This paper considers the noncooperative maximization of mutual information in the vector Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been widely studied in a number of works during the past decade for frequency-selective channels, and recently for the more general multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) case, for which the state-of-the art results are valid only for nonsingular square channel matrices. Surprisingly, these results do not hold true when the channel matrices are rectangular and/or rank deficient matrices. The goal of this paper is to provide a complete characterization of the MIMO game for arbitrary channel matrices, in terms of conditions guaranteeing both the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the convergence of asynchronous distributed iterative waterfilling algorithms. Our analysis hinges on new technical intermediate results, such as a new expression for the MIMO waterfilling projection valid (also) for singular matrices, a mean-value theorem for complex matrix-valued functions, and a general contraction theorem for the multiuser MIMO watefilling mapping valid for arbitrary channel matrices. The quite surprising result is that uniqueness/convergence conditions in the case of tall (possibly singular) channel matrices are more restrictive than those required in the case of (full rank) fat channel matrices. We also propose a modified game and algorithm with milder conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence, and virtually the same performance (in terms of Nash equilibria) of the original game.

The MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm / Scutari, Gesualdo; D. P., Palomar; Barbarossa, Sergio. - 57:5(2009), pp. 1917-1935. [10.1109/tsp.2009.2013894]

The MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm

SCUTARI, GESUALDO;BARBAROSSA, Sergio
2009

Abstract

This paper considers the noncooperative maximization of mutual information in the vector Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been widely studied in a number of works during the past decade for frequency-selective channels, and recently for the more general multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) case, for which the state-of-the art results are valid only for nonsingular square channel matrices. Surprisingly, these results do not hold true when the channel matrices are rectangular and/or rank deficient matrices. The goal of this paper is to provide a complete characterization of the MIMO game for arbitrary channel matrices, in terms of conditions guaranteeing both the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the convergence of asynchronous distributed iterative waterfilling algorithms. Our analysis hinges on new technical intermediate results, such as a new expression for the MIMO waterfilling projection valid (also) for singular matrices, a mean-value theorem for complex matrix-valued functions, and a general contraction theorem for the multiuser MIMO watefilling mapping valid for arbitrary channel matrices. The quite surprising result is that uniqueness/convergence conditions in the case of tall (possibly singular) channel matrices are more restrictive than those required in the case of (full rank) fat channel matrices. We also propose a modified game and algorithm with milder conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence, and virtually the same performance (in terms of Nash equilibria) of the original game.
2009
game theory; mimo; mimo gaussian interference channel; nash equilibrium; optimal coding; totally asynchronous algorithms; waterfilling; waterfilling algorithms
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
The MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm / Scutari, Gesualdo; D. P., Palomar; Barbarossa, Sergio. - 57:5(2009), pp. 1917-1935. [10.1109/tsp.2009.2013894]
File allegati a questo prodotto
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/17190
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 186
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 142
social impact