Il fallimento del modello argentino degli anni '90: un punto di vista keynesiano

The first part of this paper analyses the macroeconomic performance of Argentina since the introduction of the Convertibility Law (April 1991) up to 1998. The reforms carried out with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) attracted large inflows of capital which allowed to increase the reserves and to finance, through the expansion of credit, a growth process mainly caused by the increase in private investment. Because of the exceptional growth in imports (brought about by the real appreciation of the exchange rate and by trade liberalization) and because of capital movement liberalization, the contribution of the private sector to the increase in reserves was modest. That increase, which was necessary to finance the expansion of aggregate demand, was mainly insured by increasing public foreign debt. This conclusion is in sharp contrast with the IMF’s point of view according to which the crisis of the convertibility regime was mainly due to the lack of fiscal discipline during the years of high growth. In the second part of the paper the recession period (1999-2001) is examined. The decision of the Argentine government to keep the peso pegged to the dollar after the Brazilian devaluation, and capital movements freedom, strongly supported by the IMF, made necessary to adopt restrictive fiscal policies in order to slow down inflation and stimulate exports. In fact, those measures worsened the recession: the positive effect on exports was more than compensated by the contemporary fall in consumption and investments.