We examine the relationship between corporate governance and shareholder voting as we consider this as a crucial factor when taking corporate governance into account. We believe that the outcome of the vote in remuneration policies may be influenced by the structure of the governance. The understanding of the effectiveness of the best practices of governance requires that scholars go beyond the analysis of a single mechanism and consider all mechanisms simultaneously. This has led to an increasing attention to the “bundles of corporate governance” (BCG) at company level and how such practices are influenced by contextual contingencies. We propose a novel (new) model to take these issues into account. To date based on our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the issue of voting dissent with a configurational approach unlike other authors who have used regression techniques. This is the aspect of originality of our paper. In doing so, we contribute to a better understanding of the role of corporate governance in shareholder dissent. We then explore the necessary and sufficient conditions of corporate governance practices that cause high voting dissent. Finally, we develop several general propositions on how the mechanisms work together effectively as a governance bundle for a high dissent on say on pay.

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and shareholder voting as we consider this as a crucial factor when taking corporate governance into account. We believe that the outcome of the vote in remuneration policies may be influenced by the structure of the governance. The understanding of the effectiveness of the best practices of governance requires that scholars go beyond the analysis of a single mechanism and consider all mechanisms simultaneously. This has led to an increasing attention to the “bundles of corporate governance” (BCG) at company level and how such practices are influenced by contextual contingencies. We propose a novel (new) model to take these issues into account. To date based on our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the issue of voting dissent with a configurational approach unlike other authors who have used regression techniques. This is the aspect of originality of our paper. In doing so, we contribute to a better understanding of the role of corporate governance in shareholder dissent. We then explore the necessary and sufficient conditions of corporate governance practices that cause high voting dissent. Finally, we develop several general propositions on how the mechanisms work together effectively as a governance bundle for a high dissent on say on pay.

Voting dissent and QCA

ESPOSITO DE FALCO, SALVATORE;CUCARI, NICOLA;
2017

Abstract

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and shareholder voting as we consider this as a crucial factor when taking corporate governance into account. We believe that the outcome of the vote in remuneration policies may be influenced by the structure of the governance. The understanding of the effectiveness of the best practices of governance requires that scholars go beyond the analysis of a single mechanism and consider all mechanisms simultaneously. This has led to an increasing attention to the “bundles of corporate governance” (BCG) at company level and how such practices are influenced by contextual contingencies. We propose a novel (new) model to take these issues into account. To date based on our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the issue of voting dissent with a configurational approach unlike other authors who have used regression techniques. This is the aspect of originality of our paper. In doing so, we contribute to a better understanding of the role of corporate governance in shareholder dissent. We then explore the necessary and sufficient conditions of corporate governance practices that cause high voting dissent. Finally, we develop several general propositions on how the mechanisms work together effectively as a governance bundle for a high dissent on say on pay.
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We examine the relationship between corporate governance and shareholder voting as we consider this as a crucial factor when taking corporate governance into account. We believe that the outcome of the vote in remuneration policies may be influenced by the structure of the governance. The understanding of the effectiveness of the best practices of governance requires that scholars go beyond the analysis of a single mechanism and consider all mechanisms simultaneously. This has led to an increasing attention to the “bundles of corporate governance” (BCG) at company level and how such practices are influenced by contextual contingencies. We propose a novel (new) model to take these issues into account. To date based on our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the issue of voting dissent with a configurational approach unlike other authors who have used regression techniques. This is the aspect of originality of our paper. In doing so, we contribute to a better understanding of the role of corporate governance in shareholder dissent. We then explore the necessary and sufficient conditions of corporate governance practices that cause high voting dissent. Finally, we develop several general propositions on how the mechanisms work together effectively as a governance bundle for a high dissent on say on pay.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11573/991954
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