

ORGANIZED CRIME IN OSTIA. A THEORETICAL NOTE

Ilaria Meli

Abstract

Even if only recently public opinion is focalizing on Ostia, this criminal context had been very problematic since the 1970s. Here several criminal organizations cohabit, fight and shared power and areas of influence. But what made very particular this municipality is the presence of very strong and well embedded local mafias (autochthonous criminal groups that adopt mafia model, without any link with traditional organizations). These groups had been developed also in others Italian region, but in Rome seems to be permanent and stronger (sometime also stronger than traditional mafias).

So, this paper proposes an analysis of local mafias embedded model in a non-traditional territory, and in particular it is presented a case study on Ostia.

Keywords: Territory, local mafias, Ostia, non-traditional areas, mafia model

1. Local roots and international trafficking. The framework of a debate

Even if traditional mafia organizations (Cosa nostra, 'ndrangheta e camorra) originally arose – respectively - in Sicilian and Calabrese agricultural areas and in Napoli's popular quarters during the Bourbons period, they have been able to emerge and succeed in very different contexts too.

This paper proposes a cause of reflection on the mafia model expansion process and its efficiency and in particular, it is focalized on the phenomenon of the autochthonous mafia groups. In order to do so, the most interesting field of study is the city of Rome, due to the fact here coexist – almost always – pacifically traditional mafias and local ones. However differently from what literature says on the latter, sometimes those are able to be stronger and better embedded in the territory than the first ones.

The literature on the origins of mafia is rich and heterogeneous. Many authors underline the deep link existed between those criminal organizations and the economic, political and social contexts. In particular, some theories argue that mafia arises in underdeveloped areas, as a consequence of “meridional question”, especially in Southern agrarian economies after the latifundium’s abolition¹. Others suggest that the origin could be found in the relationship between city and its countryside: not in the poorer areas, but in the richer markets². Varese uses the theory of “the properties’ rights” to explain not only the Cosa nostra’s origins, but also the development of Japanese Yakuza and Russian mafia. This theory affirms that mafias could emerge in periods of sudden but flawed transition to free economy. Sciarrone³ recalled this theory too. He outlines that those organizations could arise in contexts, in which property rights are not granted and there is not a legitimate authority⁴.

Some authors assume that Cosa nostra could be even as a Sicilian people attitude (the most important scholars who affirmed this were Capuana⁵ and Pitрэ⁶, but to some extent the same reflexion could be found in Mosca’s definition of “mafia’s spirit”⁷).

¹ Henner Hess, *Mafia - Zentrale Herrschaft und lokale* J.C.B. Mohr, Gegenmacht, Tübingen, 1970. Trad. it. *Mafia*, Laterza, Bari, 1973. Napoleone Colajanni, *Nel regno della mafia (dai Borboni ai Sabaudi)*, Rivista popolare, Roma, 1900. Napoleone Colajanni, 1984. *Nel regno della mafia. La Sicilia dai Borboni ai Sabaudi*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 1984. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *I ribelli. Rivolta sociale*, Einaudi, Torino, 1966. Giuseppe Alongi, *La mafia nei suoi fattori e nelle sue manifestazioni. Saggio sulle classi pericolose di Sicilia*, Torino; *La mafia*, Flli. Bocca, Palermo, 1886. Giuseppe Alongi, *La mafia: fattori, manifestazioni, rimedi*, A. Forni, Palermo, 1904. Giuseppe Alongi, *La mafia*, Sellerio, Palermo, 1977. Giuseppe De Felice Giuffrida, *“Mafia e delinquenza in Sicilia (Milano 1900). Politica, criminalità e magistratura tra delitto Notarbartolo e il processo Codronchi-De Felice*, Società editrice lombarda, Milano, 1900.

² Leopoldo Franchetti, *Condizioni politiche e amministrative della Sicilia*, Donzelli, Roma, 1993. Salvatore Lupo, *Storia della mafia*, Donzelli, Roma, 2004. Raimondo Catanzaro, *Il delitto come impresa: storia sociale della mafia*, Liviana, Padova, 1988. Pino Arlacchi, *La mafia imprenditrice*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1983. Isaia Sales in collaboration with M. Ravveduto, *Le strade della violenza. Malviventi e bande di camorra a Napoli*, L’Ancora del Mediterraneo, Napoli, 2006.

³ Rocco Sciarrone, *Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove*, Donzelli, Roma, 1998.

⁴ Nevertheless, the same Varese admits that this theory could explain only some specific cases, but mafia-type organizations could emerge also in a solid free economy for reasons different than property rights defence.

⁵ Luigi Capuana, *La Sicilia e il brigantaggio*, Il Folchetto, Roma, 1892.

⁶ Giuseppe Pitрэ, *La mafia e l’omertà. Biblioteca delle tradizioni popolari*, Edizioni Brancato, Milano, 2007.

⁷ Gaetano Mosca, *Che cos’è la mafia*, in “Giornale degli economisti”, 1900, XX, pp. 236-262.

Therefore, the strong relationship with their contexts of origin based mafias power and give them resources. This consideration reaches some authors to the conclusion that the transplantation is impossible, due to the fact that such organizations are too much linked with the original territory, so the achievement of the necessary resources in order to take the power in new areas could be too much expensive⁸.

Actually, since early 1990s some judicial inquiries demonstrate that especially Cosa nostra and 'ndrangheta had succeeded in their entrenchment in the Centre and in the North of Italy and since the 1960s.

Therefore, this phenomenon called transplantation⁹ or colonization¹⁰ has become a topic of growing interest among organized crime studies and their success had questioned all the most important authors.

Nevertheless, another trend emerged in the same years: new types of mafia organizations –without explicit link to the traditional ones - started to rise in areas that have never known such criminal model before.

This happened in some Sicilian territory, in Veneto, in Apulia, in Basilicata and in Rome; some local criminal groups adopted mafia model through a process called “imitation”¹¹ or “isomorphism”¹². The most popular are Sacra corona unita, Mala del Brenta, Basilischi but all these experiences are ended.

⁸ Diego Gambetta, *La mafia siciliana. Un'industria della protezione privata*, Einaudi, Torino, 1992. Peter Reuter, *The decline of the American mafia* in “The Public Interest”, 1995, 120, pp. 89-99.

⁹ Federico Varese, *Mafie in movimento. Come il crimine organizzato conquista nuovi territori*, Einaudi, Torino, 2011.

¹⁰ Nando dalla Chiesa and Martina Panzarasa, *Buccinasco. La 'ndrangheta al Nord*, Einaudi, Torino, 2012.

¹¹ Rocco Sciarrone, *Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove*, cit.

¹² Antonio La Spina, *Riconoscere le organizzazioni mafiose, oggi: neo-formazione, trasformazione, espansione e repressione in prospettiva comparata in Riconoscere le mafie. Cosa sono, come funzionano, come si muovono*, Marco Santoro, (edited by), Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015, pp. 95–122.

This issue has attracted still little attention in academic studies¹³. Massari¹⁴ in particular suggests that in urban contexts these types of criminal organizations tend to be less able to approach the institutions and have fewer resources, so they could be defined as more similar to gangster groups.

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyze a case of autochthonous mafia – type organizations through the perspective of this relationship with its territory.

In organized crime literature, the issue of relationship between mafia–type associations and territories has been discussed by the most important authors (dalla Chiesa, Santino, Sciarrone and Varese) and the territory is considered important from a strategical and symbolical perspective. It is a constitutive element of mafia model¹⁵ and also the power of these organizations is defined “territorial”¹⁶. Is it possible for such peculiar organizations to reproduce a traditional embedded, also in a non-traditional territory?

2. Mafias’ settlement in a territory: two antithetical models

Before discussing those questions, it is important to introduce a focus on what are the traditional model’s characteristics. This issue is addressed by comparing two different ideal-types: the first could be called the ideal-type of “territorial sovereignty” (recalling the classical Santino’s definition¹⁷). It is the traditional

¹³ Antonio La Spina, *op. cit.* Monica Massari, *La Sacra Corona Unita. Potere e segreto*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1998. Rocco Sciarrone, *Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove*, cit. Anna Sergi, *A qualitative reading of the ecological (dis)organization of criminal associations. The case of the “Famiglia Basilischi” in Italy* in “Trends in Organized Crime”, 2015, 19(2), pp. 149-174. Arianna Zottarel, *La mala del Brenta: un caso speciale di mafia autoctona*, Tesi di Laurea, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2016.

¹⁴ Monica Massari, *Versilia e Toscana. La criminalità organizzata nelle aree non tradizionali. Un’analisi di caso*, in “Strumenti: economia, legalità, criminalità: studi e ricerche”, 1998, 1, pp. 11–78.

¹⁵ Nando dalla Chiesa, *La convergenza. Mafia e politica nella seconda Repubblica*, Melampo, Milano, 2010.

¹⁶ Rocco Sciarrone, *Le mafie dalla società locale all’economia globale*, in “Meridiana”, 2002, 43, pp. 49–82.

¹⁷ Giorgio Chinnici and Umberto Santino, *La violenza programmata. Omicidi e guerre di mafia a Palermo dagli anni sessanta ad oggi*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1991. Umberto Santino, *La mafia interpretata. Dilemmi, stereotipi, paradigmi*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 1995.

entrenched model, easier to find in the areas of origins. The second is the opposite, namely the ideal-type that we might call of “economic mafia”. Those don’t represent necessarily a concrete context, but are generalizations that could be useful to introduce a comparison.

The mafias’ traditional contexts are usually small villages (i.e. two of the most evocative are San Luca in Calabria or Corleone in Sicily) or cities neighborhoods with precise borders and a strong identity (i.e. Palermo or Naples)¹⁸. Here they exercise a form of “territorial sovereignty”¹⁹, so they maintain a strong – usually military – control on social, political, economic, even the private life of the local community. In new expansion areas, instead, the relationship with the territory is “more fluid and flexible”²⁰.

Space is always a strategic resource for the organizations²¹ and obviously, also for mafias. In traditional contexts territory play a key role from different perspectives: at first, it is considered in literature the principal “factor of accumulation”. Through the relationship established in their original area, mafias also obtain material resources and social capital²². Lastly, it is also the grounds of their construction of identity and social recognisability²³.

The table 1 compare principal characteristics of traditional and non-traditional mafias’ entrenched model, based on literary review and analysis of the most important judicial inquires in traditional (especially Calabria and Sicily) and non-traditional regions (especially Lazio, Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia Romagna and

¹⁸ Nando dalla Chiesa, *Passaggio a Nord. La colonizzazione mafiosa*, edizioni Gruppo Abele, Torino, 2016.

¹⁹ Umberto Santino, *La mafia interpretata. Dilemmi, stereotipi, paradigmi*, cit.

²⁰ Rocco Sciarrone, (ed), *Mafie del Nord. Strategie criminali e contesti locali*, Donzelli, Roma, 2014, pp. 28.

²¹ Mike Chrang and Nigel Thrift, *Thinking space*, Routledge, London, 2000.

²² In this case the social capital’s definition is taken by Sciarrone (1998) that applies Coleman’s definition to mafia organizations, but not all authors agree, i.e. dalla Chiesa uses Putnam one (Putnam, 1993).

²³ Rocco Sciarrone, *La territorializzazione del potere mafioso: controllo del territorio e nuove geografie di espansione*, in “Laboratorio di Progettazione Ecologica degli Insediamenti”, 2016, retrieved March 10, 2016 (<http://www.lapei.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/1-la-territorializzazione-del-potere-mafioso-controllo-del-territorio-e-nuove-geografie-di-espansione1.pdf>).

Liguria) in the last seven years. This timeframe has been chosen due to the fact that public and also academic interests on the issue of mafias' expansion had been considerably increased after "Crimine - Infinito" inquiry on July 2010. This showed, for the first time in an organic and structured way, 'ndrangheta's successfully transplantation in Northern Italy and its internal organization.

Table 1 - Mafias' entrenched models. Distinction between traditional and non-traditional

<i>Entrenched model characteristics</i>	<i>Territorial sovereignty</i>	<i>Economic mafia</i>
Where	Places	Spaces
Intimidation and power's accumulation factor	Social control, violence as possible resource, reputation	Violence as possible resource, corruption, system of relationship
Benefits	Consideration, power, social capital, resources, identity, social recognisability	Power, resources
Relationship with politic	Systematic	Not necessary
Organizational structure	Hierarchical	Flat/flexible
Presence on the territory	Monopoly	Possible/Frequent presence of other OCs

At first, based on Giddens' definition the notion of "place is best conceptualised by means of the idea of locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically"²⁴. So, one of elements that could define the traditional model is the fact that it is played on a place, instead of in a space. On this issue, see also Colombo and Navarini: they point out that the notion of place underlines cultural dimension of social activity based geographically. It refers to identity, relationships and sense²⁵.

²⁴ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford University Press, 1990.

²⁵ Enzo Colombo and Gianmarco Navarini, *Confini dentro la città. Antropologia della Stazione Centrale di Milano*, Guerini, Milano, 1999.

Their construction of power and intimidation are founded upon, in both cases, the ability to use violence as a resource²⁶. Violence, even if it is only to threaten, is the more efficient way to obtain power and control over local society²⁷. The first model exhibits control used over the local communities and reliance on their reputation. In the non-traditional model, the organization is fearsome due to its ability to weave relationships and eventually push out hostile actors from sectors where they operate. Corruption is obviously another very efficient instrument, specifically in areas of new expansion in order to obtain public contracts²⁸.

In Sciarrone's opinion²⁹, "territorial power" (the power exercised in a specific and limited local context) is a useful instrument for gathering resources, creating and maintaining social recognition and, last but not least, for forming those partnerships that could comprise their social capital.

In the first model, clans meddle in politics to control the vote, but sometimes also to present their own men in electoral competitions (see model of joint participation in dalla Chiesa³⁰). In the second one, it seems to be more useful and less risky to form partnership with bureaucratic actors in local administration instead of politicians. This due to the fact that politicians could change more frequently than bureaucrats.

From the point of view of the structure, it seems to be that usually in non-traditional context criminal organizations adopt a less hierarchical structure³¹.

Finally, in a traditional entrenchment the mafia group has the monopoly in the local criminal context, while with an "economic mafia" model there is a coexistence, due to the fact that the organization has to share wide markets instead of a territory.

²⁶ Nando dalla Chiesa, *La convergenza. Mafia e politica nella seconda Repubblica*, cit.

²⁷ Umberto Santino, *La mafia interpretata. Dilemmi, stereotipi, paradigmi*, cit.

²⁸ Anita Lavorgna and Anna Sergi, *Different Manifestations of Organised Crime and Corruption in Italy. A Socio-legal Analysis*, in *Corruption, Greed and Crime Money. Sleaze and Shady Economy in Europe and Beyond*, Petrus C. Van Duyne, Jackie Harvey, (edited by), Wolf Legal Publisher, 2014, pp. 139-161.

²⁹ Rocco Sciarrone, *La territorializzazione del potere mafioso: controllo del territorio e nuove geografie di espansione*, cit.

³⁰ Nando dalla Chiesa and Martina Panzarasa, *Buccinasco. La 'ndrangheta al Nord*, cit.

³¹ Federico Varese, *Mafie in movimento. Come il crimine organizzato conquista nuovi territori*, cit. Vittorio Martone, *Le mafie di mezzo*, Donzelli, Roma, 2017.

3. Rome: a case study of a new expansion area and of the relevance of local mafias

Rome is an important and challenging case of a new expansion area to study. Because, here traditional mafias, local mafias and organized crimes live together, sharing territories and markets. “This area isn’t under control – said a boss - we aren’t in Palermo. Here all groups are working together (...) and make money”³².

All the traditional mafias moved to this territory since the 1970s mainly to reinvest their illicit profits in the legal economy, but also to invest in entrepreneurial activities³³. The first organization that moved from the original region to the Capital was Cosa nostra, in particular the city became the base for the activity of Pippo Calò and in the same period some camorra bosses, fellows of Cutolo – when Nuova Camorra Organizzata had been defeated by Nuova Famiglia – tried to find a refuge in Rome³⁴.

‘Ndrangheta, instead, as in many other cases³⁵, started its transplantation from the suburbs and in particular from two towns situated on the coast (Anzio and Nettuno) and, progressively, from Fondi (where camorra is also present). In Rome, those groups have never been structured in a traditional way - both for a strategic decision and for a specific need³⁶ - but they anyway had been present since the 1980s³⁷.

³² Tribunale di Roma, Sezione X, *Sentenza* n. 6846/15, 27 aprile 2015.

³³ Direzione Nazionale Antimafia, *Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal procuratore nazionale antimafia e dalla Dna nonché sulle dinamiche e strategie della criminalità organizzata di tipo mafioso nel periodo 1° luglio 2015 – 30 luglio 2016*, DNA, Roma, 2017.

³⁴ Giuseppe Pignatone and Michele Prestipino, *Le mafie su Roma, la mafia di Roma*, in *Atlante delle mafie. Storia, economia, società, cultura*, Enzo Ciconte, Francesco Forgione, Isaia Sales (edited by), Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, vol. III, 2015, pp. 95-130.

³⁵ I.e. see Cross (Osservatorio sulla criminalità organizzata), *Monitoraggio della presenza mafiosa in Lombardia*, Cross, Università degli studi di Milano, Milano, 2017.

³⁶ Giuseppe Pignatone and Michele Prestipino, *Le mafie su Roma, la mafia di Roma*, in *Atlante delle mafie. Storia, economia, società, cultura*, cit.

³⁷ An accurate reconstruction of mafias transplantation in Rome could be found in Osservatorio Tecnico Scientifico per la sicurezza e la legalità Regione Lazio, *Rapporto mafie nel Lazio*, Roma, report in collaboration with Fondazione Libera Informazione, Osservatorio sull’informazione per la legalità e contro le mafie, Roma, 2016.

What made Rome a context so different from the other cities where mafias moved their activities and structures (i.e. Milan or Turin) is the presence of a very strong and embedded local mafias, started with Banda della Magliana experience in 1970s.

In the past few years, several criminal groups have been identified in the urban area. Except of Ostia's clans (to whom is dedicated the next paragraph), the most important are the Senese/Pagnozzi clan ("the Neapolitans of Tuscolana") and the Casamonicas in the Southern part of the city, and the Cordaros, a small criminal group operating in Tor Bella Monaca. Least but not last Mafia capitale, which is perhaps the best-known criminal organization of Rome, an association "original and originating"³⁸ disrupted by "Mondo di mezzo" inquiry concluded in December 2014³⁹.

Despite the relevance of this case, there is a lack of academic literature about Roman mafias. Moreover, there aren't many police inquiries. Therefore, a sources' diversification is a needed. In order to conduct the case study, the analysis of the existing academic, journalistic and documentary sources has been integrated by an empirical analysis on the fieldwork, in particular through semi-structured interviews to privileged observers (a prosecutor, a judge, an investigator, a journalist, a local anti-mafia activist and a local politician) and participation to public events.

4. Ostia: a traditional entrenched model for a new mafia?

Ostia is situated on the coast, on the periphery of Rome. It was mostly swampland until Mussolini ordered its reclamation. Its position is strategical for international trafficking, because it caught between Civitavecchia and Fiumicino harbours and the international Leonardo da Vinci airport, which are "well-established entry points for

³⁸ Tribunale di Roma, *Ordinanza di applicazione di misure di cautelari nei confronti di Massimo Carminati e altri*, 30546/10, 2014.

³⁹ Not all of these groups have been defined "mafia-type association" based on art. 416 *bis* Italian Penal Code and Tribunal of Rome's jurisprudence on this issue is conflicting.

drugs”⁴⁰. In addition, its development potential (in particular through the “economy of the sea”) made this territory very attractive to different organized crime groups.

“The Roman coast is one of areas with the highest criminal density”⁴¹ and different form of organized crimes are historically well established in Ostia.

At first, a large number of mafias fugitives have found refuge along the Roman coast⁴² and since the 1970s several of camorra’s and Cosa nostra’s bosses have moved into this area in order to enter into drug trafficking market.

But the first group that operated specifically in Ostia was Banda della Magliana. Since the beginning of the 1970s, Nicolino Selis – a boss in relationship with Raffaele Cutolo - assembled a “batteria”, composed by some young thefts that recently invested in drug trafficking. This groups joined others two roman “batterie”⁴³, forming Banda della Magliana⁴⁴. Since then, Banda della Magliana members have always been active in Ostia. In a first period, until the 1990s they had had a sort of criminal monopoly, at the beginning with Selis and, after his murder in Acilia in 1981, with Paolo Frau and Edoardo Toscano⁴⁵. In particular, Frau started with drug trafficking in this area in the 1980s and reinvested illicit profits in Ostia legal economy⁴⁶. In 2002 also Frau was killed and replaced at first by two of his collaborators, Roberto Pergola (arrested in 2004) and Emidio Salomone (killed in 2009), and then by Baficchio (Giovanni Galleoni) and Sorcanera (Francesco Antonini)⁴⁷.

⁴⁰ Direzione Nazionale Antimafia, *Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal procuratore nazionale antimafia e dalla Dna nonché sulle dinamiche e strategie della criminalità organizzata di tipo mafioso nel periodo 1° luglio 2015 – 30 luglio 2016*, cit. p. 879.

⁴¹ Vittorio Martone, *op. cit.*

⁴² Angelo Bonelli, politician and former President of Ostia municipality, public speech during “Università itinerante”, Ostia, July 27, 2015.

⁴³ The “batterie” were small criminal groups, peculiar of Rome. Three of them formed a stable organization, known as Banda della Magliana. A group from Testaccio, headed by Abbruciati, De Pedis, Pernasetti and Giuseppucci, one from Acilia and Ostia, of which leaders were Selis, Mancini, Luciola, Toscano, Mancone and Carnovale brothers and lastly one from Magliana, runned by Abbattino, Colafigli, Paradisi, Sicilia, Danesi and Mastropietro (Giuliano Benincasa, *Qui la mafia non esiste*, Castelvecchi editore, Roma, 2017).

⁴⁴ Angela Camuso, *Mai ci fu pietà*, Castelvecchi editore, Roma, 2014.

⁴⁵ Osservatorio Tecnico Scientifico per la sicurezza e la legalità Regione Lazio, *Rapporto mafie nel Lazio*, cit.

⁴⁶ Vittorio Martone, *op.cit.*

⁴⁷ Tribunale di Roma, n. 6087/16, Gip Anna Maria Fattori.

However, during the 1990s other groups increased their power and became more competitive, while Banda della Magliana declined in Ostia and also in Rome; the Triassis and the Fascianis families.

The first ones are linked to a very important Cosa nostra's family, the Cuntrera Caruanas. The latter originated from Abruzzo and moved to Ostia in the 1970s, in order to begin their economic activities (initially bakeries). After Frau was assassinated and others Banda della Magliana survivors were arrested, the Fascianis and the Triassis shared the power, but between 2007 and 2011 they once again started to fight for the territorial control. The Fascianis won, and thereafter, forced the latter to stipulate a "*pax mafiosa*". During this time, the clan of Michele Senese, a former member of Alfieri's camorra clan who moved to Rome after the camorra war against Cutolo, seemed unaffected by the conflict. It is known he was involved in establishing the *pax* and it is known that his clan's presence was influential but to what degree we are unsure. Since then he has been arrested. Therefore, some privileged observers have defined "Ostia model" as a peaceful but armed coexistence, which is always being renegotiated. The respect of this pact is granted by Francesco D'Agati (an important Cosa nostra bosses who lives in Ostia), who acts as an arbiter between the rival groups, grounded on the kudos gained from his relevant criminal career in Cosa nostra⁴⁸. In the last few years, also the Spadas – a nomad family allied with the Fascianis – seems to become more powerful, due to the detention of many Fasciani's members. In particular, they replaced Baficchio and Sorcanera in the area of Nuova Ostia.

The table 2 synthetizes the distribution of the power in Ostia since the 1970s until today.

⁴⁸ Norma Ferrara, *Quegli equilibri fra guerra e pace* in "Mafie.blogautore.repubblica.it", April 11, 2017, retrieved April 15, 2017 (<http://mafie.blogautore.repubblica.it/2017/04/454/>).

Table 2 – Criminal groups in Ostia

<i>Period</i>	<i>Dominant criminal group</i>	<i>Bosses</i>
'70-'90	Banda della Magliana	Nicolino Selis Paolo Frau
'90 - 2007	Compresence (Banda della Magliana, the Fascianis and the Triassis)	Emidio Salomone and Roberto Pergola, Carmine Fasciani, Vito and Vincenzo Triassi
2007 - 2017	Fasciani - Spada	Carmine Fasciani and Ottavio Spada

In order to analyze which is the relationship with the territory in a case of local mafia, seems to be interesting to study the Fascianis. Their principle activities are drug and weapons trafficking, exploitation, gambling, extortion and money laundering through several investments in Ostia's local economy. In particular, they invest in cafes, restaurants and, most of all, lidos⁴⁹.

The Fascianis' presence in the territory is pervasive. Members of clan and also their allies (other criminal groups in the same area, such as the Spadas family) are linked through kinship (i.e. arranged marriages).

The association leaders are all linked by kinship. This type of relationship is unusual in traditional mafias, especially in non-traditional areas (even in 'ndrangheta, which is known for its familiar structure)⁵⁰ and made the typical rituals and owes unnecessary⁵¹.

The Fascianis clan exercised a strong pressure on entrepreneurs. Extortion is the most evident symbol of their power⁵². A Rome prosecutor inquiring into the profits gained through this activity, reports that a cooperating witness has said: "It is a question of respect. For people like us, 500 euros per month is a small thing"⁵³.

⁴⁹ Osservatorio Tecnico Scientifico per la sicurezza e la legalità Regione Lazio, *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ Paolo Campana and Federico Varese, *Cooperation in Criminal Organizations: Kinship and Violence as Credible Commitments*, in "Rationality and Society", 2013, 25(3), pp. 263–289.

⁵¹ Rocco Sciarrone (ed), *Mafie del Nord. Strategie criminali e contesti locali*, cit.

⁵² Antonio La Spina (ed), *I costi dell'illegalità. Mafia ed estorsioni in Sicilia*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2008.

⁵³ Prestipino in Vittorio Martone, *op. cit.*

Even if general opinion is that in non-traditional territory violence is rare, in Ostia this statement seems not to be true. For instances, since 2002, there have been seven occurrences of homicides or kneecappings and, between 2007 and 2015, 35 reports of intimidations against businesses (particularly lidos and bars)⁵⁴. Violence is also used as a resource to solicit money from entrepreneurs. The informer Sebastiano Cassia⁵⁵ explains; “if you want tranquility in this area, it means that I don’t bother you...or I burn your business or I burn your car or I come in and disturb...”⁵⁶. “In Ostia, sometimes something catches on fire”⁵⁷.

Finally, it is efficient to build their criminal reputation, as explains another cooperating witness; “...Punish one to educate 100...this methodology is used in Sicily but also in other criminal contexts...”⁵⁸.

They also pay attention to social acceptance: for instances, they are organized, as traditional mafias are, to pay a sort of salary to the families of the ones that have been arrested. Also, lidos have responded to this strategic need. In fact, to gain the “access to the sea” is prestigious (interview with local antimafia activist, Ostia, May 2017)⁵⁹. In particular, they owned (irrespective of whether or not it is formally assigned to a front man) a lido, the “Village”, even if seized by the authorities now. The Village was an important meeting point⁶⁰ and facilitated the Fascianis family in

⁵⁴ The quantitative data on number of intimidations are obviously underestimate due to the fact that usually this type of crime is not reported by the victim to the authorities. Tribunale di Roma, *Sommario ragionato delle conclusioni del pubblico ministero*, N. 54911/12, 2015.

⁵⁵ Sebastiano Cassia was a member of Cosa nostra’s clan Santapaola and he has started its activity in Ostia since the 1980s.

⁵⁶ Tribunale di Roma, *Sommario ragionato delle conclusioni del pubblico ministero*, N. 54911/12, 2015, p. 44.

⁵⁷ Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia, *Audizione di Alfonso Sabella, già assessore alla legalità del comune di Roma*. Resoconto Stenografico. CPA, Italian Parliament, Roma, retrieved November 19, 2015.

(http://www.camera.it/leg17/1058?idLegislatura=17&tipologia=audiz2&sottotipologia=audizione&anno=2015&mese=11&giorno=19&idCommissione=24&numero=0122&file=indice_stenografico, p. 6).

⁵⁸ Tribunale di Roma, *Sommario ragionato delle conclusioni del pubblico ministero*, N. 54911/12, 2015, p. 45.

⁵⁹ On the issue of strategical importance of economic activities see Cross, *Secondo rapporto trimestrale sulle aree settentrionali per la presidenza della Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno mafioso*, Cross (Osservatorio sulla criminalità organizzata), Cross, Università degli studi di Milano, retrieved March 10, 2015 (<http://www.cross.unimi.it/secondo-rapporto-trimestrale-sulle-aree-settentrionali/>).

⁶⁰ On the importance of the study of meeting points in mafias analysis, see Ilaria Meli, *La geografia degli incontri di ‘ndrangheta in Lombardia*, in “Polis”, 2015, 3, pp. 391-416.

forging relationships with local entrepreneurs and the upper classes⁶¹. They were also in contact with the Assobalneari (trade association of lidos' entrepreneurs), professionals and banks; some of them decide to relate with the Fascianis not for fear but for convenience⁶².

In particular, the lidos are frequently presented as a sector where illegality and breaches of law are common and rooted (on this issue an interesting and documented academic research is the one recently proposed by Martone⁶³).

The Spadas "assign" council housing that were occupied previously by them and they opened, in an area of social unease near Gasparri square, a popular gym with activities of social inclusion, frequented by many local children and youths⁶⁴. However, this building also was "practically illegally occupied" as reported by Alfonso Sabella⁶⁵.

Therefore, in the last 30 years they built such a solid social control that they aren't facing condemnation by entrepreneurs who have been extorted and none are prepared to testify against them. Their power seems to not be damage even after judicial inquires have led to arrests within the major members of the clan.

From a political point of view, the infiltration in the municipality seems to be evident due to the fact that it was dissolved firstly in 1992 for corruption and then again in 2015 for mafia infiltration. The inquires showed that local clans were able to influence political decisions and prevent a normal development of public life.

The table below illustrates the characteristics of the Fasciani's entrenched model in Ostia.

⁶¹ Alfonso Sabella, *I campieri del mare*, in "Mafie.blogautore.repubblica.it", April 8. retrieved April 8, 2017 (<http://mafie.blogautore.repubblica.it/2017/04/i-campieri-del-mare/>).

⁶² Tribunale di Roma, *Sentenza di sequestro preventivo nei confronti di Carmine Fasciani e altri*, 1018/2014.

⁶³ Vittorio Martone, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁶⁵ When Ignazio Marino was Rome's mayor, Alfonso Sabella was his councilor for Legality and Transparency and then he has been made responsible for Ostia. Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Table 3 - The Fascianis' entrenched model in ostia

<i>Entrenched model characteristics</i>	<i>Ostia</i>
Where	Place
Intimidation and power's accumulation factor	Social control, violence, reputation, social acceptance
Benefits	Power, resources, social recognisability
Relationship with politic	Systematic
Organizational structure	Hierarchical and familiar
Presence on the territory	Other OCs Presented

Corruption may be a useful instrument not only because this is a non-traditional area (see above), but also because there is an explicit pact among the criminal organizations to maintain a peace, and hence avoid police attention (even if corruption continues to be an available resource). However, in this case, violence appears to be the most used and efficient resource. What seems to be significantly different from "territorial sovereignty" model is the identity issue, because this clan doesn't present any form of symbolism to be legitimized.

5. Conclusions

The case study presented seems to exactly correspond to the traditional entrenched model, even if the initial conditions were supposed to prevent it. Keeping the literature in mind, Ostia is actually too large and populated to allow the establishment of the mafias. And in an urban context, local mafias should not be able to systematically encroach upon politics and to collect resources.

Beyond the mere juridical definition, on which, as it is said above, the debate is still open, the Fascianis group behaves as a mafia-type organization. However, two elements continue to be different from the classical entrenchment model. The first is the renunciation of the possibility to create a monopoly. Based on a cost-benefit

analysis, at this specific moment, they prefer peace rather than a much too visible war. The second element is a lack of a specific identity. This question is frequently opposed by who affirm that Mafia capitale isn't a proper mafia. Some claim that is impossible to define as mafia an organization with no rituals, history and identity. Because of this, this organization would be destined to dissolution after the death or capture of its boss. Family structure seems to indicate a solution to this problem, by assuring that there are descendants and fidelity.

Some Ostia's characteristics could have facilitated this type of settlement. In particular, a widespread lack of legality; in politics, demonstrated by the fact that the municipal council had been dissolved twice in the last 30 years, and in economy, as the frequent breaches challenged the lidos entrepreneurs show. Secondly, even if Ostia maintains a large population with extended neighborhood, this type of control is exercised on a specific part of the territory where there are pockets of poverty, underdevelopment and social unease.

In conclusion, mafia entrenchment model still seems to be not only efficient but also easily expandable to new area, even in a metropolitan context that have right requirements, as is Rome.