

Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online

Chapter Title	Anti-Semitism and the Arab-Israeli Question: The Italian Left in the First Ten Years of the Republic	
Copyright Year	2019	
Copyright Holder	The Author(s)	
Corresponding Author	Family Name	Tarquini
	Particle	
	Given Name	Alessandra
	Suffix	
	Division	
	Organization/University	Sapienza University of Rome
Address	Rome, Italy	
Abstract	<p>In the aftermath of the Second World War, socialists and communists shared a theoretical viewpoint deriving from Marxism and the bipolar line that emerged from the Cold War. In that time, they took a position of harsh criticism against the United States, against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and against the Christian Democrat government that in Italy led the inclusion of the country in the Western bloc. The two parties of Marxist tradition failed to elaborate a statement or a historiographical reflection on anti-Semitism, as demonstrated by two authoritative sources: the party press and the contribution of intellectuals who in that first decade of republican Italy had had a role and visibility of great importance. In both cases, the interpretation of anti-Semitism was crushed onto that of anti-fascism: concerned with presenting themselves to the public and the world, as the protagonists of the anti-fascist struggle and the rebirth of democracy, socialists and communists, and above all the latter, did not deal with the reasons for, causes, or the outcomes of the persecution of Jews in the 1930s and 1940s or the anti-Semitic demonstrations in the USSR of the 1950s. In some cases, the theme fell under the ax of silence, in others it was presented in an ambiguous way, as one of the many forms of Nazi-fascist violence. In this way, talking about concentration camps meant dealing with places of detention for the persecuted, without dwelling on the fact that the reason for the persecution and the <i>Shoah</i> was racial rather than political. This difficulty in analyzing anti-Semitism, in recognizing its specificity, without including it in the great container of anti-fascism, was expressed in the same years in which left-wing intellectuals and politicians spoke about the Arab-Israeli conflict.</p>	

Anti-Semitism and the Arab-Israeli Question: 2

The Italian Left in the First Ten Years 3

of the Republic 4

Alessandra Tarquini 5

9.1 INTRODUCTION 6

In the following pages, I will try to analyze how the main exponents of the Italian Left—parties, movements and intellectuals—were confronted with two very different themes from 1946 to 1956: the problem of anti-Semitism in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Arab-Israeli question from the birth of the State of Israel to the Suez crisis. The aim of this chapter is to study how men and women, who in Italy referred to the Marxist tradition, considered a minority that historically presented itself to the world especially concerning cultural, religious and national elements. It will therefore be necessary to answer the following questions: what space did Jews have in the culture and politics of the Left? And is the Italian case unique or is it similar to other European experiences?

The chapter is divided into three parts: in the first I will try to describe the protagonists of the research; in the second I will deal with the problem

A. Tarquini (✉)
Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy

20 of anti-Semitism in the Italian Left in the aftermath of the World War and
 21 in the third of how socialists and communists tackled the Arab-Israeli
 22 question from 1948 to the Suez crisis of 1956.

23 9.2 THE ITALIAN LEFT AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

24 In the elections of 2 June 1946, the first free vote after 20 years of the
 25 fascist regime, there were two main parties in the Italian Left: the *Partito*
 26 *socialista di unità proletaria* (PSIUP—Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity)
 27 and the *Partito comunista italiano* (PCI—Italian Communist Party). The
 28 PSIUP, led by Pietro Nenni, received 20.7% of the votes. He garnered his
 29 greatest support in the industrial proletariat of the north and in the unions,
 30 and despite the financial and logistical difficulties of the post-war period,
 31 he succeeded in creating an efficient organizational structure and in pro-
 32 posing it as one of the most important parties in the country. With a media
 33 outlet and several magazines gravitating in the socialist area, committed to
 34 training its 700,000 members, the militants and, in theory, all Italian pub-
 35 lic opinion were divided into three main currents: reformists, who pro-
 36 posed forging ties with European and democratic socialism; fusionists
 37 who, on the contrary, hoped to merge with the PCI and finally the maxi-
 38 malist current that was fighting for the unity of action with the commu-
 39 nists, while maintaining that it had to preserve its autonomy.¹

40 In January 1947, the clash between these different groups in Rome led
 41 to the division of *Palazzo Barberini* and to the birth of the *Partito socialista*
 42 *dei lavoratori italiani* (PSLI—Socialist Party of Italian Workers), which
 43 was led by Giuseppe Saragat, who was supported by the group of *Critica*
 44 *Sociale* reformists and youth of *Iniziativa socialista* and who was a staunch
 45 supporter of both the Marshall Plan and the European choice.² A few

¹ Giovanni Sabbatucci, *Il riformismo impossibile. Storie del socialismo italiano* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1991), 79–91; Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, Maurizio Degl’Innocenti, Giovanni Sabbatucci, *Storia del Psi. III. Dal dopoguerra a oggi* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1993), 59; Paolo Mattered, *Storia del Psi. 1892–1994* (Rome: Carocci, 2010); Paolo Mattered, *I socialisti*, in *Storia delle sinistre nell’Italia Repubblicana*, eds. Marco Gervasoni (Cosenza: Marco editore, 2010), 56–59.

² Francesca Taddei, *Il socialismo italiano del dopoguerra: correnti ideologiche e scelte politiche (1943–1947)*, (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1984); Michele Donno, *Socialisti democratici. Giuseppe Saragat e il Pslì (1945–52)*, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2009); Daniele Pipitone, *Il socialismo democratico italiano fra la Liberazione e la legge truffa. Fratture, ricomposizioni e culture politiche di un’area di frontiera*, (Milan: Ledizioni, 2013).

months later the PSLI welcomed some members of the *Partito d'azione* (PdA—Action Party), which had obtained just over 1% at the elections and disbanded in October 1947, even though the majority of its members split between the socialists and the republicans. In the following years, it almost always settled around 4% and never became a mass party. Indeed, unlike what happened in the rest of Europe, in Italy there was no labor or social democratic party, capable of competing with the communists and their allies.

From then on, and until the early 1960s, the Italian Left was represented by the *Partito Socialista Italiano* (PSI—Italian Socialist Party) and the PCI, allied and in a position of clear supremacy compared to the Social Democrats, who for the next four decades remained a small party, available to support the governments led by Christian Democrats. So, in Europe the PSI talked with the socialists of the Left and not with Labor, in Italy it had its preferential relationship with the PCI, was not part of the Socialist International that was reborn as an organization of social democratic parties in 1951, and was preparing to assume a neutralist position in the political-international alliance brought about by the Cold War.³ According to many historians, this neutralist resulted in an ambiguous policy, given the alliance with the Communist Party that, after the creation of COMINFORM, acted more and more clearly in strict accordance with Soviet directives.⁴ In fact, Italian socialists, linked to the PCI, suffered hegemony, so in the late 1940s expressed a political culture that, although not Stalinist, was decidedly pro-Soviet and struggled to propose an independent line of thinking.

³ On the PSI's foreign policy: Alberto Benzoni, *I socialisti e la politica estera*, in *La politica estera della repubblica italiana*, (Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1967), III, 927–949; Pietro Nenni, *I nodi della politica estera italiana*, eds. Domenico Zucaro, (Milan: Sugarco, 1974); Danilo Ardia, *Il partito socialista e il patto atlantico*, (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1976); Ennio Di Nolfo, *Il socialismo italiano tra i due blocchi*, in *Trent'anni di politica socialista*, Atti del Convegno di Parma, January 1977, (Rome: Mondo Operaio, 1977), 47–66; Giovanni Scirocco, "Politique d'abord". *Il Psi, la guerra fredda e la politica internazionale (1948–1957)*, (Milan: Unicopli, 2010). For the clash between the PSI and International socialist between 1948 and 1949, see Lucio Pesetti, *L'internazionale socialista dal 1951 al 1983* (Venice: Marsilio, 1989), 14–20.

⁴ Ennio Di Nolfo, *Il socialismo italiano tra i due blocchi*, 56; Giuseppe Mammarella, *L'Italia contemporanea, (1943–1985)*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985), 134–135.

71 The other major party of the Italian Left was the PCI, which in the
 72 elections of June 1946 obtained 19% of the votes, becoming the second
 73 party of the Left and the third Italian party, with a particularly strong con-
 74 sensus in the regions of central and central-northern Italy and 1,900,000
 75 members.⁵ The only party not to have undergone splits during its years of
 76 exile; it had no division into currents comparable to that of the socialists.
 77 Its secretary, Palmiro Togliatti, had been working hard to reestablish the
 78 PCI, transforming the small revolutionary formation of the 1920s into a
 79 mass party, which saw Marxism-Leninism as its point of reference and was
 80 engaged in giving life to a network of intellectuals active in the spreading
 81 of a new culture. For this reason, after the war, the PCI was full of initia-
 82 tives and publications addressed to the militants but also to a wider pub-
 83 lic.⁶ After initially adhering to a pacifist perspective, which included the
 84 alliance between the victors of the Second World War, the PCI became a
 85 supporter of a foreign policy faithful to that of the Soviet Union.⁷

86 In this scenario, the memory of anti-Jewish persecutions and, more
 87 generally, the reflection on anti-Semitism were not priorities on the politi-
 88 cal agenda of the parties of the Left.⁸ In the early post-war years, the PCI
 89 and the PSI, which together represented one third of Italians, were com-
 90 mitted to building a real mass mobilization, to becoming the privileged
 91 interlocutors of the working class and middle classes, to defining their
 92 identity in the recent fight against the fascist regime and, therefore, to

⁵ *Il Pci nell'Italia repubblicana (1943–1991)*, eds. Roberto Gualtieri, (Roma: Carocci, 2001); Giovanni Cerchia, *I comunisti, in Storia delle sinistre nell'Italia repubblicana*, 11–50.

⁶ See Albertina Vittoria, *Togliatti e gli intellettuali. La politica culturale dei comunisti italiani (1944–1964)*, (Roma: Carocci, 2014), 24–66.

⁷ Silvio Pons, *L'Unione Sovietica nella politica estera di Togliatti (1944–1949)*, *Studi Storici* 33, no. 2, 1992: 435–456; Silvio Pons, *La politica estera dell'Urss. Il Cominform e il Pci, (1947–1948)*, *Studi Storici* 35, no. 4, 1994: 1123–1147; Silvio Pons, *L'impossibile egemonia. L'Unione Sovietica, il Partito Comunista Italiano e le origini della guerra fredda (1943–1948)*, (Roma: Carocci, 1999); Victor Zaslavsky, *Lo stalinismo e la Sinistra Italiana. Dal mito dell'URSS alla fine del comunismo 1945–1991*, (Milan: Mondadori, 2004); Elena Aga Rossi, Victor Zaslavski, *Togliatti e Stalin. Il Pci e la politica estera negli archivi di Mosca*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997); Andrea Guiso, *La colomba e la spada. "Lotta per la pace" e antiamericanismo nella politica del Partito Comunista Italiano (1949–1954)*, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007).

⁸ At that time the question of the fate of Palestine under a British mandate was represented in Italy by Jewish emigration that stopped off in the peninsula. Cf. Mario Toscano, *La "Porta di Sion". L'Italia e l'immigrazione clandestina ebraica in Palestina 1945–1948*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987).

presenting themselves to their constituents and to the entire public opinion, as the architects of the new-found democracy, the protagonists of a new phase in Italy's history. 93
94
95

9.3 THE PROBLEM OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE ITALIAN LEFT'S POLITICAL CULTURE 96 97

In the aftermath of the Second World War, although the survivors of the concentration camps were often described in the main newspapers of the Left, and although the Nuremberg trials had attracted the attention of the entire world to the presence of concentration camps, the reflection on anti-Semitism was decidedly poor and left mostly to the testimony of veterans. The first reason for this poverty of analysis was underlined recently by recalling that the Nuremberg trials placed emphasis on the faults of the National Socialist regime: "The enormity of the genocide perpetrated by the Hitler regime [...] led, in the post-war period, to raise Nazi anti-Semitism and its exterminationist approach to an abstract model of reference, in relation to which to interpret, to measure – but, finally to hierarchize – historical experiences different from the German one".⁹ 98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

The second reason concerns Italian Jews. We know that between 1945 and 1947, in addition to the first attempts to reconstruct the history of Italian anti-Semitism, and alongside the texts of writers such as Curzio Malaparte and Giacomo Debenedetti, which were almost totally overlooked, 55 volumes and pamphlets written by Jews were published, in the form of first-person reports. As recent studies have pointed out, these authors described their deportation by presenting themselves as anti-fascists, ignoring the specificity of anti-Jewish persecution and including it in a broader discourse on the violence of the Nazi-Fascist regimes.¹⁰ Therefore, the Jews themselves chose to contribute to the construction of the national myth of the Italian Republic, born from the fight against fascism, with a celebration of the sacrifice of many of them in the anti-fascist 110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

⁹ Ilaria Pavan, *Gli storici e la Shoah in Italia*, in eds. Marcello Flores, Simon Levis Sullam, Anne-Marie Matarò Bonucci, Enzo Traverso, *Storia della Shoah in Italia. Vicende, memorie, rappresentazioni*, (Turin: UTET, 2010), II, 137.

¹⁰ Robert S.C. Gordon, *Scolpitelo nei cuori. L'olocausto nella cultura italiana (1944–2010)*, (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2013), 72–86, and Anna Bravo, Daniele Jalla, *Una misura onesta. Gli scritti di memoria della deportazione dall'Italia (1944–1993)*, (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1994); Annette Wieviorka, *Déportation et génocide. Entre la mémoire et l'oubli* (Paris: Hachette, 1992).

122 battle and with the reconstruction of a Resistance as a united and mass
 123 movement. Thus, in the post-war period, many Jews participated in anti-
 124 fascist rhetoric by accepting an equation still to be proved and that those
 125 persecuted by fascism were anti-fascist *naturaliter*. “*Cela a donné naissance*
 126 *à une espèce de vulgate qui a décrit les juifs italiens comme organiquement*
 127 *antifascistes*”.¹¹ In reality, at the end of the war, Italian Jews, worn out by
 128 the experience of the totalitarian regime and by deportation, economically
 129 and materially and morally destroyed, showed no interest in reopening
 130 profound and painful questions in memory of the survivors.

131 The third reason is political in nature and can be summarized by noting
 132 that the reflection on anti-Semitism was not coherent or compatible with
 133 the political proposal of the main anti-fascist protagonists. In the early
 134 post-war years, large sectors of Italian culture and politics proved incap-
 135 able of, or not interested in, dealing with the problems posed by the condi-
 136 tion of the Jews.¹² Many of them minimized the relevance of racism by
 137 helping to build the myth of the good Italian. In general, the different
 138 currents of anti-fascism were not able to grasp the specificity of anti-
 139 Semitism as shown by three different cases: the story of one of the most
 140 important post-war books, *Se questo è un uomo* (If this is a man) by Primo
 141 Levi of 1947; the reviews of the volume *Réflexions sur la question juive*
 142 (Reflections on the Jewish question) by the existentialist philosopher Jean-
 143 Paul Sartre, translated into Italian in 1947; and the cartoons of a comic
 144 book published in 1951 by the journal *Il Pioniere*, a children’s comic book
 145 directed by Gianni Rodari.

146 Primo Levi wrote his most successful book between December 1945
 147 and January 1947.¹³ It was based on his experience as a detainee in the
 148 Monowitz concentration camp, which was an Auschwitz subcamp, but the
 149 book was turned down by the Einaudi publishing house consultants

¹¹ Ilaria Pavan, *Les Juifs italiens et le fascisme (1922–1938)*, in *L’Italie et la Shoah*, vol. 1: *Le fascisme et les Juifs*, *Revue d’Histoire de la Shoah* 204, (March 2016), 36.

¹² For a panoramic view of the main European countries cf. Robert S. Wistrich, *Anti-Semitism in Europe after 1945* in *Terms of survival: The Jewish world since 1945*, eds. Robert S. Wistrich, (London: Routledge, 1995), 269–296; Anna Rossi Doria, *Memoria e storia. Il caso della deportazione*, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1998); Mario Toscano, *Ebraismo e antisemitismo in Italia. Dal 1848 alla guerra dei Sei giorni*, (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2003), 211; G. Schwarz, *The Reconstruction of Jewish life in Italy after World War II*, *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, 8, 2009: 365; Id., *Ritrovare se stessi. Gli ebrei nell’Italia postfascista*, (Rome: Laterza, 2004), 111–172; Ilaria Pavan, *Gli storici e la Shoah in Italia*, 133–164.

¹³ Cf. Robert S.C. Gordon, *Scolpitelo nei cuori*, 99–128, and also Primo Levi, *The voice of memory*, (New York: The New Press, 2001) 185.

(Natalia Ginzburg and Cesare Pavese—the former did not consider it suitable and the latter was convinced that the topic did not interest Einaudi readers because it had already been saturated by the numerous volumes that had already come out). Published in 1947 by the small publisher De Silva, owned by Franco Antonicelli, it came out in 2500 copies and was rejected again by Einaudi in 1952. For many years, it fell into oblivion and came to fame in 1958 when the Turin publishing house decided to reprint it. With more than 500,000 copies sold in Italy, it has been translated into eight languages and become one of the best-known texts on the *Shoah*.

Among the very few who realized its importance, there was the social-democratic historian Aldo Garosci who reviewed it in December 1947, comparing it to the great masterpieces of literature of all time not only for the author's ability to describe pain but also to give depth and realism to the victims.¹⁴ Garosci recalled that the men turned into gray ghosts deported to Auschwitz were Jews. He was an exception because, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the discovery of the concentration camps did not produce a reflection on the Holocaust. This is also confirmed by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre's volume *Réflexions sur la question juive* (Reflections on the Jewish question), which after the World War was one of the first to deal with anti-Semitism.¹⁵ Published in 1946 and translated two years later into Italian by the editor of *Comunità*, the book denied that there was a Jewish identity and claimed that it was created by anti-Semites. Always described in the most indistinct ways, Jews were the object of feelings and fears that had existed since the dawn of civilization. In modern society, secularized and divided into classes, in a world without landmarks, uprooted individuals had built their lives on hatred against Jews. In this way, according to Sartre, bourgeois frightened by their own instincts, by freedom and loneliness, had projected their anxieties onto the Jew, as shown by anti-Semitic intellectuals such as Barrés, Maurras, Drumont and Celine, severe critics of modern society.

Unlike the Marxist tradition from which he came, Sartre emphasized the emotional aspects of anti-Jewish hatred, its being a passion and a vision of the world, and he did not limit his analysis to class dynamics. On the

¹⁴Aldo Garosci, *Se questo è un uomo*, *Italia Socialista*, 27 December 1947, 3. In the journal that was heir of "Italia libera" del Partito d'Azione, cf. Daniele Pipitone, "L'Italia socialista" fra lotta politica e giornalismo d'opinione, *Annali della Fondazione Einaudi* 45, 2011: 113–166.

¹⁵Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'antisemitismo*, (Milan: Comunità, 1947).

183 other hand, like all Marxists, he believed that anti-Semitism would disap-
 184 pear with the socialist revolution. If we did not know that Sartre published
 185 the book in 1946, after the Nuremberg trials, we would be led to think
 186 that he had written it before 1933, before the coming to power of Nazism,
 187 before the Nuremberg laws, before the Italian legislation of 1938 and
 188 before the final solution, because there is no trace of any of these topics in
 189 the volume. In one passage from the book, Sartre mentions the extermin-
 190 nation of 6 million Jews, but does not comment on it nor analyze it.¹⁶ And
 191 while in the same years the founders of the Frankfurt School dedicated
 192 attention to the anti-Semitism of American workers and in *Dialektik der*
 193 *Aufklärung* (Dialectic of the Enlightenment), they elaborated a reflection
 194 on Auschwitz as the symbol of a phase and an aspect of modernity; in Italy
 195 there were those who criticized Sartre for moving away from Marxism.

196 In July 1948, the young socialist critic Franco Fortini wrote a long
 197 review in *Avanti!* noting that Sartre, with whom he had collaborated on
 198 the writing of the journal *Les Temps Modernes*, had not followed Marx's
 199 reflections to the end. In his opinion, the French philosopher had not
 200 analyzed the phenomenon in depth and had described a top-down anti-
 201 Semitism, not anchored to class dynamics. By dwelling on the emotional
 202 aspects, he did not understand the structural and therefore economic rea-
 203 sons for the violence that had struck the Jewish world.¹⁷ Thus, one of the
 204 main post-war Marxist philosophers ignored the existence of concentra-
 205 tion camps, provoking the observations of a leftist intellectual who did not
 206 criticize him for not having dealt with a decisive aspect of anti-Jewish
 207 persecution, but because he had moved away from Marx. Even Franco
 208 Fortini, did not feel the need to deepen the question of the origins and
 209 nature of anti-Semitism nor that of its relationship with fascism.

210 In reviewing Sartre in 1948, Fortini proposed his interpretation of anti-
 211 Semitism and fascism to the readers of the PSI newspaper. The first was to
 212 be read through Marx's categories, bearing the materialistic analysis of
 213 social processes firmly in mind and rejecting attempts to understand their
 214 subjective dynamics, as Sartre had proposed. The second, underlining the
 215 inability of the parties that were going to lead the country betraying the
 216 original anti-fascist spirit: two barbaric and reactionary phenomena, fought

¹⁶ Enzo Traverso, *The Blindness of the Intellectuals: Historicizing Sartre's "Antisemite and Jew"*, October 87, (1999): 73–88.

¹⁷ Franco Fortini, *Gli ebrei di Sartre*, *Avanti!*, 17 July 1948, 1.

by a conscience that showed itself to the world as an exponent of the good part of the country, the different and better, the one that had fought fascism and had been betrayed by the parties.

Il Pioniere comic book was not far behind. It was a weekly for children, aged 6–14, directed by Gianni Rodari and edited by the pioneering association of Italy, born from the initiative of the PCI that set out to educate with a different pedagogy to that of Catholicism.¹⁸ Since 1950, the magazine had been narrating the adventures of *Chiodino*, *Cipollino* and *Stenderello*, but also the most significant moments in the history of Italy, starting with the Resistance. After an autonomous start in 1963, it became an insert of *Unità* and then passed to *Noi donne* and closed in 1970. In 1951, *Il Pioniere* published a comic story, taken from a fable by Jiri Wolker, a poet and member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, titled *Il milionario che rubò il sole* (The millionaire who stole the sun). Among the various events, the protagonist of the comic, the worker *Primo* (First), had to run away from his creditors.¹⁹ Drawn as Orthodox Jews, with protruding noses, black coats, thick beards and hats, these gentlemen gave no respite to poor *Primo* until when, at the end of the story, they joined forces with him to get back the sun stolen by *Ultimo* (Last). Why draw creditors as Orthodox Jews? Was *Il milionario che rubò il sole* an anti-Semitic comic? Officially not, but using images that portray Jews in a caricatural way, without distancing yourself from them, in a publication aimed at children, or claiming that Jewish people must atone for the original sin means expressing anti-Semitism.

9.4 INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: FROM THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL TO THE SUEZ WAR

This reluctance of the Left culture to elaborate a memory of the anti-Semitism of totalitarian regimes, but also the same casual and unintentional use of anti-Semitic stereotypes, coincided with a series of difficulties of the Left parties toward Israel already present at the end of the 1940s

¹⁸Rossella Greco, “Educare senza annoiare. Appassionare senza corrompere”. *Gianni Rodari e la direzione de Il Pioniere (1950–1953)*, (Como: Il ciliegio, 2014). I thank my friend Andrea Guiso for this information and refer to Andrea Guiso, *La colomba e la spada. “Lotta per la pace” e antiamericanismo nella politica del Partito comunista Italiano (1949–1954)*, 558–561.

¹⁹*Il milionario che rubò il sole*, *Il Pioniere* 2, no. 15, (April 1951): 7.

247 and not, as is usually claimed, after the Six-Day War of 1967. That cer-
 248 tainly marked a deep break in the relations between the Italian Left and
 249 the Jewish state but that had a history of 20 years behind it. Indeed, at the
 250 end of the Second World War, the proximity of Italian socialists and
 251 communists to the new state was based on a very fragile balance because it
 252 depended on the support of the USSR for the Israeli cause.

253 With the aim of limiting Western influence in the Middle East, the
 254 Soviets had been the main supporters of Israel's cause, struggling in the
 255 United Nations for the birth of the new state. In May 1947, Andrej
 256 Gromyko had declared to the United Nations that the international com-
 257 munity should do justice to the Jews, since no Western country had been
 258 able to ensure the protection of the basic rights of the Jewish people and
 259 to defend them from the fascists' violence.²⁰ After being the first to juridi-
 260 cally recognize the existence of Israel, during the war of 1948 the Soviets
 261 had supplied it with arms through Czechoslovakia.²¹

262 In fact, in the days following the declaration of independence, the
 263 Prime Minister of Israel, the social democrat David Ben-Gurion, declared
 264 to the American ambassador MacDonald:

265 Israel acknowledges with satisfaction the Russian support at the United
 266 Nations, but will not tolerate Russian domination. Not only is Israel Western
 267 by its own orientation, but our people are democratic and they are aware
 268 that they cannot become strong and remain free except through their coop-
 269 eration with the United States. Only the West, humiliating and abandoning
 270 it, at the United Nations and elsewhere, could alienate our people.²²

271 For its part, the USSR changed its policy of supporting Israel immedi-
 272 ately after the birth of the new state. In September 1948, the arrival of the
 273 Israeli ambassador to Moscow, Golda Meir, provoked a very positive reac-
 274 tion from the Muscovite Jewish community that made the Soviet authori-
 275 ties suspicious.²³ Since the end of the war, among other things, while

²⁰ Léon Poliakov, *Dall'antisionismo all'antisemitismo*, (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1971), 34.

²¹ Uri Bialer, *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy, 1948-1956*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²² The episode is reported in Alan Gresh, Dominique Vidal, *Palestina 1947. Una sparizione mai nata*, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1990), 198. Cf. Walter Eytan, *The First Ten Years. A Diplomatic History of Israel*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958).

²³ The episode is reported, among others, in Léon Poliakov, *Dall'antisionismo all'antisemitismo*, (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1971), 33-35.

defending Israel, the Soviets had been engaged in a harsh and decisive campaign against the Jews that led to the erasing of *Yiddish* culture from the USSR in just a few years. “The very word Jew would gradually become a forbidden word, disguised under euphemisms such as *cosmopolitan* or *Zionist* and expunged from dictionaries”. One of the effects of this policy, all directed within the Stalinist regime, was to create confusion between the term *Zionist* and the term *Jew*. As one of the few survivors wrote:

as soon as a new name appears, the investigators entrust themselves to find out if it is Jewish. [...] if the person is really of Jewish origin, the investigators will endeavor to include it in their reports on one pretext or another. [...] and to this name the ritual qualification of *Zionist* is applied. Especially since we never talk about Jews. [...] I point out to him that *Zionist* is not a political qualification. I showed him the difference between *Jew* and *Zionist*. No way. [...] until the end this *Zionist* qualification will remain attached to the names of men and women who have never had anything in common with *Zionism*.²⁴

Thus, Moscow’s support for Israel was flanked by the persecution of Soviet Jews. Ever since the two main parties of the Italian Left expressed severe criticism of the Israeli ruling class accusing it of having transformed the country into a nation dependent on the United States and, from January 1949, they expressed their disappointment with the election victory of David Ben-Gurion who suffered harsh attacks. The then young communist historian Gabriele De Rosa in *Unità* noted that the new state was based on nationalistic and racial premises, and that it was certainly not a socialist country, despite being helped by the USSR.²⁵

The socialists were not far behind: in *Mondo Operaio* an anonymous collaborator referred to *Zionism* as “a hybrid of racism and religion”.²⁶ In the July 1951 elections in Israel, once again won by Mapai, s/he described Ben-Gurion as a charismatic leader who manipulated the media.²⁷ The

²⁴ Artur London, *La confessione*, (Milan: Garzanti, 1969), 210–211 in Léon Poliakov, *Dall’antisionismo all’antisemitismo*, 39.

²⁵ È uscito dalle urne lo Stato progressista d’Israele, *Avanti!*, 27 January 1949, 4. Laurent Rucker, *Stalin, Israel et les juifs*, (Paris: Persée, 2001). Cf. also Maurizio Ferrara, *Il Medio Oriente in rivolta contro l’imperialismo*, *Rinascita* 8, no. 7, (October 1951), 444–448.

²⁶ Thus wrote Pietro Nenni in his diary of 2 December 1948, *Tempo di guerra fredda, Diari 1943–1956*, (Milan: Sugarco, 1981), 468. G.B. White, *Israele*, Mondoperaio, 4, 116, 17 February 1951, 7. Cf. anche Id., *Israele*, Mondoperaio, 4, 117 and 118, 24 February and 3 March 1951.

²⁷ *Compagni d’Israele, Avanti!*, 19 October 1951, 3.

305 attack on the social democrat Mapai was linked to defense of the Israeli
 306 socialist party Mapam that wanted to give the new state a new policy of
 307 peace and detente and had lost the elections because it did not receive
 308 American funding, as did the Ben-Gurion party. Among these accusations
 309 the socialists compared the Israeli situation to the Italian one: as allies of
 310 the communists, they remembered their battle against the social demo-
 311 crats and against Christian Democracy (DC), the main protagonist of
 312 Italy's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
 313 Indeed, the PSI's support for Mapam was born from a real affinity between
 314 the two parties, which were authoritative representatives of leftist social-
 315 ism at the time, and that affinity revolved around three themes: the move-
 316 ment for peace, understood in the strictly pro-Soviet sense, the politics of
 317 class unity together with their communist ally and "the reference to struc-
 318 tural reforms, inserted in a planning perspective, where the myth of the
 319 experience of Soviet power and then of the progressive democracy of
 320 Eastern countries he had an influence that was anything but marginal".²⁸

321 It was a vision of the world of "cadres and militants, who operated in
 322 direct contact with the communists in mass organizations and in the man-
 323 agement of local administrations"²⁹ As the socialist exponent Giorgio
 324 Fenoaltea summed up to Rodolfo Morandi in January 1953, "the situa-
 325 tion of those who, only for the sake of brevity, can be understood, despite
 326 the different nuances under the global name of 'leftist socialists' is very
 327 difficult". In any case, their goal was "to create within the social demo-
 328 cratic parties a core of resistance consistent with imperialist politics".³⁰
 329 Within this ideological standpoint, in the summer of 1952 Mapam joined
 330 the appeal launched by the PSI to the parties of COMISCO, the
 331 Committee of the International Socialist Conference—which remained
 332 alive until the re-establishment of the Socialist International—for a united
 333 action in defense of world peace.³¹ After all, the PCI from 1947 had close
 334 relations with the Maki, the Israeli Communist Party, that was divided
 335 internally by an anti-Zionist and pro-Arab current and another more
 336 closely linked to the new state.

²⁸ Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, *Storia del Psi*, 169.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

³⁰ ACS, Archivio Pietro Nenni, Carteggio, 1949–1979, b. 25, f. 1352, Letter from Giorgio Fenoaltea to Rodolfo Morandi of 18 January 1953.

³¹ Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, *Storia del Psi*, 167.

In February 1953, Moscow broke off diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.³² It would reopen them in July of the same year, but unlike what socialists and communists wrote, Israel was in a position of isolation, deriving from its difficult relations with the Soviets and the Americans' decision to build relations with Arab countries and with Nasser's Egypt. Indeed, during the early years of the Eisenhower presidency, the United States was engaged in the creation of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), which would fail due to the impossibility of finding agreement between Great Britain and Egypt, but which arose from an attempt to stem Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and to disengage from support for Israel.³³

The left-wing press gave no news of these balances of power, and even accused the Americans of maneuvering "the proletariat in an anti-socialist manner" and the Israelis of having renounced the class struggle. In the PSI's newspaper there were those who explained that in Israel, a phenomenon similar to that which struck Tito's Yugoslavia had happened, where advanced forms of social and political coexistence survived as long as they could offer "a service to imperialism".³⁴

The change of the Italian Left toward Israel and Zionism corresponded to a new attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and particularly to Nasser's Egypt, which in April 1955 achieved great success in Bandung, at the conference of non-aligned countries, based on the theme of decolonization. At the end of September of that year, the Egyptian colonel declared that his country would supply cotton to Czechoslovakia in exchange for arms.³⁵ The trade agreement was a clear sign of the good relations between Cairo and Moscow, but also a sign of an important transformation, that is, the fact that the conflict between Israel and its neighbors, from secondary

³² *L'Urss rompe le relazioni diplomatiche con Israele denunciando le responsabilità di Tel Aviv, Avanti!*, 13 February 1953, 6.

³³ Antonio Donno, *La politica americana verso Israele nei primi anni della presidenza Eisenhower (1953–1954)*, in *Gli Stati Uniti, la Shoah e i primi anni di Israele*, eds. Antonio Donno, (Florence: Giuntina, 1995, 153) and ff. and Manuela Maglio, *Gli Stati Uniti, la Gran Bretagna e la difesa del Medio Oriente: la middle east defense organization (1950–1953)*, 115–152.

³⁴ Bruto Provedoni, *Gli americani speculano sul nazionalismo ebraico III, Avanti!*, 12 February 1953, 3. Id., *Il controllo americano sullo Stato d'Israele, Avanti!*, 21 February 1953, 3.

³⁵ *Il governo egiziano accentua la sua politica d'indipendenza, l'Unità*, 29 September 1955, 8; *Appoggio di massa a Nasser contro l'ingerenza straniera, l'Unità*, 8 October 1955, 8; *Nasser accusa le potenze occidentali di voler asservire il Medio Oriente, in l'Unità*, 3 October 1955, 7.

364 confrontation and relative to a small area of the Middle East, would soon
365 be transformed into a veritable frontier of the Cold War.³⁶

366 In October 1955, the socialist press commented on Egypt's decision to
367 buy arms and accused Israel of "nationalistic psychosis". The country, they
368 wrote in *Avanti!*, had made great strides, but now it was choking in the
369 compression of its own limits.³⁷ In the same way, the PCI, which until
370 February 1955 had accused Nasser of persecuting the communists in his
371 country and had defined the military regime as "a fascist dictatorship",³⁸
372 changed its attitude in the autumn of 1955. Faced with the transforma-
373 tions of the USSR, which set itself out as a patron of the non-aligned,
374 *Unità* was less and less concerned with Nasser's internal politics and
375 described him as one of the protagonists of the Third Socialist World in
376 the struggle against Israel, now a "pawn of American politics in the Middle
377 East" in setting up "an anti-Soviet military blockade".³⁹ In March 1956,
378 Nasser "began to take on the glorious vestments of the hero fighting
379 imperialism", "a flag, a kind of symbol of a Third World".⁴⁰

380 When, at the end of July, the colonel announced the nationalization of
381 the Suez Canal, in response to the World Bank's refusal to finance the
382 construction of the Aswan dam on the Nile, from which enormous eco-
383 nomic benefits for irrigation and electricity production were expected, the
384 socialists declared:

³⁶ Luca Riccardi, *Il "problema Israele". Diplomazia italiana e Pci di fronte allo Stato ebraico (1948-1973)*, 71 and 121; Gianmarco Santese, *Il Partito comunista italiano e la questione palestinese (1945-1956)*, 90-93.

³⁷ J.K.*, *Israele tiene in pugno la miccia della polveriera del Medio Oriente, Avanti!*, 30 October 1955, 7.

³⁸ Cf. *Cronache del mese. Situazione internazionale Rinascita* 11, no. 10, (October) 1954, 702; *Un primo bilancio del regime di Nasser, in Rinascita* 12, no. 2, (February), 1955: 101-107.

³⁹ *Il primo ministro di Israele dichiara di essere disposto ad incontrarsi con Nasser, l'Unità*, 3 November 1955, 7. Even the military clashes were described in a different way compared to 1948: *Violenti combattimenti riaccesi presso El Auja da un attacco notturno delle truppe israeliane, l'Unità*, 4 November 1955, 1; J.K.*, *Cinquantacinque soldati siriani uccisi per rapresaglia da Israele, in "Avanti!"*, 13 December 1955, p. 6. E.B*. Celentano, *Marines americani verso il Medio Oriente?*, in "Avanti!", 13 April 1956, p. 1. A different voice in the communist world was that of Maria Maddalena Rossi, leader of the Italian women's union, who went from 14 to 16 June 1956 to Israel. APCI, Minutes of direction, 7 September 1956, mf 127.

⁴⁰ Pietro Ingrao, *impossibili. raccontata con Transaglia*, and Gianmarco Santese, *Il Partito comunista italiano e la questione palestinese (1945-1956)*, 92.

no opposition to the nationalization of the Suez Canal; full solidarity with the aspiration of the colonial peoples to free themselves from the oppressive game of colonialism; condemnation of every gesture of force; request for adequate and convincing international guarantees for freedom of traffic; a warning against the danger of Nasser moving from an anti-colonialist and neutralist position to a pan-Arab, militaristic and aggressive nationalism. ⁴¹	385 386 387 388 389 390
And at the party leadership meeting on 7 September 1956, Togliatti proposed to discuss Egypt being attacked by Anglo-French imperialist forces.	391 392
The communists are in solidarity with all nations and with all countries that, freed from the colonial yoke, defend their national rights against any form of foreign intervention and repudiate the arrogance of the imperialists, who are enemies of liberty, peoples and peace. ⁴²	393 394 395 396
Consistent with these statements, the two parties of the Italian Left asked the government to take a stance. Indeed, on 2 October 1956, in the Senate, Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino recalled the condemnation “never revoked in doubt of the Egyptian decision of 26 July”. “We do not deny”, Martino pointed out, “the right of the Egyptian people to modify the legal regime of the Suez Canal, but we challenge the fact that Nasser violated an international agreement”. ⁴³ The next day, in the Chamber (of Deputies) Nenni commented on the minister’s words criticizing the absence of clear support for the “movement of the Arab peoples towards their full	397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405

⁴¹ *Continuano a Roma i contatti diplomatici, Avanti!*, 8 August 1956, 1; *L’Italia non rifiuterebbe una funzione mediatrice per la vertenza del canale di Suez*, in *Avanti!*, 7 August 1956, 1.

⁴² APCI, verbale Direzione, 7 September 1956. Also in *Quel terribile 1956. I verbali della direzione comunista tra il XX congresso del Pcus e l’VIII Congresso del Pci*, eds. Maria Luisa Righi, (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1996), 168. Ottavio Pastore, *La nazionalizzazione del canale di Suez, l’Unità*, 27 July 1956, 1. Gianmarco Santese, *Il partito comunista italiano e la questione palestinese (1945–1956)*, 98. APCI, Sezione Estero, 1956, f. 1310. a. I, 15 November 1956. In *Le vie del Socialismo* the bulletin of documentation, edited by the foreign section of the PCI, in November 1956 one reads: “We have gone through an extremely serious moment: the imperialist aggression against Egypt has led us to the brink of a world war. ... Never, as in this case, has imperialism presented itself in all its abjection, without a mask. ... French and English imperialism believed in a coup d’état to overthrow the government of Nasser by definitively seizing the so coveted canal”.

⁴³ Gaetano Martino, *Stralci del discorso pronunciato dall’on. Gaetano Martino, Ministro degli Affari Esteri, al Senato della Repubblica il 2 ottobre 1956*, in *L’Italia e la questione di Suez* (Rome: La Pace, 1956), 7–11. See, Atti Parlamentari, House of Deputies, Discussions, 2 October 1956, p. 28465.

406 independence”.⁴⁴ The socialists considered “the movement towards the
 407 independence of Asian or African peoples as a fact of civilization” and for
 408 this reason in 1952 they had expressed their solidarity with the coup d’état
 409 of Colonel Nasser, even though aware of the limits and dangers of his poli-
 410 tics. “In this regard”, explained Nenni, “it is not fair to talk about fascism
 411 and Nazism towards today’s Egypt, if not for a relationship with secondary
 412 aspects of a psychological nature” and in this sense criticized Martino for
 413 not having expressed any “breath of solidarity” with respect to Arab nation-
 414 alism. In the same session, in the Chamber, Gian Carlo Pajetta reiterated
 415 the Italian communists’ support for the colonized peoples who were seek-
 416 ing freedom. He did not cover up the story of the Egyptian communists
 417 persecuted by a dictatorial regime, but he maintained that the road to
 418 democracy passed through that of the struggle against imperialism.⁴⁵

419 Between 22 and 24 October, the prime ministers of Great Britain,
 420 France and Israel signed an agreement for an attack on Egypt that began
 421 on 29 October with socialists and communists asking the government,
 422 chaired by Antonio Segni, to refuse any support to the invading coun-
 423 tries.⁴⁶ For its part, Italy did not approve of Israel’s decision to invade
 424 Egypt, even though it did not revoke the criticism against the Egyptian
 425 decision to nationalize the Canal and reiterated the need for an interna-
 426 tional management of Suez. The decision revealed the foreign policy
 427 needs that Italians had been pursuing since the late 1940s and it is on
 428 these that attention must be focused to understand the relations between
 429 the Left parties and the Christian Democracy on the eve of the Center-
 430 Left governments, which would see a radical transformation of the rela-
 431 tions between socialists and communists.

432 Giampaolo Calchi Novati recalled that the traditional pro-Arab policy
 433 of the Italian government was accelerated in 1955 after being admitted to
 434 the United Nations Organization.⁴⁷ It was then that the Italian political

⁴⁴ Pietro Nenni, *Discorso pronunciato dall’on. Pietro Nenni alla Camera dei Deputati 3 October 1956*, in *Ibidem*, 41.

⁴⁵ *Cronache del mese. Politica internazionale*, in *Rinascita* (November) 1956, 628. Luca Riccardi, *Il “problema Israele”. Diplomazia italiana e Pci di fronte allo Stato ebraico (1948–1973)*, 155, which also recalls the cultural initiatives taken by the PCI and by Alicata at that time to build new and positive relations with the Arab countries.

⁴⁶ Cf. Giorgio Fenoaltea, *La guerra del canale: crisi del socialismo?*, *Mondoperaio* *, no. (November 1956): 629–631; e Gianmarco Santese, *Il partito comunista italiano e la questione palestinese (1945–1956)*, 98–102.

⁴⁷ Giampaolo Calchi Novati, *Mediterraneo e questione araba*, 211.

class tried to carve out an autonomous role with respect to its NATO allies, trying to be accredited by the Arabs as a more credible country compared to the colonialist and hegemonic aims of France, Great Britain and the very same United States. It did this by showing its interest in the Middle East, a strategic area for Italian economic affairs and the possibility of stemming Soviet influence in the region. In this sphere, the government had tried to build good relations with the Arabs—as it had done thanks to the initiatives of Enrico Mattei—never failing to support Western politics⁴⁸: it was the so-called neo-Atlanticism for which, while recognizing that Israel was a Western country, Italians did not fully adhere to its policy in order not to contradict the efforts in approaching Arab countries.⁴⁹

Represented by President Gronchi, Amintore Fanfani and Giorgio La Pira, neo-Atlanticism had its own exceptional protagonist in Enrico Mattei, “key element of this parallel foreign policy”. It was not a question of changing course with respect to the traditional double-track policy, Atlantic and Mediterranean, but of strengthening it by also using “a nationalist component veiled by the rhetoric of the *mare nostrum*” and justifying it with the will to bring the Arabs along the Western road: a political line that both the United States and the secular parties of the centrist coalition considered unrealistic, full of danger and ambiguity.⁵⁰

Despite fearing that the neo-Atlanticism of the christian democrats might be resolved in a new form of exploitation of Arab countries, socialists and communists positively considered the affirmation of nationalist movements because they saw an action against Western colonialism and in this sense approved the attempt by the christian democrats to build autonomous relations with the Arabs, freeing themselves from the rigid application of Western and Atlantic politics.⁵¹ For example, on 21 August 1957,

⁴⁸ Giampaolo Calchi Novati, *Mediterraneo e questione araba*, 228.

⁴⁹ Giuseppe Mammarella, Paolo Cacace, *La politica estera dell'Italia*, (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006), 206. Cf. also Pietro Pastorelli, *La politica estera italiana del secondo dopoguerra*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987); Bruna Bagnato, *Vincoli europei, echi mediterranei: l'Italia e la crisi francese in Marocco e in Tunisia*, (Florence: Ponte alle Grazie, 1991) 11; Valter Coralluzzo, *La politica estera dell'Italia repubblicana (1946–1992). Modello di analisi e studio dei casi*, (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2000), 274–278.

⁵⁰ Vittorio Ianari, *L'Italia e il Medio Oriente*, 387; Leopoldo Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*; Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *L'Italia e la nuova frontiera. Stati Uniti e centro-sinistra, 1958–1965*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998).

⁵¹ Cf. Luca Riccardi, *Il “problema Israele”. Diplomazia italiana e Pci di fronte allo Stato ebraico (1948–1973)*.

463 *Avanti!* opened with an article titled *L'Italia e il Medio Oriente: gli arabi*
 464 *ci guardano con simpatia* (Italy and the Middle East: Arabs look on us
 465 kindly) in which it commented on the Eisenhower doctrine which pro-
 466 vided for military and economic aid to the countries of the Middle East in
 467 an attempt to restrain Soviet hegemony. In this regard, the PSI pointed
 468 out the fears of Arab countries faced with the American political plan,
 469 which might hide a new form of imperialism, and highlighted the impor-
 470 tance of ENI's agreements with Iran by presenting them as a model to be
 471 imitated in the future.⁵²

472 It was the same position as the communists, even though, in the second
 473 half of the 1950s, the road of the Italian Left had divided into two differ-
 474 ent directions. In fact, faced with the invasion of Hungary, the commu-
 475 nists sided with the USSR, while the socialists developed an autonomous
 476 position that would lead them, in the following decade, to inaugurate a
 477 different path of collaboration with the government forces.

478 9.5 CONCLUSIONS

479 In the decade that we have examined the two main parties of the Italian
 480 Left, the PSI and the PCI, confirmed their alliance stipulated in 1934 to
 481 fight against fascism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, indeed,
 482 socialists and communists shared a theoretical viewpoint deriving from
 483 Marxism and the bipolar line that emerged from the Cold War and took a
 484 position of harsh criticism against the United States, against NATO and
 485 against the Christian Democrat government that in Italy led the inclusion
 486 of the country in the Western bloc. Although different in structure, given
 487 that the PSI was a party divided into currents, while the PCI was perfectly
 488 united around the ideas of its secretary, the two parties of Marxist tradition
 489 failed to elaborate a statement or a historiographical reflection on anti-
 490 Semitism, as demonstrated by two authoritative sources: the party press
 491 and the contribution of intellectuals who in that first decade of republican
 492 Italy had had a role and visibility of great importance. In both cases, social-
 493 ists and communists presented themselves to the public and the world, as

⁵² “The Arabs – we read in the PSI journal – look with natural sympathy to us for different reasons, but above all because we do not have imperialist and colonialist interests to defend in the area”, 21 August 1957. Cf. also V[ittorio] O[rilia], *Situazione più calma in Medio Oriente*, *Critica sociale*, 5 March 1957, 117; *Nenni chiede un'azione dell'Italia nel M.O. per la pace e l'indipendenza dei popoli arabi*, *Avanti!*, 17 July 1958, 1; L. Lizzadri, *Le truppe americane sgomberino il Libano*, *Avanti!*, 17 July 1958, 1.

the protagonists of the anti-fascist struggle and the rebirth of democracy, 494
 and above all the latter, did not deal with the reasons for, causes, or the 495
 outcomes of the persecution of Jews in the 1930s and 1940s or the anti- 496
 Semitic demonstrations in the USSR of the 1950s. In some cases, the 497
 theme fell under the ax of silence; in others it was presented in an ambigu- 498
 ous way, as one of the many forms of Nazi-fascist violence. In this way, 499
 talking about concentration camps meant dealing with places of detention 500
 for the persecuted, without dwelling on the fact that the reason for the 501
 persecution and the Shoah was racial rather than political. 502

This difficulty in analyzing anti-Semitism, in recognizing its specificity, 503
 without including it in the great container of anti-Fascism, was expressed 504
 in the same years in which left-wing intellectuals and politicians spoke 505
 about the Arab-Israeli conflict. From the birth of Israel to the Suez crisis, 506
 communists and socialists changed their initial positions: from 1946 to 507
 1951 the main supporters of the state that was born in 1948 were to be 508
 found in Italy; they demanded their immediate recognition by Italy, pre- 509
 sented and described as a possibility for democracy and for socialism in the 510
 Middle East. For this reason, during the first Arab-Israeli war, they strongly 511
 supported Israel, a symbol of the struggle against British imperialism. As 512
 we have seen, this was limited support: already in 1951, when relations 513
 between Israel and the USSR entered a new, decidedly conflictual phase, 514
 the PSI and PCI changed their judgments of and their position on the 515
 conflict. In 1956, in fact, during the Suez war, socialists and communists 516
 supported Colonel Nasser criticizing the politics of Israel, now considered 517
 a friendly country of the United States, and therefore enslaved to imperial- 518
 ism and the cause of Western democracies. The next decade would see the 519
 beginning of another story, the birth of a new strategy and a new reflec- 520
 tion in the socialist house. 521

BIBLIOGRAPHY 522

- Aga Rossi, Elena, Zaslavski Victor, *Togliatti e Stalin. Il Pci e la politica estera negli 523*
archivi di Mosca. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997. 524
- Ardia, Danilo, *Il partito socialista e il patto atlantico*. Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1976. 525
- Arfè, Gaetano, *I socialisti italiani dal 1945 a oggi* in *Intellettuali e società di massa*. 526
 Genoa: Ecig, 1984. 527
- Bagnato, Bruna, *Vincoli europei, echi mediterranei: l'Italia e la crisi francese in 528*
Marocco e in Tunisia. Florence: Ponte alle Grazie, 1991. 529

- 530 Benzoni, Alberto, *I socialisti e la politica estera* in *La politica estera della repubblica*
 531 *italiana*, 927–949, Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1967, vol. III.
- 532 Bialer, Uri, *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy 1948–1956*. Cambridge:
 533 Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- 534 Bravo, Anna, Jalla, Daniele, *Una misura onesta. Gli scritti di memoria della depor-*
 535 *tazione dall'Italia (1944–1993)*. Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1994.
- 536 Calchi Novati, Giampaolo, *Mediterraneo e questione araba nella politica estera*
 537 *italiana* in *Storia dell'Italia repubblicana*, vol. 2., t.1, 197–263, Torino:
 538 Einaudi, 1995.
- 539 Cerchia, Giovanni, *I comunisti*. In *Storia delle sinistre nell'Italia repubblicana*,
 540 11–50, Lungro: Marco, 2007.
- 541 Coralluzzo, Valter, *La politica estera dell'Italia repubblicana (1946–1992), modello*
 542 *di analisi e studio dei casi*. Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2000.
- 543 Ciuffoletti, Zeffiro, Degl'Innocenti, Maurizio, Sabbatucci, Giovanni, *Storia del*
 544 *Psi. III. Dal dopoguerra a oggi*. Rome-Bari: Laterza 1993.
- 545 Di Nolfo, Ennio, *Il socialismo italiano tra i due blocchi* in *Trent'anni di politica*
 546 *socialista*, 47–66, Rome: Mondo Operaio, 1977.
- 547 Donno, Antonio, *La politica americana verso Israele nei primi anni della pres-*
 548 *idenza Eisenhower (1953–1954)* in *Gli Stati Uniti, la Shoah e i primi anni di*
 549 *Israele*, 71–98, edited by Donno, Antonio, Florence: Giuntina, 1995.
- 550 Donno, Michele, *Socialisti democratici. Giuseppe Saragat e il Psli (1945–52)*.
 551 Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009.
- 552 Eytan, Walter, *The First Ten Years. A Diplomatic History of Israel*. New York:
 553 Simon and Schuster, 1958.
- 554 Ferrara, Maurizio, *Il Medio Oriente in rivolta contro l'imperialismo*, “Rinascita”,
 555 October 1951, 444–448.
- 556 Fortini, Franco, *Gli ebrei di Sartre*, “Avanti!”, 17 July 1948.
- 557 Garosci, Aldo, *Se questo è un uomo*, “Italia Socialista”, 27 December 1947.
- 558 Gentiloni Silveri, Umberto, *L'Italia e la nuova frontiera. Stati Uniti e centro-*
 559 *sinistra, 1958–1965*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998.
- 560 Gordon, Robert S.C, *Scolpitelo nei cuori. L'olocausto nella cultura italiana*
 561 *(1944–2010)*. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2013.
- 562 Greco, Rossella, “Educare senza annoiare. Appassionare senza corrompere”. *Gianni*
 563 *Rodari e la direzione de Il Pioniere (1950–1953)*. Como: Il ciliegio, 2014.
- 564 Gresh, Alan, Vidal, Dominique, *Palestina 1947. Una spartizione mai nata*. Soveria
 565 Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1990.
- 566 *Il Pci nell'Italia repubblicana (1943–1991)*, edited by Gualtieri, Roberto. Rome:
 567 Carocci, 2001.
- 568 Guiso, Andrea, *La colomba e la spada. “Lotta per la pace” e antiamericanismo nella*
 569 *politica del Partito Comunista Italiano (1949–1954)*. Soveria Mannelli:
 570 Rubbettino, 2007.

- Ianari, Vittorio, *L'Italia e il Medio Oriente dal "neoatlantismo" al peace-keeping in* 571
 Giovagnoli, Agostino, Pons, Silvio, edited by, *Tra guerra fredda e distensione.* 572
 Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003. 573
- Ingrao, Pietro, *Le cose impossibili. Un'autobiografia raccontata e discussa con Nicola* 574
Tranfaglia. Reggio Emilia: Aliberti, 1990. 575
- Levi, Primo, *The voice of memory.* New York: The New Press, 2001. 576
- Mammarella, Giuseppe, *L'Italia contemporanea, (1943-1985).* Bologna: Il 577
 Mulino, 1985. 578
- Mammarella, Giuseppe, Cacace Paolo, *La politica estera dell'Italia.* Rome-Bari: 579
 Laterza, 2006. 580
- Martino, Gaetano, *Stralci del discorso pronunciato dall'on. Gaetano Martino,* 581
Ministro degli Affari Esteri, al Senato della Repubblica il 2 ottobre 1956. in 582
L'Italia e la questione di Suez, 7-11, Rome: La Pace, 1956. 583
- Mattera, Paolo, *Storia del Psi. 1892-1994.* Rome: Carocci, 2010. 584
- Mattera, Paolo, *I socialisti,* in *Storia delle sinistre nell'Italia repubblicana, **,* 585
 Lungro: Marco, 2007. 586
- Nenni, Pietro, *I nodi della politica estera italiana.* Milan: Sugarco, 1974. 587
- Nuti Leopoldo, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a Sinistra. Importanza e limiti della* 588
presenza americana in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999. 589
- Pastorelli, Pietro, *La politica estera italiana del secondo dopoguerra.* Bologna: Il 590
 Mulino, 1987. 591
- Pavan, Ilaria, *Gli storici e la Shoah in Italia* in Flores, Marcello, Levis Sullam, 592
 Simon, Matard Bonucci, Anne Marie, Traverso, Enzo, edited by, *Storia della* 593
Shoah in Italia. Vicende, memorie, rappresentazioni, 135-164, Turin: UTET, 594
 2010, vol. II. 595
- Pavan, Ilaria, *Les Juifs italiens et le fascisme (1922-1938)* in *L'Italie et la Shoah,* vol. 596
 1: *Le fascisme et les Juifs* in "Revue d'Histoire de la Shoah", 204, March 2016, **. 597
- Pesetti, Lucio, *L'internazionale socialista dal 1951 al 1983.* Venice: Marsilio, 1989. 598
- Pipitone, Daniele, *Il socialismo democratico italiano fra la Liberazione e la legge* 599
truffa. Fratture, ricomposizioni e culture politiche di un'area di frontiera. Milan: 600
 Ledizioni, 2013. 601
- Pipitone, Daniele, *"L'Italia socialista" fra lotta politica e giornalismo d'opinione,* 602
"Annali della Fondazione Einaudi", 45, 2011, 113-166. 603
- Poliakov, Léon, *Dall'antisionismo all'antisemitismo.* Firenze: La Nuova 604
 Italia, 1971. 605
- Pons, Silvio, *L'impossibile egemonia. L'Unione Sovietica, il Partito Comunista* 606
Italiano e le origini della guerra fredda (1943-1948). Rome: Carocci, 1999. 607
- Pons, Silvio, *L'Unione Sovietica nella politica estera di Togliatti (1944-1949),* 608
"Studi Storici", 33, 2, 1992, 435-456. 609
- Pons, Silvio, *La politica estera dell'Urss. Il Cominform e il Pci, (1947-1948),* "Studi 610
 Storici", 35, 4, 1994, 1123-1147. 611

- 612 Provedoni, Bruno, *Gli americani speculano sul nazionalismo ebraico III*, “Avanti!”,
613 12 February 1953.
- 614 Provedoni, Bruno, *Il controllo americano sullo Stato d’Israele*, “Avanti!”, 21
615 February 1953.
- 616 Riccardi, Luca, *Il “problema Israele”. Diplomazia italiana e Pci di fronte allo Stato*
617 *ebraico (1948–1973)*. Milan: Guerini associati, 2003.
- 618 *Quel terribile 1956. I verbali della direzione comunista tra il XX congresso del Pcus*
619 *e l’VIII Congresso del Pci*, edited by Righi Maria, Luisa. Rome: Editori
620 Riuniti, 1996.
- 621 Rossi Doria, Anna, *Memoria e storia. Il caso della deportazione*. Soveria Mannelli:
622 Rubettino, 1998.
- 623 Sabbatucci, Giovanni, *Il riformismo impossibile. Storie del socialismo italiano*.
624 Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1991.
- 625 Santese, Gianmarco, *Il Partito comunista italiano e la questione palestinese*
626 *(1945–1956)*. “L’Unità” e “Rinascita”, “Mondo Contemporaneo”, 2,
627 2007, 63–104.
- 628 Sartre, Jean-Paul, *L’antisemitismo*. Milan: Comunità, 1947.
- 629 Schwarz, Guri, *Ritrovare se stessi. Gli ebrei nell’Italia postfascista*. Rome:
630 Laterza, 2004.
- 631 Schwarz, Guri, *The Reconstruction of Jewish life in Italy after World War II*,
632 “Journal of Modern Jewish Studies”, 8, 2009, 360–377.
- 633 Scirocco, Giovanni, *“Politique d’abord”. Il Psi, la guerra fredda e la politica inter-*
634 *nazionale (1948–1957)*. Milan: Unicopli, 2010.
- 635 Taddei, Francesca, *Il socialismo italiano del dopoguerra: correnti ideologiche e scelte*
636 *politiche (1943–1947)*. Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1984.
- 637 Toscano, Mario, *La “Porta di Sion”. L’Italia e l’immigrazione clandestina ebraica*
638 *in Palestina 1945–1948*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987.
- 639 Toscano, Mario, *Ebraismo e antisemitismo in Italia. Dal 1848 alla guerra dei Sei*
640 *giorni*. Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2003.
- 641 Traverso, Enzo, *The Blindness of the Intellectuals: Historicizing Sartre’s “Antisemite*
642 *and Jew”*, “October”, 87, 1999, 73–88.
- 643 Vittoria, Albertina, *Togliatti e gli intellettuali. La politica culturale dei comunisti*
644 *italiani (1944–1964)*. Rome: Carocci, 2014.
- 645 Wistrich, Robert S., *Anti-semitism in Europe after 1945*. In *Terms of survival: The*
646 *Jewish world since 1945*, ed. by R.S. Wistrich, 269–296. London:
647 Routledge, 1995.
- 648 Zaslavsky, Victor, *Lo stalinismo e la Sinistra Italiana. Dal mito dell’URSS alla fine*
649 *del comunismo 1945–1991*. Milan: Mondadori, 2004.