solve the problem of depopulation in the country that migrants arrive in. From the perspective of

emigration countries young people travel abroad in an effort to get better education, good housing and highly paid jobs, realize their professional abilities and adaptation skills. The latter, being a capacity to quickly respond to changing conditions, is useful both in marriage and birth of children, and when communicating with migrants from other countries. The accumulated capital, both material and social, helps in international cooperation. However, almost all positive consequences are only relevant when return migration is considered (Borisova 2019: 602).

Training and migration of young professionals in the Eurasian space

Training of specialists is one of the problems associated with the promotion of young people in the Russian labour market and neighboring countries. Despite the fact that there is an agreement between the countries about direct recognition of diplomas and qualifications (with the exception of those in medicine, pedagogy and law), each country sticks to its own training standards. Numerous young people go to study in other EEU countries. In total, 86,788 people arrived in Russia to receive higher education in 2017/18. At the same time most students who prefer to study in the EEU countries come from Kazakhstan – more than 69 thousand (among whom almost 66 thousand went to Russia). Russian youth is rather positive about higher education in their home country, but most of them have friends who have studied or are studying abroad. Hence, the share of those who would prefer their children to enter a foreign university is growing. According to researchers' estimates (Ryazantsev, Grebenyuk 2014; Topilin 2015), there is a direct correlation between how long and frequently students stay abroad and how much they want to have a career outside their homeland.

Since 2010, the focus of Russian migration policy has been on attracting highly qualified specialists. However, according to some researchers, the existing "Voluntary remigration support programme" has a number of disadvantages that reduce its effectiveness. For example, it is difficult to monitor the quality of activities carried out and there are no measures aimed at increasing tolerance towards returnees (Borisova 2019: 603). It is also necessary to provide them with "social benefits, tax discounts, higher education scholarships and grants" (Borisova 2019: 609). Such support may include employment preferences for those who have completed their studies abroad, housing purchase benefits, priority in kindergarten admission (after all, one should not forget about stimulating birth rate). Of course, these measures are relevant not only for Russia, but also for neighbouring states, where it is more appropriate to provide benefits for those who have studied or received training in the Russian Federation. Although most measures proposed are economic in nature, some of them are aimed at integrating people into society and encouraging them to have families, since the youth of the Eurasian region can and should be guided by traditional culture of family values, which include contemporary works of art and national folklore festivals.

In addition, if the Russian Federation continues its policy of "attracting" excessive amount of highly skilled specialists from the Eurasian space, including potential specialists (students, postgraduates, interns), this will eventually lead to the fact that, for example, the countries of Central Asia will fall victims to expansion of the Western world. Ukraine and Belarus are under similar pressure from the EU's Slavic states, the Czech Republic and Poland. Despite greater attractiveness of life in Russia, it is wrong to encourage those who come from other countries of the Eurasian region to stay here. After completing their training citizens of Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other countries should return to their homeland to apply their knowledge and skills as specialists. In this way, young people will be able to both strengthen their country's human capital and its ties with Russia, raising the latter's authority in the neighboring space, as well as increase their own prestige.

Conclusion

Therefore, the educational migration of young people in the Eurasian space, even if it continues in the form of labour migration, such as internships, should not turn into "brain drain", even when the Russian Federation is the host country. Therefore, it is temporary intellectual migration between Russia and its sphere of influence that should be encouraged. This implies that it is necessary to intensify measures which promote the return of young people with foreign education since this is mutually beneficial for the states of Russia's influence zone.

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

YOUTH EMIGRATION FROM NORTH MACEDONIA

Merita Zulfiu Alili and Besa Kadriu

Introduction

Devastated economies, high unemployment, skill mismatch, declining work standards, and a deteriorating quality of life have resulted in the general opinion and especially among youth that life in more developed economies is better and individuals can be much more successful abroad than at home. On the other hand, the growing demand of developed countries for educated workers has further stimulated the interest of young people to emigrate from the country. North Macedonia is a small country with 2.08 million population and young median age population of 39.1 years (United Nations, 2019), whereas the median age of EU population is 42.6 years (Eurostat, 2019) and unemployment rate of 21.55% in 2019. Between 2010 and 2017 young people in North Macedonia were more than twice as likely to be unemployed than adults, who also happen to be better educated than older workers. Youth unemployment rate is high and persistent in all Western Balkan countries compared to EU and North Macedonia holds the third place in this list with high youth unemployment rate of 44.74% in 2019 (Table1).

Table 1. Youth unemployment rates of Western Balkan Countries (*15*-24 years), 2019[1]

EU (European Union 28)	**14.9**
Albania	28.63
Bosnia and Herzegovina	46.12
Croatia	17.82
Kosovo	48.92
North Macedonia	44.74
Montenegro	29.11
Serbia	32.23

Source: Statista; Trading-Economics.

Brain drain in the Western Balkans marks a tendency of increase since a relatively high percentage of young people in the region express that they want to leave their country. According to Eurostat data around 230,000 people permanently left in 2018. The largest number emigrated from Albania — 62,000, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (53,500), Serbia (51,000), Kosovo (34,500), North Macedonia (24,300), and Montenegro (3,000) (Šelo Šabić and Kolar, 2019).

World Bank data show that about 29% of citizens of North Macedonia with university degree left the country in the period 1997-2005, which was the highest ratio in Southeast Europe (Muś, 2017). Educated people leaving the country include especially IT specialists, engineers and medical

[1] https://www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/; https://tradingeconomics.com/kosovo/youth-unemployment-rate#:~:text=Youth%20Unemployment%20Rate%20in%20Kosovo%20averaged%2053.69%20percent%20from%202012,the%20third%20quarter%20of%202019.

professionals, teachers etc. (Muś, 2017). From 2005 the intellectual emigration has continued to increase as a result of the increased youth unemployment with tertiary level of education (Janeska, 2012). According to Youth Study (2013) and Unemployment Study (2016) conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung every other young individual in 2013 was planning or had a though about leaving the country, whereas 80% of unemployed youth in 2016 contemplating or planning to leave the country (Topuzovska Latkovikj et al., 2019). In both studies, "the most significant reasons for this was the financial situation and standard of living, or unemployment and poverty in the country compared to better conditions for education, employment, and life abroad" (Topuzovska Latkovikj et al., 2019, p.28). The 2018 data of youth study regarding their desire to migrate show that one-third of them have a strong desire to leave their motherland, one-third expressed a medium-level desire to migrate, and one-third do not wish to migrate at all (Topuzovska Latkovikj et al., 2019). Most of the emigrants from North Macedonia that emigrate to Europe are concentrated in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, while everseas emigrants mostly move to Australia, USA, and Canada.

To assess the demographic, economic, sociological, cultural and other factors of youth emigration this study uses survey analysis to collect the views of potential migration of students from North Macedonia. The following section presents the survey data analyses whereas the final section summarises the key findings and explores their implications for policy recommendations.

Potential Migration Survey

This study is based on an online survey questionnaire of students at both the bachelor's and master's levels. It aims to answer the question: What motivates tertiary level students to migrate from North Macedonia. Students were asked questions on the intentions to migrate focusing on a wide range of individual and family characteristics and different push and pull factors. The survey is organised in five sections: the first section is giving overall description such as age, gender, birth place, university where they study, year and programme of study, employment status of students and their parents, parents' education; the second section includes questions on their intention to migrate; the third section includes questions on destination countries, aims, incentives and barriers to migration; section four gathers information on students and family history on migration; and the last section asks about the place and timespan of previous migration and year of return. The questionnaire was answered by 423 students during the period March- May 2020 from the major public and private universities representing all major fields of study in social and natural sciences, and humanities. The survey included students from fields of studies with greater likelihood of emigrating, such as economics, medicine, technology, languages and law.

Table 1 describes the characteristics of the students that responded the survey. The average age of the students is 22.93 years, the majority of whom are in undergraduate studies (82.51%) and leave in urban places (72.58%). In the sample, there are 63.36% females and 36.64% males, 78.49% plan to continue studies after obtaining the current degree, and 67.38% do not work part-time beside studying, whereas only 17.26% work more than 20 hours per week. The data show that the percentage of male students who work besides studying is higher compared to female students. Analysing their parents' education, 27.74% of male students have parents with university education, whereas this comparable figure is 19.40% for female students.

More than half of the participants (55.56%) are considering moving abroad (Table 2). It seems that

intention to move abroad is not related to gender[3], birthplace[4], or parents' education[5]. Students that do not plan to continue their studies are more likely to migrate (72.53%) compared to those that are planning to continue their studies after completing the current studies (50.90%). In addition, older students and those who declared that are working more than 20 hours per week are more likely to migrate. Students were also asked about aims of migration related to their studies and time when they plan to migrate. The majority (64.63%) of students plan to emigrate over the next five years and 51.78% plan to emigrate immediately after completing their university studies (Table 2).

Table 1. Characteristics of the respondents

		Female	Male	Total
Gender (%)		63.36	36.64	100
Age (mean)		22.73	23.29	22.93
Birthplace (%)	Urban	73.51	70.97	72.58
	Rural	26.49	29.03	27.42
Study degree (%)	Undergraduate	84.33	79.35	82.51
	Postgraduate	15.67	20.65	17.49
Do you plan to continue studies after this one? (%)	Yes	81.72	72.90	78.49
	No	18.28	27.10	21.51
Do your parents have a university education? (%)	No, none of them	55.22	46.45	52.01
	Yes, both of them	19.40	27.74	22.46
	Yes, father	20.90	20.00	20.57
	Yes, mother	4.48	5.81	4.96
Besides studying, do you work part-time? (%)	No, I do not work	76.12	52.26	67.38
	Yes, less than 8 hours per week	8.21	6.45	7.57
	Yes, more than 8 hours and less than 20	4.85	12.90	7.80
	Yes, more than 20 hours per week	10.82	28.39	17.26

The question on intention to migrate gives information about the different factors that motivate students to plan to migrate. Migration potential was defined in terms of intentions to leave North Macedonia for twelve reasons (Figure 1) and students were also asked to choose the main reason for emigration. As the data indicate working conditions (for example, salary, working conditions, contracts, etc.), improving living standards and difficulty in finding a job in North Macedonia are among main reasons for emigration. About 10% of respondents are planning to leave North Macedonia in order to continue their studies abroad or because they think there is no future in their home country.

[3] The *p*-value of 0.3515 indicates that there are no statistical significant differences in the intentions to leave abroad between males and females.
[4] 55.70% of urban students and 55.17% of rural students plan to migrate.
[5] The majority of students that declared that their parents have university degree (58.95%) plan to migrate and 56.82% of students that declared that their parents do not have university degree also plan to leave the country.

Table 2. Likelihood of migration

Do you plan to emigrate?	**Female**	**Male**	**Total**
Yes	54.48%	57.42%	55.56 %
No	24.25%	25.81%	24.82%
I do not know	21.27%	16.77%	19.62%
You aim to emigrate from North Macedonia:			
Before finishing university studies	12.12%	10.81%	11.65%
Immediately after completing university studies	51.52%	52.25%	51.78%
After a work experience in North Macedonia	34.34%	36.94%	35.28%
Other (I don't know)	2.02%	0.00%	1.29%
When you plan to emigrate?			
Within the year	21.39%	22.73%	21.86%
Over the next 5 years	64.68%	64.55%	64.63%
More than 5 years	13.93%	12.72%	13.51%

Figure 4. Intentions to migrate



Investigating the preferred destination country of the potential student migrant, for both male and female students countries with a priority choice are Germany, Switzerland and USA. Migrants to Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and Italy show a significantly differential pattern by gender: male migrants to Switzerland and Italy greatly outweigh female migrants and vice versa for Germany and Sweden. Analysing the branch of study the data show that the majority of female students that intend to migrate to Germany study medicine. This shows that the pattern of migration is in line with the increased demand of Germany for medical workers. Business administration and computer sciences students mainly plan to migrate to Scandinavian countries.

Figure 2. Country of choice



Asked if they can finance their emigration, 68.79% answered positively and 79.74% think they have enough information of the place they intend to emigrate. The main sources of information are from their family, friends both in North Macedonia or in the country where they plan to migrate or from their previous visits to those countries (76.46%). Other sources of information are from internet, agencies, universities or other sources. However, only 6.39% speak the language of the country where they plan to emigrate.

Other questions related to pre-migration plans were asked in order to determine the real migration potential. Asked if they would attend a training to prepare them for emigration, 63.38% (or 199 students) answered yes, 47.45% of these would like to attend language learning classes and 36.99% professional vocational training and the rest would like to follow cultural orientation training.

The proportion of students who in past had their parents living abroad, or they have lived abroad for at least one year is 37.83%. Having previous experience with migration or family member with migration experience seems to motivate students to migrate again (61.25% of those with previous migration experience are planning to migrate again and 52.09% of students with no previous migration experience plan to leave the country). Having into consideration that previous experience and social networks reduce the cost and risk of migration it might indicate that the propensity for migration would be grater (Cipuseva, et al., 2013).

Conclusion

Emigration of educated young people can have a detrimental impact on economic growth of a country. Brain drain in North Macedonia represents a decrease in the stock of human capital but also a decrease of workforce in specific sectors such as healthcare and IT sectors which are vital for economic development. Students from North Macedonia move abroad for better opportunities: employment, better working conditions, better living standards, education, etc. Working abroad allows them to increase their income, accumulate savings and acquire new skills.

Better working conditions in terms of salary, working schedule, trainings are important factors that

motivate young and educated workers to move abroad and, on the other site, are prerequisites for achieving economic growth and also for attracting migrants to return to their home countries. By generating new and better paid jobs and the more information they receive on employment opportunities in their field of expertise, better recreation opportunities, and more engagement in the community the more feasible it will be for young people to take the decision to stay and those abroad to return.

The government in cooperation with institutions of higher education need to improve the educational system, design and implement strategies that will facilitate the transition of young educated individuals, for example through practical work for students, on the labour market. Governments are aware of the cost of skilled migration and are seeking to adopt measures to retain skilled workers and to encourage the return of skilled migrants in order to maximize the benefits of skilled training, expertise and savings acquired abroad (Global Migration Group, 2016). In North Macedonia there are strategic documents for return and reintegration of migrants however the general impression is that these documents are rarely implemented.

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