SAPIENZA
UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA

The Coherence of EU Crisis Management in the Eastern Neighborhood: The Case of South Ossetia

Department of Political Science

Academic year 2016-2017

32 th Cycle

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of

PhD-Doctor of Philosophy in

Political Studies

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February 2020

Rome, Italy

Contents

List of Abbreviations

ABL	Administrative Boundary Lines
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
AGRI	Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania Interconnector
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIPDD	Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
CivOpsCdr	Civilian Operations Commander
CIVCOM	Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
COBERM	Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism
COMDEL	Committee for Management of Commission Resources in Delegations
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMCT	Crisis Management Coordination Team
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operation
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CPCMU	Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit
CROC	Crisis Response and Operational Coordination
CRT	Civilian Response Team
CSDP	Common Security Defense Policy
CSO	Civilian Strategic Option
DCCP	DEVCO Crisis Coordination Platform
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG	Directorate General
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DG E	Directorate General External Relations (Council)
DG E IX	Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management
DG ECHO	Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid

DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations(Commission)
EAM	Exceptional Assistance Measures
EC	European Community
EEAS	European Union External Action Service
ENI	European Neighborhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security Defense Policy
EU	European Union
ESG	EEAS Executive General
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova
EUDEL	EU Delegation
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMM	European Monitoring Mission
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUSS	European Security Strategy
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FCMU	Fragility and Crisis Management Unit
FFM	Fact Finding Mission
FPI	Foreign Policy Instruments
GEO DESK	Geographic Desk
GID	Geneva International Discussions
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HoM	Head of Mission
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
ICC	International Crisis Group
IcSP	Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
IDP	Internationally Displaced Person
IfS	Instrument for Stability
INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre

IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IPRM	Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
IRP	Interim Response Programs
ISC	Inter Service Consultation
JCC	Joint Control Commission
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PSC	Political Security Committee
RELEX	Working Party of Foreign Relations Counselors
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SEA	Single European Act
SECPOL.2	Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation
SITCEN	European Union Intelligence and Situation Center
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TANAP	Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline Project
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TSFSR	Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nationa Development Program
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
WTO	World Trade Organization

Acknowledgements

With this note, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the people who encouraged and supported me during the three years of my PhD and without whom it would be impossible to successfully complete this research.

First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Gianluca Passarelli, who, from the very beginning to the end, guided me throughout the entire scientific work with great support and motivation. Thanks to his constant feedback and encouragement I have made significant progress in writing my thesis.

I would like to express my deep thanks to the coordinator of our PhD Program, Professor Luca Scuccimarra, for his overall support and for giving me the opportunity to fully integrate into the PhD program. I also appreciate the enormous financial support received from the Sapienza University of Rome during my research, without which I would not be able to come to Italy and complete my research.

I would also like to sincerely thank the external evaluators of my thesis and the members of the PhD examination committee for reading my work and providing valuable comments and suggestions for future research.

I am also very grateful to the academic staff of the University of Maastricht, especially the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Professor Sophie Vanhoonacker, for hosting me as a visiting researcher at the Department of Political Science and giving me the opportunity to participate in faculty-related activities and use the library and research facilities.

The last three years of my PhD have been very stressful and difficult for me, and I would like to especially thank my parents and close friends for their tremendous moral support and strong encouragement. I especially want to thank my friend Greta for hosting me several times in Brussels during my field work and guiding me around the city.

Chapter 1: Introduction

There are a number of so-called "frozen conflicts" in Europe's eastern neighbourhood, which have the potential to turn into open conflicts and destabilize the whole region. One of these "frozen conflicts", the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, can be found in the South Caucasus. This conflict emerged when the Soviet Union fell apart, and the "disintegrating" empire could no longer reconcile Tbilisi's claim for territorial integrity with the national self-determination claimed by the Ossetians (Frichova 2010:9). A ceasefire was established between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze within the framework of the 1992 Sochi Agreement (Wolff 2011). Despite the absence of active hostilities, the conflict has not been resolved with a durable peace settlement; the active phase of the conflict has merely been managed into "frozen" status. This has created a situation in which the conflict is neither resolved, nor openly violent (Faber 2000:56).

The term "frozen conflict" has been contested, attracting a range of different classifications including "protracted", "intractable", "unsolved", "deadlocked", "difficult" and "prolonged" (Morar 2010:11). One of the misleading assumptions surrounding the term "frozen conflict" is assuming that the conflict is paused or doesn't have any dynamics (*ibid*). In fact, the term "frozen conflict" provides a false feeling of security, as such a conflict can last for years without open violence, but may easily turn into a violent conflict once it is triggered (European Movement International 2015:1). Therefore, "no conflict can be paused: a conflict can escalate or de-escalate, but remains without a final settlement unless the positions and perspectives of the parties engaged in the conflict are changed" *(ibid).*

In general, the term "frozen conflict" refers to the fact, that in countries or territories where one finds this type of conflict, a ceasefire has been established, and the phase of violent confrontation is over, however, this ceasefire has not led to real peace and reconciliation (European Parliament 2016:11).

The term “frozen conflict” has been traditionally applied to the Georgian-South Ossetian (1991-1992), Georgian-Abkhazian (1992-1993), Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-1994) and Transnistrian ethnic conflicts (Nagle and Clancy 2009:19). In all four cases ceasefire agreements have been reached without final settlements, turning the Black Sea-South Caucasus region into an area with unresolved conflicts *(ibid).*

The freezing of Caucasian conflicts is called “one of Europe's most important political innovations”, but at the same time it demonstrates a failure to resolve these conflicts, and poses a risk to the security and stability of Europe (Faber cited in European Movement International 2015:3).

Following the 2007 enlargement, the situation in the EU`s eastern neighbourhood seemed to have a more direct impact on the security of the European continent (Lynch 2003:22). The Black Sea Region became part of the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, and this increased the awareness of the threats (illegal trade, trafficking and corruption) posed by frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus, because these conflicts are now closer to the EU`s borders *(ibid).*

Given the geographical proximity of the South Caucasus to the EU, the latter acknowledges the importance of promoting peace and stability in that region (Council 2003 a). As evidence of this acknowledgement, the EUSS and a report on that strategy’s implementation, specifically refer to the frozen conflicts on EU borders, which “threaten regional stability … destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights” (Council 2003 a, Council 2008 a). “Furthermore, they can lead to terrorism, state failure, and facilitate organized crime” (*ibid*). In addition, the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS 2016 a) and the Working Document of the European Parliament on assessing the impact of changes in the global security environment (European Parliament 2015) emphasize that the EU “should now take a stronger and more active engagement in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries including the South Caucasus.

The escalation of South Caucasian conflicts has implications not only for the stability in the region and its neighboring countries, but for a broader European security architecture (Shevchuk 2014:52).

The South Caucasus region serves as an alternative corridor for energy transit from the Caspian Sea region to Europe (Kakachia 2011:15). The EU`s energy diversification in terms of its dependency on Russian gas, is high on the EU's political agenda and is one of the priorities of the President of the European Commission (Juncker 2014).

In order to reduce its dependency on Russia, the EU has sought alternate energy supply routes, including the TANAP, Nabucco, White Stream and AGRI pipelines, which aim to bring the Caspian gas through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe bypassing Russia (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2013). However, the sudden outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war over South Ossetia, demonstrated significant risks associated with the operation of the energy transit corridor in the South Caucasus (Kakachia 2011:1). During the five-day war between Russia and Georgia, the Russian forces approached the BTC gas pipeline, "calling attention to the centrality of energy vulnerability in modern conflict" (Socor 2008 cited in Ellison 2011:357). It also showed the need for broader security guarantees for the region, which is crucial to European and global energy security (Kakachia 2011:1). Thus, EU involvement in crisis management in the Southern Caucasus deserves particular attention, as it shows the importance of the region for the EU.

Since 2003, the EU has significantly expanded its presence in the South Caucasus through the use of existing crisis management tools and the introduction of new institutional actors in the region. Examples include the creation of a new CPCMU as part of the former DG RELEX, the appointment of an EUSR mandate for the South Caucasus, and the deployment of EUMM in Georgia coordinated by the CPCC.

In the post-Lisbon period, new coordination mechanisms- in particular the mandates of the HR/VP, EEAS, CMPD and CROC division were established and implemented. At the same time,

the EU granted a coordination mandate to existing institutional actors such as the Crisis Platform, the EUDEL to Georgia and the EUSR for the South Caucasus (European Court of Auditors 2014). These were meant to create a new dynamic for promoting internal coherence in EU crisis management. However, they actually generated inter-institutional fragmentation and tensions, creating the impression that the EU had underestimated the outcomes of its institutional innovations in practice (see sections 6.2 and 7.2).

The case of EU engagement in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict is a good example in this context. During the Russian-Georgian war over South Ossetia the EU played a significant role in establishing a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia and assuming a mediator role undertaken by the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia in the Geneva Talks. The first EUSR for the South Caucasus, Semneby, was also mandated to engage in political dialogue and mediation in the Geneva Talks (see section 6.1). The EUMM was heavily involved in the normalization, stabilization and confidence-building activities across South Ossetia at the same time, through the framework of the IPRM (Davis 2014:105). The mission`s operational planning periphery was filled with multiple FFMs operating in the field simultaneously (see section 6.2).

The Commission was also present in the region through its acute crisis management, post crisis reconciliation and post crisis economic reconstruction measures on behalf of DG DEVCO and FPI in collaboration with SECPOL.2 (see section 7.1).

The EU's speedy response to the escalation of the conflict over South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia was impressive, however, the multiple institutional actors engaged in crisis management did not always work in support of each other, in some cases, they actively clashed, indicating a lack of coherence of EU mediation capabilities (Dudouet and Dressler 2016, Ebenthal and Dudouet 2016).

Thus, an explanation of the reasons for such incoherence in EU crisis management in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict serves as the starting point of this dissertation.

The EU is well equipped to address regional conflicts, given the broad spectrum of its military and civilian crisis management instruments (Council 2003a). Although this gives the EU a comparative advantage in the international arena, in practice, the functional fragmentation of the EU's institutional structures has prevented the EU from speaking with one voice on the global scene (Niemann and Bretherton 2013 cited in Gebhard 2017). The EU external action involves a multitude of institutional actors with their own priorities and objectives, distinct mandates and operating methods, diverse experiences and perspectives (Faria 2014). The diverse actors engaged in EU crisis management are interdependent in their individual functions, to varying degrees, and these interdependencies need to be managed through a minimum level of coherence in their actions (Post 2013:80).

1.1. Research Focus

Achieving coherence in EU external relations is not a new challenge, but it has intensified after recent enlargements with the ten states from Central Europe and Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus (Post 2015:67). The EU new geographical and geopolitical position has brought relations with the third countries, especially those in its eastern neighbourhood, into the spotlight and has obliged the EU to define its international role and responsibilities more clearly. The toolbox available to the EU to deal with external crises is spread over "multiple policy areas, financial instruments and institutional actors" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:144). Thus, the EU is expected to be well prepared to meet the contemporary problems related to crisis management, as it possesses a broad spectrum of instruments, from civilian tools to military assets (Brauss 2006 cited in Post 2015:23). However, the wide range of EU crisis management instruments and the structural diversity, can make their coherent execution a challenging task (Post 2015:80). This makes coherence a relevant concept for exploring the inter-institutional dimension of EU crisis management.

The need for coherence in EU external relations was emphasized in the Community Treaties as a serious concern at the time of SEA, when Community external action was expanded and the EPC was institutionalized(Cremona 2011:55). In transforming the EPC into CFSP, the TEU reiterated the need for coherence between the CFSP and the external policies of the Community, imposing on the Council and Commission the duty to ensure coherence, especially in relation to EU external activities (*ibid*). In the following years, the lack of consensus over further integration was followed by mere interaction, and "coherence became the art of interface management rather than of creating systematic synergies" (Nutall 2001cited in Hill et al. 2017:126).

The Maastricht Treaty emphasized the need for greater coherence in various policies of Union`s external relations, with the aim to create a single institutional framework (Article C, TEU Maastricht). The Treaty mentioned that the Council and Commission should be responsible for ensuring such coherence, each in accordance with its respective powers (*ibid).* However, trusting both Council and Commission with the task of "ensuring coherence did not eliminate the "grey" areas, where the competences of Council and Commission overlapped"(Portela and Raube 2009:8). The objective of "coherence" as defined in Maastricht Treaty gave the Council and Commission the competence to ensure coherence, but it did not provide any guidelines on how to develop operational tools to achieve coherence (Koulaimah-Gabriel 1999 cited in Forster and Stokke 1999:350).

Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council Secretariat stated, that "a coherent framework needs to be defined within which the instruments coming under the three pillars and the competences of different institutions should be implemented in synergy" (Secretary-General/High Representative 2000).

The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the mandate of the HR, a key instrument for the improvement of inter-institutional coherence supported by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit at the Council (Portela and Raube 2012:17). The HR was mandated to represent

the Union externally in subordination to the Presidency, which already had to share its external representation functions with the Commission in accordance with Article 18(3) of the Amsterdam Treaty(*ibid*). However, this arrangement complicated the issue of EU external representation, because it increased the number of actors involved in EU external relations, but did not reduce it (Portela and Raube 2009:9).

The issue of coherence in the specific context of crisis management attracted considerable attention, when the ESDP was introduced in the Nice Treaty(Gebhard 2017:106). The creation of the ESDP created further challenges to the issue of coherence and highlighted the need for an enhanced cooperation at EU and national levels (Duke 2011:26). The primary focus of the ESDP was the military dimension of EU crisis management, mainly due to successive turmoil in the Western Balkans, but this was soon complicated by the growing attention paid to the civilian aspects of crisis management, where the issue of inter-pillar competences became more acute(Nutall 2001:6). This raised a new question about the distribution of mandates or who should be responsible for what, within the Community and CFSP *(ibid).*

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a new institutional context was created, which was the largest step in addressing the incoherence in EU external relations (Barton and Quinn 2011). Unlike the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the major improvement of the Lisbon Treaty was to bring all external aspects of security under one heading *(ibid).*

The post of the HR for the CFSP, that was established by the Amsterdam Treaty, was modified and became the post of the HR/VP for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice President of the European Commission and the Head of the EEAS. In this context, the HR/VP conducted the CFSP, chaired the FAC and, as the first Vice-President of the Commission, coordinated the external relations within the Commission`s competence (Erkelens and Blockmans 2012 cited in Furness and Ganzle 2017:480). Such an arrangement linked the boundaries between the supranational and intergovernmental competences, as well as decision making procedures (*ibid*).

With regard to ensuring coherence in EU external relations Article 18 (4) TEU states: "The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. The HR/VP shall ensure the coherence of the Union`s external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action". In addition, Art. 27(3) TEU mentions that the EEAS was created to support the HR/VP in enhancing coherence of EU external action across all policy domains.

In 2010 the HR/VP introduced the new CROC division, which was mandated to coordinate the operational planning process of CSDP missions, ensuring both swift and effective mobilization of actors and instruments in the CFSP (Dialer et al. 2014:167). Meanwhile, the HR/VP introduced the Crisis Platform – a temporary coordination mechanism, which brings together the EU crisis response actors, with the aim to facilitate coordination between the relevant units in the EEAS such as the CPCC, CIVCOM and Commission Services, such as the FPI (EEAS 2016 c).

These innovations could undoubtedly enhance coherence. However, the institutional picture is more complex, since the Lisbon Treaty granted a coordinating mandate to not just one, but to several actors, making the coherence of EU crisis decision making process more complex(see section 3.2).

The evolution of a coherence requirement through the treaties over time illustrated that the coherence requirement was constantly a goal at the EU level. However, despite the centrality of the notion of coherence in EU external relations, it is even more important to develop a clear definition of the term, because the clarity of the term as an analytical concept is challenged by the interchangeable use of the concepts "consistency" and "coherence" in both literature and practice. Such an approach can lead to confusion for anyone attempting to reach a precise understanding of these two terms (Portela and Raube 2008:6). The problem may have arisen when the term has been translated into other Community languages (*ibid*). While the English translation favors the term "consistency" (meaning the absence of contradictions), most

continental languages use the term "coherence" (meaning positive connections), in French "cohérence", in German "Kohärenz", in Italian "coerenza", in Spanish "coherencia`", in Portuguese "coerência", in Dutch "samenhang" and in Danish "sammenhæng" (*ibid).*

The Oxford English Dictionary defines coherence as the "action or a fact of sticking together" or a "harmonious connection to the several parts of a discourse so that the whole hangs together"(Andenas et al.2017:217).

The meaning of consistency is linked with a minimal requirement that mainly involves the "absence of contradictions", while coherence is associated with increased systematic synergy and is seen as more of a "desirable plus" that involves positive connections between several factors or the construction of a united whole (Missiroli et al. 2001).

There is an ontological difference between these two terms. According to Gebhard (2017:109), consistency assumes that actions or procedures are consistent over a period of time, and as such, ensure continuity (or not), whereas coherence represents a matter of the quality of interaction between various organizational entities. Consistency mainly refers to the nature of an outcome, which is compatible with another outcome, while coherence determines the quality of the process, in which the individual actors involved are combined into a synergistic procedural whole (*ibid*).

Consistency is rather a static concept and is not a suitable tool for assessing the process of interaction between several organizational units (Gauttier 2004:26).

This project largely adheres to a qualitative distinction between "consistency" and "coherence", focussing on the term "coherence", as it is well-suited for observation of the EU crisis decision-making process and interaction between different institutional agents.

EU institutional agents are defined as EU administrations composed of EU officials, which encompass the supranational European Commission with its DGs, administrative structures of the Council of the European Union and EEAS, including the CPCC, CIVCOM, EUSR and CSDP with their support staff, as well as EUDELs in the third countries (Klein 2011:66).

With regard to EU crisis management, this thesis adopts Christiansen's definition of coherence *Coherence is defined as the degree to which EU institutional agents operate a well coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making* (Christiansen 2001:747).

This definition encompasses the interactions between multiple institutional actors, applying coherence as a political objective within EU crisis management and coordination as a tool for assessing the coherence of EU crisis decision-making process.

In addition, the research employs a structural differentiation between vertical, institutional (inter-institutional, intra-institutional) and external dimensions of coherence.

Vertical coherence refers to the harmonization of the positions and policies of EU Member States with and in respect to the overall consensus or common position at the EU level (Gebhard 2017:109, Hill et al. 2017:107). This includes the general compliance of Member States with political commitments, as confirmed in the treaties, and the technical compatibility of particular national policies with common policies (*ibid*). Incoherence at the vertical level rises due to contradictions between the actions of EU institutions and Member States (*ibid).*

Institutional coherence has two types of challenges: inter-institutional and intra-institutional coherence. Inter-institutional incoherence is related to the tensions between different EU institutions: e.g. between the Commission and the EEAS or between the Commission and the Council, whereas intra-institutional incoherence refers to tensions between the different branches of an institution, for instance, between different DGs of the European Commission or between political and administrative levels (Marangoni and Vanhoonacker 2015:5).

External coherence refers to the EU capacity to represent itself to third parties as a unitary actor and to the way the third parties perceive its actions (Gebhard 2017:112). External coherence is primarily concerned with the functionality and credibility of the EU, rather than with specific foreign policy contents (Gebhard cited in Hill and Smith 2011:109). It is a function of vertical and horizontal dimensions of coherence, because "any failure to coordinate positions within the

EU, whether between Member States or institutions, might have a significant negative impact on the EU`s ability to perform for the third parties"(*ibid).*

However, without neglecting the role of EU Member States in crisis management, the research narrows down its focus on EU institutions, addressing the inter-institutional dimension of coherence.

This choice is motivated by several reasons. First, Art. 3 (TEU) emphasizes the importance of institutional coherence in achieving the EU strategic goals:"The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the coherence and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives, while respecting and building upon the *acquis communautaire".*

Second, the establishment of the ESDP since 1999 has introduced new administrative structures within the framework of the EU crisis management system, such as the EUSR, PSC, EUMC, EUMS and the CIVCOM, and thereby made the EU crisis management both intergovernmental and institutional in nature (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). All relevant tasks, from the development of the agenda, strategic planning, to the implementation and evaluation of civilian missions, are conducted through the hands of dedicated civilian crisis management bureaucracies in Brussels (Dijkstra 2013:46). Thus, the EU crisis decision making process can no longer be regarded as a purely intergovernmental process of cooperation where the decisions are made in national capitals *(ibid*).

Third, the institutionalization of EU crisis management has given the institutions more autonomy and power (Dimitrakopoulos 2001:110). The latter means that institutions do not always follow the wishes of Member States and can have their own interests and preferences, which they tend to promote via pursuing a power maximizing strategy (Puchala 1999:318). On the other hand, the desire of each institutional agent to preserve its autonomy and independence, intensifies the competition between institutional agents, especially those who perform similar functional duties within a single policy area (see section 2.5). From this perspective, it becomes

relevant to observe the interaction between multiple institutional agents in EU crisis management and assess how their interaction can affect external coherence.

1.2. Research Question

Based on the "new institutionalism" argument that "institutions do matter" in EU crisis management (see section 2.2), the thesis aims to explain the incoherence of EU crisis response activities towards the Georgian- South Ossetian conflict through the following question:

> *How does the overlap of inter-institutional mandates influence the coherence of EU crisis decision making process in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict?*

The thesis research question primarily relates to the inter-institutional coherence of EU crisis management, which is another dimension of coherence. First, it emphasizes that external coherence within EU crisis management is expected to develop, if inter-institutional coherence already exists. In this context, the research question contributes to an understanding of crisis decision making processes at the EU level, and aims to show whether different institutional agents engaged in crisis planning and implementation processes fulfill their functions in an integrated manner.

Second, the research question centralizes the allocation of mandates to different institutional actors and the causal relation between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence. According to Art. 13(2) TEU, the EU institutions must act on the principle of mutual cooperation within the limits of their powers conferred on them in the Treaties, and in accordance "with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them". However, policy-making at the EU level is often described as a complex process. The increasing institutionalization of EU crisis management has led to the transfer of both governmental decision-making and operational capacity from national ministerial departments to specialized Brussels-based bureaucracies (Duke 2008:90). This increase in the number of institutional actors has led to the emergence of an "overcrowded policy area" at the EU level, resulting in a

multitude of institutional actors with poorly defined mandates *(ibid).* This often results in inefficiencies in the form of overlapping competences or mandates between multiple institutional actors, which might have great potential to distort smooth decision-making processes through inter-institutional tensions (*ibid*). In this context, studying the inter-institutional dimension of EU crisis management would benefit from examining the inter-institutional overlap of mandates as a causal effect on the coherence of the crisis decision-making process.

The research question is operationalized to address the following sub questions: How does the overlap of inter-institutional mandates occur in the EU crisis decision-making process? How does the EU respond to overlapping inter-institutional mandates in EU crisis management? How can these responses establish a link between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence?

Answering the above questions, the research aims to build a theoretical framework which will serve as the basis for an empirical verification of the causal link between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence.

It is worth mentioning that part of the literature on EU policy coherence goes deeper into the issue of incoherence between the Development and Security (CFSP) policy areas, disregarding the cases with incoherent decision-making processes within each policy area, while the rest of the literature focuses only on the CFSP policy area.

This thesis acknowledges the challenge of coherence between development and security policies; nevertheless, it focuses on identifying the causes of incoherence within the two policy areas of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. The Civilian Headline Goal for 2008 makes this evident when it comes specifically to the coherent use of development and security instruments (Council 2004).

Secondly, much of the literature on EU crisis management in the eastern neighborhood highlights the impact of coherence on the effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of EU

actorness in the eastern neighborhood (Whitman and Wolff 2010, Tocci 2006, Popescu 2009, Lynch 2003). However, the present research intends to assess coherence as a *dependent* variable and further identify its main sources. In order to address the incoherence in EU crisis management it is essential to find out what actually causes incoherence. This makes it relevant to assess coherence as a dependent variable and reveal its main roots. Exploring the coherence of the EU crisis decision making process from this different perspective, the thesis aims to contribute to the specific strand of literature on EU crisis management in the eastern neighbourhood.

Finally, this study follows the central "new institutionalism" argument that 'institutions do matter in EU crisis management, and assesses coherence at inter-institutional level, which is another dimension of coherence. Focusing only on the intergovernmental aspect of coherence prevents one to understand the multidimensional nature of coherence in the context of EU crisis management. Coherence in EU crisis management can be identified also at the inter-institutional level, which is another measure of coherence (see section 2.2).

1.3. Enlarging the Concept of EU Crisis Management

In the EU context the crises may be both internal and external caused by human interventions or natural disasters (Batora et al. 2016). Examples of external crises can be the Balkan Wars, the earthquake in Haiti, the civil war in the Congo, and the revolution in Libya *(ibid).* Internal crises refer to national emergencies during which the available resources within the EU itself could no longer be sufficient to meet the needs of the population (Boin et al. 2013 cited in Batora et al. 2016).

The EU faces several man-made crisis situations in its neighborhood. Each of these crises represents different types of threats and challenges to its borders (NUPI 2016). In this context, a crisis can be conceptualized as a "serious incident or set of incidents involving the use of armed force, which may have negative consequences for certain groups in a given country or region" (Batora et al. 2016). Such crises are ethno-political in nature and are associated with wars and

armed conflicts (Brecher 1996:127). This definition is feasible for use in the case of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, since it is a good example of a man-made crisis in which the armed forces have been used by both parties.

Crisis management refers to the organization, regulation, procedures and mechanisms for containing the crisis and shaping its future course, while resolution is pursued (Blockmans et al.2009:276).

In the context of the EU, the concept of crisis management has been contested with various definitions. The EEAS defines crisis management as an "immediate mobilization of EU resources aimed to deal with the consequences of external crises caused by man-made and natural disasters" (EEAS 2016 c). From the Council`s perspective crisis management includes peace-making, peacekeeping, confidence-building and monitoring activities during the post-conflict stabilization phase, such as police missions, monitoring missions and border assistance missions (Council 2019). The crisis management tools at the Commission's disposal are mainly preventive and long term in nature, such as political dialogue; economic and trade agreements, macro-economic support, cooperation and development aid, emergency aid, reconstruction aid, exceptional and financial assistance (Joanin 2006).

Instead of further developing a conceptual explanation of "crisis management", this thesis considers all three of the aforementioned definitions to assess the EU crisis response activities in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, since the EU has addressed this conflict through both short-term and long-term crisis measures, ranging from immediate crisis preventive actions to post conflict reconstruction, mediation and political dialogue (see sections 6.1 and 7.1).

1.4. Theoretical Basis

The research question aims to demonstrate that the EU inter-institutional structure reflects the EU capacity to provide coherent crisis responses to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. It points to the crucial role of the "bureaucratic politics" theory of the third generation, which considers bureaucracies as hierarchical organizations jealously competing with each other to protect their own "turf" (Downs 1967, Dunleavy 1991, Kozak 1988, Hart and Rosenthal 1998).

The EU is the most developed example of a multi-level governance system (Kohler-Koch 1996:360-364, Jachtenfuchs 2001:254). Its Member States are no longer the only ones at the center of decision making (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010:13). Policy is formulated and implemented through interaction between different levels of public authorities (*ibid*). In this context, the EU institutional agents or bureaucracies are considered as legitimate actors of EU multi-governance system, whose primary function is to plan and implement EU policies (*ibid*). The study of the bureaucratic apparatus of EU crisis management is associated with the important role of bureaucracies as the key players determining the nature of policy planning and implementation (Moe 1990:143).

The application of "bureaucratic politics" is a useful theoretical approach to explain the impact of overlapping of inter-institutional mandates on the coherence of EU crisis decision making process. First, it presumes that EU crisis management is not a merely intergovernmental process and that Brussels based actors also matter in EU crisis decision making process, which is conducted through multiple channels and multiple actors. Second, "bureaucratic politics" does not assume that decision making and implementation are limited to a single actor. Instead, it assumes that the decision making process is highly diffused: multiple bureaucratic actors through multiple channels can also be treated as unitary actors in foreign policy decision making processes (Wilson 1991, Kanninen and Piiparinen 2014). Once created bureaucracies tend to pursue distinct institutional interests and become political actors in their own right with a tendency to increase their power and autonomy (see section 2.4.1). In this context, given the

heterogenous institutional structure of the EU, which consists of multiple bureaucracies, one can apply the "bureaucratic politics" to analyze the internal dynamics of the EU crisis decision-making process and the extent to which it can affect the coherence of that process.

Although the bureaucracies are seen as *apolitical agents* implementing the tasks given by politicians, they also pursue their own organizational interests and preferences (Alison 1971:162, Alisson and Zelikow 1999:256). The preferences of bureaucracies are aligned to their mandates (Kozak 1988:5-10). Thus, in order to fulfil their mandates, the bureaucracies will seek to maintain or expand certain resources, including funding, decision-making discretion, and political support (*ibid*). Because these resources are limited, bureaucracies enter into competition with each other. Competition intensifies in the areas of overlapping functions or mandates, which gives a rise to the rivalries in which two or more bureaucracies aim to assert a permanent control over the same mandate, or in which one bureaucratic organization seeks to take over another organization as well as the mandate of that organization (Holden 1966:943).

In the context of "bureaucratic politics" the EU bureaucracies can be seen as rational entities pursuing institutional preferences, competing for maximum autonomy and avoiding time-consuming and resource-intensive coordination (Alison and Halperin 1972:75). Competition increases when a new bureaucracy invades the territorial zone of another bureaucracy within a given policy space (*ibid*). However, given the fact that resources are limited, the tendency of each bureaucracy to increase its territorial zone at the expense of the territory of another bureaucracy, will not be welcomed by the latter, which will jealously guard its territory (Downs 1967:216). This situation will generate "turf" wars leading to dysfunctional coordination (*ibid).*

Coherence is directly affected by "poor" coordination, as the former is specified as a coordinated process of crisis decision making (see section 1.1). Coherence is directly affected by "poor" coordination, as the former is specified as a coordinated process of decision making (see section 2.5).

1.5. Hypotheses

Based on the analytical framework the overlap of inter-institutional mandates without further coordination leads to incoherent decision making process (see section 2.5). In this context, coordination becomes an instrument to enhance the coherence at the planning and operational levels of crisis of decision making process (see section 3.3). Thus, coordination is the intervening variable and the overlap of inter-institutional mandates is considered the independent variable.

The figure below provides the graphic illustration of the causal relation between the three variables.



Figure 1: Own compilation based on Alison and Halperin(1972), Downs 1967, Dunleavy 1991, Kozak 1988, Hart and Rosenthal 1998).

The issue of overlapping mandates or so called functional overlaps is widely recognized as one of the main sources of organizational procedural incoherence and ineffectiveness (Tyre and Hauptman 1992 cited in Gebhard 2017:19).

In the EU context a mandate is understood as the tasks and functions that institutions have subscribed to in their treaties, strategies and other constitutive and operational texts (Hofmann 2010:103). Mandates set the rules of the game and need to balance a sense of specificity, but also need to be open to interpretation (OECD 2018:15).

Since institutionalization has equipped the EU crisis management field with similar institutional actors operating in the same policy area, possibilities arise that their mandates may conflict with each other. Thus, the overlap of mandates can occur between institutional actors which operate within a single policy field and are bound to similar commitments (Hoffmann 2010:103-104).

The operationalization of overlapping mandates starts identifying the main players, their mandates in the two main policy areas of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, and thereafter mapping the sub areas in which the targeted institutional agents are fulfilling similar tasks that might lead to the overlap of their mandates (see section 3.3).

Coordination in this thesis is applied as an instrument to enhance the coherence of EU crisis decision making process. In this context, coherence is reviewed as an outcome of successful coordination.

De Coning (2008:96) defines coordination as "planning, sharing information, agreeing on the division of roles, responsibilities and tasks and mobilizing organizational resources ".

This definition merges two aspects of coordination. First, it reviews coordination as the outcome of inter-organizational relationships and, second, it comprises an effort to enhance coherence to overcome organizational fragmentation. This thesis applies de Coning's (2008) definition as the most feasible evidence that the two concepts are interconnected: coordination is considered an instrument for achieving inter-institutional coherence (Duke 1999) and is seen as a term focused on the inter-institutional implementation of the coherence requirement in EU crisis management.

Coordination can be characterized as either formal or informal (Lipson 2005, Christiansen et al. 2007, Comfort 2007). Formal coordination mechanisms within a hierarchy form routines and rules that specify the responsibilities and tasks of organizational entities (*ibid*). Communication

occurs via official channels which are described in official documents (Christiansen et al. 2007:24-25). Informal coordination mechanisms occur spontaneously, outside a formal organizational structure, when a specific need to manage existing interdependences arises between organizations *(ibid).* Thus, informal coordination mechanisms can be activated in the absence of formal coordination structures or in parallel with formal coordination mechanisms (*ibid).*

Coordination is operationalized via assessing whether or not there was an exchange of information to divide tasks and mobilize resources during the overlap of inter-institutional mandates at each stage of the EU crisis decision-making process(see section 3.4).

The analytical framework developed in section 2.5 helps to develop the three main hypotheses by which the independent variable (overlap of inter-institutional mandates), the intervening variable (coordination) and the dependent variable (coherence) are causally related.

Hypothesis 1: *If inter-institutional mandates are overlapped and coordination mechanisms are not activated, the EU crisis decision making process is incoherent.*

The first hypothesis describes a condition when coordination mechanisms are not activated to coordinate the overlap of inter-institutional mandates. In this situation the independent variable has a direct effect on the intervening variable, and the intervening variable directly affects the dependent variable. This hypothesis is in line with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical reasoning, since it confirms that the overlap of inter-institutional mandates in the absence of coordination mechanisms leads to incoherent crisis decision making process.

Hypothesis 2: *If inter-institutional mandates are overlapped and coordination mechanisms are activated, the EU crisis decision making process is coherent.*

This hypothesis is also consistent with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical reasoning, as it illustrates that inter-institutional coordination mechanisms act as an intervening variable, influencing the dependent variable - coherence, by coordinating the overlapping mandates. In

this case, the coordination mechanisms are effectively implemented, since they lead to a coherent crisis decision making process.

Hypothesis 3: *If inter-institutional mandates are overlapped and coordination mechanisms are activated, the EU crisis decision making process is incoherent.*

The third hypothesis demonstrates a sequence of variables which rejects the main reasoning of the "bureaucratic politics" theory. Although coordination mechanisms are activated to impede the further overlap of mandates, the activation of these coordination mechanisms does not contribute to a coherent decision making process. This hypothesis demonstrates, that institutional coordination mechanisms do not work effectively, therefore, they do not lead to a coherent process of policy planning and implementation.

The probability of occurrence of a null hypothesis, which applies to cases without overlapping mandates, is also considered in this study. However, in the absence of overlapping mandates, the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence is not considered for further analysis (see section 2.5).

1.6. Single Case Research Design

Of the three frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict has been chosen as the main case of the study for the following reasons:

I. In contrast to their roles in Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, the EU institutions have a greater engagement in South Ossetia in terms of managing the crisis, and no EU member state has been present in South Ossetia(Popescu 2007).

II. The evidence shows that the engagement of multiple institutional actors in the field after the Russian-Georgian war over South-Ossetia, including the two EUSRs, the Commission Delegation, the EUMM, has created confusion on the ground and thereby

undermined the coherence and effectiveness of EU`s mediation capacity (Dudouet and Dressler 2016, Ebenthal and Dudouet 2016).

III. The political context and dynamics of violence in South Ossetia provide a particularly significant reason for targeting the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. It is much more difficult for Georgia to control the area surrounding the region of South Ossetia than Abkhazia because of the distance (Tskinvali is about 100 km from Tbilisi), making South Ossetia an attractive place for organized crime and smuggling activities (Oxford Analytica 2008). In addition, the presence of Russian troops and fencing activities along the administrative lines dividing South Ossetia and Georgia have made the security situation in the region highly critical (Boyle 2017).

The research extends to the following policy areas of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. These two policy areas are centralized in the European Security Strategy (Council 2003a) and in the joint Communication by the Commission and the HR/VP on the EU`s Comprehensive Approach to external crises (European Commission 2013b). In addition, the EU has been engaged in the South Caucasus via short term and long term crisis management tools from both policy areas: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid (see section 6.2 and section 7.2).

The research considers a within case study analysis as the most relevant approach to examine the impact of the independent variable (overlap of inter-institutional mandates) on the dependent variable (coherence) through the developed causal chain in section 3.4. Applying a within case study approach, the research tested the developed hypotheses within the selected sub-cases and then compared the results across these sub-cases in the planning and implementation levels.

The causal connection between the independent, dependent and intervening variables was assessed using a process tracing method in the two main policy areas: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. Four separate process tracings were conducted, two for each sub-case. After finalizing the process tracing within each sub-case, a cross-case analysis was applied to find

common patterns or differences between the Security (CFSP) and Development policy areas in the planning and operational phases of EU crisis decision making process before and after Lisbon (see section 4.2).

In this research the data collection was based on document analyses and semi-structured interviews. The key document collection sources were primary and secondary data sources. The primary sources relevant for the analysis included all public documents of EU institutions that were directly related to EU crisis management planning and implementation processes, as well as EU internal documents or co called "sensitive unclassified documents" on EU crisis management planning and implementation processes, which were requested via a special document request form.

The secondary documents, through which data was collected during this study, included various types of publications from academics and policy observers, as well as think tanks and international organizations working on EU foreign policy planning and crisis management.

However, the document analysis was not sufficient to obtain the required information. For that purpose the document analysis was combined with semi structured interviews.

In total, forty interviews were conducted between 2017 and 2019, of which twenty four were conducted in the Security (CFSP) policy area and sixteen in the Development Aid policy area. The number of interviews conducted in the CFSP was higher than in the Development Aid, as the CFSP institutional arena was significantly crowded compared to the Development Aid.

The primary dimension of the interviews conducted in June, 2017 and April, 2018 included four and seventeen semi-structured face-to-face interviews respectively, with EU officials and Academic Experts in Brussels and Tbilisi. Three of four interviews were conducted in the Security (CFSP) policy area, and only one interview was conducted in the Development Aid policy in 2017. In 2018, nine interviews were conducted in the Security (CFSP) policy area and the other eight in the Development Aid policy area.

The second phase of interviews was conducted during the last week of May 2019 and the first two weeks of June in 2019. Twelve of the nineteen interviews were done in the Security (CFSP) policy area, and the remaining seven interviews were conducted in the Development Aid policy domain. Of the forty interviews twelve were conducted by phone (see ANNEX 2).

1.7. Thesis Outline

This dissertation consists of eight chapters. The introductory chapter, **Chapter 1,** presents the focus of the research, followed by the research question in the first two sections of this chapter. The first section of Chapter 1 introduces the general concept of coherence, developing a working definition of the term and adapting it to the area of EU crisis management. The second section presents the research question of the thesis, which is based on the "new institutionalism" argument that "institutions matter" in EU crisis management, provides an overview on the gaps in the literatures, and presents the specific contributions of this study.

The third section discusses various definitions of the concept of "crisis management" and chooses the most feasible definition for the analysis of EU crisis management activities in South Ossetia.

Sections four and five discuss the theoretical premise and hypotheses of the thesis by introducing the causal connection between the dependent (coherence), intervening (coordination) and independent (overlap of mandates) variables. Section six presents the criteria for case selection, analysis and data collection used in the thesis.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of this thesis. The chapter starts with section one which addresses the main gaps in the observed sets of literature. Section two provides an overview of several theoretical perspectives on "new institutionalism" which illustrate the role of institutions in EU crisis management. The third section discusses existing foreign policy decision-making theories and chooses the most feasible approach in support of the main

argument of the research. Section four emphasizes the general role of bureaucracies in foreign policy-making and implementation processes and discusses the "bureaucratic politics" model. Section five adapts the basic assumptions surrounding "bureaucratic politics" and applies them to the construction of the analytical framework.

Chapter 3 operationalizes the dependent, intervening and independent variables on the basis of developed indicators in the context of the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical framework. Therefore, the chapter begins by identifying the main indicators for the independent and intervening variables and continues by translating the dependent variable into observable indicator(s). In section one, the operationalization of the overlap of mandates aims to identify functional duplications in each policy area and both at the planning and implementation levels, which would enable an empirical assessment of the possible impact of the overlap of mandates on the coherence of the crisis decision-making process. Section two operationalizes the intervening variable, coordination, by mapping both formal and informal coordination mechanisms within the Security (CFSP) and Development Aid policy areas at every stage of decision-making. Section three assesses coherence, based on qualitative measurements, as it was shown that quantitative approaches are not suitable for measuring abstract concepts such as coherence. Section four establishes a causal connection between the three variables in each policy area of EU crisis management in line with the analytical framework of the thesis.

Chapter 4 discusses the basic methods for selecting, analyzing, and collecting reliable empirical data. The first section of the chapter indicates the main case study, then briefly presents the selected sub-cases, embedded analytical units and the main time frame of the dissertation.

The second section of this chapter lays out the analytical methods of the selected cases. This section details how a within-case analysis through process tracing is applied as the principal method for studying the responses of the main analytical units (institutional actors) in relation to Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. A cross-case synthesis in addition to a within-case analysis is

applied to find common patterns between the two sub-cases. The final section discusses the main data collection methods.

Chapter 5 provides a descriptive overview of the origins of the Georgian-South Ossetian frozen conflict and its evolution since the early Soviet days. The chapter proceeds in three steps: the first section introduces the South Ossetia region, including an overview of the region`s geography, population, religion and economic situation. The second section observes the historical background of Georgian-South Ossetian relations. The final section describes the evolution of the conflict over the territory of South Ossetia and the main mediation mechanisms applied since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 summarize the empirical findings of the case study at two levels of crisis decision-making, planning and implementation, and in the two main policy areas, Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. Both chapters are divided into three sections. The first section starts with a brief overview of EU early steps as a crisis manager in South Ossetia in relation to Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, respectively. The second section traces the planning and implementation processes within the Security (CFSP) and Development Aid respectively, for the aforementioned 2003-2016 time period, with the purpose of assessing the causality between the overlap of mandates and coherence. The third section summarizes the main empirical findings in the Security (CFSP) and Development Aid policy areas separately, presenting the results of within-case analyses built on the assumptions of "bureaucratic politics" reasoning, as illustrated in Chapter 2.

The conclusion in **Chapter 8** summarizes the main findings of the thesis and answers the research question illustrated at the beginning of the study in section 1.2. The chapter consists of eight sections. The first four sections of the chapter systematically analyze the confirmation of the three main hypotheses in each policy area of EU crisis management, at each level of the crisis decision making process before and after Lisbon. The fifth section analyses the effectiveness of the activated coordination mechanisms and the frequency of their

implementation in each policy area and at each decision-making phase. The sixth section emphasizes the added value of the thesis and the main ways in which the thesis fills the gap in the literature. The seventh section presents and explains the main theoretical and methodological limitations of the thesis. The eighth and final section provides general recommendations based on the empirical findings in Chapters 6 and Chapter 7.

Chapter 2: Analytical Framework

The overall contribution of the chapter is to construct an analytical framework, that will demonstrate a causal link between coherence (dependent variable) and overlap of inter-institutional mandates (independent variable). The analytical framework guides a further empirical analysis. The chapter starts with section one, which stresses the significance of a better understanding of different scholarly contributions on assessing the coherence in EU external relations and addresses the main gaps in the observed sets of literature. The second section provides an overview of several theoretical perspectives and emphasizes the role of institutions in EU crisis management. Afterwards, the third section discusses existing foreign policy decision-making theories and chooses the most feasible theoretical approach as a starting point for developing the analytical framework of the thesis. Section four emphasizes the general role of bureaucracies in political decision making processes and discusses the "bureaucratic politics" model. Section five presents the main assumptions on "bureaucratic politics" theory and develops an analytical framework. The final section of the chapter provides concluding remarks on the proposed analytical framework.

2.1. Literature Review

As seen in the introduction, the thesis aims to explain the incoherence of EU crisis decision making processes in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Thus, deeply observing different scientific understandings of what causes incoherence in EU external relations is foundational to solving the puzzle behind that term and proposing an original analytical framework for its assessment.

This section observes the two sets of literature: the literature on EU policy coherence and the literature on EU crisis management in the eastern neighbourhood. Considering the relevant findings of both literatures the section addresses their shortcomings and outlines how this study aims to address them.

It is worth mentioning that the EU expresses the coherence requirement in EU external relations at two levels: treaty level and policy level (Portela and Raube 2009:4). The Treaty framework defines coherence as one of the guiding principles and objectives of EU external action. Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the problems with the coherence in EU crisis management were the consequence of the "choice for a pillar structure in which both the EU CFSP and the EC had separate external competences and decision-making procedures" (Blockmans and Wessel 2009:33). The Lisbon Treaty further strengthened the coherence requirement and introduced significant institutional changes to implement this requirement in EU external relations (*ibid*).

Meanwhile, certain legal scholars such as Krenzler and Schneider (1997), Tietje (1997), Schmalz (1998), Nutall (2001), Gauttier (2004), Smith (2011) and Cremona (2008) discuss the strengthening of the coherence requirement in the Treaties, including the delineation between former EC external policies and CFSP, as well as the institutional provisions for fulfilling the coherence requirement contained in the Treaties.

Coherence is one of the core constitutional values of the EU (Tietje 1997 cited in Cremona 2008). "It provides the context and rationale for the operation of fundamental legal principles

governing relations between Member States and EU Institutions, as well as between the institutions themselves, including the principle of primacy, the duty of cooperation and the principle by which the Community acquis is protected from being affected by the exercise of CFSP powers" (Cremona 2008).

The analysis of coherence at the treaty level is important for addressing its main obstacles, as it provides the legal basis for the coherence requirement in EU external policies. However, in practice, the legal approach can not by itself help find the reasons for the incoherence of EU external relations and ensure coherence: achieving coherence also depends on political will and the availability of the necessary instruments at all levels of external action (Missiroli et al. 2001). The coherence requirement is "legally binding, but it is not legally enforceable" (Hill and Smith 2011: 114).

As this study aims to analyze the coherence requirement through the daily crisis decision-making processes, it is important to observe the implementation of the coherence requirement at the substantive policy level, rather than at the treaty level. This approach is necessary for three main reasons.

First, observing coherence at the treaty level illustrates the way "the EU ensures coherence by reforming or interpreting the polity framework through formal constitutional change and judicial interpretation" (Portela and Raube 2009:3). In contrast, observing the coherence requirement at the policy level, focuses on the actual EU policy-making processes (*ibid*). This is in line with the research goal of the thesis, which aims to assess the coherence of daily decision-making processes within EU crisis management.

Second, the legal approach might always lead to different, but not necessarily tangential recommendations from those who approach the issue of coherence from a political science perspective (Duke 2011:15). A legal explanation of incoherence may lead to the assertion of the need for some form of binding coherence requirement (*ibid*). In contrast, the policy

framework approach most often pays attention to institutions, processes and decision-making procedures to address perceived incoherence (*ibid*).

Third, it is difficult to judge whether a particular policy outcome is coherent or incoherent, because EU treaties do not provide sufficient quantitative or qualitative frameworks against which reality could be measured (Thaler 2020:29).

In the context of the literature on EU policy coherence, the scholars attempting to theorize coherence in this strand of literature are categorized into two groups: The first group of scholars: Koulaimah-Gabriel (1999), Grimm and Kielwein (2005), Youngs (2007), Grevi(2009), De Coning and Friss (2011), Lushi(2015), Post (2015), Gianniou and Galariotis (2016), Koenig (2016) and Thaler (2020) study the concept of coherence from institutionalist and intergovernmentalist perspectives. By this, they tend to illustrate that the nature of EU decision making process is both intergovernmental and supranational.

The scholars in the second group: Hoebink et al. (2005), Duke (2011), Kapidzic (2011), Juncos (2013) and Stross (2014) address the intra/inter institutional aspects of coherence in EU external relations, centralizing instutionalist and constructivist approaches in their works.

From the "liberal intergovernmentalism" perspective, the Member States are the dominant players in EU foreign policy, and institutional preferences may affect policy coherence if Member States delegate sovereignty to institutions (Moravcsik 1993, Wincott 1995, Schimmelfennig 2004). The "new institutionalism" school assigns a more dominant role to institutional actors and structures in the analysis of policy processes (see section 2.2). Institutions structure the input of social and political forces, and thus, influence the nature of EU foreign policy (March and Olsen 1989, Hall and Taylor 1994, Bulmer 1998).

Koulaimah-Gabriel (1999), Grimm and Kielwein (2005), Youngs (2007) and Koenig (2016) examine the problems of coherence also between development and security policy areas.

Koulaimah-Gabriel (1999) argues that a certain degree of incoherence is rooted in governance structures, due to several reasons, such as the interest-based politics, lack of information,

difficulty in prioritizing and fragmentation of policies. The incoherence at EU level is increased due to institutional differentiation, fragmentation of the decision making system, and the coexistence of a two level policy determination: European and National (Koulaimah-Gabriel 1999:357).

The author explores the interplay between development and security policy areas since the establishment of the Maastricht Treaty regarding economic sanctions, conflict prevention, and geographical policy articulation (Koulaimah-Gabriel 1999:349, 364, 483).

The coexistence of national and EU competence in each field has been identified as a potential source of conflict (Koulaimah-Gabriel 1999:357-358). Thus, the interaction between the Council of Ministers, Parliament and Commission is studied, which varies depending on the three main policy areas: Trade, Development and CFSP, and according to the type of external agreements (trade cooperation, association) which are considered as part of the treaty making powers of the EC (Koulaimah-Gabriel 1999:358). This usually generates competition among the various actors, who seek to implement their own agendas at the expense of coherence, and leads to confusion for observers and third countries (*ibid*).

The author concludes that "the EU lacks a central analytical unit that would serve both the EU and the Member States" (Koulaimah-Gabriel 1999:356). This "strategic thinking" should be the responsibility of the Commission, since the latter serves the common interests of the Union, and it has an overview of all areas of external relations, except in defense. However, the Commission`s strategic thinking is questionable, as Member States are reluctant to provide the European Commission with a leading-coordinating or strategic role (*ibid*).

Grimm and Kielwein (2005) discuss the Commission proposal for the first EU strategy towards Africa. One of the merits of the strategy is primarily associated with achieving greater coherence in the policy of the whole EU towards Africa. The authors note that the implementation of the strategy was largely dependant on Member States . However, the internal coherence of all European actors, the complementarity of the Member States `s and the

Commission`s policies and closer coordination on the spot should also be seen as critical issues (*ibid*). The authors refer to the Commission interpretation of coherence, the latter is defined as a suitable policy mix, i.e. a coordinated and mutually supportive blend of different policies (Grimm and Kielwein 2005:2).

It is concluded that a coherent European policy towards Africa faces a number of challenges. Member States need to ensure coherence between foreign, development, trade and other policies- such as migration (Grimm and Kielwein 2005:3). However, the Member States face challenges related to coordination and division of labor between them, which hinders the internal coherence in the Member States ` Africa policies (*ibid).* At the European level, the weight distribution between the Commission and the Member States varies from one European policy to another (Grimm and Kielwein 2005:3). Another difficulty is the division of responsibilities for external relations in the Commission, not only by policy area, but also geographically, between Africa north and south of the Sahara (*ibid).*

Youngs (2007) argues that the EU has achieved little toward the balance between the security and development policy areas, apart from various rhetorical commitments (Youngs 2007:3). In particular, an increased emphasis on supporting governance reforms serves as a potential link between security and development goals in several layers of European policies (*ibid*). However, what the link means in practice is still contested (*ibid).* *"*The EU still has no clearly thought-out vision of the balance or direction of causality between these two policy goals, but rather an ad hoc approach based on the rather easy assumption that all good things go together" (*ibid).* In some cases development efforts have been limited in conflict situations, and in the other cases security engagement has been limited in support of development challenges (Youngs 2007:21). Another reason of incoherence can be seen in the "differences between Member States over what the development-security link means in terms of policy evolution"(*ibid).* Tensions have also intensified between EU institutions, since each institution argues that "its own area of

policy competence is that, which is intended to be most strengthened by the security-development leitmotif (*ibid*).

Efforts to enhance coherence between development and security policy areas include two completely different sets of policy issues (Youngs 2007:5). One of the problems is associated with instability, conflict and insecurity in developing countries themselves, as well with the problems they create for economic development *(ibid).* Another issue relates to the EU's own security concerns and ways to mitigate them (Youngs 2007: 5).

Koenig (2016), on the other hand, argues that coherence is a function of competing interests and norms between Member States and institutions. The influence and interaction of interests and norms across governance levels are examined from sociological institutionalism and intergovernmenalism perspectives (Koenig 2016:223). The author observes factors that explain the varying degrees of coherence in EU crisis management. The analysis applies a process tracing approach to trace the activities and interaction of EU institutions and Member States , with a focus on France, the United Kingdom and Germany. Coherence is measured at an ordinal level (low, medium, high) using four operational elements- consistency, common objectives, process of interaction between individuals or entities, and compliance with joint decisions, positions, actions, rules or provisions (Koenig 2016:72). Consistency means there is no contradiction or mutual interference between policy outputs or activities, which leads to a high degree of coherence (*ibid*). A high degree of coherence is expected if common objectives and shared priorities are agreed in the form of a common strategy towards a certain conflict or crisis (*ibid*). Regarding the process of interaction between individuals or entities, a high degree of coherence is more likely if there is a non-adversarial and collaborative interaction (*ibid).* And full compliance with joint decisions, positions, actions, rules or provisions, also leads to a high degree of coherence (*ibid).*

Grevi (2009) describes how ESDP decision-making has developed, for both civil and military crisis management. He argues that the Lisbon innovations had considerable implications for

CFSP and ESDP, notably with a view to enhancing the coherence of the EU foreign and security policy and ensuring further convergence of Member States' positions (Grevi 2009:21). EU Member States make the final decisions in this policy area, based on the unanimity rule. However, these decisions are made as a result of a complex decision-making process which usually entails extensive, institutional based intergovernmental interaction (Grevi 2009:19). The effectiveness of decisions taken depends on the mobilization of all relevant actors and all necessary instruments in a coherent manner at each stage of the decision-making process (Grevi 2009:20). Achieving coherence requires a constant balance between national interests and institutional perspectives (*ibid*). Grevi (2009) concludes that "the emphasis rightly put on the need to ensure more and better coordination within and between EU institutions and to devise a comprehensive approach to crisis management has delivered modest results until quite recently". In general, weak structural cooperation and coordination between the Council Secretariat and the Commission have accompanied the development of the ESDP, undermining its output (Grevi 2009:64).

De Coning and Friss (2011) argue that the assumptions on which the principle of coherence is based are flawed, and that the empirical and theoretical evidence indicates that there is much less room for coherence than generally recognized in the policy debate (De Coning and Friss 2011:244). "Coherence should not be understood as an effort aimed equally at all, nor should all partners be expected to achieve the same level of unity of effort"**(***ibid).* The authors argue that the EU has developed a sophisticated crisis management capability, including military, police and civilian capacities, but it has not yet applied these capacities together in one integrated operation (De Coning and Friss 2011:248). Internal institutional divisions, the separation of pillars and the lengthy ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty are among the factors that have prevented a more coherent EU, despite the enormous potential in the military, political and economic sectors (*ibid).*

The authors define coherence as the "effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, governance and security dimensions of international peace and stability operations towards common strategic objectives" (De Coning and Friss:253). The comprehensive approach model proposed by De Coning and Friss (2011) distinguishes between four levels of coherence and six types of relationships. The four levels of coherence are: intra-agency coherence, whole-of-government coherence, inter-agency coherence and international-local coherence (*ibid*). The types of relationships that influence the degree of coherence are presented on a scale ranging from unity to competition: actors are united, actors are integrated, actors cooperate, actors coordinate, actors coexist, actors compete (De Coning and Friss:255-256). According to the authors there is always a moment when doing more will no longer bring additional benefits. Thus, if the limits of enhancing coherence are not recognized, pursuing coherence beyond certain limits will lead to the opposite outcome: inefficiency and ineffectiveness (De Coning and Friss 2011:260).

Lushi (2015) observes the extent to which the institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon treaty have changed the EU actorness in the international arena, and whether these changes have contributed to a more coherent foreign policy. In this context, the author emphasizes the role of the HR as an important agenda-setter in the EU`s foreign policy and her contribution to enhancing EU foreign policy coherence (Lushi 2015:3). The study focuses on horizontal and vertical dimensions of coherence, as these two dimensions have been expected to be reinforced by institutional changes after Lisbon (Lushi 2015:3). Coherence is analyzed at a benign level, which considers coherence as a desirable way of interacting (Nutall 2001 cited in Lushi 2015:7). This choice is justified by the fact, that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced new institutional prerogatives to enhance horizontal coherence, but the problem is whether the European Council will allow the HR and the FAC to be not only the agenda-setters in the foreign policy issues, but also decision makers (*ibid*).

Lushi (2015) concludes that the coherence in EU foreign policy has improved between 2009-2014 with regard to implementation, as "there is a single diplomatic mechanism and more defined positions obliged to deal with the Union`s foreign policy" (Lushi 2015:13). However, when it comes to agenda setting in the area of CFSP, the HR`s actions depend on the willingness of Member States to give her or not a mandate to act on certain CFSP issues on behalf of the EU (*ibid*). Thus, the effectiveness of the HR to take a leading role in EU foreign policy, depends on her personal negotiating skills to convince EU Member States to support her agenda and build consensus between them (Lushi 2015:12). This would further enhance the coherence of EU foreign policy and make the EU a more unitary international actor (Lushi 2015:13).

Post (2015:28) observes the extent to which the EU and the three Member States-the Great Britain, Germany and Sweden have difficulties with effectively implementing the CA. This problem is approached from two angles. The first perspective assumes that the CA challenges can be addressed by organizational reforms, as the difficulties with the CA implementation are caused by inadequate policy arrangements in terms of crisis management structures (*ibid).* The second approach specifies that the difficulties of CA implementation can be the result of contradicting interests and values of crisis management actors (*ibid*). The author associates the CA with two main keywords: policy coherence and coordination (Post 2015:105).

In the context of comprehensive crisis management, Post (2015) defines coherence as the obligation of ensuring synergy between different crisis management instruments and fields, and also, as a matter of the quality of interactions between different organizational entities (Post 2015:109). Coordination is understood as an instrument to increase coherence and organizational efficiency of crisis management actors and the effective implementation of the CA (Post 2015:117). In this context the two main theoretical approaches are applied. The first analytical approach applies insights from organizational theory and public administration studies, which help to focus on the aim of coherence and coordination, as well as on the structures and

mechanisms which are supposed to enable CA (*ibid).* The second analytical approach is based on the concept of Europeanization and deals with the impact of EU crisis management on domestic Member State crisis management policies and vice versa (*ibid*).

The author concludes that the EU and national approaches reveal many distinctive characteristics in the vision for crisis management policy coherence, and there are certain characteristics that all three country case studies and the EU have in common, although to different degrees and in different variations (Post 2015:367). However, there are major differences, in both conceptual and organizational aspects of specific attempts to achieve coherence in crisis management and to implement the CA (*ibid*).

Gianniou and Galariotis (2016) argue that the creation of the EEAS has added further confusion to the existing EU foreign policy system, and instead of increasing its effectiveness, it actually represents a step back (Gianniou and Galariotis 2016:109).

EEAS`s vague chain of command often blocks decision making (Burke cited in Gianniou and Galariotis 2016:108). In addition, the creation of the EEAS became a direct consequence of the reluctance of Member States to empower the Commission as their representative in international affairs, in order to maintain the intergovernmental decision-making process on CFSP matters (Gianniou and Galariotis 2016:113*).* At the same time, the creation of the EEAS led to incoherence between the Member States themselves: some Member States , such as the UK, France and Germany, wanted to maintain their own international leverage, while enhancing the EU`s diplomatic role (*ibid*). Other Member States like the Czech Republic, by contrast, were reluctant to form an independent EU foreign service, which could interfere with their national interests *(ibid).*

The authors conclude that, the Union`s coherence in external relations depends on the Member States ' willingness to delegate more power in the field of external relations to the supranational level (Giannious and Galariotis 2016:116). The convergence of national preferences and interests on the foreign policy agenda is an integral part of this goal (*ibid).*

Thaler (2020) explores the extent to which policy setting and content can impact the EU`s external coherence towards Russia. The author targets the EU`s energy policy towards Russia as an example of a case illustrating the lack of EU external coherence towards Moscow.

Coherence at horizontal level refers to the creation/presence of synergies between external policies and objectives of actors at EU level (Thaler 2020:29). The vertical dimension of coherence includes the creation/presence of synergies between external policies and objectives of actors at EU and member state level (*ibid*).

Tools for assessing coherence, where the policy setting serves as an independent variable, are legal remedies and institutional reforms (Thaler 2020:67). Historical institutionalism approach is applied to explain why institutional reforms do not always lead to the desired outcomes (Thaler 2020:129).

And the tools for enhancing coherence regarding the policy content focus on Wolfers` framework of milieu and possession goals. These tools are related to political initiatives, such as an increase in the debate and voluntary coordination, identity creation, unity in decision making (Thaler 2020:33).

Thaler (2020) concludes that insufficient coordination mechanisms and inappropriate institutional reform due to path dependence and institutional legacies undermine the EU`s external coherence towards Russia (Thaler 2020:129). A lack of external coherence also results from a constant tension between milieu and possession goals. "In cases where the tensions between milieu and possession goals can either be avoided or resolved, the EU`s external policies are likely to be coherent"(Thaler 2020:5).

The scholars in the second group**,** address the intra/inter institutional aspects of coherence in EU external relations, centralizing instutionalist and constructivist approaches in their works. The literature, that is concerned with the specific institutional factors explaining the incoherence in EU external relations, is rooted in the works of Hoebink et al. (2005), Duke (2011), Kapidzic (2011), Juncos (2013) and Stross (2014). These scholars demonstrate how institutional structure

and the nature of relationships between institutional actors, power and policy preferences can shape the coherence of decision-making in the EU.

Hoebink et al. (2005) aim to identify and exemplify EU policies that are incoherent with European Commission`s development policy objectives, and propose ways of addressing this in relation to two countries: Morocco and Senegal.

The authors have developed indicators to assess the potential incoherences of policy formulation amongst the EU`s Fisheries, Common Agricultural, Environmental and Migration Policies. Their study defines policy coherence as "the non occurrence of policies or the results of policies that are contrary to the objectives of a given policy "(Hoebink et al. 2005:3).

The research targets three types of incoherence internal (1)-within development policy itself, internal (2) -within development and foreign policy, external-between development policy and other policies (*ibid*). Internal (1) incoherence is related to incoherence within development policy itself, in particular, to conflicts between general social and economic goals and the goal of poverty reduction, or between implementation schedules and local necessities (Hoebink et al. 2005:79). Internal (2) incoherence refers to conflicts between EU foreign policy concerns (security, human rights) and development policy objectives, or strategic interests of Member States clashing with development objectives (*ibid*). External incoherence refers to contradictions between development policy and other policies of the European Union such as- Trade, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Immigration (*ibid).*

The analysis of treaties, policy documents and guidelines is conducted on the basis of content and discourse analysis, and is combined with a series of interviews with EU staff and NGO representatives, and field visits and interviews in Morocco and Senegal with top officials in ministries, embassy and EU mission staff and local NGOs (Hoebink et al. 2005:10). A content analysis aims to detect and sort the incoherent paragraphs of all the Country Strategy Papers of the targeted countries (*ibid*).

The authors concluded that external incoherence was noticeable in Morocco in the fields of migration, market access and fisheries, while EU policies to foster agricultural development in Senegal were considered coherent with the exception of fisheries and migration policies, which demonstrated a mix of internal and external coherence issues (Hoebink et al.2005:5).

Duke (2011), Juncos (2013) and Stross (2014) examine the theme of coherence in EU external relations from a "historical institutionalism" perspective.

Duke (2011) provides an overview of coherence and consistency in EU external relations in the context of "historical institutionalism" (Duke 2011:15).

According to Duke (2011) consistency and coherence are far from being uni-dimensional concepts and both terms have complex implications for EU institutions, Member States as well as third parties working with the EU (Duke 2011:54). For example, "the absence of contradictions between the EU and CFSP and the CSDP is more a matter of consistency, while the need for positive links between policy areas is more a matter of coherence" (Duke 2011:18).

The author looks at the origins of consistency in EU external relations, from EPC to the present (Duke 2011:16). He explores whether the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and its institutional changes will lead to more consistency, so that the EU becomes more coherent, effective and visible in the international arena (*ibid*). According to Duke (2011) there is a risk that the EEAS will become an object of tensions between the EU institutions, and will have a difficult birth which, with careful observation of Member States , will help determine how seriously they take the creation of a new sui generis (Duke 2011:42). The EEAS is regarded as a programming and decision making body, while the Commission DGs are considered as implementing bodies (Duke 2011:25). Thus, if the EEAS should promote consistency and coherence, the link between programming and implementation must be carefully thought out, since thematic instruments remain within the Commission or under its control *(ibid).*

Juncos (2013) assesses the impact of the institutionalization of CFSP on the coherence and effectiveness of EU foreign policy in Bosnia. Based on "historical institutionalism" the author

demonstrates that institutions are a key variable in explaining the levels of coherence and effectiveness of EU CFSP, and that institutional legacies and unintended consequences have shaped the impact of CFSP over time (Juncos 2013:3).

Coherence is defined as "the lack of contradictions between policies/institutions/instruments, plus a variable degree of synergy as a result of policies/institutions/instruments working together in order to achieve a common objective" (Juncos 2013:46). The concept of effectiveness in the CFSP is related to goal attainment (Vedung 1999 cited in Juncos 2013: 53). Thus, effectiveness is evaluated in terms of the achievement of externally defined goals (Juncos 2013:55).

Juncos (2013:159) concludes that although the institutionalization has increased the capabilities and visibility of the EU (and to some extent its effectiveness), coherence remains an elusive goal. The institutionalization has not addressed deficiencies in coherence, and although levels of coherence showed a steady improvement over time, problems remained in later stages as a result of path dependency, unintended consequences, the fragmentation of the EU`s presence in Bosnia and increasing complexity of its conflict resolution mechanisms (Juncos 2013:165-166). Regarding effectiveness, the introduction of the HR or CFSP/CSDP committees improved the decision making process in the case of Bosnia, facilitating coordination and monitoring of CFSP policies (Juncos 2013:166). The creation of the EUSR and the deployment of new military crisis management instruments have also enhanced the EU`s ability to achieve its objectives and contribute to conflict resolution *(ibid*).

Kapidzic (2011) examines the international role of the EU in regard to the Western Balkans, based on "constructivism" reasoning. The research goal is to find whether the EU expresses a consistent and coherent foreign policy identity towards the Western Balkan states (Kapidzic 2011:7). The observed cases are EU official, publicly available documents of the three major EU institutions: Council of the European Union, European Commission and European Parliament (Kapidzic 2011:11).

Consistency is specified as stability in norm expression within a given time frame, indicating the degree of political commitment to certain foreign policy goals and the persistence of intrinsic values influencing such commitment (Kapidzic 2011:9). Coherence is described as "stable norm expression across EU institutions, which gives an insight into the non fragmentation of EU external policy discourse within the EU, inter-institutional dialogue, and the underlying normative influences affecting separate decision-making bodies of the EU" (*ibid).*

The question of consistent and coherent value expression is empirically tested applying the method of qualitative content analysis to EU foreign political documents concerning the Western Balkan states before and after Lisbon (Kapidzic 2011:7-9).

An ideally consistent and coherent foreign policy discourse and role conception are expected to show minimal change in expressing objectives, interests and values over a certain period of time, and a unanimous degree of expression across institutional lines (Kapidzic 2011:9).

Kapidzic (2011:14) concludes that a strong emphasis on consistency and coherence, as indicated in the central EU documents and statements, was not found. The EU lacks the ability to coherently promote European values, because it internally focuses on and emphasizes different aspirations (*ibid).*

Stross (2014) investigates how and to what extent the EU promotes the aim for PCD in the policy formulation of different governance areas. By constructing an analytical framework based on the "historical institutionalism" reasoning, Stross (2014:3) assesses the process of PCD in three areas of governance: Fisheries, Environment and Security. Thus, the process of PCD of an EU policy initiative is considered as the dependent variable on which institutional factors have a direct and indirect influence (Stross 2014:11). Governance regimes, including key actors, institutional procedures and policy instruments within a given EU policy field, are considered as the independent variable (*ibid).*

Development actors are seen as an intervening variable "which can enter the process and influence policy initiatives to incorporate PCD aspects" *(ibid).* In this way, the study aims to

show what role the institutional procedures play in the improvement of coherence and coordination efforts in the EU's day-to-day policy making (Stross 2014:3). Through the process-tracing of the policy formulation of six selected policy initiatives the author assesses the manifestations of the three main variables (*ibid).*

Stross (2014) concludes that the variation in PCD performance is notably higher between the individual EU institutions and their coherence procedures, than between the different policy areas (Stross 2014:205). For this reason, any proposal on enhancing PCD in the EU context should start at the level of the EU institutions (*ibid).* In this context, enhanced inter-departmental coordination within each institution will increase the EU's effectiveness in promoting PCD (Stross 2014:209).

The second set of academic literature: The EU crisis management in the Eastern Neighborhood emphasizes the relevance of "coherence" as a conceptual tool to assess the EU actorness as a crisis manager in its Eastern periphery. Scholars such as Lynch (2003), Tocci (2006), Popescu (2009), Whitman and Wolff (2010), analyze the impact of coherence on the EU`s ability to exploit conditionality with the South Caucasus states, as well as on the effectiveness and credibility of the EU`s actions as a crisis manager in the region, respectively.

Popescu (2009) applies "historical institutionalism" and "liberal intergovernmentalism" theoretical lenses to explain the level of EU engagement in the frozen conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood. The author promotes the idea that EU foreign policy decisions are mainly taken at the intergovernmental level, and EU institutions do not play an independent role in this process and are penalized by EU Member States when they overstep the lowest common denominator (Popescu 2009:24).

Popescu (2009) explains the ineffectiveness of EU engagement in the conflicts in the Eastern Neighborhood as a result of diverging positions of Member States in relation to their foreign policies towards Russia. For instance, the EU's Southern Member States , or so-called Russia-friendly states, such as Italy, France, Greece and Cyprus, have often been reluctant to see a

greater EU role in the conflicts in the Eastern neighbourhood, as they have strong economic and security ties with Russia and do not want to upset Russia (Popescu 2009:58-59). In contrast, new EU member states, such as the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania, have always encouraged EU greater engagement in the region, as these states do not have close ties with Russia. They have land and sea borders with the eastern neighbourhood and have the highest level of interdependence with that region (*ibid).*

Lynch (2003:195) argues that the EU`s ability to "exploit" conditionality with the three countries in the South Caucasus depends on well-coordinated, coherent activities between EU Member States . A number of EU Member States have developed precise and even special positions towards the region. The Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General for Georgia included the following EU countries: the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Lynch 2003:179). The German diplomat, Dieter Boden, held the post of Special Representative of the Secretary General between 1992 and 2002 (Lynch 2003:179). Sir Brian Falla was appointed as a Special Envoy to Georgia by the British Government in 2002. In addition, France co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, along with Russia and the US *(ibid).* However, coordination between EU Member States , as well as between the Member States and Brussels was limited(*ibid).*

Whitman and Wolff (2010) argue that the most serious obstacle towards a more effective EU conflict management is the lack of coherent and comprehensive conflict management strategy that all EU institutions and Member States adhere to. According to the authors, the fact that the Union too often merely reacts to developments in its neighbourhood, instead of defining a clear strategic vision for proactive and effective conflict management, is partly the reason and partly the sign of this shortcoming (Whitman and Wolf 2010:18).

Analyzing the EU engagement in the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts, Whitman and Wolff (2010) stress the complex relationship between Member States and EU institutions that prevents the EU from making effective decisions. In cases when national interests and domestic sensitivities intersect, it becomes difficult to reach common

positions within the Council (Whitman and Wolf 2010:16). In addition, there is also a difficult relationship between individual EU Member States with pro and anti-Russian sentiments, which further complicates effective policy planning and implementation when it comes to conflict management *(ibid).*

In her book *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, Tocci (2006) emphasizes the point that unlike the US, the EU has not shown the desire to actively restrain the influence of regional players such as Russia (Tocci 2006:128). Unlike other EU Member States , Germany, Italy and the UK have emphasized the need not to oppose Russia in its backyard (*ibid*). This has generated a vague approach towards the settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts. The EU has called for maximum autonomy in Abkhazia, permitting Abkhazians "to express their identity within Georgia" (Council 1999 cited in Tocci 2006:129). In addition, the proposal drafted by Dieter Boden on behalf of the Friends of the UNSG on Georgia (Germany, France, UK, US, Russia) includes too general ideas about the distribution of competences between Georgia and Abkhazia (Council 2001 cited in Tocci 2006:129). The EU position has been even more vague regarding South Ossetia. It has expressed support for South Ossetian autonomy within Georgia, for the demilitarization of the conflict zone, and for unspecified confidence-building measures(OSCE cited in Tocci 2006:129).

In contrast, Kereselidze (2015), who also considers the diverging preferences of the old and new Member States following their historical experience with Russia, observes the link between coherence and functionality of the EU foreign policy in Georgia between 1992 and 2013. The author argues that EU foreign policy should be studied with a focus on functionality rather than effectiveness, based on the assumption that "consensus on foreign affairs between Member States matters more than the outcomes"(Bickerton 2011 cited in Kereselidze 2015:19). Applying a "liberal intergovernmentalism" theoretical approach the author suggests that "the EU foreign policy regarding transport area has been coherent in terms of its functionality, whereas the EU's conflict resolution policy lacks this feature, it cannot be regarded

coherent"*(ibid).*, Kereselidze assesses coherence by "examining the results of the EU's conflict resolution commitments against its outputs"(Kereselidze 2015:18).

The author concludes that the EU was not able to pursue a coherent conflict resolution policy due to disagreements on engagement within the EU Member States (Kereselidze 2015:159).

2.1.1. Identifying the Gap

This section reviewed current major scholarship on EU Policy Coherence and EU Crisis Management in the Eastern Neighborhood.

It is worth mentioning that part of the literature on EU policy coherence goes deeper into the issue of incoherence between the Development and Security(CFSP) policy areas, disregarding the cases with incoherent decision-making processes within each policy area, while the rest of the literature focuses only on the CFSP policy area.

This project acknowledges the challenge of coherence between Development and Security policy areas; nevertheless, it focuses on identifying the causes of incoherencies within the two policy areas of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid.

This is necessary for two main reasons: first, EU crisis management is characterized as having a complex institutional framework consisting of too many actors involved in crisis management efforts in the Security (CFSP) and Development Aid policy areas, the actions of which are interdependent in each policy area. Thus, "the success of each individual activity is linked to the success of the total collective and cumulative effect of the overall undertaking" (Smuts cited in De Coning 2008:85-87). This makes a separate assessment of the coherence of EU crisis decision-making process within each policy area a relevant task.

Second, the Security (CFSP) and Development Aid policy areas are both outlined as significant areas in which the EU should promote coherent decision-making processes, in the EUSS (Council 2003a) and in the joint Communication by the Commission and the HR/VP on the EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Crises (European Commission 2013b).

Methodologically, in the literature on EU policy coherence, "coherence" has been operationalized either at an ordinal level (Koulaimah and Gabriel (1999), De Coning and Friss (2011), Juncos (2013), Koenig (2016)) or via a qualitative content analysis (Kapidzic (2011), Hoebink (2015), Thaler (2020).

The current research aims to contribute to the literature on EU policy coherence by assessing coherence as a binary and nominal variable, which means that the crisis decision making process is either coherent or incoherent (see section 3.3). The assessment of coherence is consistent with its operational definition provided in section 1.1, which defines coherence as the degree to which EU institutions operate a well-coordinated process of deliberation and decision making (Christiansen 2001:747).

Meanwhile, the literature on EU crisis management in the eastern neighbourhood has reviewed "coherence" as an independent variable in assessing the effectiveness, legitimacy and credibility of EU actorness in the region. However, in order to address the incoherence in EU crisis management it is essential to find out what actually causes incoherence. Therefore, the present research intends to assess coherence as a *dependent* variable and further identify its main sources, which will contribute to the specific strand of literature on EU crisis management in the eastern neighbourhood.

Finally, this study follows the central "new institutionalism" argument that 'institutions do matter in EU crisis management, and assesses coherence at inter-institutional level, which is another dimension of coherence. With the growing density of the institutional structure of EU crisis management, the issue of inter-institutional coherence becomes increasingly relevant (see section 1.1).

Based on the "rational choice institutionalism" argument, that institutions do influence the crisis decision-making process due to their increased institutional autonomy, this research applies the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical approach to assess the coherence of EU crisis decision making process at inter-institutional level (see section 2.4). The application of "bureaucratic

politics" theory to the specific area of EU crisis management in the Eastern Neighborhood will enhance understanding on how the bureaucracies can influence the coherence of the EU crisis decision-making process.

In the context of "bureaucratic politics" the study aims to analyze the interaction between multiple bureaucracies as a means of addressing coordination problems resulting from the functional overlap of inter-institutional mandates, which could negatively affect the coherence of the decision making process (see section 2.5).

2.2. Institutions do Matter in EU Crisis Management

As the thesis is nested in an overall interest in EU institutions, based on the assumption, that the EU inter-institutional framework can shape the nature of EU crisis decision making process, the analysis relies on a variety of theoretical approaches in the prism of "new institutionalism" which could be relevant to assess the role of institutions in EU crisis management.

The role and functions of institutions in EU crisis management are discussed from three main perspectives of "new institutionalism": "rational choice institutionalism", "sociological institutionalism" and "historical institutionalism".

The "new institutionalism" research agenda is concerned not just with the question of whether institutions matter, but also how and under which conditions they do so (Hall and Taylor 1996:936). In this context, institutions are not only defined as formal organizations as the "old institutionalism" would classify them, but they are extended to illustrate the informal patterns of structured interactions between individuals in the sense that they constrain or shape individual behavior (Bache et al. 2011:22).

All the above cited three lenses of the "new institutionalism" agree that "institutions matter", however, their conceptualization of institutional influence varies.

"Sociological institutionalism" defines institutions as a collection of interrelated norms, rules and understandings that determine appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations (March and Olsen1989:21-26). Thus, an individual selects a number of different roles and plays those appropriate for the institution that are most relevant at the moment (Peters 2012:26). For sociological institutionalists, on the other hand, institutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to individual behavior (Scott 1995:33).

From the perspective of "sociological institutionalism", the behavior of individual actors is determined and shaped by their involvement within institutions (Juncos 2013:86). In an EU context, sociological institutionalists argue, that a decision making process is governed by a problem solving and compromise seeking behavior of institutions, rather than by a hard bargaining logic ruled by national preferences of Member States (Delreux 2015:154-162). They emphasize the importance of informal norms, such as mutual trust and consensus building, which facilitate the understanding by Member States and institutions of each other's positions and concerns. This means that Member States don't deploy their formal veto power, but follow the informal norms "to keep everyone on board" and accommodate the diverging interests (*ibid*). Institutions in "sociological institutionalism" are understood as socialization platforms promoting the Union's standards of appropriateness, which constrain the rational calculus behavior of supranational actors. In this context, informal norms could positively influence the coherence in of crisis management, if there is an intense interaction and cooperation between the different institutional actors in charge of crisis decision making (*ibid*). However, as the research focuses on the notion of inter-institutional overlap of mandates and tensions, "sociological institutionalism" is not a suitable approach to further illustrate why and how the institutions matter in EU crisis management.

The basic idea of "historical institutionalism" is the notion of path dependency, which means that policy choices made in the past, will have a long lasting influence on future policy (Krasner

1984:223-243). Scholars in this field describe it as a path dependent process, in which the Member States are constrained by previous decisions and institutional choices (Petrov 2011:50). Historical institutionalists focus on the evolution of EU crisis management. In this context the "range of options available to policymakers at any given point in time is a function of institutional capabilities that were put in place at some earlier period" (*ibid*).

In the prism of "historical institutionalism" institutions are defined as formal or informal rules embedded in an organization (Hall 1986:74). As formal rules, the institutions are considered as compliance procedures and standard operating procedures that structure the relationships between individuals within an institution. Institutions, therefore, allow individuals to calculate rationally and persist, because they are useful to individual actors (*ibid*).

As informal rules, the institutions can act as socialization platforms promoting the Union's standards of appropriateness, which constrains rational behavior. In other words, institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action"(Hall and Taylor 1996:939).

"Historical institutionalism" helps to explain the direction and pace of institutionalization, but is less suited for the analysis of the day to day crisis decision making procedures. In addition, the theory includes both normative and rational dimensions, which means that crisis decision making in this context should be viewed as a process of inter-institutional cooperation and competition. However, this is not in line with the main research argument of the thesis, which focuses on daily crisis decision making processes and inter-institutional overlap of mandates and emerging tensions during these decision making processes.

Unlike the "sociological and historical institutionalism" lenses, the fundamental argument of "rational choice institutionalism" is that utility maximization is the primary motivation of individuals acting out of their self-interests as central actors in the political system (Buchanan and Tullock:1962:9-23). Utility maximization means that an individual knows his/her preferences and can rank or order them, and, when faced with a set of options to achieve these

preferences, he/she will choose those that are expected to maximize individual benefits and minimize individual costs *(ibid).*

Individuals bring their preferences-notably utility maximization- with them to join an institution (Peters 2012:26). The theory points out that, unlike the aforementioned two theoretical approaches, the individual utility maximization produces dysfunctional behavior among individuals, such as free riding and shirking (Bache et al.2011:23). However, their behavior is constrained by formal institutional rules, which establish the conditions of rationality, and therefore, establish a political space in which the institutional actors can function *(ibid).* Thus, "rational choice institutionalism" defines institutions as the rules used by individuals for determining what actions can be taken and in what sequence, and how individual actions can be combined into collective decisions (Kiser and Ostrom 1982:179).

From the "rational choice institutionalism" perspective, cooperation between Member States and institutions is structured according to formal rules (Cini and Solorzano 2010:110). In other words, institutions act as intervening variables in interstate bargaining. Acting as intervening variables means that institutions do not alter the preferences of Member States , "but can reflect the ways in which Member States pursue their preferences"*(ibid).* Institutions can impact the interstate bargaining in many ways. First, it is worth pointing out, that the institutionalization of EU crisis management has altered the competences of institutions and has created opportunities for them to possess certain levels of autonomy (Dimitrakopoulos 2001:110-111). This means that institutions will not always act in a manner consistent with the initial wishes of Member States , and in the light of the inability of the Member States to foresee all contingencies, they may become the actors of their own (*ibid*). In this context institutions are not just seen as information-rich environments where Member States tend to negotiate, but like Member States , they also have preferences of their own, which they tend to promote via pursuing a "power maximizing" strategy (Puchala 1999:318). Power is linked to the expansion of the mandate of an institutional agent delegated by EU Member States for fulfilling certain functions *(ibid*). For

example, once the EU appoints the EUSRs for certain conflict zones, one expects that these institutional agents will seek to expand the number of their staff under their command to facilitate a higher level of their involvement and the launch of EU-led operations on the ground (Popescu 2009:12). Since 2003 the EUSRs in the South Caucasus have promoted the EU involvement in the mediation and dialogue and acquired more personnel working for them in Brussels and in the South Caucasus (*ibid*).

Second, the EU institutional agents benefit from the created information asymmetries to increase their autonomy and influence in crisis decision-making process (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017:239). Information asymmetry is defined as an excess of knowledge about the delegated task and related preferences that is available to the institutional agent*(ibid).*

For instance, an institutional agent can possess private information about the status of the peace negotiations on the ground or take a privileged institutional position which it can use to play a leading role in the peace process *(ibid*). In this way an institutional agent might take the opportunity presented by this situation and might not want to share available information with the Member States , in order to manipulate the situation*(ibid).*

"Rational choice institutionalism" illustrates why and how institutions matter in EU crisis management, emphasizing how institutions influence crisis decision-making process through institutional autonomy, power maximization and information asymmetry (Puchala 1999, Dimitrakopoulos 2001, Delreux and Adriaensen 2017).

Since the thesis focuses on the notion of competition between institutional agents, who seek to expand their mandates in their assigned areas of responsibilities, the insights of rational choice institutionalism serve as the basis for exploring the main theoretical approaches to foreign policy decision-making, which could help explain the impact of inter-institutional overlap of mandates on coherence.

2.3. Theoretical Considerations

As the focus of the research is the EU crisis decision-making process at the planning and implementation levels, and as coherence is defined as a coordinated process of crisis decision-making, further study of existing "decision-making" theories becomes relevant.

This section discusses the main theoretical approaches to foreign policy decision making and chooses the most feasible approach to explain the causal connection between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence.

Foreign policy comprises of a series of decisions made by a group of people who can be labelled as decision makers (Hermann M. and Hermann F. 1989:363). It explains the behavior of an individual or a group of individuals who are mandated to make and enforce decisions (*ibid*). This section discusses the rational actor model, the bounded rationality theory, the poliheuristic theory, the organizational process model and the bureaucratic politics model. The first three of these theories (the rational actor model, bounded rationality theory and poliheuristic theory) might be called problem-solving theories, since they focus on the intellectual process of solving a problem under the assumption, that the decision-maker is a unitary actor (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:345). The last two theories, the organizational process and bureaucratic politics models, instead, look at the ongoing political processes inside the decision-making unit. All these theories are treated as theories of "decision-making".

The Rational Actor Model

The "rational actor" theoretical model reviews decision-making as a process of maximizing the expected utility (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:345-346). Today it is widely used in foreign policy analysis and has its roots in microeconomics. Utility maximization means that an individual will choose the alternative that provides the greatest quantity of net benefits. The theory assumes that an individual knows his/her preferences and goals, can rank order them, and, when faced with a set of options to achieve these preferences, he/she chooses those expected to maximize

individual benefits and minimize costs. "The preferred mix of benefits and costs is referred to as individual's utility function" (*ibid).* In the context of foreign policy decision making, the rational actor model assumes that foreign policy decisions are rational responses to a particular situation formulated by a single actor: state, which is considered as a rational unified actor in the strategic pursuit of its own national interests (*ibid*). Thus, foreign policy is the outcome of deliberate choices made by states through their governments. And the behavior of states is the outcome of a rational decision making process or logic of consequences. The latter is described in three steps. 1) The options for a given situation are presented 2) The consequences of each option are projected 3) A choice is made which maximizes the value held by the decision maker, which is the state (Krasner 1972:161).

The rational actor model could be useful for understanding how individual Member States promote their national interests in the PSC and how their positions are absorbed during the EU policy making process. Thus, here Member States , not the institutions, are the target of the study. This model could be suitable, for example, for studying the policies of individual Member States towards the South Caucasus, but it is not well suited for the analysis of the EU crisis decision-making process at inter-institutional level. It reviews the foreign policy decision making process as an outcome of a single state's actions and not as an outcome of multiple actors' (institutions') choices, as the current research does.

Bounded Rationality

Decision making is a process of finding the best alternative, and the best alternative is the one, that promises to achieve the most of various desired goods (Simon 1985:294). However, sometimes it is hard to find the best alternative, but it is possible to consider those alternatives, which appear most obvious, reasonable and promising (*ibid).* This type of behavior is known as "bounded rationality", which sees decision-making as a "cognitive" search for a strategy using "constraints and levels of acceptability to eliminate other alternatives, which might be too risky

or too costly" (*ibid*). "One cannot consider the possible consequences, but one can eliminate the alternative or modify it to reduce the likelihood of these consequences" *(ibid).*

The term "bounded rationality" theory was coined by Simon (1985), with the aim to distinguish the rational and cognitive decision making processes. The cognitive approach to decision making assumes, that decision makers have limited information processing capabilities: instead of objectively searching for the best or optimal outcome, they select an alternative that is acceptable (*ibid*).

The bounded rationality assumes that decisions are made only by individuals and not by collectives. It presumes that collective decisions are aggregations of individual choices, and not the property of the group. Bounded rationality is a procedural behavior of a human being that is "adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker(Simon 1957:198-199).

The "bounded rationality" theory could be more suitable for analyzing the decisions of individual Member States or single institutional actors at the strategic level of the EU crisis decision-making process. The theory does not review the foreign policy outcome as a collective decision-making process, thus, it does not focus on the interactions between multiple institutional actors, but rather assumes that foreign policy output is the result of a unitary decision-maker. Therefore, it cannot help to assess the inter-institutional coherence of EU crisis management.

The Poliheuristic Model of Decision Making

The poliheuristic approach to decision making is a model combining both the rational and cognitive schools (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:346-348). The theory postulates that when making decisions, policy makers apply a two stage decision calculus.

The first phase involves a satisficing and non-holistic search, similar to the decision-making process of the "bounded rationality" theory (Payne et al. 1988:534). The decision-maker rejects

those policies which are unacceptable from a critical dimension or dimensions. In the next step, the rational approach is used to select the best option from the remaining alternatives, as in the case of the "rational actor" approach. The decision-maker selects an alternative from the subset of the remaining alternatives, maximizing benefits and minimizing risks. Thus a decision-making process has two components: cognitive heuristics, which is relevant in the first stage of the decision-making process, and rational- utility maximizing, which is applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process (*ibid*).

The poliheurestic theory is applicable to individual decisions made under strategic conditions by political leaders who are concerned about their survival and political power (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:78). A key feature of this theory is that political leaders use more than one strategy when making decisions, including strategies that are suboptimal. It means that political leaders will avoid policies, that can lead to electoral defeat and will analyze the remaining options *(ibid).*

The poliheurestic theoretical approach is useful for the analysis of foreign policy formulation stage by an individual actor, as the main decision maker. Thus, one cannot consider the politheuristic decision making model as a feasible theoretical approach to study the inter-institutional decision making processes in the planning and implementation phases of EU crisis management.

The Organisational Process Model

The "organizational process" model reviews foreign policy decision making as the product of intra-organizational output, namely the behavior of organizations with clear responsibilities and preferences following standard operating procedures, partially coordinated by government leaders, that can "substantially disturb, but rarely precisely control the specific behavior of organizations" (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:79-96). Each organization addresses problems, processes information and performs a series of actions with considerable autonomy. Furthermore,

organizations and their standard operating procedures do not change significantly: they adapt slowly and gradually over time (Jones 2010:161).

Therefore, foreign policy is not a product of a purposeful process, but is shaped by the routines to which policy makers are assigned, and by the options presented, thus limiting the political leaders' influence on the policy making process *(ibid*).

Problems are divided into sub-problems and are solved in various parts of the organization on the basis of "satisfactory outcomes", and thus not by striving for an optimal or a utility maximizing outcome (Allison and Zelikow 1999:146). This means that the "actions of organizations are chosen by recognizing a situation as being of a familiar and frequently encountered type and matching the recognized situation to a set of rules"*(*March and Simon 1993:8). To perform and to make regular judgments, organizations adopt rules or routines. Where satisficing is the rule or a routine, they stop with the first alternative that is good enough*(ibid).*

Organizations generate alternatives by relatively stable, sequential search process. As a result, "the menu of choice is strictly limited and success is more likely to be defined simply as compliance with relevant rules or routines"(Jones 2010:161).

The "organizational process" model explains extensively how an organization behaves and makes decisions and how these decisions are implemented. However, this model can help to understand the intra- institutional dimension of EU crisis decision making process, which is not covered by the current study.

The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm

The "bureaucratic politics" theoretical model disputes the traditional view of decision making strategy in foreign policy, which considers the state as the central monolithic and unitary rational actor in international affairs (Allison 1969:708). The model sees foreign policy outcome as the result of political battles over the acquisition of power within the executive branch of the

government (*ibid*). As such, foreign policy is neither the outcome of deliberate choices made by states through their governments, nor the outcome of organizational routines, but rather an outcome of the interaction of multiple bureaucratic organizations and individual political leaders who compete to influence both governmental decisions and the actions of their government (Alison and Halperin 1974 cited in Juncos 2013:42). These players pursue their personal or organizational interests while seeking to maximize power and autonomy and avoiding time-consuming and resource-intensive coordination (Allison and Halperin 1972:75).

Allison's (1969) model of "bureaucratic politics" is constructed from four basic propositions:

I. The executive branch consists of numerous interdependent organizations and individuals having divergent agendas.

II. The final decision is a "political resultant": the government`s decision is the outcome of competition for authority or compromise-the product of a political process.

III. There is a difference between policy making, planning and implementation:once an action is decided upon, the task of implementing that decision is handed over to other actors, who must also make decisions about their specific actions. It means that decisions are shaped by the operating procedures and interests of the implementing actors.

The bureaucratic politics model has been mostly applied by American scholars Neustadt (1960), Alison (1969), Halperin (1972), Gallucci (1975), Coulam (1975), Romer and Rosenthal (1979), who studied the US foreign policy in the Cold War period. These scholars see multiple actors, overlapping mandates, poor coordination and conflict as leading characteristics of the US political system. The most significant of these works is done by Alison and Zelikow (1999) who identified rivalries between the multiple bureaucracies in the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA. Compared to other aforementioned decision-making theories, the application of the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm can help to understand the impact of EU inter-institutional machinery on the coherence of its crisis decision making process in a number ways.

Although the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm has been specifically applied in the US context, given the EU`s complex and multi-layered governance structure, the "bureaucratic politics" can also be applied to analyze the internal dynamics of decision making processes within the EU, which consists of multiple bureaucratic structures, seeking to maximize their power and autonomy.

Second, the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm does not focus only on individual players, but, suggests that large bureaucratic organizations can also be considered as unitary actors or players in foreign policy decision-making processes (Alison and Halperin 1972:47).

The EU is the most developed example of a multi-level governance system (Kohler-Koch and Jachtenfuchs 1996, Jachtenfuchs 2001). The Member States are no longer the only actors at the center of policy-making (Vanhoonacker et al. 2013). Policy is formulated and implemented through an interaction between different levels of public authorities (*ibid*). In this context, the EU institutional agents or supranational institutions can be considered as legitimate actors in the EU multi-layered governance system, whose primary function is to plan and implement its policies.

Thus, reviewing EU supranational institutions as multiple bureaucratic organizations with formal and informal rules, provides a common analytical basis for applying the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm to analyze how decisions are made among these supranational bureaucracies in the context of EU crisis management.

Compared to other decision making theories, the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm focuses on political games, such as internal political imperatives of preserving and increasing influence and power, "rather than on the purely intellectual problem of choosing a strategy to deal with an external opportunity or threat" (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:70). "Unlike organizational routines, these games may operate during the moment of policy making process itself, as well as during its implementation phase" (Welch 1992:118). In addition, the model is also feasible for analyzing mid-level and low-salience policy decisions, mostly routine or technical policy areas

dominated by bureaucracies, rather than by high-level officials (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:71). This makes it relevant to analyze the interactions between the EU institutional agents which represent the administrative and executive structures of EU crisis management. The "bureaucratic politics" also emphasizes the issue of competition for mandate and autonomy(see section 2.5). This is in line with the central research question of the thesis, which aims to explain the causal connection between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence.

Finally, the last point of the theory, which assumes that there is a difference between policy planning and implementation (Alison 1969), supports our assertion, that coherent policy planning can be seen as necessary for coherent policy implementation, but not as a prerequisite for coherent implementation of policies, since the implementation phase of crisis management involves different actors and decision making processes(see section 4.1).

However, in order to have a clear idea of how the "bureaucratic politics" model can explain the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence, it is necessary to understand the fundamental assumptions of the model and how these assumptions can be utilized to construct an analytical framework to theorize coherence. The "bureaucratic politics" model and its application to EU crisis decision making process is further explained in the following sections.

2.4. Bureaucratic Politics

As seen in the previous section the "bureaucratic politics" is the most feasible decision making approach to address the incoherence of EU crisis decision making process at the inter-institutional level. However, in order to understand how the "bureaucratic politics" model can explain the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence, there is a need to construct an analytical framework applying the main insights of the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm, which will serve as the basis for empirical analysis.

This section consists of four sub-chapters. The first subsection starts by defining the term "bureaucracy", followed by the explanations of the general role of bureaucracies in policy making and implementation processes presenting the three main generations of the scholarship. The second sub-section begins with a brief outline of the intellectual roots of "bureaucratic politics" and its core propositions. This is named as the first generation literature on bureaucratic politics. The third subsection moves to a discussion of the second generation literature on "bureaucratic politics", including Alison's main work (1969) and other scholars` efforts to build upon that literature. Finally, the fourth subsection provides the most recent contributions to the "bureaucratic politics" reasoning discussing the third generation literature. This portion of the section highlights a number of forms and intensity levels that "bureaucratic politics" can take. It then proceeds to highlight the main limitation(s) of the model.

2.4.1. The Relevance of Bureaucracies in Policy Processes

The term "bureaucracy" originates from a cloth covering the desk of French officials in the eighteenth century called a "bureau" (Poocharoen 2012:331). In earlier works on public administration the scholars used the word "bureau" synonymously with bureaucracy (Downs 1967:26). The latter can be referred in two ways. First, it refers to the bureaucracy as a form of organization or a specific institution, where there are structures, rules and resources. In this context, bureaucracy also means a specific method of allocating resources in a large organization. Second, the word "bureaucracy" refers to the administrative machinery which is part of the government. Here its main function is to execute the will of the state (*ibid*).

The Weberian classical type of bureaucracy comprises of six characteristics-hierarchy, written documentation, office management, full working capacity, formal rules and impersonality (Weber 1970:46). Weber (1970) considered the bureaucratic organization as "the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control and superior to any other form of societal organization"(*ibid*).

In contrast to Weber`s definition of bureaucracy, "the contemporary post-Weberian bureaucracies imply absence of charismatic leadership", as policies might emerge from decision making processes involving also the network of officials at a horizontal level, as well as from the bottom up (Barnett et al.1999:707).

Wilson (1991:13), Kanninen and Piiparinen (2014:48-49) refer to bureaucracies consisting of "multiple channels, complex power relationships and ill-defined roles" where decision making is highly diffused. In this way "the power of bureaucracies generally is that they present themselves as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral – not, as exercising power, but, instead as serving others"(Barnett and Finnemore 1999:708).

In this thesis, bureaucracy is viewed as an organizational form within an EU multilevel governance system in which policies are formulated and implemented through an interaction between multiple institutional agents at different decision making levels whose primary function is to formulate and implement its policies (Tasie 1997:54).

Thus, the thesis reviews the EU institutional agents or administrations as bureaucratic organizations demonstrating the six characteristics of Weber's (1970) classical type of bureaucracy (hierarchy, written documentation, office management, full working capacity, formal rules and impersonality) and, at the same time, operating in a highly complex and networked institutional arena governed by both formal and informal rules.

However, apart from executing the policies of decision makers, bureaucracies are considered as one of the key actors involved in the policy making process through dialogue, conflict and compromise (Tasie 1997:54).

Understanding the dominant role of bureaucracies in the policy making process is not new and has been recognized for many years by public administration scholars such as Beck (1932), Burnham (1941), Peters (1995) and Tasie (1997). There is a common consensus among these scholars that bureaucracy and administration are significant features of modern policy making and that they do influence the policy outcomes of the political system(*ibid.*

Bureaucracies are very influential. This influence makes bureaucracies, not only just policy executors, but also policy makers and indirectly the "policy" itself (Tasie 1997:54). They draft memoranda, plan policy agenda, negotiate funds and technical assistance and set government priorities. This functional significance strengthens the political importance of bureaucracies *(ibid).*

There are several reasons why bureaucrats can influence the policy processes at different stages. At the policy formulation stage bureaucracies often have expertise and long term institutional knowledge of certain public issues and "are often involved at the very early stage of agenda setting" (Poocharoen 2012:335). Sometimes it is the bureaucracy that initiates policy. A good example of this is the bureaucracy's involvement in decision-making processes on the national budget and the tendency to maximize its interests through the budget process (*ibid*).

At the policy implementation stage, bureaucracies usually have access to more data sources and information regarding specific policies. Thus, as policy executors, the bureaucracies have many opportunities to collect data that would be useful for further policy evaluation *(ibid).*

As emphasized by Weber (1970) "bureaucracies are not merely transmission belts implementing the decisions taken by political leaders, but actors possessing a certain degree of autonomy, vested power and preferences". Neustadt (1960:27), Alison (1971:162) and Halperin (1974:87) have expanded the above awareness, arguing that "loosely linked bureaucracies struggle over the conduct of foreign policy trying to advance their own parochial priorities and perceptions".

Studying the bureaucratic apparatus of EU crisis management is primarily associated with the important role of bureaucracies as key actors shaping the nature of crisis decision making process. Once created, bureaucracies tend to pursue certain institutional interests and become "political actors in their own right" with a tendency to increase their power and autonomy (Moe 1990:143). This may even go so far that EU bureaucracies can set the agenda and impose their own preferences. In this context, analyzing the role of bureaucracies in shaping the nature of EU crisis decision making process becomes a relevant task.

2.4.2. The Evolution of Bureaucratic Politics

Contrary to the realist model of states as rational unitary actors, the "bureaucratic politics" perspective depicts a country's foreign policy formulation and execution, as a pluralistic arena, where policy is the result of political interaction between multiple stakeholders in the government (Hart and Rosenthal 1998:233-234).

In fact the concept of executive bureaucrats being heavily involved in the politics of policy making contradicts the administrative doctrines that portray bureaucrats as neutral administrators executing, *sine ira et studio, "*the laws and decisions made by elected politicians" (*ibid*). By classifying the bureaucrats as "neutral administrators" Weber (1968:28) wanted bureaucrats to be carefully controlled by strong politicians and to have as little involvement in politics. Wilson (1887) provided a similar system, but instead he was concerned not about the bureaucratic power, but about the politicization of bureaucracies: "bureaucrats should simply implement political decisions, but not be involved in the *hurry and strife* of politics", as he called it (Wilson cited in Hart and Rosenthal 1998:233-234). By this he wanted to separate politics from the administration.

However, the Weberian-Wilsonian notion of a bureaucratic monolith disappeared when the field of public administration became dominated by the leaders of the politics-administration dichotomy (Jones 2010:151). The intellectual roots of the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical reasoning can be found in the field of public administration and classical studies examining the role of domestic politics in public policy making (*ibid*).

The scholars of the post World War II era, such as Appleby (194), Norton (1949), Hilsman (1959), Holden (1966), Huntington (1960), Neustadt (1960), Schilling et al. (1962), Seidman (1970:54) and Gawthrop (1971) criticized the idea of separating the politics from the administration. They emphasized the importance of the administrative structure in the

governance of foreign policy and the engagement of bureaucracies in the formulation of foreign policy.

As cited by Kozak (1988:5-10) "It was out of this adverse reaction to the politics–administration dichotomy that the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm was born".

Appleby (1949:45) and Long (1949:257-264) point out the significant role of bureaucrats in policy formulation and execution. The above mentioned viewpoint was also confirmed by public administration theorists such as Hilsman (1959:361), Huntington (1960:285-299), Neustadt (1960:21), Schilling et al. (1962:44-46), Holden (1966:943-951), Seidman (1970:11), Gawthrop (1971:55-58), and Art (1973:456), that are seen as the founders of the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm. They argue that the conflicting goals and interests of office holders in the government impact the decision-making processes in which bargaining, debate, conflict, persuasion, coercion and pressure play a significant role (Hart and Wille 2012:370).

The **first generation** of scholars focused mainly on the importance of individual decision makers in the policy making process examining the US foreign and domestic policies. The most famous studies of the early "bureaucratic politics" theory are Huntington's (1961) "The Common Defense" work, Schilling's et al. (1962) essay on the "Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets", and, most famously, Neustadt's (1960) "Presidential Power". In these works bureaucracies are not described as neutral agents merely implementing the policy, but as active participants in determining the will of the state (Hart and Wille 2012:370).

Huntington (1961:54) and Neustadt (1960:25) define foreign policy as the result of political bargaining among several independent individual players. In their view, each government is a complex arena of internal negotiations, consisting of bureaucratic elements and political figures that represent its working apparatus. Its action is the outcome of these negotiations.

Schiling(1962:44-46) et al., and Hilsman(1959:364-366) describe foreign policy decision-making as the process of both conflict and consensus building, and consider the outcome of this

process as the result of compromise, coalition and competition among multiple government officials.

In the works of the aforementioned scholars, the main idea of policy making was politics rather than a poor utility maximization strategy, which was later named as the "political process model". Politics is defined as "bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government" (Hilsman 1959:362). Schilling et al.(1962:44-46) argue that human decision making is the basis of foreign policy decision making process. As cited by the authors, each state defines its foreign policy " by the way in which a situation is defined subjectively by those acting in the name of the state or charged with the responsibility for making choices"(Schilling at al. 1962:212).

Art(1973) summarizes the main assumptions of the political process approach emphasizing the following main points (Art cited in Jones 2017).

I. Political power is distributed among institutions at the national government level.
II. Within these institutions individual participants sit with differing views on what they would like to do on any given issue.
III. Political leadership within or across institutions is exercised primarily through persuasion, which depends on the skill of an individual used by his/her limited power that his or her position provides.
IV. "Foreign policy making is a political process of building consensus and support for a policy among those participants who have the power to influence its outcome and often disagree over what they think that outcome should be. Consensus is achieved through standard negotiation, bargaining and compromise" (*ibid*).

As noted by Lindblom (1959:79) the policy-making process is a fragmented process that produces bargaining between individual actors with very different perspectives. The outcomes of this bargaining process are rooted in the nature of compromises. In addition, Hilsman(1959:364-366) proposes a "conflict consensus" model of decision making which offers three conditions:

I. The reconciliation of diverse goals of alternative means and policies

II. The recognition of competing groups identified with particular goals and policies

III. The assessment of the relative power of participating groups.

The political process model places a greater emphasis on the foreign policy-making process than on implementation. In addition, the model stresses the role of domestic politics, including the actors outside the executive branch, such as Congress, interest groups, the media and the public (Jones 2017).

However, despite the significant interest in the political process model of decision making in the late fifties and sixties, public administration scholars have failed to convert the political process model into a decision-making model(Jones 2010:120). The model shows that the policy preferences of decision-makers are influenced by their viewpoints than by their governmental roles (*ibid*). In addition, it views foreign policy outcomes as "*intended* political resultants, attached to the preferences, strategies and expectations of the decision makers" (Art cited in Jones 2017).

The bargaining notion of governmental policy was merged into a decision making model by the **second generation** scholars of bureaucratic politics, which was represented by Alison (1971) and Halperin (1974). These scholars attempted to further develop the political process model and offer alternative approaches for analyzing the foreign policy decision making. The new claim is that bureaucracy makes policy through the exercise of discretion and the exercise of these responsibilities gives the administration a political quality. In this context Allison`s (1971) famous " bureaucratic politics" model represents the best example of that approach (Hart and Wille 2012:370).

2.4.3. The Bureaucratic Politics Model

The bureaucratic politics model was introduced by Alison (1971), in his Essence of Decision, further updated by Alison and Halperin in 1972. They examine the Cuban missile crisis and try to find out how the policies are made within the executive branch and who determines or influences it?

The bureaucratic politics model views the actions of governments as political resultants, which emerge from a competitive game where multiple players holding different policy preferences struggle, compete and bargain over the substance and conduct of foreign policy within the executive branch of the government (Jones 2010:120). The actors in the bureaucratic politics model are the key individuals occupying high positions on top of the critical organizations. Each individual actor seeks to maximize its own policy preferences and interests (Allison 1969:707). The latters are expressed in the form of mandates, budget and prestige.

"The leaders who sit at the top of the organizations are not a monolithic group, however. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his or her own right, a player in a central game" (Alison 1971:144). The name of the game is bureaucratic politics: governmental decisions emerge as neither a calculated rational choice of a unified group, nor an outcome of organizational routines, but rather by pulling and hauling (*ibid*). This means that some players committed to a certain course of action "triumph" over other players, fighting for other alternatives (Allison and Zelikow 1999:256). Equally, often different groups pulling in different directions produce a result that is distinct from what other players intended (*ibid*).

The "bureaucratic politics" model assumes that decisions are the products of competition or compromises. In this context bureaucratic politics contains two dimensions: non-rational and rational. The non-rational dimension comprises of the individual`s values, beliefs and cognitive sensitivities, which are determined by its position in the government. The non-rational component emphasizes the socialization and cooperation among the individuals who aim to develop a common cognitive value orientation (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:46-48). From this

perspective bureaucratic leaders do not tend to commit themselves, but rather mediate between multiple players suggesting compromises and develop a combination of a proposal that is acceptable for most of the players (*ibid*).

In the rational dimension of "bureaucratic politics", decisions are made and implemented by individual political leaders who compete to influence both governmental decisions and the actions of the government (Alison 1971:165-181). Each player involved in the process manipulates foreign policy in the way that corresponds to its particular interests: national, organizational or personal. Decision makers compete internally with each other before presenting alternatives to the executive (*ibid*). According to the rational perspective of bureaucratic politics in order to control or participate in controlling the foreign policy decision making process, one needs authority, power and information. "These three components are considered rational imperatives in the sense that they are prerequisites for any participation in government"(*ibid).*

The possession of an authority and access to information is the key determining factor which bureaucrats and bureaucratic agencies use in order to maximize their power in a certain policy domain. Authority is what is conferred when a bureaucrat or a bureaucratic organization occupies a formal role or mandate, which is a collection of formal tasks and responsibilities that a bureaucrat is authorized to do (Weber 1922 cited in Barnett et al. 1999).

Thus, power is attached to the formal authority which a bureaucratic leader uses as the primary source of his influence over the decision making process (*ibid*). Bureaucratic position determines a player's perception and influence on the issue: "Where you sit influences what you say, as well as where you stand"(Allison and Halperin:1974:60). Thus, bureaucratic position implies that the office and not its occupant determines the behavior of players (Krasner 1972:171). In order to influence the decision making process, an individual leader tends to maintain its power via getting re-elected or forming a coalition with another influential player. It

should insure that "no other player or group of players becomes strong enough to capture or dominate it" (*ibid).*

In addition, the possession of relevant information will help each bureaucrat to maintain its independent central position and influence as well as maximize its power (Krasner 1972:346-348). The information is shared through formal (top down) and informal (horizontal) organizational channels. The uneven distribution of information via formal and informal channels often creates an information asymmetry, which means that some bureaucrats possess more information and power than others, and can influence the decision-making process. Such a situation might restrict the access to information and limit the additional policy options (*ibid).*

Alison and Halperin (1974) further integrated the organizational process and bureaucratic politics models into a single model, called the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm, which explains foreign policy decision making not only in terms of an individual political actor, but also as a conglomerate of large bureaucratic organizations, which could be treated as single policy actors. In this context the actions of the head of the organization and its several individual members, whose goals are determined largely by that organization, can be considered as actions of the organization (Alison and Halperin 1974:60). Thus the organization`s needs are dictated by organizational survival and growth (*ibid*).

Each bureaucracy develops its own preference function by fulfilling its responsibilities (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:346-348). It uses its resources- political authority, expertise and contacts, to implement its strategies (*ibid*).

Although the bureaucratic politics approach presents a mixed process of compromise and competition, "it does not suppose that the individual players behave irrationally in the games in which they participate, merely that the net effect of those games is to deflect state behavior from the course that would have been chosen by a unitary rational actor" (Welch 1992:118). The model rather assumes that foreign policy decisions emerge as unintended outcomes of competitive bargaining through an abstract political space, rather than merely through a formal

decision making procedure that only relies on a central chain of command (Allison and Zelikow1999*).*

2.4.4. Forms of Bureaucratic Politics

The third wave of scholars of bureaucratic politics: Rhodes (2011), Destler (1972), Hart and Rosenthal (1998), Kozak (1988), Dunleavy (1991), Niskanen (1971), Dunsire and Hood (1989) further developed and built their theoretical considerations on the concepts of the second generation of "bureaucratic politics". The aforementioned scholars distinguish between several forms of bureaucratic politics: budget politics, court politics and turf politics.

Budget Politics

The budget politics applies well-developed economic tools in public administration and presents the public sector in market terms. It integrates three main approaches: Niskanen`s (1971) "budget maximization" model, Dunsire and Hood`s (1989) "cutback management" model and Wildavsky`s (1975) study of the "budgetary process" model.

The budget maximization model is rooted in the classical rational choice type of "bureaucratic politics" first developed by Niskanen (1971) who has created the first formal economic theory of bureaucratic behavior. His model is based on mathematical conclusions concerning the utility functions of bureaucrats. Each bureaucrat strives to maximize its budget. The higher is the budget, the higher is the utility of the bureaucrat (Hart and Wille 2012:632). Niskanen (1971:57) suggests the following variables for his utility function: salary, perquisites, power, prestige, patronage and public reputation.

Thus, in an effort to maximize their budgets, bureaucrats compete with each other for budget shares. Niskanen (1971:54) argues that bureaucrats will always seek to increase their budgets, in order to increase their own power, "thereby strongly contributing to state growth and potentially reducing social efficiency".

Dunsire and Hood (1989:632) study the bureaucratic politics in the prism of "cutback management": a situation when the "money has run out and bureaucrats are told by their political masters to decrease the public spending" . They likewise compete with each other on how to allocate the remaining budget. Moreover, internal rivalries between bureaucracies explain that the cost reduction is not equally developed among them *(ibid).*

In contrast, Wildavsky (1975:632-633) focuses on the normative aspect of "bureaucratic politics", which emphasizes the collaboration between bureaucracies, rather than the competition for power. In his classic analysis of the "budgetary process" inside government, he defines the two main roles that bureaucrats or bureaucratic organizations play in it: they are either guardians of the treasury (which impose limits to public expenditure) or advocates of program spending (which push public expenditures).

Guardians and advocates interact in a complementary way, and their roles should be understood as a whole (Wildavsky 1975:632-633). The interaction between guardians and advocates creates a "stable pattern of mutual expectations rather than rivalries: each expects the other to do its job"(*ibid*). Thus the process of interaction is more collaborative and consensus seeking rather than competitive (*ibid*).

Court Politics

The term "court politics" is applied by Savoie (2008) and Rhodes (2011) and refers to the competition between different groups of advisers to senior governmental leaders, as well as to the interaction between leaders and their advisors. "Striving to increase their powers and promote policy preferences the office holders treat their offices or bureaus as instruments of their ambitions" (*ibid*). The role of these courtiers is to provide advice to their leaders, and they need to be able "to sense emerging political crises and to have an intuitive sense of what is required to get things done"(Savoie 2008:635). In court politics "there is a shift from formal hierarchy and decision making to informal processes, which involve only a handful of actors"

(*ibid*). "This form of bureaucratic politics takes place in more fluid relationships, providing a quick access to the levers of power, with the aim to get things done and to see results"(Rhodes cited in Hart and Wille 2012:373).

Turf Politics

This type of "bureaucratic politics" model, defines bureaucracies as hierarchical organizations that jealously protect their own "turf ", such as mandates, autonomy and power, by controlling policy in their area of expertise (Dunleavy 1991:23). Turf wars between bureaucratic organizations can lead to one bureaucracy being swallowed by another larger bureaucracy*(ibid).*

"Turf politics explains how bureaucracies are more motivated to carefully guard their own fiefdoms, than to contribute dispassionately to reasoned analysis of how to achieve the public good" (Hart and Wille 2012*).*

In this context a number of propositions are made by Kozak (1988:5-10) in terms of understanding the behavior of bureaucracies. He argues that the preferences of bureaucracies are aligned to their mandates or functional roles. Thus, in order to fulfil their mandates, the bureaucracies will seek to maintain or expand certain resources, including funding, decision-making discretion, and political support (*ibid*). Because these resources are limited, bureaucracies enter into competition with each other. Competition intensifies in the areas of overlapping functional responsibilities of bureaucracies *(ibid).*

In addition, Hart and Rosenthal (1998:237) state that the formation of distinct organizational units with overlapping tasks generates competition leading to miscommunication and coordination problems. This is reinforced "when bureaucratic units operate in an environment of selective political attention or limited resources that have been divided among them" (*ibid*).

According to Downs (1967:213) each bureaucracy has a certain location in a single policy space, where it fulfills its functional responsibilities or mandates. The functions of bureaucracies are interdependent and the resources allocated to each policy area are limited (*ibid*). Each specific

functional location of bureaucracies has its own territorial zone, which is defined by the degree of dominance over the social actions that the bureaus exercise in each part of the policy space (*ibid*).

The bureaucracy, which is heavily influenced by the policies of another bureaucracy, does its best to influence its decisions (Downs 1967:213). If it succeeds, it becomes the invader of the other actor`s territorial zone. As a result, there occurs an "incessant jockeying for position" in policy space, as each bureaucracy struggles to defend or expand the existing borders of its territorial zone *(ibid*). These struggles inevitably create the need to coordinate their actions (*ibid*).

The "turf politics" is more relevant to address the main argument of this thesis, which analyzes the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence. The "turf politics" considers the competition between bureaucracies as a result of overlapping mandates, and not as a result of a strategy to maximize the budget. In contrast, the budget maximization model focuses on the behavior of bureaucrats inside the bureaucracy, instead of observing the interactions between bureaucracies. Regarding the "cut back management", although it addresses the issues related to resource scarcity and competition between bureaucracies, it does not explain how this competition can influence the coordination of activities between the bureaucracies. Court politics as well is not relevant to assess the inter-institutional dimension of coherence, since it focuses on the interactions between individual bureaucrats rather than bureaucracies .

The "bureaucratic politics" paradigm developed by Alison and Halperin (1972), or the second generation scholarship, points out the issue of dysfunctional coordination, which is the result of a struggle between bureaucracies to maximize their power and autonomy. However, it does not specify the main reasons for competition and under which circumstances and in relation to which issue areas, the competition between bureaucracies can impact the coherence of policy formulation and implementation. The assumptions made by the third generation theorists

(Downs 1967, Dunleavy 1991, Kozak 1988, Hart and Rosenthal 1998) in the context of "turf politics" complement the "Alison`s (1971) model" (second generation scholarship) of "bureaucratic politics" in two ways and are consistent with the main argument of this thesis:

I. The overlap of bureaucratic mandates causes competition between bureaucracies considering the fact that the resources are scarce within each policy space (Kozak 1988).
II. Competition between bureaucracies to defend or expand the territorial zones of their specific mandates creates a dysfunctional coordination (Downs 1967, Hart and Rosenthal 1998).

Based on the working definition of coherence, which conceptualizes coherence as a coordinated crisis decision making process, the above mentioned two key assumptions are further extended to examine the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence. Thus, for the purpose of answering the main research question of the thesis, coherence is theorized by integrating the second generation (Alison and Halperin 1972) assumptions of the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm and the third generation (Downs 1967, Kozak 1988, Hart and Rosenthal 1998,) assumptions in the context of "turf politics".

2.5. Theorizing Coherence

The research aims to demonstrate that the EU inter-institutional structure reflects the coherence of the planning and implementation processes of EU crisis response activities in South Ossetia. The thesis emphasizes the crucial role of "bureaucratic politics" in explaining how the overlap of inter-institutional mandates can impede the coherent decision making process in EU crisis management. In this context the study analyzes the interaction among EU supranational bureaucracies to address the coordination problems resulting from the functional overlap of bureaucratic mandates, which could negatively affect the "process coherence" of EU crisis response activities in South Ossetia.

The inter-institutional framework of EU crisis management consists of diverse sets of bureaucracies, the functions of which are interdependent, and which are supposed to work together to develop coherent policies (De Coning 2008:7).

However, a huge number of diverse bureaucratic actors with similar mandates in the same policy domain, and the interdependence of their functions, increases the chances of duplication of their mandates, which creates the need for effective coordination (Michaud 2002:272).

Since the establishment of the CSDP, the crisis management process in the EU has been marked by overlapping mandates "within and across multiple bureaucratic structures" (Juncos 2013: 165). This has created new tensions related to the "distribution of mandates" between EU institutional agents. This kind of functional fragmentation has underlined the need to understand the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence in EU crisis management, which is well described through the prism of "turf politics": bureaucracies compete to extend their policy- turf, including mandates, budget and prestige, in the areas of their assigned responsibilities (Downs 1967, Kozak 1988, Hart and Rosenthal 1998).

The competition between EU bureaucracies mostly occurs in the areas of overlapping responsibilities or mandates, which gives rise to rivalries in which "two or more bureaucracies try to assert permanent control over the same mandate, or in which one bureaucratic organization tends to seize another bureaucratic organization as well as the mandate of that organization" (Holden 1966:943). Fulfilling its mandate and securing the necessary capabilities lead to the concern for maintaining autonomy via expanding its mandate and resources in a competitive game (Alison and Halperin 1972:48). In order to survive and become successful, the importance of the bureaucratic mandate is elevated: bureaucracies tend to maximize control over the resources needed for policy planning and implementation, while at the same time to preserve their mandates (Peters 2009:214). As a result, they defend their "turf" fighting for their autonomy in those functional areas in which they have a significant influence (Hudson 2007:78).

In the context of "bureaucratic politics" the EU institutional agents or bureaucracies can be seen as rational entities pursuing institutional preferences, competing for maximum autonomy and avoiding time-consuming and resource-intensive coordination (Alison and Halperin 1972:75). The overlap of their mandates and resource scarcity trigger intra and inter-institutional competition and fragmentation, creating a need for internal coordination (Christiansen 2001:756). Competition increases when a new bureaucracy invades the territorial zone of another bureaucracy within a given policy space (*ibid*). In this context, one could review the EU crisis decision making process as a rational game, where the degree of coherence is an unintended consequence of the interaction between a number of institutional agents promoting their policy preferences in order to protect and expand their territorial zones in a given policy space (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010:18). However, given the fact that resources are limited, the tendency of each bureaucracy to to increase its territorial zone at the expense of the territory of another bureaucracy, will not be welcomed by the latter, which will jealously guard its territory (Downs 1967:216). This situation will generate "turf" wars leading to dysfunctional coordination (*ibid).* Coherence is directly affected by "poor" coordination, as the former is specified as a coordinated process of crisis decision making (see section 1.1).

In order to have a better understanding of how the overlap of inter-institutional mandates can impact the coherence of EU crisis decision making process in the prism of "bureaucratic politics", there is a need to provide the graphic illustration of their causal connection. The below rectangle illustrates the single policy space (e.g. CFSP) in which the EU institutional agents operate. For simplicity only two institutional agents, A and B, are shown. Each agent operates within the boundaries of its functional responsibilities or mandates, which are defined as territorial zones. However, overlap of their mandates causes tensions, as each agent competes to expand its mandate at the expense of another agent`s mandate. This creates dysfunctional coordination, during which the overlap of inter-institutional mandates is either not coordinated, or coordination mechanisms are not implemented effectively (Downs 1967:216).



Figure 2: The Analytical Framework adapted from (Alison and Halperin, 1972), Downs (1967)

Thus, coordination serves as an intervening variable between overlapping mandates and coherence. The aforementioned analytical framework helps to elaborate on three main hypotheses by which the independent variable (overlap of mandates), intervening variable (coordination) and dependent variable (coherence) are causally related.

Hypothesis 1: *If inter-institutional mandates are overlapped and coordination mechanisms are not activated, the EU crisis decision making process is incoherent.*

The first hypothesis describes a condition when coordination mechanisms are not activated to coordinate the overlap of inter-institutional mandates. In this situation the independent variable has a direct effect on the intervening variable, and the intervening variable directly affects the dependent variable. This hypothesis is in line with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical reasoning, since it confirms that the overlap of inter-institutional mandates in the absence of coordination mechanisms leads to incoherent crisis decision making process.

Hypothesis 2: *If inter-institutional mandates are overlapped and coordination mechanisms are activated, the EU crisis decision making process is coherent.*

In the second hypothesis, one can still notice a causal link between the independent, intervening and dependent variables.

This hypothesis is also consistent with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical reasoning, as it illustrates that inter-institutional coordination mechanisms act as an intervening variable, influencing the dependent variable - coherence, by coordinating the overlapping mandates. In this case, the coordination mechanisms are implemented effectively, since they lead to a coherent decision making process.

Thus, in the second hypothesis, as in the first hypothesis, institutional coordination mechanisms serve as a link between the overlapping mandates and coherence.

Hypothesis 3: *If inter-institutional mandates are overlapped and coordination mechanisms are activated, the EU crisis decision making process is incoherent.*

The third hypothesis demonstrates a sequence of variables which rejects the main reasoning of the "bureaucratic politics" theory. Here, although coordination mechanisms are activated to impede the further overlap of mandates, the implementation of these coordination mechanisms does not contribute to a coherent decision making process. This hypothesis illustrates, that institutional coordination mechanisms do not work effectively, therefore, they do not lead to a coherent process of policy planning and implementation.

Finally, it is also important to consider the probability of occurrence of a null or zero (0) hypothesis, which applies to cases without overlapping mandates. Thus, in the absence of overlapping mandates, the causality between the overlap of mandates and coherence is not considered for further analysis.

Although it might be theoretically possible to identify several other factors, in addition to overlapping mandates, that affect the coherence of EU crisis decision making process, however,

this study is interested to observe the causal link between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence.

The aforementioned three hypotheses, included the null hypothesis, are tested in the empirical pat of the thesis.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to develop the analytical framework of the thesis, which would serve as the basis for empirical research. For that purpose the chapter started from discussing the roles and functions of institutions in EU crisis management in the context of rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. The "rational choice institutionalism" approach has been further developed to demonstrate the growing role of EU institutional agents in crisis management. Based on the "rational choice institutionalism" argument, that institutions do influence the process of EU policy making and implementation due to their increased institutional autonomy, power maximization strategy and ability to create information asymmetries, the causal link between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence, is presented through the "bureaucratic politics" theory. Coherence has been theorized through integrating the second (bureaucratic politics paradigm) and the third generation (turf politics) assumptions of "bureaucratic politics" and developing an analytical framework, which illustrates how the overlapped inter-institutional mandates and the scarcity of resources for a given EU crisis management measure or activity, may lead to incoherent crisis decision making process.

Based on the working definition of coherence, which defines it as the degree to which EU institutional actors operate a coordinated process of deliberation and decision making (Christiansen 2001), the coordination is presented as an intervening variable between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence.

"Bureaucratic politics" is a useful theoretical approach to explore and evaluate the functioning of the EU inter-institutional architecture, as it assumes that the EU crisis decision making process is not merely an intergovernmental process, and that Brussels based institutional agents also matter in EU crisis management. The main task was to show that the EU crisis management machinery represents a complex political system with different institutional agents having their own policy preferences, but with interrelated mandates. Thus, the interaction between diverse institutional agents, driven by bureaucratic rivalries to defend their mandates, will help to understand how the EU plans and executes its crisis response measures and, ultimately, why the nature of EU crisis management is what it is - incoherent.

Chapter 3: Operationalization

In order to empirically test the main hypotheses developed through the analytical framework presented in section 2.5, it is necessary to operationalize the overlap of inter-institutional mandates as an independent variable, coordination as an intervening variable, and coherence as a dependent variable. Operationalization is the process of transforming abstract concepts into concrete indicators that can be observed and measured (Smith 1988 cited in O`Hair and Kreps) 1990:28). This chapter aims to develop measurable indicators for the aforementioned three variables in the two main policy areas of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. The chapter begins by identifying the indicators for the independent (overlapping mandates), intervening (coordination) and dependent variables (coherence). Afterwards, the chapter continues by establishing a causal link between the three main variables within each policy area, in line with the "bureaucratic politics" analytical framework of this study (see section 2.5).

3.1. Overlap of Inter-Institutional Mandates

Based on the analytical framework developed in section 2.5 the overlap of inter-institutional mandates is considered the independent variable of this study.

In the EU context a mandate is understood as the tasks and functions that institutions have subscribed to in their treaties, strategies and other constitutive and operational texts (Hofmann 2010:103). Mandates set the rules of the game and need to balance a sense of specificity, but also need to be open to interpretation (OECD 2018:15). If the mandate is too specific, an institutional agent does not have the ability to implement its functions flexibly, if the mandate is too broad, the institutional agent has more freedom to act, but at the same time a broad mandate is more likely to clash with other institutional agent`s mandate (Academic Expert D 2019).

Since institutionalization has equipped the EU crisis management field with similar institutions that work in the same policy area, possibilities arise that the mandates of the institutional agents operating in the same policy area may clash with each other. Thus, the overlap of mandates can occur between institutional actors which operate within a single policy field and are bound to similar commitments (Hoffmann 2010:103-104).

Overlapping mandates can indeed raise a concern. If the mandates are duplicated, this may lead to higher costs and ambiguity (Academic Expert D 2019).

The operationalization of overlapping mandates starts identifying the main players, their mandates in the two main policy areas of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, and thereafter mapping the sub areas in which the targeted institutional agents are fulfilling similar tasks that might lead to the overlap of their mandates.

3.1.1. The Main Institutional Actors in the CFSP at the Planning Level

CFSP involves joint statements on current affairs, common positions in international organizations, political and economic sanctions, regular political dialogue with third countries, participation in peace talks, etc.(EPLO 2019:6). For the purpose of the thesis, the two main components of CFSP are considered for further analysis: CSDP missions in third countries and political dialogues and peace talks involving EUSRs.

In the last two decades, the EU has developed its CSDP, which falls under the CFSP(Barbieri et al. 2016). The main representations of CSDP are the military and civilian missions that the EU has deployed around the world, in its immediate neighbourhood and in Africa *(ibid*). However, as the EU has been so far engaged in Georgia with its civilian monitoring mission, this section focuses on the civilian dimension of CSDP in order to contribute to a deeper understanding of the planning and implementation phases of the mission.

The concept of civilian crisis management in the EU context refers "to the entire range of nonmilitary tools which are activated in crisis situations-whether pre or post-crisis (Barbieri et al. 2016). Examples of such missions are police training, confidence building, state-building capacity, security sector reforms (SSR), civil protections, etc. The concept of civilian management first emerged at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999, where an Action Plan was agreed on the list of the available resources, a database of capabilities and know-how, and finally the setting of specific targets for civilian crisis management *(ibid*).

At the Lisbon Council in 2000, the CIVCOM was established in the Council of the EU, and Solana later created a mechanism to coordinate the Council Secretariat and the Commission(*ibid*). At the Feira European Council (2000), civilian crisis management was assigned to the CSDP, and four main areas were established: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. In November 2002 the first conference on Civilian Crisis Management Capability was held by EU ministers. On 1 January 2003, the EU launched its first mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), which lasted until 2012 (*ibid*).

The decision making process in EU crisis management includes three phases: strategic planning phase, operational planning phase and implementation phase.

The strategic planning concerns the discussions on the political objectives of the Union among EU Member States, in the PSC, and the military or civilian means required to fulfil those objectives (Grevi 2009:55). The strategic planning process is an intergovernmental instrument largely governed by consensus, thus the interests of Member States are critical components of the process *(ibid).*

When a crisis is noted, the PSC and the CMPD are the two key entities engaged in the strategic planning of a CSDP mission (Duke 2008:80). The PSC monitors the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and contributes to the policy making by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or of the HR/VP or on its own initiative in accordance with Article 38 TEU. The PSC, which is based in Brussels, consists of ambassadorial level representatives from all the EU Member States and usually meets twice per week*(ibid*).

The CMPD was created in 2009 as a result of the merger of the two pre-Lisbon directorates within the Council Secretariat:DG E VIII (military) and DG E IX(civilian planning)(Vanhoonacker 2011:94-95). It works under the political authority of the PSC, acting under the responsibility of the Council and the HR/VP. The CMPD is an integrated civilian-military strategic planning structure for CSDP operations and missions and it is the primary EEAS unit for political-strategic planning on CSDP. In this context the CMPD is in charge of developing the CMC and ensuring coherence between CSDP and other EU instruments as required. In addition, it is mandated to conduct the strategic reviews of CSDP missions and operations in the light of a changing strategic context, ensuring their coherence with agreed political strategic objectives(*ibid*). Although the CMPD provides an integrated strategic planning, the operational planning and conduct structures remain separate between the military and civilian structures(*ibid*).

As the central focus of the thesis is the inter-institutional framework of EU crisis management, the research further analyzes the operational planning and implementation phases of EU crisis management in South Ossetia, skipping the strategic planning phase, which is a purely intergovernmental process of decision making.

The operational planning process of a CSDP mission addresses the implementation of its political mandate through a military or civilian operation, including its organization and the key operational tasks while providing for all the enabling requirements such as logistics and communication and information systems (Stabilization Unit 2014). The EU crisis management structures responsible for the operational planning of civilian CSDP missions are the CIVCOM, the Policy Unit and the CPCC. The advisory bodies such as the EU INTCEN and Policy Unit are the first to alert the HR/VP on the emerging crisis. The EU INTCEN is mandated to provide intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the HR/VP and the EEAS. The Policy Unit prepares policy option papers for the HR/VP*(ibid).*

The CIVCOM is a supranational bureaucratic structure established in May 2000 (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). Operating as a standard advisory body CIVCOM plays a critical role in the development of strategies for the four main areas of civilian crisis management: police missions, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection as well as in overseeing civilian crisis management operations. CIVCOM`s main mandate is to provide information, draft recommendations and give its opinion on the civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC (Council Decision 2000/354). However, in the pre Lisbon period the CIVCOM was distinguished by its weak civilian ESDP structures in the Council Secretariat compared to the military ones (Grevi 2009:33). Understaffing always affected the work of the DGE IX in charge of civilian crisis management planning, guidance and support of civilian ESDP operations, until the CPCC was set up in 2007*(ibid*). The creation of the CPCC in 2007, headed by a CivOpsCdr marked a further strengthening of the EU`s civilian crisis management capabilities. Mr. Kees Klompenhouwer was the first CivOpsCdr, with the mandate to exercise the command

and control of a mission for the planning and conduct of all EU civilian crisis management operations under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the HR/VP (EEAS 2011).

After the creation of the CPCC the DG E IX continued to deal with horizontal issues of ESDP and remained in charge of political-strategic aspects of crisis management, including the conduct of situation assessment and preparation of the CMC. Its work was supposed to complement the work of the CIVCOM (Smith 2017:170).

The primary mandate of the CPCC is to prepare the mission budget and establish planning teams to develop operational planning documents such as the CONOPS and OPLAN, and to support missions in all aspects of their start-up phase (EEAS 2011). The head of the CPCC or the CivOprCdr exercises command and control of the mission. He is mandated to issue instructions as required to the HoM and provide him with advice and support on financial, personnel and logistical issues. In this context the CPCC processes and presents the mission reports to the PSC and CIVCOM accompanied by the HoM as appropriate *(ibid*).

It is worth to mention that in the pre Lisbon period after the approval of the CSDP operational plan both the CPCC and the DG RELEX were mandated to jointly prepare the draft mission budget (Former Commission Official L 2019). After the merger of the DG RELEX into the EEAS the draft mission budget is prepared by the CPCC and the FPI. The CPCC has also a coordinating mandate: it is tasked to coordinate the operational planning process of a mission at the vertical level (*ibid*).

After defining the mandates of each actor engaged in the CSDP mission planning it is worthwhile to describe the CSDP mission planning process and graphically illustrate the engagement of each actor in the operational planning phase of a mission.

The CSDP Mission Planning Process

When there is an outbreak of an external crisis, the Crisis Platform, chaired by the HR/VP, the ESG or the EEAS Managing Director for Crisis Response, is activated (EEAS 2019). Afterwards the EEAS GEO Desks prepare the political framework for crisis approach, on the basis of which the PSC analyses the situation and decides whether to initiate a CSDP action or not (EEAS 2015 b). The PSC decides whether it is appropriate and, if so, will assign the HR/VP [1] and the CMPD to formulate the CMC. The latter defines the political-strategic objectives of CSDP engagement and frames possible goals and scope of an EU mission (*ibid*).

The CMPD sends a FFM led by the CIVCOM into the crisis zone to find out the security situation on the ground. A FFM is usually sent to the region to which it is deployed to assess the situation on the ground and provide recommendations on options for EU engagement (Stabilization Unit 2014).

However, apart the CIVCOM, the EUSR and the Commission representatives, EEAS Geographic Desks are also mandated to participate in FFMs (Commission Official K 2019, Former Desk Officer B 2019). In the course of these events, the EU INTCEN reports on the situation in the country or region on a daily basis. It is worth to mention that before the creation of the CMPD the CMC was prepared by the DG E-IX within the Council Secretariat (Hill and Smith 2011:94).

Based on the information collected during the FFM the CIVCOM with the support from the CPCC will base its assessment to the PSC (Duke 2008:80). Usually the PSC can request that joint Council/Commission FFMs are dispatched in the field to collect information on the context of EU intervention *(ibid*).

The PSC will then discuss the assessment of the situation and agree upon a CMC which will be presented to COREPER. The latter will analyze the CMC and any positive decision made by

[1] The HR/VP is not involved in the actual CSDP planning process, leaving it to the CMPD, but she is responsible for the overall coherence of the mission planning and implementation process(Commisssion Official A 2018).

COREPER is then adopted by the PSC and then approved by the Council (Stabilization Unit 2014).

Following the political approval of the Council, the PSC requests that the CSO is developed and tasks the CivOpsCdr to start the recruitment of the HoM and the core team *(ibid).*

Based on the CMC the CivOpsCdr drafts the CONOPS for CIVCOM which is subject to approval by the Council. The CONOPS is a planning document indicating the line of action chosen by the CivOpCdr to accomplish the mission operation, thus translating the political intent into action and guidance (Council 2018).

The CONOPS planning team directly involves the HoM and relevant EEAS services. However, the DG DEVCO with its Fragility and Crisis Management Unit (B2) can also participate in the CONOPS planning process, which narrows the policy planning space (Former Commission Official C 2018).

To inform the development of the CONOPS, the planning team will normally conduct a TAM supported by the relevant EEAS Services, the EUDEL and/or EUSR Office as appropriate (Council 2013). A TAM mainly aims to collect all the data necessary for the operational planning and mission design, especially in relation to concrete tasks, numbers, logistical issues and security. TAMs are led by the CPCC and are composed of subject matter experts, including other services, notably the FPI, CMPD, EEAS Geographic Desks, EUSR office, SECPOL.2 and the DG DEVCO. In the pre-Lisbon period, TAMs also included the SitCen and DG E IX(Former EEAS Official L 2019).

Based on the findings of the TAM the CONOPS is presented to the PSC by the CivOpsCdr. CIVCOM provides advice and recommendations to the PSC on the draft civilian CONOPS (Council 2013). Afterwards the PSC approves the draft CONOPS and forwards it to the Council, unless it has been previously authorized, to approve it directly (*ibid*). After the approval of the CONOPS by the Council the CivOpsCdr starts preparing the respective OPLAN. The HoM and the core team are fully involved in the planning of the OPLAN under the

supervision of the CivOpsCdr. The latter is responsible for the operational details of the mission, such as the preparation of its budget, execution and control of the mission through reporting and analysis, as indicated in the CONOPS (*ibid*).

In some cases when a rapid decision-making is required, a 'fast track' process can be followed, in which the CONOPS phase is skipped (Stabilization Unit 2014). The minimum requirement for civilian planning is the OPLAN. On the basis of the advice from the CIVCOM the PSC endorses the OPLAN and forwards it to the Council for approval. The Council then adopts a decision on launching the mission as soon as the IOC is achieved (i.e.minimal practical requirements to start the mission).

The mission budget is allocated from the CFSP budget out of which civilian CSDP missions and operations are financed (Commission Official B 2018). Before Lisbon the civilian mission budget was managed by the DG RELEX. The latter prepared the funding decisions in cooperation with various thematic and geographic Council working groups (Boin, et al. 2005).

In the post Lisbon period the CFSP budget is administered by the FPI, which falls under the responsibility of the HR/VP. Apart being in charge of administering the EU CSDP budget, the FPI also participates in the drafting process of the budget. The latter is sent to the RELEX Working Party for final approval, after which the FPI disburses the funds (Commission Official B 2018).

The RELEX Working Party is responsible for discussing the legal and financial aspects of CFSP and its instruments, including CSDP (Carrasco et al.2016). It prepares the Council Decisions and related financial instruments allowing the deployment of CSDP engagements in close cooperation with the FPI (*ibid).*

When the mission mandate approaches its end date, the CMPD, supported by the CPCC, conducts a strategic review or assessment of the mission(Council 2017). The strategic review may result in an extension of the existing mandate, a refocusing of the CSDP engagement or termination of the mission. The final version of the strategic review is evaluated by the PSC

(*ibid).* The graphic illustration of EU civilian CSDP mission planning process is presented in the below figure.



Figure 3: The CSDP Strategic Planning Process. Source: Own compilation adapted from EEAS(2015).



Figure 4: The Operational Planning Process. Source:Own compilation adapted from EEAS (2015).

The below two graphs illustrate the chain of command of the CSDP planning phase for the two time periods:(2003-2010) and (2010-2016).



Figure 5: Source:own compilation based on the interviews with the EEAS, Commission and Council Staff.



Figure 6:Source:own compilation based on the interviews with the EEAS, Commission and Council Staff..

3.1.2. The Main Institutional Actors in the CFSP at the Implementation Level

The third stage of crisis decision making in the CFSP includes the implementation of already developed policies at the operational planning phase. It is worthwhile to mention that the EU Council and Commission have their own sets of instruments for responding to various types of crises(Batora et al. 2016). These tools range from diplomatic and political instruments to military involvement or training, building and reform of civil institutions, or humanitarian aid (*ibid*). It is also possible that some mandates are modified and extended depending on specific policy requirements and lengths. The main institutional actors at the **implementation** level of

crisis decision making are the HR/VP, the HoM, the EUSR and the EUDELs in the third countries.

High Representative (HR) for CFSP

The post of the HR for Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) was created under the Treaty of Amsterdam and was occupied by Javier Solana for ten years until the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty (Tache 2015:7). However the formal mandate of the HR was extremely limited. Solana only formally assisted the Presidency and the Council in CFSP matters, "mainly contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties" (art. 26 TEU cited in Dijkstra 2011:69).

Following the Lisbon Treaty the post was titled as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (abbreviated HR or HR/VP). In an effort to ensure coherence and visibility between the different areas of EU external action the mandate of the HR/VP was introduced to the system of CFSP through the Lisbon Treaty who should be the central player coordinating the entire EU external action supported by the EEAS. The first HR/VP in this new institutional setting was Baroness Catherine Ashton, who was succeeded by the former Italian foreign minister, Federica Mogherini in November 2014 (Kerres and Wessel 2015).

The mandate of the current HR/VP merges several posts into one: 1) the former post of the HR for CFSP (established by the Amsterdam Treaty and held from 1999 to 2009 by Javier Solana); 2) the post of the European Commissioner for External Affairs; and 3) the chair of the FAC previously held by the foreign affairs minister of the MS holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU (*ibid*).

The HR/VP is appointed by the European Council for a five-year term, by qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission (European Parliament 2014).

According to Art. 18 TEU, the HR/VP conducts and implements the EU's CFSP and CSDP in accordance with the mandate given by the Council, and has the right to submit proposals in these areas*(ibid).*

The mandate of the HR/VP includes: a) negotiating international agreements related exclusively or principally to CFSP matters; b) representing the Union on matters related to CFSP, including conducting political dialogue with third parties, expressing the EU's position in international organizations and international conferences; c)ensuring coordination of the civilian and military aspects of CSDP missions in the areas of peacekeeping missions and strengthening international security or conflict prevention (Art. 43 TEU), d) exercising authority over the EUSRs appointed by the Council on a proposal by the HR/VP, and over the EEAS, created to assist the HR/VP in carrying out all their functions (*ibid).*

The HR/VP is also mandated to organize the RELEX Working Party meetings, although it is formally chaired by the Commission President. However, as clarified by the Commission Official, the HR/VP was not interested in participating in the RELEX Working Party meetings on a regular basis (Former Commission Official I 2019).

Head of Mission (HoM)

Once the operational planning process of a mission concludes, the HoM takes command and control of the mission in-theatre at the implementation level (Council 2013). The HoM shall be the representative of the Mission. The mandate of the HoM is usually given for a period of twelve(12) months and only the Council can extend its mandate by taking a joint action (*ibid*).

The HoM is mandated to issue instructions and orders for the effective implementation of the mission, assuming its coordination and day to day management in accordance with the command status assigned by the CivOpCdr (Council 2008 b).

The HoM may delegate management tasks in administrative and financial matters to staff members of the mission, under the auspices of his/her overall responsibility (Council 2013). The

HoM is responsible for managing the funds entrusted by the general EU budget. The Mission Support Department then handles practical budgetary provisions, such as identifying needs and making provisions to cover those needs*(ibid).* Together with the representatives from CIVCOM and CPCC, the HoM is also mandated to take part in FFMs and TAMs and contribute to the assessment and refocusing of civilian CSDP missions. He or she meets this requirement by providing operational expertise through reports, briefing notes and analytical summaries(*ibid).*

Before the establishment of the CPCC in 2007, the HoM was tasked with receiving and screening information on the security situation on the ground and transmitting it to the EUSR (Grevi 2007). The EUSR was mandated to directly report the received information from the HoM to the HR/VP. However, with the establishment of the CPCC a new civilian command structure was developed: the HoM reports directly to the CivOpCdr on local security situations in the field, and the CivOpCdr reports directly to the HR/VP. The EUSR is neither present in the chain of civilian CSDP mission command, nor mandated to give operation-related instructions to the HoM (*ibid*). The EUSR directly reports to the HR on the internal political situation in a specific region, which includes also information on the situation in conflict zone(s).

In addition, in the regions where the EUSRs are not deployed alongside the CSDP missions, it is important that the HoM plays a proactive role in engaging the parties in the peace process at the political level (Gourlay 2010:15 cited in European Parliament 2012).

However, the CSDP mission might also have a mediation component if its mandate includes activities such as confidence building. The HoM and the EUSR both might have access to the high(track one) and low(track two) levels of mediation (Former EU Diplomat B 2019).

Track one mediation describes the highest level of formal negotiations between the highest level, governmental and military leaders focusing on cease-fires, peace talks and agreements (Dudouet and Lundström 2016 cited in Ebenthal and Dudouet 2017:7).

In track two mediation the individuals or organizations have privileged access to track one mediation, but are not themselves parties to the negotiations (*ibid*). Thus, the EUSR is likely to

be accompanied by a CSDP mission during the track one mediation, and this CSDP mission has the potential to impact the mediation process, despite its lack of direct engagement in peace talks: the HoM possesses a relevant information on the security situation on the ground and is expected to share it with the EUSR(Former EU Diplomat B 2019).

EU Special Representative (EUSR)

The main EU instrument with the highest mediation mandate is the EUSR, who is tasked with contributing to the implementation of an EU policy and/or strategy towards the mandate area(European Parliament 2019). This concept was first introduced in March 1996 when the first EUSR, Aldo Ajello, was appointed as the Special Envoy (later changed to the Special Representative) to the Great Lake Region of Africa (*ibid*). The appointment was a direct response to the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda and included a mandate for mediation and supporting peace and ceasefire agreements (*ibid)*

The EUSRs are appointed by the PSC, on a recommendation by the HR/VP, to assist the latter in troubled crisis countries or regions with the aim of promoting peace, stability and the rule of law (Art. 33 TEU). The EUSRs have often been depicted as the EU's "ears and eyes" on the ground (Grevi 2007:11). In this context they have three main tasks in the service of EU foreign policy: representation, information and coordination. Regarding representation, they provide the Union with an active political presence and are involved in high level or track one formal negotiations with the official representatives of the parties, or gather first hand information and provide it to the HR/VP(*ibid*). Second, the EUSRs collect information in the field and transfer it back to Brussels. The EUSRs can enhance coordination at multiple levels: firstly, between different CSDP missions in the same country; secondly, between CSDP actors and other foreign policy actors on the ground, e.g. EU delegations; and thirdly, between EU policies and those pursued by other international actors, including international organizations (Grevi 2007:46).

The average duration of the EUSR mandate is around one year and serves to provide external political representation and information-gathering functions for the EU (European Parliament 2019). The individual EUSR's exact mandate depends on the location and nature of the specific crisis. In some cases, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EUSR plays an extremely active and influential role, backed by international agreements, the Stabilization and Association Process and a specific mandate(*ibid*). Whereas the focus of the EUSR for Central Asia is on regional cooperation and conflict prevention, the mandates of the EUSRs in the Horn of Africa and Sahel, focus on stabilization, conflict resolution and crisis management with regard to different conflicts in these mandate areas (*ibid*).

Today EUSRs remain de facto Council instruments and are situated outside the formal structure of the EEAS, reporting directly to the HR/VP. Being rather *free electrons*, the EUSRs enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the EEAS and are appointed with a mandate in relation to a specific policy issue (Tolksdorf 2012).

In the pre-Lisbon period, the CPCMU within the DG RELEX was in charge of managing the funds for EUSR`s administrative costs and mediation activities through the RRM, which was replaced by the IfS later in 2007(Grevi 2007:20). Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EUSRs' expenditures have been administered by the FPI regarded by most EUSRs as sufficient (European Parliament 2019). This is not the case with the expenditures of EUDELs, where the administration of the budget is much stricter both in terms of travelling and complementing manpower (*ibid*). Apart from budgetary flexibility, their exposure to lower institutional burdens also provides the EUSRs a greater window for discretion and pro-activity in deciding their objectives based on personal judgement *(ibid).* Being located outside the EEAS bureaucratic structure, enables EUSRs to be quickly deployed and activated if a particular crisis arises in a country (*ibid).* The EUSRs are therefore perceived as having a larger margin for action than their EEAS counterparts(*ibid*).

Although the EUSRs are the principle actors in the area of mediation, certain institutional actors, such as EUDELs and HoMs, can also be engaged in mediation(Former EU Diplomat A 2017). The EUSR is tasked with conducting mediation and political dialogue and implementing confidence-building measures. In line with his or her mandate, the EUSR provides the HoM with local political guidance and the HoM shares his or her understanding of the security situation on the ground with the EUSR *(ibid*).

The HoM conducts mediation at a lower level than the EUSR (Former EU Diplomat A 2017). Lower level refers to activities on the ground, such as supporting the implementation of peace agreements, confidence-building, cease-fires and agreements on border issues (*ibid*). A high-level or track one mediation covers political dialogue and diplomacy and falls outside the functional responsibilities of a CSDP mission(*ibid*). However, it is possible for the EUSR, HoM and the Head of EUDEL to be engaged in the same mediation path or conduct similar parallel confidence-building measures narrowing the policy space for mediation (Former Policy Officer B 2019).

EU Delegations (EUDELs)

The current EUDELs under the EEAS trace back to the Commission Delegations from the early 1950s, with the very first EU Delegation being established in Washington D.C. in 1954(Kerres and Wessel 2015).

Before Lisbon, the EU as such was not represented abroad, as the delegations were mandated to represent only the Commission and dealt exclusively with issues over which the Community had control (*ibid*). The delegations were largely busy managing technical and financial cooperation programs and implementing trade and cooperation agreements. Political and security issues fell outside the remit of delegations and were dealt by the embassies of individual Member States (Comelli and Matarazzo 2011).

With the inclusion of CFSP in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the involvement of delegations in diplomacy, and their political role, increased (Dermenzhiev 2014). The delegations gradually became involved in many aspects of CFSP. Delegations were already dealing with areas of shared or parallel competence, such as justice and home affairs, and with political reporting, thus going beyond the scope of the Commission's exclusive powers *(ibid).*

Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the European diplomatic service was managed by the DG RELEX in conjunction with the head of delegation, reporting to the CPCMU within the DG RELEX(Former Commission Official H 2018). The latter was given responsibility for managing the delegation's role in political analysis and reporting, as well as for coordinating relations with third countries (*ibid*).

In sum, the pre-Lisbon Commission delegations fulfilled a wide range of tasks, from presenting and implementing EU policies to assisting the rotating presidency at the local level. However, in order to ensure the coherent management of these prerogatives, a joint external service was required, the legal basis for which was provided only by the Treaty of Lisbon (Dermenzhiev 2014).

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission delegations are placed under the authority of the HR/VP as EUDELs (Keukeleire et al. 2016:210). The EUDELs act as the Union's diplomatic representatives and, as such, are part of the EEAS (*ibid*).

The Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the role of EUDELs in EU crisis management (Think Tank Expert C 2019). With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EUDELs have obtained responsibilities in the field of mediation and political dialogue (*ibid*). The Head of EUDEL is often involved in high-level political dialogues in countries affected by conflicts, or in track one mediation, sharing its policy space with the EUSR and HoM *(ibid).*

The EUDELs have gained an important role in the implementation of CSDP missions, supplying information on what is happening on the ground to the HR/VP and to all stakeholders involved, which is paramount in the launch of a mission (Barbieri et al. 2016).

However, the division of tasks between the EUSRs and EUDELs is often unclear during the political reporting phase (Think Tank Expert B 2018). The EUSRs and EUDELs are often engaged in bureaucratic rivalries to be the first to deliver security-related information to Brussels (*ibid*).

The EUDELs illustrate the legal and organizational duality that is observed in Brussels (European Parliament 2013). The Head of EUDEL thus brings together two different tasks and institutions while supervising both the EEAS staff in political, press, information and administrative sections and Commission staff in trade and development sections (*ibid*). The Head of EUDEL is responsible for the execution of the tasks he or she receives from the HR/VP or the EEAS Headquarters (Council 2010 a). However, the Commission can also issue instructions to the respective staff within EUDEL in areas that fall within its sphere of competence (*ibid*). Such instructions are then to be executed under the overall responsibility of the Head of EUDEL. When the Commission issues instructions to delegations' staff, it provides a copy of those instructions to the Head of EUDEL and the EEAS central administration (*ibid*). The reports from the EUDEL to Brussels should also include both sides: the EEAS and the respective Commission DGs (Sus 2014:74). The instructions from the Commission should include non-CFSP aspects, while the EEAS should play a leading role in CFSP matters, and both actors should collaborate when CFSP and non-CFSP issues are addressed (*ibid*).

The figure below illustrates the CFSP command chain at the implementation level before and after Lisbon.



Figure 7 : Source:own compilation based on the interviews with the EEAS, Commission and Council staff.

3.1.3. The Main Institutional Actors in the Development Aid at the Planning Level

Between 2001 and 2006, EU crisis management actions in the context of Development Aid were funded by the Commission RRM. The latter was created in 2001 under the Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 to enhance the EU`s civilian capacity to intervene in crisis situations by mobilizing the existing resources and instruments more quickly and effectively (Council 2001). Activities under the RRM included: human rights work, election monitoring, institution building, media support, border management, humanitarian missions, police training equipment provision, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation, reconstruction, pacification, resettlement and mediation (*ibid*). The RRM aimed to deliver the above cited activities as rapid stabilizers and as precursors for eventual longer-term assistance'(World Vision 2002). However, the RRM was endowed with only €30 million per year and could fund actions for no longer than six months, which was sometimes not enough to allow for other financial instruments to take over and provide required assistance(Grevi 2009:96).

Another issue was the connection between actions undertaken in the critical phase and actions to be undertaken in the midterm stabilization phase(European Commission 2013 a). The RRM projects did not have sufficient duration to create a continuum with traditional long-term rehabilitation support programs (*ibid*). Such concerns led to the launch of the IfS as a follow up to the RRM in 2007. By launching the IfS the European Commission considerably intensified its work in the area of crisis management. The IfS aimed to establish links between short-term crisis response and long term development assistance measures(*ibid*).

The IfS could be used in all areas of development aid (conflict prevention, acute crisis management, post-conflict reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction) that fall under the Community competence, with the exception of humanitarian assistance(*ibid).*

Crisis management projects under the IfS focus on the following areas:

I. Preventive action during emerging crises. The IfS can finance short term actions as part of a wider package of Community and EU measures to address the immediate and root causes of an emerging crisis.

II. Acute crisis management. The IfS can be deployed during a conflict or in response to a sudden-onset emergency, to implement measures to restore stability.

III. Post-conflict reconciliation. The IfS can be used to provide confidence building measures in support of an emerging or established peace process.

IV. Post-crisis reconstruction. The IfS can be used to spearhead the long term Community co-operation programs immediately after a war or a sudden natural or man-made emergency, and to ensure a smooth transition between humanitarian relief operations, the restoration of civil administration and the rule of law, and subsequent rehabilitation and development programs.

The IfS is divided into two components, the short term (Art.3) and long-term(Art.4, Art.5) parts (European Commission 2013a). The short-term part deals with the more immediate crisis response, such as acute crisis management and conflict prevention activities during emerging crisis. Thus the IfS allows the Commission to fund short-term projects complementary to CSDP missions and finance activities for which other means of funding are not available in a timely manner(Hanssen 2010 cited in Post 2015:195). The long-term component that falls under Art.4,

concerns peacebuilding and crisis preparedness, which includes the following activities: early warning, conflict analysis, capacity-building for mediation, civilian stabilization missions, post-crisis reconciliation and reconstruction activities (Bergmann 2018). And the long term component under Art. 5 addresses global and trans- regional threats and emerging threats such as terrorism, cyber crime, organized crime, management of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks and border management *(ibid*). However, the EU funded IcSP projects in South Ossetia fall under Art.3 and Art.4.

It is worth mentioning that the short-term crisis response activities initiated under Art. 3 can either be conducted as EAMs or as IRPs (Bergmann 2018). The short-term crisis response activities initiated under Art. 3 as EAMs with a duration of up to 18 months and a budget of less than € 20 million are exempted from the comitology procedure (*ibid*). The EAMs not requiring a comitology procedure are only presented to the PSC for information. The EAMs exceeding the €20 mln. require a comitology procedure (*ibid*).

However, the funding capacity of the IcSP is relatively small compared to the funds of DCI and ENI, which are roughly eight times higher than the IcSP budget (*ibid).* The total amount allocated to Art. 4 actions (roughly € 5 mln.) is extremely small and in cases when the IcSP does not have sufficient resources to implement its projects, the DNI and NPI funds are used (Former Commission Official I 2019).

For the purposes of the study, the main EU activities in the context of Development Aid highlighted in this thesis include acute crisis management, post crisis reconciliation, post crisis economic reconstruction and development and capacity building.

In relation to Development Aid the main actor at the planning level in the pre Lisbon period was the DG RELEX which was in charge of programming and managing its rapid reaction interventions in the third countries excluded the ACP countries (Council 2001)[2].

The main objective of the DG RELEX was to search and gather information on the potential conflicts in the EU`s neighbourhood and assess the crisis situation in each region cooperating with the Commission delegations (Boin et al. 2005).

When the IfS replaced the RRM the DG RELEX became responsible for managing the crisis response component (assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis) under Art.3 of the IfS, as well as pre- and post-crisis capacity building preparedness measures under Art. 4 of the IfS (European Commission 2007a). The crisis response component of the IfS was under direct responsibility of Directorate A of DG RELEX with an increased involvement of Commission Delegations in its implementation stage(*ibid).*

The CPCMU within the Directorate A of DG RELEX was mandated to introduce conflict prevention indicators such as a checklist of the root causes of conflict into the Commission`s country strategy papers that set the political agenda for further Community involvement in a specific region (Duke 2011:15-29). Further, the CPCMU was also given responsibility for coordinating crisis management efforts in the Commission and providing the Council with a watch-list of potential crises and managing the RRM *(ibid*).

The Regulation No 381/2001 establishing the RRM allowed the Commission to decide whether intervention by means of the RRM, should be combined with the DG ECHO action in a

[2] The post conflict rehabilitation projects in the ACP countries was managed by the DG Development within the European Development Fund(ICG 2005).

particular security or crisis management circumstances (Council 2001). However, the linkage of humanitarian aid projects with development assistance projects reflected a certain amount of conflict within the Commission regarding the role of humanitarian aid as a crisis response tool (Former Commisison Official L 2017). While the DG ECHO was politically neutral, the RRM was intended to operate in the context of crisis management (*ibid*). According to Stewart (2005) humanitarian aid is part of the EU response to man-made crises, and it cannot be disconnected from crisis management. "When international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict"(Andersson 1999 cited in Stewart 2005:113). In such cases, close coordination between the DG RELEX and the DG ECHO could be crucial to avoid the overlapping mandates between the two actors and to provide optimal overall coherence.

Following the Lisbon Treaty the EU started to rebuild its new institutional framework via establishing new crisis management actors and coordination mechanisms. One of its first innovations was the creation of the FPI. The latter was created in response to the establishment of the EEAS. The FPI is co-located within the services of the EEAS, but remains separate from the EEAS in administrative and functional terms, because the Commission has an exclusive responsibility for the management of the operational chapters of the EU budget (StateWatch 2013).

The FPI is mandated to manage the IcSP budget (European Parliament 2013). Meanwhile, it has a function to facilitate the coordination between the EEAS and policy instruments which are programmed by the EEAS and run by the Commission. As a Commission service, the FPI is under the direct authority of the HR/VP *(ibid).*

The service is structured in three main units: FPI.1 deals with budget, finance and relations with other institutions; FPI.2 is responsible for the IcSP, an EU instrument to support security initiatives and peace-building activities in partner countries through specific projects, and FPI.3 is the CFSP operations unit, which prepares a budgetary impact statement for each EUSR and CSDP mission (Barbieri et al. 2016).

With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS, the decision making responsibilities of the programming and management cycles under the IcSP have changed. Overall strategic and political coordination is from now conducted by the HR/VP, while the Commission is responsible for the subsequent implementation (Tannous 2013:345).

The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the interdependence between the Commission and EEAS, by sharing the territorial space of the IcSP programming process between the two actors (*ibid*). In accordance with the Council decision (2010/427/EU) establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS, the programming of the IfS was shared between the EEAS(SECPOL.2) and the Commission (FPI) under the authority of the HR/VP (Council 2010 a). During the "entire cycle of programming, planning and implementation, the EEAS shall work with the relevant members and services of the Commission"(Council 2010 a).

Ideas for EAMs under Art. 3 may originate from various sources: the Commission, Member States , the EEAS, EUDELs, international organizations or civil society organizations, NGOs (European Commission 2012 a). These measures are evaluated jointly by EEAS and FPI and other relevant Commission services. The FPI submits the final list of the IcSP measures which the Commission plans to finance to the EEAS Management Board for clearance(*ibid*). The Executive Secretary General confirms the HR/VP's approval writing to FPI. The final note is

presented by the FPI to the PSC. The FPI then prepares an EAM/ Financing Decision, on which the EEAS and relevant Commission services are consulted through inter-service consultation. The proposal for adoption of the Commission Decision on EAM is launched by the FPI, under the authority of the HR/VP (*ibid).*

For the IRPs (and in the case of EAMs above € 20 mln.), the draft Commission proposals are prepared by FPI in consultation with the EEAS (European Commission 2012 a). After inter-service consultation between the relevant Commission services, FPI submits the draft proposal for the relevant comitology procedure. The comitology process is chaired by the DG DEVCO (*ibid*). During the discussions of IcSP crisis response component proposals the FPI usually co-chairs with the DG DEVCO. The SECPOL.2 is invited to participate. The proposal for adoption of the Commission Decision on EAM or IRP shall be launched by the FPI, under the authority of the HR/VP. The planning process of IcSP measures as part of the crisis preparedness component covered by Art. 4.3, is identical to the planning process of the IRPs and the EAMs above € 20 mln.). The planning process of EU crisis response and preventive measures under Art.3 and Art. 4.3 is presented in the below figure.



Figure 8: The IcSP Planning Process. Own compilation adapted from Commission (2012 a).

After signing the working arrangements between the Commission Services and EEAS in January 2012, an additional layer of complexity was added to the already fragmented and heavy planning process of the IcSP (European Commission 2012 a). The DG DEVCO`s engagement with its Fragility and Crisis Management Unit (B2) in the planning process of long-term interim crisis response activities (Art. 4.1, Art. 4.2 and Art. 5) in relation to IcSP changed the rules of the game (Former Commission Official E 2018). The Commission and EEAS working arrangements called for the DG DEVCO and EEAS to take joint responsibility for the programming and managerial cycles of long-term components under the IcSP and thematic programs under the ENPI(European Commission 2012 a).

The DG DEVCO was created by merging the DG Development (responsible for initiating development policy) and the DG EuropeAid (responsible for implementing external aid programs and projects), following the transfer of around hundred administrators working at the country desks of the DG Development to the EEAS(EPLO 2019). This new arrangement has created an additional power struggle between the engaged actors such as the DEVCO and SECPOL.2, FPI and SECPOL.2, as each of them now competes for the power to set the agenda for EU crisis response and preparedness programs (Former Policy Officer A 2019).

The DG DEVCO is responsible for the programming of long-term multi annual projects under Art. 4.1/4.2 and Art. 5 of the IcSP regulation together with the SECPOL.2 (ICON Institute 2017). The EEAS prepares the strategy paper and multi-annual programming measures, in consultation with FPI and DEVCO. On the basis of the Strategy papers and multi-annual programming,

DEVCO prepares the draft proposals for the annual action programs (European Commission 2012 a).

Afterwards the draft proposal is submitted to the inter service consultation during which the FCMU on behalf of DEVCO consults the SECPOL.2(EEAS) and relevant Commission services. The inter service consultation is followed by the comitology procedure, in which the SECPOL.2 is also invited. The DG DEVCO then launches the project (European Commission 2012 a).

The planning process of EU crisis response and preventive measures under Art. 4.1/4.2 and Art.5 is presented in the below figure.



Figure 9: The IcSP Planning Process. Art.4.1/4.2, 5. Own compilation adapted from Commission (2012 a).

In sum the planning of short term and long term actions in relation to Art. 3 and Art.4.3 is jointly chaired by SECPOL.2 and FPI. The FPI does not chair the planning of long term IcSP projects that fall under Art. 4.1/4.2 and Art.5. The chair and secretariat of the committee for long term measures is provided by the DG DEVCO. The SECPOL.2 is invited to participate in such cases (European Commission 2012 a).

In addition to EU financial assistance projects under the IcSP, the EU finances several post conflict reconstruction and economic development projects under the DCI, in case IcSP funds are limited (Former Commission Official C 2018). The DCI planning process slightly differs from the IcSP programming process.

According to Art. 9 (4) of the EEAS Council Decision, the thematic programs and multi annual indicative programs under the DCI shall be prepared by the DG DEVCO under the guidance of the Commissioner for Development and presented to the College in agreement with the HR/VP and other relevant Commissioners (European Commission 2012 a).

The DG DEVCO, in consultation with the SECPOL.2, prepares guidelines from the Development Commissioner, setting out the main objective to be followed for the programming process (European Commission 2012 a). The draft proposal is prepared by the DG DEVCO, in consultation with the SECPOL.2. The proposal for adoption of the Commission decision is sent to the inter service consultation by the DG DEVCO, following agreement by the Commissioner for Development and the HR/VP (Bergmann 2018). Afterwards DEVCO presents the draft Commission proposal to the comitology review. The procedure for adoption by the Commission is launched by the DG DEVCO in agreement with the EEAS(European Commission 2012 a).

However, it is also possible that the planning process starts by the initiative of the EUDELs in the third countries (Former Commission Official C 2018). The EUDELs analyze the project details taking into account the development potential of the targeted region, as well as the EU regional development goals. The EUDELs submit the draft proposal to the DG DEVCO and SECPOL.2 headquarters in Brussels (*ibid).*

After having heard from the EUDELs on the ground, both the DG DEVCO and SECPOL.2 send the draft proposal for the approval to the Development Commissioner and the HR/VP. The draft proposal is jointly signed and submitted to the College of Commissioners by the HR/VP and the Development Commissioner (European Commission 2012 a). After passing the comitology review, the procedure for adoption of the Commission decision is launched by the DG DEVCO (*ibid*).

An overview of the command chain in the Development Aid at the planning level is shown in the figure below.

The Institutional Actors in the Development Aid at the Planning Level (2003-2010)



The Institutional Actors in the Development Aid at the Planning Level (2010-2016)



Figure 10: Source:own compilation based on the interviews with the EEAS, Commission and Council staff.

3.1.4. The Main Institutional Actors in the Development Aid at the Implementation Level

Before Lisbon the budgetary implementation of development programs related to crisis management was conducted by Commission delegations under the supervision of the DG RELEX(Lavallee 2013:377). The Head of delegation reported directly to the CPCMU within the DG RELEX. In the development policy area the Commission delegations were responsible for program identification, program preparation, and financial and technical implementation of development aid projects in close cooperation with Commission headquarters in Brussels.

In the post-Lisbon period, the coordination of the implementation of EU crisis response measures in relation to IcSP was placed under the direct responsibility of the HR/VP (Natorski 2011:27).

After Lisbon the EUDELs began to participate more actively in political affairs, and the budgetary implementation of crisis response and preventive measures, as well as post-conflict economic reconstruction projects were delegated to the EUDELs, located in the third countries (Dialer et al. 2014). After the amendment of the Financial Regulation no.1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2010) Regulation on the sub-delegation of the budgetary responsibilities of the Commission to the Head of EUDEL, the delegations work closely with the FPI and DG DEVCO in Brussels, exchanging information on the progress of implementation of the IcSP and DCI (Council 2010 a). The FPI has also personnel (Crisis Response Planners) posted to EU Delegations to oversee the implementation of the IcSP (Former Commission Official L 2019).

According to Art. 221 TFEU, the EUDELs are placed under the authority of the HR/VP, thus the HR/VP, the EEAS and the Commission can – in areas such as “development” and “neighbourhood” (Article 5(3) EEAS Decision) – issue direct instructions to the EUDEL (Tannous 2013:342).

Likewise the EUSRs, the EUDELs have a coordinating mandate on the ground on behalf of the Head of EUDEL who organizes and holds monthly coordination meetings (so-called EU family meetings) with other stakeholders on the ground, such as the EUSR, HoM and Geographic Desks (Former EU Diplomat B 2019). However, the coordinating mandate of the Head of EUDEL often strains the relations between the EUSR and the Head of EUDEL. The EUSR does not have a separate budget for conducting financial assistance or aid programs: such a mandate belongs to the FPI within the Commission (*ibid*). Thus the EUSR cannot implement its own confidence building projects in conflict affected regions (Former Diplomat 2018). The EUSR`s mandate allows to coordinate the implementation of confidence building measures or other post crisis reconstruction programs, funded by IcSP or DCI and allocated to EUDELs (*ibid).* However, the post-Lisbon delegations are also mandated to coordinate the implementation of confidence building measures in the field funded by the IcSP (Former Desk Officer A 2018).

A graphic illustration of EU institutional actors engaged in the implementation of Development Did activities is presented below.



Figure 11: Source: own compilation based on the interviews with the EEAS, Commission and Council staff.

The next subsection operationalizes the coordination, which is the intervening variable between the overlapping mandates and coherence. Relying on the main theoretical argument of the thesis, that *the overlap of inter-institutional mandates in EU crisis management in the absence of coordination mechanisms leads to an incoherent crisis decision-making process,* coordination is applied as an intervening variable between the coherence and overlapped mandates and as a direct measure of coherence.

3.2. Coordination

As de Coning (2008) states "if coherence is the aim, then coordination is the activity through which coherence is pursued". Coordination has been always classified as an element of organization (Osifo 2012). It assumes that distinct components within an organization are linked with respect to their policy goals and tasks. From this perspective, coordination involves the creation of a common order for various separate elements *(ibid).* Herrhausen (2009) defines coordination as the process of bringing different elements in a system in order (Herhausen 2009 cited in Post 2015:113). Seybolt (2000) reviews coordination as a "search for efficiency in an organic whole, where diverse parts operate within a shared set of environmental, structural and procedural constraints and opportunities"(Seybolt 2000:3).

As maintained by Malone and Crowson (1994) coordination is a process of managing dependencies between activities. If there is no interdependence, there is nothing to coordinate (Beuselinck et al. 2007:89-91). In this context, coordination could be reviewed as "the interrelation of functions, structures, and resources in an organizational context, which can take place at different levels or posses different dimensions" (Viinamaki 2004 cited in Osifo 2012).

In the EU context, coordination is an ongoing effort to bring together different actors and governance levels across a broad range of policies with the aim to produce a coherent output, which is expected to provide an "effet utile" of the Union's external action as a whole

(Dashwood 2008:70). According to Keohane (1988:380) coordination is a result of cooperation which can be measured by the difference between the actual outcome and a situation that could be reached in the absence of coordination. However, a specific policy outcome is difficult to predict due to a lack of organizational means, as several factors might influence it *(ibid*). De Coning (2008:96) defines coordination as "planning, sharing information, agreeing on the division of roles, responsibilities and tasks and mobilizing organizational resources".

This definition merges two aspects of coordination. First, it reviews coordination as the outcome of inter-organizational relationships and, second, it comprises an effort to enhance coherence to overcome organizational fragmentation. This thesis applies de Coning's (2008) definition as the most appropriate evidence that the two concepts are interconnected: coordination is considered an instrument for achieving inter-institutional coherence (Duke 1999) and is seen as a term focused on the inter-institutional implementation of the coherence requirement in EU crisis management.

Whenever the coherence requirement is presented, the classic response of the Union to this task is to pay more attention to coordination as one of its main determining factors (Jordan and Schout 2006:201).

The EU recognizes the importance of enhancing coordination in its external actions. In addition, the main EU policy documents (European Commission 2007 b, European Commission 2013 b, Council 2008 a, EEAS 2016 a) address the coherence concern by emphasizing coordination throughout decision-making processes.

The EU Joint Communication on the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises developed by the Commission and HR/VP, as well as the Commission document on evaluating the role and application of the Maastricht Treaty, follow the so-called three Cs discussion on the need for coherence, coordination and complementarity between EU instruments and policies (European Commission 2007 b, 2013 b). The EU is in a unique position to make a significant contribution to complex crisis management situations, as it has a broad range of political, economic, civilian and military instruments at its disposal (Greco et al. 2010). The full range of

instruments available provides the EU with unique external capabilities, however, multiple lines of action and the players involved require a sound coordination(Rehrl and Glume 2017).

The EU`s Global Strategy puts forward a positive intention for the EU`s external action to "become more joined up", highlighting institutional developments implemented to achieve this goal, including the establishment of a double hated mandate of the HR/VP along with the Lisbon Treaty (EEAS 2016 a). As cited in the document "better coordination between institutions would also add coherence and spread best practices, helping us build a stronger Union and a more resilient, peaceful and sustainable world"(*ibid).*

Coordination can be characterized as either formal or informal (Lipson 2005, Christiansen et al. 2007, Comfort 2007), however, before choosing coordination mechanisms relevant to this thesis, it is worth observing the respective organizational structures that determine the nature of coordination in a particular organization. The basic forms of organizational structure are hierarchies and networks (Powell 1990:300). Hierarchies have clearly defined lines of authority, and coordination within hierarchical system is formalized with a strong emphasis on formal rules and routines *(ibid).* Coordination within a hierarchical organization is carried out using a top-down approach and with clearly determined accountability (Calabro 2011:8-10). Formal coordination mechanisms within a hierarchy form routines and rules that specify the responsibilities and tasks of organizational entities (*ibid*). Communication occurs via official channels which are described in official documents (Christiansen et al. 2007:24-25). In a network type of environment, organizations are independent and base their activities on consensus, trust and solidarity (Gittell and Weiss 2004:127-129). Coordination between network organizations is informal and is accomplished at the horizontal level via personal contact (*ibid*). Informal coordination mechanisms occur spontaneously, outside a formal organizational structure, when a specific need to manage existing interdependences arises between organizations *(ibid).* Thus, informal coordination mechanisms can be activated in the absence of formal coordination structures or in parallel with formal coordination mechanisms (*ibid).*

As the EU is characterized by multiple combinations of governance forms that range from networks to hierarchy, political decisions can be adopted and implemented by relying on either hierarchical or non-hierarchical coordination mechanisms (Scharpf 2000). Thus, in practice, the dissertation examines both formal and informal coordination mechanisms in the Security (CFSP) and Development Aid policy areas respectively.

Coordination is operationalized via assessing whether or not there was an exchange of information to divide tasks and mobilize resources during the overlap of inter-institutional mandates at each stage of the EU crisis decision-making process: planning and implementation. The empirical analysis in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 then displays the activation of specific coordination mechanisms in each phase of crisis decision-making process (in relation to CFSP and Development Aid).

3.2.1 Coordination Mechanisms in the Development Aid Policy Area

The operationalization of the intervening variable (coordination) in relation to Development Aid in the planning and implementation phases of crisis decision making process starts from the analysis of formal and informal information sharing instruments which aim to coordinate the overlap of inter-institutional mandates. It is worth mentioning that information sharing instruments may vary significantly between the planning and implementation stages due to the involvement of different institutional actors in each phase of crisis decision making process.

Planning Stage

The most common informal **i**nformation sharing instruments at the planning stage of crisis decision making process in the Development Aid are informal discussions between the institutional actors involved in the planning process. During the informal discussions the institutional actors have the opportunity to discuss the initiatives related to specific crisis measures and find mutually acceptable solutions to existing issues in the planning and implementation phases through inter-institutional negotiations (Think Tank Expert B 2018,

Former Diplomat 2018). During the IcSP programming phase the FPI, DEVCO and SECPOL.2 hold weekly and monthly meetings to broadly discuss the details of the programming process *(ibid*). During these meetings the FPI, DEVCO and SECPOL.2 share the individual documents related to IcSP planning with each other. In this way, they can get informed on each other's actions (*ibid*).

Formal information sharing tools at the planning stage of the crisis decision making process in relation to Development Aid are designed to develop the bottom-up and top-down coordination processes between the EUDELs and Brussels headquarters such as SECPOL.2, FPI and DEVCO (Former Policy Officer B 2019).

The EEAS Decision (Art. 5(3)) on working arrangements between the EEAS and Commission, obliges the Commission to provide the Head of EUDEL a simultaneous copy of its instructions to its services within EUDEL (European Commission 2012 a). These instructions are implemented under the overall responsibility of the Head of EUDEL (*ibid*).

In addition, EUDELs have established specific direct reporting lines with the relevant Commission DGs and Services such as DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, FPI, systematically copying the EEAS (European Commission 2012 a).

Internal exchange of information within the Commission in relation to the management of Commission resources in EUDEL is carried out via COMDEL (European Commission 2012 b). The latter involves the Commission DGs and Services with staff in delegations. The COMDEL meets on a monthly basis at Director level. Occasionally, the COMDEL shall meet with the representatives from all home DGs and adopt its own internal rules (i*bid*).

Implementation Stage

During the implementation of the EU led programs in the Development Aid policy area EUDELs share the information they possess on the ground with the FPI, DG DEVCO and SECPOL.2 in Brussels.

However, since there are not hierarchical relations between the main actors on the ground:EUDEL and CSDP mission administration, EUSR administration and EUDEL, formal information exchange tools are not used to coordinate the functional overlap of their mandates, if any (Former Diplomat 2018). Thus, the exchange of information is carried out spontaneously whenever the actors are involved in collective discussions in the form of informal small coordination committees or information exchange platforms consisting of the Head of the EUDEL, the Head of the CSDP Mission, CSDP Project Manager and the EUSR *(ibid).*

The hybrid nature of HR/VP provides an opportunity to coordinate the implementation of the EU led Development Aid programs in relation to crisis management (Academic Expert B 2017). Holding the mandate of the vice president of the Commission, the HR/VP is mandated to participate in the RELEX group meetings, and thereby enhance exchange of information within that group, as well as the implementation of EU external assistance instruments (DCI, IcSP, ENI) within the competence of the Commission *(ibid*).

At the same time, based on the decision establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS, the management of the IcSP programming is now shared between the EEAS and the Commission under the authority of the HR/VP (Council 2010 Art.9 cited in Lavallee 2013:382). Thus, it is expected that the HR/VP, who heads the EEAS and has direct authority over the FPI, will coordinate the implementation of both short term and long term components of the IcSP.

3.2.2 Coordination Mechanisms in the Security (CFSP) Policy Area

Planning Stage

In relation to CFSP the Planning Teams and joint TAMs are considered as the key information sharing tools at the informal level (EEAS Officer E 2018, Former Desk Officer B 2019). Planning Teams are formed by the CMPD and involve participants from the EEAS and Commission on behalf of the SECPOL.2, CPCC, GEO Desks, FPI and DG DEVCO during the planning process of OPLAN. The Planning Teams enable the CPCC and FPI to share their reports on their individual assessment of the overall security situation on the ground and mission prospects (*ibid*).

TAMs aim to enhance mutual exchange of information between the CSDP actors such as the CPCC, SECPOL.2, FPI, DG DEVCO, GEO Desks and CMPD which conduct joint trips into the field to get fresh information on the ongoing mission and evaluate the perspectives of a possible continuation of a mission (Former EEAS Official I 2019). The TAM process can take up to six months and must be planned in advance in order to be successful (*Ibid*).

In the CFSP policy area the formal information sharing tools at the planning stage of the crisis decision-making process were the CROC division, which was dissolved in 2012, and the Crisis Platform which is active until now.

The CROC department was established in 2010 with the aim of improving the coherence and coordination of EU external action, especially in the area of crisis management (Terkovich 2014:1). This department was established as one of the key foreign policy innovations of the Lisbon Treaty (*ibid*). The CROC division was responsible not only for the overall coordination of EU crisis management tools, but "also functioned as a clearing house and crisis actor of "first resort" being able to deploy early warning capabilities" (*ibid*).

The CROC division was mandated to provide a first assessment of an emerging crisis and coordinate the whole crisis response process via activating the EU Crisis Response System, which includes the Crisis Platform, the EU Situation Room and the Crisis Management Board

(EEAS 2016 c). The department was also mandated to coordinate the activities of EEAS GEO desks jointly with the CPCC during the mission implementation process (EEAS Official H 2019).

The Crisis Platform is another formal information sharing instrument introduced by the HR/VP after the Lisbon Treaty (EEAS 2016 c). The Crisis Platform is a temporary coordination mechanism and is activated in response to an outbreak of an acute crisis in order to coordinate all relevant EU crisis management actors (*ibid*). The Crisis Platform can be activated and chaired either by the HR/VP or the EEAS Executive Secretary General (*ibid).*

Meeting on an ad-hoc basis, the Crisis Platform consists of the relevant EEAS services, as well as the relevant Commission services and the General Secretariat of the Council services (Batora et al. 2016). The Crisis Platform represents the most extensive tool for inter-institutional coordination as it facilitates information sharing between the relevant units of the EEAS such as the CMPD, CPCC, CIVCOM, EUMC, EUMS, EU INTCEN and Commission Services such as the DG ECHO, DG NEAR, DG DEVCO and the FPI) (*ibid).*

Implementation Stage

The functional duplications during the implementation of CSDP missions and mediation activities in the CFSP are mostly coordinated through informal information sharing tools (EEAS Official C 2018). In order to avoid functional overlaps and to foster a genuine culture of information sharing between the EUDELs, CSDP missions and the EUSR administration, usually small, informal coordination committees are created, consisting of the EUSR, Head of EUDEL, Head of CSDP Mission and Project Manager of the Mission (*ibid).* During these committee meetings the CSDP Project Manager and the Deputy Head of the Mission prepare and send their joint report on the planned mission activities on the ground to the EUSR and to the Head of EUDEL so as to avoid duplications between their activities in the future (*ibid*).

In the pre-Lisbon period the only formal coordination mechanism at the implementation level was the Commission's Crisis Room, which was created in 2001 and hosted the infrastructure of

the DG RELEX duty system, providing a platform for exchange of information between the Commission Headquarters in Brussels and the EUDELs during acute crises (EEAS Official D 2018).

After Lisbon the HR/VP has gained a crucial role in the implementation of the EU`s CFSP. She assists the Council and Commission in ensuring coherence between the different areas of the EU`s foreign policy (Art. 21(3) TEU). Chairing the FAC and holding the post of the Vice President of the Commission the HR is mandated to coordinate the implementation of EU civilian and military missions in the conflict affected areas, as well as the mediation and dialogue activities conducted by the EUSRs in the third countries (Former Policy Officer A 2019).

The aforementioned information sharing instruments are key elements of the EU crisis response system that are expected to impede institutional fragmentation in EU crisis management. The challenge is now to make these instruments work in practice.

3.3. Coherence

The measurement of abstract concepts remains of the most challenging tasks in empirical research in the field of social sciences (Bhattacherjee 2012).

Quantitative measurement procedures often focus on the reliability and accuracy of measurements, which underestimates extremely complex situations and enables the researcher to "move down the ladder abstraction and draw simplified conclusions about the observed variables" (Phillips 2001:12). Quantitative research targets "those aspects of social behavior which can be quantified and patterned, rather than just identifying them and interpreting their meanings the people bring to their own action"(Rahman 2016).

However, in quantitative research, the researcher is detached from the observed participants or objects, which undermines his/her ability to study phenomena more deeply within its natural settings (Eyisi 2016). It means that the participants themselves are not able to contribute to the study: the researcher is in the driver`s seat (Bryman 2001:286 cited in Eyisi 2016).

Observation of the main causes of inter-institutional incoherence of EU crisis decision making process, requires an intense interaction with the target audience- institutional agents, therefore, the application of the quantitative measurement method can not generate the desired empirical results.

Unlike quantitative measurement methods, qualitative research methods are focused on "people's belief, experience and meaning systems from the perspective of the people"(Brink 1993). The qualitative measurement design can be constructed and reconstructed to a greater extent (Maxwell 2012 cited in Rahman 2016). In this way participants are free to determine what is consistent for them (Flick 2011 cited in Rahman 2016). As a result, this can help to understand complex concepts easily (Rahman 2016). As coherence is a complex concept in nature, and the non-rational dimension of "bureaucratic politics" focuses on the individual`s values, beliefs and cognitive sensitivities (see section 2.5), this thesis considers a qualitative measurement method to empirically assess coherence.

Coherence is assessed via an indicator which resonates very closely with its conceptual definition: *coherence is the degree to which EU institutional actors operate a well coordinated process of deliberation and decision making* (Christiansen 2001:747).

In this context, coordination becomes an instrument to enhance the coherence of EU crisis decision making process at the planning and operational levels. Coherence is therefore considered an outcome of successful coordination.

Thus, one can assess coherence by considering the extent to which formal and informal coordination mechanisms have been activated to abolish the overlap of inter-institutional mandates in each phase of crisis decision-making process.

This study assesses coherence as a binary and nominal variable. This means that if coordination mechanisms have been activated to impede the overlap of inter-institutional mandates, the crisis decision-making process is considered to be coherent. If, on the other hand, coordination mechanisms have not been activated to impede the further overlap of inter-institutional

mandates, the crisis decision-making process is considered to be incoherent (see the figure below).



Figure 12:Operationilzing Coherence. Source:own compilation based on the Analytical Framework(see section 2.5).

In this thesis, an approach using a nominal assessment of variables will make it possible to identify all activated coordination mechanisms during the overlap of inter-institutional mandates in order to find out whether these coordination mechanisms have contributed to coherent planning and implementation processes in the CFSP and Development Aid or not.

3.4. The Causal Structure of Variables

After demonstrating estimates of independent, intervening and dependent variables, this section is designed to develop a causal sequence that will explain the course of interaction between the three main variables. In this context, the process tracing technique is adapted to the causal process to characterize the phenomenon-coherence, being investigated (George and Bennett 2005). One of the most commonly used methods for analyzing a causal process is a linear causality: a direct chain of events characterizing a complex concept (*ibid*). Such an approach helps to illustrate the causal sequence between independent, intervening and dependent variables, in which the independent variable may be a necessary cause of the intervening variable, and the intervening variable may influence the dependent variable (Simeonova 2014:342-343).

Thus, this thesis applies a linear causality method to illustrate the causal relation between dependent, independent and intervening variables, because the sequence of their interaction has a linear pattern: overlap of inter-institutional mandates creates a direct need for coordination,

and the activation or non-activation of coordination mechanisms affects the dependent variable- coherence.

In this thesis overlap of inter-institutional mandates, coordination and coherence are assessed as binary and nominal variables. Thus, the nominal categorization of variables serves as a preliminary step in assessing the extent to which coordination serves as the link between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence.

Nominal assessment has two characteristics that apply to all measurement levels: the evaluated variables must be mutually exclusive and both exhaustive (Dixon et al. 2016:117). Mutual exclusivity means that "the persons or things being classified must not fit into more than one category" (Dixon et al. 2016:117). Mutually exhaustive measurement indicates that there must be a sufficient number categories, so that all the evaluated persons or subjects can fit into one of the categories (*ibid).*

Thus, the three variables in this study- coherence, coordination and overlap of inter-institutional mandates, are assessed applying *Coherent/Incoherent, Activated/Not Activated, Overlap/No Overlap* matrix respectively. The figure below shows the graphic illustration of the main hypotheses during the crisis planning process, in relation to the CFSP. The same causal process is applied during the planning phase in the Development Aid policy area.



Figure 13. Source:own compilation based on the Analytical Framework(see section 2.5)

The causality between the three variables is traced over a certain period of time at a particular crisis decision making stage for each policy area. Thus, the causal relation between the overlapping mandates, coordination and coherence in the CFSP for the 2003-2016 time period is traced at the planning level, and then the outcome is compared with the result of the traced causal sequence of variables in the Development Aid planning process during 2010-2016. The same approach is used during the implementation phases of CFSP and Development Aid.

The final comparison of sub cases summarizes the results together and helps to discover cross-case patterns. A cross-case comparison can help to detect the cases which confirm or reject the causal relation between coherence, coordination and overlap of inter-institutional mandates in different policy area(s), stages of decision-making and time periods (before and after Lisbon).

The tables below illustrate the operationalization of each variable in the two main policy areas: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid.

Operationaliza-ton of Variables	Common Foreign Security Policy(CFSP)				
	The Main Actors	**Inter-institutional Mandates**	**Coordination Mechanisms**		**Crisis Decision Making Process**
Planning	Civilian Planning Conduct Capability(CPCC), Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management(DG E IX) Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management(CIVCOM), Directorate General External Relations(DG RELEX), Geographic Desks(GEO Desks), Head of Mission(HoM), Crisis Response Operational Coordination Department(CROC).	Overlap/No Overlap	Planning Teams	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
		Overlap/No Overlap	Technical Assessment Missions(TAM)	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
		Overlap/No Overlap	Crisis Platform	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
Implementation	Directorate General External Relations(DG RELEX), EU Special Representative(EUSR) EU Delegation(EUDEL) EU Monitoring Mission(EUMM)	Overlap/No Overlap	Small Coordination Committees	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
			Informal Discussions	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
			HR/VP	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent

Table 1. Source: own compilation based on the analytical framework (see section 2.5)

Operationaliza-tion of Variables	Development Aid				
	The Main Actors	**Inter-institutional Mandates**	**Coordination Mechanisms**		**Crisis Decision Making Process**
Planning	Foreign Policy Instruments Service(FPI), Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation Unit(SECPOL.2)	Overlap/No Overlap	Informal Discussions/Joint Meetings	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
			HR/VP	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
	Fragility and Crisis Management Unit(FCMU), Foreign Policy Instruments Service(FPI), Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation Unit(SECPOL.2)	Overlap/No Overlap	Informal Discussions, Joint Meetings	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
	Fragility and Crisis Management Unit(FCMU), Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation Unit(SECPOL.2)	Overlap/No Overlap	COMDEL	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
Implementation	EU Monitoring Mission(EUMM), EU Delegation(EUDEL)	Overlap/No Overlap	Small Coordination Committees	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent

		Overlap/No Overlap	HR/VP	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
	Fragility and Crisis Management Unit(FCMU), EU Delegation(EUDEL)	Overlap/No Overlap	Joint Reporting	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
	EU Special Representative (EUSR) EU Delegation(EUDEL)	Overlap/No Overlap	Formally established information sharing system	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent
			HR/VP	Activated/Not Activated	Coherent/Incoherent

Table 2. Source: own compilation based on the analytical framework (see section 2.5)

Conclusion

This chapter served as the basis for developing measurable indicator(s) to operationalize the independent (overlapping mandates), intervening (coordination) and dependent (coherence) variables within both policy areas (CFSP and Development Aid) of EU crisis management and at two stages of the crisis decision-making process: planning and implementation.

The operationalization of overlapping mandates began with the identification of the main institutional actors and the assessment of their mandates in the two policy areas of EU crisis management, CFSP and Development Aid, during the 2003-2016 time period. Here the main objective was to identify functional duplications in each policy area and at the planning and implementation stages, which would help to empirically assess the possible impact of the observed functional duplications on the coherence of EU crisis decision-making process.

The operationalization of the intervening variable, coordination, went through different stages, the first of which provided multiple definitions of the concept and chose the most suitable definition for assessing the causal relation between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence. De Coning's definition of coordination was chosen as a working definition of "coordination": "planning, sharing information, agreeing on the division of roles, responsibilities and tasks and mobilizing resources" (De Coning 2008). Based on its working definition and the fact that the EU is characterized by different combinations of governance levels that range from networks to hierarchy, coordination was operationalized through formal and informal information sharing mechanisms within the CFSP and Development Aid policy areas at each stage of decision making.

Coherence was assessed based on qualitative measures, as it was shown that quantitative approaches are not suitable for measuring abstract concepts such as coherence. This unsuitability

is due to the fact that quantitative measures often underestimate the important parameters of abstract concepts (see section 3.3).

Similarly to coordination, coherence was operationalized based on its working definition: a well-coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making (Christiansen 2001:747). However, it should be noted, that coordination and coherence are not the same: coordination aims to ensure the coherence of a process or a decision taken, but coherence may or may not be the outcome of coordination. In this context, coherence was viewed as an outcome of successful coordination and was assessed as a binary and nominal variable, which means that if coordination mechanisms are activated, the crisis decision making process becomes coherent, and if coordination mechanisms are not activated, the crisis decision making process becomes incoherent.

After finalizing the operationalization of three variables, the last section of the chapter developed three main causal chains, demonstrating the process of interaction between independent, intervening and dependent variables in both policy areas of EU crisis management for the indicated time period (2003-2016). The following Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology, including case selection, case analysis and data collection methods.

Chapter 4: Research Methodology

The EU crisis management consists of multiple institutional actors operating in the same policy area and fulfilling similar commitments, which might cause duplications in fulfilling their institutional mandates (Hoffmann 2010:214). The thesis aims to demonstrate that the overlap of the inter-institutional mandates leads to incoherent crisis decision-making processes in the two main policy areas of EU crisis management:Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. In order to test the main hypotheses developed in section 2.5, this chapter provides the rationale for case selection, case analysis and data collection.

The first section of the chapter identifies the main case study. The case(s) relevant for testing the main argument are selected from the population of the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus. The case(s) are chosen based on the "typical case" study method via targeting those conflict(s) in the South Caucasus to which the EU responses have been incoherent (Seawright and Gerring 2008:294). The section then proceeds with presenting the selected sub-cases, embedded analytical units and a research time frame.

In the second section, the chapter presents the methods of the case analysis. Here a within case analysis via process tracing examines the responses of the main analytical units(institutional agents) to the South Ossetian conflict. Afterwards a cross-case comparison is proposed to identify common patterns between the sub-cases for each historical time period in each policy area.

In the final section of the chapter, the main data collection methods are discussed. The first method is a document analysis, which includes both primary and secondary sources. The primary documents refer to EU official documents such as the statements made by the HR/VP, EUSR, and EUMM, the reports made by the Council and European Parliament, and Commission staff

working documents. The primary document analysis is followed by secondary document analysis, such as research and evaluation papers written by various Brussels-based think tanks, international organizations and academic experts. Semi-structured interviews conducted with EU officials and diplomats in 2018 and 2019 are an additional source of information.

4.1. Case Selection Methods

The thesis applies a "single-case embedded design in which the EU institutional agents constitute the embedded analytical units (Yin 2009:157). A case study is a helpful method to "examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms and to address a causal complexity" (George and Bennett 2005:48). Causal mechanisms are defined as, "a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts". (Glennan 1996:53).

A case study design should be applied if multiple variables of interest exist than data points, the research relies on various sources of evidence and there is an opportunity to benefit from the prior development of theoretical premises to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 2009:18). This is particularly consistent with an analysis of the impact of EU complex inter-institutional machinery on the coherence of EU crisis decision-making processes. However, one concern with case studies is that they might be less generalizable than those of large-sample, quantitative methods because of the small-N problem (Gerring 2007 cited in Tsang 2013:369). In case studies "internal case comparability is prioritized over external case representativeness" (Gerring 2004:348).

However, case studies rely on analytic generalization, rather than on statistical generalization (Yin 2009:43). The analytic generalization compares the results of a case study and makes conclusions with regard to a previously developed theory, and does not draw inferences from

data to a population *(ibid*). Applying analytic generalization, this thesis is intended to illustrate how the case study findings confirm the basic argument of the thesis, developed in accordance with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical premise.

The case selection in this study has two main objectives: the chosen case should be from a representative sample and the case should illustrate a typical example for testing the causality between the dependent, independent and intervening variables. In other words, the chosen case should be feasible to test the main hypotheses.

The first criterion, case representativeness, assumes that the selected case(s) should represent a given population (Gerring 2001:182). In this context the case(s) first need to be geographically located in the South Caucasus. At the first stage the research chooses all relevant conflicts which are located in the South Caucasus, as it aims to study the incoherence of EU crisis management in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Here the main focus lies on the three frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus: the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, and the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, which are the only frozen conflicts in the region. However, it is also important to evaluate the feasibility of each case in terms of testing the main hypotheses based on the analytical framework developed in section 2.5. Under the second criterion, since this thesis analyzes the incoherence of EU crisis decision making process, it is logical to choose the most common or typical conflicts in which the EU institutional engagement has been incoherent. In other words, the selected case(s) also need to demonstrate a vivid example of EU inability to develop a coherent crisis response to each conflict.

In relation to the frozen conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, the EU does not have a mandate, and therefore legitimacy to perform the role of mediator, as the

OSCE Minsk Group has been granted the role of mediator since 1994(Ghazaryan 2010). Thus, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is not a relevant potential example.

Regarding the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the EU has been mainly engaged in crisis management through Member States : France, Germany and the UK have been involved through the UN leaving less room for the EU institutions play a vital role in crisis management (Popescu 2007). This means that the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is likewise not a feasible case for further study, as the main focus of the research is to observe the influence of the overlap of inter-institutional mandates on the coherence of the EU crisis decision-making process.

The last case studied is the frozen Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, in which, in contrast to Abkhazia, EU institutions have greater engagement in terms of managing the crisis and no member state has been present (Popescu 2007). Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that the engagement of multiple institutional actors in the field after the the Russian-Georgian war over South-Ossetia, including the two EUSRs, the Commission Delegation, the EUMM, created confusion on the ground and thus undermined the coherence and effectiveness of EU`s mediation capacity (Dudouet and Dresssler 2016, Ebenthal and Dudouet 2016).

Lastly, the political context and dynamics of violence in South Ossetia provide particular significant attention for targeting the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Compared to Abkhazia, South Ossetia has experienced three escalations of violence: The first outbreak occurred in 1989, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the second phase of the escalation was in 2004, in the wake of the Rose Revolution, and the final stage of escalation was the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia (ICG 2010). In terms of security, it is much more difficult for the EU to control the area surrounding the region of South Ossetia (Roki tunnel-the main route linking Russia to Georgia), than the territory around Abkhazia, because of its distance

(Tskinvali is about 100 km from Tbilisi): this makes South Ossetia an attractive place for organized crime and smuggling activities(Oxford Analytica 2008). In addition, the presence of Russian troops and fencing activities along the administrative lines dividing South Ossetia and Georgia have made the security situation in the region highly critical (Boyle 2017).

Based on the above-mentioned reasons, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict is considered as the primary case study in order to test the main hypotheses developed in the analytical framework (see section 2.5). Thus, a single case study research design is applied.

Although the multiple case study design allows the researcher to simultaneously analyze the data within each case and across cases, exploring either contrasting or similar results, the single case study design has several advantages over a multiple case study design (Yin 2009:156-157). Single case studies are better suited for studying one single thing or group of people (*ibid).* Single case studies are idiographic, they give the researcher an in-depth understanding of the research subject and thoroughly describe the existence of a certain phenomenon (*ibid*).

A single case study design allows the researcher to analyze the data within the case as well as investigate multiple sub-units or sub-cases within the case (Yin 1984:27).

Single case studies require fewer participants and are therefore easier to implement, as they require less time than multiple case studies (Yin 1984:17-23). This makes single case studies to be suitable for conducting longitudinal observations, as they "provide a systematic way of observing the events, collecting data, analyzing information, and reporting the results over a long period of time" *(*Zaynal 2007).

Considering the above-mentioned in favor of a single case design, the thesis applies a single case study research design with embedded analytical units.

Observing the inter-institutional coherence in relation to the frozen Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, the research targets the EU institutional agents as embedded analytical units, engaged in the planning and implementation phases of EU crisis response actions in this conflict.

This approach aims to illustrate how EU institutional agents act in the planning and implementation stages of EU crisis management and create an array of evidence demonstrating how the overlap of inter-institutional mandates can influence the EU crisis decision making process.

The next step is to look at specific policy areas or sub cases, which are relevant to analyze the influence of inter-institutional mandate overlaps on the coherence of crisis decision making process. Thus, the research extends to the following policy areas of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. These two policy areas are centralized in the European Security Strategy (Council 2003a) and in the joint Communication by the Commission and the HR/VP on the EU`s Comprehensive Approach to external crises (European Commission 2013b). In addition, the EU has been engaged in the South Caucasus via short term and long term crisis management tools from both policy areas: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid(see section 6.2 and section 7.2).

For the purpose of the thesis, the two main components of CFSP are considered for further analysis: CSDP missions in third countries and political dialogues and peace talks involving EUSRs (see section 3.11). As part of the CFSP, CSDP covers the Union's military operations and civilian missions that the EU has deployed around the world (Barbieri 2016 et al.). For the purposes of the study, the main EU activities in the context of Development Aid highlighted in this thesis include acute crisis management, post crisis reconciliation, post crisis economic reconstruction and development and capacity building (see section 7.1). Here the central focus is

on the EU's financial instruments dealing with crisis management, rather than on humanitarian assistance programs.

The EU engagement in the frozen Georgian-South Ossetian conflict is analyzed both at the planning and implementation stages of the crisis decision making process; the implementation phase may differ from the planned one, as the implementation phase might include different actors and coordination mechanisms.

After selecting the main case study, the sub-cases and the main analytical units, it is worthwhile to set a case boundary or case time frame. The EU engagement in the frozen Georgian-South Ossetian conflict is studied for the 2003-2016 period in the planning and implementation levels within each policy area. Before 2003 the EU was not present as crisis manager in the South Caucasus; its presence was limited to, providing humanitarian assistance to the region followed by the PCAs (see section 6.1). The EU involvement in the South Caucasus has increased dramatically since 2003, following the appointment of the first EUSR for the South Caucasus in 2003, deployment of an unarmed EUMM in Georgia, and the launch of the IfS in 2007. The EU has further expanded its institutional capacity since 2010 as a result of adopting the Lisbon Treaty. Several structural changes have been made in relation to the CFSP, such as creating the HR/VP mandate, establishing the EEAS, and within the EEAS the CMPD, with its civil-military coherence mandate, and the unit SECPOL.2 which played a crucial role in the strategic planning of EU post- crisis response measures falling under the IcSP. In addition, the EU introduced the COBERM funded by the IcSP and implemented by the UNDP (see section 7.1). Thus, given the EU gradual engagement in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict within 2013-2016, it becomes relevant to test and compare the main hypotheses developed in section 2.5 before and after Lisbon.

In sum, this thesis chooses an embedded single case study research design. The embedded analytical units are EU institutional agents responsible for the planning and implementation of EU crisis response measures in the two main policy areas: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, which also serve as sub cases of the research (see Figure 14).



Figure 14.Source: own compilation adapted from Yin (2009: 46-47)

4.2. Case Analysis Methods

The research considers a within case study analysis as the most relevant approach to examine the impact of the independent variable (overlap of inter-institutional mandates) on the dependent variable (coherence) through the developed causal chain in section 3.4. Applying a within case study approach, the research aims to test the developed hypotheses within the selected sub-cases and compare those results across these sub-cases in the planning and implementation levels.

The causal relation between the independent, dependent and intervening variables is assessed through a process tracing method in two sub cases or policy areas: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid.

Process tracing method involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable(s) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett 2005:206). Process tracing therefore has a great potential for making causal inference in single cases (within-case inferences) and allows to study causal mechanisms in social science (*ibid).*

Thus process tracing goes beyond the correlation methods, it attempts to unpack the intervening causal mechanisms between conditions and outcomes, analyzing the development of a sequence of events over time (Berkowitch et al. 2009:76) .

Process tracing is useful to apply in the context of the "bureaucratic politics" analytical framework. Process tracing allows "to explore the perceptions, expectations and political interactions of the actors inside the *black box* of decision making" *(ibid*). In this context, the process tracing can fully replicate the reactions of individual, institutional agents during the planning and implementation phases of the EU crisis decision making process.

Forms of process tracing include: theory testing, theory building and explaining a historical outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013:6). As the research aims to posit the causal link between the independent (overlap of inter-institutional mandates), intervening (coordination) and dependent (coherence) variables and test whether the developed causal mechanism(s) are verified or falsified by empirical evidence, a theory testing process tracing method is considered the right case analysis approach for this study. A theory testing process tracing method helps to make inferences on the existence and functioning of a more general, parsimonious theorized causal mechanism(s) between the observable variables within the selected case (Beach and Pedersen 2013:2).

Four separate process tracings were performed, two for each sub-case. The planning and implementation processes of EU crisis response actions were traced separately within each sub case and a given time period (2013-2016).

After finalizing the process tracing within each sub-case, a cross-case analysis was applied to identify common patterns or differences between the Security (CFSP) and Development policy areas in the planning and operational phases of EU crisis decision making process before and after Lisbon.

Cross-case analysis extends the researcher`s expertise beyond the single case, provoking the researcher's imagination, prompting new questions, revealing new dimensions, producing alternatives, generating models, and constructing ideals and utopias (Stretton 1969 cited in Khan and VanWynsberge 2008).

In addition, cross case analysis allows the researcher to compare cases from one or more parameters, communities or groups (Khan and VanWynsberge 2008). This makes it possible to learn from different cases and collect critical evidence for policy change (*ibid).*

The application of a two level case analysis helped to test the three main hypotheses plus the null hypothesis in the prism of "bureaucratic politics" via within-case format for each sub case and decision making level, and then conduct a cross-case comparison as an additional data analysis tool to evaluate the main empirical findings across the two sub cases.

4.3. Data Collection Methods

This section describes the data collection strategies aimed to address the central research argument of the thesis in the framework of "bureaucratic politics" premise. Data collection is the process of collecting information from all relevant sources that enables one to answer stated research questions, test hypotheses, and evaluate outcomes (Kabir 2016).

In this thesis the theory testing process tracing method is applied to analyze the empirical data. In process tracing one can examine histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources, to see whether a proposed theory hypothesizes in a case is in fact evident in the sequence of the intervening variables in that case (George and Bennett 2005:6).

The following sections provide a detailed overview of the two main methods of data collection: document analysis and interviewing.

4.3.1. Document Analysis

Document analysis is a type of qualitative research, through which the researcher can evaluate the meaning of documents along with other types of data, to support the research findings(Smulowitz 2017).

In this research the key document collection sources are primary and secondary sources, which helped to trace the EU crisis response cycle at the planning and operational levels. The primary sources relevant for the analysis are 1) public documents of EU institutions that are directly related to EU crisis planning and implementation processes, such as Council Conclusions and Decisions, EEAS Annual Activity Reports, Commission Staff Working documents, EUSR Mandate Implementation reports, EUMM Press Releases on Georgia and etc. 2) EU internal documents or so called "sensitive unclassified documents" on crisis policy planning and implementation processes, which are not disclosed to the public and are possible to request only in rare cases. Only a limited number of EU internal documents were requested via a special document request form, based on regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (Quintanilla et al. 2013).

Secondary or external data sources are related to the information which is obtained from outside as either public source or someone else, who have already worked or encountered on the specific subject (Baral 2017:91). This type of data can be obtained in the form of published and unpublished documents, and public and private documents (Myneni 2014 cited in Baral 2017:91). The secondary documents through which data was collected during this study include various types of research publications from academics and policy observers, as well as think tanks and international organizations working on EU foreign policy and crisis management. However, the document analysis was not sufficient to obtain more detailed information on the EU internal decision making processes, including EU officials and diplomats directly involved in these processes. For that purpose there was a need to combine the document analysis with semi structured interviews.

4.3.2. Semi-Structured Interviews

The interview is a verbal method of securing data: it may be conducted face to face or over the telephone or through an online process (Baral 2017:100). Interviews, including elite interviews, are very relevant for case study methods with process tracing approaches, as "process tracing involves the analysis of political developments at the highest level and elite actors are often the key sources of information about the political processes of interest" (Tansey 2007:766). The elite interviews help to verify what has been established from other sources, reconstruct events or decision-making episodes, improve understanding of what many relevant actors thinks and thereby enhance the researcher`s ability to directly address hypothesized causal mechanisms (*ibid*).

In many cases the published legal documents do not de jure reflect the EU policy making and implementation processes, as well as the actions of EU institutional actors, that occur de facto (Think Tank Expert C 2019). Through elite interviewing, it is possible to collect extensive information about the opinions and attitudes of key elites on central issues (Tansey 2007:766-767)." Thus, interviews allow "to collect first-hand testimony from direct participants and witnesses regarding critical events and processes"(*ibid).*

The interviewees were chosen applying a non-probability sampling technique. In non-probability sampling, subjective judgement plays a significant role in the sampling process, as the researcher decides which units of the population to include in the interview (Henry 1990 cited in Tansey 2007:768). This kind of strategy does not aim to make generalizations from the selected sample to the whole population, but rather to get information from the individuals who were/are involved in EU crisis planning and implementation processes or who held relevant expertise in that specific area.

Thus the identification of the relevant audience for interviews was based on the two main criteria. The first technique is called positional sampling, since it involves the selection of all relevant players based on the their positions in the organization (Tansey 2007:770). In this context the interviewees were selected on the basis of their occupations, because their work was related to EU crisis management, as evidenced by the title of their position and the name of their units, or because of their expertise in the selected region. However, when it was difficult to find potential interviewees, a snowball sampling technique was applied to identify the key individuals who occupied the specific positions of interest (Tansey 2007:770). Such a method involved requesting the previous respondents to suggest other EU officials, diplomats or academic experts, who might be closely involved with or informed about the administrative and political issues related to EU crisis decision-making processes. However, the main risk here is that the representativeness of the sample is not guaranteed, because the interviewed officials and diplomats could refer those with whom they are associated and who have similar traits (Gabor 2007). To overcome this selection bias, the data collected from both outlined methods was cross checked.

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, as semi structured interviews are more flexible in nature: the questions have an open ended format and an interviewee can easily add any information or suggest additional topics during the interview (Yin 2009:107-108). The main idea of conducting semi-structured interviews is to reflect the respondent`s own opinions and beliefs on a particular topic *(ibid*).

In total, forty interviews were conducted between 2017 and 2019, from which twenty four were conducted in the CFSP policy area and sixteen in the Development Aid policy area. The number

of interviews conducted in the CFSP was higher than in the Development Aid, as the CFSP institutional arena was significantly crowded compared to the Development Aid.

However, interviews might have also multiple sources of bias. First, the respondents might not be able to recall some specific details of an event which happened long ago (Tourangeau et al., 2000 in Kaminska and Foulsham 2013). Second, interviews can be subject to social desirability bias *(ibid*). The most common source of social desirability bias is the respondent's lack of confidence in expressing his or her true positions or feelings (*ibid).* It is believed that respondents act in such a way so as to avoid the embarrassment and anxiety, which socially undesirable answers may bring (*ibid*). Such condition was noticed, especially among the currently employed EU officials and academic experts, rather than among those who no more hold these positions. Finally, respondents might intentionally alter or omit answers, due to personal or professional reasons (Sarantakos 1998:259). Considering the aforementioned reasons for bias, the data collected from interviews was verified against the information collected from alternative source(s).

Conclusion

The chapter described the research methodology applying an embedded single case study approach. A single case study research design was chosen to test the main hypotheses developed in accordance with the analytical framework (see section 2.5). The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict was considered the most feasible case for exploring the coherence of EU crisis decision making processes in the Security(CFSP) and Development Aid policy domains. In terms of case analysis, process tracing was proposed to apply; due to its ability to make the researcher develop strong inferences within each case and a great potential of studying causal mechanisms. Such an

approach is in line with the operationalization of independent, dependent and intervening variables previously mentioned in Chapter 3.

Four process tracings were performed two per policy area, Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, since all the three hypotheses were tested separately within each policy area at the planning and implementation levels. In addition, a cross-case analysis was conducted to identify common features and differences between the two sub cases/policy areas and decision making processes before and after Lisbon.

The time frame for the study was established as 2003-2016, because the EU engagement in South Ossetia as a crisis manager began in 2003, and the EU institutional structure had changed significantly since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in 2010. Thus, it was also important to include 2010 onwards, to follow the main institutional developments before and after Lisbon.

The chapter also discussed the two main data collection methods - document analysis and interviews-which provided the necessary empirical ground for drawing conclusions.

The document analysis was based on primary sources, such as public and non-public documents, as well as secondary sources such as research studies and reports. The document analysis was succeeded by semi-structured interviews, which applied the non-probability sampling technique when identifying the respondents. This method was chosen to target those actors who have/had a direct connection with the planning or implementation processes of EU crisis response measures in relation to CFSP and Development Aid, based on their mandates. As some interviews could be subject to social desirability bias and deliberate or unintentional distortion of information by the respondents, the interview responses were verified against the information collected from alternative source(s). A summary of the methodology is briefly illustrated in the figure below.



Figure 15. Source: own compilation adapted from Yin (2009:50-52)

The next step is the transition to empirical analysis, which applies the developed analytical framework to analyze the EU crisis response measures in two main policy areas: Secutiy(CFSP)

and Development Aid. The empirical part of the thesis begins with the introduction of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and its main mediation mechanisms.

Chapter 5: The Evolution of the Georgian- South Ossetian Conflict

Before starting the empirical analysis of the collected data, it is crucial to provide a descriptive overview of the origins of the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict and its evolution since the early Soviet days.

The chapter proceeds in three steps: the first section provides an introduction to the region of South Ossetia, including an overview of the region`s geography, population, religion and economic situation.

The second section observes the history of relations between Georgia and South Ossetia discussing the conflicting historical claims on the territory of South Ossetia presented by both sides.

The third section describes the evolution of the conflict over the territory of South Ossetia and the existing mediating mechanisms after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

5.1. Introduction to the Region of South Ossetia

South Ossetia occupies an area of 3,900 square kilometers with two large towns: Tskhinvali and Java. The region is located along the northern border of Georgia in the southern foothills of the Caucasian Mountain Range, bordering the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic of the Russian Federation (ICG 2004).

South Ossetia is a home to an ethnic group distinct from both the Georgians and Russians (Ratliff 2006). When Georgia came under Soviet rule in 1923, the Soviet Government granted South Ossetia the status of being the South Ossetian Autonomous Region within the Soviet Republic of Georgia(*ibid).* Meanwhile, North Ossetia was left under the domain of Russia, thus splitting Ossetia into Northern and Southern regions(*ibid).*

The Ossetians descend from the Alans, a Sarmatian tribe of Iranian stock and speak their own language which is Ossetian. Ossetian language belongs to the subgroup of Eastern-Iranian group of the Indo-European family of languages (CAIS 1998). Today, both South and North Ossetians use the Cyrillic alphabet, but in the old days they used Greek, Latin and Georgian alphabet. The Georgians, on the other hand, are Caucasian people and speak a language belonging to the Caucasian family (*ibid).*

Both Ossetians and Georgians are predominately Orthodox Christians, with a Sunni Islam minority among Ossetians (Borgabui 2015). Around 75% of Ossetians are Orthodox Christians. A small minority of Digor and Iron speaking Ossetians are Muslims (*ibid).*

According to the census, conducted before the escalation of the Georgian—South Ossetian conflict in 1989, 98,000 people lived in South Ossetia, of which 66, 2% were Ossetians, 29 % Georgians, 4 % Jews, 2,2 % Russians and 1 % Armenians (Kolosov and O`Loughlin 2011:5).

According to the Georgian Census conducted in 2002, about 38,000 Ossetians remained in Georgia, accounting for 0.9 % of Georgia's population (MRGI 2019). According to the last census conducted in South Ossetia in 2015, a total of 53.532 people lived in South Ossetia, of which 91.5 % were Ossetians, 7.4% were Georgians and 1.1 % were Russians (*ibid*). Since the Georgian statistical office was not able to conduct its own census in South Ossetia in 2015, the current ethnic composition of South Ossetia`s population is not known (Svanidze 2016).

As regards the economic situation in the region, it is worth to mention, that after the closure of the border with Georgia, South Ossetia's landlocked economy was left devastated and fully dependent on its northern neighbor Russia (Schleifer 2015). The region is very poor with the slight economic activity that existed before "now largely extinguished by the recent wars and decades of isolation"(GeoHistory 2015).

The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict escalated three times: the first outbreak occurred in 1989, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the second stage of the escalation was in 2004, in the wake of the Rose Revolution, when Georgian president launched an anti-smuggling operation in South Ossetia. The final stage of escalation was the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia (ICG 2010).

At present, gas, electricity, and large quantities of food products are imported from Russia (GeoHistory 2015). With the exception of the deployment of Russian military forces and construction spending, South Ossetia could not attract any major foreign direct investments, given its unrecognized status, the absence of a peace agreement with Georgia, a weak legal framework and a high level of corruption (Schleifer 2015).

5.2. The Historical Background of Georgian-South Ossetian Relations

It is very relevant to introduce the historical development of South Ossetian and Georgian Relations, as the history of relations between Ossetians and Georgians, has been one of the key sources of the conflict.

Several contradictory historical claims have been proposed by both Georgian and Ossetian historians. The Georgian position is presented by the following statement "...Ossetian settlements began mostly in the last two or three centuries" (Nodia 1992 cited in Sammut and Chetkovski

1996:7). This claim was further strengthened during the period of nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who called the Ossetians "ungrateful guests of Georgia", having their historical homeland in North Ossetia *(ibid*). According to Georgians Ossetians are newcomers to Georgia, and their historical homeland is in North Ossetia. Thus, they have no right to territorial autonomy *(ibid).* On the contrary Ossetians claim, that they have lived on both sides of the Greater Caucasian Mountains for centuries. The South Ossetians consider themselves the southern branch of the Ossetian nation and consider Ossetians as descendants of the Alans, a Scythian tribe that arrived in the Caucasus in ancient times and merged with the local population(*ibid*).

In addition, Ossetian communities were geographically closer to the Georgians than the Abkhaz ones, and the infrastructure ties through marriages and trade were especially close (Hewitt 2009). Queen Tamar, for instance, was in fact in three quarters Ossetian and one of her consorts was Ossetian(*ibid*).

However, Georgian sources claim that South Ossetians merged with the Alans in the North Caucasus and then expanded to the Shida Kartli region (Topchishvili 2009, Sammut and Chetkovski 1996:7).

After the Mongol-Tatar invasions in the 13th Century, the Alans was exterminated, and those who survived moved to the North Caucasus, thus beginning the formation of the Ossetians (Kulakovsky 1899 cited in Bubenok 2010).

Settlement of Ossetians in the Georgian province of Dvaleti, located in the northern part of the Caucasus, started at the end of the 18 th century (Topchishvili 2010). The priests in Dvaleti used Georgian language while serving in churches in Dvaleti. The existence of Georgian churches and servings of Georgian priests in Georgian language shows that Dvaleti was Georgian land with its

Christian religion (*ibid*). Prior to the Ossetian settlement in Dvaleti, due to Ossetian raids and attacks in the region, the majority of Dvals moved to different parts of Georgia (Shida Karthli, Kvemo Karthli, Imereti, Racha). Those who remained were quickly assimilated by the intensively growing Ossetian ethnic groups (*ibid*).

At the beginning of the 18 th. Century, the Ossetians occupied the Patara Liakhvi Gorge area in Georgia and moved to the southern part of Georgia (Topchishvili 2010). The Ossetian migration from the North Caucasian Mountains to Georgia stopped at the end of the 18 th century, because the Russian government allowed Ossetians to settle down in the North Caucasian valleys (*ibid*).

In 1918, after the collapse of the Tsarist civil administration, Georgia was declared as a separate, independent state(Minahan 1998:118).

In May 1920, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Georgia in which, according to Georgian sources, it recognized South Ossetia as part of Georgia. It was named as Tiflis Gubernia and included the district Shida Kartli(Menteshashvili 1992 cited in DARC 2005).

The Ossetian interpretation of historical events in Georgia however, is presented differently (Sammut and Cvetkovski 1996:8). According to Ossetian sources the Ossetians joined Russia voluntarily in 1774, and they state that the treaty on friendship did not mention about North Ossetia and South Ossetia as separate states (*ibid).* When Georgia left Russia in 1918, South Ossetia did not want to stay within the framework of Georgia *(ibid*).

In addition, the Mensheviks supported the Georgian nationalism, trying to strengthen state support (Cornell 2001:135). This led to the fact that, minorities, including Ossetians, felt isolated within Georgia, and Georgians began to consider them as a potential fifth column, which could cooperate with forces outside Georgia to undermine the Georgian government (*ibid).*

On 8 June 1920, South Ossetia declared its independence as a South Ossetian Soviet Republic. Georgia started an armed attack on South Ossetia, as such a statement undermined Georgia`s territorial integrity (Jentzsch 2009:3-7). For South Ossetians it was a denial of their right to self-determination. From the Russian point of view, such an action by Georgia was as an intervention into the internal affairs of South Ossetia (*ibid*). About 5,000 Ossetians were killed, and 13,000 died from hunger and epidemics (Fearon and Laitin 2006, ICG 2004).

In 1921, the Red Army occupied Georgia and the latter entered the phase of Sovietization (Feldbbrugge et al. 1985:464). In 1922 South Ossetia became attached to Georgia as an Autonomous Oblast (Hunter 2006). Dissatisfied with the division of Ossetia into two units in separate Soviet republics, the leaders of North and South Ossetia favored an idea of a united Ossetia within the Soviet Union and petitioned the Soviet leadership for this. Unfortunately, their request was denied *(ibid*).

5.3. The Escalation of the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict after the Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Main Mediation Mechanisms

The conflict over South Ossetia is deeply rooted in the Soviet history (Pipia 2014:340). During the Soviet period South-Ossetians received a degree of autonomy with regard to language and education, however, their position was inferior to that of Abkhazia (Herrberg 2006). When Georgia became part of the Soviet Empire in 1923, there was no direct violence between Georgians and South Ossetians during the Soviet period, as the entire administration for both was conducted by one central power- Kremlin (Academic Expert C 2017).

The conflict erupted when the Soviet Union collapsed and competing claims emerged: Tbilisi's claim for territorial integrity, versus the national self-determination claimed by the Ossetians,

could no longer be reconciled within a decaying empire (Pipia 2014:340). Georgia wanted to protect its territorial integrity and prevent the South Ossetia from seceding (Ratliff 2006). However, South Ossetia wanted to gain independence from Georgia and join North Ossetia (*ibid*). South Ossetia also felt that it was economically disadvantaged in comparison to Georgia (Wolff 2008:428). In the late 1980s, a national movement emerged in South Ossetia, under the leadership of Adamon Nikhas from the "Voice of the People" party (Konig 2004:240). In 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast regional council announced its intention to convert the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into an Autonomous Republic (ICG 2004). Tbilisi refused the request of South Ossetia. Tensions increased in the last years of the Soviet Union and for the first time developed into a full-scale conflict between November 1989 and January 1990 (Wolff 2011). South Ossetians protested against the political process in Georgia declaring their region's independence (*ibid*). In 1991 the tensions escalated and Georgian troops entered Tskhinvali (ICG 2004).

The war over South Ossetia lasted until June 1992 leading to approximately 1,000 causalities and 60,000 displaced people (Merkel and Grimm 2009:158).

Eventually, a ceasefire was established between the Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze under the 1992 Sochi Agreement (Wolff 2011). This was followed by the deployment of the OSCE Observer Mission and the Russia-led CIS peacekeeping force, as well as the creation of the JCC, which aimed to facilitate cooperation between Georgia and South Ossetia on a day-to-day basis (*ibid*).

The JCC was created to "implement conflict settlement measures, promote dialogue and political settlement, devise and carry out measures to facilitate refugee and IDP return, solve problems related to economic reconstruction in the zone of conflict, and monitor human rights"(ICG 2004).

The European Commission was granted an observer status at the JCC meetings on economic programs (Coppietters 2007:7)

Tensions between, on the one hand, Georgia and, on the other hand, the breakaway regions and Russia, rose in the wake of the Rose Revolution (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2009). Motivated to establish control over the Adjaria region within a few months of his presidency, Saakashvili began to pursue a nationalist agenda with the aim of reconstructing the country's armed forces and promoting the reintegration of the breakaway territories (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2009).

On May 2004, Saakashvili sent armed forces to South Ossetia to establish checkpoints at key road crossings to combat the smuggling in the region (Konig 2004:247). Georgia justified this step, stating that it was important for achieving regional stability and improving economic performance in the country (*ibid*). From the South Ossetian perspective the deployment of Georgian troops in their territory was a "pure provocation" and an attack on South Ossetian independence and security *(ibid).*

In June 2004, Tbilisi accused Russia of supplying weapons to the South Ossetians (ICG 2004). Georgian forces confiscated two trucks belonging to Russian peacekeepers loaded with 300 unguided missiles for helicopters (*ibid).* According to Russian foreign and defense ministries, the JCC Agreement of June 2 authorized the resupply shipment (*ibid).* In July 2004 fifty troops in police uniforms were detained in the Georgian populated village of Vanati inside the South Ossetian conflict zone by South Ossetian forces, but most of them were released the following day *(ibid).* Together, these events caused tensions to escalate and brought the region into a renewed state of violent conflict.

At the same time, both the Georgian and the South Ossetian sides accused the OSCE in achieving nothing by relying only on monitoring and reporting (Strober 2011:212). In addition,

instability and occasional clashes were still going on, and negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia within the JCC framework stalled (Buchanan et al., 2009). Georgia insisted on changing the JCC format, as it saw the JCC as a "three against one" arrangement (*ibid*). Meanwhile, Tbilisi called for limiting Russia's role and insisted on the participation of the EU in the talks *(ibid*).

At the same time the EU, under the auspices of the recently appointed EUSR to the South Caucasus, was trying to assist Georgia to improve its own border monitoring capacity (German 2006). South Ossetia was against changing the format of the JCC, as this would undermine the political support it received from Russia (ICG 2007). From the Georgian point of view, the existing format was "non transparent and was largely ineffective and dominated by a non honest and biased broker"(*ibid*).

On 31 May, 2004 during a telephone discussion between the Russian and Georgian presidents, Saakashvili announced that Georgian reinforcements were being withdrawn from the checkpoints (Van der Schriek 2004).

However the so called "peace" between Georgia and South Ossetia, lasted only four years and the conflict escalated again in 2008.

Already from 2006, the Georgian government presented a one-sided conflict resolution plan to the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2009). These measures angered both South Ossetian and Russian authorities. In addition, Georgia`s motivation to join the NATO, further aggravated the relations between Russia and Georgia (*ibid).*

On September 27, 2006 tensions escalated further when Georgian police arrested four Russian military officers, who were accused of espionage (HRW 2007). On October 2, 2006 Georgian authorities handed over the four Russian military officers to the OSCE. Afterwards, Russia

imposed sanctions against Georgia, blocking the air, land, and sea traffic, as well as postal communication between the two countries (*ibid).*

Following the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008 supported by the West, Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated further (Levy 2008). The resolution adopted by the Russian parliament, stated "Now that the situation in Kosovo has become an international precedent, Russia should take into account the Kosovo scenario…when considering ongoing territorial conflicts"(Sterio 2013:152).

On 7 August 2008, Georgian troops entered South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel surrounding its capital Tskhinvali (IIFFMCG 2009:11). The surrounding areas were under attack, and the fighting soon involved Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian military units and armed elements(*ibid*). Thus, the confrontation developed into a combined inter-state and intra-state conflict: the opposing Georgian and Russian forces at one level of confrontation, and the South Ossetians and Georgians at another *(ibid).*

The OSCE Mission agreed upon the deployment of additional nine observers, but this was rejected by South Ossetia (Strober 2011:214). The already deployed eight OSCE observers were faced with several hundred Russian, South Ossetian and Georgian peacekeeping troops *(ibid).* The Russian and South Ossetian units had the advantage over the OSCE observers, as they could detect the plains around Tskhinvali and Georgian villages on both sides of the border from the South Ossetian mountains (*ibid).* The OSCE observers which carried out patrols within the conflict zone, were not allowed to enter the northern part of Tskhinvali - the Roki Tunnel (*ibid*).

Following the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 26, 2008, Russia wanted the OSCE to agree to establish separate missions in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali under separate commands (UK Parliament 2009). This was unacceptable to most OSCE

participating states, and to Georgia in particular, as such a decision would be equivalent to recognizing the independence of South Ossetia (*ibid*).

Thus, by annulling the Sochi Agreement of 1992, Georgia removed the OSCE mission`s mandate, which expired on 31 December 2008 (Strober 2011:219).

Eventually, France, which held the EU Presidency, took the leading role in the mediation of the Russian-Georgian war (Isakhanyan 2011). On August 12, 2008 President Sarkozy, on behalf of the EU proposed a six-point peace plan, which was subsequently approved by three Presidents - Saakashvili, Medvedev and Sarkozy (*ibid).*

In October 2008, the Geneva Talks on security and stability were launched, bringing together representatives of Tbilisi, Moscow, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, co-chaired by the EU, UN and OSCE (Macharashvili et al. 2017).

In 2009, the EUMM signed Memoranda of Understanding with the Georgian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs limiting the deployment of certain troops and equipment within a distance of 15 kilometers from the conflict zones (Phillips 2011). This agreement reaffirmed the Georgian government's commitment to the principle of non-use of force, as indicated in the six-point agreement (Macharashvili et al.2017).

However, in January 2009, Russia began to delimit the borders of South Ossetia with Georgia (Lavrov 2010). Thereby, Russia counted on documents of 1921 that established the administrative border of South Ossetia (*ibid*). Georgia reacted by saying that Russia's efforts were illegitimate and that it would not recognize these borders(*ibid).* On April 30, 2009, Russia signed an agreement with South Ossetia and Abkhazia on joint efforts to protect the borders between Russia and South Ossetia (*ibid*). According to this agreement, Russian border guard armed forces were to be placed in South Ossetia on a permanent basis: if Georgia launched

another attack on South Ossetia, the Russian border guards would be the first line of defense and prevent Georgia's rapid action (*ibid).*

Since 2010 tensions in South Ossetia have declined, and the overall situation has improved. The the situation on the ground was relatively stable, although this was frequently changed as a result of random ceasefire violations (Academic Expert C 2017). Although there were no significant violent incidents, the growing military cooperation between Russia and South Ossetia remained a serious problem. South Ossetia and Russia signed an agreement on creating a joint military base in Tskhinvali in April 2010 (ICG 2010).

In 2011 instability escalated in South Ossetia with several security incidents related to the freedom of movement of the population (Rogin 2011). In one of the incidents, two Georgian civilians were wounded during a shootout near the South Ossetian ABL and four civilians were arrested by Ossetian authorities for entering Ossetian territory (*ibid*).

The tensions between Georgia and Russia in relation to South Ossetia spread to international negotiations when Russia requested to join the WTO. Georgia said it would support the Russian request, if the latter is committed to transparency in terms of trade at the crossing points between Russia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia (ICG 2008).

The South Ossetian authorities were against the deployment of any international custom monitoring mission to their external borders (Racz 2011). Their resistance was motivated by some politico-economic reasons[3] and they protested against any external monitoring even before the Geneva agreements were signed (*ibid).* However, Moscow agreed to the deployment of international custom monitors to the land trade routes between Russia and Georgia, including

[3] "The trade between Russia and South Ossetia was dominated by smuggling various illegal goods, such as alcohol, tobacco and electronics largely bypassing Russian customs regulations. Thus the deployment of any international monitoring would endanger this business on both sides of the South Ossetian section of the Russia-Georgia border" (Racz 2011).

South Ossetia and Abkhazia *(ibid).* On August 22, 2012 Russia eventually became the 156 th WTO member (WTO 2012).

In December a large number of Russian troops were concentrated along the South Ossetian ABLs. However, despite growing tensions, South Ossetia and Georgia continued to participate in the IPRM, as well as in the Geneva talks (Think Tank Expert C 2019).

Georgia's October 27, 2013, presidential election won by "Georgia Dream" party coalition candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili, did not make radical changes in the country`s foreign policy towards the West (Nichol 2013). However, the foreign policy approach towards Russia slightly differed. As the resolution on the Georgian foreign policy adopted by the Georgian Parliament in 2013 declared "Georgia should not have diplomatic relations, nor be in a military, political, or customs alliance, with the states which recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/former autonomous district of South Ossetia or occupy Georgia`s territories". However, despite this statement, the document acknowledged that Georgia sought to continue a dialogue with Russia in both the Geneva and bilateral contexts aimed at conflict resolution and development of good neighborly relations with Russia (Parliament of Georgia 2013).

During 2013 tensions arose over Russian troops' ongoing construction of fences along the ABL, which led to local protests and calls of alarm from the Georgian government (Boyle 2017). The latter briefed foreign diplomats and international organizations regarding the installation of fences by Russian troops, drawing their attention to fencing activities near the villages of Ditsi, Didi Khurvaleti and Gugutiankari (*ibid).* The co-chairs of the Geneva Talks expressed concern about the negative impact these measures could have on the population, in terms of freedom of movement and well being (Council of Europe 2014). In general terms, during 2014 the issue of "borderization" along the South Ossetian ABL, was marked by the temporary suspension of all

fencing activities during the Olympic Games in Sochi (*ibid).* However, after the Sochi Games, such activities were pursued once more, despite the protests of the Georgian government*(ibid).*

Relations between Georgia and Russia deteriorated in March 2015 with the signing of a "Treaty of Alliance and Integration" between Tskhinvali and Moscow, which Tbilisi criticized and classified as annexation (Democracy and Freedom Watch 2015). The treaty provided for the formation of a common security and defense space between Russia and South Ossetia, the integration of South Ossetian and Russian customs services, as well as the simplification of procedures for obtaining Russian citizenship (*ibid*). From Moscow's viewpoint, the signing of the treaty with South Ossetia, whose independence, Russia recognized in 2008, would further strengthen the partnership between Russia and South Ossetia *(ibid).*

In contrast, Tbilisi announced that this so-called agreement was contrary to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, and accused Russia of moving towards the de facto annexation of its territory (Democracy and Freedom Watch 2015, Kalandarishvili-Mueller 2015). In addition, Georgia expressed concern when Russian military forces moved the border fence 1.5 km further towards Georgia - "a short distance from the country's main west-east highway" (BBC 2016).

The installation of border fences in July 2015 by Russian troops in South Ossetia became another source of conflict. The fences located near the main east-west road in Georgia, left a 1,605 kilometer stretch of the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which transports up to 100,000 barrels of Caspian oil per day to the Western markets in the Russian-controlled territory-South Ossetia (Apriashvili 2015). This situation provoked some Georgian protests along the ABLs and in Tbilisi, demanding a tougher response from the Georgian government against Russia (Tsereteli 2015).

Borderization negatively affected communities on both sides of the ABL, limiting freedom of movement and liberty, undermining living standards and reinforcing discriminatory attitudes (Amnesty International 2018:5).

The general security situation along the administrative border of South Ossetia since 2016 was assessed by the GID participants as relatively calm (Council of Europe 2017). However, the so called "borderization" activities were still ongoing. The Georgian government condemned all "borderization" activities and continued to address the matter in the framework of the GID, IPRM and other international settings. The IPRM meetings in Ergneti organized by the OSCE co-chair of the GID and the EUMM continued to take place regularly *(ibid).*

Conclusion

Almost half a century has passed, but the frozen conflict over South Ossetia still remains unresolved. The conflict is perceived as "protracted" due to its instability, long duration, violence, and deadlocked peace negotiations, as well as persisting hatred from both parties in the conflict: Georgians and South-Ossetians. When discussing the evolution of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, it was considered important to study the historical and political context of the conflict and explore the responses from both Georgian and Russian governments which triggered the escalation of the conflict. In order to reach a much better understanding of the conflict, the second and third sections of this chapter presented the two main pathways that led to the escalation of the conflict.

The first pathway, in section two, is related to the time period before the collapse of the Soviet Union, starting from the 13th century, when the Mongol-Tatars were trying to occupy the Caucasus and Iran. It reflected the historical context of the events related to the subsequent

evolution of the conflict, as well as the reinforcing factors of conflict`s escalation, such as the nationalist claims by Georgians and the struggle for sovereignty by South Ossetians.

The second pathway, introduced in section three, starts with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which escalated the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia on the basis of the two contradictory historical claims proposed by the two sides: the right to self-determination of Ossetians living in South Ossetia and the territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. The section also provided an empirical description of the major political events that triggered the escalation of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in 2004 and 2008.

South Ossetians have always stressed that they have lived in the region inhabited mostly by ethnic Ossetians who used to speak a common language that is close to Farsi. Ethnic Georgians accounted for less than one-third of the population there (see section 5.3).

South Ossetians have always perceived the conflict with Georgia as their continuous struggle against Georgian nationalism. Their major goal was the preservation of their national identity and sovereignty. Georgia has always sought to maintain territorial control over the South Ossetian region by closing the local economies that facilitated cross-border trading (*ibid*).

However, both sides have been responsible for atrocities and failures that hindered the resolution of the conflict. From being the most "silent" of the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict became the most "unstable" due to its unusual escalating patterns.

The 1992 Sochi Agreement did not lead to the resolution of the conflict; instead the region entered a "frozen" conflict phase similar to other frozen ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria), in which, although the violence was ceased, no lasting peace was achieved.

The Georgian-South Ossetian dispute was largely ignored until 2004, when Saakashvilli came to power and his attempts to regain full control of South Ossetia escalated the tensions between the two nations.

In addition, negotiations under the JCC were deadlocked: each side had almost no confidence in the conflict resolution process and many Georgian and South Ossetian soldiers were killed.

Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated even further in April 2008, when Russia strengthened its political and economic ties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The conflict entered a new phase, and this new fighting was transformed into a bloody war until a ceasefire was agreed on 18 August 2008. The five-day August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia exposed the old grievances of both nations against each other. Despite the EU's involvement in the conflict as a mediator since 2008 through Geneva Talks, the existence of Russian troops in South Ossetia and ongoing construction of fences along its administrative border remain a serious problem.

Presenting the evolution of Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and its main mediation mechanisms in the sections of this chapter serves as the basis for the empirical analysis of EU crisis management in the region for the 2003-2016 time period in relation to Security (CFSP) and Development policy areas.

Chapter 6: The EU Response to the Georgian- South Ossetian Conflict in relation to CFSP

The chapter provides an empirical analysis of EU crisis responses to the South Ossetian conflict in the CFSP area for the 2003-2016 historical period. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section starts with a brief overview of EU early steps as a crisis manager in South Ossetia in relation to the CFSP, outlining main events triggering EU engagement in the region since 2003 and introducing the historical background of EU crisis response activities in South Ossetia before and after Lisbon.

The second section traces the planning and implementation processes within the CFSP for the aforementioned historical period of 2003-2016, with the aim of assessing the causality between the overlap of institutional mandates and coherence based on the analytical framework of the thesis. The third section summarizes the main empirical findings, introducing the results of within-case analyses built on the assumptions of "bureaucratic politics" reasoning, as illustrated in Chapter 2.

6.1. The Evolution of EU CFSP towards South Ossetia

It was difficult to refer to an EU CFSP toward the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus until 2003, since until that time there was practically no such policy (Popescu 2011:175-228). This was due to a number of reasons. First, geographically the South Caucasus was too far from the EU, and the EU did not have a sense of urgency in solving the "problems" of such a complex and remote region (*ibid).* Secondly, the EU was busy with its own internal developments, "reforming itself through three new treaties in less than a decade – Maastricht in 1993, Amsterdam in 1997 and Nice in 2000" - while preparing for enlargement (*ibid*). Thirdly, the EU had not yet developed a proper institutional framework which would allow it to be directly involved in crisis management activities in CFSP, such as mediation, political dialogue and CSDP missions (*ibid).*

From 2003 the EU started to expand its crisis management capabilities to be better institutionally prepared for the engagement in the South Caucasus, particularly in Georgia (ICG 2006). In March 2003, the Commission published a communication on "Wider Europe-Neighborhood", with the aim to enhance the relations with the new neighbors (European Commission 2003). However, the South Caucasus countries were not initially mentioned in the aforementioned document(*ibid*). In 2003 Council adopted the European Security Strategy, which stated that the EU "should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighboring region" (European Security Strategy 2003).

This increased attention attached to the region was reflected also at an institutional level with the appointment of the first EUSR to the South Caucasus, the role of which was filled by the Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie(Council 2003 b). By this step the EU made its first steps as a mediator in the region. The mandate of the EUSR to the South Caucasus was to assist "Georgia in carrying out political and economic reforms, notably in the fields of the rule of law, democratization, human rights, good governance, development and poverty reduction, in accordance with existing mechanisms, to prevent conflicts in the region, to assist in the resolution of conflicts, and to prepare the return of peace, through promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons"(Council 2003 b). On December 8, 2003 the Council adopted a Joint Action 2003/872/CFSP amending and extending the mandate of the EUSR for the South Caucasus until February 2006 (Council 2003c). As a result of the amendment of the EUSR`s mandate, its functions also included providing guidance to the HoM and reporting to the Council through the HR on the activities of a mission (*ibid).*

In fulfillment of his mandate Talvitie visited the region, several times conducting meetings with senior level officials from Georgia and South Ossetia. The EUSR also represented the EU in political negotiations at the JCC level while continuing working closely with the Commission through the DG RELEX (ICG 2006).

In February 2006 the mandate of the EUSR was amended again with an appointment of a new EUSR to the South Caucasus, a Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby (EEAS 2006). This time, the EUSR had a stronger mandate than before: "to contribute to the settlement of conflicts and facilitate the implementation of such settlement in close coordination with the UN Mission in Georgia and OSCE in Europe", instead of just supporting the existing frameworks of mediation

(*ibid*). In addition to conducting mediation at the political level, the EUSR tasks included developing local confidence building activities through community-level infrastructure projects in South Ossetia (Former EEAS Official L 2019). In addition, another two points were added to the mandate, such as assisting the Council in further developing a comprehensive policy towards the South Caucasus and reporting on a continued assessment of the border situation between Georgia and Russia (Council 2007). Thus, the EUSR structure included also the EU Border Support Team, which developed a border management strategy and implementation plan for Georgia and built the capacity of Georgian border guards (European Parliament 2009).

The EUSR Semneby`s mandate was expanded and included a range of possible areas, from conflict prevention and management, to engagement with the regional actors (MediatEur 2012). In an attempt to fulfill his mandate, the EUSR Semneby, along with the Director General of the DG RELEX, led a FFM in South Ossetia in January 2007(Popescu 2011:202). The mission consisted of eighteen EU officials, including also experts from the European Commission and Council (*ibid).* According to the Head of the Commission Delegation to Georgia, the purpose of the *mission* was to see what the EU could do more in the conflict areas for crisis management and confidence building (UNPO 2007). In this regard, the mission aimed to further promote the border cooperation and encourage confidence building between Georgia and South Ossetia*(ibid).* At the end of the mission representatives from the Commission on behalf of the DG RELEX and the Council on behalf of CIVCOM submitted their policy recommendations to the PSC for approval (Former Commission Official L 2019).

On August 07, 2008 a war broke up between Russia and Georgia around the region of South Ossetia. On August 11, 2008 Georgia announced a unilateral ceasefire (Phillips 2011). The next

day, the EU entered into a "Six Point Ceasefire Agreement" initiated by the French President Sarkozy. On September 08, 2008 Sarkozy and Medvedev signed an additional agreement clarifying "implementation measures" of the ceasefire*(ibid).* These measures were aimed at the withdrawal of Russian troops from the areas outside the ABLs of South Ossetia, the return of Georgian troops to their barracks by October 1, 2008 (Nichol 2009). The agreement also indicated that the current group of international observers from the UN and OSCE would remain, and an additional 200 EU observers constituting the EUMM would be deployed (*ibid*).

On 15, October 2008 the Geneva Talks or Geneva International Discussions (GIDs) were launched, bringing together representatives of Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and co-chaired by the EU (through the EUSR), the UN and the OSCE (Jeppsson 2015). The Geneva Talks consist of two main informal working groups. The first working group deals with security related conflict issues, such as the shooting incidents resulting from ceasefire violations, military operations conducted by Russian forces and the installation of wire fences by Russia across South Ossetian administrative border (Mikhelidze 2010). While the second working group deals with the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, such as the issues of IDPs, rehabilitation of water and gas supply, as well as education matters (*ibid).* The talks in the working groups are conducted under the auspices of the EU, UN and OSCE at the level of special envoys (*ibid*).

Following the establishment of the Geneva Talks, the EU CRT was deployed by the request of the EUSR Semneby to strengthen its presence in Georgia (MediatEur 2012). This was the first CRT[4] deployment in support of an EUSR and provided crucial capacity, since it allowed the EUSR to deploy personnel for monitoring in various parts of Georgia. The CRTs, that were

[4] The Civilian Response Team (CRT) is made up of a multi-functional pool of experts from the Council and Commission for shortnotice deployments by the EU in crisis situations(Council 2009).

deployed immediately after the ceasefire, were a unique source of information on the local security situation for several weeks until the deployment of the EUMM. The EUSR staff based in Tbilisi became familiar with the situation on the ground, and the deployment of the CRT significantly facilitated the establishment of the EUMM a few weeks later (*ibid*).

The 2008 war strengthened the role of the EU as a crisis manager and led to a new line of activities for the EUSR (MediatEur 2012). However, the implementation of the ceasefire brokered by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy on behalf of the EU, was soon entrusted to another EUSR (*ibid*).

In September 2008, the PSC decided in addition to the existing mandate of the EUSR to the South Caucasus, to establish an additional mandate of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia:a French diplomat Pierre Morel filled that post (Council 2008 C). His main task was to assist the preparation of Geneva Talks as stipulated by the settlement plan of August 12, 2008, and represent the EU in these discussions. Secondly, he was mandated to "facilitate the implementation of the agreement concluded on September 8, 2008 in Moscow and Tbilisi, as well as the agreement of August 12, 2008, in close coordination with the UN and the OSCE" (*ibid*). The mission of the EUSR Morel was challenging, considering that it was the first time that the EU was engaged in the forefront (Jadi 2011).

Parallel to the mandate of Pierre Morel, the EUSR Semneby continued implementing its broad mandate with a focus at the conflict resolution throughout the South Caucasus region (MediatEur 2012).

At the headquarters level the PSC discussed the deployment of a possible civilian monitoring mission in Georgia and tasked the CIVCOM to start the drafting of the CONOPS (Fischer

2009:380-381). For that purpose in August 2008 the Council Secretariat had set up a CMCT and had sent two small exploratory CRTs to Georgia. The Commission, for its part, dispatched two crisis assessment teams on behalf of the DG RELEX and the DG ECHO to assess the humanitarian situation in Georgia (*ibid).* After the Council meeting on September 1, 2008 a decision was made to deploy another Council/Commission exploratory team in order to prepare the CONOPS. The Council exploratory team consisted of representatives from SitCen and CPCC (*ibid).*

The CPCC assumed the responsibility for OPLAN, and the planning process moved from the development of CONOPS to the operational phase. The DG E IX and the CPCC unanimously decided to equip the mission with no more than 140 observers. After the conclusion of the implementation agreement in Moscow on September 8, 2008 the number of monitors patrolling the buffer zones around the conflict zone, in particular the areas adjacent to the ABLs of South Ossetia were planned to reach 200 (Macharashvili et al. 2017).

The OPLAN was approved by the PSC on September 15, 2008, and in October 2008, the EU launched its unarmed civilian monitoring mission to Georgia (EEAS 2011). The launch of the EUMM was the fastest European Union's mission deployment in its history (Isakhanyan 2011). The operational command of the mission was exercised by the Ambassador Hansjörg Haber, who served as the first HoM in Georgia from October 2008 until April 2011(*ibid*). In accordance with the Council decision, the EUMM in Georgia was to be deployed in a very short time-frame in two phases, skipping the strategic planning phase (Council 2008 d). The first phase included the deployment of human and material resources starting in September 2008 and then the operational phase was initiated 'no later than October 2008 (*ibid).*

This rapid response to the security situation on the ground was a fundamental step towards increasing the visibility of EU actions at the local level(Simao and Freire 2013). The early months of EUMM were marked by adjustments to a rapid deployment, where planning and organizational capacities were tested. The institutional structure of the mission was at the center-stage of these adjustments, so that the monitors could be easily identified by the locals. The EUMM was set up with its headquarters in Tbilisi and three regional offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi (*ibid*).

Initially, the EUMM was supposed to fulfil its mandate in close cooperation with the OSCE and the UN, but after Russia vetoed the extension of the OSCE`s mandate in South Ossetia and the UN`s mandate in Abkhazia, the EU was left alone in the region with the EUMM-the only international mandated mission in Georgia (Isakhanyan 2011).

The mission was aimed at monitoring the actions of the parties involved in the conflict and their full compliance with the Six-Point Agreement, promoting stabilization, normalization, confidence building and exchanging information among the relevant local authorities and informing EU policy for a political solution of the conflict (Council 2010 b). Regarding the stabilization the mission was mandated to monitor, analyze and report on the implementation of the Six-Point Agreement and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (*ibid*). Under the normalization part of the mandate, EUMM monitored human rights and humanitarian issues, including the conditions for the IDPs, effective law enforcement structures and adequate public order *(ibid*). Confidence building through the mission aimed to reduce the tensions through liaison, facilitate contacts between the parties in the conflict and other measures. Through the information sharing, the mission was tasked to report about the local

security situation on both sides of the ABLs-Georgia and South Ossetia, to the Brussels headquarters and to present the situation on the ground at Geneva Talks (*ibid*). In sum, the short-term objective of the EUMM was to stabilize the situation and to reduce the risk of renewed hostilities, while the long term objective was to contribute to stability in Georgia and the surrounding regions *(ibid).*

It is worth to mention that since 2008, no significant changes have been made to the mandate of the EUMM: EUMM Georgia was tasked to continue to monitor the terms of August 12, 2008 and September 8, 2008 ceasefire agreements and implement measures, and contribute to the long term stability of Georgia and the South Caucasus as a whole (Council 2010 b).

The EUMM covers the territory of Georgia's internationally recognized borders; however the mission has so far been denied access by the *de facto* authorities of South Ossetia to the territories under their control (EEAS 2012). The movements of military and police forces, as well as equipments and vehicles are allowed only at the ABL between Georgia and South Ossetia(*ibid*). Thus, the lack of access to South Ossetia for the EUMM has resulted in the asymmetrical implementation of the mission's mandate (European Commission 2011).

The EUMM`s most prominent and urgent task was to monitor and report on the withdrawal of Russian troops by October 10, 2008 (EUMM 2018). The EUMM had repeatedly called upon the Russian and South Ossetian sides to withdraw military forces from Perevi village and to reduce the number of troops deployed in South Ossetia according to the provisions of the ceasefire. At the same time the EUMM monitored the Georgian movements in the areas adjacent to the administrative borders (*ibid*).

On 18, February 2009 during the Geneva talks a decision was made to set up the IPRM by which the EUMM tried to establish closer contacts and mutual confidence building with South Ossetia (Phillips 2011). The IPRMs are designed to identify and review potential risks; share information on the recent security incidents on the ground between the authorities of Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia, facilitate access of humanitarian aid to South Ossetia and free movement across the ABLs and provide recommendations on how to prevent future incidents *(ibid).* Each IPRM has its own 24 hour "hotline" through which the participants can contact each other in case of serious incidents (*ibid).*

The IPRM meetings are co-facilitated by the OSCE and the EUMM on behalf of the HoM with participation from the Georgian, Russian and de facto South Ossetian authorities (EUMM 2018). The IPRM meetings allow participants from both sides of the ABL to talk to one another about security issues and other issues that affect people living along the ABL (*ibid).*

The meetings established in South Ossetia, were, however, blocked in October 2009, due to the attempts by South Ossetian authorities to use the IPRM as a tool to gain the de facto institutional recognition (Pirozzi 2012:203). The IPRM meetings were recovered in February 2009 at the sixth meeting of the Geneva International Discussions. The meetings were held in Egneti "on a spot at the very ABL every three weeks" *(ibid*). The EUMM was invited for the first time to visit the South Ossetian Zhimbali region. The topics discussed during the IPRM meetings in Ergneti included the detentions of people crossing the ABL, access to agricultural land for people living along the ABL and installation of fences for free movement across the ABL ('borderisation') (*ibid).*

The Lisbon Treaty equipped the EU with more tools and instruments in the area of CFSP. The most common institutional innovations were the "redesign" of the mandate of the HR/VP and the establishment of the EEAS (Paul 2008). In addition, the Lisbon Treaty gave the HR/VP more influence on the nomination of EUSRs. Although the PSC is mandated to appoint new EUSRs in the target regions, the HR/VP has an absolute mandate to propose the appointment of a new EUSR (Art.33 TEU).

In the early 2010s, the EU`s Eastern Neighborhood, including the South Caucasus, was not in the HR/VP`s domain; moreover, she intended to abolish the EUSR mandates for the South Caucasus region and Moldova, instead retaining the EUSRs only for the Great Lakes area and for Central Asia (Socor 2010). The HR/VP announced in a PSC meeting in 2010, that the mandates of a number of EUSRs should be terminated by February 2011(Fouéré 2016 cited in European Parliament 2019). In her 2013 Review of the EEAS she referred to the EUSRs as "anomalies" in the Post-Lisbon institutional structure for EU foreign policy and emphasized the need for their inclusion in the EEAS (European Parliament 2019). However, the Member States disagreed with that approach (*ibid).*

From February 2010, based on Council Decision 109/CFSP, the EUSR Semneby`s mandate was extended until February 2011 (Council 2010 c).

Meanwhile, the coexistence of two EUSRs restrained the resources: the operational budget of the EUSR Morel was not sufficient to fulfil his mandate, and this gap was proposed to be filled by staff members belonging to the EUSR Semneby`s support team with extensive experience and knowledge in the region: it was envisaged that the EUSR Morrel`s mandate could also cover the

whole South Caucasus region, as the EUSR Semneby`s mandate had already expired since February 2011(House of Commons 2011).

However, from September 2011 a decision to appoint Philippe Lefort as the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia was made by the PSC(Council 2011). The mandate, based on a proposal from the HR, covered the initial period from 1 September 2011 until 30 June 2012. Mr. Lefort replaced Pierre Morel, who served as the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia until 31 August 2011 and Peter Semneby, who served as the EUSR for the South Caucasus until 28 February 2011 (*ibid).* Thus, the mandates of the two previous EUSR`s were merged into one EUSR mandate.

The EUSR Lefort was mandated to contribute to a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region, including the crisis in Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh, by facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and through other appropriate means, as well as supporting the implementation of such a settlement in accordance with the principles of international law and facilitating the implementation of such a settlement in close coordination with the UN and the OSCE Minsk Group(Council 2011). Regarding the conflict in Georgia, the EUSR was mandated to prepare Geneva International discussions and represent the EU in these talks, facilitate confidence building measures and assist in the preparation of EU contributions to the implementation of a possible conflict settlement (*ibid*).

In the same month the EUSR Lefort visited the EUMM in Tbilisi. He was welcomed by the HoM Ambassador Andrzej Tyszkiewicz (EUMM 2011). Lefort was accompanied by members of his team and the Head of EUDEL to Georgia. Lefort was briefed on the overall security situation in

the areas adjacent to the South Ossetian ABLs, the freedom of movement across the ABLs, and the confidence building role played by the IPRM meetings(*ibid).*

In general, the overall situation along the ABL between South Ossetia and Georgia was noted to be relatively calm after Lisbon, but incidents and detentions for "illegal crossings" continued to occur, and the situation remained unstable(Former EEAS Official K 2018). In this context the EUMM headed by Ambassador Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, from July 2011 until June 2013(EUMM 2018) continued to work closely with the EUDEL to Georgia to support all possible confidence building initiatives and to bring together Georgian and South Ossetian communities(*ibid).*

In June 2012 the CIVCOM representatives together with the European Commission representatives from the DG DEVCO visited the EUMM Field Office in Gori and went on patrols to see for themselves the situation along the ABL in South Ossetia (EUMM 2012 a). They had the opportunity to discuss progress towards the delivery of the mission's mandate. The following month CIVCOM sent two small teams of experts from the CPCC and the EEAS CROC department as part of a FFM on the ground *(*Former EEAS Official F 2018). The EUMM expressed its concern on the recent resumption of the installation of fences along the ABL with South Ossetia, which restricted the freedom of movement of both Georgian and South Ossetian citizens on both sides of the ABL (*ibid*). The EUMM further intensified its patrolling to actively monitor the situation on the ground, as it observed a build-up of Russian armed personnel along the South Ossetian ABL (EUMM 2012 b). The EUMM activated the IPRM hotline, calling on all sides to exchange information about the latest developments. A patrol was sent to the Dirbi-Ghogheti area and observed the installation of red metal poles along an estimated 160-meter stretch of land (EUMM 2013a). However, the fact that the EUMM did not have access to South

Ossetia hindered the EUMM in playing a more active role in preventing Russia from installing fences across the ABL of South Ossetia.

The EUMM mandate was prolonged for two years until September 2013 with the appointment of a new HoM, Estonian diplomat Toivo Klaar (EUMM 2013 d). Although the security situation had been improved since that time, there was an ongoing noncompliance with the cease-fire agreement, particularly the non-withdrawal of Russian troops to positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities (EUMM 2013 c). In addition, during the twenty fourth round of the Geneva Talks the Co-Chairs found it unfortunate that "fences were erected and trenches were dug at different locations along the ABL"(EUMM 2013 b).

The core tasks of the EUMM - monitoring and contributing to confidence-building - remained unchanged in 2014 (Council 2015). EUMM continued to initiate significant confidence-building measures and established an "EU Confidence Building Fund" in 2014. These measures were aimed at weakening the link between incidents and conflicts and creating a more transparent security system (*ibid).*

In January 2014 the EUSR Lefort announced his resignation and the EUSR mandate was empty for six months (EEAS 2015 a). In July 2014 Herbert Salber was appointed as the EUSR for the South Caucasus and Crisis in Georgia following the proposal made by the HR/VP and the political endorsement of his nomination by the PSC (*ibid*). His mandate was the same as of the previous EUSR Lefort, who served from 1 September 2011 until 31 January 2014. The EUSR Salber was mandated to contribute to a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region, including the crisis in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He continued to represent the EU in

the Geneva Talks aimed at resolving the aftermath of the 2008 war between Russia and South Ossetia(*ibid*).

On March 3, 2014 the CIVCOM delegation conducted a FFM consisting of the CIVCOM staff in Tbilisi to discuss the situation with the Georgian authorities (Council 2014). The EEAS geographic desks also took part in the mission. However, the mission was not allowed by the Ossetian authorities to visit South Ossetia. The mission had no opportunity to discuss with the *de facto* authorities the human rights situation on the ground or to reflect on their position on other issues raised *(ibid*).

In December 2014 the Council extended the mandate of the EUMM for two years until December 14, 2016: Toivo Klaar was replaced by the new HoM, Lithuanian diplomat Ambassador Kęstutis Jankauskas (EUMM 2016). One year later, the HR/VP Federica Mogherini, together with EEAS representatives, visited the ABL during her trip to the Eastern Partnership partner countries (EUMM 2015). The new HoM-Kęstutis Jankauskas and the chief of Field Office Gori, Mat Whatley, briefed Mogherini about the activities of the EUMM and the latest developments on the ground. According to EUMM the number of detentions concerning the people crossing the ABL, was higher than during the previous year *(ibid).*

As a result, in September 2016, a CIVCOM delegation visited the EUMM. The delegation was led by the CIVCOM Chair (EEAS 2016 b). A number of officials from the EEAS from Brussels also accompanied the group. The purpose of the visit for CIVCOM was to familiarize themselves with the security situation on the ground and the day-to-day work of the EUMM (*ibid*). The group visited the areas of responsibility of all three EUMM Field Offices – Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi. During these field visit the group received briefings on the latest developments at the

ABL concerning the increased rate of detentions and hotline activations (*ibid*). The CIVCOM delegates also joined the EUMM monitors on patrols, where they were informed of local problems and how the EUMM conducts its monitoring and reporting in practice (*ibid).*

In sum, no major changes were reported by the EUMM in respect to the overall security situation in 2016, apart the concerns on so-called "borderization" process and the "resulting" obstacles to the freedom of movement between Georgia and South Ossetia (EUMM 2016).

A brief description of the main activities in the CFSP is presented in the table below.

Table 3. The Overview of the Main Activities in the CFSP.

Date	The Main Events
07.07.2003	The Council appointed the first EUSR to the South Caucasus
01.01.2007	The EUSR and the DG RELEX team conducted a fact finding mission to South Ossetia
07.08.2008	A war broke up between Russia and Georgia
12.08.2008	A Six Point Ceasefire Agreement was initiated by the French President Sarkozy
15.08.2008	The CPCC conducted a FFM in Georgia
01.09.2008	A joint Council/Commission exploratory team was sent to Georgia
15.09.2008	The PSC approved the OPLAN presented by the CIVCOM
25.09.2008	The PSC appointed Pierre Morel as an EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia
01.10.2008	The EUMM Georgia was deployed following the EU Council Joint Action of 2008/736/CFS.
15.10.2008	Geneva International Discussions (GIDs) or Geneva Talks were signed
18.02.2009	Incident Prevention, Response Mechanisms (IPRM) were instigated by the EUMM
01.07.2011	Ambassador Andrzej Tyszkiewicz was appointed as the second Head of EUMM
01.09.2011	The mandates of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the EUSR for Crisis in Georgia were merged into one single mandate: the EUSR to the South Caucasus and Crisis in Georgia.
01.09.2012	The EUMM increased its patrolling along the South Osetian ABL

13.09.2013	Ambassador Toivo Klaar was appointed as the new Head of EUMM
30.09.2013	The PSC travelled to Georgia and to the South Ossetian ABL
03.03.2014	The CIVCOM carried out a Fact Finding Mission(FFM) in the South Ossetian ABL
01.07.2014	The PSC appointed Herbert Salber as the new EUSR for the South Caucasus and Crisis in Georgia
14.12.2014	Toivo Klaar was replaced by a new Head of EUMM- Lithuanian diplomat Ambassador Kęstutis Jankauskas for a two year mandate
10.11.2015	The HR/VP Federica Mogherini visited the ABL with EUMM
01.09.2016	The CIVCOM delegation visited the EUMM

Source: own compilation based on the information in section 6.1.

6.2. The Analysis of Overlapped Mandates and their Impact on Coherence

This subsection provides an overview of the analysis of overlapping inter-institutional mandates in the CFSP and their impact on the coherence of EU crisis decision-making in the context of "bureaucratic politics" theory. The empirical analysis of the analytical framework is conducted in the planning and implementation levels, respectively, for the 2003-2016 historical period.

After the escalation of the Russian–Georgian War, Georgia became a very crowded place with multiple exploratory and fact finding missions deployed and many parallel crisis management actors involved in the region (Fischer 2009:386). Due to the urgency of deploying the EUMM, its strategic planning part, which involves the development of the CMC by the CMPD, was skipped by the decision of the PSC (Former EEAS Official I 2019).

Prior to the development of CONOPS, the CPCC formed two separate CRTs and sent both to the field at the same time (Former EEAS Official F 2018). The two CRTs had the same mandate: to explore the situation on the ground and to strengthen the Tbilisi-based EUSR CRT(*ibid*). In addition to the two CPCC teams, two other teams from the Commission were sent to the field on behalf of the DG RELEX and the DG ECHO, respectively (Former Commission Official F 2018*)*. The crisis assessment team, on behalf of the DG ECHO, was tasked with evaluating the humanitarian situation in Georgia and South Ossetia, including the health and safety of the people affected by the conflict, their access to water and food, etc.(*ibid*). Thus, the presence of DG ECHO did not create any overlap with the CPCC, as the two actors had completely different mandates.

The DG RELEX was represented by its CPCMU, which was mandated to help the mission to oversee the Commission`s management of the administration of mission`s financial aspects

(Former Commission Official G 2019). In practice, the CPCC and DG RELEX mandates did not overlap either, but there were difficulties in exchanging information, because the mandates belonged to two different teams.

The CPCC team wanted to be consulted beforehand on all issues concerning the financial management of the EUMM by the DG RELEX, while the CPCC`s mandate does not allow it to instruct the DG RELEX on budgetary issues (Former Commission Official G 2019, Think Tank Expert B 2018). The CPCC can only request such an information through the HoM, which enlarges the command chain and usually takes considerable time (*ibid*). The DG RELEX, in its turn, asked the CPCC team to transfer all the weekly political reports received from the HoM, as they were necessary to ensure proper financial management of the mission`s budget in conformity with the mission`s objectives (*ibid*). Thus, in order not to delay the execution of the mission, the CPCC-led team decided to include DG RELEX representatives in their team, to ensure an efficient exchange of information between the two teams (*ibid).*

The second exploratory team, sent one month later by the CPCC, consisted of the representatives of CPCC and SitCen, and was intended to assess the overall security situation on the ground (Former Commission Official E 2019). In order to avoid further overlap with the existing EUSR`s CRT, a planning team was formed by the CPCC and the EUSR team was invited to participate in it (*ibid).* The rapid planning of the mission occurred in the form of informal discussions (*ibid*). Later, the DG ECHO was also added to the planning team to draft the CONOPS. The planning team met weekly to exchange information on both sides (*ibid).* These informal discussions contributed significantly to the operational planning process of the mission. In particular, the meetings allowed the actors to develop common positions on issues, especially in cases where their activities and goals

coincided(*ibid*) Of particular note here was the importance of the CPCC. Officials from the Commission and EEAS accepted that CPCC had made significant contributions to the development of weekly coordination meetings *(ibid*).

At the headquarters level, the division of tasks between the CPCC and the DG E IX was unclear, and the workload of the CPCC was much higher than that of the DG E IX (Former Policy Officer A 2019). In accordance with its mandate, the CPCC was tasked with monitoring of the operational planning of the mission and coordinating its implementation. However, in addition to its mandate, the CPCC also dealt with such aspects of the mission planning, as the development of the EUMM strategic goals, training issues and policy developments, which led to duplication with the DG E IX, because the latter was initially responsible for developing mission objectives, collecting and assessing lessons learned and training of civilian personnel (*ibid).*

Until 2007, the DG E IX was the responsible Directorate for EU civilian crisis management (Henriksson 2008). From autumn 2007 these responsibilities were divided between the DGE IX and the newly created CPCC (*ibid*). The DGE IX mandate covered conceptual and strategic issues, including the development of the CMC and the analysis of lessons learned from all civilian missions (Former Policy Officer A 2019). While the CPCC became responsible for the operational planning phase and conduct of missions, as well as improving mission planning, administration and logistics (Henriksson 2008). However, in practice, the DG E IX also oversaw the development of the EUMM's operational planning documents, which was the CPCC's territory (EEAS Official D 2018). During the operational planning phase, the CPCC guarded its role by limiting contacts between the DG E IX and the mission (*ibid).* The relationship between these two actors remained tense, partly because the dividing line between their responsibilities was never drawn effectively,

despite clearly defined mandates on paper *(ibid*). Since they were not held frequently, informal discussions did not provide sufficient information sharing between the two actors to prevent duplication of their mandates(*ibid).*

Although the HR/VP mandate allowed it to enhance the coordination of EU external activities (Art.18(TEU), Solana's coherence role was minimal in the EUMM operational planning process, as he initially had a greater personal interest in southern Europe than in the eastern part of the EU neighbourhood (Academic Expert B 2017*).* This adversely affected the HR/VP`s coherence mandate and the overall coherence of mission planning (*ibid*).

Solana did not visit Georgia or Russia in August 2008, when the war escalated, nor did he play any visible role in establishing a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia (EEAS Official C 2018).

The OPLAN of the EUMM was prepared by the HoM Hansjorg Haber under the supervision of the CPCC director or the CivOpsCdr - Kees Klompenhouwer (see section 3.1.3). Thus, there were no overlaps during the OPLAN preparation phase, since both actors had different mandates.

In June 2012, the CIVCOM and DG DEVCO staff visited the EUMM field office to assess the security situation at the ABL between Georgia and South Ossetia(see section 6.1). Although the mandates of the DG DEVCO and CIVCOM staff were different and could not overlap, the CIVCOM invited DEVCO to participate in the assessment to enhance the coherence and transparency of the mission assessment process (Former Commission Official F 2018).

The following month, two small teams of experts—the first team assembled from the CPCC and the second from the new EEAS department: CROC—were deployed to follow the developments on the ground (see section 6.1).

Both teams were designed to collect updated information on the security situation at the ABL in South Ossetia; however, no prior communication between the actors took place regarding their respective goals in the field (EEAS Official B 2019, EEAS Official E 2018). In general, the creation of the CROC division initially created duplication problems with the CPCC, who shared a mandate very similar to the CROC's (*ibid).* The CROC division was supposed to monitor and coordinate all phases of the crisis cycle, identifying the appropriate tools and instruments available at the EU level, thus encroaching on the territorial space of the CPCC, which was traditionally mandated to coordinate the EU civilian crisis response process (*ibid*). Since the mandates of both actors already included a coordinating function, the PSC had not established a centralized coordination mechanism to coordinate these overlaps (*ibid*). This is a major failure within the institutional structure of EU crisis management, as actors with coordinating mandates also need to be coordinated.

In the years 2014 and 2016 the CIVCOM delegation carried out two FFMs in South Ossetia and Georgia (see section 6.1). The first fact finding mission consisted of the CIVCOM staff and EEAS Central Asia and South Caucasus GEO Desk staff. Since CIVCOM is a Council body separated from the EEAS, particularly from the EEAS GEO Desks, the participation of GEO Desks and CIVCOM staff in the same FFM could create functional duplications during the assessment of a mission (EEAS Official G 2018).

However, frequent informal discussions were held in order to gain input from both CIVCOM and Central Asia/South Caucasus GEO Desk during the mission assessment and to clearly divide their tasks in order to avoid duplication of mandates between the two teams (Former EEAS Official F 2018). CIVCOM staff was instructed to contribute in terms of identifying the current security

situation at the ABL and to propose more technical solutions to the CMPD. The Central Asia/South Caucasus GEO Desk staff was tasked with providing recommendations to CIVCOM in accordance with the political situation in Georgia and South Ossetia (*ibid*).

The second fact finding mission conducted in 2016 consisted only of CIVCOM staff, and therefore, the possibility for duplications of inter- institutional mandates was not discussed further, as mandates must include at least two institutional actors in order to demonstrate overlap (see section 3.1).

At the implementation level, in January 2007, the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the CPCMU on behalf of the DG RELEX were tasked with leading a joint fact-finding mission in Georgia to determine the scale of confidence building measures between Tbilisi and South Ossetia, either by reducing the armed forces in Georgia, conducting joint patrols, or enhancing people to people contacts across the conflict divide (see section 6.1).

Overall, the EUSR`s mandate allowed him to conduct FFMs in the region where he was based (Former EEAS Official A 2019). At the same time, the CPCMU representing the DG RELEX, was mandated to conduct rapid reaction interventions under the RRM in the third countries, which also included FFMs (Former Commission Official A 2018). In addition, both actors had a mandate to monitor the implementation of any confidence building project in the region, which could further complicate the decision-making process on the ground (*ibid).* Informal discussions between the two actors rarely happened, and the similar functions of both actors led to divergences between the EUSR and the DG RELEX on the nature of the confidence building measure that was being implemented. Following further discussions in the PSC, it was decided to focus on person-to-person diplomacy to build confidence between youth in South Ossetia and Georgia (*ibid*).

In the absence of a centralized coordination system, the duplication of their functions remained unresolved until the DG RELEX was dissolved in 2009 (Think Tank Expert B 2018). The coordination between the DG RELEX and EUSR in the field should have been formalized to ensure a more stable and permanent flow of information at the horizontal level (*ibid*). Thus, when the DG RELEX merged into the EEAS with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the competition between the EUSR (as a Council instrument) and the DG RELEX (as a Commission instrument) disappeared (*ibid).*

A particularly confusing story happened around the mandates of the two EUSRs both engaged in the mediation of South Caucasus conflicts and the Russian-Georgian war after 2008.

As already discussed, Peter Semneby had held the mandate of the EUSR for the South Caucasus since 2006 (see section 6.1). However, on September 1, 2008, the EUSR mandate for the crisis in Georgia was established based on the joint Council action 2008/760/CFSP, in addition to the existing similar EUSR mandate for the South Caucasus (Council 2008 C). This second EUSR mandate aimed to contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the South Caucasus in accordance with the principles of international law and to facilitate the development and implementation of confidence-building measures *(ibid*). Regarding the Russian-Georgian conflict, the EUSR Morel was tasked to prepare the international negotiations foreseen under the Geneva Talks settlement plan on August 12, 2008, represent the EU at these talks, and further implement its agreements of September 8, 2008 and August 12, 2008 (*ibid).*

The appointment of Pierre Morel, as the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia, seemed confusing, since Morel was at the same time the EUSR for Central Asia (Former EEAS Official A 2019, Former EU Diplomat A 2017). This new appointment overlapped with the responsibilities of the acting EUSR for

the South Caucasus-Peter Semneby, delineating Semneby`s mandate in regard to mediation and political dialogue in Georgia (*ibid*). Peter Semneby remained the EUSR for the South Caucasus, but in practice his responsibilities related to the crisis in Georgia were limited (*ibid)*. The EUSR Morel co-chaired the Geneva Talks with the OSCE and the UN (see section 6.1). In accordance with his mandate, the EUSR Semneby could also participate in the Geneva talks, as could Morel. The EUSR Semneby`s mandate allowed him to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to assist in creating the conditions for progress on the settlement of conflicts in the South Caucasus.., as well as to facilitate confidence-building between Georgia and the Russian Federation, "thereby ensuring efficient cooperation and liaison with all relevant actors" (Council 2007, Council 2010 c). However, instead of mediating in the Geneva Talks, the EUSR Semneby was more involved in the track two mediation along with local actors in the field (Former EU Diplomat A 2017). In addition, the EUSR Semneby`s mandate was too broadly defined and had not been updated since 2008 (*ibid).* Likewise the EUSR Morel, the EUSR Semneby still had the mandate to engage in political dialogue at the highest level (*ibid).* The absence of the EUSR Semneby in the mediation of the Geneva Talks created the need for increased coordination on the ground, as the two-EUSR model hindered the coherence of the negotiation process (*ibid*).

The EUSR Semneby was not often present at the coordination meetings chaired by the Head of the Commission Delegation (Former EU Diplomat A 2017, EEAS Official D 2018). While Morel and the Head of EUMM regularly participated in coordination meetings of the Commission Delegation, or the so-called "EU family meetings". The relationship between the two EUSRs was marked by relatively high tensions, resulting in a lack of common understanding and thus negatively affecting the process of mediation and political dialogue (*ibid).*

The joint application of the efforts by the two EUSRs was necessary to coordinate the partially overlapping areas of their responsibilities, which would facilitate the exchange of information and collaboration between the two actors. However, due to the lack of a central coordination mechanism between the two EUSRs, the duplication of their mandates continued until the merger of the two mandates into one mandate in September 2011*(ibid*).

The EUSR's mandate aims to facilitate the overall coordination of the implementation of the EU CFSP in the field in its areas of competence (European Parliament 2019). However, as noted by the interviewees, both EUSRs wanted to coordinate, but neither of them wanted to be coordinated (Former EEAS Official L 2019, EEAS Official E 2018).

In addition, the South Caucasus region was largely ignored by the HR/VP despite its ability to ensure horizontal coordination, and it was Stefan Fuhle, the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, who was active in the region (EEAS Official E 2018). Thus, personal contacts or exchanges between the HR and the EUSR(s) were also limited (*ibid*).

The appointment of the second EUSR in the region caused confusion on the ground also with other local actors, such as the EUMM. The EUMM was the only actor possessing comprehensive information on the security situation at the administrative border between South Ossetia and Georgia, and he was not participating in the Geneva Talks, because track one or high-level mediation is the EUSR's purview, and the latter was reluctant to concede his policy space to the EUMM (Former EU Diplomat A 2017). During the first two rounds of Geneva Talks, the EUSR and the Head of EUMM were not able to negotiate the implementation of their tasks(*ibid*). The absence of the Head of EUMM from the Geneva Talks did not provide an effective exchange of information between Brussels and the field, as the HoM was not able to share the first hand

information directly with the mediators at the Geneva Talks, and relied on the EUSR in reporting on the local security situation to Brussels *(ibid*).

Although the EUSR Morel had access to South Ossetia and could negotiate potential confidence building measures, his reliance on the Head of EUMM for information on the security situation along the administrative border between South Ossetia and Georgia was significant (Former Diplomat 2018, Think Tank Expert B 2018). Thus, the PSC decided to include the EUMM in the Geneva Talks only from the third round. Such a tactic technically created overlaps, as the EUMM was not officially mandated to participate in track one mediation (*ibid*).

As the EU diplomat noted, in practice the different interpretations of their own mandates by the Head of EUMM and EUSR at some point negatively affected the mediation process (Former EU Diplomat A 2017). However, the created overlap was coordinated by a clear delineation of the EUSR and EUMM functions at the Geneva Talks. The EUMM`s functions were established by the PSC: the EUMM was mandated to brief only the EUSR on the security situation at the ABL between Georgia and South Ossetia (*ibid*). The EUMM's weekly participation in EU family meetings with other stakeholders (including the EUSR, the Georgia Geographic Desk, and the EUDEL to Georgia) on the ground served as an additional tool for enhancing a smooth exchange of information at the horizontal level (*ibid).*

The EUSR's mandate remained unchanged: he was mandated to conduct political dialogue with the other two co-chairs of the Geneva Talks: OSCE and the UN(see section 6.1). Within the format of the IPRM the HoM hosted meetings to discuss the security situation along the ABL between South Ossetia and Georgia and briefed the EUSR on the main points discussed by those involved in the meetings (Former EU Diplomat B 2019).

According to the EEAS source, the mandates of institutional agents might seem to be clearly defined on paper in some specific cases, but in practice these mandates can cause considerable confusion, as it happened between the EUMM and the EUSR (EEAS Official E 2018).

The EUMM mandate allows it to conduct a track two mediation on the ground via building confidence between parties to the conflict to avoid escalation (*ibid*). Meanwhile, the EUSR is mandated to mediate at the political level or at track one mediation level. However, the HoMs are sometimes called upon to mediate between parties to the conflict at the political level as well, which often leads to duplication, as conducting mediation at the highest political level is the primary mandate of the EUSR (see section 3.1.3). Here the need to coordinate the overlap of their mandates becomes an essential task.

6.3. Summary and Assessment

Empirical analysis showed that the EUMM planning process was crowded with multiple exploratory teams from the Council and Commission. Process tracing detected nine out of thirteen cases with inter-institutional overlap of mandates, eight of which confirm the main argument of this thesis in regards to "bureaucratic politics" reasoning. Six out of eight cases with overlapped mandates were recorded during the EUMM planning process, and the other three cases were detected in the implementation phase of the Geneva Talks. Out of these six cases from the EUMM planning phase, three correspond to hypothesis "2", two cases correspond to hypothesis "1" and one case corresponds to hypothesis "3".

During the EUMM planning process, the strategic planning phase, or the development of the CMC, was skipped, differing from the traditional CSDP planning process. The first two teams sent by the CPCC did not overlap with the Commission two teams from the DG RELEX and DG ECHO.

Thus, the absence of overlaps between the CPCC and DG ECHO, and between the CPCC and DG RELEX, corresponds to the null hypothesis, which means that the activation of coordination mechanisms and their impact on coherence is not relevant to discuss, in the absence of inter-institutional overlap of mandates.

The first two cases with overlapped mandates were noticed between the CPCC's two exploratory teams and the previously-existing EUSR and ECHO teams. However, these overlaps were coordinated through informal discussions between the CPCC and EUSR planning teams, and including the ECHO with the CPCC planning team. The third case with overlapped mandates was identified between the CIVCOM and the Central Asia and Caucasus GEO Desk, and was coordinated through informal discussions. The coordination of overlapped mandates in all three aforementioned cases corresponds to hypothesis "2", which is in line with the "bureaucratic politics" analytical reasoning. Hypothesis "2" confirms the effectiveness of planning teams and informal discussions implemented during the operational planning phase, leading to process coherence.

Two other cases with overlapped mandates, one between the CPCC and DG IX and the second between the DG CROC and CPCC, were not coordinated via formal coordination mechanisms.

The overlap of mandates without further coordination corresponds to hypothesis "1", which confirms the main argument of the analytical framework: in the absence of coordination mechanism(s), the overlap of inter-institutional mandates leads to an incoherent decision making process(see section 2.5).

Regarding the overlap of mandates between CPCC and DG E IX, informal discussions were rarely performed, and their implementation did not contribute to the coherent planning process. This kind of overlap corresponds to the third hypothesis of the analytical framework which shows that institutional coordination mechanisms do not work effectively and do not have a real impact on the coherence of crisis decision making process.

At the implementation level, there were three cases with overlapped mandates, of which one case was coordinated and the other two lacked a further coordination. The first case with overlapped mandate(s) without a further coordination was noted between the EUSR and DG RELEX. Here neither formal nor informal discussions were performed. The overlap of the mandates between the two EUSRs was not coordinated either. The EUSR Semneby did not participate in EU family meetings, and informal discussions did not take place between him and the EUSR Morel. Thus, both cases with overlapping mandates confirm hypothesis "1" of the analytical framework, which states that the overlap of inter-institutional mandates without further coordination leads to incoherent decision making process.

In contrast to the above cited two cases, the third case relates to the overlap of mandates between the EUMM and EUSR, which is congruent with the second hypothesis of the analytical framework applied in this thesis and is in line with the "bureaucratic politics" reasoning. It confirms the effectiveness of informal coordination mechanisms between the EUMM and EUSR in providing a coherent process of negotiations in the Geneva Talks.

In sum, the empirical findings showed that hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" dominated over hypothesis "3". Eight out of thirteen observations, corresponding to hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2", confirmed the causal relation between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and

coherence in accordance with the main reasoning of "bureaucratic politics" analytical framework as outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

	Table 4. Analysis of Hypotheses in the CFSP (2003-2016)					
	Actors	**Inter-institutional Mandates**	**Coordination Mechanisms**	**Decision Making Process is**	**Hypo-theses**	**No. of Observations**
Planning	CPCC and DG ECHO	No Overlap	N/A	N/A	0	1
	CPCC and DG RELEX	No Overlap	N/A	N/A	0	1
	CPCC and EUSR	Overlap	Activated	Coherent	2	1
	CPCC and DG ECHO	Overlap	Activated	Coherent	2	1
	CPCC and DG E IX	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
	CPCC and DG E IX	Overlap	Activated	Incoherent	3	1
	HoM and CivOpsCdr	No Overlap	N/A	N/A	0	1
	DG DEVCO and CIVCOM	No Overlap	N/A	N/A	0	1
	CPCC and DG CROC	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
	CIVCOM and EEAS GEO.DESK	Overlap	Activated	Coherent	2	1

Implementation	EUSR, DG RELEX	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
	EUSR, EUMM	Overlap	Activated	Coherent	2	1
	EUSR1, EUSR2	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
						Total 13

Source:own compilation based on the analytical framework(see section 2.5)

Chapter 7: The EU Response to the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict in relation to Development Aid

The chapter provides an empirical analysis of EU crisis responses to the South Ossetian conflict in the Development Aid policy area for the 2003-2016 historical period. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section briefly discusses the evolution of EU Commission-funded activities in South Ossetia from 2003 to 2016, in the frameworks of the RRM and the IcSP. The second section provides the results of process tracing, conducted separately at the planning and implementation levels, in order to assess the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence based on the analytical framework of the thesis. The third section summarizes the empirical findings, introducing the results of within-case analysis built on the assumptions of "bureaucratic politics" premise as illustrated in section 2.5.

7.1. The Evolution of European Commission Assistance in South Ossetia

The EU`s early steps as a crisis manager in South Ossetia became noticeable in 2000, when the European Commission became an observer in the JCC on issues related to the economic rehabilitation of the region (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2009). Created in 1992 the JCC consisted of four members with equal representation: Georgia, North Ossetia, Russia and South Ossetia (Lott 2012:15-16). The EU's major objective in providing assistance to South Ossetia was "to improve living conditions of the population affected by the conflict and to create conditions for the return of IDPs, as well as facilitating progress in a constructive dialogue' between the South Ossetia and Tbilisi (*ibid).* In January 2003 the Commission allocated €2.5 million for the rehabilitation of the Georgian/South Ossetian main north-south road as part of a joint customs collection mechanism (ICG 2004). However, both sides could not agree on the location of the customs point, and the project was changed to provide more shelter and rehabilitative support to the refugees in South Ossetia (*ibid*). Thus, in the same month a protocol for the implementation of Commission funded rehabilitation program in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone was signed by the JCC, and was implemented under the aegis of the UNDP (*ibid).* The project was divided into three parts: part one, €800,000 for basic shelter assistance and repatriation kits for refugees, part two, €1,300,000 for rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in support of permanent residents and part three, €400,000 for rehabilitation in South Ossetia. A Steering Committee, including the representatives of the Commission, Georgian and South Ossetian governments, was set up under the JCC to address the technical aspects of the project`s implementation (*ibid).*

In June 2004, the Commission and the World Bank co-chaired a donors` conference in Georgia, during which nearly €125 mln. assistance was allocated to Georgia (European Commission 2005). However, such an assistance was aimed, in particular, at supporting the Georgian

government to improve the rule of law and the fight against corruption, as well as addressing serious poverty problems in Georgia, rather than financing the implementation of post–conflict rehabilitation projects (Former Commission Official A 2018).

In 2006 economic rehabilitation projects were launched in South Ossetia as a result of the international donor conference co-organized by the Commission and the OSCE (OSCE 2008). The projects included the restoration of electricity, water and gas networks, schools and medical facilities, as well as the development of small businesses and agriculture, covering both South Ossetia and the surrounding regions of Georgia(*ibid*). The implementation of these projects was coordinated by the OSCE. However, the intended rehabilitation of the water supply and irrigation system that covered both South Ossetia and adjacent parts of Georgia was disrupted by the war (*ibid).* The problems of insufficient water supplies and poor sanitary conditions, thus remained unsolved (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2009).

With the launch of the IfS in 2007, as a follow up to the RRM, the Commission started to finance more projects than before (EUDEL to Georgia 2010). The IfS-financed projects in South Ossetia aimed at improving the living conditions of the local population affected by the conflict. At the same time, these actions were designed to assist in creating conditions for the return of IDPs who had to leave their homes in the early 1990s *(ibid*).

Between 2006-2008 the Commission had initially allocated €2 mln. for further rehabilitation activities under an OSCE-led multi donor program in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict area with a total budget of €10 mln. following the donor conference in Brussels (EUDEL Georgia 2010). The EU mandate under this rehabilitation program initially focused on electricity and gas projects, but in summer 2008 it was reallocated to school rehabilitation. After the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, this initiative was temporarily suspended *(ibid*). However, in autumn 2010 the program resumed, when it was agreed to redistribute the remaining funds for water projects in South Ossetia and the surrounding areas (*ibid*).

In the frame of the Geneva Talks, it was decided to implement projects aimed at improving the water supply in both sides of the conflict (EUDEL Georgia 2011). In this context, the safety of the Zonkari dam in South Ossetia and the upgrading of the Nikosi pumping station represented the first significant achievements(*ibid*). The Commission funded these projects, totalling €2,8 mln., from which €2mln. was allocated for the rehabilitation of the Zonkari dam and € 800,000 was planned to be spent on the upgrading of the Nikosi pumping station (Commission Official D 2018). Both projects were implemented by the OSCE during 2010-2011. The upgrading of the Nikosi pumping station was supposed to include the provision of new pipes and of a seventh pump, which would transport water from the Didi Liakhvi River to the Saltsivi irrigation channel (EUDEL Georgia 2011).

The rehabilitation of the Zonkari dam had a crucial confidence building aspect, as the damage of the dam would negatively affect both-South Ossetian and Georgian sides(OSCE 2010). Thus, an engineer from Tbilisi was allowed to enter South Ossetia and, together with the experts from Tskhinvali, carry out rehabilitation works (*ibid*). The €2 mln. project focused on regulating the water level in the Zonkari reservoir and exploring ways to provide additional potable water to the population living in Tskhinvali (*ibid).*

After the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, the Commission continued to provide support to people affected by the conflict in Georgia, launching its first phase of the IfS from 2008 until 2009 (EUDEL to Georgia 2009). Between 2008-2009 the Commission allocated €32 mln. to facilitate the return and reintegration of IDPs in Georgia and South Ossetia (Jeppsson 2015).

Under the first phase of the IfS, winterisation and housing support projects were funded with the budget of € 9,7 mln.(EUDEL to Georgia 2009). The projects aimed at restoring livelihoods and securing access to food for communities and families in post-conflict situations (*ibid*).

The second phase of the IfS started with the development of an early warning system in conflict-affected Shida Kartli region of South Ossetia with a €40,000 budget between September 2009 and October 2010(EUDEL to Georgia 2010). The project produced monthly monitoring reports on the situation in Shida Kartli (including Akhalgori) based on early warning indicators. The project was implemented by the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development(*ibid).*

From September 2009 until March 2011 the Commission funded the implementation of a small scale confidence building project in Akhalgori with a €50,000 budget (EUDEL to Georgia 2011). Akhalgori is a region of South Ossetia with a predominantly Georgian population. This project included language and computer classes for the local Georgian and South Ossetian children in the Akhalgori Youth House, as well as cultural excursions (*ibid*).

In May 2010 the Commission started financing the implementation of confidence building and dialogue projects in South Ossetia in the framework of COBERM (EUDEL to Georgia 2011). The latter "is designed to provide rapid early support to confidence building opportunities emerging from the grassroots level in an effort to manage the conflicts from further escalation" (Macharashvili et. al., 2017). Thus, the main objective of COBERM is to foster a peaceful transformation of conflicts (EUDEL to Georgia 2011).

The projects financed under the framework of COBERM present opportunities for confidence building through direct people-to-people contacts, such as dialogues between communities and civil society actors across the conflict divide (EUDEL to Georgia 2011). The COBERM`s area of operation includes communities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia along their administrative boundary lines and other parts of Georgia (*ibid*).

COBERM was formulated in three phases: the first phase lasted from 2010 to 2012, the second phase from 2012 to 2015 and the third phase from 2015 to 2018 (UNDP 2019). However, as

the time frame of the current study is set for 2003-2015, only the first two phases of COBERM are included in empirical analysis.

The scope of the implementation of the first phase of COBERM was connected with building credibility among the representatives of the parties in the conflict and facilitate their participation in the program (Macharashvili et. al., 2017). The second phase of COBERM, like its predecessor, continued to support confidence building measures in South Ossetia in order to prevent and transform the conflict through the provision of a rapid response mechanism (*ibid).* Here the emphasis was placed on enhancing skills and increasing knowledge in concepts and strategies related to confidence building. Each phase of COBERM was conducted in four rounds (*ibid).*

Regarding the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, COBERM included community-based projects in Georgia and South Ossetia with the primary goal of promoting the peaceful transformation of the conflict and the development of people-to-people contacts (Jeppsson 2015). The COBERM projects covered all those areas that might help to build confidence among the Georgian and South Ossetian communities, such as youth and education, promotion of civic activism and tolerance, personal diplomacy, provision of health care for South Ossetian patients in Georgia, enhancing the role of women in peace building and promoting peace journalism (European Commission 2013 c). The projects are implemented by UNDP in close cooperation with the EUDEL to Georgia (EUDEL to Georgia 2010).

In total 60 projects were implemented as part of the first phase of COBERM(European Commission 2013 c). The main projects dedicated to South Ossetia included two long-term and four short-term projects. The first big project was related to "Engagement through Dialogue: Dialogue and Study Visits for the Management of the Georgian–Ossetian Conflict", an initiative carried out since 2010, with a €4 mln. budget (CORE 2013). The duration of the project was about 18 months. The aim of the project was to facilitate dialogue between young Georgian and

South Ossetian professionals, such as journalists and civil activists, deepen their understanding of political processes across the conflict divide, and explore the possibilities and limits of trust-building processes (*ibid*). The idea behind the project was to train the young professionals as young leaders so that they could manage dialogue meetings on their own across the conflict divide(CORE 2013). Unlike other projects carried out by international organizations, the "Engagement through Dialogue" project foresaw an ongoing rotation of participants, which provided potential for the enlargement of the network of participants and increased the effectiveness of the project (*ibid).* The project contained a series of workshops conducted in Georgia and South Ossetia. The topics of the workshops were related to the issue of everyday political life and its perception by Georgians and Ossetians (*ibid*). Because of the sensitivity of this project, the dissemination of its content and results was restricted and was not possible to reveal during the interviews.

The Innovative Action for Gender Equality in Georgia (IAGE) was another COBERM project financed by the Commission from January 2013 until November 2015 with the total budget of €799,988 aimed to assess the situation and needs of four categories of women in Georgia and its surrounded regions: ethnic minorities, imprisoned women, women residing in isolated mountainous settings and single, elderly and disabled women among IDPs and conflict affected communities (European Commission 2013 c). The specific objective of the project was to support women`s initiatives aimed at confidence building and social stability through addressing healthcare, social, and economic needs of the women belonging to the above mentioned categories (UN Women 2016). In the Shida Kartli region, the project engaged the displaced and conflict-affected women and girls residing in mountainous regions through advocacy, people-to-people diplomacy and social-cultural integration. The project contributed to the establishment of two libraries and one computer center in the conflict affected villages in

Shida Kartli and to an increase of the capacity of 30 young activists (IDPs and conflict affected) on the issues of human rights and IDP legislation(*ibid).*

The remaining four short sub-projects were implemented by mid November 2011. These projects contained both educational and confidence building elements. The average duration of each project was one year[5].

The first small scale project was related to the editing of the Georgian/Ossetian and Ossetian/ Georgian dictionaries. The project aimed to promote the Georgian/Ossetian and Ossetian/Georgian dictionaries (1000-1000 copies in each language) which would ease the communication between the two ethnic groups. The dictionaries were also considered to be a great asset for scholars and researchers, who were motivated to learn the Ossetian language and vice-versa. The dictionaries were posted online for easy access (UNDP 2011).

The "European School for Young Leaders", was another project, which was designed to establish contacts between young representatives of the society, divided by the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and promote their engagement in peace-building processes. Ten young people from Shida Kartli and ten peers from Tskhinvali region were selected to participate in the Europe School in the Czech Republic (UNDP 2011).

The third project was named "Ex-combatants for Non Violence"(UNDP 2011). The key objective of the project was to promote the full integration of former participants or ex-combatants of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict into a society. Thus, the project aimed to enhance the skills of ex-combatants in order to strengthen the peacekeeping process (*ibid*). The ex-combatants participated in public activities in order to enhance their potential towards non-violent ways of conflict resolution. In total ten participants were selected from each side to join

[5] Due to the delicate nature of some information related to the implementation time table of sub-projects, the thesis can not publish the exact time frame for each sub-project.

the public roundtables. In addition, a training course was conducted aimed at creating an atmosphere of mutual trust for the integration of the ex-combatants into civilian activities (*ibid*). And the last project was aimed to increase confidence through community security in Shida Kartli(*ibid*). The overall goal of the project was to create a favorable atmosphere for developing confidence within communities in Shida Kartli, between communities and security providers in Shida Kartli and between communities across the Shida Kartli/South Ossetia ABL. This was expected to increase communities' ability to manage local conflicts, which would in turn reduce tensions and enhance the potential for contact across the conflict divide (*ibid).*

From 2014 the IfS was succeeded by the IcSP, which provides both short-term and long-term financial assistance to the conflict affected regions (see section 3.1.4). Working closely with other services of the European Commission and the EEAS, "the FPI mobilizes the IcSP to develop short-term actions in response to actual or emerging crises around the world" (Batora et al. 2016). The IcSP actions are often conducted jointly with an existing EU mission in a third country *(ibid).*

Under the IcSP the Commission began funding the second phase of COBERM. The projects in the second phase of COBERM were implemented from 2012-2015 (UNDP 2014). In total, seventy-four projects were implemented in Georgia, thirty projects and sub-projects of which were implemented in South Ossetia. Five long-term projects out of thirty were implemented in a period of one to two years (*ibid*).

The first long-term budget was a two year project on "Ensuring access to effective mental health services in conflict affected regions of Shida Kartli and South Ossetia" with a budget of € 85,678 and implemented within 2013-2015(UNDP 2014). The project focused on promotion of sustainable institutional mechanisms of mental health care both for Georgian and South Ossetian IDPs. The project was based on the scientific evidence, according to which "mental health condition within and between affected communities can influence the conflict dynamics"

(*ibid*). The project aimed to build confidence between the conflict affected communities via strengthening links between the mental health professionals from both Georgia and South Ossetia and improve access to mental health services for the population residing in Shida Kartli and Tskhinvali regions *(Ibid*).

"The Dialogue of Generations: Learning from the Past" project with the budget € 49,227 was launched in 2012 (UNDP 2014). The project aimed to "increase trust between the Georgian and Ossetian communities by means of a dialogue between socially active representatives of different generations on both sides (opinion leaders), analysis of the past period and the formation of a vision for the future on the basis of common interests" (*ibid*). The participants from different age-groups from Georgia and South Ossetia were engaged in a dialogue on a history. During these dialogues, they exchanged stories about their own history and listened to different opinions and shared their own experiences. The main message was that, the hearing of grievances and appreciating the other sides' losses could be a step towards forgiving each other (Berghof Foundation 2012).

The project named "Youth Peace Express" was implemented within 2013-2014 with a budget of € 56,110 (UNDP 2014). The project aimed to develop relations between Georgian and Ossetian youth and create conditions for cooperation via organizing numerous joint educational tours in selected European countries. Such a technique was supposed to create incentives for cooperation among the young people on the basis of knowledge and experiences received from European participants (*ibid).*

In 2013 the Commission started to fund another confidence-building project, "Writers for Peace", which was implemented by the UNDP in cooperation with the EUDEL to Georgia (UNDP 2014). The project lasted two years (2013-2015) with a budget of €37, 021. The project was designed to build confidence and develop positive attitudes through reestablishment of

networks and cooperation between the Georgian and Ossetian writers; this included capacity development of cultural circles to engage in peace processes (*ibid).*

The project helped the writers from both regions to come together and share with each other their peace of works (UNDP 2014). The novels of South Ossetian writers were translated into Georgian and vice versa, and shared between two groups. A collection of stories and various discussion papers by Georgian and Ossetian writers, and the digitalization of archived South Ossetian and Georgian manuscripts was also publicized *(Ibid).*

"Georgian-Ossetian Platform of Trade Union Solidarity" was the last long term project implemented within 2013-2015, with a total budget of € 35,665 (UNDP 2014). The project aimed to promote confidence and improve communication between the Georgian and Ossetian communities through creating a cooperation platform of Trade Unions. The project involved the Georgian and Ossetian Trade Union specialists in different areas (education, culture, sport, small enterprise/trading sectors) and assisted them in developing mechanisms for further cooperation (*ibid).*

The specific goal of the remaining twenty five sub-projects was to strengthen the skills and capacities of participants in conflict-sensitive communication, to increase their knowledge in confidence building concepts and peace building strategies (UNDP 2014).

In addition to the IcSP funded projects, the EU has implemented several DCI financed development assistance projects in the conflict-affected areas of the South Caucasus, including South Ossetia (Former Commission Official H 2018). The DCI aims to "contribute to fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and supporting democracy, good governance, human rights and international law in recipient countries" (European Parliament 2017). However, part of the DCI budget is secured for thematic programs such as good governance, support to civil society development in fragile regions, economic development

projects, migration and asylum (*ibid).* Within 2010-2012 the Commission on behalf of the DG DEVCO financed a post conflict, economic development project, which aimed to support the IDP agricultural livelihoods in the Shida Kartli region with a total budget of € 615, 000 (EUDEL to Georgia 2011). The main goal of the project was to reduce poverty and promote the inclusion of the youth in livelihood development for IDP families in South Ossettia and Georgia (*ibid).* "By the end of the project, 500 young IDP farmers from the Shida Kartli region benefited from increased productivity and were able to access regional markets"(*ibid*). 350 young people were integrated in the agricultural production and in the development of rural communities. The project was implemented by the World Vision with the support of the EUDEL to Georgia (*ibid*). During 2016-2017 the Commission financed a €3 mln. program to support the integration of IDPs from South Ossetia and Abkhazia (EUDEL to Georgia 2017). The project aimed at providing housing and allowances to IDPs to help them to expand their livelihoods as their own sources of income, which would reduce their dependency on the host states (*ibid*).

A brief description of the main activities in the Development Aid is presented in the table below.

Table 5. The Overview of the Main Activities in the Development Aid

Date	The Main Events
01.01.2003	The Commission allocated €2.5 million for the rehabilitation of the Georgian/South Ossetian main north-south road as part of a joint customs collection mechanism.
01.01.2004	A protocol for the implementation of Commission funded rehabilitation program in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was signed in the Joint Control Commission (JCC).
01.01.2006	The European Commission became the biggest international donor in South Ossetia.
01.01.2007	The first phase of the Instrument of Stability(IfS) was launched.
12.08.2008	Due to the escalation of the Russian-Georgian war the Commission projects aimed at electricity, gas and school rehabilitation in the two main cities of South Ossetia: Gali and Tskhinvali were temporary suspended.
15.08.2008-	The Commission funded the implementation of a small scale confidence building project in

15.08.2009	Akhalgori, a district in South Ossetia with a predominantly Georgian population.
01.09.2009	The Commission launched the rehabilitation project in the Zonkari dam and two other water irrigation projects in Znauri village and in the Upper Nikosi.
01.09.2009-10.10.2010	The second phase of the IfS started with the development of an early warning system in conflict-affected Shida Kartli region of South Ossetia with a €40,000 budget.
15.05.2010-01.01.2012	The Commission started to fund the implementation of the first phase of Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM) in South Ossetia.
01.01.2012-01.01.2015	The Commission launched the second phase of Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism(COBERM) during which thirty projects were implemented in South Ossetia.
01.01.2014	The Instrument for Stability (IfS) was succeeded by the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) which provides both short-term and long-term financial assistance to the conflict affected regions.
09.01.2016	The Commission allocated €3 mln. payment into Georgia's state budget to support the integration of internally displaced people (IDPs) from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Source: own compilation based on the information in section 7.1.

7.2. The Analysis of Overlapped Mandates and their Impact on Coherence

In relation to Development Aid, the 2003-2006 financial programming of Commission-funded post-conflict economic rehabilitation projects, such as electricity and gas supply to adjacent areas of South Ossetia, was planned by the DG RELEX and implemented by the OSCE (Former Commission Official H 2018). Within the DG RELEX the pre-Lisbon Directorate A was mandated to administer the CFSP budget (*ibid).*

Similarly, the 2006-2009 programming of the first and second phases of the confidence-building and economic rehabilitation projects, as well as the development of an early warning system in the Shida Kartili region of South Ossetia, were conducted exclusively by the DG RELEX under the strategic guidance of the PSC (*ibid*). Thus, not a single case of duplication of mandates was recorded, since only one actor was responsible for the whole programming process.

Since 2010, the Commission has started funding a water safety project in South Ossetia, which included the rehabilitation of the water infrastructure in the Zonkari Dam, a drinking water

provision in Znauri and a water irrigation in Nikosi, which lasted one year (OSCE 2013). The idea of the project came from the EUSR.

The operational part of the project was solely planned by the FPI, as it fell under the short term programming cycle of the IfS (Art.3). However, the EUSR team was also involved in the planning process in close cooperation with the EUDEL in the field, as the idea to fund the project belonged to the EUSR (Former EU Diplomat A 2017). The FPI analyzed the feasibility of the proposal and agreed to fund it through the IfS (*Ibid*). There was no overlap between the mandates of the FPI and the EUSR administration, because there was a clear definition of their tasks: the FPI was responsible for the management of the project`s budget and the EUSR was involved in strategic planning (*ibid).* However, a miscommunication between the EUSR and the EUDEL in Georgia arose over the coordination of the implementation phase of the project (Former Commission Official J 2019). The EUDEL and the EUSR did not often consult with each other on issues related to the political analysis of the project (*ibid*). Their spheres of interests overlapped, creating a need for a substantive coordination (*ibid).* The EUDEL, like the EUSR, has a coordinating mandate on the ground on behalf of the Head of EUDEL, who organizes and holds monthly EU family coordination meetings (see section 3.1.5). The coordinating mandate of the EUDEL often strains the relations between the EUSR and the EUDEL, because the EUSR's mandate also allows it to coordinate the implementation of post-crisis reconstruction projects financed by the Commission (Academic Expert A 2017). As the interviewed EU officials mentioned, if there was a formal information sharing system between the EUSR and the EUDEL, their coordination mandates would have less chances to overlap, because both actors would follow a routine based coordination process (Former Commission Official M 2019, Commission Official B 2018). Here, the main issue is that the treaties give a "coordinating mandate" to numerous institutional actors, without taking into consideration, that the mandates of institutional actors performing coordinating functions could also overlap, and it

becomes difficult to indicate who the coordinator is and who is actually being coordinated (Former EEAS Official J 2019).

In addition, the EUSRs located outside the EEAS, have made the EU institutional structure denser than before, which usually alleviates coordination issues with other EU actors on the ground, especially with EUDELs in third countries (EEAS Official H 2019, EEAS Official C 2018).

Immediately after the implementation of the water infrastructure safety program at Zonkari dam, the provision of potable water to the households living next to the ABLs of South Ossetia was implemented in Znauri and Nikosi (Former EU Diplomat 2017). However, the implementation of that sub-project coincided with a similar water irrigation confidence building project conducted by the EUMM in the same area with a budget of €200,000 (*ibid*).

It is worth mentioning that the CSDP missions do not possess their own funds to implement projects (Former EEAS Official K 2018, Former EEAS Official J 2019). However, according to the Council Joint Action 2009/842/CFSP the CSDP missions are provided with budgets for carrying out so called "Project Cells" which are small projects with up to € 200,000 (*ibid).*

In order to avoid the future overlap of the two similar projects a small coordination committee comprising of the EUSR, Head of the EUMM and Head of the EUDEL to Georgia was formed in 2012 by the initiation of the newly appointed Head of the EUMM Andrzej Tyszkiewicz (*ibid*). This newly established informal coordination mechanism was aimed at improving the exchange of information between the EUDEL, EUSR and EUMM in the field. The Committee meetings were held informally once a week and were organized by the project manager of the EUMM, so that the implementation of the two parallel projects did not overlap in the future (*ibid).*

In the post-Lisbon period, the strategic programming phase of the EU crisis response and preparedness measures under the IcSP was "prepared jointly" by the EEAS and the Commission services (see section 3.1.4).

However, the inclusion of the FPI and SECPOL.2 in the joint IcSP programming processes(Art. 3 and Art. 4.3), at some point blurred the decision-making process and created contradictions (Former Commission Official A 2018, Former EEAS Official G 2018). The FPI was keen to add some elements of economic cooperation to the projects, while SECPOL.2 sought to fund projects with a more political dimension (*ibid*).

According to the source from the EEAS, there was no formal information sharing system between the SECPOL.2 and FPI, and effective coordination between the two actors depended mainly on informal communication channels, which was rare (Former EEAS Official F 2018). Consequently the extent to which information was exchanged between these two actors remained limited (*ibid).* The SECPOL.2 could be seen as a more competing actor with the FPI, rather than cooperating, and this complicated the coordination of their preferences (*ibid).*

The Commission document SEC (2012)48 on the working arrangements between the Commission and the EEAS states that both actors should jointly manage the IfS programming process (European Commission 2012 a). However, this new arrangement does not set a threshold between their mandates in the programming phase (Former EEAS Official F 2018, Former Commission Official G 2018).

At first glance the coordination between the FPI and the SECPOL.2 could seem simple, since both actors work under the direct authority of the HR/VP and are located in the same building. According to Art.27(3)TEU the EEAS should assist the HR/VP in enhancing coherence of EU external action across all policy domains, however, in practice the EEAS cannot implement that mandate for the FPI and SECPOL.2, because the EEAS is located outside the Commission and the FPI appears in the organizational structure of the Commission (Academic Expert B 2017). The FPI, although physically located in the EEAS building, is legally part of the Commission (Smith 2017:257).

The EEAS has limited authority over the IcSP budget compared to the Commission, which also leads the short term component of IcSP under Art.3, which accounts for 70 % of the IcSP budget (European Commission 2014). Thus, EEAS respondents suggested extending the SECPOL.2`s mandate by transferring the whole "competency" over the long term component of the IcSP (Art. 4.3) from FPI to SECPOL.2 (Former EEAS Official I 2019, EEAS Official C 2018). In contrast, one respondent from the Commission and a Think Tank representative suggested, that the SECPOL.2`s mandate remains unchanged during the IcSP programming phase, but instead, creating a constantly structured, formal coordination mechanism between the SECPOL.2 and FPI, consisted of both Commission and EEAS representatives (Former Commission Official A 2018, Think Tank Expert B 2018).

It is important to note, that effective coordination between the FPI and SECPOL.2 depended also on the HR/VP`s coordination mandate in the Commission (Former EEAS Official J 2019, Think Tank Expert B 2018). However, the HR/VP had a limited power to utilize its so called "coordination" mandate in the Commission, as she did not regularly attend meetings of the RELEX Commissioners Group, which led to a lack of trust among some Commissioners to her(*ibid*).

In general the DG DEVCO had a minor role in the programming process of COBERM (Former Commission Official H 2018, Think Tank Expert B 2018). However, due to the delicate nature of some projects, the DG DEVCO's expertise in providing technical assistance and capacity building in gender mainstreaming in the development aid was relevant in the long term programming phase falling under Art. 4.3 *(ibid*). As the DG DEVCO and FPI both co-chaired the comitology process, the DG DEVCO activated its ad-hoc DCCP mechanism, which acted as an internal coordination tool to ensure a full exchange of information with FPI and SECPOL.2(if SECPOL.2 is also involved in the comitology process) during comitology

discussions (*ibid).* The DCCP mechanism gave the DG DEVCO, FPI and SECPOL.2 a clear idea of the project objectives and the opportunity to express their viewpoints (*ibid).*

The COBERM was launched by the FPI under the HR/VP`s authority. The projects were implemented by several NGOs in close coordination with the EUDEL to Georgia (EUDEL to Georgia 2010). Thus, there was no confirmed case of duplication of mandates on the ground due to the presence of only one EU institutional actor responsible for implementation, such as the EUDEL to Georgia.

There was a good level of information exchange between the FPI in Brussels and EUDEL to Georgia (Former Commission Official N 2019, Former Commission Official F 2018). The FPI contacted the EUDEL to Georgia on a regular basis, and specific briefings related to the implementation of the project were constantly updated through weekly information exchanges and monthly reports from the EUDEL to Commission (*ibid*).

As for the DCI project planning process, it was slightly different from the IcSP programming process. Here SECPOL.2 was not equally involved in the initial programming process (Former Commission Official N 2019). The SECPOL.2 was invited to participate in several ad hoc meetings at the last stage of the programming process. SECPOL.2 was passively involved in the planning phase, because the essence of the project was more compatible with the experience that the DG DEVCO possessed in the field of agriculture and food security *(ibid).* The planning process, thus used a top-down hierarchy and was initiated by the FCMU on behalf of the DG DEVCO under the guidance of the Commissioner for Development and the HR/VP *(ibid).* The draft project proposal was sent by the DG DEVCO for the comitology review and then to the PSC for the final political approval *(ibid*). Since the planning process was carried out only under the direction of the DG DEVCO, no cases of duplication of mandates were identified at this stage.

Although the DG DEVCO and EUDEL were both mandated to coordinate the implementation of the project, the DG DEVCO dominated the entire coordination process over EUDEL by narrowing the latter`s policy space (Former Commission Official J 2019, Former EEAS Official F 2018). In the cases when the project planning is initiated by the DG DEVCO, the latter leads the coordination of the whole implementation process (*ibid).* Likewise, EUDELs are also mandated to coordinate the implementation of DCI funded projects on behalf of the Head of EUDEL, who organizes and holds monthly coordination meetings (so-called EU family meetings) with other stakeholders on the ground (see section 3.1.5). However, in the cases when EUDELs are not highly involved in the project planning process, their mandate is often ignored at a certain point, as they are not always consulted from the headquarters on implementation processes (Think Tank Expert A 2019, Former Commission Official G 2018). The lack of information exchange, prevented the EUDEL in the field from having an overview of the strategic outline of the project, so that the former could set the stage for coherent implementation of the project *(ibid*). From the EEAS perspective, this could be perceived as a neglect of its politico- strategic considerations on the ground by the Commission (Former EEAS Official B 2019).

In some cases it is possible that the DCI programming process starts from the bottom rather than from the top. In such cases the programming phase was undertaken by the EUDEL`s operational department in Georgia under the close guidance of the DG DEVCO (Former Commission Official B 2018). The programming process involved consultations with relevant actors, including civil society organizations, NGOs and other donors. Afterwards, the EUDEL to Georgia submitted the draft proposal to the relevant desk officers in DEVCO and SECPOL.2 in Brussels (*ibid*).

The DG DEVCO and SECPOL.2 units assessed the proposal and became engaged in a dialogue with the EUDEL to Georgia through the country team meetings and video-conferences to

ensure, that the draft proposal is in line with the EU`s strategic interests in the region and finalize the selection of the main target audience (Former Commission Official I 2018, Former EEAS Official B 2019). The above process was coordinated by the SECPOL.2 unit together with the DG DEVCO, ensuring the participation of the EUDEL`s team (*ibid*). The SECPOL.2 and the DG DEVCO submitted the amended proposal to the EUDEL to Georgia with the final instructions on the draft. Such a programming framework required an intensive interaction between the SECPOL.2, DEVCO and EUDEL (*ibid*).

In the second phase, the EUDEL to Georgia, on the basis of the instructions provided by the DG DEVCO and SECPOL.2, updated the draft project including the context and justification of the choice of the project. The final project proposal was sent back to DG DEVCO and SECPOL.2 and was evaluated at the level of comitology (Former Commission Official I 2018, Former EEAS Official B 2019).

However, according to the Commission and EEAS sources, the mandates of the political and operational divisions (on behalf of the SECPOL.2 and DG DEVCO, respectively) overlapped during the second phase of the proposal drafting process (EEAS Official D 2018, Former Commission Official C 2018). The main problem was that the operational division on behalf of the DG DEVCO, without having a "full time" mandate to perform political planning functions, in addition to its organizational duties, was highly engaged also in the political programming phase, which was the territorial space of the political unit on behalf of the SECPOL.2 (*ibid*).

The SECPOL.2 staff does not always possess sufficient development programming skills and competencies (Former Commission Official A 2018, Former EEAS Official F 2018). This usually leads to the dominance of the operational unit on behalf of the DG DEVCO over the political unit on behalf of the SECPOL.2 during the programming process (*ibid*).

In addition, the COMDEL was not a feasible coordination mechanism between the DG DEVCO and SECPOL.2 units: the COMDEL was mandated to ensure "internal coordination within the

Commission in relation to the management of Commission resources in EUDELs and consisted only of Commission DGs and Services" (European Commission 2012 b).

One important factor is that Commission officials make up the majority of EUDEL staff (Hayes 2013:32). However, although the Commission staff in EUDELs is assigned to a home Directorate-General in the Commission, the former is under the authority of the Head of EUDEL assigned to the EEAS (European Commission 2012 b). Thus, the Head of EUDEL with its coordinating mandate could act as a connecting hub between DEVCO and SECPOL.2 units.

Another option could be creating a joint committee, composed of Commission and EEAS representatives, to enhance mutual consultations between SECPOL.2 and DEVCO units in EUDEL (Former Desk Officer A 2018). In general, the joint committee could serve as a forum for the mutual exchange of knowledge and skills between the EEAS and Commission staff within the EUDEL *(ibid).*

The role of the HR/VP as a coordinator was also minimal (Former Commission Official L 2019). She did not have the authority to impose any coordinating "obligations" to the Commissioner for Development, and therefore could not influence the coordination between DEVCO and SECPOL.2 staff in EUDEL. As by doing so, she would abuse her competences and create tensions with the Commission *(ibid*).

7.3. Summary and Assessment

The empirical analysis of European Commission assistance in South Ossetia showed that no cases with overlapped mandates were recorded before Lisbon, due to the presence of only one actor in charge of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation planning measures: the DG RELEX, operating under the strategic guidance of the PSC.

In the post-Lisbon period eight cases with overlapped mandates were detected out of thirteen observations: five at the planning level and three at the implementation level.

The first two cases showing overlapping mandates, were observed between the SECPOL.2 and the FPI during the planning process of the IcSP. Here two main hypotheses were identified at the same time: hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "3". The hypothesis "1" shows that there was no formal and structured information-sharing system between the SECPOL.2 and FPI. Such a situation underlines that the crisis decision-making process is incoherent, if the institutional mandates overlap and coordination mechanism(s) are not activated (see section 2.5). The hypothesis "3" indicates that informal discussions rarely took place among the two actors which did not contribute to a coherent planning process. The hypothesis "3" depicts a situation, in which the activation of coordination mechanisms does not affect the coherence of the crisis decision making process and emphasizes the need to effectively coordinate the overlapped mandates in order to avoid an incoherent policy planning process(*ibid).*

During the IcSP programming phase falling under Art. 4.3 the mandates of DG DEVCO and FPI slightly overlapped, as both were tasked with co-chairing the comitology process. However, the DG DEVCO activated its ad-hoc DCCP mechanism, which acted as an internal coordination tool to ensure a smooth exchange of information with the FPI and SECPOL.2 (if SECPOL.2 is also involved in the comitology process). Thus, such a situation corresponds to the second hypothesis of the theoretical framework, meaning that if the overlapped mandates are coordinated, the crisis decision-making process is coherent. The hypothesis "2" shows that the coordination mechanisms were implemented effectively, as they contributed to a coherent implementation process. It confirms the main argument of the theoretical framework, in which inter-institutional coordination mechanisms serve as a link between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence.

The fourth case with overlapping mandates was identified in the DCI planning process, during which the programming phase started from the bottom rather than from the top. The EUDEL to Georgia, the SECPOL.2 unit and the DG DEVCO were responsible for the programming process and drafting the project proposal. However, the SECPOL.2 led the coordination of this process jointly with the relevant DEVCO Fragility Unit (B2), ensuring the involvement of the EUDEL in the country team meetings and video-conferences. This situation also confirms hypothesis "2" in line with "bureaucratic politics" theoretical framework, in which the inter-institutional coordination mechanisms serve as a link between overlapping mandates and coherence.

The last case illustrating the duplication of mandates at the planning level was found between the DEVCO and SECPOL.2 sections within the EUDEL to Georgia. The COMDEL coordination mechanism was not activated at a horizontal level, and no other coordination mechanisms were applied. This overlap confirms hypothesis "1" of the analytical framework, which stresses that the crisis decision-making process is incoherent, if the overlapped inter-institutional mandates are left without further coordination (see section 2.5). Thus, it is in line with the main reasoning of "bureaucratic politics" theory: the overlap of inter-institutional mandates adversely affects the coherence of EU crisis decision-making process in the absence of coordination.

As with the CFSP policy area, three cases with overlapped inter-institutional mandates were detected during the implementation phase in the Development Aid policy area.

During the implementation of the water safety project in South Ossetia, an overlap between the mandates of the EUSR and the EUDEL in Georgia was observed over the coordination of the project`s implementation. Their spheres of interests overlapped, creating a need for substantive coordination. However, due to the lack of a formal coordination mechanism between the actors, it was not possible to impede the duplication. This kind of situation refers to the first hypothesis

of the analytical framework, confirming the main reasoning of the "bureaucratic politics" theory, which stresses that the crisis decision-making process is incoherent if institutional coordination mechanisms are not activated to impede the overlap of mandates(see section 2.5).

The implementation of two parallel confidence-building projects in Znauri and Nikosi by the EUMM and the EUDEL in Georgia created duplications at the field level. However, this overlap was coordinated by a small, newly-established coordinating committee composed of EUDEL and EUMM staff in Georgia. This situation corresponds to the second hypothesis of the theoretical framework, meaning that if the overlap of inter-institutional mandates is coordinated, the crisis decision-making process is coherent (see section 2.5). It still confirms the main argument of the thesis, in which institutional coordination mechanisms serve as a link between overlapping mandates and coherence: coordination mechanisms are effectively implemented because they have contributed to a coherent implementation process.

Lastly, during the DCI implementation phase, in which both the DEVCO and EUDEL had coordinating mandates, the DEVCO dominated the coordination process in the field, over the EUDEL, by narrowing down the latter's territorial space. Due to the lack of a formal coordination scheme between the two actors, which already possessed coordination mandates, this overlap created potential for the incoherent decision-making process at the implementation level. This situation confirms hypothesis "1" of the analytical framework, illustrating that in the absence of coordination mechanisms, the overlap of inter-institutional mandates leads to incoherent crisis decision-making process, which is consistent with the main reasoning of "bureaucratic politics".

In addition, there were five cases without overlapped mandates, corresponding to hypothesis "0", which means that in the absence of overlapped mandates, the activation of coordination mechanisms and their impact on coherence are not relevant for consideration for further analysis(see section 2.5). All five cases were identified at the planning level.

The first case was during the planning of the water safety project at Zonkari dam, Nikosi and Znauri, when the FPI led the budget and the EUSR was engaged in the strategic planning. The second case without overlapped mandates was identified during the DCI planning phase, when DG DEVCO chaired the programming process. And the remaining three cases refer to the engagement of the DG RELEX in the planning phase of RRM and IfS activities in South Ossetia before Lisbon.

In sum, the process tracing of policy planning and implementation in regards to Development Aid policy area pointed in a direction similar to the results of process tracing in the Security (CFSP) policy domain. Here one could also note the dominance of hypotheses "1" and "2" over hypothesis "3". Thus, seven out of thirteen observations, corresponding to hypotheses "1" and "2", confirmed the main reasoning of "bureaucratic politics" presented in the analytical framework (see section 2.5).

The analysis of the hypotheses in the Development Aid policy area is presented in Table 6.

	Table 6. Analysis of Hypotheses in the Development Aid (2003-2016)					
	Actors	**Inter-institutional Mandates**	**Coordination Mechanisms**	**Decision Making Process is**	**Hypo-theses**	**No. of Observations**
Planning	SECPOL.2 and FPI	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
	SECPOL.2 and FPI	Overlap	Activated	Incoherent	3	1
	FPI and EUSR	No Overlap	N/A	N/A	0	1
	DEVCO (alone)	No Overlap	N/A	N/A	0	1
	DG RELEX (alone)	No Overlap	N/A	N/A	0	3
	DEVCO and FPI	Overlap	Activated	Coherent	2	2
	DEVCO and SECPOL.2(within EUDEL)	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
Implementation	EUDEL and EUMM	Overlap	Activated	Coherent	2	1
	DEVCO and EUDEL	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
	EUSR and EUDEL	Overlap	Not Activated	Incoherent	1	1
						Total 13

Source: own compilation based on the analytical framework(see section 2.5).

Chapter 8: Analysis of Findings and Conclusion

The objective of the study was to investigate the way(s) in which the EU's inter-institutional structure can impact EU capacity to formulate and implement a coherent crisis management policy in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian frozen conflict. Policy making and implementation have already become a complex process at the EU level, with multiple actors involved in a single policy area with unclear and vague mandates (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). The creation of the ESDP in 1999, in particular, enriched EU crisis management architecture with new interdependent institutional structures and coordination mechanisms operating in the same policy area. At the same time, this increased the risk for functional duplications or overlaps leading to the incoherent crisis decision making processes at EU level (see Chapter 1).

The incoherence of EU crisis decision making process in the context of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict has been addressed by the following research question: *How does the overlap of inter-institutional mandates influence the coherence of EU crisis decision making process in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict?*

The thesis research question relates primarily to inter-institutional coherence, which is another dimension of coherence. Several studies do exist in the literature, particularly studies applying coherence as an independent variable to assess the EU actorness in crisis management in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy and credibility (Whitman and Wolff 2010, Tocci 2006, Popescu 2009, Lynch 2003) focusing mainly on the intergovernmental dimension of coherence. This thesis filled the gap by applying coherence as a dependent variable, analyzing its causes within the inter-institutional machinery of EU crisis management, as focusing exclusively on the intergovernmental aspect of coherence prevents one from understanding the multidimensional character of coherence in the context of EU crisis management.

The study applied the second generation (Alison and Halperin 1972) assumptions of the "bureaucratic politics" paradigm and the third generation (Downs 1967, Dunleavy 1991, Kozak 1988, Hart and Rosenthal 1998) assumptions in the context of "turf politics" to develop an analytical framework and identify the ways in which the overlap of inter-institutional mandates impacts the coherence of EU crisis decision-making process. The analytical framework identified coherence as a dependent variable, coordination as an intervening variable, and the overlap of inter-institutional mandates as an independent variable. The framework developed three hypotheses showing the possible causal relations between the aforementioned three variables. The operationalization based on the analytical framework developed measurable indicators for assessing the dependent, intervening and independent variables in an empirical setting.

Applying a typical case study technique, the study chose a within-case analysis approach, testing the main hypotheses in the context of the "bureaucratic politics" analytical framework in the two main policy areas, Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, and in the planning and implementation levels.

This final chapter presents and compares the detailed empirical results concluding with final remarks and recommendations.

The chapter consists of eight sections. The first section provides a general analysis of empirical results, summarizing the confirmation of the main hypotheses, including the hypothesis "0", in the planning and implementation phases of the crisis decision-making process.

The second section summarizes the confirmation of the main hypotheses in each policy area and compares their occurrence across the two policy areas, Security (CFSP) and Development. The third section provides the overview of the empirical results in the pre and post Lisbon periods. The results are compared at two levels. First, the section summarizes the confirmation of each hypothesis before and after Lisbon in each policy area separately. Then, it clusters the

data to reveal the general confirmation of each hypothesis before and after Lisbon. The fourth section, like the third section, first provides information on the confirmation of each hypothesis in the planning and implementation phases in each policy area. Afterwards it summarizes the confirmation of each hypothesis in general at the planning and implementation levels.

The fifth section analyses the main types of coordination mechanisms activated in each policy area of EU crisis management, the frequency of their activation, and the effectiveness of these mechanisms in each policy area and in each decision-making phase.

The sixth section emphasizes the added value of the thesis and the main ways in which the thesis fills the gap in the literature. The seventh section presents and explains the main theoretical and methodological limitations of the thesis. The eighth and last section covers the final remarks and provides general recommendations based on the empirical findings in Chapters 6 and Chapter 7.

8.1. General Overview of Empirical Analysis

The empirical results are generated from the four process tracings applied for each sub case: Security (CFSP) and Development Aid. Summarizing the empirical results from the two sub cases in total twenty six observations were made from which seventeen (65%) were cases with overlapped mandates and another nine (35%) cases with no mandate overlaps.

The absence of overlapped mandates has two explanations: either there was only one institutional actor involved in the planning or implementation phase, or the institutional actors had different and clearly defined mandates (both on paper and in practice), not allowing any scope for overlap.

From seventeen cases with mandate overlaps eight cases confirm the first hypothesis of the thesis: *if the inter-institutional mandates overlap and coordination mechanisms are not*

activated, the crisis decision making process is incoherent. Another seven cases confirm the second hypothesis: *if the inter-institutional mandates overlap and coordination mechanisms are activated, the crisis decision making process is coherent.* And only in two cases, although coordination mechanisms were implemented, the crisis decision making process did not become coherent. Such a situation corresponds to the third hypothesis: *the inter-institutional mandates overlap and coordination mechanisms are activated, however, the crisis decision making process is incoherent.*

The performance of all four hypotheses, including the hypothesis "0", is illustrated in the below graph.



Figure 16. Source: own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

In eight cases out of seventeen with overlapped mandates (47%), the absence of coordination mechanisms led to incoherent decision making processes in both policy areas-security and development. In seven out of seventeen cases (41%), the activation of coordination mechanisms contributed to the coherent decision making process. In the remaining two cases (12%), the activation of coordination mechanisms did not provide coherent crisis decision making process.

These were the cases in which the informal coordination was not implemented frequently between the CPCC and the DG E IX, and between the FPI and SECPOL.2, and thus failed to overcome the duplication of mandates of the mentioned actors.

The performance of all three hypotheses excluded hypothesis "0" is presented below.



Figure 17.Source: own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

An interesting pattern is that most cases with overlapped mandates were discovered in the post Lisbon period. Out of seventeen cases with overlapped mandates seven (41%) occurred in the pre-Lisbon period and ten (59%) occurred after the Lisbon period.

It was also interesting to follow the frequency of overlapped mandates in both policy areas in the planning and implementation levels. Empirical analysis showed that eleven (65%) out of seventeen cases with overlapped mandates occurred at the planning phase, while only six (35%) cases were discovered at the implementation phase.

This difference is due to the fact that the development policy area's implementation phase was managed by a single institutional actor: the EUDEL in Georgia, in cooperation with the UN and the OSCE (see section 8.4). In general, the planning phase was more crowded than the implementation phase, which increased the chances of inter-institutional mandates to overlap at the planning level.

8.2. The Analysis of Hypotheses by Policy Areas

After providing a general overview of the empirical results, the section proceeds to an analysis of the causal connection between the inter-institutional mandate overlaps and coherence in the context of "bureaucratic politics" reasoning within each policy area: Security and Development Aid, separately. First the overall picture of all observed hypotheses is presented, including the `0` hypothesis in each policy area (see Figure 18).



Figure 18. Source: own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

The number of cases fitting the first and third hypotheses was identical in both policy areas: thirty-one (31%) and eight (8%) percent, respectively.

In 38% of all cases in the Development Aid policy area the inter-institutional mandates did not overlap, while in the Security policy area the cases without overlapping mandates were confirmed by 30%. This difference is explained by the fact that most cases without overlapped mandates occurred before Lisbon during the IfS planning phase, when there was only one actor – the DG RELEX, involved in the whole process. In contrast, the planning arena for the EUMM was crowded with multiple institutional actors (the CPCC, DG ECHO, DG RELEX, GEO Desks and CIVCOM) engaged in parallel fact-finding missions.

Observing all the cases excluded the hypothesis "0", one can notice a similar situation (see Figure 19).



Figure 19: Source:own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

Examining all the three hypotheses, we see an identical percentage of cases (44%) fitting hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" in the Security policy area. In the Development policy area, hypothesis "1" was confirmed in 12 % more cases than hypothesis "2" . In addition, hypothesis "3" was confirmed two times in both policy areas, constituting twelve (12%).

Both hypotheses: hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" dominate over hypothesis "3" in each policy area, confirming the central argument of the thesis in the context of "bureaucratic politics" theoretical premise: the overlap of mandates impacts the coherence of crisis decision making process, having coordination as an intervening variable (see section 2.5).

Summarizing the data illustrated in Figure 20, one can conclude that, out of thirteen cases, nine total cases with overlapped mandates (70%) were observed in the Security policy area, eight of which (61%) are consistent with the "bureaucratic politics" theory. In all eight cases, the independent variable correlates with the intervening variable, which in turn correlates with the dependent variable, confirming the main argument in line with "bureaucratuc politics" theory (see section 2.5).

Similarly, out of thirteen cases, eight cases with overlapped mandates (61%) were observed in the Development Aid policy area, seven of which (55%) confirmed the main argument behind the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical premise.

Based on the provided results one can conclude the prevalence of hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" in both security and development policy areas, which confirms the central argument of the thesis in the prism of "bureaucratic politics" theory: the overlap of inter-institutional mandates impact the coherence of EU crisis decision making process through coordination mechanisms.

8.3. The Analysis of Hypotheses in the Pre-Lisbon and Post-Lisbon Periods

After observing how frequently the main hypotheses in each policy area of EU crisis management are confirmed, it becomes relevant to analyze how often the main hypotheses are supported within each policy area before and after Lisbon.

Such an analysis enables to see in which policy area the number of cases with overlapped mandates was the highest and the opposite, which policy area had the least number of cases with overlapped mandates before and after Lisbon.

It becomes clear that the hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" were confirmed at the same rates, (23 %, 23%, 8%, and 8%, respectively) in the Security policy area before and after Lisbon(see Figure 20). Hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" were confirmed by eight (8%) after Lisbon, which was roughly three times less often than in the post-Lisbon period.

It shows that there were fewer cases with overlapped mandates in the Security policy area before Lisbon than after Lisbon.

In fact, most of the overlaps occurred during the EUMM's planning process, immediately after the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, during which there were too many actors involved in the planning phase with multiple tools and instruments. In the post Lisbon period by contrast, the overall security situation was calm in the region; thus there were fewer actors in the field. The third hypothesis was confirmed only once (8%) in the pre-Lisbon period, during the overlap of mandates between the CPCC and DG E IX. It shows that the institutional coordination mechanisms did not work effectively, as they were implemented between the two actors, but could not enhance the coherence of the planning process in which both actors were involved.

A different result is noticed in cases without overlapped mandates or null hypothesis. In almost 22 % of cases the institutional mandates did not overlap before Lisbon, which is roughly three times higher than the cases without overlapped mandates after Lisbon.

This is explained by a smaller number of causalities after Lisbon and consequently by a smaller number of institutional actors engaged in crisis planning and implementation processes as compared with the pre Lisbon period.



Figure 20. Source: own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.



Figure 21.Source: own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

In contrast to the Security policy area, in the Development policy area there were not cases with overlapped mandates before Lisbon (see Figure 21). As already noted, this was mainly due to the fact that the programming of EU financial assistance programs under the RRM and IfS was managed only by the DG RELEX before Lisbon.

As a result, the number of cases with the null hypothesis (without overlapped mandates) in the pre-Lisbon period was higher than the same figure in the post Lisbon period: 23% and 15%, respectively.

The prevalence of hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" (31% and 23% respectively) in the post-Lisbon period once again confirms the central argument of the thesis in the prism of "bureaucratic politics" premise: the overlap of inter-institutional mandates impacts the coherence of EU crisis decision-making process through coordination mechanisms. As in the Security policy area, the hypothesis "3" was confirmed once (with 8% rate) in the Development policy area after Lisbon.

Together, the results acquired in the Security and Development policy areas confirm the prevalence of hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" before and after Lisbon. In the Security policy area, hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" were confirmed at equal rates before Lisbon: 23% for each. In the Development policy area, however, hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" were confirmed at 31% and 23% respectively after Lisbon. This indicates the necessity to strengthen the coordination to overcome the existing overlap of mandates at both levels of crisis decision making process.

Summing up the results of inter-institutional mandate overlaps in both policy areas, one can confirm the prevalence of hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" before and after Lisbon, which confirms the main argument of the theoretical framework in line with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical premise. Meanwhile, one can also observe that hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2", were confirmed at higher rates after Lisbon, than before Lisbon-28%, 24%, 18 % and 18% respectively. The hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" were confirmed at the same rates before Lisbon: 18% and 18% respectively(see Figure 22).



Figure 22.Source: own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

8.4. The Analysis of Hypotheses by the Decision Making Phase

This section analyses the confirmed cases of the main hypotheses in each stage of crisis decision making process: planning and implementation. The section first observes the confirmed cases of all three hypotheses in the planning and implementation levels in each policy area. Afterwards the section collects the data from each policy area and summarizes the confirmed cases of each hypothesis in the planning and implementation phases.

In the Security policy area most inter-institutional mandate overlaps occurred during the EUMM planning phase. Six cases with mandate overlaps were observed at the planning level, two of which confirm hypothesis "1" (22%) and another three (34%) confirm hypothesis "2". The last case confirms hypothesis "3", constituting 11% of all nine overlapped cases. This illustrates that in 11% of cases the institutional coordination mechanisms do not work effectively leading to incoherent decision making processes.

In the implementation phase three cases with overlapped mandates were observed, two of which confirm hypothesis "1"(22%) and only one case confirms hypothesis "2"(11%). Hypothesis "1" was confirmed twice at a rate of twenty two percent (22%) at both planning and implementation phases (see Figure 23).



Figure 23. Source: own Compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

The overall picture in the Development policy area is similar. Most of the mandate overlaps were observed in the planning phase, rather than in the implementation phase. Five cases with overlapped mandates were noticed at the planning level and three cases with overlapped mandates were observed at the implementation level. Two out of five cases with overlapped mandates (25%) confirm hypothesis "1", and another two cases (25%) confirm hypothesis "2". And only one case (12%) illustrating overlapping mandates confirms hypothesis "3".

In the implementation phase, as in the Security policy area, three cases with overlapped mandates were observed, two of which confirm hypothesis "1"(25%) and only one case confirms hypothesis "2"(13%) (see Figure 24).



Figure 24. Source:own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

Summarizing the data from both policy areas, of the seventeen observed cases with overlapping mandates, eleven cases(65%) were noticed at the planning level, and six cases(35%) were reported during the implementation phase. Hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" have significant dominance over hypothesis "3" at the planning level, comprising 24% and 28%, respectively. The third hypothesis, which rejects the main reasoning behind the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical premise and shows that the institutional coordination mechanisms do not work effectively, is confirmed twice in the planning phase at 12%.

In the implementation phase hypothesis "1" is confirmed as twice as hypothesis "2": 24% and 12% respectively (see Figure 25).

In sum, hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" occupy a dominant position in the planning phase, confirming the causal connection between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence in line with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical premise. In the implementation

phase hypothesis "1" is still more prevalent than hypothesis "2", still confirming the main premise of the "bureaucratic politics" theory (see section 2.5).



Figure 25. Source:own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

8.5. The Analysis of Activated Coordination Mechanisms

The section observes the implemented coordination mechanisms in each policy area of EU crisis management:Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, at the planning and implementation levels. The purpose of such an analysis is to find out which types of coordination mechanisms were implemented more frequently and which types provided coherent decision making processes.

The analysis shows that coordination mechanisms were activated in eight out of seventeen observed cases with overlapped mandates (47%), two of which did not contribute to a coherent planning process and thus were ineffective.

Those ineffective cases involved the cases with overlapped mandates between the CPCC and the DG E IX in the Security policy area during the EUMM operational planning process, and between the FPI and SECPOL.2 in the Development Aid policy area during IcSP programming (see section 6.2 and section 7.2). In both cases, informal discussions were conducted infrequently; this limited the capacity of coordination mechanisms to manage the overlapped mandates between the aforementioned actors.

The analysis also showed that in another six cases in which coordination mechanisms were implemented effectively, in two cases the overlapped mandates were coordinated via planning teams and in four cases the overlapped mandates were coordinated via informal discussions. The planning teams were activated to coordinate the mandate overlaps between the CPCC and the EUSR, and the CPCC and DG ECHO in the Security policy area during the EUMM planning process.

One out of the four remaining informal discussions was performed in the form of a small, ad hoc coordination committee established during the implementation of the water safety and irrigation project in South Ossetia. This committee was enacted by the EUMM and EUDEL in Georgia in the Development policy area. The other three informal coordination mechanisms took the form of informal discussions between the DG DEVCO, FPI and SECPOL.2 during the IcSP programming phase(Art.4.3) in the Development policy area, between the CIVCOM and the GEO Desk for Central Asia and Caucasus during the assessment of the EUMM in Georgia, and between the EUMM and EUSR from the third round of Geneva Talks in the Security policy area.

Thus, informal coordination mechanisms were effectively implemented twice as often in the Security policy area, as in the Development policy area.

In sum, informal coordination mechanisms dominated formal coordination mechanisms. This is also explained by the fact, that some formal coordination mechanisms (such as Crisis Platform

and DG CROC) did not exist during the escalation of Russian-Georgian war over South Ossetia, as they were created after Lisbon. In addition, the CROC division was not effective as a formal coordination mechanism. Since its creation with a coordinating mandate, the department itself created duplication problems with the CPCC, narrowing the CPCC's traditional policy space to coordinate EU civilian monitoring missions at the operational level (see section 6.2).

Other formal coordination mechanisms could not be feasibly implemented at the lower levels; the COMDEL formal coordination mechanism, for example, which is effective as an internal information sharing tool within the Commission in relation to the management of Commission resources in EUDELs (see section 7.2).

A graphic illustration of the activated coordination mechanisms in the planning and implementation phases in each policy area is presented below(see Figure 26).



Figure 26. Source: own compilation based on the data collected from the interviews.

The Figure 26 shows that coordination mechanisms were implemented more frequently during the planning phase in both policy areas than during the implementation phase.

One can observe that coordination mechanisms were implemented twice as often at the planning level in the Security policy area (50%) as in the Development policy area in the same phase (25%). In the implementation phase, by contrast, two coordination mechanisms in total were activated, one per policy area (12.5% and 12.5% respectively). In addition, in both policy areas the coordination mechanisms were implemented more often in the planning phase than in the implementation phase (Security -12.5%, 50%, Development-12.5%, 25% respectively).

The central argument of the research is based on the presumption that institutions do matter in EU crisis decision making process. The "bureaucratic politics" theory emphasizes both formal and informal communication mechanisms, such as vertically established routines and rules which specify formal coordination mechanisms, as well as horizontal communication tools in the form of informal dialogues (Alison and Halperin 1972). The empirical analysis demonstrated that both formal and informal coordination mechanisms play a significant role in enhancing the coherence of EU crisis planning and implementation processes, reaffirming the main reasoning of the "new institutionalism" approach: institutions do play a significant role in EU policy planning and implementation processes.

Following the categorization of informal discussions by Lipson (2005) (see section 3.2), the empirical results showed that the six informal discussions between the CPCC and EUSR, CPCC and DG ECHO, EUMM and EUSR, CIVCOM and EEAS GEO Desk, DG DEVCO, FPI and SECPOL.2, as well as EUDEL and EUMM, contributed to coherent planning and implementation processes in the absence of formal coordination mechanisms.

8.6. Theoretical Contribution of the Research

The "bureaucratic politics" theory served as the starting point for analyzing decision-making processes in EU crisis management in relation to the Georgian-South Ossetian frozen conflict. Based on the developed hypotheses (see section 3.4), the analysis identified the key institutional actors, their mandates and institutional coordination mechanisms in the two selected policy areas: Security(CFSP) and Development Aid.

The empirical results confirmed that the inter-institutional framework of EU crisis management does influence the coherence of the EU crisis decision making process. The coordination mechanisms affect the degree to which the overlap of inter-institutional mandates affect the coherence of the EU crisis decision making process in the Security (CFSP) and Development policy areas. In both policy areas, hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" were confirmed more frequently than hypothesis "3", which means that the overlaps of inter-institutional mandates were either coordinated, leading to a coherent crisis decision-making process, or, were not coordinated, contributing to an incoherent decision-making process. Hypothesis "1" and hypothesis "2" emphasized the relevance of formal and informal coordination mechanisms in both policy areas in accordance with the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical premise. In contrast, hypothesis "3", which rejects the basic argument of the theory was confirmed only twice.

By applying the "bureaucratic politics" theory in assessing the coherence of the EU crisis decision making process, this study contributed to the academic literature on EU policy coherence and EU crisis management in the Eastern Neighborhood.

First, based on the "rational choice institutionalism" argument, that institutions do influence the EU crisis decision making process due to their increased institutional autonomy, the research applied the developed analytical framework in the context of the "bureaucratic politics" theoretical reasoning, and assessed coherence as a dependent variable, analyzing the impact of

overlapping inter-institutional mandates on the coherence of the EU crisis decision-making process. The application of "bureaucratic politics" theory to the specific area of EU crisis management in the Eastern Neighborhood contributed to an enhanced understanding of the role of EU bureaucracies in shaping the nature of the EU crisis decision making process.

Second, the thesis developed individual measurement tools for the dependent, intervening and independent variables, in order to empirically assess the EU crisis decision making process within each policy area of EU crisis management: Security (CFSP) and Development. In this context, the research contributed to the literature on EU policy coherence by assessing coherence as a nominal variable, which means that the EU crisis decision making process is either coherent or incoherent. The assessment of coherence developed a specific measure which is in line with the working definition of coherence provided in section 1.1.

8.7. Limitations

In order to assess the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence, the thesis applied the "bureaucratic politics" theory in the context of "turf" politics, which defines bureaucracies as hierarchical organizations that jealously protect their own "turf", such as mandates, autonomy and power, by controlling the policy in their area of expertise (Downs 1967, Dunleavy 1991, Kozak 1988, Hart and Rosenthal 1998). In the context of "turf politics" the overlapping mandates and resource scarcity trigger inter-institutional competition and increase the necessity for coordination (*ibid*). However, "bureaucratic politics" also assumes that the foreign policy making process is a political process of consensus building and support among participants who have the power to affect the decision- making outcome and who often disagree over what they think that outcome should be (Alison and Halperin 1974, Lindblom 1959). Consensus is achieved through the standard negotiation techniques, bargaining,

and compromise (*ibid*). This thesis reviews the EU crisis decision making process as a rational game where the institutional agents compete to extend their mandates, thus the analytical framework does not include the "normative" dimension of "bureaucratic politics", which could also be applied to assess the impact of inter-institutional bargaining and socialization on the coherence of the EU crisis decision making process.

As the thesis applies a case study approach, justifying a case representativeness is a crucial task. Section 4.1 provides a detailed explanation of the main selection criteria which led to the case of the frozen Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, and applies a typical case study method. In addition, the thesis applies a single case study approach to assess the causality between the overlap of inter-institutional mandates and coherence. However, a thorough analysis of the three main hypotheses, as well as the null hypothesis has limited the application of a multiple case study approach in relation to Security (CFSP) and Development Aid policy areas in the planning and implementation levels. In order to have a more detailed overview of the EU crisis decision making process across larger regions, future research could extend potential case studies to the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans (the Bosnian war and the frozen conflict over Kosovo) and Africa (Libya, Somalia and Mali) in which the EU has been engaged with multiple institutional actors and coordination mechanisms.

Another limitation refers to the selected analytical units. This thesis focuses on EU institutional agents as embedded analytical units within a single case study research design. The selection of EU institutional agents is in line with the "bureaucratic politics" analytical framework (see section 2.5), which considers the EU institutional agents as relevant bureaucratic players in the EU crisis decision-making process. By targeting the EU institutional agents, the thesis focuses on the inter-institutional coherence of EU crisis management, emphasizing that the external coherence in EU crisis management will be established, if inter-institutional coherence already exists.

The analysis of coherence in EU crisis management would also benefit from the involvement of horizontal and vertical dimensions of coherence, in additional to the inter-institutional dimension of coherence. The inclusion of all dimensions of coherence could produce relevant empirical results, however, the current analytical framework focuses only on daily decision making processes between multiple bureaucratic actors at the inter-institutional level.

The methodology used in this thesis relies on the data, collected through document analysis and semi-structured interviews through process tracing. Since research focuses on EU internal decision-making processes in relation to Security (CFSP) and Development Aid, the thesis is highly dependent on EU internal documents.

Although some EU documents were available on public domain, the access to EU internal documents was limited. Thus, if the desired information was not available in public documents, the official document request form was used to acquire the necessary information.

However, the requested information was not always possible to receive due to its sensitive nature. In such a situation expert interviews were conducted with the targeted EU officials, requesting them to provide materials (if any) on the information which was not available on the public domain. It is worth noting that, despite the extended period for empirical research, gaining access to interviewees was not easy, especially in the case of those who no longer work in the EU. Another limitation, was the delicate nature of the research topic, which made it difficult to obtain the necessary information during the interviews.

8.8. Final Remarks and Recommendations

The EU was praised for its spontaneous engagement in the Georgian-South Ossetian "frozen" conflict on several occasions. The EU involvement in the conflict took the form of direct intervention, including the activities which fall under the CFSP area, such as CSDP fact-finding, civilian missions, and confidence building and mediation efforts, as well as Development Aid activities, such as Commission-financed post-conflict reconstruction, economic rehabilitation and development assistance measures under the IcSP and DCI. However, these achievements paralleled the crowded institutional arena. The sudden eruption of the Russian-Georgian war over South Ossetia urged the EU to provide a rapid response to the emerging crisis by dispatching multiple exploratory teams from the Commission and Council on behalf of the DG RELEX and DG ECHO, SitCen, CIVCOM and CPCC, respectively.

The EUMM was heavily involved in normalization, stabilization and confidence-building activities across South Ossetia through the IPRM framework. The EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia was engaged in political dialogue in the context of Geneva Talks, and in facilitating the implementation of the conflict settlement plan between Georgia and Russia, while the EUSR for the South Caucasus was also engaged in political dialogue and mediation until his mandate ended in February 2011. However, the aforementioned instruments did not always work in harmony and created functional duplications. Coordination was especially difficult in such an extreme situation, as there was little time to plan complex coordination arrangements carefully.

The evidence showed that the mandates of some institutional agents were too broadly defined and were not often updated. Although broadly defined mandates allow the institutional agents more flexibility in their actions, such a broad definition of mandates creates a high potential for overlaps during their implementation.

Through the establishment of the EEAS and the newly merged functions of the office of the HR/VP, the Lisbon Treaty enhanced collective action among the institutional actors at some point (Furness and Ganzle 2017). However, the Georgian-South Ossetian case study illustrated that, while the post-Lisbon institutional changes and the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS were positive developments with regards to coherence, they did not completely resolve the issue of coherence in the two observed policy areas of EU crisis management, Security (CFSP) and Development Aid.

The empirical evidence showed that the Lisbon Treaty resolved some overlaps from the pre-Lisbon period, but at the same time created opportunities for new overlaps. The newly established EEAS created duplications with Commission DGs and services in several instances, as it became involved in the programming processes of IcSP and DCI. Meanwhile, the role of the HR/VP as a coordinator of EU crisis planning and implementation processes in the Security (CFSP) and Development policy areas was limited. The double hatted function of the HR/VP in the Commission and Council did not guarantee inter-institutional coherence. The HR/VP was not constantly present in the Commission. This could have led to a lack of trust among members of the Commission, and the lack of trust could have weakened the HR/VP's coherence mandate.

In addition, the South Caucasus region was largely ignored by both HRs; instead, the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, Stefan Fuhle, was mostly active in the region(see section 6.2).

Recommendations

I. Strengthening the HR/VP's mandate in terms of ensuring coherence in the Security (CFSP) and Development Aid policy areas.

The HR's coherence mandate before and after Lisbon was minimal. Both Solana and Ashton had a greater personal interest in Southern Europe and Middle East than in the Eastern part of the EU's neighborhood. Thus an increased engagement of the HR/VP in the South Caucasus region could help to fully utilize her coherence mandate and provide a closer communication between the HR/VP and EUSR in the South Caucasus to ensure coherent policy implementation.

In addition, HR/VP Ashton did not capitalize on her function as the VP of the Commission. Thus, the increased presence of the HR/VP in the meetings of the RELEX Commissioners Group is essential. This will help to minimize the duplications between the EEAS and Commission services and increase the presence of the HR/VP in the Commission.

II. Making institutional mandates narrower and more specific: EU institutional actors` mandates should be clearly defined, and should carefully delineate their tasks.

Although broad mandates provide more flexibility for action than narrowly defined mandates, in practice, broad mandates have great potential for creating functional overlaps, as happened between the two EUSRs engaged in mediation and political dialogue in the context of the Georgian-Russian war over South Ossetia. In accordance with his mandate, EUSR Semneby could participate in political dialogue at a higher political level (track one mediation), facilitating confidence-building between Georgia and the Russian Federation, as could the newly appointed EUSR Morel. A similar situation occurred when the FPI and

SECPOL.2 shared the programming of EU financial assistance in the context of the IcSP. According to the document that defines the working arrangements between the Commission and the EEAS, the FPI and EEAS are jointly tasked with preparing the decisions regarding the financial programming of EU crisis response and crisis preparedness measures within the framework of the IcSP (Art. 3, Art. 4.3), however, the same document does not indicate the dividing lines between their mandates in that specific programming phase.

III. Frequently amending the institutional mandates when there is a risk of overlap and setting coordination mechanisms for each phase of decision-making in advance to impede incoherence in each phase.

Although the narrowly-defined mandates have lower chances of overlap than broadly-defined mandates, however, it is possible that the mandates are clearly defined on paper under certain circumstances, but they create overlaps during implementation due to ineffectively working coordination mechanisms or lack of coordination mechanisms. For instance, the communication between the CPCC and DG E IX during the operational planning of the EUMM remained tense, despite their clearly-defined mandates on paper, because in practice, the boundary lines between their mandates had never been clarified and coordinated. A similar case happened with the EUMM and EUSR mandates in the field. Both actors had clearly defined and differing mandates on paper (see section 6.2), but their mandates overlapped after the inclusion of the EUMM in Geneva Talks, as mediation at the highest political level is the primary mandate of the EUSR.

IV. Establishing a centralized formal coordination mechanism between the institutional agents which already possess coordinating mandate(s).

The evidence showed that one of the major failures in the functioning of inter-institutional structure of EU crisis management was, that the actors with coordinating mandates, such as the two EUSRs in the South Caucasus, the CPCC and the CROC, the EUSR and the EUDEL to Georgia, could also create duplications. These actors wanted to coordinate but none of them wanted to be coordinated. For instance, the CROC division monitored and coordinated all phases of the crisis cycle, narrowing the CPCC's territorial space, which was initially mandated to coordinate the EU civilian crisis response process. The EUDEL, like the EUSR, had a coordinating mandate on the ground on behalf of the Head of EUDEL, who organized and held monthly EU family coordination meetings. This created overlaps between the EUDEL`s and EUSR`s mandates on the ground. In this case it is extremely important to optimize the number of institutional agents with coordinating mandates at each stage of decision-making, so that to avoid future overlaps.

V. Improving coordination at a lower level and increasing the coordination mandate of the Head of the EU Delegation in the field.

Here a crucial factor is the DG DEVCO's level of influence within the EUDEL, due to its large number of staff compared to the EEAS team. This created a situation in which the DEVCO staff occupied the political sphere of DCI programming belonging to the EEAS (see section 7.2). It is important to allocate an equal number of staff to the SECPOL.2 and DEVCO units within EUDEL, enable the SECPOL unit to fulfil its mandate in regards to the political aspect of programming, and grant the DEVCO unit full responsibility for economic-development aspects of programming.

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Annex 1: List of Interviewees

N	Interview Month	Interviewee Title	Organization	Location
1.	June 2017	Former EU Diplomat A	Anonymous	Tbilisi
2	June 2017	Academic Expert A	Anonymous	Tbilisi
3	June 2017	Academic Expert B	Anonymous	Tbilisi
4	June 2017	Academic Expert C	Anonymous	Tbilisi
5	April 2018	Former Commission Official A	European Commission	Brussels
6	April 2018	Commission Official B	European Commission	Brussels
7	April 2018	Former Commission Official C	European Commission	Brussels
8	April 2018	Commission Official D	European Commission	Brussels
9	April 2018	Former Commission Official E	European Commission	Brussels
10	April 2018	Former Commission Official F	European Commission	Brussels
11	April 2018	Former Commission Official G	European Commission	Brussels
12	April 2018	Former Commission	European Commission	Telephone

		Official H		Interview
13	April 2018	EEAS Official C	European External Action Service	Brussels
14	April 2018	EEAS Official D	European External Action Service	Brussels
15	April 2018	EEAS Official E	European External Action Service	Brussels
16	April 2018	Former EEAS Official F	European External Action Service	Brussels
17	April 2018	Former EEAS Official G	European External Action Service	Brussels
18	April 2018	Former Desk Officer A	European External Action Service	Brussels
19	April 2018	Think Tank Expert B	Anonymous	Telephone Interview
20	April 2018	Former EEAS Official K	European External Action Service	Telephone Interview
21	April 2018	Former Diplomat	Council	Telephone Interview
22	May 2019	Think Tank Expert C	Anonymous	Brussels
23	May 2019	EEAS Official H	European External Action Service	Brussels
24	May 2019	Former Desk Officer B	European External	Brussels

			Action Service	
25	May 2019	Former EEAS Official I	European External Action Service	Telephone Interview
26	May 2019	Former EEAS Official J	European External Action Service	Brussels
27	May 2019	Former Policy Officer A	European External Action Service	Brussels
28	May 2019	Former EU Diplomat B	European External Action Service	Telephone Interview
29	May 2019	Former Policy Officer B	European External Action Service	Telephone Interview
30	May 2019	Former Commission Official L	European Commission	Telephone Interview
31	May 2019	Think Tank Expert A	Anonymous	Telephone Interview
32	June 2019	Former EEAS Official L	European External Action Service	Telephone Interview
33	June 2019	Former EEAS Official B	European External Action Service	Telephone Interview
34	June 2019	Former EEAS Official A	European External Action Service	Telephone Interview
35	June 2019	Former Commission Official J	European Commission	Brussels

36	June 2019	Commission Official K	European Commission	Brussels
37	June 2019	Former Commission Official M	European Commission	Brussels
38	June 2019	Former Commission Official N	European Commission	Brussels
39	June 2019	Academic Expert D	Anonymous	Brussels
40	June 2019	Former Commission Official I	European Commission	Telephone Interview