The paper analyses the relevance of financial distress and other objectives that may drive the municipalities in competitive procedures by exploring the relationships between city antecedents and scoring rules. The task is carried out by means of an empirical analysis of the calls for tenders that Italian municipalities have issued in the gas distribution sector over the 2001-2008 period. Results seem to reject the taxation by regulation story, but by contrast some parallel hypotheses are found to explain the design of competitive procedure.
City objectives and monopoly franchising. An empirical analysis of calls for tenders in Italian gas distribution / Marzano, R.. - (2014), pp. 1-24. (Intervento presentato al convegno Innovation in Public Finance Conference tenutosi a Milano).
City objectives and monopoly franchising. An empirical analysis of calls for tenders in Italian gas distribution
R. Marzano
2014
Abstract
The paper analyses the relevance of financial distress and other objectives that may drive the municipalities in competitive procedures by exploring the relationships between city antecedents and scoring rules. The task is carried out by means of an empirical analysis of the calls for tenders that Italian municipalities have issued in the gas distribution sector over the 2001-2008 period. Results seem to reject the taxation by regulation story, but by contrast some parallel hypotheses are found to explain the design of competitive procedure.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
