



Emanuela Calore / Roberta Marini (Hg.)

## **Imperium, Staat, Civitas**

Ein kritischer Beitrag zum postmodernen Konzept  
der Macht

## **Imperium, Stato, Civitas**

Contributo critico alla concezione postmoderna  
del potere

BAND 10

VILLA VIGONI IM GESPRÄCH

Franz Steiner Verlag

# IMPULSE



CENTRO ITALO-ITALIANO  
PER L'ECCELLENZA  
EUROPEA

DEUTSCH-ITALIENISCHES  
ZENTRUM FÜR  
EUROPÄISCHE EXZELLENZ





Impulse – Villa Vigoni im Gespräch

Band 10

Herausgegeben von

IMMACOLATA AMODEO

Imperium, Staat, Civitas.  
Ein kritischer Beitrag zum  
postmodernen Konzept der Macht

Imperium, Stato, Civitas.  
Contributo critico alla concezione  
postmoderna del potere

Villa Vigoni 19-21 marzo 2013

Herausgegeben von Emanuela Calore und Roberta Marini



Franz Steiner Verlag



7	
11	
21	
51	
69	
83	
93	
107	
119	
175	
135	
153	
161	
171	

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek  
 Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese  
 Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie;  
 detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über  
<http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

ISBN 978-3-70-01696-3 (Print)

ISBN 978-3-70-01697-4 (E-Book)

Jede Verzerrung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen  
 des Urheberrechtsschutzes ist unzulässig und strafbar.  
 Dies gilt insbesondere für Übersetzung, Nachdruck,  
 Mikroverfilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie  
 für die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen.

© Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2015

Einbandgestaltung: Gablitz, Berlin

Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier  
 Druck: A.Z. Druck und Medien GmbH, Kempten

Printed in Germany

## Inhalt

- 7 RICCARDO CARDILLI, MARTIN SCHERMAIER  
Vorwort/Prefazione
- 11 PIERANGELO CATALANO  
Impero (romano) e stati
- 21 EMANUELA CALORE  
Il tribuno della plebe: un limite al potere a garanzia del popolo
- 31 CHRISTIAN HATTENHAUER  
«Deutschland wird auf deutsch regiert» – Zum Verhältnis zwischen  
dem Heiligen Römischen Reich deutscher Nation und seinen Gliedern  
in der Neuzeit
- 69 CHRISTIAN GOLDSCHMIDT  
Das personale Reichverständnis im Alten Reich am Beispiel der  
höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit
- 83 TATIANA ALEXEEVA  
A proposito dello Stato russo: tra zarstvo e impero
- 93 SOLANGE GUIDA  
Imperium populii Romani e «o império» del Brasile
- XU TIEYING  
107 Il potere imperiale nella tradizione cinese
- 119 CARLO MONGARDINI  
Lo Stato e le trasformazioni della politica moderna
- 125 MAURIZIO BACII  
Zur Interdependenz des Strukturwandels von Gesellschaft und Staat
- 135 ERICA ANTONINI  
Multidimensionality of power in hypermodern societies
- 153 HOLGER GREFRATH  
Rechtssprache zwischen Wertmagie und Social Engineering – Skizzen zur  
Stiftung des Denkstils der Jurisprudenz im frühen römischen Recht
- 161 ROBERTA IANRONE  
Unsocial capital, Patronage and Cronyism in postmodern power
- 171 EMANUELE ROSSI  
Suspended in no man's land: the "state of exception" as a form of  
postmodern domination



- 181 MARTIN SCHERMAYER  
Staatsangehörigkeit und Rechtsleithaber: Zu den römischen Anfängen  
eines Spannungszustandes
- 207 ROBERTA MARINI  
Attualità e ricchezza del *ludex iudicis di civitas augustens*
- 223 ALEXANDER SCHÜSSLER  
Der Wandel vom Staatsangehörigkeits- zum Aufenthaltsprinzip in einem  
komplizierten europäischen Ehegüterkonfliktsrecht
- 245 STEFANO PORCELLI  
Power and Contracts
- 285 GREGOR ALBERS  
Völkerrechtliche Regimekonflikte. Doppelverpflichtung und Konkurrenz  
auf der Suche nach einem *ius commune*
- 321 Ordine dei lavori / Programm

## Unsocial capital. Patronage and cronyism in postmodern power

### 1. Introduction

Not always the relational capital is also a "social" capital. Often, this type of capital though composed of bonds and interactions, appears nonetheless as a capital which is profoundly unsocial.

This happens in two cases: either when the laces do not bind to each other, or when they bind well between them but do not bind to the wider society in which they are also inserted. It presents itself then, as a capital that binds but not as one that unites, which connects but not that which integrates. It is the capital of linkages and of small groups, which however do not amalgamate into larger forms of cohesion. The illustrative image may be that of many small aggregations that do not however make a single large network. It is the capital of narrow ties rather than relations which are broader and inclusive.

Or it is the case of strong ties and closure forms of pseudo-community. In this case that we speak of capital which binds rather than which bridges, to use an expression which is dear to the dominant literature on the subject<sup>1</sup>. For these reasons, it ends up making more for the convenience "of" the society, than "for" the society<sup>2</sup> and therefore social cohesion and amalgamation are clumped into many small social circles and just for very exclusively selected affinities.

*The hypothesis that in these pages we intend to support is that the unsocial capital is the product of "certain forms" of relational particularism, which produce a patronage degeneration of power. At question therefore is not relational particularism "in itself", but rather relational particularism "under certain conditions" or "with certain characteristics" which are able to mark a continuum between unsocial capital and forms of patronage (but also nepotistic or familialistic) of power. The story of the power of Rome can help us to grasp some of these unexpected relational consequences.*

### 2. Rome, the city of power

If it is true that even places have a soul<sup>3</sup>, a "daimon", as for London this daimon is finance, for Genova, Venice and Amsterdam is trade, undoubtedly for Rome, it is traced mainly in power.

"Rome, the city of art, faith, beauty and spirituality has a history of more than a thousand years we go to the fourth millennium and the first settlements date from the legendary founding of the city of Romulus and its relationship with power is known to all: Rome is the city of power"<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Weisberg,

<sup>2</sup> - see: egl. ug out obs

<sup>3</sup> bassichen  
<sup>4</sup> auf, New  
 esität in  
 "and late  
 monditte,

n: Friaff  
 s, exposé  
 pro socie  
 errant:  
 kaff ausn,  
 s. Mythos  
 onsumen,

die Leber

Diegenly.

rezeßbau,



From the beginning of time the link between Rome and power existed, from its origins to the present day, from the times of Caesars to those of the Popes, up until contemporary Rome.

It is not, however, any kind of power: the power which defines the function and history of Rome is above all political power. Even the terms that define the attributes of power (in Latin in fact) are: *imperium*, *potestas*, *maiestas*, *regnum*, *gubernium*, *dictatorum* and *dominium*, which are all terms that are undoubtedly related to the history of Rome.

The word *palazzo*, which is the symbolic center of power, or *palais* for the French, or palace for the British, or *palacio* for the Spanish, or *Palast* for the Germans, come from the Roman hill called *Palatium*<sup>6</sup>, where the residences of power rose since ancient times.

### 3. Patronage?

Every phenomenon has its own proper context of reference in which it generally takes shape and texture. To "decontextualize" a phenomenon, usually implies some stretching of knowledge and generally a bit defective analysis. This is the case of the phenomenon of cronyism and patronage of power, whose explanation necessarily refers to the study of the time and places of ancient Rome and hardly leads to be transposed mechanically into actuality.

However, even if this is true, it is hard not to find meaningful correspondences between yesterday and today. Even after taking into account all the necessary conceptual precautions and the necessary attention in terms of "distinctions and clarifications", there is no dearth of studies that are able to trace the patronage nature of the power of Rome and of contemporary Italy, attributing such a nature to the historical origins of the phenomenon of cronyism.

Staying on the terms, that are often evocative of the phenomena to which they relate, makes us remember for example that the term cronyism derives from the Latin word, which in Roman era, used to indicate that citizen who, by the virtue of having a disadvantaged position within the society, found himself of having to resort to the protection of a *patronus* or an entire *gens* (race). This generally used to occur in exchanging favors also in the sign of *applicatio* physical or psychological subordination.

The so-called *aditio* was furthermore known as the form through which the fulfillment of the condition of the client occurred. It consisted in usufruct (beneficial interest) of a public good – for example parts of *ager publicus* (public fields) – on concession (in *precarium*) of the patronage that appropriated of that property. The client was obliged in relation to his *patronus* either through the public vote in the assemblies, or through the personal engagement in case of war.

The poet Martial, as indeed many other Latin authors who came from ancient Rome, lived in the state of client, thus finding many benefits.

To put it in a nutshell, the power that arrives from Rome since antiquity to the present day is also, if not mainly, a power of patronage.



Roman Benini, in his book *Italia cortigiana* (book, moreover, recommended by Harvard as the best of the Italian essays in 2012), defines this power as "courtisan", distinguishing it from its opposite "artisan": "the first type of power is based mostly on the "knowing how to stand / holding a position", and the second on "know-how" or which Amartya Sen would define as the "ability to act."<sup>7</sup> In the first case prevails income, in the second the skills.

The essence of courtier power is therefore diametrically opposed to that detectable in Italy of traders and productive labor, of hard working and responsible communities, as in the case of free Italian Municipalities and after also in the case of Renaissance to the present day *Made in Italy*. It in essence is:

- *Clientèles* understood as individuals, families and friends who require protection and favors and whose role in the society is very dependent on keeping to the referral political power, for which there is no openness, against the favor received;
- Practices of nepotism or familism understood as support to the individual in so far as "belonging to" and irrespective of "merit" and "capacity" of the same;
- Forms of co-optation and recommendation as a means to achieve certain social or professional positions thanks to the favor of the powerful and the relationship within this circle;
- Mechanisms of self-reference, understood as power as an end unto itself;
- Initiatives of propaganda as forms of representation of reality, and in particular of the qualities and actions of the powerful.

The consequences that can be derived from this model of power are different and decisively less encouraging. According to Benini, these consequences range from parasitism to illicit enrichment, from social passivity to immobilism, from corruption to injustice. The first social guarantees that collapse are (here/fore the selection based on merit, legality, representativeness, participation, the guaranty of justice, the welfare state, the promotion of employment, the tax fairness and, above all, the protection of the common good. This aspect (common good) easily directs us to the heart of the issue in question. Rather than appealing to different adjectives the power at issue (cronyist, courtisan, familist, nepotist, etc.), the matter is to understand its own particularistic nature which makes it to deny its collateral or more universal ability.

It therefore points to analyze relational particularism, and when and under what conditions, it genres (or degenerates into) power of cronyism.

#### 4. What type of particularism?

The power of cronyism is therefore an expression of a kind of particularistic power, a child of that phenomenon we call *relational particularism*.

The point is, however, to understand about the type of particularism that we are talking about. That is, if there exists only one type of particularism, which actually is the opposite of dialectical universalism (ie against public good, citizenship, etc.) And so condemnable en masse because it is always harmful and always synonymous



to social, economic and political egoism, to the interest of a part and a restricted loyalty, in place of the most universal forms of cooperative spirit, extended solidarity and shared trust; if there are several particularisms and maybe even compatible with the development and modernization, but above all with universalism.

The importance of this question stems from the fact that, as long as we remain obstinate to think (as often happens) particularism as one, and therefore as a reality which is split and opposite to its "alter ego" universalism, then it will be only a matter of just oversimplified reading of the reality, which does not capture the complexity to which they are referring to. This happens particularly when we replicate rigid binary codes and end up giving interpretations that are not only dichotomous, but also dualistic of these phenomena, as was the case even in the best sociological and postmodern traditions and also in the post-modern interpretations, which are more attentive to the ambiguities and contradictions of modernity.

When this happens:

1. We conduct "crusades" against something that is not episodic or occasional, but is structural and inherent to our social experience, to modernity, to the history of Europe and of Italy, but also to the history of power and its manifestations. So we deny something which, however, will continue to exist despite the negations.
2. We absolutize universalism and for this reason we push towards its opposite, it is indeed particularism, precisely because it is negated, comes back like a boomerang and re-emerges in a form which is even more radicalized and accessible (as is testified by the various localisms and neo-tribalisms).
3. We cannot look beyond in a sense given the development and modernization, and even backwards, that is learning from the past and its mistakes.

In this sense, for example, it might be interesting to know that historically the cryism has surfaced especially in times of decline and that these moments were especially subsequent to the first four centuries of development, either after first century AD or after the first millennium. Even today when we find ourselves at the beginning of another millennium, we can hope for occurrences or recurrences of history.

*Historia magistra vitae*, then should be acknowledged, even if only to avoid the golden and rather timeless rule in human history, which is that people who forget their history are condemned to repeat the same.

One of the cognitive objectives that should be emphasized to address these issues is therefore to try to understand:

- A. How many particularisms exist;
- B. when and under what conditions, the particularism degenerates into, or simply puts on the form of cryism, thus becoming an expression of unso-  
cial capital. Particularly interesting, in this regard, is the analysis of Mutti on "particularism" in his book dedicated to the issues of social capital and development<sup>6</sup>.



As regards point A, it is enough to remember that:

1. Particularism depends both on the boundary and also on the size of the relevant universe. This can be known as, a demographic interpretation of particularism that, even in its simplicity, has already for itself the merit of relativizing the nature of the phenomenon and to grade its dimensions which can vary from a minimum exclusion to maximum exclusion. Therefore by itself avoids the limitations of shallow and dichotomous definitions.
2. To cite from M. Weber's, particularism depends on the degree of beginning and closing of the relationship and this can in turn depend on the grounds of beginning and closing (that is, if traditional, affective or rational, and the latter based on the "purpose" or in base of "value").
3. The particularism also depends on the context. As noted by Mutti, in a market based economy of free competition, any form of barrier to the admission (oligopolistic or monopolistic) can be an example of economic particularism. In a representative political system based on the general mandate, the relationship between representatives and represented becomes particularistic when it takes on the nature of the cronyist exchange, i.e. the exchange of votes against favors conceded to single individuals and/or specific social groups or particular territorial areas. In the same way at the social level they are treated as particularistic, all those groups/communities which are bearers of values and specific logic of actions, that cannot be exported to the rest of society or even in conflict with it. In the conceptual framework it is also interesting to note that in the dictionary of synonyms and antonyms, the opposite of "Cronyism", is not "foreign to the circle," but is fair, just, impartial, objective and honest. And this ought to make us reflect
4. As important as the previous one is of course, the case of associations that, arise on the basis of special interests, over time have learned to reformulate their claims in more general and universalistic terms<sup>10</sup>.

As regards point B, the hypothesis that moves these assumptions is that the degeneration of particularism into clientelism can be avoided only when there are bridges between particularism and universalism and when links are identified. Let us now look at a deeper analysis of the same.

#### B.1. Hybrid models

This is the case, as well known, of the so-called *universalistic models of attribution and particularistic models of realization*.

From the sociological tradition, and in particular from the studies on modernization, we inherit a representation of the tradition as a kingdom of particularistic relations, functionally diffusive and emotive but above all else attributive, that is related to the birth; and an image of modernity as the prevalence of social universalistic relations, functionally specific, affectively neutral but above all acquisitive or realizational, that is they are not related to innate characteristics, but acquired by virtue of the capacity, performance, personal commitment and merits.



So in this way the particularism is attributed and universalism is realized par excellence. Is it possible to change these terms/phenomena? Is realization of particularism possible? And is it possible to hypothesize them not only in theory but also in practice?

According to Roniger<sup>11</sup> - who has analyzed some of the most recently industrialized countries - the experience of Japan, unlike that of Mexico or Brazil, shows that this is possible. In fact, Japan has experienced the compatibility with the modernization of certain forms of particularism (and even Cronyism), that is possible where objective criteria are associated with its particularistic relations. Such as technical expertise, the fulfillment of the role and of responsibility related to a mandate. It deals with criteria of realized type and linked to the principle of performance, to what people "do" rather than to what they "are". When these criteria and the principles of performance are satisfied, the result that derives is higher levels of modernization, even if there are situations of particularism.

### B.2. The Trust

It is also the case of the passages from interpersonal trust to those of institutional and systemic ones. As long as there have not been adequate studies on trust, perhaps because blinded by cold reasoning of institutional engineering, admitting that the importance of trust was recognized, it used to be believed that trust was or was not there in a given society. Today, however, we know much more about the presence/absence of trust and its mechanisms of production and reproduction. For example, we know that there are three levels at least and that amongst these levels there may be conflicting and inversely proportional rapports. For example, there can be a high level of interpersonal trust, but a low level of institutional trust. And that interpersonal trust can be high because the institutional trust is low. Or individuals can have strong attachments of trust with respect to one or more specific institutions, but not towards the entire social system.

So the question is how to increase the trust (especially institutional and systemic) and how to carry trust from an interpersonal level to an institutional and a systemic level. Also because let's not forget that if the familism is unmoral (to paraphrase a stereotype that was more harmful than helpful) to the State, because at the same time, it is moral in respect to civil society. So there is a basis of relationship, albeit horizontal, not vertical, from which to begin.

### B.3. The weight of cultural representations

Particularism is often a child of wrong cultural representations at least as inadequate social processes. But unfortunately we are not willing to recognize that culture has a weight all of its own (in orienting to the experience to which it refers) with the same weight we recognize to the so-called "facts" (which, as Nietzsche taught us, as "culture" by themselves).

If we look at representations we make of things, we realize that we are often more focused on the obstacles that need to be overcome rather than on the resources to be valued. We are more apt to break with tradition, than in saving or enhancing it selectively: forgetting the concept of "creative destruction" of Schumpeter<sup>12</sup>.



And this exaggerated insistence on the obstacles to be overcome has also fueled, remaining still on the subject of representations, of what has been called as the "syndrome of failure." This is what happens in southern Italy or Latin America, where the belief that dominates is "that nothing more can be done" for a given territory and that "any attempt to reform and to develop is already doomed to fail." It is what Hirschman<sup>13</sup> has defined with the term *frustration*, which are nothing more than self-fulfilling prophecies. In the end it is nothing but a return to the theorem of Thomas: what individuals think of as real is real in its consequences. With all the vicious circle of actions and reactions, that can result from this.

#### B.4. The weight of the 'ideology of recommendation'

The anthropologist Zinn, in his book titled "Recommendation. Old and new Cronyism"<sup>14</sup>, taking up the concept of ideology from Gramsci (as a glue that holds together the collective will articulated by the ruling class), speaks properly of recommendation as an ideology which expresses the common sense of the South-erners on "how things are going in the South" and especially their personalistic conception of power.

It is therefore an ideological conception of the recommendation that acts as a break to universalism.

However there are those who believe (and the same Zinn brings back in this book) that in fact the recommendation can be understood also as a bridge with universalism through the ideology of gift and exchange; the aim is in fact to own the rational-universalism, establishing a relationship of gift in a meritocratic context or dominated by market.

What is certain is that recommendation existed since the days of ancient Rome. There are letters in which Iacitus, Pliny and Suetonius "organize" recommendations in the proper sense of the term and it is significant to note that in all these letters the aim is not to report the capabilities of the recommended person (as may be the practice when one makes a reference in the Anglo-Saxon world), but it is about true and real information about affinities (social capital, family, etc.). Speaking about the person recommended and the bond of friendship, one can tie this to three subjects: the one who sends the recommendation, those who receive and those who have been recommended. So much so that the usual phrase concerning this is: "do this favor for him as if it had been done to me".

#### B.5. The networks

A useful support to explain these concepts can also come from the analysis of the network, where it can tell us how certain structures, such as parental, can become networks rather than community rigidly closed in themselves. It means communities that have an internal dynamics and minimal outward projections. And above all, what networks, with which forms and content, with what dynamism, processes and weaves between formal and informal dimensions, endogenous and exogenous, public and private may allow a certain success. If we ignore the complexity of these articulations, we fall easily into the naive rhetoric of institutional engineering which



forgets how institutions are rooted in the society. Or, even worse, end up attributing to formal institutions too much conditioning power on the rest of society.

#### 8.6. Geography of power and its actors

It is important to grasp the geography of power that allows to some (economic, political and social) actors to act as innovators and manipulators of networks and their rules, by creating connections between these same networks and by the stimulation of the processes of both horizontal and vertical cooperation. In most cases they are mediators or social entrepreneurs who unite themselves to other innovative groups, acting as catalysts and mobilizers of resources. They are very important to the world which is increasingly interdependent and it requires skills of negotiation.

Less clear is the social profile of these innovators: who are they? Are they designers, or the marginalized, as it was in the past for the greatest innovations, or "actors with weak links" capable of bridging structural gaps as stated in the literature on social capital?

#### 5. Concluding remarks

In light of these considerations, some aspects are very evident:

1. There is a particularism, which stands as a drastic obstacle to modernization and universalism, and also there is a particularism that coexists and can also be functional to universalism. In the first case the social circles are rigidly closed to the outside, they are unique and are able to set clear boundaries between members and non-members and to see them as a contrast between the protected and the unprotected. In the second case, however, particularism is weaker and inclusive, despite setting boundaries, does not reject the comparison with the outside and hence a relative opening with what is beyond the borders. They are not only particularistic networks but also capable of negotiating their own tradition and identity, perhaps starting from the interests at stake (assuming that it is now clear that there exists no identity without interest and no interest without identity). Parsons<sup>13</sup> has called them *Social communities*. Etzioni<sup>14</sup> calls them *inclusive communities*. We can also define them as pluralistic societies in the proper sense of the term, but the concept should by now be clear, at least in its essence.
2. Power does not operate in a vacuum nor can it operate in a vacuum of historical memory: the objective is therefore to activate selectively and to reinterpret all those elements that are traditional, informal, internal and interpersonal which can still tend to be functional to universalism.
3. It is necessary to recuperate with a lot more of attention what, amongst others, is explained very clearly by Held<sup>15</sup>, in his essay *Power and Legitimacy in Contemporary Britain* of 1984, after having distinguished at least seven reasons why "people obey" or bases of legitimacy of power ("coercion" on one side and "ideal-regulatory agreement" on the other side, but also, as intermediate solutions,



"tradition", "apathy", "pragmatic acquiescence", "instrumental acceptance" and "regulatory agreement") that:

The political order is not achieved through systems of shared values, or with the general respect for the authority of the State, or legitimacy; or, conversely, with a simple brute force, but rather is the result of a complex web of interdependencies between political, economic and social activities, which divide the centers of power and create multiple pressures to obey. The power of the State is a central aspect of these structures; but it is not the only variable key.

- R. Benini, *Italia corruttrice. Presente e passato di un modello di potere*, Roma 2012.
- A. Eliazzi, "Two Approaches to Organizational Effectiveness: A Critique and Suggestion", in *Adm. Science Quarterly*, 1969.
- D. Held, "Power and Legitimacy in Contemporary Britain", in G. McLennan, D. Held, S. Hal, (a cura di), *State and Society in Contemporary Britain: a Critical Introduction*, Oxford 1984.
- J. Hillman, *L'azienda del burocrate*, Milano 2004.
- A. Hirschman, *Le passioni e gli interessi*, Milano 1979; *Lesica, defezione, promessa*, Milano 1980; *Come compiere l'economia*, Bologna 1998.
- R. Inouane, *Il capitale sociale. Origini, significati e funzioni*, Milano 2008.
- C. Moscardini, *La società politica*, vol. I, Genova 2001.
- V. Pareto, *Capitale sociale e sviluppo. La fiducia come risorsa*, Bologna 1998.
- T. Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied*, Giorno 1949; *Structure and Process in Modern Society*, New York 1960; *Prefigments ad una teoria delle istituzioni sociali*, Roma 1935.
- L. Raniger, *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil*, New York 1990.
- L.A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy*, New York 1942, trad. it. *Capitalismo, socialismo e democrazia*, Milano 1994.
- A. Sen, *Etica ed economia*, Roma-Bari 2001.
- G. Tassinari, *Associazioni per amore*, Milano 1991.
- M. Weber, *Economia e società*, Milano 1988.
- D. L. Zurek, *La raccomandazione. Clientelismo vecchio e nuovo*, Roma 2001.

\* Rubera Janone is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Department of Political Science, "Sapienza" University of Rome. rubera.janone@sapienza.it

1. With this lemma, we refer, as noted, to one of the emerging forms of human capital, along with the intellectual capital and cultural capital.
2. Not being able, in this context, to examine these aspects, for a more comprehensive analysis, please refer to insights already present in R. Janone, *Il capitale sociale. Origini, significati e funzioni*, Milano 2008.
3. This concept of the society benefits is well analyzed in the work of Vilfredo Pareto who defines it as economic growth and cohesion of the social bond, thus differentiating the benefits for the society, resulting through the expansion and implementation of activities that cause the life of society itself. Not always in fact the policy promoting actions for the improvement of their revenues, manages to reach improvements in living conditions and, conversely, the rise of the welfare conditions of the community, may cause divisions and conflicts of interest that mitigate the social bond". C. Mongardini, *La società politica*, vol. I, Genova 2001, 34. Vedi V. Pareto, *Trattato di sociologia generale*, Milano 1964.



- 4 We refer especially to the thought of ancient Greece and in particular the insights of Jung. On these issues, J. Hillman, *L'animus del bogliolo*, Milano 2004.
- 5 On these themes please refer to R. Binotti, *Italia corrigenda. Presenze e persistenze di un modello di potere*, Roma 2022.
- 6 As is known, the Palatine Hill was the original and constitutive of Rome, where, according to the legend, Romulus drew the sacred boundary of the city (*pomerium*) in the eighth century BC, more or less around the date of 753 BC, the date handed down by Rome as a moment of foundation of the city.
- 7 A. Sen, *Etica ed economia*, Roma Bari 2023.
- 8 A. Maffei, *Capitali sociali e sviluppo. La fiducia come risorsa*, Bologna 1998.
- 9 M. Weber, *Economia e società*, Milano 1968.
- 10 G. Turcato, *Associazioni per amore*, Milano 1991.
- 11 L. Reingov, *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil*, New York 1990.
- 12 J.A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy*, New York 1942, trad. it. *Capitalismo, socialismo e democrazia*, Milano 1994.
- 13 A. Hirschman, *Le passioni e gli interessi*, Milano 1979; *Lealtà, defezioni, profughi*, Milano 1980; *Come complicare l'economia*, Bologna 1998.
- 14 D. L. Zinn, *La raccomandazione. Clientelismo vecchio e nuovo*, Roma 2021.
- 15 T. Parsons, *Essay in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied*, Glencoe 1949; *Structure and Process in Modern Society*, New York 1960; *Prolegomena ad una teoria delle istituzioni sociali*, Roma 1995.
- 16 A. Fezoui, "Two Approaches to Organizational Effectiveness: A Critique and Suggestion", in *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5, 1963.
- 17 D. Held, "Power and Legitimacy in Contemporary Britain", in: G. McLennan, D. Held, S. Hall (a cura di), *State and Society in Contemporary Britain: a Critical Introduction*, Oxford 1984, 301-322.



Die ökonomischen und sozialen Bedürfnisse der Globalisierung haben das Modell des Nationalstaats in eine Krise geführt. Paradoxerweise müssen die nationalen Rechtsordnungen globalen Problemen begegnen. Dieser Prozess unterminiert den Begriff der Souveränität und ihre Verankerung im Staatsvolk ebenso wie das Konzept der Staatsbürgerschaft. In interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit wurden hier die römischen Konzeptionen des *imperium*, der *res publica* und der *civitas* herangezogen. Von ihren modernen Verkrüstungen befreit, sollen sie zur Überwindung der aktuellen Probleme beitragen.

Le nuove esigenze economico-sociali imposte dalla globalizzazione hanno comportato una crisi del modello dello stato-nazione. I singoli stati si trovano a fronteggiare problemi globali con i limiti degli ordinamenti giuridici nazionali, e ciò si ripercuote, minandone, sulla concezione di «sovranità» (e sul suo fondamento popolare) nonché sulla «cittadinanza statale». Con un approccio interdisciplinare si è guardato alle costruzioni romane di *imperium*, *res publica* e *civitas* – desedimentandole dalle incrostazioni moderne – per tentare di superare i problemi di gestione in atto.

[www.steiner-verlag.de](http://www.steiner-verlag.de)

Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-11098-3



9 783515 110983