Multistage bilateral bargaining model with incomplete information – a fuzzy approach

The study proposes the implementation of an intermediation model in supply chain environment integrating game theory and fuzzy logic, to represent the characteristic aspects of a bilateral bargaining with incomplete information, where the supplier – customer relationship are indirectly managed by a third party agent. The choice of combining these theories comes out from the necessity of smoothing the peculiar elements of the two analysis tools that, in describing real situation, present many potentialities of reciprocal adaptation. The scope is to combine a formal structure that could figure out the interrelations among actors involved in a strategic decisional context, with a mathematical elaboration of natural imprecision, uncertainty and incompleteness of available data and information. The model derives from the theoretic foundation of Spulber (1999) and Rubinstein (1982) that, compared to the classical framework of asymmetric information and bid-spread problem by Harsanyi (1967), describe the process through the definition of new parameters such as bargaining power and breakdown probability. The contribute to the research is enriched by fuzzyfication process of data, considering Feng et al. (2005) experiences, to build an architecture that could transform inputs related to the transaction itself, agents and markets in an output that could regulate the possible concessions and the opportunity of accepting or refusing an offer.