This paper illustrates how the classical theory of economic policy can profitably be used to verify some properties of the Linear Nash Feedback Equilibrium in difference LQ-games. In particular, we find that both a necessary condition for the equilibrium existence and a sufficient condition for policy ineffectiveness can be defined in the terms of the simple Tinbergen counting rule.
Existence and policy effectiveness in feedback Nash LQ-games / Acocella, Nicola; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni. - In: RATIO MATHEMATICA. - ISSN 1592-7415. - ELETTRONICO. - 18:(2008), pp. 1-8.
Existence and policy effectiveness in feedback Nash LQ-games
ACOCELLA, Nicola;DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni
2008
Abstract
This paper illustrates how the classical theory of economic policy can profitably be used to verify some properties of the Linear Nash Feedback Equilibrium in difference LQ-games. In particular, we find that both a necessary condition for the equilibrium existence and a sufficient condition for policy ineffectiveness can be defined in the terms of the simple Tinbergen counting rule.File allegati a questo prodotto
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