

Tower Grounding Improvement Versus Line Surge Arresters: Comparison of Remedial Measures for High-BFOR Subtransmission Lines

Fabio Massimo Gatta, Alberto Geri, Stefano Lauria, *Member, IEEE*, Marco Maccioni, and Francesco Palone

Abstract—This paper presents a technical/economic comparison between remedial measures aimed at improving the lightning performance of an existing Italian three-phase 150-kV overhead line. The line is characterized by a very high back-flashover rate (BFOR), due to large grounding resistance values. Two countermeasures are proposed: grounding system improvement with additional vertical rods and line metal oxide surge arrester (MOSA) installation on one or all phases. A Monte Carlo ATP-EMTP procedure developed by the authors, which takes into account both the tower grounding nonlinear transient response due to soil ionization and MOSA nonlinear response, has been applied to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasures. The installation of MOSA on all phases is technically the best option, but it is relatively expensive. Tower grounding improvement and MOSA installation on the lower phase yield very similar BFORs: the economic comparison strongly depends on tower's accessibility and soil nature.

Index Terms—ATP-EMTP, back-flashover rate (BFOR), grounding system, high-voltage (HV) overhead line, metal oxide surge arrester (MOSA), Monte Carlo method.

I. INTRODUCTION

IN Italy, 132- or 150-kV high-voltage (HV) overhead lines (OHLs) form the bulk (40 000 km) of Terna's (the Italian transmission network operator, TSO) subtransmission networks, often running through hilly or mountainous terrain due to the country's geography. The attendant increased exposure to lightning, in conjunction with the relatively high keraunic level of mainland Italy, is liable to cause undesirably high back-flashover rates (BFORs). This notably applies to older lines, whose tower grounding systems can be also impaired by corrosion [1], sometimes leading to equivalent grounding resistances in excess of 100 Ω . High BFORs are often associated to a limited number of "rogue" towers, characterized

by a combination of high lightning exposure (e.g., located on ridges or mountainsides) and high grounding resistance. A straightforward corrective measure is tower grounding improvement, which can range from total rebuilding of badly corroded systems to more limited actions, such as the installation of a few (2–4) additional rods alongside the existing grounding system. In recent years, lightweight polymer-insulated metal oxide surge arresters (MOSAs), so-called "line arresters," have been installed on OHL towers directly across phase insulation [2]–[4]. In Italy, where tower grounding improvement often incurs serious delays due to the legal/regulatory framework (authorization and property expropriation problems), the installation of surge arresters meets less obstacles under this regard and can constitute an alternative solution to the rogue towers problem.

This paper presents a technical–economic comparison of the aforementioned BFOR countermeasures for an existing 150-kV subtransmission OHL operated by Terna in Center Italy. The 10.8-km-long line crosses a mountain ridge with a moderate keraunic level (3.5 flashes/km²/year) for Italy, whereas soil resistivity is about 1000 $\Omega \cdot \text{m}$; furthermore, grounding resistance has substantially increased at some towers due to corrosion of earth electrodes. All these factors contribute to an exceptionally high BFOR recorded by the TSO (about 70 faults/100 km/year).

Both applicable countermeasures, that is, grounding system improvement with additional vertical rods and line arrester installation on one or more phases, are investigated by means of ATP-EMTP transient simulations. The impact of line arresters on the lightning performance of OHLs has been the object of several papers: deterministic studies, basically focused on arrester location and using ATP-EMTP transient simulations, are presented in [5] and [6]. A mixed Monte-Carlo–deterministic procedure was proposed in [7], whereas a probabilistic approach (not using Monte Carlo method) is detailed in [8], in order to evaluate the failure risk of surge arresters caused by lightning flash. Despite different approaches, all aforementioned studies point out to the highly beneficial role played by line arresters (whose systematic installation can reduce or even nullify the BFOR), as well as discussing the effectiveness of partial protection by line surge arrester (only one phase per tower and/or only some towers). In this paper, the lightning performance of the line, in the starting configuration and after the implementation of either of the proposed countermeasures, is evaluated by means of a Monte Carlo ATP-EMTP procedure [9], [10] developed by the authors and able, in addition to

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


Fig. 1. Outline of the OHL tower head (dimensions are in meters).

TABLE I
PHASE AND SHIELD WIRE CONDUCTOR COORDINATES

| | A | B | C | SW |
|-------|------|------|------|------|
| x (m) | -2.9 | 3 | -3.5 | 0 |
| y (m) | 22.1 | 20.1 | 18.1 | 27.7 |

84 previous contributions, to provide a statistical assessment of
85 MOSA failure rates. Detailed modeling of line insulation, tower
86 grounding nonlinear transient response due to soil ionization,
87 and MOSAs, where present, is included. Results obtained are
88 finally analyzed and compared, both from a technical and from
89 an economic point of view.

II. SYSTEM MODELING DETAILS

A. OHL Model

92 The single-circuit three-phase 150-kV 50-Hz OHL under
93 study is 10.8 km long (37 line spans, for an average 290-m
94 span length), with a single 11.5-mm steel ground wire and the
95 phases, equipped with ~~single 31.5-mm aluminium conductor~~
96 ~~steel reinforced conductors~~, in a triangular arrangement, as
97 shown in Fig. 1. The simulated tower height is 27.7 m (the av-
98 erage tower height of the 38 towers), with an 11.4-m phase con-
99 ductor sag and a 9.7-m shield wire sag. Table I reports the phase
100 and shield wire conductors coordinates. All line spans were
101 simulated in ATP-EMTP by means of the “JMarti” frequency-
102 dependent model (reference frequency for modal calculation
103 taken at 500 kHz). At both ends of the simulated line stretch,
104 the OHL model is connected to the line surge impedances:
105 phase conductors are then terminated on a three-phase 150-kV
106 50-Hz voltage system, with one of the phases always at the
107 maximum operating voltage to ground (i.e., $170 \cdot \sqrt{2}/\sqrt{3}$ kV),
108 whereas the shield wire is solidly grounded. Segments and
109 crossarms of the OHL towers have been simulated by means of
110 lossless single-phase transmission lines (Bergeron model, with
111 $Z_T = 200 \Omega$); at each tower, the shield wire is connected to the
112 tower peak. Corona effect was not simulated.




Fig. 2. Simplified pi-circuit model of tower grounding system [7]–[9].

B. Line Insulation Model

Line insulation breakdown has been simulated with the
114 CIGRE Leader Progression Model, implemented with ATP-
115 EMTP by means of the embedded “MODELS” program-
116 ming/simulation language, i.e.,
117

$$\frac{dl}{dt} = k \cdot u(t) \left[\frac{u(t)}{d_G - l(t)} - E_0 \right] \quad (1)$$

where $l(t)$ (m) is the leader length, d_G (m) is the gap length,
118 and $u(t)$ (kV) is the voltage across the gap. E_0 (kV/m) and
119 k ($\text{m}^2 \cdot \text{kV}^{-2} \cdot \text{s}^{-1}$) depend on gap configuration and impulse
120 polarity. The gap length d_G is 1.46 m.
121

C. Lightning Model

The well-known “Heidler” impulse current source available
123 in ATP-EMTP has been used in all simulations, i.e.,
124

$$i(t) = \frac{I_P}{\eta} \cdot \frac{k_s^n}{1 + k_s^n} \cdot e^{-\frac{t}{\tau_2}} \quad (2)$$

where I_P is the peak current; η is the correction factor of
125 the peak current; $k_s = t/\tau_1$; τ_1 and τ_2 are time constants
126 determining current rise time and decay time, respectively; and
127 n is the current steepness factor.
128

D. Grounding System Model

The transient simulation of tower grounding systems is car-
130 ried out by means of the simplified pi-circuit model proposed
131 by the authors in [11]–[13] and depicted in Fig. 2.
132

The pi-circuit model is obtained by synthesis of a full cir-
133 cuit model [14], able to reproduce the transient impedance of
134 extended grounding systems also taking into account the soil
135 ionization. The linear components of the pi circuit (shunt resis-
136 tors and capacitors R_1 , R_2 , C_1 , and C_2 ; longitudinal resistor
137 and inductance R and L) are estimated by comparing the input
138 impedances of the full circuit model (ATP-EMTP frequency
139 scans without considering ionization) and of the pi circuit,
140 switching off the ideal voltage-controlled current sources G_1
141 and G_2 . A μ GA-based [15] optimization procedure minimizes
142 the standard deviation between the input impedances in the fre-
143 quency range 1 Hz to 1 MHz. Ideal voltage-controlled current
144 sources G_1 and G_2 simulate nonlinear soil ionization caused
145




Fig. 3. (a) Sketch of the MT1 grounding system. (b) Connection at the tower foot (burying depth 0.8 m).

146 by large current pulses. The analytical functions assigned to G_1
147 and G_2 are ($i = 1, 2$)

$$G_i(t) = \frac{V_{Ri}(t)}{F_i(t)} - \frac{V_{Ri}(t)}{R_i} \quad (3)$$

148 being $V_{Ri}(t)$ the instantaneous value of the voltage across the
149 linear shunt resistor R_i , and $F_i(t)$ is given by

$$F_i(t) = R_i - \alpha_i \cdot \log \left(10^{-4} + \beta_i \frac{V_{Ri}(t)}{R_i} \right), \quad F_i \in [10^{-4}; R_i] \quad (4)$$

150 where α_i (expressed in ohms) and β_i (expressed in A^{-1})
151 take into account nonlinear soil ionization phenomena. The pi-
152 circuit model is implemented with ATP-EMTP by means of the
153 “MODELS” programming language [16].

154 Thirty-five out of 38 towers of the line under study are
155 equipped with the simplest Terna’s standard tower ground-
156 ing system, code-named MT1 and depicted in Fig. 3. The
157 low-frequency ground resistance value of the simulated MT1
158 grounding system is 114 Ω (considering a constant 1000- $\Omega \cdot m$
159 soil resistivity value along the whole line), which is in accor-
160 dance with ground resistance values measured at 50 Hz by
161 the TSO, ranging from 50 to 125 Ω . At the remaining three
162 towers, the measured ground resistance at 50 Hz is about 500 Ω :
163 such a large value is very probably due to corrosion of the
164 original grounding system. In the simulations, a 2-m-long ver-
165 tical rod (1ROD in the following), with a low-frequency ground
166 resistance value around 500 Ω , is used.

TABLE II
LINEAR PARAMETER VALUES FOR PI-TYPE
SIMPLIFIED EQUIVALENT CIRCUITS

| | R_1 (Ω) | R_2 (Ω) | R (Ω) | L (μH) | C_1 (nF) | C_2 (nF) |
|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| MT1 | 386.8 | 8.2 | 153.9 | 1.0 | 2.74 | 1.00 |
| 1ROD | 928.9 | 119.9 | 972.6 | 0.48 | 0.09 | 0.79 |
| 4RODS 1ROD | 96.2 | 25.6 | 196.9 | 3.9 | 4.70 | 0.33 |
| 4RODS MT1 | 60.2 | 748.9 | 5.1 | 25.0 | 4.97 | 0.57 |

TABLE III
NONLINEAR COEFFICIENT VALUES FOR PI-TYPE
SIMPLIFIED EQUIVALENT CIRCUITS

| | α_1 (Ω) | α_2 (Ω) | β_1 (A^{-1}) | β_2 (A^{-1}) |
|-------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| MT1 | 27.08 | 0 | 48.08 | 1.50 |
| 1ROD | 44.00 | 20.00 | 4010.6 | 8500.5 |
| 4RODS 1ROD | 2.96 | 2.91 | 4010.6 | 8500.5 |
| 4RODS MT1 | 1.41 | 0.91 | 3950.2 | 7458.5 |

As reported in Section I, one of the foreseeable counter-
167 measures aimed at improving the grounding system behavior
168 is the addition of vertical rods: in this paper, four vertical
169 rods, each 5 m long and connected to one tower foot, are
170 simulated (Countermeasure 1 in the following). The addition
171 of four vertical rods to the preexisting MT1 grounding system
172 (4RODS||MT1 in the following) decreases the low-frequency
173 ground resistance value from 114 Ω to about 56 Ω , whereas the
174 same addition to 1ROD configuration (4RODS||1ROD in the
175 following) causes a very large ground resistance decrease from
176 500 to 67 Ω .
177

Numerical values of the pi-circuit parameters used to simu-
178 late the above-described grounding system configurations are
179 reported in Tables II and III.
180

E. MOSA Model

MOSAs have been simulated with the model described in
182 [17] and depicted in Fig. 4, consisting of a constant resistance
183 $R = 1$ m Ω , two nonlinear resistors A_0 and A_1 , whose $V-I$
184 characteristics (both of the form $I = BV^q$) are determined
185 by the parameters listed in Table IV, and the inductances
186 L_0 and L_1 defined by the following equations (values are in
187 microhenries):
188

$$L_0 = \frac{1}{12} \cdot \frac{V_{r1/T_2} - V_{r8/20}}{V_{r8/20}} \cdot V_n \quad (5)$$

$$L_1 = \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{V_{r1/T_2} - V_{r8/20}}{V_{r8/20}} \cdot V_n \quad (6)$$

where V_n is the arrester rated voltage, V_{r1/T_2} is the residual
189 voltage for a 10-kA fast front current surge ($1/T_2$ μs), and
190




Fig. 4. MOSA model used in simulations [13].

TABLE IV
V-I CHARACTERISTICS FOR A_0 AND A_1
(VALUES ARE IN P.U. OF THE $V_{R8/20}$ VOLTAGE)

| I (kA) | A_0 (p.u.) | A_1 (p.u.) |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| $2 \cdot 10^{-6}$ | 0.810 | 0.623 |
| 0.1 | 0.974 | 0.788 |
| 1 | 1.052 | 0.866 |
| 3 | 1.108 | 0.922 |
| 10 | 1.195 | 1.009 |
| 20 | 1.277 | 1.091 |




Fig. 5. Residual voltage calculated by ATP-EMTP for a 100-kA 1.46-/390- μ s direct stroke. (Continuous line) MOSA simulated by true nonlinear resistance. (Dotted line) MOSA simulated by piecewise-linear resistance.

191 $V_{r8/20}$ is the residual voltage for a 10-kA current surge with
192 an 8-/20- μ s shape. The model is derived from the one rec-
193 ommended by the IEEE W.G. 3.4.11 [18], but parameters are
194 directly calculated by using the standard data reported in the ar-
195 rester data sheets, and any iterative procedure in order to correct
196 parameter values is needed. The model has been validated by
197 comparison between the calculated residual voltages and those
198 reported on manufacturer's data sheet [17] and by experimental
199 tests [19].

200 The ATP-EMTP implementation of the model may be per-
201 formed by using Type-92 branch cards [16], either the so-called
202 true nonlinear exponential MOSA $R(i)$ or the piecewise-linear
203 resistance $R(i)$. Fig. 5 reports the residual voltages calculated
204 by ATP-EMTP, simulating a direct lightning (100-kA Heidler
205 source) on a 150-kV OHL tower equipped with MOSAs on

all phases, by using the two different Type-92 implementa- 206
tions: a very good agreement is obtained. In our Monte Carlo 207
simulations, however, the piecewise-linear resistance Type-92 208
has been implemented, in order to avoid numerical oscillations 209
observed in our complete OHL ATP-EMTP model if MOSAs 210
are simulated with true nonlinear resistance and very large 211
lightning strokes (peak current greater than 200 kA) hit the line. 212

In this paper, the installation of MOSAs along the whole 213
OHL under study is proposed (Countermeasure 2 in the fol- 214
lowing). In the simulations described in Section IV, MOSAs 215
are installed on each phase of the OHL ("MOSA-ABC" con- 216
figuration) or only on one phase ("MOSA-A," "MOSA-B," 217
and "MOSA-C" configurations, respectively). The simulated 218
line arrester manufacturer's data are as follows: arrester rated 219
voltage $U_r = 138$ kV, $V_{r1/T2} = 327$ kV, $V_{r8/20} = 313$ kV, 220
yielding $L_0 = 0.527$ μ H and $L_1 = 1.58$ μ H; the MOSA's ther- 221
mal energy rating W_{th} [20] is 345 kJ. 222

III. BFOR CALCULATION PROCEDURE 223

The BFOR is evaluated by means of a Monte Carlo proce- 224
dure. A large population of N_{tot} lightnings, assumed to fall 225
within a 1-km-wide swath centered on the OHL, is generated; 226
only strokes to tower are considered, and among these, the 227
sample of N_{Lin} flashes that actually hit the line is extracted 228
by means of the Eriksson electrogeometric model [21]. The 229
attendant strokes are simulated by means of an ATP-EMTP 230
system model, in order to investigate the occurrence of back 231
flashover: N_{BFO} total flashovers are then yielded out of N 232
strokes. At the end of the procedure, when $N = N_{tot}$, the 233
BFOR (referred to 100 km of line-year) is then calculated as 234

$$\text{BFOR} = k_{\text{BFO}} \cdot \frac{N_{\text{BFO}}}{N_{\text{tot}}} \cdot N_g \cdot 100 \quad (7)$$

where N_g is the ground flash density (flashes/km²/year), and 235
 k_{BFO} is a numerical multiplicative coefficient taking into ac- 236
count the percentage of the N_{Lin} lightning strokes, which are 237
able to cause back flashover. In previous papers by the authors 238
[9], [10], k_{BFO} was set equal to 0.6, since strokes to the shield 239
wire (40% of the total, according to [22]) were disregarded, 240
i.e., it is assumed that only strokes to tower are liable to cause 241
back flashover. In the OHL under study, this assumption is 242
not correct, due to the very high values of tower grounding 243
resistance found along the line; thus, an approach able to 244
roughly estimate k_{BFO} has been developed by the authors. 245

- 246 1) Evaluate the minimum peak current $I_{P_{\min}}$ out of N_{BFO} 247
lightning strokes, liable to cause back flashover. 248
- 249 2) For strokes to the shield wire, the minimum current liable 249
to cause back flashover, i.e., $I_{P_{\min}}(l)$, may be evaluated, 250
disregarding the surge attenuation along the span, as lin- 251
early increasing from $I_{P_{\min}}$ (stroke to tower) to $2 \cdot I_{P_{\min}}$ 252
(stroke to midspan). 253
- 254 3) Evaluate the probability $p_{\text{sw}}(l)$ that a lightning stroke 254
having I_P greater or equal to $I_{P_{\min}}(l)$ hit the shield wire 255
at the distance l from the tower. 256

TABLE V
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS OF LIGHTNING CURRENT
(FIRST NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RETURN STROKES)

| Parameter | Median value | | Standard deviation | |
|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------------|------|
| | + | - | + | - |
| I_P | 35 kA | 31.1 kA | 1.21 | 0.48 |
| t_F | 22 μ s | 3.83 μ s | 1.23 | 0.55 |
| t_T | 230 μ s | 77.5 μ s | 1.33 | 0.58 |

TABLE VI
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS FOR LINE INSULATION

| Polarity | Median value (kV/m) | Standard deviation (kV/m) |
|----------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| + | 560 | 16.80 |
| - | 605 | 18.15 |

- 257 4) Evaluate the integral of $p_{sw}(l)$ along the shield wire, ob-
258 taining the probability p_{SW} referred to lightning strokes
259 within the span able to cause back flashover.
260 5) Calculate k_{BFO} as $k_{BFO} = 0.6 + 0.4 \cdot p_{SW}$.

261 The description of the statistical inputs is given in the follow-
262 ing subsections.

263 A. Lightning Polarity

264 Assuming that 90% of flashes to ground are negative [23],
265 lightning polarity is associated to a random variable uniformly
266 distributed between 0 and 1: if the random number exceeds 0.9,
267 the flash is positive; otherwise, it is negative.

268 B. Lightning Stroke Parameters

269 The statistical variation of lightning stroke parameters (peak
270 current I_P , front time t_F , and tail time t_T) has been assumed to
271 follow a log-normal distribution. According to [23], values of
272 medians and standard deviations, both for positive (+) and first
273 negative (-) strokes, are reported in Table V.

274 C. Line Insulation Parameters

275 Statistical data for the critical field E_0 in (1), i.e., median
276 value E_{0m} and standard deviation, are taken from [24] and
277 summarized in Table VI. Values of constant k in (1) are
278 $1.2 \cdot 10^{-6}$ and $1.3 \cdot 10^{-6}$ for positive and negative polarities,
279 respectively [23].

280 D. Phase Angle of the Supply Voltage

281 The phase angle of the three-phase positive phase sequence
282 system of impressed voltages is assumed as a uniformly dis-
283 tributed variable between 0% and 360%.




Fig. 6. (Continuous line) Ground-level height profile along the OHL. (Dotted line) Shield wire height.

E. Lightning Location

284

To check the occurrence of a lightning stroke to the OHL, 285
the position of the lightning in a 1-km-wide strip, centered on 286
the OHL (implicitly, its initial distance from the line, assum- 287
ing a vertical channel), is generated as a random uniformly 288
distributed variable, according to [25]. From the peak current 289
value of the given lightning stroke, the attractive radius R_a of 290
the OHL, according to Eriksson's electrogeometric model [21], 291
is calculated as 292

$$R_a = 0.67 \cdot H^{0.6} \cdot I_P^{0.74} \quad (8)$$

H being the tower height (m), and I_P the peak current 293
(kA): if the initial lightning position falls within the attractive 294
radius of the line, then the sampled lightning is assumed to hit 295
the OHL. 296

Equation (8) strictly applies to OHLs on flat terrain, which is 297
not the case of the OHL under study (the line is built on hills, 298
with the altitude profile shown in Fig. 6). In order to adapt (8) 299
to an OHL not built on a flat terrain, the following simplifying 300
assumption has been assumed: the line is considered on flat 301
terrain, and the tower height is given by the average altitude 302
of the OHL (572.27 m) minus the hill height at the abscissa 303
 $x = 0$ m (449 m), thus yielding $H = 132.27$ m. 304

IV. RESULTS

305

The OHL length is $L = 10.8$ km, of which $L_1 = 10.2$ km 306
(Stretch 1, 94.4% of the OHL length) is equipped with the MT1 307
grounding system configuration, and $L_2 = 0.6$ km (Stretch 2, 308
5.6% of the OHL length) is equipped with the IROD grounding 309
system configuration. The BFOR of the line, experienced by 310
the TSO, is about 70 faults/100 km/year, being $N_g = 3.5$ 311
flashes/km²/year. In order to evaluate the BFOR related to 312
each stretch of the OHL, the Monte Carlo procedure generated 313
 $N_{tot} = 314254$ lightnings, corresponding to $N_{Lin} = 100000$ 314
strokes to tower. 315




Fig. 7. Monte Carlo procedure N_{BFO}/N ratio versus N calculated for the base case configuration. (Dotted line) Stretch 1 (with MT1 grounding system). (Continuous line) Stretch 2 (with 1ROD grounding system).

TABLE VII
BFOR VALUES COMPUTED FOR THE BASE CASE CONFIGURATION

| | k_{BFO} | N_{BFO}/N_{tot} | <i>BFOR</i> (faults/100 km-year) |
|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Stretch 1 | 0.825 | 0.2112 | 57.600 |
| Stretch 2 | 0.986 | 0.3243 | 6.216 |

316 The procedure runs in parallel on a 12 CPU cluster: the
317 computation time of a single ATP-EMTP lightning stroke sim-
318 ulation is small (about 3 s), thus obtaining, for the 100 000
319 strokes to tower, a total computation time of about 7 h.

320 A. Base Case Configuration

321 Fig. 7 shows the plot of the N_{BFO}/N ratio versus N for
322 each stretch of the OHL, whereas Table VII reports the corre-
323 sponding BFORs evaluated by the Monte Carlo procedure. The
324 overall BFOR is therefore about 63.8 faults/100 km/year, which
325 is very close to the exact BFOR of the OHL (the procedure
326 underestimates the BFOR by about 8.9%). This result thus
327 confirms the effectiveness of the procedure and the approxima-
328 tions discussed and assumed in Section III in order to simulate
329 the studied OHL. Moreover, this also shows that, despite the
330 prominently higher N_{BFO}/N ratio of Stretch 2, the BFOR of
331 the studied OHL is strongly dependent on the lightning perfor-
332 mance of Stretch 1, which is very much longer than Stretch 2.

333 B. Countermeasure 1

334 As described in Section II-D, Countermeasure 1 consists in
335 the addition of four vertical rods, each 5 m long and connected
336 to one tower foot, to all preexisting tower grounding systems.
337 This solution has been chosen because of its effectiveness in
338 decreasing the low frequency values of grounding resistance, as
339 well as for its simplicity both from a technical (civil works are
340 not long and difficult) and from a legal/regulatory (there is no
341 need for expropriations or widening the right of way) point of

TABLE VIII
BFOR VALUES COMPUTED FOR COUNTERMEASURE 1

| | k_{BFO} | N_{BFO}/N_{tot} | <i>BFOR</i> (faults/100 km-year) |
|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Stretch 1 (4RODS MT1) | 0.665 | 0.1334 | 29.339 |
| Stretch 2 (4RODS 1ROD) | 0.746 | 0.1549 | 2.244 |

TABLE IX
BFOR VALUES COMPUTED FOR COUNTERMEASURE 2
(MOSA-ABC CONFIGURATION)

| | k_{BFO} | N_{BFO}/N_{tot} | <i>BFOR</i> (faults/100 km-year) |
|-------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-ABC) | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-ABC) | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

TABLE X
MOSAFR VALUES COMPUTED FOR COUNTERMEASURE 2
(MOSA-ABC CONFIGURATION)

| | k_{MOSAF} | N_{MOSAF}/N_{tot} | <i>MOSAFR</i> (failures/100 km-year) |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|---|
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-ABC) | 0.6 | 0.175 | 0.347 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-ABC) | 0.6 | 0.504 | 0.059 |

view. Table VIII reports BFORs calculated by the Monte Carlo
342 procedure for the two stretches of the OHL, yielding an overall
343 BFOR of about 31.58 faults/100 km/year. 344

This result shows that Countermeasure 1 improves the light-
345 ning performance of the line and causes a 50.5% overall re-
346 duction in the BFOR; the reduction is a little more marked in
347 Stretch 2 (about 63.9%) than in Stretch 1 (about 49.1%). 348

349 C. Countermeasure 2

As described in Section II-E, Countermeasure 2 consists
350 in the installation of MOSAs on all OHL towers, directly
351 across phase insulation. The Monte Carlo procedure also al-
352 lows estimating the MOSA failure rate (here abbreviated as
353 MOSAFR, expressed in failures/100 km/year) caused by an
354 energy absorption exceeding the rated value $W_{th} = 345$ kJ. The
355 calculation is performed by replacing in (7) k_{BFO} with k_{MOSAF}
356 (the percentage of the N_{Lin} lightnings that may cause MOSA
357 failures) and N_{BFO} with N_{MOSAF} (number of MOSA failures).
358 At first, the MOSA-ABC configuration (MOSAs installed on
359 all phases) has been evaluated: Tables IX and X report the
360 BFORs and MOSAFRs, estimated for each stretch of the line,
361 respectively. As expected, the overall BFOR of the OHL be-
362 comes nil, whereas the overall estimated MOSAFR amounts to
363 about 0.406 failures/100 km/year, i.e., about 0.044 failures/year
364 (a MOSA failure every 22.7 years) in the studied OHL. Finally, 365

TABLE XI
BFOR VALUES COMPUTED FOR COUNTERMEASURE 2
(MOSA-A, MOSA-B, AND MOSA-C CONFIGURATIONS)

| | k_{BFO} | N_{BFO}/N_{tot} | BFOR (faults/100 km-year) |
|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-A) | 0.762 | 0.1302 | 32.798 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-A) | 0.982 | 0.3418 | 6.526 |
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-B) | 0.762 | 0.1299 | 32.717 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-B) | 0.982 | 0.3410 | 6.511 |
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-C) | 0.751 | 0.1147 | 28.463 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-C) | 0.980 | 0.3011 | 5.730 |

TABLE XII
MOSAFR VALUES COMPUTED FOR COUNTERMEASURE 2
(MOSA-A, MOSA-B, AND MOSA-C CONFIGURATIONS)

| | k_{MOSAF} | N_{MOSAF}/N_{tot} | MOSAFR (failures/100 km-year) |
|-----------------------|-------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-A) | 0.6 | 0.1075 | 0.213 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-A) | 0.6 | 0.3741 | 0.044 |
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-B) | 0.6 | 0.1460 | 0.290 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-B) | 0.6 | 0.508 | 0.059 |
| Stretch 1 (MOSA-C) | 0.6 | 0.1500 | 0.298 |
| Stretch 2 (MOSA-C) | 0.6 | 0.5220 | 0.061 |

366 Tables XI and XII report the BFORs and MOSAFRs obtained
367 considering MOSA-A, MOSA-B, and MOSA-C configura-
368 tions, respectively.

369 With regard to BFOR reduction, MOSA-C (MOSAs installed
370 only on lower phase) is the most effective configuration (a 46.4%
371 reduction with respect to the Base Case), whereas in terms
372 of MOSAFR, the MOSA-A configuration yields the best re-
373 sults (0.257 failures/100 km/year, corresponding to 0.028 fail-
374 ures/year, i.e., a MOSA failure every 36 years).

375 D. Comparison Between Countermeasures

376 With regard to BFOR reduction, the best solution is the
377 MOSA-ABC configuration of Countermeasure 2, which alto-
378 gether suppresses back flashovers and only introduces a negli-
379 gible MOSA failure rate (a failure every 22.7 years). However,

this countermeasure is also relatively expensive, since it re- 380
quires the installation of 114 MOSAs, i.e., 10.7 MOSAs/km. 381

The MOSA-C configuration (arresters on the lower phase) 382
practically halves the original BFOR, at one third of the ar- 383
resters' procurement cost (around 2 k/unit for bulk purchases). 384

Installation costs of Countermeasure 2 can be estimated 385
as follows, assuming use of internal workforce (workforce is 386
deployed in four-man squads, with a conventional cost of 35-/ 387
man-hour): 388

- MOSA-C: (4 h to reach the tower + 2.5 h to install one 390
MOSA) × 4 = 26 man-hours = 910 €/tower; total cost for 391
38 towers is 110.58 k€; 392
- MOSA-ABC: (4 h to reach the tower + 4 h to install three 393
MOSAs) × 4 = 32 man-hours = 1120 €/tower; total cost 394
for 38 towers is 270.56 k€ (it can be readily seen that 395
labor cost is a fraction of MOSA cost). 396

Countermeasure 1 seems to be the most effective one from a 397
technical-economic point of view, yielding BFOR values com- 398
parable with those of the MOSA-C configuration. Attendant 399
civil works only involve the existing pylon base area, thus min- 400
imizing the authorization and property expropriation problems 401
related to the substitution of the old grounding systems along 402
the line. The cost of Countermeasure 1 strongly depends on 403
tower location and soil hardness. In case of soft soil, costs are 404
expected to be significantly lower than for Countermeasure 2. 405
Considering 600 /tower for the grounding rods and 30 man- 406
hours per tower, the cost of Countermeasure 1 is 1.65 k/tower, 407
i.e., 62.7 k total. Hard soil requires a vertical drilling rig, 408
which must be leased and then, at inaccessible tower sites, also 409
delivered by helicopter. The additional costs involved can be 410
roughly estimated at 1500 /tower, raising the total to 119.7 k; in 411
such cases, MOSA-C Countermeasure 2 becomes competitive. 412

V. CONCLUSION 413

The analysis of remedial measures aimed at reducing the 414
exceptionally high BFOR (70 faults/100 km/year) of an existing 415
10.8-km-long 150-kV OHL has been carried out by means of a 416
Monte Carlo procedure, based on detailed ATP-EMTP transient 417
simulations. The proposed remedial measures are as follows: 418

- 1) reduction of tower grounding low-frequency resistances 420
by installing additional vertical grounding rods; 421
- 2) installation of MOSAs across the insulation of one or all 422
phases (line arresters). 423

The extensive statistically based ATP-EMTP transient analy- 424
sis evidenced the following main results. 425

- The installation of MOSAs across all phases is the tech- 427
nical best, as it suppresses the BFOR, with a fairly low 428
MOSA failure rate (a failure every 22.7 years). The capital 429
cost of the 114 line arresters is, however, significant. 430
- The installation of only one arrester per tower yields a sig- 431
nificant BFOR reduction at a lower capital cost; the most 432
effective location is the lower phase (BFOR is 34.2 faults/ 433
100 km/year). 434

435 • The installation at each tower of four additional vertical
436 grounding rods, each 5 m long, is comparable with the use
437 of one MOSA per tower (lower phase), with a calculated
438 BFOR equal to 31.6 faults/100 km/year; its economic
439 convenience, however, depends on accessibility, as well
440 as soil hardness, of the tower foot. An economic analysis
441 thus requires taking into account the exact location of
442 each tower.

443 As an additional remark, the study showed the applicability
444 of the authors' ATP-EMTP Monte Carlo procedure to a practi-
445 cal problem.

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AQ1 = ACSR was expanded as “aluminium conductor steel reinforced.” Please check if appropriate.

Otherwise, please provide the corresponding expanded form.

AQ2 = The value “1 Hz ÷ 1 MHz” was changed to “1 Hz to 1 MHz.” Please check if appropriate. Otherwise, please make the necessary changes.

AQ3 = Please provide the expanded form of “SSR.”

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