Collective actions exerted by social classes play a crucial role in the theory of wages advanced by the classical economists and, at the same time, do not conflict with their notion of competition (free competition). According to the classical economists and Marx the conflict for the distribution of income does not involve only wage bargaining, but also the influence on institutions and social conventions, a distinctive ground of collective action. This is even more clear if we take into consideration present-day societies, which are characterized by great development and complexity of the institutions that condition the conflict for the distribution of income.

Azione collettiva, classi sociali e teoria classica dei salari / Maffeo, Vincenzo. - STAMPA. - 118(2017), pp. 146-166. [10.3280/STE2016-118009]

Azione collettiva, classi sociali e teoria classica dei salari

Maffeo, Vincenzo
2017

Abstract

Collective actions exerted by social classes play a crucial role in the theory of wages advanced by the classical economists and, at the same time, do not conflict with their notion of competition (free competition). According to the classical economists and Marx the conflict for the distribution of income does not involve only wage bargaining, but also the influence on institutions and social conventions, a distinctive ground of collective action. This is even more clear if we take into consideration present-day societies, which are characterized by great development and complexity of the institutions that condition the conflict for the distribution of income.
2017
Collective action, Competition, Classical theory, Marginalist theory, Income distribution, Social classes
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Azione collettiva, classi sociali e teoria classica dei salari / Maffeo, Vincenzo. - STAMPA. - 118(2017), pp. 146-166. [10.3280/STE2016-118009]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1072844
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