Passioni epistemologiche. Uoluptas e dolor come criteri di verità in Lucrezio

Tὰ πάθη, namely pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (ἀλγηδών), represent the third criterion of truth envisioned by Epicurean Canonic. Besides acting as practical criteria directly pointed to action, these two affections work as gnoseological criteria, employed by διάνοια in order to distinguish between actions that should be performed and those we should rather avoid. The present contribution argues that even before any rational operation, namely in thinking them as something self-evident (ἐναργές) and a-rational (ἄλογον), these “basic” feelings – Epicurus’ πάθη and, above all, Lucretius’ uoluptas and dolor – may rightfully be described as criteria of truth: a truth which is at “zero grade” and which pertains to things rather than judgements, but which nonetheless possesses an unquestionable epistemological value.