Social pacts, while improving the macroeconomic performance, usually inflict costs to unions. To facilitate their stipulation various substitutes can operate such as payment of transfers to unions, central bank conservativeness, inflation aversion or political partisanship by the unions. We present a model encompassing the operation of these different mechanisms and hint at cases were these actually operated in the European experience.
The cost of social pacts / Acocella, Nicola; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni. - In: BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. - ISSN 0307-3378. - STAMPA. - (2009), pp. .-..
The cost of social pacts
ACOCELLA, Nicola;DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni
2009
Abstract
Social pacts, while improving the macroeconomic performance, usually inflict costs to unions. To facilitate their stipulation various substitutes can operate such as payment of transfers to unions, central bank conservativeness, inflation aversion or political partisanship by the unions. We present a model encompassing the operation of these different mechanisms and hint at cases were these actually operated in the European experience.File allegati a questo prodotto
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