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**Studying immigrant integration in Europe:
civic rhetoric, citizenship policies and
self-reported life satisfaction.**

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INTRODUCTION

Immigrant integration is a central issue in contemporary societies. It is at the core of both public debate and intimate reflection, since it challenges both national identity and socio-economic cohesion. It pertains, at the same time, the private encounter with the ‘other’ and the communities’ best way of allocating resources and opportunities for all. For this reason, it is at the top of countries’ policy agenda, both from an economic and a social standpoint.

While the American debate, started at the beginning of 1900s, focused on the assimilation of European immigrants living in the U.S., the more recent European debate refers to the concept of integration. In particular, in the American reflection, the term “assimilation” implies an idea of mainstream respect to which immigrants and their children can become similar, following a process which, especially for the second-generation immigrants, can shape up-ward assimilation (Alba and Nee, 1997), down-ward assimilation (Gans, 1992) or segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes *et al.*, 2009). In the European context, instead, the term “integration” suggests structural modes of incorporation, which mainly depends on immigrants’ educational attainment and access to the labour market. High educational and professional careers are some of the indicators for immigrants to be integrated into the European societies.

Immigrant integration is considered a strategic policy priority at European Union (EU) level. It became a topic for the EU institutions in the 1990s, because of the increasing immigrant population residing in European countries. In 1999, the Tampere Programme established an EU cooperation on the integration of non-EU nationals, thus including the integration issues in EU competencies. In 2003, the European Commission defined integration as ‘a two-way process’, which implies efforts from both the immigrants and the host society and it is developed over time (Pennix, 2004; Mussino *et al.*, 2014). The 2004 ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policies in the EU’ set out the importance of developing goals and indicators to implement policies and evaluate the national efforts and actions on integration. In 2007, the European Commission produced the ‘Handbook on Integration’ with the aim of promoting the exchange of good practices among policy-makers and experts across Europe. The 2010 Zaragoza Ministerial Conference Member States established a set of core indicators, which are one of the most important sources of integration indicators at European level. They cover four policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active integration.

However, in the 2011 'European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals', the EU interpreted its role as limited to establish common standards for immigrant integration measures, to exchange best practices and successful models of integration and to support integration strategies in the EU member states. In this field, the EU acts more as a framework of standards and recommendations and as a forum for dialogue and information exchange for the development of integration strategies (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006), rather than as a policy-maker *strictu sensu*.

Since the integration process of immigrants takes place primarily at local level (Penninx, 2003), the EU entitles member states to design and implement integration policies. However, their policy-making process depends on the interpretation they give to the concept and definition of integration, which is not equal and univocal. On the contrary, it varies across the EU member states, mainly depending on their first mass immigration experience and on the degree of institutionalization of such a phenomenon (Freeman, 1995). In other words, it varies according to countries' philosophies of integration or to the so-called 'traditional national models of immigration and integration', which have been defined as "nationally distinct approaches to managing migration flows and their political consequences" (Freeman, 2006: 227), such as the integration of immigrants, through the construction of "abstract typologies of incorporation regimes" (Freeman, 2004: 946).

As recognized by a wide range of scholars, the integration of immigrants is shaped both by resources from within their own families and communities, and by the educational, social and economic opportunities that institutions provide (e.g. Piché, 2004; Crul *et al.*, 2012; Hou and Bonikowska, 2016). Evidence shows that currently opportunities and life chances, as well as social welfare benefits for immigrants are significantly lower compared to those of natives (Morris, 2001; Guiraudon, 2014; Busetta, 2015). In particular, recent studies have found that immigrants are more exposed to the risk of experiencing 'ethnic penalties' (Koopmans, 2016), which are forms of discrimination at work, unemployment, over-qualification and employment in the underground economy (Reyneri, 2001), than natives. In addition, immigrants suffer more economic downturns, as occurred with the 2008 economic crisis (Pastore and Villosio, 2011; De Rose and Strozza, 2015).

Integration patterns are the main forces driving long-term success in the lifetimes of immigrants. Therefore, integration should be seen as fundamental to ensure social cohesion in the EU and to prevent marginalization, especially in a period marked by

terroristic events and unprecedented movements of people globally – whether escaping from war and persecution, or towards fresh starts and economic opportunity – that in various countries all over the EU have shaped populist claims and social resentment against immigrants.

To advance the European vision, my work intends to verify if integration acts as the ensemble of the “processes that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants to obtain the valued ‘stuff’ of a society, as well as social acceptance, through participation in major institutions such as the educational and political system and the labour and housing markets” (Alba and Foner, 2016: 5). In other words, my study aims to understand if integration policies help immigrants to enhance their long-term success and their parity with natives.

My thesis is structured along three papers. The first paper takes origin from a broader analysis of the literature on integration and integration policies at European level. This led me to offer a comparative overview of civic integration programmes adopted by European countries in recent years, in order to shed light on their main features and, in particular, on the rationale that is behind the European convergence towards civic integration. The European debate on the “civic direction” (Joppke 2004: 253) is focused on ‘old’ European immigration countries. ‘New’ immigration countries appear to be involved in the European convergence towards civic integration as well, but remain excluded from this debate. For this reason, I choose to focus on Italy as one of the ‘new’ immigration countries with the largest migration inflows in Europe.

Through a systematic review of actual legal texts and academic literature, I study how civic integration challenges immigrants’ entry, settlement and citizenship. My hypothesis is that a philosophy based on migration control and selection underpins civic integration, creating new requirements that immigrants have to fulfil and respect as universal values. Civic integration is intrinsically connected to citizenship. In particular, it establishes under what conditions someone with eligibility obtain the citizenship status of the new residence country (Wallace Goodman, 2012). In other words, civic integration appears to be as a new standard for a successfully integrated member of the European societies, that is the citizen. Citizenship status is recognized as an objective indicator of integration, such as educational attainment, household income, employment or housing (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994; Vink, 2013), because by granting to immigrants the same status and rights of native-born residents, it reduces gaps with natives and equalizes new to old citizens, thus formally making them integrated.

The acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country is influenced by immigrants' characteristics, such as socio-economic assimilation to the residence country and demographic characteristics, and by structural and institutional factors in both origin and destination countries. Among the latter, we have policy factors and precisely national citizenship policies, which establish who is eligible for naturalization (Peters *et al.*, 2015). Therefore, the acquisition of citizenship status perfectly reflects the idea that both immigrants and the host society play a role in the integration process of individuals. Within these considerations, the second paper aims to examine the effect of both individual-level characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies on the likelihood of having citizenship status among immigrants living in selected European countries. On this regard, it is helpful to highlight that in a pivotal work, Yang (1994) elucidated that immigrants decide to naturalize after a 'cost-benefit' analysis. The benefit consists in the acquisition of the same social, political and economic rights of natives, while costs depend on some factors related to the national citizenship policies, such as the fulfilment of the residence requirements for naturalization, long application processes and the potential loss of the native citizenship. However, conditions for naturalization largely vary across countries. In my view, the germs of these differences can be found in the traditional national models of immigration and integration, although they evolved toward new measures over time, as the civic integration convergence makes clear. For this paper, individual level data stem from the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), conducted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, from October 2011 to January 2012. Country-level data come from a systematic review of national citizenship policies, academic literature and the Eurostat database.

Finally, the last paper arises from the consideration that to fully understand integration, especially its dynamic and multidimensional character, is not sufficient to investigate only its 'objective' forms. Instead, one must also study 'subjective' integration (Neto, 1995; 2011; Amit, 2010), in order to take into account immigrants' perceptions and opinions about their experience into the residence country and, therefore, their integration process. Self-reported life satisfaction is particularly suitable to evaluate immigrants' integration process into the residence country, as it is commonly used to estimate the perceived quality of life within a country or a specific social group. In particular, life satisfaction has been defined as "a global assessment of a person's quality of life according to his chosen criteria" (Shin and Johnson, 1978, cit. in Dieder *et al.*, 1985: 71), therefore to the criteria judged important by the individual. This paper,

therefore, aims to advance the research strand of subjective integration, by measuring the effect of demographic, human capital and 'immigration' variables on the self-reported life satisfaction of young and adult immigrants living in selected European countries, using the ICS data.

The positive linkage existing between citizenship status and life satisfaction in the residence country (Massey and Akresh, 2006) provides evidence for the objective character of naturalization in shaping integration, which, although made more demanding by civic requirements, represents, to this day, the best way for immigrants to acquire parity with natives.

1. THE EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE TOWARDS CIVIC INTEGRATION

1.1. Introduction

A series of events, such as the 9/11 terroristic attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C, the political rise and murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 in the Netherlands, the attacks of the 11 March 2004 in Madrid and of the 7 July 2005 in London, the murder of the film director Theo Van Gogh during November 2004 in Amsterdam and the 2005 Paris riots have highlighted the lack of integration and the socio-economic marginalization of populations with immigrant background, especially those with Muslim origins. This has led hosting countries to reassess their integration policies, emphasizing the need of improving immigrants' socio-economic integration, through the knowledge of the language of the hosting society, the respect of the national identity, the promotion of the culture and values of the hosting society among immigrants. For this reason, it has been argued that European countries have converged towards civic integration (Joppke, 2007b; Zincone, 2011).

With the expression civic integration, we generally refer to those policies requiring immigrants to learn the language, the civic values and the culture of the residence country. Civic integration policies often require immigrants, through the signature of an 'integration agreement' or an 'integration contract', to take language and civic courses¹ immediately after their entry into the new country of residence, in order to ask for a permit of stay or to apply for the citizenship status. Sometimes courses are organized in origin countries, in order to facilitate the so-called 'integration process from abroad' or, more likely, to prevent or limit the entry of those immigrants who are considered particularly difficult to integrate. The success of immigrants in civic integration courses implies the issue or the renewal of the permit of stay and the granting of naturalization, while the failure means the denial or the non-renewal of permits of stay and naturalization (Joppke, 2007a). However, civic integration can also include 'civic participation' (Vogel and Triandafyllidou, 2005; Gsir, 2014) and, therefore, the active engaging of immigrants in political parties, labour unions, ethnic associations and

¹ Several doubts about the coherence between the compulsory nature of these courses and liberal principles have been raised (Joppke, 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2012).

migrants organizations in destination countries, and the local vote. The local vote has been defined by Baubock (2006: 24) as a “residential citizenship that is disconnected by the nation-state membership”: currently, it is granted by 15 of the 28 European Union (EU) member states to Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) (Groenendijk, 2014). Anti-discrimination policies, that is, actions aimed at preventing episodes of discrimination and xenophobia towards immigrants and their descendants in hosting societies and at ensuring basic civil and social rights, such as healthcare, housing and public schooling for their children, are considered forms of civic integration as well. In particular, the transmission of the language and the culture of the country of settlement to immigrants’ children, together with the socialization with natives, are seen as functional to the integration process of the entire immigrant family.

Regardless of their capacity to promote immigrants’ socio-economic integration and to foster social cohesion in the hosting society, civic integration policies seem to favour “a certain degree of socio-cultural assimilation” (Sciortino, 2014: 261) and to contribute to the decline of multiculturalism as integration philosophy (Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Joppke, 2004); on the contrary, the “category of practice” (Sciortino, 2003: 276) of multiculturalism appears to remain at the core of the social relationship between immigrant and hosting society in almost all liberal states, with hosting countries being more heterogeneous than their policies state ‘on paper’². However, I argue that the grade of socio-cultural assimilation produced by civic integration, as well as the coercive nature of its programmes, can vary geographically, because of countries’ immigration experience and of their traditional national models of immigration and integration.

In light of these considerations, this paper aims to offer an overview of civic integration programmes adopted by European countries over time, in order to shed light on their main features and, in particular, on the rationale that is behind the European convergence towards civic integration. My hypothesis is that a philosophy based on migration control and selection underpins this convergence. This philosophy is coherent with the EU policy ideology, which appears to be marked by a ‘securitization’ approach towards migration. The European debate on the “civic direction” (Joppke, 2004: 253)

² The case of France is illustrative. As stressed by Simon (2012), although multiculturalism in France is still rather rejected by both the political and public debate, France is multicultural, since its population is largely and increasingly diverse. Minority identities are not necessarily conflicting with the sense of belonging and assimilation to France; immigrants are transnational beings, who live constantly a sort of ‘double presence’ in both the origin and the destination country, therefore they can be integrated or ‘assimilated’ into the host society without renouncing to their identity.

undertaken by integration policies in the last decade is mainly focused on ‘old’ European immigration countries. ‘New’ immigration countries appear to be involved in the European convergence towards civic integration as well, but generally remain excluded from this debate. Therefore, I choose to focus on Italy as one of the Southern European countries with the largest migration inflows in Europe, despite the recent economic crisis (Pastore and Villosio, 2011). The paper comprises the following sections: an analysis of the EU framework on immigrant integration; a discussion of the traditional national models of immigration and integration; an explanation of the data and method used; a description of various civic integration programmes across Europe and a focus on the civic integration in Italy. The paper ends with the discussion of these programmes in the final section.

1.2. The EU framework on immigrant integration

Although often seen as a sort of ‘pendulum’ between actions aimed at protecting the EU from unwanted immigration and measures on the admission and the settlement of migrants in its member states, there is general agreement on the existence of a common EU migration and asylum policy (e.g. Faist and Andreas, 2007; Boswell and Geddes, 2011). With the increase of migration inflows, the EU migration and asylum policy has become progressively more restrictive: it appears to be marked by a ‘securitization’ approach (Carling, 2002; Geddes, 2003; Bonjour, 2011), both at the level of policy measures and at the level of public debate. Moreover, with the effort of policy harmonization, the ‘securitization’ approach has affected the EU member states’ immigration measures as well. Strict border controls, stringent visa requirements, draconian asylum procedures and demanding administrative measures have made migration and residence in the EU more complicated. For this reason, it can be argued that “under control” (Bendel, 2007) has become one of the distinctive features of the EU migration and asylum policy. The Treaty of Amsterdam is considered a very important starting point of this policy since in 1999 it transferred asylum and immigration policies in a new Title IV of the Treaty dealing with free movement, migration and asylum. In particular, the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the European competences on external border controls; reception of asylum seekers; conditions of entry and residence for TCNs and fight against illegal migration. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 marked a further step towards a real communitarization (Geddes, 2003)

by transferring more powers to the EU institutions. Starting from Amsterdam, three five-years work plans have been organized, with the aim of monitoring and actualizing treaties' provisions on migration and asylum (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). The Tampere Programme covered the period 1999-2004, with the agenda of enhancing cooperation with third countries, promoting fair treatment of TCNs regularly residing in the EU member states, establishing a European Asylum System and controlling irregular migration. The Hague Programme (2005-09) intended to create a common asylum area and reinforce measures to contrast illegal migration, trafficking and smuggling. Finally, the Stockholm Programme (2010-14) tried to counterbalance the goal of promoting the socio-economic development of immigrants' origin countries on the one hand, by incrementing the protection of the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' on the other hand (Kostakopoulou, 2012).

Conversely, a similar consensus on the existence of a common EU immigrant integration policy does not exist. Integration became a topic for the EU institutions in the 1990s, as a result of the increasing immigrant population residing in European countries. In particular, considering that what "happens after" the entry (Favell, 2003: 14) often reflects what happens at the entry, and that could be defined an 'immigration-integration nexus' perspective (Pastore and Sciortino, 2001; Penninx, 2003), the Tampere Programme in 1999 established an EU cooperation on the integration of non-EU nationals, thus including the integration issues in EU competencies. The Thessaloniki summit of June 2003 and the consequent publication of the 'Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment' confirmed the EU interest in immigrant integration. The 2004 'Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policies in the EU' set out the importance of developing goals and indicators to implement policies and evaluate the national efforts and actions on integration. In 2007, the 'Handbook on Integration' was produced by the European Commission with the aim of promoting the exchange of good practices among policy-makers and experts across Europe. The 'Common Basic Principles' were also adopted in Malmo in 2009. Four core areas, employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship, and 14 core indicators were set out in that occasion. The 2010 Zaragoza Ministerial Conference Member States established a set of core outcome indicators, which are now considered some of the most important sources of integration indicators at European level. However, in the 2011 'European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals', the EU's role was limited to the establishment of common standards for

integration measures, to the exchange of best practices and successful models of integration and to support integration strategies in the EU member states. Therefore, it can be concluded that the EU contributes almost exclusively to orientate and coordinate states' integration policies. In particular, it acts as a framework of standards and recommendations and as a forum of dialogue and information exchange (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006) for the development of integration strategies, rather than as a policy-maker. For this reason, it can be argued that a common EU immigrant integration policy does not exist (yet). Nevertheless, it is incontrovertible that the EU principles and guidelines are able to influence the formulation and the implementation of integration policies at national level and can help producing a harmonization and a convergence of integration measures across Europe.

While the term and the meaning of integration can be understood differently among the EU member states, mainly depending on the timing when they experienced their first mass immigration and on the level of institutionalization of such a phenomenon (Freeman, 1995), EU generally considers integration as a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States” (Justice and Common Affairs Council, 2004). From this perspective, immigrants *have to* demonstrate their willing to be integrated into the host society and to respect its rules and values. On the other hand, the host societies *have to* answer to immigrants' needs and make efforts to grant and preserve their culture and origins. Since the integration process takes place primarily at local level (Penninx, 2004; Penninx *et al.*, 2004), with cities and municipalities as the places where immigrants are received and natives encounter new cultures and identities, the EU argues that integration policies should be developed primarily at local level. According to the principle of subsidiarity, the local level appears closer to immigrants in providing services they need and, at the same time, more apt in managing their interaction with natives. Nevertheless, a strong coordination between all the actors involved in the integration process, therefore the European institutions, the EU member states, the national, regional and local authorities, as well as NGOs and migrants organizations, is considered necessary in order to produce consistent and effective integration policies.

1.3. The traditional national models of immigration and integration

Academic literature generally distinguishes among three traditional national models of immigration and integration: the exclusionist model, the assimilationist model and the

multiculturalist or pluralist model (e.g. Castles, 1995; Koopmans and Statham, 1999). This kind of categorization reflects the fact that the debate on integration and integration policies have been historically mainly focused on the so-called ‘old’ immigration countries. Nevertheless, if the ‘new’ immigration countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) are taken into consideration, this categorization becomes incomplete (Freeman, 1995). Therefore, I suggest that the Southern European model, which characterizes the ‘new’ immigration countries (e.g. Baganha, 1997; King *et al.*, 2000; Peixoto *et al.*, 2012), also is considered, when referring to the traditional national models of immigration and integration.

The exclusionist model of integration (Germany (pre-2000), Austria and Belgium-Flanders) considers migration as a temporary and functional phenomenon: a means to meet short labour demands. Immigrants are expected to return home rather than permanently settle in the host country. Consequently, the permit of stay is often linked to the job contract: the expiration of the job contract means the loss of the right to live in the host country. Immigrants are well integrated into the labour market, but not in the social and political community (they are generally excluded from welfare systems, citizenship rights and political participation). Countries fitting this model are quite reluctant to permanent settlement, family reunification and immigrants’ naturalization. Citizenship rights are based on “ethno-cultural belonging to nationhood” (Koopmans and Statham, 1999: 660) and therefore mainly on the principle of *ius sanguinis*.

According to the assimilationist model (France), immigrants are expected to be fully incorporated in the host country as individuals: they have to accept and internalize both values and culture of the country of settlement. The existence and maintenance of ethnic communities is prevented since these are seen as a sign of incomplete assimilation. As a consequence, the naturalization is relatively easy, since it is essentially based on civic territorial criteria and, therefore, on *ius soli*. However, it is noteworthy, for instance, that France evolved towards more pluralist policy measures over the years, with a mixture of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli*, as it will be clarified in the second paper.

According to the multiculturalist or pluralist model (Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden), immigrants’ culture and origins should be granted, preserved and enhanced, “as positive marks of a diverse heritage” (Simon, 2012: 3). Hosting societies that adopt multiculturalist or pluralist models of immigrant integration generally show a strong willingness to include ethnic minorities into their community, respecting their language and their cultural and religious differences. Although immigrants do not always have

the benefit of full social and political rights, ethnic communities are officially accepted, forms of ethnic entrepreneurship are encouraged and quotas of social benefits and facilities are reserved to them. Nevertheless, the academic literature has recently questioned the validity of such a model (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011) and the capacity of multiculturalism to grant immigrants equality and emancipation (Koopmans, 2010).

The last model of integration is that of the ‘new’ immigration countries or the Southern European model (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain). As pointed out by Freeman (1995), only a few years ago these countries were characterized by “the near complete absence of any institutional mechanisms or administrative experience as to planning and regulating immigration” (1995: 894). As a consequence, these countries do not have a strong integration ideology and integration practices are still embryonic and spontaneous, although rather inclusive. For instance, the expression “implicit model of integration” or “subordinate integration” has been coined for Italy (Ambrosini, 2001; 2005), in order to denote an unintended and unsystematic way of integrating immigrants, which tends to privilege the economic inclusion (therefore, into the labour market), with forms of over-qualification and labour “ethnicization” (Ambrosini, 2013: 183), rather than the full political participation of immigrants. This *de facto* integration process is, in some extent, similar to the so-called “differential exclusion model” described by Castles (1995: 294), according to which certain dimensions of integration are favoured, such as the socio-economic dimension.

I believe that the European convergence towards civic integration is not necessarily competing with the traditional national models of immigration and integration. In other words, the civic integration convergence does not mark a decline of the traditional national models of immigration and integration. On the contrary, these models remain and can represent useful interpretative criteria of the civic integration programmes adopted by European countries over the years. Nevertheless, though the usefulness of models in reducing the complexity of the issue of the immigrant integration, explaining and taking into account the national differences and making international comparisons, has been largely demonstrated by the numerous classifications of integration policies available in the academic literature (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998; Castles and Miller, 2009), models should be not considered as static and immutable identities able to perfectly explain the social processes, that is, the relationship between immigrant and hosting society (Bertossi, 2011; Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2012). Sometimes this

relationship can diverge from the dominant policy model and conceptualization, taking forms, which often do not correspond to the alleged national models of immigrant integration. As already stressed (e.g. Cento Bull, 2010; Czaika and de Haas, 2013), a gap between the normative model (policy discourse), the policy practices (policy outcomes) and, finally, the social processes, may exist. Several reasons can produce this gap: at national level, electoral needs and economic interests can lead policy-makers to implement measures that can contradict the policy discourse; at the public opinion level, terroristic and tragic events need strong policy actions to reassure the public opinion; at international level, the states' obligations to participate in supranational bodies, for instance the EU, can orient national policy strategies and contribute to produce a "convergence of specific policy measures" (Finotelli and Michalowski, 2012: 234). Therefore, it is important to keep in mind these considerations when interpreting the civic integration programmes and their rationale.

1.4. Data and method

In order to provide an overview of the civic integration programmes adopted in Europe, I have made a systematic review of actual legal texts and academic literature. I have found civic integration policies in 14 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. As shown in Table 1.1, I have categorized civic integration programmes according to the name, the year of implementation, the target groups, whether or not civic courses are organized, whether or not language or civic tests have to be passed by immigrants, whether or not integration from abroad is practised and, finally, whether or not local voting rights are granted to immigrants. In the next section, I present the civic integration programmes in a chronological order, in other words, according to their year of implementation.

Table 1.1. Overview of civic integration programmes in Europe

Country	Name of the Programme	Year	Target group	Civic course	Civic test	Integration from abroad	Local vote
The Netherlands	Newcomer Integration Law	1998	Non-EU and non-Switzerland immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit and immigrants applying for citizenship	600 hours of language, civic and labour market courses	Yes	Yes, for family immigrants and immigrants who planned to permanently reside in the Netherlands	Yes

Denmark	Danish Integration Act: A. Integration Program; B. Contract of Integration and Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship	1999	A. Immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit; B. Refugees and family immigrants	The Danish culture and history, social conditions in Denmark, the functioning of the labour market, the welfare system, the schooling and housing system	No	No	Yes
Estonia	Integration in Estonian Society	2000	'Russophone' immigrants and immigrants working in the service sector	Estonian language, values and norms	No	No	No
Germany	Integration Courses ('Integrationskurse')	2001	Immigrants applying for a permit of stay, immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit and immigrants applying for citizenship	600 hours of language course and 30 hours of civic course	Yes	Yes, for family immigrants	No
Spain	Integration Plans, implemented in Cataluña, Madrid and Andalucía and 'Strategic Plans for Citizenship and Integration'	2001	Not specified	Orientation, juridical guidance, education and language courses	No	No	Yes
United Kingdom	Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act	2002	Permanent immigrants and immigrants applying for citizenship	English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and citizenship classes	Yes	No	Yes
France	Integration Contract ('Contrat d'accueil et de l'intégration')	2003	Immigrants holding a long-term visa or a permit of stay for work, study or family reasons, immigrants with a residence card and the CE long term residence card	A 6 hours civic course concerning the fundamental values of the French Republic and the functioning of the state; a course which can range from 1 to 6 hours for the learning of the access to the public services and the everyday life in France; a 400 hours French language course	Yes	No	No
Austria	Integration Agreement	2003	Non-EU immigrants arrived after 1998, applying for a permit of stay	Literacy and language, social, economic and cultural aspects of life in Austria	No	No	No
Belgium	Citizenisation ('Inburgering') and Integration Programme (including the Integration Contract), implemented in	2004	Immigrants of 18 years and over who are registered in the National Register, are living in a Flemish city and hold a first		No	No	Yes

	Flanders		temporary permit of stay				
Latvia	Immigration Law	2005	Immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit	Language, tradition and culture courses	No	No	
Greece	Integration Agreement	2006	Immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit	Language and culture test	Yes	No	No
Finland	Personal Integration Plan	2011	All immigrants residing in Finland, over 18 years and unemployed	Language courses, information on the labour market, education, schooling for children and healthcare system	No	No	Yes
Poland	Integration Programs	2012	Refugees, repatriates and their familiars	Language instruction, vocational training and subsistence support	No	No	No
Italy	Integration Agreement ('Patto per l'integrazione')	2012	Immigrants applying for a permit of stay and immigrants applying for the 'EC residence permit for long-term residents' (the permanent residence permit).	Language, fundamental principles of the Constitution; civic life, health, education, social services and labour market sectors	Yes	No	No

Source: Own elaboration on various sources

1.5. Civic integration programmes across Europe

The Netherlands has been pioneer in the civic integration, introducing the 'Newcomer Integration Law' in 1998, which required most non-EU immigrants to attend a 12-month integration course, consisting in 600 hours of language, civic and labour market courses. Both the state and the municipalities organized courses. The law was revised in 2006, introducing a series of more demanding amendments (Fischler, 2014). In particular, all immigrants from outside the EU and Switzerland applying for a residence permit for an indefinite period were required to attend an integration course and to pay for it. The issue of the permanent residence permit and the grant of the naturalization were linked to the success in passing an integration test. Family immigrants and other immigrants who planned to permanently reside in the Netherlands were asked to take an integration test at the Dutch Embassy or Consulate in their origin country or in the country where they were residing from at least three months. Courses had to be organized by private organizations in each municipality and rather than by the state, as in the past (Joppke, 2007b; Bruquetas-Callejo *et al.*, 2011; Fischler, 2014). Immigrants

who failed in the compliance of the integration test were not granted the residence permit. However, while compliance with the test did not imply the issue of the residence permit, eventually a permit/special visa would be issued only for one year. This special document subsequently allowed the application for the residence permit. Since January 2013, all immigrants, including asylum seekers, are required to pay for both the integration course and the integration exam. Moreover, starting from January 2014 the ‘Participation Agreement’ has been introduced by municipalities with the aim of teaching immigrants the fundamental norms and principles of Dutch society. This agreement is targeted especially to family migrants, refugees, EU work migrants and immigrants from Turkey and former Antilles (Fischler, 2014).

In 1999, Denmark introduced the ‘Danish Integration Act’, with the aim to teach immigrants the core values and norms of Danish society. The implementation of the ‘Danish Integration Act’ takes place at local level with municipalities primarily responsible for providing immigrants with the ‘Integration Program’. In particular, immigrants are asked to be enrolled in an ‘Integration Program’ in order to learn about Danish culture and history, social conditions in Denmark, the functioning of the labour market, the welfare system, the schooling and housing system. Participation in the ‘Integration Program’ is needed to obtain a permanent residence permit and to be eligible for social benefits. Immigrants are expected to become economically active and culturally integrated into the hosting society, and thus to be suitable to receive social rights and benefits (Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014). Moreover, refugees and reunified families are asked to sign a compulsory ‘Contract of Integration’ and a ‘Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship’. The Danish language, the respect of democratic principles, values of liberty, freedom of speech, gender equality are required to be observed by such immigrants, which are considered particularly difficult to integrate. Sanctions are enacted in case immigrants refusing to sign both the ‘Contract of Integration’ and the ‘Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship’.

The ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007’ and the ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2008-2013’ strategies both focused on civic integration, and thus on the understanding of Estonian language, values and norms. The main target group of civic integration policies in Estonia are the ‘Russophone’ immigrants – that are those who have migrated from other parts of the Soviet Union before Estonia’s independence. Nevertheless, these integration measures are not compulsory although they are strongly recommended for immigrants working in the service sector (Jakobson, 2014).

In 2001 Germany introduced the ‘Integrationskurse’ (transl.: ‘Integration courses’), founded by the Federal Government. It consisted in 600 hours of a language course and 30 hours of a civic course (Joopke, 2007b). The 2004 ‘Immigration Law’ made conditions for such courses stricter, since the non-compliance of the courses meant the non-renewal of the permit of stay and the denial of the permanent residence permit. Moreover, sanctions such as the reduction of welfare benefits were introduced for those immigrants refusing to participate in courses. Family immigrants were asked to prove their language skills before migrating. Since 2005, integration courses have been organized at local level (Borkert and Bosswick, 2011). In 2006, the attendance on civic integration courses and the successful completion of the language test became required also for naturalisation (Joppke, 2007b). In 2007, the ‘Directive Implementation Act for EU Directives on Residence and Asylum Issues’ stated, among other things, the necessary evidence of basic German skills for spouses, through pre-entry tests. The rationale for this provision was to avoid forced marriages and to hinder as much as possible the integration process (Borkert and Bosswick, 2011).

In Spain, the autonomous communities are responsible for the immigrant integration programmes. A series of ‘Integration Plans’ have been implemented by Cataluña, Madrid and Andalucía since 2001, with the aim of promoting the principles of equal treatment, respect for multiculturalism and the protection of cultural plurality. These mainly concern orientation, juridical guidance, education and language courses (Carrera, 2006). Moreover, two ‘Strategic Plans for Citizenship and Integration’ have been approved for the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-14, with the aim of strengthening social cohesion and ensuring equal access to public services and participation of all citizens. Language courses are among the measures recommended by such plans (Pasetti, 2014).

In United Kingdom the 2002 ‘Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act’ asks permanent immigrants and immigrants applying for citizenship to follow English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes and citizenship courses.

In 2003, under the Raffarin government, France implemented the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ (CAI) program (transl.: ‘Integration contract’), consisting in one day of civic instructions and 500 hours of language course. Then, the *first Sarkozy Law* of 2003 decreed the knowledge of the French language and the fundamental values of the French Republic as prerequisite to renew the permit of stay and to obtain both the ten-year residence permit and the legal permanent residence. Moreover, the Law stated that

family members were entitled to receive only a one-year permit of stay; then, after two years, could apply for the ten-year residence permit. The rationale behind this provision was to avoid the increase of ethnic marriages or at least to require family migrants to learn French language and values. However, the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ has been made compulsory only starting from 1 January 2007, after the entry into force of the 2006 ‘Law of immigration and integration’, also known as the *second Sarkozy Law*. Immigrants eligible and thus required to sign the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ are those who intend to permanently reside in France and thus hold a long-term visa or a temporary permit of stay for work, study or family reasons, as well as a residence card and the CE long term residence card. Seasonal workers, researchers and highly skilled immigrants (in other words, those in possession of the so-called ‘Carte d’Entrée et de Séjour Compétences et Talents’ (Wihl de Wenden, 2011)), including their families, are exempted from the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’. The signature of the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ includes commitment to six-hour civic course concerning the fundamental values of the French Republic and the functioning of the state; a course which can range from one to six hours on access to public services and the everyday life in France and a 400-hour French language class for those immigrants whose French is considered insufficient. The course is followed by a final exam issuing the language certificate.

In Austria, the ‘Settlement and Residence Act’ establishes the ‘Integration Agreement’. It consists of two modules: the first deals with literacy and the second focuses on language, social, economic and cultural aspects of life in Austria (Carrera, 2006).

In Belgium, integration has been a community competence since the 1980s. Therefore, policies are different between Wallonia, Flanders and the Region of Brussels. In the last ten years, Flanders have been developing civic integration policies with the ‘Inburgering’ (transl: ‘Citizenisation’) policy which, through an ‘Integration Programme’ encourages the learning of the Flemish language, values and norms among immigrants. ‘Integration Programmes’ are compulsory for immigrants of 18 years and over who are registered in the National Register, are living in a Flemish city and hold a first permit of stay of more than three months. The ‘Citizenisation’ policy also includes a mandatory ‘Integration Contract’, which allows the immigrant to understand the content and structure of the ‘Integration Program’. According to the ‘Integration Contract’, the knowledge of the official language is compulsory, as well as the internalization of values, norms and institutions of the Flemish society (Mandin, 2014).

In Latvia, the 2005 'Immigration Law' has introduced language, tradition and culture courses for immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit (Carrera, 2006).

In Greece, starting from 2006 immigrants who ask for permanent residence permit need to earn an annual income of 8,500 Euros (15 percent more for each additional family member), to own a healthcare insurance and to pass a language and culture test (D'Angelo, 2006).

In Finland, starting from 2011 the immigrant integration policy has been oriented towards the improvement of immigrants' inclusion into the labour market and the civic integration actions are seen as a tool to achieve this goal. The 'Personal Integration Plan' has been introduced. It represents an 'agreement' between the immigrant and Finland and it includes language courses, information on the labour market, education, schooling for children and healthcare system. All immigrants residing in Finland, over 18 years and unemployed are eligible and thus required to follow the 'Personal Integration Plan' (Koskela, 2014).

In Poland 'Integration Programs' are targeted only to refugees and repatriates and their familiars. They consist of Polish language instruction, vocational training and subsistence support (Stefańska, 2015).

1.6. Civic integration in Italy

Traditionally an emigration country, Italy turned into an immigration country since the late 1970s onwards. Due to its geographical position at the southern border of Europe, Italy is one of the most important access points and one of the major immigrant destinations in the European Union. The foreign resident population amounted to more than 5 million individuals at 1 January 2016 (Istat online database) and it represents around 8.3 percent of the total population. This number rises to 6 million (around 10 percent of the total population), considering non-resident regular and irregular migrants (ISMU, 2016).

As in other 'new' immigration countries, the acceptance of the existence of the immigration phenomenon has been late and the first law of immigration was introduced not until 1986 (Zincone, 1998; Einaudi, 2007). As a consequence, the issue of immigrant integration has been formally taken into account and introduced in the Italian legislation only with the Single Act of Immigration Law (Law n. 40/1998), also known as the *Turco-Napolitano Law*. The Turco-Napolitano Law was based on four pillars

(Zincone and Caponio, 2004: 4): (1) the prevention and fight of illegal entries; (2) the regulation of new arrivals of foreign workers through annual quotas of workers and the introduction of the so-called 'sponsor system', a special settlement permit that allowed foreigners to enter Italy to look for a job if they were sponsored by an Italian or a foreigner legally resident in Italy who was financially able to do that; (3) the granting of basic human rights to illegal immigrants, such as basic healthcare and education; (4) the promotion of the integration of immigrants already resident in Italy through the creation of a 'National Integration Fund' dedicated to finance multicultural activities. These four aims corresponded to four basic elements of the so-called 'model of reasonable integration', "a model which is not too rigid, not too ideological, not too pretentious" (Zincone, 2000: 959). The four basic elements were (Zincone, 2000): (1) interaction based on security; (2) full integrity for legal immigrants; (3) integrity of human rights for illegal immigrants; (4) interaction based on pluralism and communication (Zincone, 2000). The rationale behind the Turco-Napolitano Law lies in the concept that immigrants should benefit of the same civil and in part social rights of nationals. Finally, the Turco-Napolitano Law (art. 42) established a 'multilevel governance' with local authorities in charge of developing and implementing integration actions for their immigrant populations.

The centre-right wing government coalition reformed the Single Act of 1998 through the introduction of the *Bossi-Fini Law* in 2002. In particular, the Bossi-Fini Law modified the first two pillars of the Single Act of Immigration Law, making residence rights and illegal entries more restrictive. In particular, to discourage permanent settlement of immigrants, a series of measures were introduced. The 'sponsor system' was abolished; the permit of stay was linked to the 'unified contract of employment and residence' ('contratto di soggiorno'), with the result that, once the work contract ended, the foreigner had to leave the country. The length of the permit of stay depended on the length of the work contract, according to an exclusionist interpretation of immigrant integration. An amnesty was established by the Bossi-Fini Law for those non-EU immigrants who had been working irregularly in Italy for at least three months before the law became effective (July 2002). It was the biggest amnesty ever given in Europe: 646,000 immigrants were regularized under this law (Barbagli *et al.*, 2004; Strozza and Zucchetti, 2006). Therefore, the Bossi-Fini Law emphasized the temporary nature of immigration and the economic dimension of integration and this trend was maintained over the years, as the Flows Decree of 2006 contributed to demonstrate. In 2009, a new

amnesty was introduced and it was addressed to domestic care-workers. The reason behind this amnesty was that despite the economic crisis the domestic worker sector continued to grow and, therefore, to demand foreign workforce (Ambrosini, 2013). Finally, the amnesty of 2012 was addressed to irregular non-EU workers and in particular to full-time workers and domestic workers, employed at least 20 hours per week.

However, a turn towards the social and cultural dimension of integration has occurred also in Italy, as reaction to the above-mentioned international events, which have reopened the debate on assimilation and multiculturalism in Europe. The ‘Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione’ (transl.: ‘Charter of the values of citizenship and integration’), introduced by the Home Affairs Minister Giuliano Amato during the II Prodi Government in 2006, the Security Package (Law 94/2009), approved by the IV Silvio Berlusconi Government in July 2009, the 2010 ‘Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza. Identità e incontro’ (transl.: ‘Plan for integration in secure environment. Identity and encounter’) and the ‘Patto per l’integrazione’ (transl.: ‘Integration agreement’), approved by the same government coalition in 2009, but entered into force in March 2012, claimed the importance of learning the Italian language and about Italian history and culture as prerequisite for a positive and active inclusion of immigrants into the Italian society. In particular, the ‘Integration Agreement’ defined integration as “a process designed to promote the coexistence of Italian citizens and foreign nationals legally residing in the country, and based on mutual commitment to participate in the economic, social and cultural life, under the values enshrined in the Italian Constitution” (Official Gazette of the Italian Republic). Within these considerations, the ‘Integration Agreement’ asked immigrants who want to obtain a permit of stay to learn the Italian language (level A2); to learn the fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution and institutions; to learn about civic life, the functioning of the health sector, the education and social services sectors, the labour market and related fiscal obligations and, last but not least, to respect the rule according to which children have to attend school up to 16 years old (Caponio and Zincone, 2011). At the moment of the signing the contract, few days after the entry into the Italian territory, immigrants receive 16 credits, but then have to score 30 credits within two years by attending free courses on civic values (Caneva, 2014). The non-attendance at these sessions results in the loss of 15 credits. If the number of credits acquired is more than zero but less than 30, or the knowledge of the Italian language, civic culture and

civil life cannot be sufficiently proved by the immigrant, the agreement can be extended for one more year. A number of credits equivalent to zero or less than zero means the denial of the permit of stay and expulsion from Italian territory. Finally, if the number of credits acquired is 40 or more, additional cultural and formative activities are offered to immigrants. A number of non-profit organizations and institutions organize free languages courses for immigrants. Moreover, successfully passing a language test is among the requirements asked to immigrants who apply for the 'EC residence permit for long-term residents' (the permanent residence permit).

Concluding this section, the Italian centre-left coalition approach towards integration appears traditionally quite inclusive and multiculturalist. It tries to equalize as much as possible immigrants to Italians as far as social rights are concerned. On the contrary, the Italian centre-right coalition considers immigrants as functional to the national economy, and therefore mainly as workforce to be employed in those sectors which native workers usually refuse (Ambrosini, 2013). Furthermore, the Italian centre-right coalition perceives immigrants as a threat when issues of public order, national identity and culture are debated (e.g. Geddes, 2008; Salis, 2012). Therefore, from this point of view, civic integration has succeeded in conciliating these divergent approaches to migration, since the knowledge of the Italian language and values has been considered crucial for the process of immigrants' socio-economic integration by both the government coalitions in the last years. In other words, the above mentioned policy measures have aligned the two Italian political coalitions, as well as the Italian debate on immigrant integration to the ongoing European convergence.

1.7. Discussion and conclusions

This paper has focused on the civic integration programmes adopted by European countries in recent years. The aim has been to shed light on their main features and on the rationale that is behind the European convergence towards civic integration. I have responded to these research questions by a systematic review of actual legal texts and academic literature on 14 European countries. The comparative analysis of the civic integration programmes adopted by the European countries covered by my study has highlighted: the use of mandatory 'integration contracts' for immigrants who ask for a permanent residence permit or apply for citizenship; the obligatory participation in language and civic courses, especially for refugees and family immigrants; the necessity

to pass a final exam and the almost total exemption of high-skilled and temporary immigrants from civic integration programmes. Regarding the so-called ‘integration from abroad’ or ‘integration at distance’, comparative analysis has shown that only two countries, namely the Netherlands and Germany, ask family immigrants to follow civic courses in their origin country. Finally, six of the 14 countries analysed, grant local voting rights to immigrants.

Regardless of their national integration philosophies, restrictive measures for granting residence and citizenship rights have been endorsed by European countries to discourage the entry and the permanent settlement of immigrants. Taken for granted that host-country language ability is considered fundamental to enhance social mobility and the integration of immigrants into the labour market of the hosting country – recent studies have shed light on the positive relationship between socio-economic integration and language proficiency (e.g. Di Bartolomeo and Strozza, 2014) – empirical evidence shows that policies based on civic requirements have a weak impact on socio-economic and political integration of immigrants (Wallace Goodman and Wright, 2015). On the contrary, civic integration policies appear to produce a ‘stratification’ of the immigrant population in hosting societies. In particular, by building up different integration regimes, the civic integration tends to intensify the gap between low-skilled immigrants (such as refugees and family migrants, which are those who intend to permanently reside in European receiving countries) and high-skilled immigrants (mainly temporary immigrants) or between undesirable and desirable migration. For this reason, it can be concluded that the European convergence towards civic integration is underpinned by a philosophy based on migration control and selection. This philosophy is coherent with the EU migration policy ideology, which is marked by a ‘securitization’ approach towards migration, as explained at the beginning of this paper. Policy restrictiveness and an idea of *immigration choisie*, with language and civic skills as criteria of selection, appear to be at the core of the European civic integration convergence. Several studies have shown the limited success of policy restrictiveness (e.g. Vogel, 2000; Castles, 2004a; 2004b; Cornelius, 2005). Measures aimed to restrict and select migration are generally ineffective, since the factors determining and nurturing migration processes are very complex and deep-rooted in both origin and destination areas (e.g. de Haas, 2010). Moreover, policy restrictiveness contributes to change the routes and channels through which people migrate, increasing illegal entries (Cornelius, 2001; de Haas, 2011). Finally, since it hinders circulation and mobility (Wihtol de

Wenden, 1999; 2013; Massey *et al.*, 2015), policy restrictiveness makes more precarious the residence of immigrants and fosters their irregularity. Irregular migration and the political rhetoric on irregular migration produce feelings of anxiety and fear towards immigrants in hosting societies; this undermines the social cohesion and may discourage newcomers to adopt and internalize civic values. This vicious circle provides evidence not only for the existence of a nexus between immigration and integration policies, as stressed before, but also for the fact that restrictive immigration policies and effective integration policies based on civic values cannot easily coexist.

However, active civic participation and anti-discrimination policies are not covered by my analysis, therefore this work may appear biased and the analysis on the aim and the scope of the civic integration programmes adopted in Europe may be viewed as partial. Moreover, it has been argued that a divergence between the national policy-making and the local policy implementation may exist when integration policies are concerned (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Jørgensen, 2012). Due to “different institutional logics” (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008: 3) and divergent policy needs, civic integration programmes may not actually be developed or implemented at local level. Therefore, further research is needed in order to gain more insight on these aspects.

2. IMMIGRANTS' CITIZENSHIP STATUS IN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NATIONAL POLICIES

2.1. Introduction

A large body of literature has stressed the role played by citizenship status for immigrants' process of integration into the residence country (e.g. Castles, 1995; Joppke, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Favell, 2003; Bauböck, 2006). In particular, there is general agreement on citizenship status as an objective³ indicator of integration (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994). Citizenship status represents only a component of the entire process of integration and, therefore, it does not necessarily imply immigrants' social acceptance and sense of belonging to the hosting society (Alba and Foner, 2016). However, by granting the same *status* and *rights* of natives, citizenship status formally reduces gaps between new and old citizens (Diehl and Blohm, 2003), shaping parity between them, which is one of the main goals of the integration process (Vink, 2013).

The acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country may depend on (1) individual characteristics of immigrants, such as demographic, human capital and the so-called 'immigration' variables (e.g. years since migration, age at arrival and reason of migration) (Amit, 2010), (2) structural characteristics of both origin and destination countries and (3) institutional factors in the destination country. Among the latter, we find policy factors and precisely national citizenship policies, which establish who is eligible for naturalization (Peters *et al.*, 2015).

Although almost all European countries have shifted from a 'nationalist' to a more 'multiculturalist' citizenship policy, thus formally liberalizing the access to citizenship rights (Joppke, 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2010; 2012), the chances to obtain the citizenship status of the new residence country are still quite limited for many immigrants and their descendants in Europe (Howard, 2009). For instance, citizenship eligibility has become more difficult because of civic integration requirements, such as mandatory courses, tests and contracts for applicants (Wallace Goodman, 2010; 2012). In addition,

³ We can distinguish between objective and subjective indicators of integration. Among the objective indicators of integration we find level of educational attainment, household income, employment, housing, legal status, etc. Among the subjective indicators of integration, we have self-reported life satisfaction, perceived well-being, happiness, perceived financial well-being, self-reported health status, perceived discrimination, etc. (OECD/EU, 2015).

conditions under which immigrants become naturalized citizens largely vary across countries. Indeed, several differences in citizenship rights policies exist in terms of residence requirement for naturalization, citizenship by birth, dual citizenship toleration and language requirements (e.g. Dronkers and Vink, 2010). These differences take origin in structural variations in the implementation of policies and attitudes towards immigrants, which mainly depend on countries' immigration experience and on the degree of acceptance of the phenomenon of immigration (Freeman, 1995), which have resulted in the institutionalization of different integration regimes and, therefore, in the development of the traditional national models of immigration and integration.

As elucidated in the first paper, the academic literature generally distinguishes among four traditional national models of immigration and integration: the exclusionist model, the assimilationist model, the multiculturalist or pluralist model and the 'new' immigration countries model or the Southern European model (e.g. Castles, 1995; Favell, 1998; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Peixoto *et al.*, 2012).

The exclusionist model of integration (Germany (pre-2000) and Austria) mainly considers migration as a short-term phenomenon and, in particular, as a mean to meet short labour demands (*Gastarbeiter*). Countries fitting this model are quite reluctant to permanent settlement, family reunification and immigrants' naturalization. An ethnic understanding of nationhood is at the core of citizenship rights and consequently they are granted according to the principle of *ius sanguinis*. For instance, although 1999 Law has implemented citizenship by birth in Germany, it implies that children have to renounce to the nationality of their parents and to decide between the age of 18 and 23 (Green, 2005).

According to the assimilationist model (France and Belgium), immigrants are expected to be integrated into the host country primarily as individuals and, therefore, they are asked to accept and adopt sincerely the culture and the values of the new residence country. Consequently, since it is a distinctive sign of equality (reduction of differences) with the mainstreaming society, citizenship status is relatively easy to acquire. It is based on a civic and territorial understanding of nationhood and, therefore, on a mixture of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli*. For instance, children born in France to foreign parents automatically become French when they turn to 18 years old, if they have resided in France in the last five years (Weil, 2005). However, at the beginning of 2000s, a shift towards anti-discrimination policies has occurred in France, because of some events such as riots of young immigrants living in the country, which highlighted the limits of

the assimilationist paradigm in integrating immigrants and their descendants (Bertossi, 2007; Escafré-Dublet, 2014). A pivotal role in this process of policy change has been played by the European Union (EU) and in particular by the starting of Tampere Programme (1999-2004), which, among other things, asked for a fairer treatment of immigrants regularly residing in the EU (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). The rationale behind anti-discrimination policies is to alleviate immigrants' duty to integrate into the reception society, by making institutions, such as the school and the labour market more responsible for immigrants' integration, trying to guaranteeing them equity and emancipation within the mainstream society. Moreover, as described in the first paper, starting from 2007, immigrants have to learn French and demonstrate the knowledge of French laws, signing the 'Contrat d'accueil et de l'intégration', in order to ask for the renewal of their permit of stay and the issue of the permanent residence permit. However, these policies have not led to the adoption of a broader multiculturalism, which appears still quite distant from the French way of integrating immigrants (Lepinard and Simon, 2008). The ban of religious symbols in public buildings and the recent decrees against the use of full-body bathing suits ("burkini") at sea, which have been issued by fifteen French municipalities, are two examples of how, in continuity with assimilationism, anti-discrimination policies strongly preserve the principle of secularism (laïcité).

At the core of multiculturalism (Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden), there is the idea that ethnic minorities' identity, culture, language and religion should be preserved and enhanced. Therefore, countries adopting multiculturalist policies tend to promote ethnic particularisms, instead of absorbing them through assimilation within the majority group. However, citizenship rights are based on a combination of both *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli*. For instance, the Dutch Citizenship Act of 1985 established that citizenship could be granted to immigrants after 5 years of legal residence and to children at the age of 18, if they have lived in the Netherlands continuously since they were born.

The 'new' immigration countries model or the Southern European model (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) does not have a strong immigrant integration ideology, because of the relatively recent immigration history of countries belonging to this model (mainly emigration countries until the mid-1970s, they received mass immigration starting from the 1990s) (Freeman, 1995). As consequence, integration policies have not been completely institutionalized yet, although they appear rather favourable to immigrants' process of stabilization in society and incorporation into the labour market. Some

common features, as far as the management of migration inflows, characterize countries embedded in this model (King *et al.*, 2000; Arango and Finotelli, 2010). In particular, one can observe the lack of selective immigration policies, a large underground economy attracting undocumented immigrants, a strong segmentation of the labour market and the use of *ex-post* instruments to provide a legal status to immigrants, such as regularizations, quota systems and flows decrees (Peixoto *et al.*, 2012; Di Bartolomeo *et al.*, 2016; Fellini and Fullin, 2016). On the contrary, despite of a rather good social acceptance of certain categories of immigrants (Ambrosini, 2013), immigrants' political incorporation and other forms of participation in society tend to be quite penalised. Countries fitting this model show some notable differences, especially when citizenship policies are considered. For instance, Italian citizenship policy, which is mainly based on *ius sanguinis* (Italian-born foreigners until the age of 18 can apply to citizenship within one year of turning 18)⁴, is one of the most exigent in terms of residence requirement (10 years of uninterrupted residence for non-EU citizens, because they are considered more culturally distant and, therefore, more difficult to be integrated, compared to EU citizens) and one of the most discretionary in Europe (Sciortino, 2002). On the contrary, Portugal and Spain tend to combine elements of *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*, through the introduction of quite limited residence requirement, which immigrants have to fulfil to allow their children to acquire the new citizenship status. For instance, children born in a Portuguese territory to non-Portuguese parents may obtain citizenship rights if the parents have resided in Portugal for five years, or if they have completed primary school education in Portugal. Moreover, in Spain, immigrants from Latin American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal and those of Sephardic origin are facilitated in the access to citizenship rights (2 years instead of 10 years) (Izquierdo *et al.*, 2002).

As shown in the first paper, in the last two decades, countries have converged towards civic integration policies, which emphasize the importance of the knowledge of the language, the culture and the civic values of the hosting society for the entry, the residence and the naturalization of immigrants, making boundaries between national

⁴ The *ius scholae* or *ius culturae*, according to which Italian-born foreigners or foreign-born children arrived in Italy before the age of 12, can automatically obtain the citizenship status after successfully attending elementary education classes or after having completed an educational cycle in Italy is still under consideration by the Italian Parliament. At the same time, a partial *ius soli* (*'ius soli temperato'*) has also been proposed. It would link the possibility of Italian-born foreigners to acquire the citizenship status, if their foreign-born parents hold an 'EC residence permit for long-term residents', which is the permanent residence permit.

policies more blurred compared to the past. However, I argue that, combined with these recent policy developments, traditional national models of immigration and integration represent a heritage of paramount importance that cannot be neglected when examining how both individual and policy factors influence immigrants' acquisition of citizenship status in Europe. In the light of the above considerations, aim of this paper is to examine the effect of both individual-level characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies on the likelihood of having citizenship status among young and adult immigrants living in selected European countries. In particular, my research questions are the following: Which factors influence more immigrants' citizenship status? Do national citizenship policies affect citizenship status of immigrants living in European countries? Are the traditional national models of immigration and integration helpful in interpreting my results?

The paper is structured as follows. First, an overview of the main individual and policy factors explaining citizenship status among immigrants is offered. Second, data, measures and method are described, followed by the presentation of the main results of the analysis. The paper ends with a discussion on how traditional national models of immigration and integration can explain the research findings.

2.2. Explaining citizenship status among immigrants in Europe

Joppke (2010) has conducted an exploration of the theoretical reflection around citizenship and immigration, specifically the aspects of citizenship pertaining immigration. He found that citizenship entails *status*, which is the formal state membership, *rights*, the set of rights distinguishing citizens from residents, and *identity*, the ensemble of values, which ties individuals to the political community. These dimensions, which offer a measure of the degree of incorporation of immigrants into the receiving society (Bloemraad *et al.*, 2008), can depend on either individual or policy factors.

At individual level, international literature (e.g. Yang, 1994; Piché, 2004; Dronkers and Vink, 2010) has highlighted that demographic, human capital and 'immigration' variables are key factors in explaining the citizenship status of the new residence country among immigrants. In particular, as far as the demographic variables are concerned, age plays a positive effect on the acquisition of citizenship status: the older immigrants are, the higher the likelihood that they will have the citizenship status of the

residence country. Females are more likely to acquire the new citizenship status, as naturalization implies long-term settlement abroad and this represents a form of emancipation from their origin country and its rules (Dronkers and Vink, 2010). Marital status is a significant predictor of citizenship status among immigrants (Yang, 1994). In particular, higher family stability increases the probability of having the citizenship status for two reasons. First, familiar stability is linked to immigrants' length of residence into the new residence country, a requirement that, in combination with other factors, such as evidence of social and economic integration and knowledge of the national language, is considered important by all naturalization laws, as shown below. Second, spouses and children benefit more from immigrants' duration of residence and stabilization into the host society, in terms of chances of family reunification and naturalization, compared to immigrants without such a familiar status into the residence country. Human capital represents an essential condition for a positive incorporation into the host society and it constitutes a fundamental starting point for succeeding into the labour market (Schneider and Crul, 2010; Guiraudon, 2014). On this regard, evidence shows that education improves socio-economic status and occupational attainment of immigrants and their descendants (Di Bartolomeo, 2011; Ali and Fokkema, 2015; Baizán and González-Ferrer, 2016), increasing the probability of being naturalized (e.g. Koopmans, 2016). Moreover, because of the recent importance attributed to the knowledge of the language and civic values of the residence country as new requirements that applicants to citizenship have to fulfil (Joopke, 2012) educational attainment appears to increase immigrants' opportunities to have the citizenship status of the new residence country. Therefore, highly educated immigrants are expected to be more likely to have the citizenship status compared to less educated immigrants. Moreover, economic and financial conditions have a significant effect on citizenship status among immigrants: the more stable immigrants' labour and financial conditions are, the higher the likelihood that they will have the citizenship status of the new residence country. At the same time, the acquisition of the citizenship status can be interpreted as a mean to improve immigrants' stabilization, labour opportunities into the residence country and chances of mobility (Massey *et al.*, 2015), especially in times of economic recession. Finally, immigrants' area of origin and cultural similarity, given, for instance, by colonial and post-colonial links between origin and residence countries, can influence the acquisition of the citizenship status among immigrants (Yang, 1994;

Piché, 2004; Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009). The case of Filipinos and Latin Americans living in Spain or in Portugal is an example.

Concerning the 'immigration' variables, the number of years spent into the residence country contributes to increase immigrants' likelihood of being naturalized (Piché, 2004). Immigrants with a longer duration of residence are less likely to be excluded or discriminated at social and economic level and they are generally more likely to have established a solid relationship with the host society. Concerning the period of arrival in the residence country, it is well acknowledged (e.g. Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Alba and Nee, 2003) that the age at arrival, or the immigrant generation (in literature, they are used interchangeably, since the former is used to disaggregate the latter into sub-groups) influences the cultural, political and socio-economic assimilation of immigrants (Tran, 2016). In particular, immigrants who migrated at younger ages, and therefore socialized in the residence country, have more chances to be better integrated, especially in terms of language proficiency, educational attainment, labour opportunities and household income, compared to immigrants who migrated at older ages (e.g. Rumbaut, 1997; 2004). Status at entry in the residence country, which can be considered as a proxy for reason of migration or migration channel, is a predictor of immigrants' likelihood of being naturalized into the residence country. In particular, it can predict immigrants' more or less permanent residence intentions and their more or less lasting participation into the labour market of the hosting society, thus influencing immigrants' process of integration and incorporation into the reception society. In sum, because they are indicator of assimilation into the residence country, higher education, economic status, perceived financial well-being and duration of residence appear to increase the likelihood of having the citizenship status among young and adult immigrants.

However, such factors only constitute components, even though important ones, of the more comprehensive issue of citizenship status among immigrants in Europe. National citizenship policies, which establish the rules to obtain the citizenship status of the residence country, are fundamental to complete this picture. In particular, international literature (e.g. Bauböck and Helbling, 2001) has highlighted that the residence requirement for naturalization, the dual citizenship toleration and policy outcomes, such as the naturalization rate and the proportion of foreign citizens (resident population with the citizenship of a foreign country) can influence the access to citizenship status. In particular, a higher number of years of residence required for naturalization can

decrease the likelihood that immigrants will have the citizenship status of the new residence country. As indicator of the degree of inclusiveness of immigrants' receiving country and permeability of its material and immaterial boundaries (Howard, 2005; Vink, 2013), the dual citizenship toleration, understood as the possibility for naturalized citizens to keep their native citizenship, appear to favour the citizenship status among newcomers, since it does not change their sense of belonging to the origin country. Moreover, as claimed by Howard (2009), the naturalization rate, which measures the ratio between the yearly number of naturalizations and the number of foreign citizens living in a country, can depend on both the naturalization policy and the demand of foreign citizens, which in my view are mutually dependent. Therefore, the higher the naturalization rate, the higher the likelihood that immigrants will have the citizenship status of the new residence country. Finally, in contrast to the detrimental effect played by a high proportion of foreign citizens for the integration process of immigrants, as found by Cesareo and Blangiardo (2009), we argue that the proportion of foreign citizens positively influences the citizenship status among immigrants, since it means openness and inclination of the receiving society in hosting newcomers and potentially new citizens.

2.3. Data, measures and method

2.3.1. Data sources

Individual level data stem from the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), conducted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, from October 2011 to January 2012. 7,468 immigrants were surveyed in the following countries and cities: Belgium (Antwerp, Brussels and Liège), France (Lyon and Paris), Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Milan and Naples), Portugal (Faro, Lisbon and Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid). However, Hungary has been dropped out from the sample because it cannot be easily framed in one of the four traditional national models of immigration and integration; therefore, the dataset has been reduced to 6,255 individuals. The ICS survey aims to reach those: not born in the residence country (although immigrated as minors); who are or were non-EU citizens or stateless persons (born as citizen of country other than EU/EEA countries or Switzerland); residing in the country for more than one year; holding or renewing a legal immigration status and being 15 years or older. The survey addresses the following topics:

employment; languages; civic and political participation; family reunion; long-term residence and citizenship.

Country-level data come from a systematic review of national citizenship policies, academic literature and the Eurostat database.

2.3.2. Individual-level measures: demographic, human capital and 'immigration' variables

The key dependent variable is *nationality*, which is a 0/1 variable where 1 indicates the respondent has the citizenship status of the residence country and 0 not. Given previous literature, as individual-level independent measures, I have selected the following demographic variables: (a) respondents' *age*, measured in years, (b) *gender*, represented by the dummy variable male (reference category) and female and (c) *marital status*, distinguishing between 'legally married or civil union' (reference category), 'legally separated or divorced or civil union dissolved', 'living with my partner', 'widowed or civil partner died' and 'single'. Then, (d) *area of origin*, distinguishing between 'Asia' (reference category), 'Eastern Europe', 'Latin America', 'Middle East', 'North Africa' and 'Sub-Saharan Africa' and, finally, (e) *cultural similarity*, measured by a dummy variable (0/1) indicating whether respondent's origin country is a former colony of his/her new residence country. For what concerns the human capital variables, I have selected: (f) *current economic situation*, distinguishing between 'in paid work' (reference category), 'in education', 'unemployed', 'retired or sick or disabled' and 'doing housework or other', (g) *perceived financial well-being*, distinguishing between 'comfortable' (reference category), 'sufficient', 'difficult' and 'very difficult' and, finally, (h) *educational attainment*, which refers to the number of years spent in education. As 'immigration' variables, I have selected first, (i) *years since migration*, which refers to the number of years one lives in the residence country, measured by the difference between the year of the interview and the year of arrival in the residence country. Second, (l) *status at entry*, distinguishing between 'work or study' (reference category), 'family reunion', 'permanent-long term', 'humanitarian', 'other legal status' and 'other illegal status'. Third, (m) respondents' *immigrant generation*, distinguishing between 1st (reference category) and 1.5. In particular, 1st generation means those who

have migrated at age older than 17, while 1.5 generation includes those who have migrated at age younger than 17, according to a definition given by Rumbaut (1997)⁵.

As shown in Table 2.1, the proportion of immigrants holding the citizenship status of the residence country largely varies across countries, with Belgium and France being the most favourable to grant the citizenship status to immigrants and Italy the least favourable.

Table 2.1. Immigrants by citizenship status in six selected residence countries, around 2011-2012. Percentage values and number of cases

Immigrants' citizenship	Residence country						Total
	Belgium	France	Germany	Italy	Portugal	Spain	
Nationals	47.5	42	15.2	6.6	23.4	38.4	1,810
Foreigners	52.5	58	84.8	93.4	76.6	61.6	4,445
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of cases	1,024	981	1,201	797	1,258	994	6,255
% by country	16.4	15.7	19.2	12.7	20.1	15.9	100.0

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

I report the definition of the independent individual-level measures along with their percentage, mean and standard deviation in Table 2.2. This contributes to shed light on the individual characteristics of the respondents. The average age of immigrants residing in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain is 38.2 years. Females represent 51.2%. While the most part of immigrants are married (52.1%), 29.7% are single, 7.9% are legally separated, divorced or with a civil union dissolved, 6.9% are living with their partner and 2.7 are widowed. Concerning the area of origin, 22.6% of immigrants come from Latin America, 16.6% from Eastern Europe, 18.6% from Sub-Saharan Africa, 16.6% from North Africa, 13.1% from Asia and 11.6% from Middle East. It is interesting to highlight that 38% of the respondents' origin country is a former colony of their new residence country. As far as the current economic situation, 57.9% have a paid work, 19.1% are unemployed, 9.8% are in education, 7.2% are doing housework or other and 5.3% are retired, sick or disabled. Regarding their financial well-being, 14.9% of the respondents have a comfortable financial well-being, 45.5%

⁵ Ruben G. Rumbaut distinguished between 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75 generation, referring to those children who immigrate at ages 0-5, 6-12 and 13-17, respectively. 1st generation means those who immigrate at age older than 17. We decided to aggregate 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75 in 1.5 generation and compare it to 1st generation.

sufficient, 25.4% difficult and 12.9% very difficult. Educational attainment is quite high and on average equal to 10.7 years of education. When immigration variables are considered, the number of years since migration is on average 13.8. On average, three out of four respondents are 1st generation immigrants, while one out of four is 1.5-generation. Moreover, the respondents entered the residence country with the following status: 32.5% work or study, 27.9% family reunion, 8.3% permanent-long term, 11.9% humanitarian, 12% another legal status and 4.2% other illegal status.

Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics on independent individual-level variables⁶. Sample of immigrants (N = 6,255) in six selected residence countries, around 2011-2012

Independent variables	% or mean and (SD)	Independent variables	% or mean and (SD)
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES		<i>Current economic situation</i>	
Age (in years)	38.2	- In paid work	57.9
	(12.5)	- Doing housework or other	7.2
Female	51.2	- In education	9.8
<i>Marital status</i>		- Retired, sick, disabled	5.3
- Legally married, civil union	52.1	- Unemployed	19.1
- Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved	7.9	Educational attainment	10.7
- Living with partner	6.9		(4.4)
- Single	29.7	IMMIGRATION VARIABLES	
- Widowed, civil partner died	2.7	Years since migration	13.8
<i>Area of origin</i>			(10.6)
- Asia	13.1	<i>Immigrant generations</i>	
- Eastern Europe	16.6	- 1st generation	75.3
- Latin America	22.6	- 1.5 generation	24.1
- Middle East	11.6	<i>Status at entry</i>	
- North Africa	16.6	- Work or study	32.5
- Sub-Saharan Africa	18.6	- Family reunion	27.9
Cultural similarity	38.0	- Permanent-long term	8.3
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES		- Humanitarian	11.9
<i>Perceived financial well-being</i>		- Other legal status	12.0
- Comfortable	14.9	- Other illegal status	4.2
- Sufficient	45.5		
- Difficult	25.4		
- Very difficult	12.9		

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

⁶ The variables marital status, area of origin, perceived financial well-being, current economic situation, immigrant generation and status at entry contain missing values.

2.3.3. Country-level measures: national citizenship policies

Consistent with the dimensions of national citizenship policies discussed above, I have identified four measures of national citizenship policies. First, the *residence requirement for naturalization*, a continuous variable measuring the number of years needed to foreign citizens to naturalize in the new residence country. Second, the *dual citizenship toleration*, a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not foreign citizens acquiring the citizenship rights of the new residence country can keep their previous citizenship. Third, the *naturalization rate*, the ratio between the yearly number of naturalizations and the number of foreign citizens in a country (Eurostat online database, 2011). Finally, the *proportion of foreign citizens*, a continuous variable measuring the number of foreign citizens as a percentage of the total resident population (Eurostat online database, 2011). Although it represents one of the key aspects of national citizenship policies, I have not taken into account the variable *citizenship by birth*, which measures whether or not children born to parents with a foreign citizenship automatically receive the citizenship rights of the country of birth, since the focus of my analysis are young and adult immigrants who are not born in the residence country. Table 2.3 shows detailed values for these policy variables.

Table 2.3. Measures of national citizenship policies in the six selected countries, around 2011

Country	No. of years of residence required for naturalization	Dual citizenship toleration (1=yes; 0=no)	Naturalization rate (in %) (2011)	Proportion (%) of foreign citizens (2011)
Belgium	5	1	2.56	11.04
France	5	1	2.96	6.04
Germany	8	0	1.52	9.05
Italy	10	1	1.45	6.82
Portugal	6	1	5.22	4.14
Spain	10	1	2.16	11.18

Source: Own elaboration on various sources

Of the countries represented here, Italy and Spain show the highest number of years needed to foreign citizens to naturalize. In particular, 10 years of residence are required to non-EU first-generation immigrants who intend to acquire the Italian or the Spanish citizenship. Nevertheless, Spain has one the highest levels of naturalization rates and proportions of foreign citizens, because of Spanish legislation, which allows some

nationalities to acquire citizenship after 2 years of uninterrupted legal residence without losing the citizenship of their country of birth, as shown above. However, according to the Italian legislation, only 4 years of legal residence are needed to EU citizens. Nevertheless, this does not seem to encourage Romanians, the largest immigrant group residing in Italy, to ask for the Italian citizenship and, therefore, to contribute to increase the Italian naturalization rate, as recently highlighted by Conti and Rottino (2016). With 8 years of residence needed to naturalization, Germany's citizenship policy appears to be one of the most restrictive in Europe: despite the high proportion of foreign citizens (9.05%), Germany has an extremely low naturalization rate (1.52%). On the contrary, France and Belgium have the lowest number of years needed to naturalization: for first-generation immigrants, naturalization is possible after 5 years of residence. However, in France applicants have to prove their language ability and sufficient assimilation, the latter being part of French Nationality Law since 1945. In the 1950s, sufficient assimilation mainly meant basic language knowledge but, in the 1970s, when the number of non-European applicants for naturalization increased, sufficient assimilation also meant accepting French values (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010). Dual citizenship is tolerated in all the countries considered by this study, with the exception of Germany, where the 1999 reform of citizenship, entered into force in 2000, has formally recalled the principle of avoidance of dual citizenship, but it has increased cases of tolerance, such as for refugees (Green, 2005). On the contrary, Spain formally has a renunciation demand but does not enforce it (Vink, 2013). With 11.04% and 11.18% respectively, Belgium and Spain have the highest proportions of foreign citizens.

2.3.4. Method

As my focus is on immigrants' citizenship status as the result of both individual and policy factors, I have performed a multilevel logistic model, to analyse differences in the probability to have citizenship status of the country of residence among young and adult immigrants as an outcome of variations in the two different levels of independent variables. Level-1 variables are the individual characteristics of immigrants and level-2 variables are the country characteristics. As well acknowledged (e.g. Goldstein, 1999), the multilevel modelling technique is used to assess the effects of macro-level characteristics on individuals, because this method uses data in which units at one level are clustered within the units at the next higher level. Multilevel modelling allows the

“interaction between variables characterizing individuals and variables characterizing groups” (Hox, 1995: 1). In other words, it permits the estimation of how covariates at different levels affect the outcome variable and how the interactions among these covariates affect the outcome variable (Guo and Zhao, 2000). Moreover, as elucidated by Khan (1997), through the variance component method, multilevel modelling has the advantage, compared to other linear and nonlinear models, “to assess the extent to which the variance in the outcome variable is attributable to different levels of hierarchy” (1997: 58). Therefore, multilevel modelling enables to measure the extent to which the variance in the probability to have the citizenship status of the country of residence is attributable to differences in individual characteristics and the extent to which the variance is attributable to differences in country characteristics. Finally, multilevel modelling allows determining whether group characteristics influence the strength of the effects of individual characteristics on the outcome variable.

2.4. Results

To analyse differences in the likelihood of having citizenship status of the country of residence among young and adult immigrants residing in six European countries as an outcome of variations in individual and policy factors, I have performed a multilevel logistic regression⁷. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.4. However, before starting to interpret the odds ratios, it is important to point out that individual- and country-level measures have a mutually conditioning effect on the acquisition of citizenship status among young and adult immigrants residing in Europe. In particular, concerning the individual-level measures, since I have taken into account heterogeneous factors, I argue that they can be selective of immigrants who are more prone to acquire the citizenship status of the residence country but also that they can produce attitudes and values who increase immigrants’ likelihood of acquiring the citizenship status of

⁷ To test the significance of policy effects, a likelihood ratio test has been carried out, comparing the null multilevel model with a null single-level model. The likelihood ratio test statistic is calculated as two times the difference in the log likelihood values for the two models. $\log\text{Lik}(\text{nm}) = -3446.589$ ($\text{df}=2$) and $\log\text{Lik}(\text{ns}) = -3762.916$ ($\text{df}=1$). $\text{LR} = 2 * (-3446.589 - -3762.916) = 632.654$ on 1 degree of freedom (because there is only one parameter difference between the models). Bearing in mind that the 5% point of a chi-squared distribution on 1 degree of freedom is 3.84, there is overwhelming evidence of policy effects on nationality. Moreover, first, I calculated the between-country variance considering the dependent variable only, which is equal to 0.780; second, I measured the between-country variance with individual variables only, which is equal to 0.843. Third, I measured the between-country variance with country level variables only, which is equal to 0.209 and, finally, I measured the between-country variance considering individual and country level variables together, which is equal to 0.063.

the residence country. However, my data do not allow us to empirically test whether the relationship between individual-level measures and the citizenship status is selectivity or causal influence (Axinn and Thornton, 1992).

Findings on gender show that females are more likely to have the citizenship status, compared to males. According to international literature (e.g. Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo, 2005), females are more likely to experience a positive incorporation into the host society, compared to their male counterpart, and therefore they are more likely to intend to permanently remain in the residence country. Conversely, a possible return to the origin country may signify the loss of independence and equality gained in the receiving country, which would entail the readjustment of their traditional roles. As far as marital status, results show that single, living with partner, legally separated, divorced or with dissolved civil union immigrants are less likely to have the citizenship status, compared to married or in civil union immigrants. Literature has highlighted the positive association between family stability and naturalization (e.g. Yang, 1994). In particular, family stability reveals the presence of social capital (i.e. family networks), more contacts within the residence country, a long-term and stable residence, less intention to return to the origin country and, therefore, a successful process of integration into the residence country (e.g. Piracha *et al.*, 2013). Concerning the area of origin, immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan, Latin American and Eastern European countries appear to be the most likely to have the citizenship status of the new residence country. A special regime for naturalization provided to Latin Americans, ethno-cultural and geographical proximity to the origin country for both Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans (Yang, 1994; Piché, 2004; Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009), but also more deprived and precarious life conditions at the origin, such those characterizing immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan countries, are relevant factors explaining this result. Similarly, immigrants coming from a country that is a former colony of their new residence country appear to be more likely to have the citizenship status of the new residence country, compared to immigrants coming from a country that is not a former colony of their new residence country. Cultural similarity, which depend on colonial and post-colonial ties between origin and residence countries, which “make the former colonial state a preferred destination for people from the former colonies” (Vezzoli and Flahaux, 2016: 3), can imply the use of the same language for foreign and native citizens. This can help reducing risks of social marginalization and economic and professional segregation, increasing, for example, the chances of being employed in

medium and high-skilled jobs and, more in general, of having a successful path of integration into the new residence country.

As far as the human capital variables, findings for the current economic situation show that immigrants who are doing housework or other and are retired, sick or disabled are less likely to be naturalized, compared to those who are employed. This result can be interpreted in the light of the neoclassical theory of migration (e.g. Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969), according to which immigrants who are not employed face more problems in actualizing their immigration and integration goals and, therefore, they are less equipped to apply for and obtain the citizenship status of the new residence country. As predictable, a worse perceived financial well-being decreases immigrants' likelihood of having the citizenship status of the new residence country. Perceived financial well-being is a subjective indicator of integration that can be considered as a proxy for income and labour market participation, which affects immigrants' legality and mobility in the residence country (Sacchetto and Vianello, 2016). In particular, income and labour market participation can influence immigrants' capability to stabilize themselves in the host country, in terms of legal residence and stable labour conditions (Morris, 2001), as well as their chances of becoming part of the host society and, therefore, enjoying the citizenship rights. Moreover, a proper annual income can be a prerequisite for naturalization, as in the case of Italy (Paparusso *et al.*, 2016). Education plays a positive effect on immigrants' citizenship status: immigrants that are more educated are more likely to have citizenship status, compared to less educated immigrants. This result provides evidence for the position in the European public debate, which argues that the acquisition of citizenship rights should be only granted to immigrants who can demonstrate to have completed the integration process, fulfilling high integration requirements, such as high educational and professional careers (Schneider and Crul, 2010; Crul *et al.*, 2012).

As far as the 'immigration' variables are concerned, the number of years since migration shapes immigrants' likelihood of naturalization, as Peters *et al.* (2015) have recently highlighted. Therefore, the more years they are living in the residence country, the higher the likelihood that they will have the citizenship status. Moreover, 1.5-generation immigrants are more likely to have citizenship status, compared to 1st generation immigrants. This result provides evidence for the literature on integration studies, which argue that immigrants who arrived at younger ages are more integrated into the residence country, compared to immigrants who arrived at older ages (Portes

and Rumbaut, 2001). Indeed, immigrant generation is considered a crucial component of the integration process (Piché, 2004; Tran, 2016). In particular, previous studies show that to migrate at young ages can facilitate the process of incorporation, increase sense of belonging and political participation to the host society and encourage the acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). Coming to the status at entry, results show that family migrants are the most likely to acquire citizenship status. Family reunification is a “key source of immigration” (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006: 19). In particular, it is one of the major entry channels for European countries, especially for Mediterranean countries (Reyneri, 2001). Family reunification generally implies immigrants’ intention to permanently settle into the new residence country, as they migrated to join their family members. Moreover, family formation facilitates the naturalization of immigrants and their descendants in European countries. Humanitarian immigrants also have a strong motivation to acquire the citizenship status of the residence country: it could give them more safety and freedom of movement, considering that they had to leave their country for safety reasons.

When policy factors are considered, results show that the residence requirement for naturalization decreases the likelihood of acquiring citizenship status among immigrants residing in European countries. A higher number of years of residence required for naturalization can deter immigrants’ desire to apply for citizenship status and hinder the chances of obtaining it. Conversely, the dual citizenship toleration into the residence country increases the likelihood of having the citizenship status among immigrants, since they are not forced to renounce to their previous citizenship and, therefore, to challenge their relationship and sense of belonging to the origin country, including the autonomy and freedom of returning or travelling without constraints (Massey *et al.* 2015). Concerning the naturalization rate and the proportion of foreign citizens, results show a positive effect on the likelihood of acquiring the citizenship status, since they are synonymous of residence countries that are inclusive and proactive towards immigrants and their descendants.

Table 2.4. Multilevel logistic regression with dependent variable nationality (N = 6,255)

Independent variables	Odds ratios	Significance
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES		
Age	1.007	
Female (ref. cat. = male)	1.264	**
<i>Marital Status</i> (ref. cat. = legally married or civil union)		
- Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved	0.937	
- Living with partner	0.496	***
- Single	0.758	**
- Widowed, civil partner died	1.076	
<i>Area of origin</i> (ref. cat. = Asia)		
- Eastern Europe	1.546	**
- Latin America	1.439	*
- Middle East	0.968	
- North Africa	1.076	
- Sub-Saharan Africa	1.573	**
Cultural similarity	1.534	**
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES		
<i>Current economic situation</i> (ref. cat. = in paid work)		
- Doing housework or other	0.731	*
- In education	0.862	
- Retired, sick, disabled	0.532	***
- Unemployed	0.917	
<i>Perceived financial well-being</i> (ref. cat. = comfortable)		
- Sufficient	0.728	**
- Difficult	0.755	*
- Very difficult	0.520	***
Educational attainment (in years)	1.057	***
IMMIGRATION VARIABLES		
Years since migration	1.091	***
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = 1st generation)	1.702	***
<i>Status at entry</i> (ref. cat. = work or study)		
- Family reunion	1.451	***
- Permanent-long term	1.084	
- Humanitarian	1.147	
- Other legal status	0.877	
- Other illegal status	0.599	***
NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP POLICIES		
No. of years of residence required for naturalization	0.818	***
Dual citizenship toleration	2.127	*
Naturalization rate	1.452	***
Proportion of foreign citizens	1.350	***

Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

2.5. Discussion and conclusions

Aim of this work has been to examine the effect of both individual characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies on the likelihood of having citizenship status among young and adult immigrants living in European countries. In particular, my research questions have been the following: Which factors influence more immigrants' citizenship status? Do national citizenship policies affect citizenship status of immigrants living in European countries? Are the traditional national models of immigration and integration helpful in interpreting my results? I have responded to these research questions by performing a multilevel logistic regression on selected European countries.

The analysis has highlighted the strong effect of individual characteristics on citizenship status. In particular, as synonyms of a consolidated process of integration into the residence country, higher family stability, educational attainment, current economic situation, perceived financial well-being, duration of residence and cultural similarity with the origin country appear to increase the likelihood of having the citizenship status among immigrants living in Europe. However, this effect is mediated by policy factors. In particular, a lower residence requirement for naturalization and a more inclusive environment help immigrants in the process of becoming citizens of the new residence country. These conditions seem to characterize countries belonging to the French model of integration, where there is a more balanced relationship between a low number of years of residence required for naturalization, the dual citizenship toleration and relatively high naturalization rates and proportions of foreign citizens, compared to other countries. Therefore, this seems to be an optimal mix for promoting the acquisition of citizenship status among young and adult immigrants. Indeed, the acquisition of citizenship status for immigrants perfectly reflects the French model of integration, according to which "members of some cultural community abandon at least some of their customs and practices" (Mason, 1999: 266). The use of the French 'Contrat d'accueil et de l'intégration' introduced by the *first Sarkozy Law* of 2003, but made compulsory in 2007 after the second *Sarkozy Law*, and the 'Integration Contract' recently included in the Belgian 'Citizenisation' policy proves that the introduction of civic requirements has not been questioned by the shift from assimilationist to anti-discrimination policies. However, immigrants become more alike to natives not just through the adoption of similar social, economic and cultural behaviours, but also through the acquisition of same rights and duties. In this regard, citizenship status helps

to reduce differences among foreign citizens and natives, which marks the integration paradigm. Conversely, a “subordinate integration” (Ambrosini, 2001), mainly restricted to some segments of the labour market, where there is a strong demand of unskilled and precarious jobs, which characterizes Southern European and exclusionist countries, does not comply (yet) with the process of granting to immigrants the same civil and political participation of natives, which distinguishes the citizenship status.

This study has some limitations, because it does not allow taking into account the behaviour of multiculturalist countries for what concerns the concession of citizenship rights to immigrants. The academic literature (e.g. Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011; Kymlicka, 2012) has recently shed light on the debate about the effectiveness of multiculturalism to achieve its intended effects, especially in granting immigrants equality and emancipation (Koopmans, 2010). In particular, a research strand argues that since they emphasize ethnic and cultural particularisms, multicultural policies risk of “reinforcing ethnic stratification and ethno-cultural conflict” (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006: 5), producing isolation and discouraging the process of reducing gaps between nationals and non-nationals. These considerations point to the need for more detailed analysis of how the acquisition of citizenship rights works in a multiculturalist context.

3. STUDYING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION THROUGH SELF-REPORTED LIFE SATISFACTION IN THE RESIDENCE COUNTRY: EVIDENCE FOR SEVEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

3.1. Introduction

Immigrant integration has been defined as the ensemble of the “processes that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants to obtain the valued ‘stuff’ of a society, as well as social acceptance, through participation in major institutions such as the educational and political system and the labour and housing markets” (Alba and Foner, 2016: 5). The academic literature unanimously recognizes these processes as dynamic, multidimensional and two-way that involve, at the same time and by the same measure, the receiving society and the newcomers (Penninx, 2004; Piché, 2004; Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009). The complexity and the multi-dimensionality of these processes has led analysts and researchers to take into account a multiplicity of factors, such as the demographic characteristics of immigrants, the human capital variables and the so-called ‘immigration variables’ (Amit, 2010), which are variables pertaining the migration process as a whole (e.g. years since migration, period of arrival, reason of migration). Moreover, as far as the assessment of integration outcomes, several scholars have tried to examine the effect of different integration paradigms (e.g. assimilation, acculturation, multiculturalism and mandatory integration) on immigrants’ socioeconomic, sociocultural and political integration using *ad hoc* indicators (e.g. Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010; Maxwell, 2010; Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011; Maxwell, 2012; Wright and Bloemraad, 2012; Koopmans, 2013; Wallace Goodman and Wright, 2015; Koopmans, 2016). Despite the remarkable contribution of these works to integration studies, it has been concluded that to understand integration is not sufficient to investigate only its ‘objective’ forms (e.g. educational attainment, household income, employment, housing, legal status, etc.). Instead, one must also study ‘subjective’ integration (Amit, 2010; Neto, 1995; 2011), using immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction, in order to take into account their perceptions and opinions about their experience into the residence country. Life satisfaction has been defined as “a global assessment of a person’s quality of life according to his chosen criteria” (Shin and Johnson, 1978, cit. in Dieder *et al.*, 1985: 71). Due to its common use in estimating the “apparent quality of life within a country or a specific social group” (Veenhoven, 1996:

3), immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction can be used to evaluate the integration process into the residence country. For example, Angelini *et al.* (2015) studied the association between immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction and cultural assimilation in Germany. In particular, they showed that the positive effect of cultural assimilation on immigrants' subjective well-being is stronger for established and second-generation immigrants than for immigrants that are more recent. Safi (2010) demonstrated that perceived discrimination negatively affects immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction; in particular, the grade of self-reported life satisfaction decreases among ethnic groups facing discrimination in the residence country. A higher self-reported life satisfaction underlies a successful and long-term residence abroad. The analysis of Massey and Akresh (2006) revealed, indeed, that more satisfied immigrants are more likely to intend to naturalize and permanently settled in the U.S. compared to less satisfied immigrants. In their view, immigrants' intention to acquire the citizenship status and to remain in the residence country are synonyms of a positive integration process. Finally, in their analysis of Somali women in Melbourne, McMicheal and Manderson (2004) concluded that weak social capital and social networks negatively affect women's self-reported life satisfaction. Within these considerations, this paper aims to contribute to this strand of research, using self-reported life satisfaction to assess immigrants' integration into the residence country. In particular, I intend to measure the effect of demographic, human capital and 'immigration' variables on the self-reported life satisfaction of young and adult immigrants residing in seven European countries, using the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS). The paper is structured as followed: Section 3.2 discusses the main determinants of self-reported life satisfaction. Section 3.3 describes data and operationalization. In section 3.4, I present the results and I conclude in Section 3.5.

3.2. The main determinants of self-reported life satisfaction in the residence country

Many studies investigated the determinants of immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction in the residence country, finding an association between life satisfaction and immigrants' individual characteristics, such as demographic and human capital variables, on the one hand, and 'immigration' variables, on the other (e.g. Fugl-Meyer *et al.*, 2002; Bonini, 2008; Amit, 2010; Safi, 2010). While results for gender are not very clear-cut, empirical evidence shows that the effect of age on immigrants' life

satisfaction is not linear (e.g. Bartram, 2013; D'Isanto *et al.*, 2016; Schalembier, 2016). Marital status appears to be a significant predictor of life satisfaction: immigrants engaged in a stable relationship express significantly higher levels of satisfaction with life, compared to those without such a status (Fugl-Meyer *et al.*, 2002). Economic and financial conditions also have a significant effect on life satisfaction: immigrants with a more stable labour and economic conditions show higher levels of life satisfaction compared to those immigrants with labour and economic conditions that are more precarious (Amit, 2010; D'Isanto *et al.*, 2016). Education also plays a significant role on immigrants' life satisfaction: education improves social relationships and labour market opportunities and, therefore, it increases well-being (e.g. Koopmans, 2016). Therefore, highly educated immigrants are expected to express higher level of life satisfaction, compared to less educated immigrants. However, it cannot be neglected that over-qualified immigrants can express less satisfaction with life due to the difficulty of finding a proper occupation in the residence country (e.g. Massey and Akresh, 2006; Fullin and Reyneri, 2010).

Concerning the 'immigration' variables, the number of years spent in the residence country contributes to improve immigrants' life satisfaction (Piché, 2004; Cela *et al.*, 2013). Indeed, a higher number of years since migration is expected to strength the socio-economic position of immigrants, as well as their legal status in the residence country and both are predictors of high life satisfaction. Concerning the period of arrival in the residence country, it is well acknowledged that immigrants who have migrated at younger ages, and therefore have socialized in the residence country, have more chances to be better integrated, especially in terms of language proficiency, educational attainment, labour opportunities and household income, compared to immigrants who have migrated at older ages (e.g. Rumbaut, 1997; 2004). Legal status has been defined as "the rights afforded or denied by the state to individuals residing in its territory" (Söhn, 2014: 3). On legal status, can depend the civil, social and political rights (i.e. receipt of welfare benefits, political participation and representation) enjoyed by immigrants and their families, the access and the permanence into the labour market, the possibility to apply for and obtain a long-term residence permit or the citizenship of the residence country (Bauböck, 2006; Morris, 2001; Cangiano, 2014). A more permanent legal status confers a more stable stay in the residence country, a more lasting participation into the labour market, more public resources and a higher social capital (Vertovec, 2007), thus improving immigrants' life satisfaction and integration.

Therefore, based on previous literature, I formulate the following research hypotheses. (1) I expect younger and older immigrants be more satisfied with life and, therefore, more integrated into the residence country. (2) I moreover expect that immigrants with higher family stability, better labour and economic conditions and higher educational attainment will show higher levels of life satisfaction and, therefore, be more integrated into the residence country. (3) I also expect to find an association between immigrants' level of life satisfaction, and therefore of their integration, and their area of origin. As claimed by Maxwell (2012), integration is not a unique and homogenous process and not all immigrant groups perform in the same way. Immigrants' background and precisely their area of origin can have an impact on immigrants' integration outcomes into the residence country. For instance, the area of origin can affect the likelihood of obtaining the citizenship of the residence country, depending on whether or not origin countries tolerate dual citizenship (Vink, 2013), or contribute to produce the so-called 'ethnic penalties', which are forms of discrimination at work, because of cultural distance between immigrants and natives (Koopmans, 2016). In particular, ethno-cultural (e.g. former colonial ties, common history, use of the same language and practicing the same religion), social and economic (e.g. type of family organization, labour market structure and level of economic development) similarity, including geographical proximity, between the country of origin and the country of residence (Yang, 1994; Piché, 2004) can increase immigrants' satisfaction with life and facilitate their process of integration into the new residence country. Specifically, "countries that have been colonies or dependencies of more-developed countries tend to retain a special relationship with the colonizing country, since many residents of such countries speak the language of the colonizer and immigrants from the former colony are often given an advantage in applying for permanent resident status" (Wanner, 2011: 16). Therefore, I make the hypothesis (4) that immigrants coming from a country which is a former colony of his/her new residence country will be more satisfied with life, and therefore more integrated, compared to immigrants coming from a country which is not a former colony of his/her new residence country. In addition, according to previous research, which has demonstrated the positive process of integration of immigrants coming from Latin American countries and the comparative advantageous position in the labour market of immigrants coming from East Europeans countries (e.g. Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009; Khattab and Fox, 2016), I make the hypothesis (5) that Latin Americans and East Europeans will be more satisfied with life, and, therefore, be more

integrated into the residence country, compared to immigrants coming from other countries. (6) I furthermore expect that the higher the number of years spent in the residence country and the more permanent the legal status, the higher the levels of immigrants' life satisfaction and, therefore, the higher the level of their integration. Finally, institutional factors and in particular immigration and integration policies can contribute to affect immigrants' level of life satisfaction and, therefore, their integration into the residence country (e.g. Martin, 1994; Penninx, 2003; Büchel and Frick, 2005). (7) I thus expect to find differences among residence countries.

3.3. Data, method and operationalization

My study draws on the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), conducted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, from October 2011 to January 2012, with the aim to ask immigrants themselves how they experienced integration policies (www.immigrantsurvey.org). 7,468 immigrants were surveyed in the following countries and cities: Belgium (Antwerp, Brussels and Liège), France (Lyon and Paris), Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Milan and Naples), Portugal (Faro, Lisbon and Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid). The ICS survey aims to reach those: not born in the residence country (although immigrated as minors); who are or were non-EU citizens or stateless persons (born as citizen of country other than EU/EEA countries or Switzerland); residing in the country for more than one year; holding or renewing a legal immigration status and being 15 years or older. The survey addresses the following topics: employment; languages; civic and political participation; family reunion; long-term residence and citizenship.

To test my research hypotheses, I have performed ordered logistic regression models. Ordered logistic regression is an extension of the binary logistic regression used when the response variable has ordered categorical values. One of main assumptions underlying ordered logistic regression is that the relationship between each couple of outcome groups is the same. In other words, ordered logistic regression assumes that the coefficients describing the relationship between the lowest and all higher categories of the response variable are the same as those describing the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories (Brant, 1990). This is known as the 'proportional odds assumption'. Ordered logistic regression appears very suitable to be employed when analysing subjective indicators, such as self-reported life satisfaction,

happiness, perceived well-being or self-reported health status, since they are generally measured on an ordinal scale (Baker *et al.*, 2005; Bowling *et al.*, 2006; Lim and Putnam, 2010). I have used the following variables in the analysis.

3.3.1. Self-reported life satisfaction

As dependent variable, I have analysed immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction. Respondents were asked the following question: could you please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10 how satisfied you are with each of the following items, when 0 means you are very dissatisfied and 10 means you are very satisfied? The items were the following: 'your life these days', 'your present level of education', 'your present job', 'your accommodation', 'your family life', 'your health' and 'your social life'. The ICS survey does not provide an item that rates satisfaction with life *as a whole*, as the literature recommends when measuring life satisfaction (Diener, 1984; Diener *et al.*, 1985; 1993). Nevertheless, as suggested by Bonini (2008), the item 'your life these days' can be used as synthetic indicator of life satisfaction⁸. Before performing the ordered logistic regressions, I have used a predictive mean matching method to impute the missing data contained in the variable 'your life these days'.

3.3.2. Demographic, human capital and 'immigration' variables

Given previous literature and my research hypotheses, I have operationalized several independent variables. Among the demographic variables, I have selected (a) respondents' *age*, measured in years; (b) *age squared*; (c) *gender*, represented by the dummy variable male (reference category) and female and (d) *marital status*, distinguishing between 'legally married or civil union' (reference category), 'legally separated or divorced or civil union dissolved', 'living with my partner', 'widowed or civil partner died' and 'single'. Then, (e) *area of origin*, distinguishing between 'Asia' (reference category), 'Eastern Europe', 'Latin America', 'Middle East', 'North Africa' and 'Sub-Saharan Africa' and finally, (f) *cultural similarity*, measured by a dummy variable (0/1) indicating whether respondent's origin country is a former colony of

⁸ I have also performed an ordered logistic regression model on each of the other dimensions of life satisfaction and therefore on 'your present level of education', 'your accommodation', 'your family life', 'your health' and 'your social life', in order to account for all these aspects. I have not considered 'your present job', because of the large number of missing data, which are due to the unemployed, which are not supposed to answer. Results are displayed in the Appendix.

his/her new residence country (for instance, the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America for Spain and Brazil for Portugal) or not (reference category). For what concerns the human capital variables, I have selected (g) *current economic situation*, distinguishing between ‘in paid work’ (reference category), ‘in education’, ‘unemployed’, ‘retired or sick or disabled’, ‘doing housework or other’; (h) *perceived financial well-being*, distinguishing between ‘comfortable’ (reference category), ‘sufficient’, ‘difficult’ and ‘very difficult’ and (i) *educational attainment*, which refers to the number of years spent in education. For the so-called ‘immigration’ variables, I have selected three variables. First, (l) *years since migration*, which refers to the number of years one lives in the residence country, measured by the difference between the year of the interview and the year of arrival in the residence country. Second, (m) *years since migration squared*. Third, (n) respondents’ *immigrant generation*, distinguishing between 1st (reference category) and 1.5. In particular, 1st generation means those who migrated at age older than 17, while 1.5 generation includes those who migrated at age younger than 17. Forth, (o) *legal status*, distinguishing between ‘work or study’ (reference category), ‘family reunion’, ‘permanent/long term residence permit’, ‘humanitarian’, ‘other legal status’ and ‘national’. Among the modalities considered by this variable, there are different categories of residence permit, which can determine specific sets of rights and conditions for immigrants who hold them. Finally, I have included the (p) *residence country*, distinguishing between Belgium (reference category), France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

3.4. Results

3.4.1. Descriptive results

The definition of variables along with their percentages, means and standard deviation are displayed in Table 3.1. The average age of immigrants residing in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain is 38.6 years old. Females represent around 51% of the total sample. While the most part of immigrants are married (52.3%), 29.3% are single, 7.7% are legally separated, divorced or with a civil union dissolved, 6.4% are living with their partner and 3.2% are widowed. Concerning the area of origin, 21.9% of immigrants come from Eastern Europe, 18.9% from Latin America, 16.2% from Asia, 15.8% from Sub-Saharan Africa, 14.3% from North Africa and 11.4% from Middle East. It is interesting to note that 31.8% of the respondents’ origin country is a

former colony of their new residence country. As far as the current economic situation is concerned, 57% of the respondents have a paid work, 16.8% are unemployed, 10.8% are in education, 7.4% are doing housework or other and 6.8% are retired, sick or disabled. Regarding their financial well-being, 17.1% of the respondents have a comfortable financial well-being, 24% difficult, 45.1% sufficient and 11.9% very difficult. Educational attainment is quite high and on average equal to 10.84 years. When immigration variables are considered, the number of years since migration is on average 14.4. On average, three out of four respondents are 1st generation immigrants, while one out of four is 1.5-generation. Moreover, 31.8% of the respondents hold a permanent/long-term residence permit, 31.4% are national, 22.6% have a work or study status, 7.4% have family reunion, 2.7% have a humanitarian status and 3% have other legal status and. Finally, 13.8% is living in Belgium, 13.2% in France, 16.1% in Germany; 16.1% in Hungary, 10.7% in Italy; 16.9% in Portugal and 13.3% in Spain.

Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics on independent variables⁹. Sample of immigrants (N = 7,468) in seven residence countries, around 2011-2012

Independent variables	% or mean and (SD)	Independent variables	% or mean and (SD)
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES		<i>Perceived financial well-being</i>	
Age (in years)	38.6 (13.4)	- Comfortable	17.1
		- Sufficient	45.1
Female	50.9	- Difficult	24
<i>Marital status</i>		- Very difficult	11.9
- Legally married, civil union	52.3	Educational attainment	10.9
- Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved	7.7		(4.5)
- Living with partner	6.4	IMMIGRATION VARIABLES	
- Single	29.3	Years since migration	14.4
- Widowed, civil partner died	3.2		(11.8)
<i>Area of origin</i>		<i>Immigrant generations</i>	
- Asia	16.2	- 1st generation	74.9
- Eastern Europe	21.9	- 1.5 generation	24.6
- Latin America	18.9	<i>Legal status</i>	
- Middle East	11.4	- Work or study	22.6

⁹ The variables marital status, area of origin, current economic situation, perceived financial well-being, immigrant generation and legal status contain missing values.

- North Africa	14.3	- Family reunion	7.4
- Sub-Saharan Africa	15.8	- Humanitarian	2.7
Cultural similarity	31.8	- National	31.4
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES		- Other legal status	3
<i>Current economic situation</i>		- Permanent/long-term residence permit	31.8
- In paid work	57	<i>Residence country</i>	
- Doing housework or other	7.4	- Belgium	13.8
- In education	10.8	- France	13.2
- Retired, sick, disabled	6.8	- Germany	16.1
- Unemployed	16.8	- Hungary	16.1
		- Italy	10.7
		- Portugal	16.9
		- Spain	13.3

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

3.4.2. Regression results

To ascertain the contributions of demographic, human capital and so-called ‘immigration’ variables, I have carried out three ordered logistic regression models, where demographic variables have been first introduced (Model 1), then human capital variables (Model 2) and finally ‘immigration’ variables (Model 3). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 3.2.

The variables that contribute significantly to the model are age, age squared, gender, marital status and area of origin. Age has a negative effect on immigrants’ life satisfaction: the older immigrants are, the lower their level of satisfaction with life. However, additional analysis suggests that this effect is not linear: age squared is positive. Thus, when immigrants get older, the negative effect of age is reduced. As mentioned before, this result finds evidence in the international literature, according to which younger and older immigrants report higher levels of life satisfaction (e.g. Safi, 2010; Bartram, 2013; D’Isanto *et al.*, 2016). Therefore, this result verifies the first research hypothesis. Females are more satisfied with life compared to males. As I have argued in the first paper, females are more likely to be successfully integrated into the host country, compared to males, and therefore they are more likely to express higher satisfaction with life into the residence country. As far as marital status, results show that married or in civil union immigrants are more satisfied with life, compared to those who live with partner, are legally separated, divorced or with a civil union dissolved and

are widowed. Literature has highlighted the positive association between being married and being satisfied with life (e.g. Diener *et al.*, 1999). Although with many individual (Diener *et al.*, 2006) and contextual (Wadsworth, 2016) differences, being married increases life satisfaction, at least on the short term. Indeed, marriage provides emotional, psychological, material and physic support, especially at elderly stages of life (Chipperfield and Havens, 2001). Especially among immigrants, being married can be a predictor of more social capital (i.e. family networks); it can also reveal a long-term residence abroad and, therefore, a successful process of integration into the residence country (e.g. Piracha *et al.*, 2013). This result verifies the second research hypothesis, as far as family stability. Concerning the area of origin, immigrants coming from Latin American, Middle Eastern and Eastern European countries appear to be the most satisfied with life, while immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan African countries are the least satisfied, as previous research has shown (e.g. Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009). The existence of “smaller cultural discrepancies” (D’Isanto *et al.*, 2016: 1124) between the area of origin and the country of residence for Latin Americans living in Spain, Portugal or Italy, appears to have a positive effect on life satisfaction¹⁰. For instance, the use of the same language, or the use of a language that is not very distant from the native one, can reduce immigrants’ difficulties of interaction with natives, increase the chances of incorporation into the labour market and, therefore, promote social mobility. For Eastern Europeans, ethno-cultural similarity and geographical proximity can play a positive role in determining their satisfaction with life into the new residence country. Finally, Middle Easter immigrants, such as Turks, represent an ancient immigrant group in Western Europe, especially in Germany: the first arrivals of Turks in Germany started in the 1960s, with the recruitment agreement of 1961 (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011). As a result of their ancient migration history in Western Europe, Turkish immigrants are one of the first immigrant groups to experience the aging of its first-generation members and the growing of the second- and third-generations, which are typical features of a well-stabilized and integrated population of immigrants in the host country (Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009). I believe that this factor can contribute to determine Middle Easter immigrants’ positive life

¹⁰ The specific variable labeled *cultural similarity*, which indicates the existence of colonial and post-colonial ties between origin and residence countries, and which implies the presence of cultural common features among them, is not significant, because it has been probably captured by the variable *area of origin*. Nevertheless, in other regression models it appears to be significant (see the Appendix).

satisfaction and integration into the residence country. These results verify the third and the fifth research hypothesis.

When introducing the human capital variables, the variable current economic situation contributes quite significantly to the model: unemployed immigrants are less satisfied with life, compared to those who are employed, as previous research has stressed (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1994). The perceived financial well-being contributes significantly to the model, too. As predictable, a worse perceived financial well-being decreases immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction. Perceived financial well-being is a subjective indicator of integration, which can be interpreted as a proxy of income. As recently highlighted (D'Isanto *et al.*, 2016; Schalembier, 2016; Tibesigwa *et al.*, 2016), many studies have examined the association between life satisfaction and income, at both individual and country level. Although this association is quite complex and not unidirectional, because of psychological and relative factors, which should be taken into account, by strengthening individuals' economic capabilities, security and independence, income increases life satisfaction and, therefore, improves immigrants' socio-economic integration into the residence country. Moreover, in the light of the micro-perspective of the neoclassical theory of migration (e.g. Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969), as migration requires monetary and human capital investment, the expected positive net return in the form of real income or job perspectives is a sign of a completed mission in the residence country, as goals and targets have been achieved. Educational attainment has a negative impact on immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction. Therefore, immigrants that are more educated show lower levels of life satisfaction, compared to less educated immigrants. The scientific literature recognizes the interrelated role played by educational attainment, access to the labour market and economic well-being in the integration process (e.g. Di Bartolomeo and Strozza, 2014; Di Bartolomeo *et al.*, 2015). High educational and professional careers are, indeed, indicators for immigrants to be successful integrated into the receiving society (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003; Schneider and Crul, 2010). Nevertheless, the role of over-qualification cannot be overlooked when analysing immigrant integration processes. In particular, immigrants with higher educational attainment can report a lower satisfaction with life, since they probably experience more difficulties in finding a proper job and they have to accept an occupation, which is less qualified compared to their level of education (Khattab and Fox, 2016). Therefore, the second research hypothesis is

verified with the exception of the educational attainment¹¹. Age, age squared, gender, marital status and area of origin remain significant in both the models.

When introducing the ‘immigration’ variables, age, age squared, gender, marital status, area of origin, current economic situation and perceived financial well-being remain significant. However, Latin American and Eastern European immigrants become not significant and Middle Eastern and North African immigrants show less levels of satisfaction with life, compared to Asians. On this regard, it can be helpful to note that, although immigrants from Turkey represent by far the largest immigrant group in Germany, few of them have the German citizenship (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003). Therefore, when controlling for the ‘immigration’ variables, the advantage position of Middle Eastern immigrants disappears. Years since migration have been defined as “a key factor in the integration process” (Piché, 2004: 352). In particular, integration is considered a long-term process and a higher number of years since migration highlights the maturity of this process in the residence country (Mussino *et al.*, 2014). Moreover, it can reveal a process of selectivity, which excludes temporary immigrants, who planned to spend only a short period abroad, and unsatisfied immigrants, who decided to return home because their migration projects failed (Cassarino, 2004; de Haas *et al.*, 2014; Giner-Monfort *et al.*, 2015). As far as the effect of years since migration on self-reported life satisfaction, Amit (2010) has found that the number of years since migration improves immigrants’ life satisfaction, as the more years immigrants are living in the residence country, the higher the level of their economic and labour market position. On the contrary, Safi (2010) revealed that immigrants’ life satisfaction generally decreases over time and that it can increase only after a long time spent into the residence country. Nevertheless, in my models both years since migration and the square of the years since migration are not significant. However, depending on which dimension of life satisfaction is analysed, the effect of years since migration changes, as shown in the Appendix. As far as the legal status, immigrants holding the citizenship of the country of residence appear to be the most satisfied with life. As highlighted in the second paper, international literature (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994; Castles, 1995; Joppke, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Bauböck, 2006; Guiraudon, 2014) has largely demonstrated the pivotal role played by citizenship for immigrants’ process of integration into the residence country. In particular, as stressed by Ersanilli and

¹¹ For further discussion on the effect of educational attainment on life satisfaction, see the Appendix.

Koopmans (2010), two positions exist on the public debate on the issue of the citizenship status to immigrants residing in European countries. The first position argues that citizenship stimulates integration. From this point of view, citizenship is not the end of the integration process, but rather one of the many aspects constituting the whole process of integration of immigrants into the residence country. On the contrary, the second position argues that citizenship is the final step of the integration process; therefore, immigrants holding the citizenship of the residence country are expected to have completed their integration process. These positions can have different implications for the easiness with which immigrants can obtain the citizenship status of the new residence country. Nevertheless, both agree that citizenship is a legal status, which, by providing the same status and rights of native-born residents, contributes to improve parity with natives, strength foreign-born citizens' sense of identity – which enhances social cohesion (Holtug, 2016) – and, therefore, shape integration (Joopke, 2010). Moreover, literature has linked the citizenship status to immigrants' circular mobility and, therefore, to the possibility to easily travel to the origin country without any fear of losing the residence status, or to move to other European countries to find better life conditions and economic opportunities (e.g. Massey *et al.*, 2015). On the contrary, humanitarian immigrants show the least level of life satisfaction: their stay in the residence country is more precarious and uncomfortable, compared to other categories of immigrants (Connor, 2010). Due to their weak migration networks and poor human capital (Sciortino, 2006), humanitarian immigrants generally face many integration difficulties. As recently elucidated by Ortensi (2015), although they are not excluded from the access to regular employment, as one could expect, they generally experiment high level of unemployment, mainly because of their poor education, language and working skills, insecure living conditions and fragile social networks in the residence country. Moreover, because European societies often perceive them as a threat to inner security and social cohesion, they often experiment episodes of discrimination and xenophobia. Only some of the above-mentioned factors are controlled in the model, therefore the disadvantage position of humanitarian immigrants persists. Therefore, the sixth research hypothesis is tested, as far as legal status, but not as far as the variable years since migration. Finally, when the residence country is considered, results show that immigrants residing in Belgium are the most satisfied with life, while immigrants living in Hungary and Italy appear to be the least satisfied with life and, therefore, the least integrated. Several factors, which combine personal

resources from within immigrants' own families and communities in receiving countries, and educational, social and economic opportunities that institutions in receiving countries provide to immigrants can contribute to define these patterns of life satisfaction. Therefore, the seventh research hypothesis is verified too.

Table 3.3. Ordered logistic regressions models with dependent variable life satisfaction with your life these days (N =7,468)

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds Ratios	Signif.	Odds Ratios	Signif.	Odds Ratios	Signif.
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES						
Age	0.959	***	0.977	**	0.975	*
Age squared	1.586	***	1.339	**	1.292	*
Female (ref. cat. = male)	1.201	***	1.183	***	1.164	***
<i>Marital Status</i> (ref. cat. = legally married or civil union)						
- Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved	0.608	***	0.685	***	0.666	***
- Living with partner	0.843	*	0.902		0.908	
- Single	0.932		0.953		0.964	
- Widowed, civil partner died	0.558	***	0.621	***	0.660	**
<i>Area of origin</i> (ref. cat. = Asia)						
- Eastern Europe	1.165	*	1.137	**	1.004	
- Latin America	1.352	***	1.492	***	1.172	
- Middle East	1.195	***	1.079	***	0.730	***
- North Africa	1.086		1.294		0.799	*
- Sub-Saharan Africa	0.584	***	0.830	*	0.614	***
Cultural similarity	1.066		1.020		0.968	
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES						
<i>Current economic situation</i> (ref. cat. = in paid work)						
- Doing housework or other			1.010		0.963	
- In education			1.065		1.066	
- Retired, sick, disabled			0.837		0.760	*
- Unemployed			0.681	***	0.646	***
<i>Perceived financial well-being</i> (ref. cat. = comfortable)						
- Sufficient			0.564	***	0.573	***
- Difficult			0.306	***	0.316	***
- Very difficult			0.146	***	0.163	***
Educational attainment (in years)			0.982	***	0.985	**
IMMIGRATION VARIABLES						
Years since migration					1.009	
Years since migration squared					0.967	
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = 1 st)					1.019	

generation)						
<i>Legal status</i> (ref. cat. = work or study)						
- Family reunion					1.163	
- Humanitarian					0.854	*
- National					1.555	***
- Other legal status					1.263	*
- Permanent/long-term residence permit					1.225	**
<i>Residence country</i> (ref. cat. = Belgium)						
- France					0.784	*
- Germany					0.795	*
- Hungary					0.416	***
- Italy					0.439	***
- Portugal					0.624	***
- Spain					0.836	*

Significance: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

3.5. Conclusions

Aim of this paper has been to measure the effect of demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables on the self-reported life satisfaction of young and adult immigrants residing in seven European countries. Self-reported life satisfaction has been used to evaluate immigrants’ integration into the residence country, as it is commonly employed to estimate the perceived quality of life within a country or a specific social group. Self-reported life satisfaction is centred on personal judgments and criteria, not on criteria that are judged important by others (Neto, 2001), thus it appears very suitable to take into account immigrants’ view on their experience into the residence country and, therefore, to assess their subjective integration.

The multivariate regression results show that self-reported life satisfaction strongly depends on immigrants’ demographic characteristics and human capital factors, such as age, marital status, current economic situation and perceived financial well-being. Nevertheless, when controlling for ‘immigration’ variables, the association between life satisfaction and demographic and human capital variables changes, thus proving that not only factors at origin (immigrants’ background characteristics), but also conditions at destination are important in determining immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. In particular, legal status and residence country play a significant role in defining immigrants’ life satisfaction, thus demonstrating that the ensemble of rights, resources

and restrictions immigrants find into the country of residence shapes their satisfaction with life and, therefore, their subjective integration (e.g. Morris, 2001; Vertovec, 2007). Therefore, our results provide support for the importance of the individual determinants in explaining immigrants' satisfaction with life into the residence country and the differences modelling integration patterns in European societies. The concurrent role played by demographic, human capital and 'immigration' variables in explaining immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction and, therefore, their integration into the residence country provides evidence for the dynamic, multidimensional and bidirectional character of the integration process in immigrants' receiving countries (Pennix, 2003; 2004). To conclude, accounting for immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction means to study life conditions and perceived life conditions of immigrants in our societies. I believe that this issue is diriment for improving resources and structures to be allocated to immigrants and their descendants, which are a stable and pervasive feature of European social landscapes (Sciortino, 2016). In other words, analysing the implications of immigrants' self-reported life satisfaction can stimulate the planning and the construction of new regimes of immigrant incorporation, for the peaceful cohabitation of different populations and the enhancement of the social cohesion and progress of our countries and cities.

3.6. Appendix

Ordered logistic regression models on each of the other variables measuring life satisfaction, therefore, on 'your present level of education', 'your accommodation', 'your family life', 'your health' and 'your social life' have been performed. The results have been displayed in a unique table (Table 3.4) for a better comparability.

Table 3.4. Odds ratios of the ordered logistic regression models with dependent variable each other dimension of life satisfaction (N =7,468)

	Model on life satisfaction with 'your present level of education'	Model on life satisfaction with 'your accommodation'	Model on life satisfaction with 'your family life'	Model on life satisfaction with 'your health'	Model on life satisfaction with 'your social life'
Independent variables					
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES					
Age	0.994	0.987	0.946***	0.946***	0.939***
Age squared	1.101	1.204	1.649***	1.287*	1.734***
Female (ref. cat. = male)	1.042	1.138**	1.167***	0.818***	0.875**
<i>Marital Status</i> (ref. cat. = legally married or civil union)					
- Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved	0.897	0.806*	0.297***	0.866*	0.671***
- Living with partner	1.045	1.087	0.767**	0.839*	1.048
- Single	1.100	0.848**	0.441***	0.873*	1.016
- Widowed, civil partner died	0.726*	0.793*	0.393***	0.743*	0.660**
<i>Area of origin</i> (ref. cat. = Asia)					
- Eastern Europe	1.309***	1.121	1.431***	1.120	1.363***
- Latin America	1.201*	1.252*	1.661***	1.431***	1.670***
- Middle East	0.868	0.727***	1.285**	1.099	1.412***
- North Africa	0.884	0.696***	1.059	1.027	1.219*
- Sub-Saharan Africa	1.013	0.762**	1.018	1.221*	1.121
Cultural similarity	1.051	1.197*	1.140	1.071	1.117
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES					
<i>Current economic situation</i> (ref. cat. = in paid work)					
- Doing housework or other	0.785**	1.005	1.146	0.960	0.878
- In education	1.601***	0.969	0.930	0.848*	0.955
- Retired, sick, disabled	0.725**	1.019	0.876	0.268***	0.523***
- Unemployed	0.917	0.821**	0.915	0.987	0.903

<i>Perceived financial well-being</i> (ref. cat. = comfortable)					
- Sufficient	0.530***	0.657***	0.806***	0.739***	0.671***
- Difficult	0.409***	0.395***	0.569***	0.580***	0.552***
- Very difficult	0.334***	0.215***	0.386***	0.446***	0.394***
Educational attainment (in years)	1.110***	1.000	1.002	1.013*	0.991
IMMIGRATION VARIABLES					
Years since migration	0.989	1.004	1.013*	0.981**	1.039***
Years since migration squared	1.262*	1.011	0.878	1.563***	0.626***
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = 1 st generation)	1.194*	1.137*	1.184*	1.070	0.985
<i>Legal status</i> (ref. cat. = work or study)					
- Family reunion	0.889	1.141	1.468***	1.057	1.188*
- Humanitarian	0.601***	0.655**	0.711*	0.935	1.229
- National	1.263**	1.367***	1.600***	1.217*	1.374***
- Other legal status	1.292*	0.841	1.117	0.880	1.160
- Permanent/long-term residence permit	0.987	1.021	1.353***	1.069	1.344***
<i>Residence country</i> (ref. cat. = Belgium)					
- France	0.875	0.449***	1.285*	1.053	0.720**
- Germany	0.524***	0.673**	1.202*	1.252*	0.782**
- Hungary	0.772**	0.895	1.252*	1.124	0.860
- Italy	0.671***	0.739**	0.989	0.878	0.686***
- Portugal	1.085	2.316***	2.390***	2.273***	1.569**
- Spain	1.009	0.810*	1.267*	1.089	0.930

Significance: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

However, to provide an item that rates satisfaction with life *as a whole*, I have reduced the dimensions of life satisfaction ('your life these days', 'your present level of education', 'your accommodation', 'your family life', 'your health' and 'your social life'), carrying out a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), with varimax rotation. Before performing the PCA, a predictive mean matching method has been used to impute the missing data contained in each variable of life satisfaction. I am aware that PCA is a multivariate technique that is oriented to numerical data. However, if we assume the existence of the same distance in the ordinal scale variables measuring life satisfaction, this method can be applied, even though with some caution in the interpretation of the results. In the light of these considerations, the PCA extracted one factor (with eigenvalue > 1) explaining 45% of the total variance¹². Each respondent has been assigned a life satisfaction score based on the factor loadings (see Table 3.5). After standardizing this to mean zero and standard deviation one, I have used the score as the dependent variable in the stepwise ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which is shown in Table 3.6. The interpretation of the life satisfaction score is as follows: the higher the score, the higher respondents' level of self-reported life satisfaction.

Table 3.5. Factor loadings (N = 7,468)

	Factor loadings
Your life these days	0.438
Your present level of education	0.364
Your accommodation	0.399
Your family life	0.424
Your health	0.393
Your social life	0.424

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

Table 3.6. Beta coefficients of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with dependent variable life satisfaction *as a whole* (N =7,468)

Independent variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES			
Age	-0.044 ***	-0.047***	-0.039***
Age squared	0.307 ***	0.445***	0.308**
Female (ref. cat. =	0.020	-0.001	0.014

¹² I have not taken into account the second factor extracted by PCA, which explained 13% of the total variance, because it has a lower effect on each dimension of self-reported life satisfaction, compared to the first one.

male)			
<i>Marital Status</i> (ref. cat. = legally married or civil union)			
- Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved	-0.759***	-0.624***	-0.598***
- Living with partner	-0.253 **	-0.174*	-0.068
- Single	-0.267***	-0.259***	-0.259***
- Widowed, civil partner died	-0.745***	-0.616***	-0.536***
<i>Area of origin</i> (ref. cat. = Asia)			
- Eastern Europe	0.509***	0.408***	0.211***
- Latin America	0.515***	0.549***	0.357***
- Middle East	0.203***	0.140*	-0.082
- North Africa	-0.066	0.104*	-0.140*
- Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.139*	0.206**	-0.111
Cultural similarity	0.278***	0.283***	0.098
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES			
<i>Current economic situation</i> (ref. cat. = in paid work)			
- Doing housework or other		-0.069	-0.062
- In education		0.025	0.050
- Retired, sick, disabled		-0.521***	-0.614***
- Unemployed		-0.179***	-0.217***
<i>Perceived financial well-being</i> (ref. cat. = comfortable)			
- Sufficient		-0.476***	-0.472***
- Difficult		-1.014***	-0.979***
- Very difficult		-1.743***	-1.636***
Educational attainment (in years)		0.017***	0.020***
IMMIGRATION VARIABLES			
Years since migration			0.009*
Years since migration squared			-0.019
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = 1st generation)			0.144*
<i>Legal status</i> (ref. cat. = work or study)			
- Family reunion			0.190*
- Humanitarian			-0.344**

- National			0.410***
- Other legal status			0.056
- Permanent/long-term residence permit			0.212***
<i>Residence country</i> (ref. cat. = Belgium)			
- France			-0.358***
- Germany			-0.282***
- Hungary			-0.430***
- Italy			-0.635***
- Portugal			0.254**
- Spain			-0.080
Multiple R^2	0.07	0.18	0.22

ρ-values 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Source: Own elaboration on ICS data

CONCLUSIONS

Aim of this work has been to understand if integration policies help immigrants to enhance their long-term success and parity with natives. Immigrant integration has been conceived as the process aimed at reducing gaps with natives, therefore at providing to immigrants the same opportunities of native-born citizens, in the main domains of life.

The first paper has offered a comparative overview of civic integration programmes adopted by European countries in recent years. The European convergence towards civic integration means that all across Europe residence and citizenship rights are granted to immigrants if civic requirements, such the knowledge of the language and cultural values of the residence country are fulfilled. Italy also turned to civic integration officially in 2012, with the entry into force of the Integration Agreement, which newcomers have to sign few days after the entry into the Italian territory, in order to obtain a regular permit of stay. Civic integration has conciliated different Italian governments in believing that in a country where by now immigrants represent a stable and structural component of the Italian population, integration should occur under the values enshrined in the Italian Constitution, as clearly stated by the Integration Agreement. Although it is well recognised that the acquisition of destination language skills enhances immigrants' social mobility and improves their socio-economic integration, the comparative analysis of civic integration programmes adopted by 14 European countries in the last two decades has highlighted that civic integration produces a 'stratification' of the immigrant population in receiving countries. In particular, since it builds up different integration regimes, as refugees and family immigrants are required to follow language and civic courses, while temporary and high-skilled immigrants are totally exempted, I have argued that civic integration tends to exacerbate the gap between high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants, therefore between wanted and unwanted migration. Therefore, I have concluded that the logic behind the European convergence towards civic integration appears to be the same characterizing the current immigration policy at European level: a logic of increasing migration prevention, control and selection (e.g. Bonjour, 2011; Carling, 2002; Geddes, 2003). As consequence, civic requirements have become new standards for immigrants and refugees to be admitted and integrated into receiving societies. Their parity with natives lies in the knowledge of alleged universal values, such as host country's language and civic norms. Nevertheless, my study has shown that the interpretation and

the effectively implementation of civic integration largely varies across countries, according to their philosophies of integration and, therefore, to the traditional national models of immigration and integration. Consequently, a gap between the dominant policy discourse about civic integration (the so-called ‘normative model’) in Europe, the civic programmes (policy outputs) implemented by European countries and, finally, the effective spread of civic integration among immigrants residing in European countries (social processes) has been found, when civic programmes and ICS data have been analysed. Indeed, the proportion of immigrants who followed or completed a civic course in the countries I have included into the multivariate analyses was very limited and, thus, its statistical significance null. This has led me to use the term ‘civic rhetoric’ to describe this part of the thesis.

Civic integration is strongly embedded into citizenship, since it establishes under what conditions eligible immigrants can obtain the citizenship status of the new residence country (Wallace Goodman, 2012). Academic literature recognises citizenship status as an objective indicator of immigrant integration (e.g. Diehl and Blohm, 2003; Vink, 2013), as it helps to reduce gaps with natives, at least as far as status and rights gained into the receiving society. As elucidated by a vast corpus of literature that I have analysed (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994; Howard, 2009; Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011), the acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country depends not only on immigrants’ individual characteristics, but also on policy factors, such as national citizenship policies, which fix criteria for immigrants’ eligibility to naturalization. Although European countries have converged towards civic requirements to grant citizenship rights, conditions under which immigrants become naturalized citizens are still quite diverse among countries, depending also on the traditional national models of immigration and integration. This demonstrates, among other things, that despite a certain liberalization of policies and the “post-nationalization of immigrant rights” (Koopmans, 2012), the naturalization of immigrants is still intimately connected to the national sovereignty and policy-making. Therefore, the second paper has aimed to examine the effect of both individual-level characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies on the likelihood of having citizenship status among young and adult immigrants living in selected European countries. The traditional national models of immigration and integration have been used as the main interpretative key of the research findings. In particular, results have highlighted the strong effect of individual characteristics on citizenship status among young and adult immigrants and,

therefore, the positive effect of higher family stability, educational attainment, current economic situation, perceived financial well-being, duration of residence and cultural similarity between the country of residence and the country of origin. Nevertheless, policy factors intervene to produce this effect. In particular, a low number of years of residence needed for naturalization, the dual citizenship toleration and relatively high naturalization rates and proportions of foreign citizens positively influence citizenship status among young and adult immigrants. Therefore, the combination of these factors appears to be an optimal mix for promoting the acquisition of citizenship status among immigrants and, therefore, their integration. These conditions seem to pertain more to France and Belgium, where the shift from assimilationist to anti-discrimination policies has occurred without renouncing to the use of integration contracts for newcomers, as the 'Contrat d'accueil et de l'intégration' and the 'Integration contract' included in the 'Citizenisation' policy respectively demonstrate. On the contrary, limiting immigrants' integration to the incorporation into the labour market, as often occurs in Southern European and exclusionist countries, such as Italy and Germany, coexists not without any difficulty with the process of granting to immigrants the same civil and political participation of natives, which would arise from the citizenship status. It is not a casualty that Italy is the least favourable to grant the citizenship status to immigrants and one of the countries where immigrants are the least satisfied with life.

Self-reported life satisfaction has been used in the third paper to assess immigrants' subjective integration. Self-reported life satisfaction has allowed to take into account not only objective forms of integration, such as educational attainment, economic situation, employment and legal status (citizenship), but also immigrants' perceptions about their life into the residence country and about whether integration policies help them to enhance their long-term success and parity with natives, which is the broader aim of my thesis. This is also in line with the idea that integration is a multidimensional and two-way process, which implies the contribution and the point of view of both newcomers and hosting societies. Therefore, the last paper, which adds to the research strand of subjective integration (e.g. Neto, 1995; 2011; Amit, 2010), has intended to measure the effect of demographic, human capital and 'immigration' variables on the self-reported life satisfaction of young and adult immigrants living in selected European countries, using the ICS data. The multivariate analysis has shown that self-reported life satisfaction strongly depends on immigrants' demographic characteristics and human capital factors, such as age, marital status, current economic situation and perceived

financial well-being. However, when controlling for the ‘immigration’ variables, the effect of these factors changes, thus proving that ‘immigration’ variables, and in particular legal status and residence country, play a role in shaping self-reported life satisfaction among young and adult immigrants. In particular, immigrants holding the citizenship status report the highest level of life satisfaction, thus demonstrating that citizenship is a good indicator to evaluate if conditions at destination can positively meet immigrants’ expectations to determine life satisfaction and, therefore, integration into the residence country (Massey and Akresh, 2006).

Therefore, the research findings have demonstrated the importance of the individual determinants in explaining immigrants’ satisfaction with life, the combined effect of demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables in accounting for self-reported life satisfaction, and the multidimensional character of the integration process. Additional analysis, reported in the Appendix, has confirmed that self-reported life satisfaction is always strongly linked to immigrants’ familiar and economic conditions (i.e. marital status, current economic situation and perceived financial well-being, with the latter always being very statistically significant) and that a more permanent legal status, especially having the citizenship status of the residence country increases life satisfaction among young and adult immigrants residing in European countries. It has also revealed that the association between self-reported life satisfaction and the residence country changes depending on which dimension of life satisfaction is considered, thus proving that the context matters (for instance, immigrants living in Portugal report the highest level of satisfaction with life in many domains) and, finally, that self-reported life satisfaction is a complex and multilayered phenomenon, which requires much investigation and insight. I believe that researchers and policy-makers alike should take advantage of research on self-reported life satisfaction and subjective integration of immigrants, in order to construct and implement policies, which take into account not only reception societies’ needs, but also immigrants’ opinions, necessities and expectations. With civic integration and citizenship policies, self-reported life satisfaction appears to be a piece of the puzzle that completes one of the many possible pictures for the study of immigrant integration and its policy-making in Europe.

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