


# The Presidentialization of Political Parties

Organizations, Institutions and Leaders

Edited by Gianluca Passarelli



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Gianluca Passarelli

*Associate Professor of Political Science, Sapienza University, Rome, Italy*

palgrave  
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*For Cesira, with love and gratitude  
For her/him who will presidentialize my politics, our party,  
and my heart – I'll love you*



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# Preface

This work is the product of a long and tortuous phase of planning and elaboration, which in part can be traced back, albeit indirectly, to the research I did for my degree thesis in Bologna. *Galeotto* was a volume bought at the stalls of the fascinating book market in Boulevard Saint-Germain in Paris. That book reading experience was followed by a study of the institutions of government, presidents, and parties. The research work then continued, and partly stems from the rewarding years I spent on my doctorate in Comparative and European Politics at the University of Siena.

What actually makes a president of the republic a leader in (semi-) presidential regimes? And when, if ever, is it possible for a party leader, once he or she has become the head of government in a parliamentary regime, to come close to the style of leadership in similar cases in which the separation of powers exists? If institutions influence the behavior of politicians, and thus of the parties, it is necessary to understand and explain if and in what way it is possible to refer to “presidentialized” party organizations outside of the institutional context that defines its characteristics: the presidential regime.

The present state of affairs, in very brief terms, embraces those, on the one side, who maintain that it is almost exclusively the institutions that influence, condition, and make possible (or not) party (and therefore also political) presidentialization. On the other side, we find those who insist that political presidentialization – intended as a centralization of governmental, elective, and party functions – is a verifiable “tendency” in practically all Western democracies. For various reasons, we would argue that, to this dichotomy, can be added – as we shall see in detail in the Introduction – a variable: the component connected to the nature of the parties analyzed, which can contribute to spotlighting a phenomenon that is being widely discussed throughout the (not only academic) world. In light of these different research hypotheses, in this book we seek to approach our analysis by flanking the party variable with the institutional one.

In fact, the aim of the research is to understand the variation in levels of party presidentialization in various institutional contexts.

The basic research question is: To what extent does party presidentialization vary as a function of party features? In the

constitutional/regime-type framework – that is, separation of powers or not – that affects presidentialization, we need to ask whether the (genetic) features of the parties have affected the degree and the kind of party presidentialization in each country. The time span the authors refer to covers the governments and elections that took place from the early 1990s up to 2014. The focus will be on the two or three most relevant political parties: those who won the elections and/or who are the most relevant challengers.

# Acknowledgments

Leaving to one side, for once, the usual conventions of formal editorial language, in these few lines I would like to say a big thank-you to each and every person who made the task of editing this work less daunting than it would otherwise have been without their wonderful support. Perhaps my sincere recognition here will partly compensate for all the time that I took up, whether in person, through emails, or on social networks.

This book may never have seen the light of day without the essential intellectual and friendly support of Robert Elgie, to whom I owe my most grateful thanks. His frank and learned comments upon reading an early draft greatly improved the work and smoothed my course to the finish line. The task of systemizing the focus of the research and the structure of the book continued during my time as a visiting scholar at the Political Science Department at the University of California, San Diego. And I thank Daniela Giannetti for her generous support in allowing me to go abroad. I am most grateful to Ellis S. Krauss and Matthew S. Shugart for having welcomed me with such remarkable kindness, and for making my stay in California not just fun but also intellectually rewarding. The discussions at Encinitas and Ladera Frutal were crucial for the development of the work. The atmosphere on the UCSD campus made studying a pleasant and stimulating task, not least due to the enthusiastic, professional, and friendly collaboration offered by Tamara Golden. My heartfelt thanks to Matthew Bergman, who dedicated himself to working on various drafts and patiently made the book flow better. From this point of view, the editorial work by Enda Flannelly was highly professional, and crucial in improving the flow of the final draft and in correcting the English.

Piero Ignazi made straightforward but friendly comments on my ideas, wisely redirecting the focus of the research, bridging the bibliographical gap, and accompanying me with enormous patience through the vast, fascinating, and familiar (to him) world of political parties. Oreste Massari immediately and enthusiastically shared both the research and editorial processes and clarified certain concepts that are crucial to a proper understanding of party government and parliamentary dynamics. I also want to thank him for having welcomed me with friendship and professionalism to the Department of Political

Sciences at the Sapienza University of Rome, an institution characterized by extraordinary professionalism and kindness, not least due to the active and efficient nature of my colleagues and the administrative staff. In particular, I thank our director, Fulco Lanchester, for his full and unwavering cooperation, and for being constantly ready with suggestions and humane and professional support. Stefano Ceccanti's friendship was vital, as he constantly followed my initiatives, was always there to discuss whatever issue arose, and contributed to steering my research and to offering many ideas concerning the literature and comparison. The many Florentine discussions with Jean Blondel, who was often (strangely) enthusiastic over my proposals, and a patient listener generous with his advice, served as a great motivator.

Dario Tuorto, although a sociologist (nobody's perfect), amiably turned a blind eye to my many long "messages" on the status of the various parties, on my editing projects, and on the subsequent delays in handing common working papers.

Manuela Moschella kindly read and commented on a first draft of the project and encouraged me to continue.

The contributors of the individual chapters, each of them an expert in the country he or she analyzed, were extremely patient in the face of my many requests, and participated enthusiastically in the project. Without their contributions I would never have been able to bring to conclusion such an exhausting, challenging, and ambitious project.

A first draft of my research project was presented at the IPSA meeting held in Madrid in 2012. I would like to sincerely thank all the participants on the panel of *Leaders and Leadership*: in particular my thanks go to Robert Elgie, Sergio Fabbrini, Thomas Poguntke, and Paul Webb, for their insightful comments on my presentation.

I sincerely thank the publisher for the decision to publish this work. The text was lovingly nurtured and guided throughout its construction phase with extraordinary professionalism by its editors, Sara Crowley Vigneau *in primis*, who inherited and relaunched the editorial project with enthusiasm and proficiency; Jemima Warren, who followed the entire editing phase with great passion and expertise as well as Benedicta Priya for her professional help in revising the text. I am grateful to the editors for having included my work in the excellent collection that they carefully produce, and I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their shrewd comments on two previous versions of the work, which were certainly useful in improving the final version.

I would also like to thank Cesira, for so many valid reasons. She was a witness to every step, physical or intellectual, of the writing of this

work, not to mention a provider of artistic guidance in the choice of its cover. Forgive me for the time taken from our coalition of parties, a coalition that isn't presidential but made up of "lively" factions, and yet capable of sustaining our government for a long and passionate "full term," even during times of division or cohabitation. Our new impending coalition partner will most likely be very active and is bound to make our coalition even livelier, as well as frequently relegating us to a minority over divisive policies and, as an indisputable, uncontested, and unaccountable leader, will surely render effectively possible a unique form of party presidentialization.

*Ça va sans dire* – the responsibility for all that is written is mine alone.

*Gianluca Passarelli*

July 2014, (somewhere between) Rome and Bologna



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# Glossary (parties included in the research)

Abbreviation	Name	Country	Ideological stance
AD	Australian Democrats	Australia	Social liberal
ALP	Australian Labor Party	Australia	Social Democrat
AN	Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)	Italy	Right
AWS	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Solidarity Election Action)	Poland	Conservative
BO	Batkivshchyna (All Ukrainian Union-Fatherland)	Ukraine	Conservative
BYuT	Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc)	Ukraine	Social Democrat
C	Conservative	United Kingdom	Conservative
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)	Germany	Conservative
CNI	Centre National des Indépendants (National Centre of Independents)	France	Right
CPU	Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny (The Communist Party of Ukraine)	Ukraine	Communist
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union of Bavaria)	Germany	Conservative

D	Democratic Party	United States of America	Social liberal
DEM	Democratas (Democrats)	Brazil	Center-Right
DL	Démocratie Libérale (Liberal Democracy)	France	Center-Right
DPJ	Minshu-tō (Democratic Party of Japan)	Japan	Social liberal
FN	Front National (National Front)	France	Far-Right
GOP	Republican Party	United States of America	Conservative
LDP	Jiyū Minshutō (Liberal Democratic Party)	Japan	Conservative
LiD	Lewica i Demokraci (Left and Democrats)	Poland	Center-Left
LP	Labour Party	United Kingdom	Center-Left
LPA	Liberal Party of Australia	Australia	Conservative
MAPU	Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria	Chile	Center-Left
MDC	Mouvement des Citoyens (Citizens' Movement)	France	Center-Left
MIR	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Movement of the Left)	Chile	Marxist-Leninist
NDP	Narodno-Demokratychna Partiya (People's Democratic Party)	Ukraine	Conservative
NSZZRI	Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy Rolników Indywidualnych "Solidarność" (Solidarity Farmers' Union)	Poland	Conservative

OU	Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine)	Ukraine	Center Right
PAIS	Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista (Wide Party of Socialist Left)	Chile	Social Democrat
PCdoB	Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil)	Brazil	Marxist- Leninist
PCF	Parti Communiste Français (Communist Party of France)	France	Marxist- Leninist
PD	Partito Democratico (Democratic Party)	Italy	Social liberal
PDC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party)	Chile	Christian Democrat
PDL	Il Popolo della Libertà (The People of Freedom)	Italy	Conservative
PDS	Partido Democrático Social (Democratic Social Party)	Chile	Social Democrat
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labour Party)	Brazil	Social Democrat
PFL	Partido da Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party)	Brazil	Conservative
PMDB	Partido da Mobilização Democrática Brasileira (Brazilian Party of the Democratic Mobilization)	Brazil	Center
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)	Brazil	Center
PO	Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)	Poland	Christian Democrat
POR	Partiya Rehioniv (Party of Regions)	Ukraine	Center/ Regionalism
PPD	Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy)	Chile	Center-Left

PR	Partido Radical (Radical Party)	Chile	Radicalist
PR	Parti Radical (Radical Party)	France	Radicalist
PRG	Parti Radical de Gauche (The Radical Party of the Left)	France	Social Democrat
PRSD	Partido Radical Social Demócrata (Radical Social Democratic Party)	Chile	Social Democrat
PSB	Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party)	Brazil	Social Democrat
PSD	Partido Social Demócrata (Social Democratic Party)	Brazil	Social Democrat
PS	Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)	France	Social Democrat
PSC	Partido Socialista de Chile (Socialist Party of Chile)	Chile	Center-Left
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party)	Brazil	Center
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)	Italy	Social Democrat
PSL	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant Party)	Poland	Conservative
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Party)	Spain	Social Democrat
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party)	Brazil	Social Democrat
PV	Partido Verde (Green Party)	Brazil	Green
PZPR	Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers Party)	Poland	Communist
RN	Renovación Nacional (National Renewal)	Chile	Center-Right



RPR	Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic)	France	Conservative
Rukh	Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy (Peoples' Movement of Ukraine)	Ukraine	Center-Right
SFIO	Section française de l'internationale ouvrière (French Section of the Workers' International)	France	Social Democrat
SDP	Socjaldemokracja Polska (Social Democratic Party)	United Kingdom	Social Democrat
SdPR	Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Social Democracy of the Polish Republic)	Poland	Social Democrat
SDPU	Sotsial-Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy (Social Democratic Party of Ukraine)	Ukraine	Social Democrat
SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Union)	Poland	Social Democrat
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)	Germany	Social Democrat
SPU	Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrainy (Socialist Party of Ukraine)	Ukraine	Social Democrat
	Svoboda (All-Ukrainian Union)	Ukraine	Far-Right
TR	Twój Ruch, previously Ruch Palikota (Your Movement)	Poland	Liberal
UCC	Unión de Centro Centro (Centre Centre Union)	Chile	Liberal
UDAR	Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform	Ukraine	Liberal
UDF	Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy)	France	Center-Right

UDI	Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union)	Chile	Right
UP	Unia Pracy (Labor Union)	Poland	Social Democrat
UMP	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement)	France	Center-Right
UW	Unia Wolności (Freedom Union)	Poland	Liberal Democrat
ZSL	Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant Union)	Poland	Center-Right
	Ukrajina – Vpered! (Ukraine Ahead!)	Ukraine	Agrarian
ZYU	Za Yedynu Ukrayinu (For United Ukraine)	Ukraine	Center

# 1

## Parties' Genetic Features: The Missing Link in the Presidentialization of Parties

Gianluca Passarelli

*I answer that the principalities of which one has record  
are found to be governed in two different ways;  
either by a prince, with a body of servants who assist him  
to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favor and permission;  
or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity  
of blood and not by the grace of the prince.  
Such barons have states and their own subjects,  
who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affections.*  
Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

Since the 1970s–1980s, “advanced” democracies have experienced an undoubted increase in the level of centralization of political power in – *lato sensu* – executive hands. This has meant that the head of government and party leadership as a whole has become more prominent, to the detriment of mid-level political actors and institutions, such as party cadres and parliament. As a consequence, scholars have started referring to centralization, personalization, prime-ministerialization, and even to the presidentialization of politics.

The presidentialization of politics is a relatively new and important phenomenon (Patterson and Mughan, 1992; Cole, 1993; Foley, 1993; 2000; Mughan, 2000; Samuels, 2002; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Karvonen, 2010; Aarts *et al.*, 2011; Bittner, 2011). However, the term *presidentialization* has become highly debatable. In particular, a contentious suggestion is that the presidentialization of politics could

make (semi) presidential and parliamentary regimes on a par with presidentialism.

The aim of this book is to explain why the level of party presidentialization varies from one country to another. Following Samuels and Shugart (2010a), we argue that constitutional structures affect the level of party presidentialization. Samuels and Shugart claim that "party behavior and organization tend to mimic constitutional structure, giving rise to 'presidentialized' parties" (2010a, p. 16) and "to the extent that the constitutional structure separates executive and legislative origin and/or survival, parties will tend to be presidentialized" (2010a, p. 37). To this I add the party's original features and argue that the degree of party presidentialization varies as a function of the party's genetics, namely the original organizational characteristics of a party (see *paragraph 4*).

The literature has mainly focused on the general process of personalization that has been detected in recent modern politics, especially in western democracies. Depending on the cases studied, on the research fields and the data availability (and reliability), the studies conducted have had different foci. The role of institutions, the characteristics of leadership and leaders, as well as the electoral process or the mass media influence, have been the main explanatory variables analyzed in order to explain the phenomenon of presidentialization. Of course, the choice of variables included is also related to the research question(s) that scholars have sought to verify. Thus, the weakening of party loyalties, the kind of electoral system, the influence of mass media, and the form of government have in turn been considered as the independent variables, the factors that justify the above-mentioned phenomenon of a "presidentialization of politics." All these approaches have significantly contributed to a better clarification of the characteristics of such a political process.

Nevertheless, none of them has been able to furnish a complete interpretation of and justification for the presidentialization of politics. Each factor has served to enlighten a singular aspect of such a phenomenon; but the overarching framework remains incomplete. This result is not due to a weak theoretical approach but is rather a symptom of the underlying structure of the research, which was principally attempting to test the causal effects between *a* defined explanatory variable and *an* outcome of the so-called presidentialization of politics in itself. Hence, researchers mostly focused on one or a number of aspects of the presidentialization of politics, illustrating which variables were affecting such a configuration of contemporary politics.

Some studies emphasized the role of institutions, others the inevitable growing weight and influence of political and electoral changes and evolutions in each context.

However, the personalization of politics (McAllister, 2007), centralization (of government etc.), and style of leadership (candidate-centered electoral campaign, party organization, government, etc.) have different meanings and they present many differences (Blondel, 1984; Elgie, 1995; Helms, 2005, 2012). All are necessary though not sufficient conditions for the presidentialization of politics.

Here, we place greater stress both on the concept of presidentialization, and on demonstrating empirical evidence of the phenomenon, if any such evidence exists. Indeed, the presidentialization of politics in our view means the presidentialization of parties, or, better still, a phenomenon that arises from the behavior of political parties. Parties are in fact key political actors in the political system and often drive changes and innovation. It follows, therefore, that a focus on them would help to better define the borders of presidentialization around the body politic in modern democracies.

### **Constitutional constraints and the genetic characteristics of parties**

By adopting the principal-agent theoretical approach, Samuels and Shugart based their study on the “theory of how institutions shape politicians’ behavior” (2010a, 22). In this theoretical structure and causal mechanism of analysis, the principal is the party and the agent is the party leader. Believing that much of the literature on party organization has failed to take account of the impact of regime type, Samuels and Shugart aim to explain variation in the organization and behavior of political parties. In particular, the aim is tested: to what extent “the presence of constitutionally separate executive authority ‘presidentializes’ political parties” (p. 14). The authors are well aware of the relevance and importance of the socio-political factors that have enabled party formation and behavior, but they make clear that the “analysis of these differences should begin with the difference in constitutional design” (p. 18). Following this line of thinking, we will start the analysis of each case included in the book by illustrating the constitutional framework that defines the political context in which parties act. We then will focus on parties’ behavior, in particular by examining their genetic features and the way in which these features can affect the level of presidentialization.

Variation can be observed in all the three regime types: presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary. Indeed, even though the Samuels and Shugart's crucial question is how political parties organize and when they must bridge the "gap between the executive and the legislature" – clearly referring to the context of the separation of powers – they make it clear that parties in presidential regimes can exhibit "parliamentarized" characteristics and vice versa. Moreover, they affirm that such characteristics are likely to be "ephemeral" because of the "inescapable logic" of the regime's institutional foundations" (Samuels and Shugart 2010a, p. vi). Their work and arguments make clear that a comparison is advantageous and to replicate and to extend it is fruitful. In fact, we concede that "a real strength of Samuels and Shugart's approach is that it allows the comparison of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes" (Elgie, 2011a, p. 396). Moreover, if on the one hand they argue that regime type is the "missing variable" when explaining variation in party organization, their work also suggests that party organization might be the "missing variable" in studies on the effect of regime types and on their functioning. Therefore, we focus on the study of the parties and the level of their "presidentialization." According to Samuels and Shugart, presidentialized parties are the result of presidentialized constitutional systems. If so, as their work indicates, political parties also need to be included in studies (Samuels and Shugart, 2010a, pp. 18, 21) of the effects of political regimes, in order to observe the concomitant influence of party organization on such an outcome: presidentialization of parties. The variance is greater "across than within democratic regime-types, due to the constitutional separation of origin and survival" (p. 15). Here our proposal offers to include in the analysis the "missing" link that parties' genetic features represent.

However, we add to this literature by exploring the ways in which endogenous party factors, including a party's genetic features (Panbianco, 1988), act as an intervening variable to shape the degree of presidentialization of parties. Given that these party factors vary from one party to another and from one country to another, we would expect to see that the degree of presidentialization of parties varies in each context. A more detailed discussion and analysis of the role that parties play in the process of personalization and presidentialization of politics is thus necessary. Parties are affected by the process of presidentialization, and if any presidentialization occurs they are the political actors that show more presidentialized characteristics. In a sense, we can affirm that the presidentialization of politics is basically visible/possible – given

such contextual constitutional and institutional conditions – thanks to the mediation carried out by political parties. The latter offer the clearest evidence that presidentialization is (or is not) going on in a given context. Parties may simply experience such a process due to constitutional features and/or they can also mitigate or enhance it, in our view, due to their internal, organizational and genetic characteristics.

This argument introduces the research design of the book that we will detail in section in this introduction. We can start by indicating the independent and the dependent variables. The causal trajectory is summarized as follows: constitutional structures affect party presidentialization through the medium of endogenous party factors. We consider the genetic model of organizational development (penetration *vs* diffusion), the characteristics of the dominant coalition (factions *vs* tendencies), as well the balance of power in the dominant coalition (central office *vs* public office). The constitutional asset represents the most important factor in determining whether a party (and then the politics) can be presidentialized more or less. That factor – the constitutional features – offers the opportunity and the constraint to proceed toward a more effective presidentialization process. Once the win set of chances to have a more or less cogent process of presidentialization has been established, the parties' genetic features act as an intervening variable in strengthening or weakening that trend. Some parties are in fact naturally prone to adapt to presidentialization emanating from the institutions, while others are more hostile to it. The different outcomes and configuration of a presidentialization of parties will then depend upon the various combinations of such variables and conditions. The latter combinations are those of countries (constitutional frame and type of government) and party features.

The overlapping between the process of strengthening of executive power and the so-called presidentialization of politics has led to different interpretations of the phenomenon. In particular the presidentialization thesis has been criticized and debated in relation to its theoretical and conceptual frames. According to some scholars the presidentialization thesis is conceptually weak and under-specified (Samuels and Shugart, 2010a, b), and its empirical results are often scant (Karvonen, 2010; Dowding, 2013a; Heffernan, 2005, 2013).

In Poguntke and Webb's words "presidentialization denominates a process by which regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practice without, in most case, changing their formal structure" (2005, p. 1). In particular, they refer to the presidentialization of politics as "the development of increasing leadership power resources and

autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and increasingly leadership-centered electoral process" (p. 5).

On the other hand, according to Samuels and Shugart (2010a), only parties under presidential systems can be truly presidentialized because presidentialization is a direct effect of separated powers. Indeed, it is only under a constitutional context that provides independent and separated powers that parties cannot hold their presidential candidates accountable once elected. By contrast, in parliamentary systems even if a leader's reputation can overshadow the party reputation, parties have more effective tools to keep leaders' ambitions under control. Consequently, Samuels and Shugart define presidentialization "as the way the separation of powers fundamentally shapes parties' organizational and behavioral characteristics, in ways that are distinct from the organization and behavior of parties in parliamentary systems" (p. 6).

As we have seen, the debate around presidentialization has been, and to some extent still is, rich and stimulating. The discussion has been invested with theoretical and empirical consequences, cases, and definitions. On one side, we have scholars who claim that even in parliamentary regimes, there are detectable trends toward the presidential model without a change in constitutional forms.<sup>2</sup> The presidentialization concept combines different empirical trends into a unique theoretical understanding of ongoing power shifts (also) within parliamentary regimes. On the other side, scholars claim that both the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of those propositions are weak, supported only with scarce and ambiguous empirical evidence. Thus, Karvonen states that the "general 'gut impression' of expert authors seem to be more in favor of the presidentialisation thesis than is warranted from the actual evidence presented in the various country studies" (2010a, p. 20). However, as Webb *et al.* argue, offering a number of defences against these criticisms, those arguments are "quite nuanced and not conclusive" (2012, pp. 79ff.), and thus leave open the option of an increasing process of personalization of politics.

The differences between these theoretical approaches implies analogous distinctions in terms of meaning conferred to concepts, such as personalization, centralization of politics, and of course presidentialization itself. Those differences are not merely semantic but are substantial, due to their empirical and theoretical consequences. If those claiming presidentialization exists think that we can observe it in all three regime types, the related presidentialization of parties can be observed independently from variation in executive-legislative institutions. By contrast, for other scholars such a phenomenon is not



possible in non-separation of power regimes (Samuels and Shugart, 2010a, p. 10n 13). Moreover, in terms of empirical findings in support of presidentialization, the first approach refers to three organizational faces (Key, 1952; Sorauf, 1968; Katz and Mair, 1993) of parties' presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2005, pp. 2ff.); whereas the second essentially refers to a presidentialized party which delegates to its leader which has discretion in electoral and governing arenas (Samuel and Shugart, 2010a, p. 16).

The debate is ongoing (Foley, 2013) and has seen the use of frank and direct language, with some arguing that the term presidentialization "should be expunged from political science vocabulary" (Dowding, 2013a, p. 617), while others defend the thesis (Poguntke and Webb, 2013).

Once the main theoretical frame and the related problematic (and partially unsolved) conceptual controversies have been defined, we can see that obstacles originate from the following: the presidentialization of politics (and therefore of parties) refers to an institutional factor: the leader, in presidential systems, is *independent* from the legislative branch and is politically and institutionally unaccountable. Thus, a similar trend is not possible in parliamentary regimes.

## Presidentialization and personalization

We move beyond controversies, similarities, and differences between indicators of presidentialization for each definition (for example, how to measure it) and among the theoretical approaches, while recognizing that we think those claims are too important to ignore. We claim that differences between the "personalization of politics" and "presidentialization of politics" essentially refer to the fact that: a) the former implies mainly considering a sort of personal "capital" in terms of skills, characteristics, attitudes, for example, while b) the latter considers primarily institutional resources, constraints, and opportunities.

In this book we focus on political parties and on their presidentialization. Consequently, we analyze the presidentialization of politics in terms of political parties. Keeping in mind that the separation of powers shape parties' behavior and characteristics, we argue that we can have presidentialization beyond presidential systems if certain circumstances are present. In particular, we refer to the parties' genetic features which can make the overcoming of institutional constraints possible. Thus, we agree that it is not automatic "that ideal-type parties follow rigidly from regime-type. Some parties in parliamentary systems may

exhibit presidentialized features" (Samuels and Shugart, 2010a, p. 16; Poguntke and Webb, 2005), and, in reverse, some "parties in presidential systems [...] exhibit 'parliamentarized' characteristics" (Samuels and Shugart, 2010a, p. 17).

Our research argues that, while constitutional structures help to shape the level of party presidentialization, in order to better understand this process we need to include an analysis of endogenous party factors. We refer to the presidentialization of parties – given the different constitutional regimes – as the situation in which they have given greater autonomy to their leader, with great independence on crucial political topics (e.g. electoral campaign, ministerial appointments, public policies): in that situation s/he (the leader) is unaccountable to the party. These conditions are primarily possible in separation of powers contexts. Hence, this trend can be downsized or emphasized by the parties' genetic features which can enable those political actors to overcome, albeit partially and/or ephemerally, the constitutional constraints that prevent presidentialization of parties. A few indicators will help us to detect such a trend in the selected cases: the level of accountability, not only in institutional terms – in presidential systems the topic is not in discussion – but in particular in terms of political meaning (how the party leadership can turn away from parties and exert legislature influence); the candidate selection process (the level of "exclusiveness" in the electorate and the possibility of the party's leadership to strengthen his/her personal power and/or to be deselected); the real (political) power to dismiss/appoint ministers (to what extent the executive and party chief is politically free) (Samuels and Shugart, 2003).

Moreover, as can be partially inferred from the above, presidentialization can be interpreted both as a process of centralization of leadership, especially in political parties, and as a style of government. In this respect, it is very common, and to some extent inevitable, that the concept overlaps with that of the personalization of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Karvonen, 2010). Indeed, it would be beneficial as a point of clarification and distinction between the two concepts – often misleadingly used as synonymous.

Before analyzing the presidentialization of structures and the balance of powers in different countries and within political parties, a preliminary specification is needed. Even though the personalization of politics (McAllister, 2007; Karvonen, 2010), and the centralization of some related political processes – such as the rise of candidate-centered politics (Wattenberg, 1991) – have been part of the general trend that has interested political researchers in almost all

democracies, a conceptual distinction should be made with respect to presidentialization. Presidentialization and personalization both imply the increasing role of individuals in politics, as opposed to a collective dimension. There are differences, however, both at the conceptual and the empirical level.

It could be said that presidentialization is a wider concept that in some way includes personalization. Yet we can have personalization without presidentialization: this could take the form of a candidate-centered electoral campaign but not the moral hazard, adverse selection, unaccountability. On the other hand, if we have presidentialization, personalization (to some extent and at different levels) should follow: this could involve, for example, leader independence from party and personalized electoral campaigns.

The latter can be considered as an effect of the former. Presidentialization refers to a well-defined political institutional role, and not merely to a person: so, we can have an individual subject affected by presidentialization as well as a collective one, such as the party in public office or the external party (the party in central office), and naturally the individual leader as well. Moreover, presidentialization can be measured by some indicators such as elections (success or failure), the candidate selection process, political actors' resources, the concentration of power, political and electoral accountability, principal-agent relationship. By contrast, personalization usually refers to the way in which the previous phenomena occur. That distinction seems evident in Karvonen's definition of personalization, which refers to general changes affecting institutions, citizens' perceptions of politics, and voters' electoral choices (2010, p. 5). Personalization therefore seems to be supplementary to presidentialization. And following this line of thinking we must also bear in mind the increasing role and importance of political leaders in voting decision (King, 2002; Aarts *et al.*, 2011; Mughan, 2015).<sup>3</sup>

The personalization of leadership has increasingly become a diffused political phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> The literature on this topic is significant, but to some extent controversial. There is no doubt that political leaders have gained considerable power over the past half-century: but that increase in the personalization of leadership has led to many controversies.

The biggest controversy concerns the role of political leaders and their impact on elections. Some find little evidence of the influence of leaders on voters, and they are therefore skeptical about the extent to which personalization plays a part in the whole electoral processes (Curtice and Holmberg, 2005). According to this view, voters are assumed to vote for

the party that best defends their interests and their values. Thus, both the appeal of leaders to the electorate directly or through the parties of these leaders is considered to be an illusion entertained primarily by the media.

Others state that personalized leadership is critical. These authors say that there may be a significant impact of leader personalization on the electorate both directly and indirectly, and that that impact may take place directly through the party leader or indirectly through the party itself, large or small, old or new (Mughan, 2000; Blondel and Thiébault, 2010; Aarts *et al.*, 2012). Two factors are usually considered: the personalization of politics and party misalignment. Greater personalization of politics is typically linked to the growing importance of television in the last half-century. In general, the mass media's role and their influence on voting behavior, as well as the "personalization" of the mass media are controversial and debated arguments that vary according to the different methods of measurement used and on the context of analysis (Helms, 2008; Kriesi, 2012).

Trend in personalization is associated with a decline in partisan loyalties and in party identification (Särilvik and Crewe, 1983), although such a development is neither universal nor always large. Finally, some suggest that the characteristics and qualities of leaders and candidates are important under some circumstances and unimportant in others (King, 2002). Our understanding in this volume is that it is important to refer to the influence of leaders within political parties (McAllister, 2013). The classic distinction between party-centered and candidate-centered systems is of particular interest in this respect (Wattenberg, 1991). The general conclusion of the analytical models of leadership influence on political parties is that leader popularity is too closely connected to party popularity for the two effects to be separable (Bean and Mughan, 1989; Van Holsteyn and Andeweg, 2009). As parties are losing members, as the emotional ties between voters and parties are declining, and as more and more voters change their party allegiance from one election to the next, there is a massive change in the relationship between leaders and parties. The strength of social cleavages as the basic structure of parties has been reduced during the last decades of the 20th century: volatility increased (Pedersen, 1979), followed by the decline of old parties and the emergence of new ones.

Thus, we focus on an interpretation of presidentialization that represents a wider political phenomenon and that also includes personalization, with the latter representing just one aspect of the former. In particular, we have chosen to concentrate on the presidentialization

of parties and their related differences. First of all, we should consider that the reasons at the base of this trend are different and often interrelated. Nevertheless, the main factors that should be researched are the constitutional constraints that concern the parties' genetic features which have affected parties' organizational and "presidentialized" outcomes in the last 20 years.

### The party's genetic features

From a theoretical point of view, we know that the genetic "nature" of a party is a relevant factor in explaining parties' features and organization. There are three factors concerning party genetic features: 1) the organization's construction and development; 2) the presence or the absence (at the party's origin) of an external "sponsor"; 3) the role of charisma in the party's formation (Panebianco, 1988, pp. 50–52). *"A party's organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor"* (*Ibidem*, 50). For example, when a party's origins are external, meaning the presence of a *"sponsoring organization [then this] generally results in a weak institution."* As Panebianco states, *"the external organization has no interest in strengthening the party [...] for this would inevitably reduce the party's dependence upon it"* (p. 63). By contrast, *"it is easier for an internally legitimated party (i.e. a party not sponsored by another organization) to become a strong institution"* (ivi).<sup>5</sup> By the same token, parties vary in the extent that they have had an organizational development through penetration, as opposed to those that have developed via diffusion. The first *"tends to produce a strong institution, [and a] a cohesive élite, able to set in motion a strong developmental process in the nascent organization, is present by definition from the start."* However, a party which developed through diffusion *"tends to produce a weak institution because of the presence of many competing elites controlling conspicuous organizational resources; the organization is thus forced to develop through federation, compromise, and negotiation among a plurality of groups"* (p. 63).<sup>6</sup> Thus, penetration and diffusion in party development context mean, respectively, to have an organization more cohesive (in the first case) or more factionalized (in the latter). More generally still, parties are complex structures. As Panebianco reminds us, *"the leader, even if he leads because he controls crucial zones of uncertainty, must (more often than not) negotiate with other organizational actors: he is at center of a coalition of internal party forces with which he must at least to a certain degree negotiate"* (Panebianco, 1988, p. 37).

Thus, if the presidentialization of politics and the related "presidentialized" parties can be observed in regime types with separation of powers due to consequences of constitutional and institutional characteristics, then such a system implies that parties mimic and adapt; therefore, the growing role of personal factors and the centralization of parties must be taken into account in the politics of modern democracies.

Nonetheless, alongside the general process of personalization that has infected politics, we can observe an equivalent process of party personalization. The latter can be seen both as a process of centralized party leadership and a style of party leadership. In the last 25 to 30 years at least, political parties, especially (but not only) in Europe have constantly evolved. Due to many factors, such as the expanding political skills and resources of contemporary electorates (Dalton, 1984), the process of secularization, and society's socio-economical changes (Ignazi, 1996), the predominant Duvergerian party model (the mass party model) was replaced by a catch-all party model (Kirchheimer, 1966; Sartori, 1976); moreover, together with the decline of ideology and the weakening of a *classe gardée*, the party leadership grew in importance. There was a general reduction in the collective dimension of party politics, and a related increase in party personalization. Moreover, this trend has been accentuated by procedures that parties have adopted to select their leaders (Penning and Hazan, 2001; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Van Biezen, 2003; Ignazi, 2004). The personalization of parties has also been detectable in terms of a growing importance conferred by voters and party's members to the leadership and to the candidates, which lie at the core of the electoral campaigns. We therefore have an increasing centralization of party leadership and a personalized style of the leadership party itself.

Political parties thus represent an empirical field on which to test the relevance of the presidentialization of politics theory. The latter goal can be reached through taking into account the institutional and constitutional features, namely the form of government, as well as the parties' characteristics which can produce a counter effect vis-à-vis the formal constitutional and institutional constraints. The literature has generally analyzed these factors separately, either focusing on the constitutional effects on political outcomes in *latu sensu* (e.g. democracy, government, party's organization), or considering the independent changes and evolution of political parties per se (e.g. societal changes, political equilibrium). Both cases have provided important information, knowledge, and explanations of political phenomena. Nevertheless, in the

literature such variables have generally been separately analyzed. In the case of the study of the presidentialization of politics, we maintain that an attempt to overcome that difference and limitation should be undertaken in order to advance understanding and in terms of theoretical and empirical data. In accordance with this line of thought, the two variables (constitutional constraints and party's genetic) should be considered together for an in-depth analysis of the presidentialization of parties phenomena. A synthesis of what have thus far been distinctively considered approaches can then be pursued. The illustration of variables is then the first step required.

We identify and describe the constitutional and institutional systems in each of the countries included in the book. The constitutional and institutional structures are crucial in defining the win set within which political parties can organize their activities and politics. So, the form of government directly influences parties' behavior and organization by furnishing a well-defined set of constraints and opportunities.

Samuels and Shugart's (2010a) work also suggests that party organization might be the "missing variable" in studies of the effect of regime types, and so what needs to be incorporated is "the study of political parties and their organizational features" (Elgie, 2011a, pp. 408–09). The need to relate the two factors is evident. An in-depth study of how institutional context and constitutional design matter in terms of political parties' behavior and organization should be coupled with the analysis of parties' features. The latter represents an insight into our understanding of the presidentialization of politics in modern democracies. Moreover, taking into account the genetics of political parties and their organizational features may be the missing link between the separation of powers and the presidentialization of politics. Political parties act as a link between (Webb *et al.*, 2002; Dalton *et al.*, 2011) the two poles of institutions, which affect their organization, and political behavior, with the political outcome which represents the level of presidentialization. In this line of thinking, an analysis of the "presidential party" should seek to give us information on how the presidentialization of politics can work. The focus will be then on the main "presidential parties," meaning those organizations which are led by the head of government and/or are the main challenger to the party in government. In this way, we will have presidential parties (the parties which govern) and also the party of the president, when the head of the government is also – formally or politically – recognized as the leader of such an organization.

In this sense, we can admit that in the last 20 years at least there have been some crucial changes in politics that have also affected

political parties, especially (but not only) in Europe. We can define such a process as a movement from “our” party to “my” party. Such a movement was detectable and possible thanks a growing crisis in parties’ functions due to the above-mentioned decline of ideology, the weakening of a *classe gardée*, the growing importance of the leadership, the influence of lobbies, and the reduction of the weight of members and activists. Generally speaking, these latter changes that have affected parties in different contexts and in various countries having different regime types may be referred to as one great trend: the personalization of political organizations. Indeed, there has been a move toward the leader in many political activities: the campaign, the control of the party, and the voters’ behavior. Naturally, a crucial distinction must be made between countries adopting direct popular elections for the head of the state/government, and those that use parliamentary elections. In presidential regimes the constitutional constraints reinforce the changes we are referring to. In institutional terms, the separation of powers increases the role of the presidential candidate and his role in being the king maker in the “control” of the party, which has increasingly become an electoral tool in his hands. It follows that direct elections and the independent legitimacies of the presidency and the parliament in presidential systems offered more and more opportunities to strengthen the presidentialization of parties. A similar trend has been possible, even without the presence of a separation of powers system, in semi-presidential regimes (Elgie, 1999) – in which presidential power also matter – with the growing political and electoral relevance of the presidency and of its “first order” elections vis à vis the parliamentary elections, also permitting the build-up of “personal” and “presidentialized” parties (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Cole, 1993).

Finally, in parliamentary regimes, even without constitutional constraints affecting parties’ behavior and organizations as in (semi)presidential cases, some political and electoral changes referred to above have occurred, strongly modifying the role of the leader and its relationship with the voters. In particular, the changes that political parties have adopted in order to mitigate their decreasing legitimacy and appeal, eventually reinforced the party “in central office” and leadership at the expense of the party “on the ground” (Penning and Hazan, 2001; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Van Biezen, 2003; Ignazi, 2004). In particular, looking at the process of the centralization of powers in party central leadership hands, Samuels (2002) refers to a case of “presidentialized party.” Indeed, paradoxically, political changes – even in presidential and semi-presidential regimes – emphasized the trend in



presidentializing parties which already were prone to be so.<sup>7</sup> In some parliamentary regimes, the parties' genetic features and the adoption of a new organizational structure and candidate selection procedures allowed the strengthening – with some degree of conjuncture – of a “presidentialized” party by overcoming the lack of opportunities (and constraints) the regime type places upon it. In many cases we can then refer to personal or personalized parties due to the fact that to some extent the leader is increasingly separated and/or independent from his/her party. The *simul stabunt out simul cadent* effect in some way strengthens the agent (leader) vis à vis the party and his influence on the former, to which s/he is increasingly unaccountable. Similarly, we can speak of presidential or presidentialized parties (not in the separation of powers meaning) but in any case by registering a significant and relevant increase in the role of the leader in controlling his “own” party (regardless of the regime type). In this sense, however we can consider a difference between a “presidential” or “presidentialized” party and the party “of the president.” The first case – the presidentialized party – can be considered as depending mostly on presidentialism (as regime type) and thus on the separation of powers structure, while the second – the party of the president – encompasses the internal process that involves the balance of powers in parties. And so, following this line of thinking, the analytical distinction can be useful in detecting cases of “presidentialization of parties of the president” and in cases of no separation of powers. Hence, we can detect those cases in which for short-term political and electoral circumstances, thanks to the parties' genetic features, it is possible to talk of “presidentialized” parties.

The added value of this research is that it argues that while constitutional structures help to shape the level of party presidentialization in order to better understand this process we need to include an analysis of endogenous party factors. The “form” of parties can (to some extent) counter balance the effects of institutions. In fact, on one side, institutions affect parties' behavior, but in some cases the party genetic could work as a latent variable and organizational feature able to rise when systemic and political conditions allow that.

The focus on parties' internal organizational features is nevertheless crucial in testing the effects of constitutional constraints (and opportunities) in terms of presidentialization. As said, in fact, we can hypothesize that each party, or better various parties, “reacts/react” differently and behave on the basis of its/their own features which in a sense emphasize or contain the chances of “presidentialization” offered by the constitutional context. In that light, it is crucial that the parties'

changes, both organizational and ideological, that have occurred in many “modern democracies” be understood and illustrated for each national perspective analyzed in the book. In particular, we should focus on two different changes in various contexts according to each party (or parties’ political family). The latter are related to the presidentialization of politics outcomes and to the general context of personalization which have affected parties. The first is the reduced and significantly muted role of the parties’ membership and activists (Scarrow, 1996, 2015; Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen *et al.*, 2012; Van Haute and Gauja, 2015), even in contexts in which party activism was historically more rooted, and influential. This process was also detectable in non-separated powers cases where the centralization of leadership was intrinsically founded. In this sense, the weakening of the party on the ground has regularly corresponded to the growing of the party leadership, either the party in central office, or, more frequently, the party in public office.

The second phenomenon which affected many parties also in non-presidential contexts is the growing diffusion of relatively new methods, such as primaries, to select candidatures and/or party leaders. These procedures, increasingly influential and widespread even in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, were adopted by parties competing in those systems and strengthened the leadership to the detriment of the party on the ground.<sup>8</sup> There has thus been a diffused process of centralization of power in the hands of party leadership which has been favored by the adoption of “new” candidate selection procedures, resulting in a general weakening of party members and activists, radically redefining their roles. This happened and was detectable in all regime types, each with their own constitutional constraints, affecting the behavior and organization of the parties.

The interaction between constitutional features and the organization of the features of endogenous parties means that the presidentialization of parties is not a monolithic phenomenon. Rather it varies as a function of organizational development, the presence of factions, the role conferred to the leadership, etc. The extent of this variation and its multiple sources are the focus of this book.

## Research design

We choose cases that provide variation in our independent variable, which is constitutional structure. Thus, we consider all three-regime types: presidential (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Linz and Valenzuela, 1994;

Sartori, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997), semi-presidential (Elgie, 1999), and parliamentary. Moreover, the cases we have chosen also vary within each set of countries by regime type (e.g. premier-presidential and president-parliamentary forms of semi-presidentialism). Moreover, the cases have been selected by also considering different paths in the genetic features of parties: so we will have parties with internal origins and parties with external origins; parties with a penetrative organizational form and parties with a diffusion organizational form. Then we will also have parties with a cohesive dominant coalition and others with a fragmented one, etc. Other factors (such as dimension and geographical area) are also taken into account. This results in the cases of Australia, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, the US, Ukraine, and the UK. We expect to see variation in our dependent variable – the level of party presidentialization – as a function of the interaction of these factors.

The methodology we adopted is the comparison of a set of 11 cases, which vary in terms of the constitutional framework. Indeed, the analytical approach we have defined above has the advantage that it allows the comparison of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes. The analysis will therefore proceed through a most dissimilar cases approach: we have cases, which vary in terms of constitutional framework and regime type: so we can have countries with various levels of presidentialization. Indeed, the rationale for case selection cannot follow simply by assuming that the level of party presidentialization varies from one country to the next: we had to select countries with high levels of party presidentialization and countries with low levels. Nevertheless, we cannot determine that in advance. Moreover, one of the aims of the chapters is to tell us how presidentialized parties are. Similarly, we could not approach the choice of cases by proposing that the level of party presidentialization varies from one party to the next, creating the need to choose individual parties with high levels of party presidentialization and individual parties with low levels. (In that case, the same point applies as to how you then choose these parties in advance.)

The book will analyze presidentialization generally and will then examine the extent to which party genetic affects presidentialization of parties in the general schema of constitutional constraints. First, an attempt is made to identify the degree of presidentialization, and then illustrate party's features, especially certain key theoretically grounded aspects. This approach will allow us to see whether the level of presidentialization of parties varies as a function of these party features. In this way, we will be able to test and verify if these party features do

or do not explain presidentialization. Or better, to what extent parties can amplify or reduce the impact of the constitutional framework and constraints, especially in terms of how separation of powers affects parties. Indeed, we keep well in mind that the level of presidentialization comes first as the independent variable and party features are the dependent variable. The parties' genetics can then act as intervening variable in different contexts.

In particular, we have three cases of presidential regime, three semi-presidential ones, and five countries which have a parliamentary constitutional framework. This number of cases allows for more variation between them in terms of political culture, electoral systems, party system, form of government, one party or coalition government, leadership, the parties' genetic features, types of democracy, etc. The presence of cases with different regime types is crucial in responding to the book's guidelines and it has theoretical implications related to the possibility of explaining variation in the presidentialization of parties on the basis of constitutional constraints and their interaction with intervening parties' features variable.

The US case represents the archetypical example of presidentialism. It is the quintessence of such a regime type which was born for the first time in the American context. The "new first nation" (Lipset, 1963) did in fact represent the most relevant example of presidentialism to the point that for many years the US case was considered an exceptional one and therefore incomparable. So, the analysis of the "presidentialization" of parties in the regime that invented the separation of powers is crucial so as to compare it with other presidential regimes and non-presidential ones. Brazil and Chile are the two other presidential regimes we compare: both are important not only because they come from the "continent of presidentialism" but also because they represent a good example of the stable democratization process vis-à-vis the danger of collapse indicated a few decades ago (Linz, 1990). Moreover, they differ because the first two – Brazil and the US – are federal countries, whereas the third is a national one. This difference is then evident also in terms of parties' organization and features and these elements can affect the degree of presidentialization of parties and presidentialization in general. The theoretical implication of such differences comes from the fact that we could test the presidentialization hypothesis by looking at the influence not only of constitutional constraints but also at the parties' features intervening variable.

Semi-presidential regimes are analyzed, including France, Poland, and Ukraine. The first is the modern<sup>9</sup> example of such a "new" regime type

currently introduced in the political and academic debate from the 1950s onwards (Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1999) with the birth of the French Fifth Republic. The semi-presidential cases are a crucial test in our analysis due to the fact that the presidential role can be both preeminent and marginal depending on certain variables such as the presence of a coherent majority between parliament and the presidency, the nature of the parties, the role of the prime minister, etc. Moreover, Poland and Ukraine are two cases of young democracies in the post Soviet area, and as such also show peculiar genetic party features which can differently affect the presidentialization of politics outcomes. We can indeed expect different trajectories depending on the different political equilibrium in each context which is mainly affected by the control of political parties and their nature in terms of organizational features.

Finally, the parliamentary regimes are analyzed by focusing on Germany, the UK, Australia, Japan, and Italy. The first three cases are federal states and the role and the nature of parties is different from those in Japan and Italy. The UK, Australia, and to some extent, Japan represent the empirical example of the so-called Westminster mode with a two-party system. In these cases “presidentialization” has a number of peculiar pre-conditions which potentially needed to be overcome. In some (albeit ephemeral) circumstances, the absence of constitutional constraints usually favors and allows the presidentialization of parties in parliamentary regimes. Italy has had a peculiar party system, and parties with relevant genetic features: the changes of the early nineties and the birth of new personal parties allow a glimpse of a “presidentializing” of those organizations. Constitutional limits – in a parliamentary regime – contain such an outcome, while on the other hand some cases of personal leadership and party, together with new candidate selection processes have pushed toward a more relevant role of leaders.

The expected results are a combined effect, with the constitutional framework serving as the primary factor and the parties’ features having a secondary effect on the presidentialization of parties. We could thus have cases of partially presidentialized parties even in non-presidential contexts due to parties’ genetic characteristics; the political confluence may affect the outcome and push toward a different path than we would have expected based on constitutional design alone, resulting in different political outcomes in terms of presidentialization in separation of power contexts.

The methodology adopted, as already mentioned, is a comparison of different cases, which vary in terms of the constitutional framework.

The relationships between our variables and the possible outcomes are illustrated in Figure 1.1. On the x-axis are indicated the three different regime types: these represent the maximum degree of theoretical “presidentialization” of parties the regimes can generate. On the maximum “presidential score” of the continuum we find the presidential systems; on the minimum we have the parliamentary regimes; and in the middle the semi-presidential ones. In the latter case, a distinction must be made considering the different outcomes we have in terms of presidents/prime ministers relationships (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Elgie, 1999): we have therefore considered two sub-categories based on the role of the president and their presidencies. On the y-axis there lie the parties’ genetic features. A minor or major degree of presidentialization of such characteristics depends on a party’s genetic which, as we have already stated, can intervene in emphasizing or reducing presidentialization. It follows that a high degree of party centralization of the leadership, a crucial role of the party founder, and a well-defined national structure may positively affect or follow through presidentialization generated by the constitutional constraints. On the other hand, a factionalized party, with a sub-national organization able to influence the leadership, and the latter being either scarcely legitimized and often challenged by internal competitors, may negatively affect the level of presidentialization of the party in the regime it is operating.

Figure 1.1 also indicates four possible outcomes in terms of presidentialization of parties in different contexts, and according to the various combinations of the two variables affecting such a process. The typology following the possible mix of the two analytical dimensions show that, for each cell in which national and party cases are located, we can have:

- a) presidentialized parties in presidential contexts with centralized and unified parties depending on a personal leadership and a national based structure and dominant coalition. A similar trend will be possible (partially and/or temporarily) in semi-presidential regimes (*presidential-parliamentary type*) in which the balance of powers is in favor of the president over the prime minister;
- b) presidential regimes in which parties are not unified but rather highly factionalized and with relatively weak leadership controlling an organization based on sub-national and “independent” structures, their own presidentialization may vary if compared to




Figure 1.1 Party presidentialization between regime type and parties' genetic features: A framework for analysis

Note: (a) and (b) in Semi-Presidential systems refer to the role attributed to the President: A: president-parliamentary; B: premier-presidential

Source: Author's elaboration

the previous cases; an analogous outcome may be detected in semi-presidential regimes with a balance of powers in favor of the prime minister/parliament relationship "against" the president (*premier-presidential type*);

a third case, c) indicates that in parliamentary regimes that show "strong" parties in terms of unified leadership discussed above, a "kind" of presidentialization like the presidential case is then possible, although ephemeral and exceptional. Coherently, also in semi-presidential cases (presidential-prime ministerial ones) the presidentialization of parties is then theoretically possible even if we do not have a separation of powers context;

finally, d) in parliamentary regimes with factionalized parties, "weak" leadership, and divided organizational party structures, the presidentialization of parties is not only theoretically impossible (because of constitutional constraints), but also empirically impracticable (due to party features which are unable to partially face such constraints). This latter outcome is the also detectable

in semi-presidential cases that show a premier-parliament predominance over the president, and parties that have the above-mentioned divided genetic and organizational features.

We can thus try to answer to some questions, stressing if any diachronic trend is detectable in terms of presidentialization of parties; if there is a trend affecting parliamentary regime toward a (semi)presidential functioning type one; if there a general trend of presidentialization of political parties.

## **The book structure**

The basic research question is: to what extent does party presidentialization vary as a function of the independent variable (constitutional framework) and the intervening variable that is the parties' genetic features/organization. In the constitutional/regime type framework – namely separation of powers or not – that affects presidentialization (party presidentialization), we should question whether the parties' (genetic) features have affected the degree, and the kind of presidentialization of parties in each country. The time span the authors refer to covers the governments and elections that took place since the early 1990s up to 2012. The focus will be on parties (and as a consequence on presidents and prime ministers) that won the elections and became part of the government.

The cases analyzed for each country are the following: the US (Democratic Party, Republican Party), Italy (Forza Italia/People of Freedom, PDS/DS/Democratic Party); Japan (LDP, Democratic Party); Germany (CDU/CSU, SPD); Australia (Labor Party, Liberal Party); Brazil (PT, PSDB and PMDB); France (PS, RPR/UMP); Poland (PSL, SLD, and PO); UK (Conservative, New/Labour); Chile (Socialist Party, IDU); Ukraine (CPU, Ou, PoR, and BYuT).

In the first part, the authors will illustrate the constitutional design and form of government in the selected case. In this way, contributors will begin by identifying the degree of presidentialization, and so they will make it clear that the unit of observation is the nation. The institutional features and constitutional dispositions that represent opportunities and constraints for political actors, furnish the main stage to a presidentialization of politics, and vary in each case/nation. A general frame of presidentialization processes and its characteristics will be included. In particular, critical elements will be pointed out, such as: the kind of presidential election (popular or not), the electoral system



adopted for parliament, and the role of political parties (vote of confidence on the prime minister/government). The authors underline what the parties' features are resulting as a consequence of the institutional framework and constraints. The level of presidentialization comes first as the independent variable and party features are the dependent variable. Moreover, we know that each form of government, including pure presidential ones, vary in important ways, in particular with the kind of parties and party system (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, p. 1). So, this section outlines the main constitutional structure and its importance in "presidentializing" both the political system and the parties.

The authors will then identify party features – certain key theoretically grounded aspects – to see whether the level of presidentialization varies as a function of these party features. In some national contexts some parties could have been following "individual" patterns – both in behavior and organizational terms – that "disregard" the line usually followed in a given regime type. As reported extensively by Samuels "Panebianco (1988) held that the shape a party takes early on in its development largely explains its later developmental path. If parties take on a 'presidential' character, they will retain these characteristics over time. Following up on Epstein's suggestion to compare party development in presidential versus parliamentary systems ought to generate substantial new insights" (2002, pp. 479–80). The contributors are asked to bring to light such "intervening" factors that affect the level of party presidentialization in a given country. Moreover, the context (the cleavages the parties have activated) in which the political parties were born and established will be outlined (Panebianco argues that the "genetic" context and features are important; how have the latter influenced the future development of the party/ies in each country?). The effect that parties' genetic features (the presence of factions, dominant coalition's features, party's external v. internal origins, balance of powers between the party's faces, leaders, etc.) have on the variation of presidentialization are stressed. In this context, the main characteristics of the concerned parties can be illustrated (factions, president/secretary, financial and human resources, number of members and organizational structures, etc.).

The third section focuses on the level of centralized party leadership and its changes. The parties' leadership selection has become increasingly relevant especially if related to the growing importance attributed by voters to leaders in both their electoral choice and in campaigning: in short, the "personalization" of the political process. Some organizations allow "open" primaries while others allow only members/activists

to participate to the selection, and finally others do not have any of these procedures (the party in central office makes the choice of candidates). Thus in some contexts the leadership selection procedures could have strengthened a trend of presidentialization favored by an institutional framework and the regime type. Vice versa, in other contexts less "naturally" oriented by regime type toward presidentialization, the parties' strategy for leadership selection could have increased or introduced a process of centralization/presidentialization of their politics. These "presidentializing" practices can be dependent on parties' genetic features, especially when considering that parties are not unified entities. The section identifies the level (high or low) of centralized party leadership and how it has changed over time. An evaluation of the independent effect of parties' genetic features and balance of power on level of parties' presidentialization and presidentialization politics is then possible.

In analyzing the data is it possible to report relevant changes in the kind and the degree of the presidentialization of parties. We can then look to what has been, together with the institutional framework (Epstein, 1967), the most important party feature in emphasizing and/or inhibiting the rise of a well-defined path of presidentialization in a given context. The authors could thus indicate parties' genetic features that inhibit or emphasize the effects of constitutional structure on parties' presidentialization. Each author identifies the style (personalized/centralized v. fragmented/diffused) (Key, 1964; Katz and Mair, 1995) of party leadership related to effects of the parties' genetic features. Of course, results can show that party features do not explain presidentialization and that – as Samuels and Shugart (2010a) argue – the separation of powers is the primary explanation of parties. In any case, the empirical test must be undertaken. We could have (high or low) presidentialized parties in presidential regimes even though they do not have the fitting genetic features or *non* presidentialized parties in parliamentary and semi-presidential contexts even though they can show some potential genetic features, although not enough to overcome the institutional constraints. Of course the other two cases are possible too: low presidentialized parties in presidential regimes, and (temporally/ephemerally) presidentialized parties in semi-presidential or parliamentary cases, by virtue of the genetic features intervening variable.

Finally, the authors restate the argument and may outline areas where further investigation is needed. Moreover, a final general discussion of how both the constitutional structures and the parties' genetic features

affected the level of centralized party leadership and how it has changed is offered.

## Notes

1. <http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm>
2. In some cases the mediation of indirect party's genetic feature effects could be ephemerally more influent than that of institutions: however, we must keep in mind the constitutional constraints which inhere the presidentialization of parties in parliamentary regimes.
3. A clear distinction must also be made between "nominal vote" and "personal vote": "the presence of nominal voting [in which voters cast their votes for candidates by names and seats are allocated to individual candidates on the basis of the votes they receive] allows casting a 'personal vote,'" which is "based on the candidate's record, character or other attributes specific to the candidate" (Shugart and Watterberg, 2001, p. 10, *fn* 2).
4. We can have personalization of politics *without* presidentialization, as in parliamentary regimes, in local politics (mayors, governors, etc.), and in small (personal) parties.
5. In "new [European] democracies" they have mostly been internally created, that is after reaching the right to representation in democratic assemblies. They have institutional rather societal origins, and as a consequence they tried to focus on electoral mobilization rather than on partisan mobilization. Despite the fact that the official rules of Southern European parties put the party in the parliament under the strict control of the extra-parliamentary party [...], the party in public office would be the predominant face of political parties in newly democratizing systems (van Biezen, 2003, pp. 164, 175).
6. It is possible to also have a mixed kind of organizational development in which both elements of diffusion and penetration are present (Panebianco, 1988, p. 51).
7. In the US this trend has been emphasized by the introduction, in the 1960's, of the primaries to select the candidates of the Democratic Party, and consequently for the Republican Party, for the presidential race.
8. Bearing in mind that the personalization of the procedures of candidatures selections do not imply the presidentialization of parties.
9. The first conventionally recognized case of semi-presidential regime is indicated in literature with the Weimar Republic experience (1919-33) (Shen, 2001).