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The Garibaldi Squad: Hungarian and Polish Converts in Constantinople (1849-1861)

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Abstract

Garibaldi's Sword of Glory: Hungarian and Polish Converts in Constantinople

Hungary's plea for freedom was suppressed by military efforts of Tsarist Russia and the House of Austria in 1849, after which thousands of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire. Since their arrival aroused vehement protests from Austria and Russia, the Sublime Porte induced the refugees to adopt the creed of Islam to alleviate diplomatic pressures. While some refugees, led by General Józef Bem, voluntarily converted to Islam, others, mostly the upper echelon of the movement, particularly Lajos Kossuth, bitterly declined the offer. Although the divergence within the émigrés would continue in the years to come, studies under the spell of state-centric great man narratives prefer giving voice to the leaders, little is known about the rest, such as the Muslim converts, despite their vast number. This selective depiction, however, eliminates contingent discursive variations while silencing the opponents. Worse still, convert presence in the nationalist narratives is stuck with the fruitless discussion of whether they sincerely converted in such a way to disregard possible transformations in their identities in time, whereby scholars equally push the converts into predetermined identity categories to consolidate self-fulfilling national narratives. Indeed, the refugees could never know that their immediate decision to convert would grow into a distinctive revolutionary culture with accumulated knowledge, skills, and experience on Ottoman soil to be transposed to the next generation of revolutionaries no later than the 1860s through informal networks partly embedded in formal structures. As language is the central vehicle of transmission of memory through generations, analyzing the political testimonies of the converts provides a glimpse into a quite heterodox transnational identity converging with wider regions yet diverging from particular genres. As a source of self-narration, the testimonies under oath of a young Austrian deserter of Hungarian origin who converted to Islam embody the traces of how the converts gradually developed a new patriotic discourse running against the mainstream Hungarian nationalist teleology upon adopting Islam, an unacceptable identity feature for the Pantheon of the Magyar nation. Jusztián Károly took asylum in the Ottoman governor's office around Bulgaria while escaping from Austrian agents in the spring of 1861 and confessed at the end of his investigation to being a member of a revolutionary committee, Garibaldi's Sword of Glory (*Garibaldi'nin Şan Kılıncı*), whose higher-ups were mainly composed of the Islamized Hungarian and Polish émigrés in Constantinople in close interactions with certain revolutionary groups in the Italian peninsula as *Il Risorgimento* was in the making. This micro-narrative hints at an alternative route and network for Italian revolutionaries to supply information, volunteers, and arms to the patriotic wars via the Mediterranean port cities, where Constantinople emerged as a regional base that connected wider geo-cultural regions, Hungary, Italy, and Türkiye in this context. Yet this route was not merely a passageway, the converts brought their ideological differences along with their changing identities since their identity was not fixed, which was rather the result of a negotiation process, according to the observations based on the methodological premises of the interpretative variant of the historical sociology. In that regard, their story simultaneously unearths an alternative political imagination of Hungarian (and Polish, to some extent) patriotism against the corresponding elites. More precisely, the converts formulated a counter-hegemony against the sheer Catholicism defended by Napoléon III, Emperor of the French, along with his allies Count Cavour, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and Lajos Kossuth, the best-known Hungarian leader in exile, while aligning themselves with Garibaldi, whose ties with Sardinia were loosening, and adjusting their aims to the interests of the Porte, along with the more embracing political culture of the reform period of the empire, Ottomanism.

Key Words: Hungarian and Polish Refugees, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Garibaldi's Sword of Glory, Conversion and Apostasy, Political Exiles, Ego-Document, Constantinople

Abstract

La spada della gloria di Garibaldi: convertiti ungheresi e polacchi a Costantinopoli

Dopo che la domanda di libertà dell'Ungheria fu soffocata dall'intervento militare della Russia zarista e della Casa d'Austria nel 1849, migliaia di rivoluzionari Cantieri del lungo Ottocento ungheresi, polacchi e italiani cercarono asilo nell'Impero Ottomano. Il loro arrivo suscitò veementi proteste da parte di Austria e Russia, cosicché la Sublime Porta indusse i rifugiati ad abbracciare la religione islamica per alleviare le pressioni diplomatiche. Mentre alcuni rifugiati, guidati dal generale Józef Bem, si convertirono volontariamente all'Islam, altri, soprattutto i vertici del movimento (in particolare Lajos Kossuth), rifiutarono decisamente l'offerta. Sebbene le divergenze all'interno del gruppo degli emigrati continuassero negli anni seguenti, la storiografia ha privilegiato la ricostruzione delle vicende dei vertici, dei leader, trascurando le vicissitudini che gli altri, come i convertiti musulmani, nonostante il loro vasto numero. Questa rappresentazione selettiva, tuttavia, elimina le sfumature discorsive, silenziando gli oppositori. Oltretutto, la visibilità e la presenza dei convertiti nelle narrazioni nazionaliste è inquinata dall'infruttuosa discussione circa la sincerità della loro conversione; una controversia che ignora le possibili trasformazioni delle loro identità nel tempo, alimentata dalla tendenza di alcuni studiosi a incasellare i convertiti all'interno di categorie identitarie predeterminate per consolidare narrazioni nazionali che si autoavverano. In effetti, i rifugiati non potevano sapere che la loro decisione di convertirsi si sarebbe tradotta in una cultura rivoluzionaria distinta, con conoscenze, abilità ed esperienze accumulate sul suolo ottomano da trasmettere alla successiva generazione di rivoluzionari – non più tardi degli anni Sessanta dell'Ottocento – attraverso reti informali in parte incorporate in strutture formali. Poiché il linguaggio è il veicolo centrale della trasmissione della memoria attraverso le generazioni, l'analisi delle testimonianze politiche dei convertiti offre uno sguardo su un'identità transnazionale piuttosto eterodossa che converge con regioni più ampie ma che diverge da generi particolari. Come fonte di autonarrazione, le testimonianze sotto giuramento di un giovane disertore austriaco di origine ungherese convertitosi all'Islam presentano un esempio di come i convertiti abbiano gradualmente sviluppato un nuovo discorso patriottico, in contrasto con la principale teleologia nazionalista ungherese, che ritiene la conversione all'Islam una caratteristica identitaria inaccettabile per il Pantheon della nazione magiara. Jusztián Károly trovò asilo nell'ufficio del governatore ottomano in Bulgaria mentre fuggiva dagli agenti austriaci nella primavera del 1861 e confessò alla fine dell'indagine di essere un membro di un comitato rivoluzionario, Garibaldi's Sword of Glory (Garibaldi'nin Şfan Kılıncı), i cui vertici erano composti principalmente da emigrati ungheresi e polacchi islamizzati a Costantinopoli, in stretta interazione con alcuni gruppi rivoluzionari della penisola italiana, allora teatro del movimento risorgimentale. Questa micronarrazione accenna a un percorso e a una rete alternativi, utili per fornire informazioni ai rivoluzionari italiani, ai volontari, nonché armi per combattere le guerre patriottiche, trasportandole attraverso le città portuali del Mediterraneo; in tale quadro, Costantinopoli emerse come base regionale che collegava Ungheria, Italia e Turchia. Tuttavia, questo 81 82 percorso non può considerarsi contingente, poiché i convertiti mantennero le loro differenze ideologiche assieme alle loro mutevoli identità: in questo senso la loro identità era sfaccettata, il risultato di un processo di negoziazione, così come è possibile affermare basandosi sulle premesse metodologiche della sociologia storica. A questo proposito, la loro storia porta contemporaneamente alla luce un immaginario politico alternativo del patriottismo ungherese (e polacco, in una certa misura) contro le élite. Più precisamente, i convertiti elaborarono una contro-egemonia in opposizione al puro cattolicesimo difeso da Napoleone III, imperatore dei francesi, insieme ai suoi alleati conte Cavour, primo ministro del Regno di Sardegna, e Lajos Kossuth, il più noto leader ungherese in esilio. Nel contempo, si allineavano ai garibaldini, i cui legami con la Sardegna si stavano allentando, e adeguavano i loro obiettivi agli interessi della Porta e alla cultura politica del periodo di riforma dell'impero, l'ottomanesimo.¹

Parole chiave: Profughi ungheresi e polacchi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Una Spada Fiammeggiante di un Eroe, Conversione e apostasia, Esuli politici, Egodocumento, Costantinopoli

¹ This abstract was previously published in: İlkay Kirişçioglu, "La spada della gloria di Garibaldi: convertiti ungheresi e polacchi a Costantinopoli," trans. Simona Berhe, *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 1 (2024): 80–82.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

- A.AMD – Sadaret Âmedî Kalemi Defterleri
A.DVN.MHM – Sadâret Divan-ı Hümâyûn Mühimme Kalemi Belgeleri
A.M – Mütferrik Evrakı A.MKT.MHM – Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Mühimme Evrakı
A.MKT.MVL – Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Meclis-i Vâlâ Evrakı
A.MKT.NZD – Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Nezâret ve Devâir Yazışmalarına Ait Belgeler
A.MKT.UM – Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Umum Vilayet Yazışmalarına Ait Belgeler
BOA –Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri
EU – European Union
HR – Hariciye Nezareti Belgeleri
HR.MKT – Hariciye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi Belgeleri
HR.SYS – Hariciye Nezareti Siyasî Kısım
HR.TO – Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası Evrakı
İ.DH – İrâde-Dahiliye
İ.MVL – İrâde Meclis-i Vâlâ
ITO – Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
SNI – Società Nazionale Italiana
TDK – Türk Dil Kurumu
TTK – Türk Tarih Kurumu

Preface

This research is the result of a journey, not just an intellectual one. The origins of this dissertation can be traced back to the years when I was a graduate student at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Boğaziçi University. At that time, I intended to become a historian of the twentieth century, a field in which proficiency in Ottoman Turkish reading skills is not a strict precondition to research, though I still wished to acquire some knowledge of this language. Quite unexpectedly, my academic path had a twist after I enrolled in an Ottoman paleography course, focused on *istintaknâmes* (interrogation protocols). At the end of that semester, I was required to find archival evidence in Ottoman Archives and write a term paper to pass the course. This search coincidentally took me to the sworn testimony of a Hungarian deserter who was detained in Bulgaria while travelling through the Ottoman Balkans. His name was Jusztenián Károly.

Classified as "miscellaneous" in the archival database, his testimony lacked a meaningful content. The account struck me as utterly incomprehensible at first, almost absurd even, yet the records were intuitively provocative. The protagonist was a revolutionary devoted to the Hungarian cause, yet he did not speak the language. Even though he was a revolutionary, he fashioned himself as an ardent opponent of Lajos Kossuth, who has been habitually assumed to have represented the entire Hungarian emigration of his time. Jusztenián was a young revolutionary, yet his understanding of international politics was unparalleled. He had sharp opinions

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on the Balkan policies of the French, domestic politics in Italy, and even sectarian combat in Ottoman Syria. He claimed to have personally known some of the prominent revolutionary leaders of his time, narrating firsthand memories and impressions of Giuseppe Garibaldi, Lajos Kossuth, Ferenc Pulszky, and Sándor Gál. He also mentioned several significant historical events, such as the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-49, the Crimean War (1853-1856), and the Expedition of the Thousand (1860), though he did not refer to them by these terms. He converted to Islam on Ottoman soil and changed his name to Hüseyin. While it is known that hundreds of political refugees and exiles from Hungary, Poland, and Italy converted to Islam in Ottoman lands after the Revolutions of 1848, it was unconventional for a revolutionary to do so at the time of his interrogation in 1861. His political activities covered vast geographies. He was born in Hungary. Having defected from the Austrian army, he joined the revolutionary events in Italy around 1860. From Messina, he sailed to the Ottoman capital to meet the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian Forty-Eighters (48ers). On his way to Belgrade, he was detained in Bulgaria, where his interrogations started to be recorded. The document I encountered was, in fact, his follow-up interrogations in the Ottoman capital.

My initial instinct was to dismiss these statements as calculated fabrications to get away with the utterly difficult situation since the protagonist was under arrest. At any rate, the inconsistencies, indecisiveness, and inventions embedded in these statements intrigued me so much that I decided to pursue every possible lead to

decipher the implications of the text. The record was like a sounding into a completely different mentality, yet it was necessary to engage in extensive research across various national historiographies and scholarly themes to place the specific historical contexts, even to verify whether the revelations were aligned with real historical events and persons. As I dived into the broader contexts, I gradually realized that these testimonies were far more than a simple case; one thing was certain, they did not conform to any traditional meta-narratives. Even though I was unsure whether the interrogee was faking, I found some relief that the testimonies were too precise and consistent to make up on the spot. They started to appear to me like a memoir. Imbued with political motives, symbols, and strong emotions (fear, aspirations, frustration, anger, insecurities, fantasies, preferences, and yearnings), the testimony of Jusztenián revealed a great deal about the life story of a young revolutionary from childhood to the present in a wide range of geographies, including Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East.

I had only a five-page document composed of three consecutive sworn testimonies, that was all. It was not placed within a proper classification in the imperial archives, making it difficult to track down the bureaucratic journey of the record. Even the contextual evidence was vague since the names of specific individuals and places Jusztenián mentioned were mostly impossible to read due to the Arabic and Persian scripts. As an inexperienced researcher in Ottoman Archives, I consulted with some colleagues who pointed out the difficulties in tracing this case and finding enough evidence to feed a doctoral thesis, let alone the

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challenges of accessing sources in various languages and archives. Despite all the difficulties, I found myself dedicated to studying the story, transforming these revelations into a departing point for my doctoral project.

It was first Prof. Zafer Toprak who encouraged me to pursue my academic endeavors abroad. Following his advice, I applied to several universities in Hungary and Italy for a doctoral degree, as the topic was more closely related to the national histories of these countries, not to mention that learning the language spoken in one of these countries could help further my research. Soon after, I received some offers from the University of Bologna, the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa, Sapienza University of Rome, and Eötvös Loránd University. After accepting a scholarship reserved for international students at Rome, I left behind my previous research objectives, months of hard work on a completely different topic, and institutional affiliation in Istanbul.

This journey took me to the Italian capital in the fall of 2021. My first days after arrival were shockingly different than I had anticipated. It was in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the already exhausting bureaucratic tasks became more wearisome and time-consuming. Because of these impediments, I was only able to start my research in January 2022. From then until submitting this thesis in April 2025, my days were never tranquil, problems with bureaucracy and accommodation never ceased to exist. However, the most devastating trouble occurred after I had completed an important piece of writing, in addition to a substantial amount of archival research. My personal computer was stolen. It was

such a bad luck that this happened just as I had a technical issue with storing my data, resulting in the loss of crucial work.

Despite all the difficulties, I was lucky to have the support of so many people, to whom I am deeply grateful, as this work would not have come about without their help. I should start with the place this study originally began, Boğaziçi University, where I had started to pursue a PhD degree, even though I did not complete it. I have already noted how coincidence played a role in finding my topic, but the truth is, it was not entirely coincidental. Even though my level of Ottoman Turkish was quite insufficient for taking that graduate course, Prof. Edhem Eldem encouraged me to enroll, nonetheless. In consequence, the course enhanced my ability to read Ottoman bureaucratic correspondences from the 19th century, introduced me to interrogation protocols as a document genre, and provided me with the chance to examine the first piece of evidence that ultimately inspired this study.

Even though this research is a direct outcome of my time in Rome, the years I spent at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History had indirect but significant bearing on my research output. I can even confess that because I had initially trained myself as a Cold War historian, the seminars of Prof. Cengiz Kırımlı and Prof. Nadir Özbek on Ottoman historiography were less appealing to me, much like the extensive reading list the institute required doctoral students to internalize in preparation for the proficiency exam before beginning their thesis. However, the historiographic insights I was "compelled" to acquire there turned out to be essential

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for this research, something I could only appreciate in hindsight. From the same institute, furthermore, Prof. Mehmet Asım Karaömerlioğlu has always been a prominent intellectual mentor to me, his graduate course on generational perspectives in history was particularly inspiring for the final chapter of this dissertation. Nor should I dismiss the paleographic assistance I received from Dr. Erhan Bektaş in reading my first piece of evidence.

I am foremost grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Fabio L. Grassi, for his unique mentorship all along my intellectual journey. He became an intellectual father to me, both through his unwavering support of my research project and his pioneering role in bringing Ottoman archival registers about Garibaldi and his associates to the attention of Italian scholars (some fifteen years ago). In a way, I happened to follow his lead with the present work. I also owe him my appreciation for his positive attitude toward my unending requests. It merits also to underscore that he has always been supportive for numerous researchers from Türkiye, rendering himself as a bridge between the academia of the two countries. In my opinion, nevertheless, these interactions should rather be institutionalized beyond personal contacts and individual efforts. Historians from Türkiye and Italy have a lot to learn from each other regarding their shared past.

Under Prof. Grassi's supervision, I enjoyed the utmost academic freedom, which was crucial for this sort of study to emerge. Similarly, the History (and Cultures) of Europe PhD program at Sapienza University offered unique environment for pursuing my independent research. Prof. Alessandro Saggioro and

Prof. Michaela Valente were the two directors of the program during my stay. They have never refused my requests in terms of bureaucratic and academic matters. Their colleagues Walter Montanari, Federica Modesti, and Barbara De Santis were equally patient to assist me whenever necessary. Owing to the kindness of all these people, I have spent a research period highly productive and intense. Besides publishing a few articles, I have participated in numerous academic gatherings that played a crucial role in shaping my research. It should not be an exaggeration to say that I have written this dissertation through these academic gatherings and papers, after immersing myself in the stimulating questions, useful comments, and fresh insights offered by many colleagues. Prof. Natalie Rothman provided a valuable feedback when my research was still a proposal. Prof. Paolo Montesperelli was among those who made important criticisms in terms of the methodology of my research. Dr. Ilona Sandor and Dr. Agnieszka Aysen Kaim have given important insights into the public perceptions on the converts in Hungary and Poland. I have to thank Dr. Emilj Consuelo Malara, Dr. Roberto Motta Sosa, Luis Miguel Selvelli, Dr. Cs Beatrix Lengyel, Dr. Johannes Mattes, Dr. Franz L. Fillafer, Dr. Johannes Feichtinger, Assoc. Prof. Emre Saral, Dr. Gábor Fodor, Dr. Ebru Onay, Dr. Erdal Bilgiç, and Dr. Bodnár-Király Tibor for their kindness and the material they provided. I also have to thank the two external referees and defense committee for the time and effort they dedicated to reviewing the thesis.

During my stay in Rome, I mostly studied at the library of the Philosophy Department of the Sapienza University and at Sala Emiciclo on its main campus. I

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am indebted to the student collaborators, whose names largely remain unknown to me. I would also like to extend my gratitude to several individuals I have never met in person, yet who generously helped me in transcribing some Ottoman scripts I struggled with through social media platforms. It is not possible to mention all their names, but Bektaş Kaya, Müjgan Göktürk, Recep Tokmak, Ergün Tanlak, Mustafa Tanrıver, and Feyza Başgöze were among those who immediately come to my mind.

This work is likely to attract more critiques than appreciation, considering its engagement with official/nationalist meta-narratives as well as the religious perspectives that underpin them. Needless to say, any errors and misinterpretations can solely be attributed to me, yet critiques must be fair. At various academic gatherings, numerous scholars, particularly from Hungary and Italy, expressed appreciation for my research project, noting the general lack of interest in this particular topic. Even after nearly two centuries, indeed, the refugee issue and the issue of conversion on Ottoman soil remains still inadequately addressed. While framing this work around the lives of the revolutionary converts, even the fundamental task of compiling and synchronizing a chronology of historical events intersecting Turkish, Hungarian, and Italian histories from the late 1840s to the early 1860s proved exhausting. It had to be arranged from scratch using an array of disparate sources, due to the absence of any precedent in this regard. In any case, I still do not consider this study a final product. Rather, it is a manifesto that illuminates the central themes of my future research. That is to say, my journey

remains ongoing, and I remain committed to advancing this work, ready to embrace the challenges of moving across cities, learning new languages, conducting research in diverse archives, and engaging with a wide range of scholarly perspectives.

In the course of writing this dissertation, I employed artificial intelligence as a valuable tool to support various aspects of academic writing. It played a supportive role in my final year to enhance the clarity and coherence of my writing. It assisted me with tasks such as refining complex sentences, improving the flow of the text, and ensuring consistency in style. AI was also instrumental in formatting citations and references according to the seventeenth edition of the Chicago Manual of Style. I hereby declare that I have never used artificial intelligence to generate independent content or to import material into this dissertation without thorough investigation. The arguments, perspectives, structure, and overall line of thought are entirely my own.

I used the online machine at the website of the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu, TTK) to convert Hijri and Gregorian dates appearing on the sources in Ottoman Turkish. In order not to overwhelm the footnotes in the main text, I provided translations of the titles of non-English sources in the bibliography. The names of the cities in the Eastern and Central Europe pose a perennial problem for researchers because places might have a variety of names in different national contexts. I have preferred to use the original names of places in their *current* national contexts, while alternative names are given in parentheses. Istanbul has numerous names in different languages and contexts. In this study, I preferred using

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Istanbul, Constantinople, Dersaadet, and Deraliyye interchangeably without attributing to them any political message. The names of geographical locations and the names of non-Muslim individuals in Arabic and Persian scripts also pose significant problems for students of Ottoman history, sometimes they can be almost impossible to read. Unfortunately, I was unable to transcribe some proper names, yet I was able to decipher most of them owing to contextual evidence. I tried to stick to their original spelling whenever possible; for instance, I preferred Jusztinián Károly over Charles Justinian. The expressions in Ottoman Turkish are transliterated in footnotes according to their modern spelling.

İL KAY KİRİŞÇİ O GLU

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Introduction

Hungary's quest for freedom was suppressed by the armies of Tsarist Russia and the House of Austria in 1849, after which thousands of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire. These refugees included representatives of the revolutionary government in Hungary, as well as military personnel from high-ranking officers and physicians to engineers and rank-and-file soldiers. This influx aroused vehement protests from Austria and Russia. Even though it was primarily the latter that pressed more strongly for the extradition of the refugees, the Sublime Porte had a bilateral agreement that ensured the protection of Muslim refugees. This led some refugees, notably under the leadership of General Józef Bem (Murad Pasha), to voluntarily convert to Islam, while others, mostly the upper echelon of the revolutionary movement, under the leadership of Lajos Kossuth, bitterly declined the option. Although the divergence among the refugees would continue in the years to come, "great man" narratives have thus far tended to privilege the voice of the upper echelons, thus, little is known about the rest, such as the converts, despite their significant number. This selective portrayal eliminates contingent discursive variations while silencing alternative historical trajectories. The present study aims to contribute to academic knowledge about these refugees who converted from one religion to the other, and the alternative historical visions they might offer.

Ever since the linguistic turn, knowledge production has been understood as deeply intertwined with daily contestations occurring within specific historical contexts; no historical explanation, thus, could be considered meaningful outside of power mechanisms. Relying on this premise, this doctoral project starts with examining the genealogy of the relevant literature, analyzing the way Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers who converted to Islam on Ottoman

soil have been evaluated to date, to lay the grounds for an *alternative* epistemological framework. The underlying idea along the survey is to pinpoint the subaltern, who have been overwhelmed by triumphant discursive practices, as historical texts embody the disposition of power out of which they flourish. In other words, it attempts to observe the *evolution* of the existing scholarship, rather than merely outlining what is present and what is lacking in the literature. Rather than focusing on social realities, thus, the dedicated section addresses the discursive problem, aiming to identify a variation/deviation from the mainstream, for which the dominant narratives are the main point of departure.

Turkish and Hungarian (also Polish and Italian) official historiographies have maintained a consensus on the significance of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49 and its aftermath in the Ottoman Empire, reflecting the friendly relations between the two countries since last quarter of the nineteenth century. A plethora of writings on the refugees revolving around the "undisputed" leader of the Magyar national cause are visible, so much so that the Hungarian emigration after the failure in 1849 is even called "Kossuth emigration" as a whole without representing those who refused to follow him. As a persona, the revolutionary leader embodies the identity of the imagined community at a specific moment in the life of the nation, while those who challenge him find themselves outside the mental map of the nation. More intriguingly, the personality cult of Kossuth gradually penetrates the Turkish official narratives, eventually coming to symbolize the friendship between the Turkish and Hungarian nations. Yet the inevitable consequence of his elevation to sainthood within state-centered narratives is the silencing of those who opposed Kossuth at the peak of his political career, including the revolutionary converts. The only way for the converts to remain visible in the Hungarian narratives was through the perceived "insincerity" of their apostasy (as being pejoratively called renegades), while it was through their usefulness to

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further the national narrative in the Turkish literature. For the Hungarian perspective, in sum, the converts never truly embraced Islam, they just behaved as such.

The Turkish perspective remains indifferent to the question of sincerity; the revolutionaries are rather evaluated according to their contributions to the nation-state formation. Quite extraordinarily, even this position stems from the discourses of Kossuth, who declared in refuge that the Hungarian refugees could modernize the Orient. Following this epistemological precedent, scholars of the early republican era in Türkiye, on the whole, portrayed the refugees as one of the conduits through which romantic nationalist ideas penetrated into the Ottoman Empire, which was then undergoing a refashioning period. That is to say, the teleology of nation-state formation based on grand man narratives not only intertwines with political and hagiographic historiography, but also reinforces the interpretations rooted in the Eurocentric model of modernization, all as part of a negotiation process on a transnational level. The key observation in this regard is that the national/official narratives have maintained a mutual understanding, despite the cultural underpinnings that decisively divides the Turkish and Hungarian identities, which are often framed in terms of "impermeable" religious differences (Christianity vs Islam). The modernization paradigm forms the basis of this epistemological consensus. The result is that the modernizing mission of the exiles who brought the values identified exclusively with the hegemonic West to a subordinated Oriental state have hitherto remained the most dominant premise in the literature.

It is crucial to acknowledge divergences from mainstream narratives and to deconstruct linear interpretations of history writing under the auspices of national historiographies. However, overemphasis on cultural difference is typically criticized to sustain the power relations as they are, justifying the culturally framed injustices at the present. Indeed, the heyday of postmodernism has long passed, with deconstruction proving to be insufficient

without a simultaneous effort toward reconstruction.² At this juncture, the genealogical survey in this study also provides important insights into the methodological foundations of our inquiry. The main issue lies in the elitist and essentializing tendency within master narratives that focus on the deeds of great men and the structural transformations they orchestrated, culminating with the linear ascendancy of nation-states. After placing the textual strategies and mechanisms of repression in discourses that marginalize those who parted their ways with the mainstream and became subaltern, the central aim of this work becomes to revive the voice of the voiceless, for which the so-called ego documents are put into play.

The document genre that underpins this study was discussed in the second subsection of the first chapter, where interrogation protocols are peculiarly introduced, and a viable methodology to make use of them is elaborated. For these records, the Ottoman Imperial Archives in Istanbul stood as our primary source. Even though relying on material preserved in state archives may seem anomalous when attempting to unearth the voice of the subaltern, the interstitial clues embedded in the dominating structures present crucial opportunities to trace the voices of the castaways. Interrogation protocols, in this sense, often emerge in states of exception, when the state perceives the public order under threat, meaning that these records have the potential to offer insights into the power relations. The narratives derived from interrogation protocols might help us usher fresh perspectives, as they have potential to unravel discrepancies in traditional historiographies, without supporting the marginal statuses of the subaltern. These micro-stories are not isolated as one might think, especially when one unravels the collective character of a given ideological discourse, since the circulation of a certain language, after all, implies a collective experience as much as it is described. Relying upon interstitial revelations embedded in interrogative process, this study empirically observes how

² Margaret C. Jacob, Joyce Appleby, and Lynn Hunt, *Telling the Truth About History* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 234.

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concrete individuals responded to broader social and political transformations in a given time and space, rather than imposing abstract conceptions onto their perceptions without even addressing their voices. The final part of the first chapter suggests that Ottoman Archives offer valuable opportunities to contribute to European history writing, given that the liberal-nationalist revolutionary network of the nineteenth century also comprises Ottoman lands, where revolutionary events and figures in Europe inescapably left archival traces. European revolutionary exiles who found refuge on Ottoman soil in the nineteenth century were often marginalized within their own revolutionary movements at the time of emerging nation; therefore, reviving their voices holds the potential to bring new perspectives. In this regard, this study suggests that search for alternative nation-state projects may consider to take Ottoman sources into account.

Along with the related bureaucratic correspondences, the empirical part of the work in the third chapter fundamentally rests upon the testimonies under oath in cases of Polish Wiktor Jabłoński, Italo-Hungarian Giuseppe Bloscò, and Hungarian convert Juszinián Károly (Hüseyin), while it also utilized the petitions (*arz-u hal*) addressed to the Sublime Porte in the case of Antal Schneider (Hüseyin Faik); not to mention that memoirs and scholarly works of some revolutionary converts were complementary to reach the collective psyche of the larger community. The individual stories at hand unfold a high level of transnational engagement across a wide range of geographies, from Hungary and Poland through the Austrian, Russian, and Turkish empires to the Balkan and Italian peninsulas in the second half of the nineteenth century when the formation of nation-states in these regions had already been set in motion. Their engagement makes the protagonists go-betweens who interacted with different environments at the time of grand transformations within which they found themselves in and on which they had impacts.

This study aims to uncover the mentality of those who were overwhelmingly Hungarian and Polish by birth and fought for the independence of their countries during the Revolutions of 1848, converted to Islam on Ottoman soil in the post-revolutionary period, and then took part in the modernization of this empire. Around a decade later, they participated in the patriotic wars under the leadership of Giuseppe Garibaldi in Italy for its unification. Their presence at the intersection of mainly three national histories made the underground activities in these domains interrelated, thus, evaluating their actual situation requires a more inclusive paradigm than what the literature offers. After all, they were both *trans-national* and *trans-imperial* agents, constantly circulating through and interacting with various regions, which means that their activities not only overlapped with formal and informal institutions and structures but also multiple cultural and ideological environments. The methods of *histoire croisée* focus precisely on these entanglements with their uncontrolled outcomes. This research applies its methodological premises at the Mediterranean scale to move beyond the narrowly defined nation-state paradigms and to avoid essentialization pitfalls. Mostly through the port cities of the Balkan and Italian peninsulas in the Mediterranean basin, the political refugees in Ottoman lands interacted with other revolutionary groups beyond national and imperial borders, which affected their political identities and ideological discourses in return. That is to say, focusing on the representations in the first chapter and the narration in the third does not necessarily undermine analytical and rationalist discussions in this research.

The analytical part of this study interprets the transnational interactions and exchanges of the revolutionary converts, as well as their resulting impacts on their political identities and ideological discourses. Studies generally treat the identities of the converts as fixed, perpetuating oversimplified binary categorizations, albeit expressed in ethno-religious terms. Thus, the convert presence in the nationalist narratives is stuck with the fruitless discussion of whether they *sincerely* converted in such a way to disregard possible transformations in their

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identities *in time*. Consciously or unconsciously, scholars tend to push the converts into predetermined identity categories to corroborate their self-fulfilling national narratives, while the self-perception of the objectified converts is characteristically denied. In fact, this is the narcissistic side of historical profession at modern times, which seeks to reconfirm one's present sense of identity while suppressing potentially disruptive alterity.³ On the contrary, this study attempts to go beyond either-or perspectives and the paired concepts that animate them, including East and West, Europeans and Turks, and Christian and Islam, center and periphery, state and society, agents and structures, and objectivism and subjectivism. It maintains that no predetermined identity can be upheld prior to experience; no identity persists as a fixation based on a transcendental essence that imposes itself from above; and the psychological self does not exist in an uncontextualized vacuum but is rather subject to conflicts over meaning in relation to power and authority in everyday politics. Accordingly, the political identities of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts pose a difficult question to address, since their identity traits do not fit into the categories existing in our mental maps, which does not prevent this study from problematizing it in the final chapter.

This work interprets the transformation in the political identities of a group of itinerant insurgents during the first two decades of the second half of the nineteenth century and the resulting political discourses they promoted, in other words, how they came to terms with different cultural environments and how these encounters gradually shaped the way they perceived the world around them. Understanding the conditions under which their identity and ideology took shape is crucial for accurately interpreting what the revolutionary converts appropriated as they navigated key international and domestic events at the intersection of three historical contexts. These are the Hungarian plea for freedom (1825-1867), the Tanzimat period (1839-1871) of the Ottoman Empire, and the Risorgimento period (1848-1870) in Italy. Göran

³ Lois McNay, "The Foucauldian Body and the Exclusion of Experience," *Hypatia* 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 127.

Therborn stresses that the material basis for the emergence of ideology is found in the transformative processes within the structures of a given society, as well as its interactions with other societies.⁴ In attempting to understand and explain the ideological discourses of the convert revolutionaries *at a given moment*, it is essential to consider the historical processes that preceded that moment. The ideological preferences at every "historical junctions" are, in fact, built upon prior sociopolitical conditions. Indeed, this study deals with the interplay between the revolutionary converts and the dynamic structures from the transnational perspective. These structures are objective, meaning that their existence is independent of individual social agents. Although structures have capacity to guide and constrain agents' practices, the subjective representations of the agents must also be considered to explain the everyday struggles aiming at transforming the same structures.⁵ Neither the state nor society is homogeneous or isolated; both contain various subgroups that have their own alliances, disputes, and cultural projects. This research aims to indicate that the mobility of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionary converts articulated intra-group disputes in different polities they trespassed. It evaluates the sociopolitical and cultural contexts with which these revolutionaries interacted, along with the interstices within the structures and institutions they engaged, in order to identify the sites of resistance, and autonomy they navigated.

At the end of the 1840s, the revolution in Hungary had generated internal factionalism, which soon interacted with the political factions within the Ottoman reformist elite when the revolutionaries sought asylum in the Balkans. When the revolutionary wars in Italy sparked new factionalisms at the beginning of the 1860s, new factions overlapped with existing factional lines among the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire. It is

⁴ Göran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1980), 43.

⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," *Sociological Theory* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 15.

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therefore essential to break down the various political and ideological currents (such as those associated with István Széchenyi, Lajos Kossuth, Józef Bem [Murad Pasha], Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Giuseppe Mazzini, Camillo Cavour, and Giuseppe Garibaldi), through which the converts organized their political alliances and ideological commitments. To illustrate, after following Kossuth's radical line, revolutionaries found themselves displaced to Ottoman lands, where some of them entered a new kind of social integration upon conversion to Islam at the end of the 1840s, aligning themselves with the reformist rulers of the empire. It must not be unsurprising that their next engagements in the Italian peninsula at the beginning of the 1860s fell on the earlier tracks in the empire. Their affiliations with one or more of these *ways* were part of a longer historical process that accompanies their shifting identities, an evolution that did not occur suddenly, but gradually unfolded. What is being described here is essentially a case of path dependency.

Incorporating the daily concerns and interactions of the revolutionary converts into this narrative relies on the premise that identity is subject to ongoing struggles, constantly defined and redefined in relation to perceived friends and foes. It is remarkable that the self-narratives of the revolutionary converts always mirror a construction vis-a-vis the privileged others, in response to outside aggressors and inside factionalisms. By the early 1860s, Hungarian and Polish converts clung to the legacy of General Bem, whose conversion had offended and infuriated the upper echelon of their respective. This legacy represented a past with which the converts could connect, a point of reference through which they could make sense of their present existence, and a tradition to pass on to future generations. While transferring the general's legacy and memory to the next generation, the convert revolutionaries translated their own experiences into an ideology. Their tradition offered an alternative way of rebelling, no matter whether it gained ground, apart from the visions the opposing factions proposed. In other words, the initiative taken by Murad Pasha to convert to Islam against the wishes of Lajos

Kossuth, Władysław Zamoyski, and Alessandro Monti in 1849 opened a new trajectory within the Hungarian and Polish nationalist circles, a *third way* that would resonate in the political discourses of the converts around a decade later. By the early 1860s, the converts articulated an alternative projection for the liberation of Hungary (and Poland), one that was both independent from and distinct to that of their once-leaders—now based in Paris and London, where the Polish and Italian nationalists resided, and in Turin, where the Sardinian rulers and the Hungarian government-in-exile stood. The immediate political strategy of the converts was ultimately based on taking a negative position against the sheer Catholicism defended by Napoléon III, Emperor of the French, along with his allies Camillo Benso di Cavour, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and Lajos Kossuth and Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, the best-known Hungarian and Polish leaders in exile. They adjusted their aims to the interests of the Porte, along with the more embracing political culture of the reform period of the Tanzimat period, *Ottomanism*. When some converts started to align themselves with *Garibaldini*, whose ties with Sardinia were loosening in the early 1860s, they inescapably severed their alliance with the Porte, which deported them to Italy in return. These people were not the Greek philosophers in intellectual pursuit of abstract values, their intellectual production was the expression of their struggles in a constantly changing social practice. Their political strategies and ideological discourses did not reflect a mere tactic either. These were rather deeply intertwined with the transformations in their selves. The new language they put in use encapsulated the evolution of this identity from the late 1840s to the early 1860s.

The argument is that after enduring a series of shared traumas, the Hungarian and Polish converts began to experience fractures in their personalities and crises in their identities. This process first includes defeat on the battlefield, displacement from the homeland, conversion to Islam, intra-communal rejection in exile, spatial isolation from their former comrades, coming to terms with the traditional "Other" (1849-1851). While they were forced to leave their home

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countries, the Porte provided them some hope. While they were excommunicated by their peers in exile, the empire successfully absorbed them into its refashioning state apparatus. Consequently, the pull and push factors in this sense were complementary. Later on, Islam gradually became a new reference point for their new lives; conversion brought a new set of confessional, legal, and moral framework, as well as new social and cultural dynamics. Their everyday lives and routines, even at the most intimate levels, had to be adjusted and remodeled to fit new cultural surroundings, governed by a set of rules regulating social relations in both public and private spheres. The process deepened as they were employed within the imperial bureaucracy. Gradually integrated into the polity, the converts were tasked with furthering the reform program while simultaneously becoming immersed in the existing schisms within the ruling cadres. They participated in the military campaigns, as a result of which they identified themselves more with the empire (1851-1856). Even though the most crucial turning point in the biographies of the converts was the decision to adopt Islam since it was the very element through which the revolutionaries were subjected to a new set of rules, it never meant a wholesale renunciation of the former set of cultural codes. In a similar vein, the Crimean War functioned as a machine of transformation; while some converts emerged from it with a stronger sense of Ottoman identity, it is also evident that some others started to stray from the Ottoman path afterwards. As the Sardinian conspirators grew more focused on the Ottoman Balkans, the stages of Italian unification introduced new ideological influences for the revolutionary converts in the Ottoman capital (1857-1861).

These revolutionaries did not call themselves syncretic (or hybrid, or heterodox, or non-conformist), yet it is evident that their performances did not conform to any orthodoxy known to us. Their political discourse came to the fore reactively but creatively owing to the real situations they confronted as well as their earlier memories and cultural backgrounds. Their collective story actually implies a new teleology for the researchers in the field. The evidence

at hand insinuates that the converts gradually developed a heterodox patriotic discourse running against the mainstream Hungarian nationalist teleology upon adopting Islam. In that regard, their story simultaneously unearths *an alternative political imagination* of Hungarian (and Polish, to some extent) patriotism against the one adhered by the corresponding elites. When analyzed, the political discourses of the converts were a clear statement of an effort to seek a balance between former cultural codes and the new ones. This reflects a selective synthesis in their identity shift experienced mainly in three national environments, the Hungarian and Polish (1825-1849), the Ottoman (1849-1859), and Italian (1859-1862). Theirs was a compromise, transgressing binary understandings. In fact, our methodology endorses that the outcomes of intercrossing cannot be reduced to none of the constituents. Finally, their micro-narratives hint at *an alternative route and network* for Italian revolutionaries to supply information, volunteers, and arms to the patriotic wars via the Mediterranean port cities, where Constantinople emerged as a regional base that connected the revolutionary activities of wider geo-cultural regions. Yet this route was not merely a passageway, the converts brought their ideological differences along with their changing identities, which was rather the result of a negotiation process.

I would like to talk very briefly about the significance of the study. Through the claims it makes, the perspectives it introduces, the sociological models it develops, and the methodologies it proposes, this study represents an endeavor without a direct precedent in the existing literature. The discoveries and insights it offers intend to reinvigorate discussions on how the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers who found asylum and converted to Islam in the Ottoman Empire are often handled, how the fates of the converts diverged from mainstream national narratives, how their psyche might be brought back in, what kinds of sources may support this enterprise, and which methodologies can be employed. Also, the present study provides insights into the intergenerational transfer of knowledge, experience, and skills

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between two different generations of refugees and converts on Ottoman soil (though the analysis may well be extended to four consecutive generations from the 1820s to the early 1900s). This study contributes not only to the scholarship on the refugees and converts, but also to the imperial politics of conversion in the nineteenth century, the uses of interrogation protocols (*istintaknâme*) as ego-documents to give voice to the subaltern, the internal composition of the reforming elites at the Porte, and the potential role of Ottoman Archives in contributing to European historiography. Underscoring technological developments that increased mobility and informal revolutionary networks that extended beyond borders, this study connects the Hungarian and Italian patriotic movements *through* the Balkan territory. This points to another significant discovery of the present work. Some Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries who sought asylum on Ottoman soil in the late 1840s extended their underground activities to the Balkan peninsula in the early 1860s, in parallel with their political engagements in the Italian peninsula. Therefore, any attempt to contextualize the revolutionary activities in the Ottoman Balkans, this study contends, must also account for the simultaneous developments in Europe. Without establishing this connection, as has been the case so far, these political activities cannot be comprehensively contextualized and assessed. In the light of the questions already addressed, moreover, this research contributes to Risorgimento historiography in terms of how the personal cult of Giuseppe Garibaldi gained widespread recognition during his lifetime and how he was admired as a mythical figure not only in Europe but also elsewhere so as to assess the Risorgimento narrative more inclusive.⁶ It is also among the claims of this work that the intense *cross-regional* interactions in the *trans-imperial* setting in the nineteenth century extended beyond the connectivity of the various regions within the same empires, so should future studies.

⁶ Lucy Riall, *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 12.

At the end, it is an effort to stretch beyond the entrenched intellectual confines. Upon closer inspection, it presents a series of hypotheses that merit further exploration through new evidence drawn from various sources in different languages and archives. It proposes a general outline and a direction for future research, an alternative meta-narrative, without claiming to say final things. The multiplicity of lived experiences pertaining to the revolutionary converts within the Ottoman bureaucracy, their solidarity networks within this locus, the internal factions they interacted with, and the specific state branches in which they contributed to the reform movement require further in-dept appraisal through additional case studies. Even though it is always claimed that the 48ers made significant contributions to Ottoman modernization, much of the existing literature remains too general to allow for a comprehensive evaluation of the specific projects they presented or carried out, the specific duties and responsibilities they undertook, and the significance of their efforts in the overall transformation of the empire. Even though the informal networks and activities of some mobile revolutionaries are scrutinized in the present study, the connections of the converts to masonic lodges were another important research agenda, though this work never dived into, another area left for future studies. This study has primarily focused on the Turkish, Hungarian, and Italian contexts, with limited attention to the Polish and Balkans contexts, which were selectively engaged in proportion to their support of the main arguments. This does not mean that the latter contexts were not important or secondary, but I had limited time, space, and intellectual capabilities. I have drawn on secondary sources to outline the history of the revolutionaries who sought refuge in the empire after the failure of the Hungarian War of Independence, but these works employ the very perspectives I sought to critique. For a more robust and nuanced study, I intend to revisit first-hand sources through the lens of the perspectives offered here in the future. My endeavor is largely limited to sources written in Ottoman Turkish, English, and Italian. Some sources in Hungarian, Polish, French, and

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German were used from their translations. Considering the transnational nature of the subject matter, the available source material is dispersed across several countries in their libraries and archives. There is a wealth of both primary and secondary sources in a wide range of languages that I was unable to incorporate, though they are highly relevant to the topic. The activities of the Italian émigrés within Ottoman territories were not limited to the associates of Garibaldi. There is a broader spectrum of involvement that remains to be explored in this sense.

Chapter 1

Fundamentals

During the Hungarian uprising of 1956, on 23 October, the Hungarian demonstrators facing Soviet troops in Budapest rallied around the statue of General Joseph Bem, one of the heroes of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. [...] The aim of the demonstrators who made Bem the focal point of their rally was to celebrate him in his persona as an anti-Russian fighter. Bem, who was Polish, had been a leader of the 1830 uprising in Poland against the Russians, and had later come to Hungary to take a leading role in the Revolution of 1848. [...] Hardly any of the demonstrators of 1956 would have known that Joseph Bem, heroic commander of the honvéd forces, died as Murad Pasa, a circumcised Muslim and an Ottoman officer.⁷

The present study starts with revealing the genealogy of a politically driven literature, in which the way the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian Forty-Eighters (48ers) who converted to Islam on Ottoman soil have been evaluated to this day will be analyzed to lay the grounds for an alternative epistemological understanding. The underlying idea throughout the survey will be first to spot and then to deconstruct an ethnoreligious discourse that permeates nearly all the texts, no matter which cultural setting they originated. The discourse was so powerful that even its earliest performers were not able to avoid being subsumed under it, thereby perpetuating their inferior standing for the sake of subjugating the culturally defined "other," in line with the same epistemic violence they had suffered. Even though their discursive strategies to secure political room for maneuver were resisted by the very subaltern they helped to bring about, the voices of resistance have yet to survive. Since the mainstream discursive formulation has remained little changed up until today, tracing its genealogy will be the departing point of the intervention to roll back the tape and finally revive a buried legacy. More concretely, this

⁷ Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 159-160.

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section attempts to make a critical reading of mainly Hungarian and Turkish official/nationalist narratives, as well as Polish and Italian ones yet to a lesser extent, regarding the legacy of the converts in historiography in order that these narratives have not only failed to provide any salvation to the masses but also served to keep them at bay.

1.1. Estrangement From National Historiography through Conversion: The Heritage Left Behind the Kossuth-Bem Split⁸

Since the advent of the so-called linguistic and cultural turns in historiography, the essence of historical knowledge has become more controversial than ever on the premise that narratives are immersed in the power relations of their historical context, whether to the awareness of the author. Approaches to textual analysis have undergone a profound transformation, thus, starting to encompass not only the daily struggles against which texts flourished, literary traditions from which they derived, and their intertextual relationships, but also their target audience and, of course, their function. Accordingly, historical reality is not "out there" just waiting for us to discover and mirror just as it is, its meaning is rather subject to the ever-changing power relations embedded in social interactions within each specific time and space, through which meaning is shaped while power is simultaneously constructed. The oft-referred excerpt below comes from Foucault:

Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands, and its interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes people mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit, rather, that power produces knowledge [...]; that power

⁸ I presented this historiographic framework during my first year of doctoral studies at a conference organized by the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada in 2022; while the core ideas remain the same, this evaluation is significantly revised and its scope expanded. İlkey Kirişcioğlu, "Estrangement from Historiography by Conversion: The Other Hungarian 48ers" (paper presented at the 36th Annual Conference of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, virtual meeting, May 14–16, 2022).

and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.⁹

If the pure image of the past is unattainable and language is the medium, historical texts embody the configuration of power out of which they come about, and thus searching for an essential meaning becomes in vain, no less than the claims for objectivity and even progress, as the role of language is to *shape* reality, not to *refer* to it.¹⁰ What really changes within any intellectual corpus of historical knowledge are the matrix of sources at hand, the methodologies at play, and the line of causation at choice; according to which innumerable variety of output can theoretically be maintained, just as the multifaceted nature of realities on the ground. At the end of the day, knowledge is bound to be the result of a certain elimination and appropriation process, which is reflective of underlying political concerns, meaning that texts repress as much as they express.¹¹ The logical outcome of the rigorous selection implies a close friendship between *what* text represses and *who* is repressed, and as Gyan Prakash points out, "[subalterns] and subalternity do not disappear into discourse but appear in its interstices, subordinated by structures over which they exert pressure" and they emerge "between the folds of the discourse, in its silences and blindness, and its overdetermined pronouncements."¹² By the same token, critical study must begin with an analysis that places special emphasis on the silences of the discourse functioning within a certain disposition of power that shapes the narrative. This makes the act of reading a creative enterprise, where one refuses simple

⁹ Michael Foucault, "The Body of the Condemned," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 175.

¹⁰ "There is nothing outside the text." Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), 9.

¹¹ Margaret C. Jacob, Joyce Appleby, and Lynn Hunt, *Telling the Truth About History* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 213, 215.

¹² Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1481–82.

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submission to the allure of the text that aims to impose an orthodoxy to decode the underlying discursive strategies to eventually reach the repressed.¹³

Recognizing the repressed in any given historical narrative calls for distinguishing the transcendental ideal that gives shape and direction to the narrative that relies on it. Author is prone to articulate and eliminate certain historical elements for the sake of a divine ideal during the process of binding events to each other in a coherent causal relationship. The process of the linear assemblage compels an assumption of hierarchy of causes, where some of them are highlighted at forefront to the detriment of others, thereby quintessentially determining the interpretation.¹⁴ The plot is thus constructed through the links of a chain, and some variants are inescapably pushed out of the fiction at every junction; in other words, they are muted, provided that they do not sufficiently feed the intended message. This is because a prophetic end necessarily subjects actors, events, institutions, structures, cultures, and alike to value judgments, which are characteristically evaluated on mutually exclusive good or bad terms. The grand idea at play sets the moral criteria that serves the justification of the deeds of the "winners," who could successfully arrive at the finish line or contribute to the process that ends with it, bearing history witness on their half against the rivals who turned out to be "losers" at some point and were condemned to be remembered in that way in discursive formulation, as victory is an incredible machine that produces a center around which a larger dominion is integrated.¹⁵ History itself is the record of what people accomplished rather than what they failed to do, implying a success story.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the more zero-sum value judgments simplify the subject matter, the more they lose their potential to explain its peculiarities since

¹³ Patricia O'Brien, "Michel Foucault's History of Culture," in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 35. Roger Chartier, "Texts, Printing, Readings," in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press), 156.

¹⁴ Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 117.

¹⁵ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. by Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell Revised Edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 436.

¹⁶ Carr, *What is History?* 167.

each element in a teleologic ordering turns into the building blocks for a desired outcome, a transcendental ideal, while at the same time detaching them from and diminishing their significance in their specific historical context. Taken altogether, even if historian's personal motivation is to be set aside, hierarchy of causes, linear understanding, and theoretical simplifications on which arguments are grounded convey a certain political message. This political framework retrospectively sketches the boundaries of a general system of values, which often constitute only partial interests of a political faction, meaning that reviving the voices of the subjects oppressed by mainstream narratives helps to raise new policy proposals. Was not one of the masterpieces of historical studies of all time about the story of the "blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers themselves"?¹⁷

Religious conversion inevitably takes its protagonists into a blind alley, one of the shortest ways to become an outcast in the history of mankind. The issue of conversion was a decisive factor that split Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees on Ottoman soil down the middle as soon as the word got around in the town of Vidin, where the refugees were housed for some time in 1849. Even its rumor was worse than its happening. Although the leader of the Hungarian Revolution and the War of Independence harshly rejected the idea of conversion as to his temperament, denouncing "those who had given in to the Turks," the Polish Field Marshal Józef Bem (1794-1850), who had already begun to question the former's ability to lead during the war, declared his voluntary conversion, no matter whether on political or moral grounds.¹⁸ Bem was consecutively followed by several other refugees, irrevocably straining the relations within the entire community. Soon after, the transfer of the Kossuth Group to the city of Kütahya and that of the Murad Pasha Group to the Vilayet of Aleppo only added a spatial but even a firm layer to the schism revolving around conversion. In this context, the

¹⁷ Edward Palmer Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 12.

¹⁸ Istvan Deak, *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849* (Columbia University Press, New York 1979), 340.

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ontological exclusion of the converts from the fraternal networks commenced, yet it was the attitudes of the top leaders of the revolutionary movements marked the beginning of an epistemological embargo. Once excommunicated, the converts were condemned to "ideological non-existence."¹⁹

The polarization never found a comparable representation in the literature. Mostly inspired by the modernization agenda and its inescapable teleology of the nation-state, studies have tended to focus on the leading elites of the national causes, so much so that it has become commonplace to reduce nineteenth-century Hungarian migration to "Kossuth Migration," without acknowledging those who refused to follow the eponymous protagonist.²⁰ It is thus difficult to imagine how those who refused to follow Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894) (Władysław Zamoyski [1803-1868] in the Polish and Alessandro Monti [1818-1854] in the Italian case) could make their voices heard through generations, especially when such a colossal figure himself was a party to the intra-group disputes. "[P]ower produces," says Foucault, "it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth."²¹ Naturally, the power centered around the leaders within the refugees on Ottoman soil would immediately leave its imprint on the production of the dominant discourses from the beginning, consolidating the leading positions of the few. Therefore, the axis of the debate about the question of conversion was to be flushed from the perspective of a definite, mundane, and biased angle. The entrenched idea that had reinforced the dominant perspectives within Hungarian, Polish, and Italian historiographies started to take shape in this early stage, which is the inadmissibility of the conversion of descendants, let alone the national heroes, to Islam, inasmuch as the same

¹⁹ Göran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1980), 83.

²⁰ For a relatively near example see István Kornél Vida, "The True Cause of Freedom: The Kossuth Emigration and the Hungarians' Participation in the American Civil War," (PhD Diss., University of Debrecen, 2008). The author regards Kossuth Emigration as follows "an umbrella term, with all Hungarians living in the United States in the period between 1848 and 1865 comprised in it, and use it interchangeably with the term 'Forty-Eighter', frequently applied to other ethnic groups," Ibid., 3.

²¹ Michael Foucault, "The Means of Correct Training," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 205.

perspective justified the deeds of the national leaders at their times and upheld the symbols they came to represent for the imagined community later in retrospect.

In keeping with their power and influence, Kossuth and his companions on Ottoman soil became a focal point of intense diplomatic controversy after seeking refuge, at the expense of their followers measured in thousands.²² The publicity surrounding the leaders drove the Ottoman state apparatus to become more vigilant and produce more records about them, in contrast to their followers, let alone the dissenters. While describing him as the "spirit" of the failed revolution, the Ottoman statesmen delegated the task of administering the Hungarian refugees to Kossuth.²³ Not only did the bureaucratic mechanisms but also international press tended to keep a close eye on the sojourn of the revolutionary leaders on Turkish soil, as the literate public became more engaged with daily news, in which the adventurous revolutionary leaders were at the forefront. It was recorded that a British enthusiast had arrived in Kütahya to draw pictures of the refugees for making money, a clear sign of the public interests in the revolutionary leaders.²⁴ The world's attention was focused on the high and mighty, while those converts who went to Aleppo did not draw enough attention mainly due to their conversions. After the leaders were relocated in Kütahya and Aleppo, worse still, those who remained in the Turkish garrison town of Shumen attracted almost no notice, as they were not impactful at all.²⁵ The less visible they were, the less likely they were to be acknowledged in historical narratives.

As soon as Kossuth penned a letter (on September 20) to the British Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865), exploiting the image of the "Terrible Turk" and claiming that the refugees were *forced* to convert, the prejudiced Western press did not delay in stirring an

²² Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 340.

²³ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler Meselesi: Macar ve Leh Mültecileri 1849-1851* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Âmire, 1926), 31. According to the Ottoman ambassador to London, the British Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston, was more focused on the refugee leaders in Kütahya. Ibid., 192. Among the Polish refugees, Zamoyski was regarded as the representative of the Polish government. Gülnar Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından Çaykovski Mehmet Sadık Paşa'nın Osmanlı Anıları* (Konya: Kömen Yayınları, 2016), 160.

²⁴ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 249-250.

²⁵ Bayram Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016), 205.

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uproar to involve itself in the relations between the refugees and the Porte (and even in the internal relations among the revolutionaries themselves).²⁶ Likewise, the commander of the Italian Legion accused the Hungarian and Polish refugees of *religious defeatism* ("*disfattismo religioso*") and a lack integrity, while the Sardinian envoy to Constantinople, Romualdo Tecco (1802-1867), conveyed his concerns that the refugees might convert in harsh conditions (famine and environmental hardships) to save lives, if not their honor ("*ma non l'onore*"). He also reported that the solidarity within the legion was dissolved in October, "following the strong religious pressures from the Turks"²⁷ Both Kossuth and Tecco claimed that the refugees were *forced* to choose between adopting Islam or being handed over to Austria. However, once it became clear that the refugees were not forced to convert, Kossuth published an apology letter.²⁸ In any case, the discourse of "apostasy or death" was already out of the bottle, and the forcible nature of the conversions began to be epistemologically established. The mainstream interpretation about the converts at the very outset revealed an obsessive search for their so-called wrongdoings, without addressing their voices.

The arguments later gained further traction through the memoir writing in the 1850s and 1860s, which was more often a propagandistic genre, where biased claims about the issue of conversion were reproduced since the revolutionary leaders were unquestionably more advantaged to speak up and be kindly received.²⁹ Published in 1851, an adjutant-general loyal to Kossuth urged in his memoirs that "merely from his thorough hatred of Russia," Bem

²⁶ For the details of the letter see Ibid., 86-90. Also see Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler Meselesi*, 155-157. Similarly, the conversion of Polish émigré, Michał Czajkowski (1804-1886), in 1850, caused an outburst in the Polish press. Aleksandar Zlatanov, "Czajkowski's Christian Army of the Sultan: 1853–1870," in *Turkish Yoke or Pax Ottomana: The Reception of Ottoman Heritage in Balkan History and Culture*, *Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Nauki Społeczne* 24, no. 1 (2019): 48.

²⁷ "in seguito alle forti pressioni religiose esercitate dai turchi da una parte." Pasquale Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano e Questione Ungherese (1849–1867): Marcello Cerruti e le Intese Politiche Italo-Magiare* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1995), 84.

²⁸ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 155.

²⁹ For a reference to suggest that the mass-produced printed autobiography was a part of political propaganda see Michael Mascuch, Rudolf Dekker and Arianne Baggerman, "Egodocuments and History: A Short Account of the Longue Durée," *The Historian* 78, no. 1, (2016), 34.

"became a Mohammedan,"—the terminology would never be used by the Muslims themselves—suggesting that his conversion was not sincere.³⁰ Some thirty years later, Kossuth himself remembers the refugee crisis on Ottoman soil and the issue of conversion as follows:

Later on, the Turks *magnanimously* defended my life, and the lives of my homeless compatriots. They defended them, not without danger to themselves. The two neighbouring Powers, flushed with victory, threatened them with war if they refused to give us up. And when the situation assumed such a threatening aspect that the counsellors of the Sultan thought *they could no longer avoid our extradition unless the fugitives embraced the Turkish faith*, and thus became Turkish subjects, the Sultan, Abdul Medjid, rose from his seat in the Divan, and, raising his hands to heaven, used these words solemnly—"Allah is powerful. I trust in his protection. But, if I must perish, may I perish with *honour*. "I will not bring upon my name the disgrace of violating the rights of *hospitality* by surrendering to the vengeance of their enemies the unfortunates who have sought my protection."³¹

This passage contains the key elements of the discursive formulation that would shape the literature up until today, giving important insights into how the arguments over conversion of the refugees actually sprang from one particular perspective that was in conflict with another one within a specific historical context. This was the perspective of Kossuth, who meticulously equated his persona with both the Hungarian emigrants and the nation on the mainland after the 1848. It is not rare in his memoirs to find Kossuth speaking on behalf of all Hungarian exiles, presenting his persona as the embodiment of the whole nation.³² It was only a matter of time before his biased perspectives on the issue of conversion seep into the academic literature under the term, "Kossuth migration." It was not the converts themselves but Kossuth who attributed certain motives that led his opponents to convert *at the time his moral hegemony was at stake*. For the issue of conversion was a challenge to Kossuth's hegemony in reality.

³⁰ The refugees were in Shumen while the book was published. Johann Pragay, *The Hungarian Revolution: Outlines of the Prominent Circumstances Attending the Hungarian Struggle for Freedom, Together with Brief Biographical Sketches of the Leading Statesmen and Generals Who Took Part in It* (New York: George P. Putnam, 1850), 171.

³¹ Emphases are mine. Louis Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, trans. Ferencz Jausz (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1880), vi-vii.

³² For some references see Ibid., vii, xvii, xviii, xiv, xxii, xxvi, 88, 89, 98, 138, 161.

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Although the leading position of the revolutionary elites was at stake, Kossuth emerged from the post-revolutionary era even stronger, as the prevailing scholarly representation of the converts in the literature verifies. One researcher notes that Kossuth's grip over the patriotic movement faced huge challenges, though his cult of personality in Hungary owed much to the entries from 1849 to 1867.³³ It was the same period that gave a momentum to incipient nationalisms even though there was no consensus about what the nation was.³⁴ Kossuth's perspective on the refugee issue defined the boundaries of the discursive universe concerning the converts, while the discourse itself nurtured his cult of leadership. That is to say, his discursive formulation reproduced the way the Hungarian nation was defined. The conversion of compatriots to Islam was more than an individual act but a deadly attack on the imagined community, especially at the time when political nations were increasingly taking shape. It carried connotations of loss of identity and dignity, and even the forfeiture of bodies and souls, as well as the harbinger of greater catastrophes, which is believed to have the potential of "denationalization," because the act supposedly violated the symbolic realm of the nation.³⁵ What I am trying to say is that the intra-group struggles for hegemony were linked to how the nation would be defined in the future, and the way the Hungarian nation was considered would ultimately shape the intellectual perspectives on the issue of conversion on Ottoman soil. Moreover, the issue of conversion never ceased to lose its potential to haunt the Hungarian and Polish mainstream narratives. Towards the end of the century, how the principal actors had interpreted the issue of conversion from their own partisan views had finally made its way into the academic literature. It is emphasized in an obituary that Bem and his companions embraced

³³ Róbert Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth ve 1848-49 Yıllarında Macar Özgürlük Savaşı*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003), 137.

³⁴ Christopher Alan Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 205-207.

³⁵ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 4.

"the Mohammedan religion" out of a need for the protection against the interpositions of the bloodthirsty enemies, which implies insincerity.³⁶

The Turkish official discourse that would coarsely reign until today began to take shape as soon as the refugees converted and were subsequently employed in Ottoman army. To begin with, the reformist rulers of the empire justified their determination not to extradite the refugees to the Austrian and Russian officials with various realpolitik arguments, while also framing it as a matter of honor in their diplomatic correspondence by underlining the piety (*diyanet*), dignity and prestige of the state (*namus-u devlet*), humanity (*insaniyet*), the responsibility to humanity (*vazîfe-i insâniyet*), and generosity (*fütüvvet*).³⁷ In fact, there was no fully established refugee law throughout the century; asylum was considered to be a "politically motivated act of tolerance" that could be circumstantially granted.³⁸ It was the Tanzimat era, when the Porte embarked on a mission to regenerate the state apparatus. Independent from the initial motivations to grant refuge, the imperial rulers soon after adhered to integrate the revolutionary converts into the political system as domestic partners, no matter to what degree their inner religious feelings were *sincere*, as long as they furthered the reform agenda. This stance had a theological basis since no clergy exists in Islam, according to the Ottoman interpretation, and thus nobody is entitled to constantly check the sincerity of another's faith. Similarly, researchers suggest that even the medieval Islamic chroniclers and religious scholars did not pay much attention to the issue of conversion in their intellectual activities.³⁹

One of the classical sources of the era, *Tezakir*, offers crucial insights into the mindset of the reformist rulers regarding religious conversion, as its author was not only a jurist from

³⁶ John Bassett Moore, "Kossuth: A Sketch of a Revolutionist II," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June, 1895), 259.

³⁷ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 6, 20, 52, 58.

³⁸ Heléna Tóth, *An Exiled Generation: German and Hungarian Refugees of Revolution, 1848-1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1. Also see *Ibid.*, 34.

³⁹ Anton Minkov, *Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahası Petitions and Ottoman Social Life, 1670–1730* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 9.

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the religious hierarchy but also an active reformer who worked closely with the great statesmen of the Tanzimat, including Mustafa Reşid (1800-1858) and Keçecizade Fuad (1814-1869).⁴⁰ As an official chronicler, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1822–1895) starts to document what he witnessed in state affairs in the mid-century to provide historical evidence to his successor, Ahmed Lütü Efendi (1817–1907). He gives place in his work to a letter from a Bavarian journalist, who petitioned him to convert to Islam and awaited further instructions. In response, he briefly suggests that since there is no clergy in Islam, conversion is not up to his consent, and his only duty is to introduce him to the religious foundations.⁴¹ In perfect consistency with these premises, he never questions the religiosities of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers in his voluminous and seminal work, nor does he exclusively mention them. Apart from him, furthermore, it is striking that even the conservative factions inside the bureaucracy did not consider abusing the issue of sincerity as a weapon to attack their reformist rivals, though the era was marked by intense factional struggles within the bureaucracy. One of the conservative bureaucrats of the era, Zarîf Mustafa Pasha (1816-1861), a protégé of Hasan Rıza Pasha (1808-1877) does not question the true faith of the converts who participated in the Crimean War (1853-1856), despite his harsh disputes with them, which even led him to have appeared in military court.⁴²

⁴⁰ The first *tezkiye* (note) in the initial volume commences on 3 Rebiülevvel 1289 (May 11, 1872); see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953), 3-4. Excluding the *tezkiyes* within these *tezkiyes*, the last note is dated 5 Şaban 1312 (February 1, 1895); Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 4 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967), 284. The final volume of this monumental work constitutes rather an appendix, piecing together his autobiography. A narrow selection of this seminal work was first published in *Târîh-i Osmânî Encümeni Mecmuası* with the title, "Vak'anüvis Cevdet Paşa'nın Evrakı" in 1917. Cavid Baysun (1899-1968) fully published the work in the 1950s and 60s.

⁴¹ For the letter see Ibid., 161-164. The letter starts with this sentence, "Şurasını ihtâra mecbûrum ki dîn-i islâmda frenkçe clêrgé denilen rehbanîyet merâsimi olmadığından sizin islâmınız bizim kabûlümüzde manût u mu'allak değildir. Bizim borcumuz ancak halka nasihat etmek ve bilmedikleri şeyi öğretmektir. Yoksa anlar vilâdet ve nikâh ve ibâdet ve vefâtlarında bir reîs-i rûhânînin vücûduna muhtâc değildir. Memâlik-i islâmiyyede seyâhat eden Avrupa'lıların çoğu hakikat-i hâlden gaafil oldukları cihetle avâm-ı nâsdan mürntâz gördükleri ulemâ sınıfım esâkîfeye ve papaslara kıyâs ediyorlar. Bu ise galat-ı fâhiştir." Ibid., 161-162. For another letter sharing similar reasoning see Ibid., 167.

⁴² For the memoir see Enver Ziya Karal. "Zarîf Paşanın Hatıratı 1816-1862," *Belleten* no. 26, 4 (1940): 442-494. Also, even though Zarîf Pasha downgrades the role of General Bem in suppressing the Arab revolt, he does not resort to hitting below the belt. Ibid., 470.

The lull does not imply that neither the converts nor their political activities were unfamiliar to Cevdet Pasha, who was surely well-acquainted with the political gossips at his time. Besides his official duties, he became a confidant (*mahrem-i esrâr*) of Mustafa Reşid in the mid-1850s, with whom he had a habit of sharing political secrets and thoughts.⁴³ Apart from the indifference Ahmed Cevdet displayed toward the religious convictions of the converts, one significant evaluation he made about the Hungarian and Polish refugees who sought asylum in the empire, which left a mark on subsequent literature, pertains to his protector. Not unexpectedly, the official chronicler attributes the lion's share of the diplomatic success to the chief architect of the reformist agenda, Mustafa Reşid, whose brilliance and skills played an important role in overcoming the crisis for him.⁴⁴ Relying on a Quranic verse, Cevdet Pasha reminds, the Grand Vizier refused to return the refugees to Russia and Austria, which prompted the prestige of the Muslim community in the eyes of the public opinion in Europe. This prestige led the British, French, and Italian governments to back the empire in the Crimean War against Russia.⁴⁵ One might suggest that while Kossuth was being placed at the center of historical narratives at this early phase, Mustafa Reşid Pasha was brought to the fore.

Besides their social contract with the executive statesmen, no evidence has been found to suggest that the religious sincerity of the converts was ever under the suspicion of the Imperial Court. While Sultan Abdülmecid (1823-1861) was recorded as feeling deep sorrow upon hearing of Murad Pasha (General Bem)'s death in 1850, Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha (Konstanty Półkozic-Borzęcki) (1826-1876) penned a memorandum to propose policies to Sultan Abdülaziz (1830-1876) in 1869. Throughout these instances, none of their religious commitments were called into a question. By the 1860s, some of these revolutionary converts established strong ties with the next generation of the intellectual elites of the Tanzimat era,

⁴³ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, vol. 4, 66, 69-70.

⁴⁴ This does not mean that Cevdet Pasha completely disregards other statesmen, he also underscores the role of Keçecizade Fuad in resolving the refugee crisis. Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, vol. 1, 13.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 12, 24; Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir*, vol 4, 23-24, 28-29.

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the Young Ottomans, whose intellectual attitude had more of an Islamist tone, possibly in proportion to their disagreements with the rule of Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha (1815-1871). These intellectuals aimed to bring about a constitutional regime in the empire. Without a social base, however, they needed internal allies. They contemplated to entrust official tasks to the Hungarian and Polish converts if a constitutional period would come along, again without paying attention to the sincerity of their religious outlook.⁴⁶ Quite strikingly, the religious ground behind these projects seems to have been retained from the previous generation of the Tanzimat period, as Ziya Pasha (1825-1888) denounced the inquisition for overseeing the religious consciousness of the people.⁴⁷ Partly owing to the intellectual interactions between these intellectuals with the converts, it is no coincidence that the generation following the 48ers played a crucial role in the emergence of the field of Turcology in the 1860s. Having travelled to Central Asia through the Ottoman Empire, Ármín Vámbéry (1832-1913) secured a tenure at Budapest University in 1864 and founded the first Turcology institute in 1870.⁴⁸

The refugee issue became a point of reference when the second generation of refugees and converts made their presence felt on the historical stage in the 1870s. This generation proved to be a formative factor in Turkish-Hungarian relations, to the extent that bilateral relations manifested themselves through the symbols of the shared past. Nevertheless, the same past equally carried potential nuisance that could jeopardize the same relations because of the irreconcilable religious divide between the two proto-nations. Accordingly, scholarly texts about the refugee issue in the Ottoman context began to appear towards the last quarter of the century, within the framework of the diplomatic relations. While the Hungarians had become

⁴⁶ As a member of the Young Ottomans, Hungarian Ömer Naili Pasha was entitled to use the power of the soldiers under his command if the attempt to introduce a constitutional regime would be challenged by the aid-de-camp of the Sultan. Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, ed. Şemsettin Kutlu (İstanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1973), 80, 83. Namık Kemal considered the Hungarian and Polish converts in the empire as plausible partners for educational reform in the Balkans. Namık Kemal, *Namık Kemal'in Husûsî Mektupları I: İstanbul, Avrupa ve Magosa Mektupları*, comp. Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 19.

⁴⁷ "Enkizisyon, me'murini diniyyeden mürekkep bir meclistir ki memuriyeti ahalinin mezhebince i'tikadlarını teftişdir." İsmail Hikmet, *Ziya Paşa: Hayatı ve Eserleri* (İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1932), 111-112.

⁴⁸ Müjdat Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan Siyasi İlişkileri 1923-1938* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2023), 19.

a shareholder in the rule of the Austrian Empire, the Pan-Slavist agitation in the Balkans brought them closer to the Ottoman Empire. In early 1877, a commission from Hungary arrived in Constantinople to congratulate Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha (1807-1883) on his victory at Aleksinaç over the Serbian insurgents in October 1876.⁴⁹ Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) decided to respond to this gesture by sending a commission to Budapest, carrying a collection of thirty-five precious manuscripts taken from Buda in the seventeenth century to Dersaadet. Preceding this handover, the journey of the fifteen Ottoman incumbents to Budapest between April and May was recorded by one of the participants, Mehmed Tevfik Efendi (Çaylak Tevfik), who published his impressions upon returning.⁵⁰ Even though it was not a study on the refugee issue per se, the book is replete with allusions to the issue. Strikingly, this text shifts the emphasis from the Tanzimat statesmen in the personality of Mustafa Reşid to the Ottoman dynasty itself when the refugee issue is framed as a diplomatic success. Besides, it clearly states that the mutual sympathies between the Ottomans and the Hungarians started with the refugee question.⁵¹ Another crucial aspect of this account, according to our research objectives, is the absence of any effort to cultivate Kossuth's prominence. On the contrary, the conversion of General Bem is presented in a romanticized way, which makes the book quite eccentric in its capacity to displace the prominence of Kossuth.⁵²

⁴⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁰ Mehmed Tevfik, *Çok Yasa! Çok Jasa! Yedigâr-ı Macaristan Asr-ı Abdülhamid Han* (İstanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1294). Çaylak Tevfik, *Yedigâr-ı Macaristan Asr-ı Abdülhamid Han*, ed. İsmail Tosun Saral, Fahri Sezer, and Emre Saral (Ankara: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği, 2009).

⁵¹ Mehmed Tevfik, *Yedigâr-ı Macaristan* (1294), 34. The following words are attributed to the Sultan in this context. "Ecdâdımın altı yüz seneden beri bunca fedâkârlıklarla muhâfaza ettiği hakk-ı himâyeti Avrupa benden nez' etmek mi istiyor? Bir Macarı elli bin Osmanlı kanı döker yine muhâfaza ederim." Ibid., 7. This does not mean that the author completely disregards the contribution of the Tanzimat statesmen, he specifically refers to the efforts of Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha, who was the Ottoman envoy to London. Ibid., 8.

⁵² "Garipdir General Bem yedi sekiz yerinden yaralı olup Vidin'de mahsûs cerrâhlar ve hekimler marifetiyle kendisine tedâvi olunarak henüz yaraları iltiyâm-ı tām bulmadığı hâlde bir gün Müsellezler Câmi-i Şerifi'nde namâz kılarlar iken câmi-i şerife girer kendisinin islâmiyetle teşrifini söyler. Usûlû vechle müşârün-ileyhe telkîn-i dîn olunur. Lâkin müşârün-ileyh asâkir-i şâhâne taburlarından birinin imamına tamâmıyla Müslümân olmak için daha ne yapılmak lâzım geleceğini suâl eder. İmam Efendi sünnet olup gusûl etmeyi tavsiye eder. General Bem derhâl mihmândâr efendiyi çağırıp sünnet olacağını ve gusûl edeceğini söyler. Keyfiyet Vidin müftüsü ve memurin-i sâire tarafından haber alınıp henüz yaraları iltiyâm bulunmadığından vücuduna bir yara daha açıp kan dökmek bilâhare telef-i nefsi müstelzim olabileceğine nazaran şeran ve aklen câiz olamayacağından gusûl ile sünneti seniyyenin icrâsını vakt-i sıhhate talik eylemesi ihtâr olunur ise de kendisi bir türlü razı olmadığından

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The telos of historical development in the twentieth century was nation-building, a framework that shaped the aura of historical texts—including the Turkish and Hungarian literature on the refugee issue. The toppling of Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) brought a new phase to the knowledge production about the converts. Relying upon official correspondences with a *defensive* agenda, the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) in the Ottoman Empire played a crucial role in shaping historical scholarship as a profession. In parallel, academic studies began to emerge in this period, though they were largely devoted to compilations of diplomatic correspondences, adhering to the blueprint of the Rankean legacy. The earliest study regarding the Hungarian, and Polish refugees is a collection of selected documents drawn from the bureaucratic correspondences.⁵³ Not exclusively about the refugee issue, Mahmud Celâleddin Pasha (1853-1903), a protégé of Âli Pasha, authored *Mir'ât-ı Hakikat* (The Mirror of Reality), in which he emphasizes the diplomatic aspects of the refugee issue (from the Tanzimat Edict to the Crimean War) in the *longue durée*, while avoiding discussions related to any famous personalities and religious aspects of the conversions.⁵⁴

The growing momentum toward the formation of a secular nation state in this period coincided with the rapprochement between the Hungarians and the Ottomans at *fin de siècle*, particularly in opposition to Pan Slavism in the Balkans. In line with this vision, it becomes even more evident that political weight was increasingly placed on the non-converts rather than the converts. On the anniversary of the Crimean War (on August 17, 1909), a ceremony was held in front of the Mickiewicz House in Istanbul, where the Young Turks commemorated the Polish national poet whose actual vision in the city was rather to seek a compromise Sadık

nâcâr ordu cerrâhî çağrılıp sünnet ettirmişlerdir. Müşârün-ileyhin teşrif ettiğini haber alan Macar koşup (*Bem Türk Bin Türk*) diye Müslümân olduğundan bu söz Macarlar beyninde darb-ı mesel gibi olmuştur. Bu hâl General Bem'in Macarlar indinde ne rütbe mu'temed bir zât olduğunu gösterir." Ibid., 9-10. The transcription is retrieved from Çaylak Tefvik, *Yadigâr-ı Macaristan*, 2009, 45.

⁵³ Mehmed Galib, "Leh ve Macar Mültecilerine Ait Vesâik," *Yeni Tasvir-i Efkâr*, July 9, 1909, 4-5; this series ran daily from July 9 to July 16, 1909, issues 40-47.

⁵⁴ Mahmud Celâleddin, *Mir'ât-ı Hakikat*, vol. 1 (Matbaa-yı Osmaniye: Dersaadet, 1326 [1908-1909]), 16. Mahmud Celâleddin Paşa, *Mir'ât-ı Hakikat: Târihi Hakikatların Aynası*, 3 vols., ed. İsmet Miroğlu (İstanbul: Berekât Yayınevi, 1983), 32-33.

Mehmed and Zamoyski in 1855.⁵⁵ The early twentieth century also witnessed some positive development in Turkish-Polish relations. Arrived in Istanbul, Tadeusz Gasztowtt (Seyfettin Bey) (1881-1936) emphasized the historical friendship between the Ottoman Empire and Poland in his books, published in 1907 and 1913.⁵⁶

Drawing from the Turcology studies of the previous generation, the diplomatic relations concurrently paved the way for the rise of Turanism in Hungary, which gave birth to the establishment a Turanist association in 1910. Hungarian public opinion soon after supported the Ottomans during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).⁵⁷ Moreover, the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires entered the Great War (1914-1918) on the same side, though the war put an end to these empires in return, after which the Hungarian and the Turkish people set out to establish their own nation-states. It is often argued that Hungarian public opinion closely followed the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) with great interest and a sense of emotional connection. Shortly after the proclamation of the Republic of Türkiye, formal diplomatic relations were constituted with Hungary through a friendship agreement, marking the beginning of a golden age in bilateral relations that lasted ten years (1923-1933).⁵⁸ This period also coincided with the growing references to bilateral friendship between Türkiye and Poland.⁵⁹ Reflecting these diplomatic tendencies, Ahmed Refik [Altınay] (1881-1937) publishes an article entitled "Mülteciler Meselesine Dair Fuad Efendi'nin Çar I. Nikola ile Mülakatı" (Fuad Efendi's Audience with Tsar Nikolai I Concerning the Refugee Question) in *Tarih-i Osmanî Encümeni Mecmuası*.⁶⁰ Founded by the Young Turks in 1910, this journal pursued a nationalist and defensive agenda to counter misinformation in historical texts by the

⁵⁵ Taha Toros, *Geçmişte Türkiye-Polonya İlişkileri* (Istanbul: Perka A.Ş., 1983), 38.

⁵⁶ The books are entitled *Pologne et l'Islam* (1907) and *Turcya a Polska* (1913). Hacer Topraktaş, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Doğu Avrupa Politikalarında Taksim Sonrası Polonya (Lehistan) Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," *Karadeniz Araştırmaları* 45 (Spring 2015): 224.

⁵⁷ Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 11.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 36, 42.

⁵⁹ Topraktaş, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Doğu Avrupa," 226.

⁶⁰ Ahmed Refik, "Mülteciler Meselesine Dâir Fuat Efendi'nin Çar Birinci Nikola ile Mülakatı," *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası* 15, no. 12 (Istanbul, 1925), 361-386.

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Westerner scholars.⁶¹ In line with this mission, Ahmed Refik pieced together a selection of archival material in a paleographic book, without suggesting an exhaustive social analysis, to refute the erroneous allegation made by the Hungarian historians that the refugees were forced to convert to Islam.⁶² On this opportunity, the author emphasizes the importance of Turkish archives in writing national diplomatic history, simultaneously unfolding his restrictive approach to the use of imperial archives. Ahmed Refik also reawakens the notion of Mustafa Reşid's brilliance in diplomacy, suggesting that the refugee issue exemplified one of his greatest achievements and constituted an honorary chapter of the Turkish diplomatic history.⁶³ Ahmed Refik does this reinterpretation within the ideological framework of the early republican era, whose official dogma put strong emphasis on Mustafa Reşid's personality as the forerunner of the republic, even though he was criticized for opening Ottoman markets into world economy, resulting in the underdevelopment.⁶⁴ Seemingly contradictory, however, Ahmed Refik devotes extensive space to the Hungarian revolutionary leader since the book solely relies on state archives and the Tanzimat bureaucracy under the influence of Mustafa Reşid undoubtedly produced more material about Kossuth because of diplomatic concerns of the time.⁶⁵ In this sense, the harmonical coexistence of Lajos Kossuth and Mustafa Reşid, like counterparts in prestige and rank as the reformist/revolutionary figures, gradually becomes the main point of reference in the Turkish literature. Written by İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı (1888-

⁶¹ Atilla Çetin, "II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Arşiv Çalışmaları," *Vakıflar Dergisi* 20 (1988): 40.

⁶² Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 3. According to Fekete, what steered him to work on Hungarian exiles was Imre Karácsony, who wrote about the exile of Rákóczi II in the Ottoman Empire. Lajos Fekete, "Türk Vesikalarının Neşri Ve Bu İşin Arzettiği Meseleler," trans. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Belleten* 5, no. 20 (October 1941): 614.

⁶³ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 3-4, 243. According to Karpas, Refik's work is "too superficial and general," as well as selective. Kemal Karpas, "Kossuth in Turkey: The Impact of Hungarian Refugees in The Ottoman Empire 1849-1851," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 170.

⁶⁴ Şerif Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesi," in *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, vol. 1, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 42.

⁶⁵ The first part of the book is more about the diplomatic aspects of the refugee issue, while it puts more emphasis on the leader after page number 187. Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 187-243.

1972) in 1932, another study that touches on the refugee issue is a book devoted to the Anatolian city of Kütahya, where the refugee leaders were interned. Citing from Ahmed Refik, Uzunçarşılı provides a summary of the refugee issue, while emphasizing the diplomatic triumph of Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha. This overture, however, aims to emphasize Kossuth's presence in the city.⁶⁶

A year after the release of Ahmed Refik's book, another work came out on the Hungarian side. István Hajnal (1892-1956) brought together lots of documents about the refugee crisis in a wide range of European languages, though the work categorically denies the new life of the converts in Ottoman territory, while limiting the period of the study to Kossuth's departure from the Bulgarian city of Shumen. In this sense, it can be considered one of the first academic texts that planted the personal cult of the leader in the literature.⁶⁷ Quite similarly, while Hajnal's book ends with Kossuth's departure from Shumen, Refik's work concludes with Kossuth's departure from Kütahya. The timeframe in both studies is restricted to the arrival and departure, which is related to the archival evidence they drew on, reminding us of *hypomnesia* that suggests that archives work against themselves. They are sites of forgetting as much as remembering, even the idea of valuing some material more preservable than others is symptomatic.⁶⁸ In other words, the abandonment of some to the dark abysses of the past begins even at the time of the events themselves and in the way these events are recorded, then preserved in archives, and thence these archives feed academic writing.⁶⁹

The good diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Hungary in this period played a concrete role in the transfusion of Kossuth's leadership cult into the Turkish historiography.

⁶⁶ İsmail Hakkı Uzun Çarşılıoğlu, *Bizans ve Selçukîlerle Germiyan ve Osman Oğulları Zamanında Kütahya Şehri* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1932), 276-278.

⁶⁷ Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey," 170. István Hajnal, *A Kossuth-emigráció Törökországban* (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1927).

⁶⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 11-12.

⁶⁹ It is also possible to talk about the practical impediments that further complicate the selection procedure in archival research, such as insufficient classification, limited accessibility, lack of transparency, and the challenges stemming from paleographic expertise.

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The leadership cult of the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, resonated with the public opinion in Hungary at the same time. In other words, the quest for integration into the Western civilization for the Turkish republican elites entailed to reach a mutual understanding with its cultural codes and official narratives. This epistemological negotiation included the reception of Atatürk's leadership cult in Hungary to bolster the revolutionary regime in Türkiye, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, on the international stage. Appointing ambassadors to Budapest with great care, Atatürk attached utmost importance to the bilateral relations with Hungary, where he was greatly admired in return.⁷⁰ Since the religious division was the weakest link in terms of the relations between the Hungarians and the Turks, it was safer to hold on to their racial affinities tracing back to Central Asia, which was among the favorite topics of Atatürk.⁷¹ He believed that the main reason for past wars between the two people had stemmed primarily from religious polarization, thus, the foundation of friendship had to be constructed on a *racial* basis.⁷² The republican intellectuals in Türkiye embarked on tracing the racial origin of the new nation in Central Asia, where the ancestors of the Turks and Magyars were thought to have related. Extending the bilateral relations to the prehistorical period also prepared the ground for the argument that the refugee issue in the nineteenth century was just a chapter in the eternal good relations between the two nations. Another link in this assemblage of historical instances also becomes prominent in this context: II. Ferenc Rákóczi, who rebelled against the Austrian Empire and subsequently sought refuge in the Turkish Empire, more than a century earlier than Kossuth.⁷³ This diplomatic-historical framework was

⁷⁰ Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 266. The Hungarian nation declared mourning when Atatürk died. Vecdet Erkun, *Budapeşte'den Ankara'ya Anılar* (Ankara: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 1999), 33.

⁷¹ Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 58.

⁷² Ibid., 51.

⁷³ Prior to the foundation of the republic, Ahmed Refik had already published another work Rákóczi this historical figure, also prior to his study on the refugee crisis. Ahmed Refik, *Memâlik-i Osmaniyyede Kral Rakoci ve tevabii 1109-1154* (İstanbul: Hilâl Matbaası, 1331).

also mirrored in the politics of memory, exemplified by the restoration of Rákóczi House (Rákóczi Evi) in the Thracian city of Tekirdağ in 1932.⁷⁴

From a broader perspective, tracing the origins of the good bilateral relationships in Central Asia was also in keeping with the secular vision of the newly founded republic, particularly reflected in the cultural reforms aiming to redefine a secular Turkish identity and purify it of Islamic influence. In that regard, the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic-Persian script in 1928, aiming not only to increase literacy but also to reduce the Islamic influences in the everyday life of the nation. As a semi-state institution, the Turkish Language Association (TDK) was established in 1932 to further purify and standardize the national language. Broader ideological narratives informed these cultural reforms, such as the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory, both of which extolled the ancient Turks for their contributions to civilization aiming to integrate the Turkish race into the Western family of nations.⁷⁵ Extraordinarily in the fullest sense of the word, the precursors of these narratives was found in the works of the Hungarian and Polish refugees and converts, whose related works were revived in the 1930s.⁷⁶ Even some descendants of these refugees were found Atatürk's inner circle, including Ali Fuad Cebesoy (1882-1968).⁷⁷ More strikingly, the grand-daughter of Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha, Münevver, was married to Sâmih Rıfat Bey (1874-1932), the first chair of the Turkish Language Association and the supporter of the Turkish Language Thesis. According to this thesis, the Turks constituted one of the most ancient civilizations in world history, and its origins go back to Central Asia, where the Turkish language also served as a source for all human languages.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 187.

⁷⁵ İlker Aytürk, "Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004): 2.

⁷⁶ Ettore Rossi, "Dall'Impero Ottomano alla Repubblica di Turchia. Origine e sviluppi del nazionalismo turco sotto l'aspetto politico-culturale," *Oriente Moderno* 23, no. 9 (September 1943): 362.

⁷⁷ Jerzy S. Latka, "Polonya Mültecileri ve Yeni Fikirler," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 91 (1991): 55.

⁷⁸ Aytürk, "Turkish Linguists," 10.

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In the latter half of the 1930s, the diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Hungary witnessed a decadence since the former opted for the status quo following the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) that sealed the independence of the country, while the latter joined the revisionist camp, increasingly aligning with Mussolini's Italy.⁷⁹ The diplomatic tensions between Türkiye and Hungary expressed itself also through historical symbols. During the 250th anniversary of the recapture of Buda from the Turks and the commemoration of the Battle of Mohács, Hungarian diplomats conveyed their unease with Türkiye, highlighting the more negative aspects of the historical relations.⁸⁰ These difficulties, however, did not hinder the development of cultural interactions between the two countries, particularly in relation to their shared past.⁸¹ Thanks to the efforts of László Rásonyi (1899-1984), the Hungarology Institute at Ankara University was established in 1936, which played an important role in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.⁸² In this period, Hungary's ambassador to Ankara, Mihály Jungerth-Arnóthy, was reporting Atatürk's keen interest and conversations on the Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory.⁸³ It is striking to observe how the vision of creating a secular nation in Türkiye was grounded upon the historical and linguistic studies of the previous generations of the Hungarian and Polish refugees and converts, who had obviously conducted these works with different motives, were enthusiastically utilized to provide a historical depth to the friendly relations with Hungary in the early twentieth century. In sum, the mission of the early republican era to trace the racial origins of the Turkish nation overlapped with the long-standing tradition of Turcology studies earlier initiated by Hungarian and Polish refugees and converts. Their solemn intellectual contributions left impacts on the

⁷⁹ Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 92, 97, 138, 213. It is interesting to note that Monti became symbolized as a hero of both Italians and Hungarians fighting against the common enemy in this period. László Pete, *Il colonnello Monti e la Legione italiana nella lotta per la libertà ungherese*, trans. Katalin Mellace (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2013), 7.

⁸⁰ Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 249-250.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 234.

⁸² Murat Deregözü, *Türkiye-Macaristan İlişkileri* (Istanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2020), 37.

⁸³ Karagülmez, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 50.

way the refugee issue was handled in a way that would be based on a racial understanding of Turkish-Hungarian relations.

The young republic laid the foundations for a more sophisticated perspective on Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire. Scholars of the early republican era spoke of the refugees as one of the conduits through which romantic nationalist ideas from Europe penetrated into the empire. The beginning of the idea that still echoes today can be found in Akçuraoglu Yusuf (1876-1935), who points out in 1928 that the political turmoil in Poland and Austria in the mid-nineteenth century drove some intellectuals from the high strata to the Ottoman lands, which eventually brought them interaction with Ottoman intellectuals. Thus, those refugees constituted one of the channels that facilitated the *transfer* of the civilization into the empire.⁸⁴ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (1891-1980), one of the proponents of the Turkish official historiography, was among those who emphasized the westernizing role of the refugees.⁸⁵ In this appropriation, the refugees were incorporated into an invented tradition of modernization teleology, destined to be completed with the secular reforms masterminded by Atatürk, whose personal cult was simultaneously underway in the late 1920s and the 1930s.⁸⁶ While treating the refugees as participants of Turkish nationalism and modernization, no matter whether they pretended this or that way from a religious point of view, the republican elites meticulously avoid meddling with the question of true faith, in accordance with the secular character of the new regime. In so doing, however, they only reproduced the theological basis of the unsecular empire that the republic inherited

⁸⁴ Yusuf Akçuraoglu, *Türk Yılı 1928*, ed. Arslan Tekin and Ahmet Zeki İzgöer (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2009), 320-21.

⁸⁵ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi Cilt 1 Kısım 2*, 4th ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991; first published 1943), 21.

⁸⁶ For Oran, the next generation after the Young Ottomans provided the antecedents from which Atatürk nationalism would rise. In that sense, one of the leading figures of Turkism was Mustafa Celâleddin, whose ideas were held by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme* 3rd Ed. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997), 51, 53. Şerafettin Turan, *Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar*, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 26-27.

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albeit renounced outwardly, not to mention that it has never been secular as it is assumed to be when it comes to identity construction.⁸⁷ Theirs was an ironic compromise, where the indifference itself could be taken as a tacit confirmation of the sincerity of the conversions, following the footsteps of the imperial legacy, even if it was not spoken aloud (should we omit the unnecessary to that end), especially when the converts were appropriated in the national narrative.⁸⁸ It goes without saying that national pride would not easily accept being deceived, nor would it cherish hypocrites had been the converts considered to be insidious. Seen from the opposite perspective, having betrayed their own nations could be viewed as a sufficient reason to render them perpetually untrustworthy. More clearly, the inclusion of converts in national narratives, especially during the early republican period, did not necessarily indicate that they were fully embraced given the belief that people with changing loyalties did not constitute genuine symbols.⁸⁹ At any rate, the eventual judgement of the refugee issue in this period signaled a tendency to embrace Kossuth-centered depictions, ultimately privileging interpretations derived from the Eurocentric model of modernization, while disregarding the psyche of the converts.

The republican elites were typically leaned on looking at their history and society through the cultural lenses of the West. While aiming to elevate a nation-state out of the remnants of the centuries-old Ottoman state, they instrumentalized the presence of the Hungarian and Polish converts as the carriers of secularity and assigned them a modernizing mission, which was actually the vision of Kossuth. During his sojourn in the empire, Kossuth

⁸⁷ For a relevant discussion see Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁸⁸ The tension between "the synchronic panoptical vision of domination (the demand for identity) and the counterpressure of the diachrony of history (change, difference)" is underscored by Homi Bhabha, for whom mimicry appears as an ironic compromise, accounting for the interpretations of the early republican period of Türkiye when it comes to the sincerity of the Hungarian and Polish converts. Bhabha, Homi. "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse." *October* 28 (1984): 126.

⁸⁹ Yorgos Tzedopoulos, "Public Secrets: Crypto Christianity in the Pontos," *DELTIO* 16 (2009): 187. Although the republican perspective on conversion as a whole lies beyond the scope of this study, it is safe to suggest that the widespread distrust toward those who changed their religion is most famously embodied in the case of the Sabbateans.

had praised the industrious character, advanced civilization, and strong national identity of the Hungarian refugees, stating that they might act as saviors for the underdeveloped Eastern country.⁹⁰ Indeed, convert's tendency to harness the empire to the modernization path seems to be well received in the Western literature. In his article about the *origins* of the Turkish nationalism, Ettore Rossi underscores that the political refugees of the 1848, employed as officers, doctors, and engineers, brought with them scientific knowledge and ideas of liberty to the Ottoman cultural life.⁹¹ At this juncture, it would be repetitive to discuss the role of the local intelligentsia, *aydın* in the Turkish context, acting as an accomplice with European Orientalists as was discussed by several intellectuals, but suffice it to say that the Orientals had never been "silent objects of a European discourse, but as active participants in its emergence."⁹² Originally rooted in the Western thought, the Orientalist depictions of the Hungarian official position were adopted by early republican elites in their bid for power in domestic politics. Their secular culture was a veil of the class cohesion of the upper stratum, "limiting the prospects or extent of rebellious activity on the part of cadres who might be so tempted."⁹³ Ultimately, the converts were further pushed to the edge.

The refugee crisis also contributed to another objective of the newly formed Turkish nation-state: to install pride and self-confidence to the newly forged nation since the only one who received the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian freedom fighters with open arms under the threat of war and financial hardships were the rulers of the empire, whose commitment was an honorable thing to do by any standards. In this regard, Ahmed Refik's work marks a pioneering endeavor to highlight the generosity and good will of the Ottoman authorities.⁹⁴ Despite the pressures of the Austrian and Russian regimes, for him, the empire handled the refugee issue

⁹⁰ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 136.

⁹¹ Rossi, "Dall'Impero Ottomano," 361.

⁹² Arif Dirlik "Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism," in *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism* (Oxford, Westview Press, 1998), 109.

⁹³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 84.

⁹⁴ Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey," 170.

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in a manner that constituted an honorary chapter in *Turkish* diplomatic history, resonating very well with public opinion in Europe.⁹⁵ This laudatory language existed long before the republican era, though changes in the emphasis of praise could be observed. Republican scholars stripped the Ottoman language of Islamic references, replacing them with more national/secular allusions. They generically introduced the adjective "Turkish" to the descriptions previously recorded in Ottoman texts, while speaking highly of the attitudes against the refugees. For instance, while the elites of the empire stressed "magnanimity" (*alıcenablık*) of the *dynasty*, the republican period rather referred to the reception of the refugees as a result of "Turkish magnanimity" (*Türk alıcenaplığı*).⁹⁶ As a matter of fact, throughout the twentieth century, Turkish historians generally tended to praise and take pride in the protective attitude of the Porte toward disadvantaged revolutionaries, a humanitarian act assumably required by Turkishness, despite all the dangers that the state might have confronted: "Turkish hospitality" (*Türk misafirsevenliği*), "kind reception" (*hüsn-ü kabul*), "Turkish magnanimity" (*Türk alıcenaplığı*), "Turkish dignity" (*Türk izzet-i nefsi*), "self-sacrifice" (*özveri*), "leniency" (*hoşgörü*), "generosity" (*cömertlik*), "protection and compassion" (*siyânet ve şefkat*), and "self-sacrificing" (*fedakarane*) are among the themes often cited.⁹⁷ European scholars (Hungarian, Polish, and Italian) complied with this representation that attributes hospitality to the Turkishness.⁹⁸ It is important to remind that even this portrayal had roots in the discourses of Kossuth, who praised the Turkish hospitality in the British city of Southampton after he was released in the fall of 1851.⁹⁹ "The Turks

⁹⁵ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteci*, 3-4.

⁹⁶ For "Turkish dignity" (*Türk izzetinefsi*) see Uzun Çarşıloğlu, *Kütahya Şehri*, 277.

⁹⁷ It is not possible to give every single reference, because almost every single study uses this language, I limit myself to give two examples from the Cold-War period before the détente. Ziya Şakir, "Türkiye'ye İlticâ Eden Macar Büyüklere." *Resimli Tarih Mecmuası* no. 30 (1952): 1537. Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Macar İhtilâli* (İstanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1966), 24.

⁹⁸ The arguments were well received even in the earliest academic writings see Moore, "Kossuth," 258.

⁹⁹ Abdullah Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara Bakışı ya da 1849 Macar- Leh Mülteciler Meselesi," *Belleten* LXI, no. 231 (1997), 384-385.

magnanimously defended my life," he noted in his memoirs.¹⁰⁰ The praises are also reciprocal; Turkish historiography constantly pays tributes to the Hungarians as a nation devoted to their liberty, something acknowledged as part of the discursive negotiation.

Taken all together, the early republican period highlights a milestone in the literature concerning Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees and converts of 1849. Ahmed Refik's book largely outlined the main discursive contours binding for future studies in Türkiye, playing a foundational role. Based on the exploitation of the imperial archives for nationalist ends, the discourse adopts a defensive stance within its diplomatic and administrative framework, while placing greater emphasis on the agencies of Kossuth and Mustafa Reşid at the expense of other historical figures. However, this stance neglects larger social analysis, a gap soon addressed by Yusuf Akçura, who emphasized the modernizing role of the refugees. Once this larger framework stemmed from a careful negotiation, it inherently carried its own burdens, leading subsequent studies to perpetuate the limitations inherent to the nation-state paradigm in general and the friendly relations between Türkiye and Hungary in particular.

The Cold War put the diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Hungary (also Türkiye and Poland) to a test, as they posited themselves in opposing camps. Even though it did not make them belligerent enemies, their relations stagnated significantly, so did the studies on the refugee issue, particularly until the *détente* in the 1970s.¹⁰¹ Perhaps partly due to this interruption, contemporary approaches in historiography, such as the rise of social and economic history, did not manifest themselves in the studies on the refugees, resulting in the confinement of the field within the political and propagandistic genres, where the bilateral relations continued to play a decisive role under the shadow of Orientalist prejudices. Building on the legacy of the early republican era, studies from the 1950s and 1960s began to broaden

¹⁰⁰ *Memories of My Exile*, vi.

¹⁰¹ Deregözü, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 13.

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our understanding of the refugee crisis, though they still maintained the statist tone. Enver Ziya Karal (1906-1982) reconsiders the hierarchy among the possible motives that drove the Ottomans not to comply with the pressures put by the allied Austria and Russia to suggest that foreign support (of England and France) was not the exclusive reason why the refugees were not given away. The stout resistance of the Porte and the diplomatic negotiations of Fuad Efendi in Russia proved decisive.¹⁰² Similarly, Yuluğ Tekin Kurat (1902-1971) objects to the general opinion that reduces the independent historical agency of the Porte to a passive position, which could not allegedly stand on its own against the Russian and Austrian aggressions without the diplomatic assistance of England and France.¹⁰³ Moreover, following the epistemological consensus inherited from previous era, scholars praised the alleged kin nation, thereby indirectly honoring their own, as the Hungarians deeply valued their independence.¹⁰⁴ From a Turkist/Turanist rather than Islamist/Ottomanist perspective, accordingly, the Porte granted refuge to Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries, because the younger generations in the empire were aware of the racial affinity between the Hungarians and the Turks, despite their religious differences, since earlier generations of Hungarians had also sought shelter under Turkish hospitality.¹⁰⁵

These views follow a slightly different, but fundamentally same approach. In 1963, Mehmed Tayyip Gökbilgin (1907-1981) pointed to the intimacy of Turkish-Hungarian relations in a book published by Turkish Language Association, where he had become a member since 1943. The book is dedicated to Gyula Németh (1890-1976), who devoted his

¹⁰² Enver Ziya Karal, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi: Nizam-ı Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789–1856)*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Yayınları, [n.d.], first published 1947), 217.

¹⁰³ Kurat's work is a criticism of the works conducted by Bapst and Temperley, who regard the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire as being directed by the Western powers. Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve 1849 Macar Mülteciler Meselesi," in *VI. Türk Tarih Kongresi: Kongreye sunulan bildiriler: 20-26 Ekim 1961* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967), 451. For the two books he cites, see Edmond Bapst, *Les Origines De La Guerre De Crimee: La France Et La Russie De 1848 a 1854* (Paris: C. Delagrave, 1912). Temperley Harold William Vazeille, *England and the Near East* (London: Cass, 1964).

¹⁰⁴ Midhat Sertoğlu, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. VI (Istanbul: Güven Yayınevi, 1963), 3007.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 3009. Karal, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 215.

entire career to the historical relations between the Hungarians and the Turks, and became an honorary member of the same association in 1957. He was also awarded the most prestigious state honor in Hungary, the first degree of Kossuth, along with several official seats, including the rectorship at Budapest University during the highly centralized socialist era.¹⁰⁶ Amidst these official relations and connections, Gökbilgin discusses the Hungarian War of Independence within the framework of the friendship between the two nations, arguing that instances of rapprochement have recurred since the sixteenth-century, sometimes more intimately. Unlike earlier scholars, however, he underscores that these favorable moments cannot simply be attributed to a shared ethnic background rooted in Central Asia, which were not even thoroughly known at the time when, for instance, the uprising led by Imre Thököly and II. Ferenc Rákóczi came to the agenda. Skillfully acknowledging this fact, Gökbilgin reverses the cause-and-effect relationship by defending the idea that the resilience of relations between the two nations was realized and constructed through these favorable encounters themselves rather than vice versa.¹⁰⁷ However, he cannot escape from coming up with the same conclusion, like others, that the aftermath of the 1848 was another manifestation of the friendship between the two nations.¹⁰⁸

All in all, researchers tended to treat the refugee issue just as a chapter in the course of enduring sound relations between the Turkish and Hungarian peoples, which is even assumed to have gone to the darkest passages of mankind. In line with this formulation, while

¹⁰⁶ As one of the students of the Turcology tradition laid down by Árminius Vámbéry, who had propounded the racial affinity between the Turks and the Hungarians in Central Asia, Németh forged close relations with Zoltán Gombocz, Árminius Vámbéry, Ignaz Goldziher, János Horváth, Bernát Munkácsi, and Ignác Kúnos. Nuri Yüce, "Németh, Gyula (Julius)," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 32 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2006), 551–552. Hasan Eren, "Gyula Németh'e Armağan," in *Németh Armağanı*, ed. János Eckmann, Ağâh Sırrı Levend, and Mecdut Mansuroğlu (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1962), VI.

¹⁰⁷ M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, "XIX. Asır Sonlarında Türk-Macar Münasebetleri ve Yakınlığı," in *Németh Armağanı*, ed. János Eckmann, Ağâh Sırrı Levend, and Mecdut Mansuroğlu (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1962), 171-172.

¹⁰⁸ Memoirs of heroes like Kossuth and Rákóczi bear a resemblance to the historical credentials of nonerasable covalent bond between Turkish and Magyar nations. M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, "Rákóczi Ferenc II. ve Osmanlı Devleti Himayesinde Macar Mültecileri," in *Türk-Macar Kültür Münasebetleri Işığında II. Rákóczi Ferenc ve Macar Mültecileri Sempozyumu 31 Mayıs-3 Haziran 1976* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1976), 17.

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expounding the reason why the Tanzimat statesmen granted the right to refuge to the asylum-seeking 48ers, some stresses the inherent sympathy towards the Magyars on the Ottomans because of the blood ties as if no practical considerations had been involved. The Turkishness here is anachronistically attributed to the rulers of the multicultural empire, a common tendency of nationalist historians to view empires through the lens of their bequest to their modern nation-states.¹⁰⁹ Methodologically, this point of view selectively juxtaposes a sequence of affirmative historical episodes concerning the relations between the Turks and the Hungarians in a teleological way to invent and provide a historical justification for the reproduction of the presumably eternal good relations, where the Hungarian and Poles who sought refuge in the empire were only exemplary. This discourse articulates the political asylum of Kossuth after the Revolution of 1848 as yet another ring in a chain of Hungarian demands for independence from the Habsburg court after the Ottoman retreat in the seventeenth century. Preceded Kossuth, Thököly was the first who had revolted against the Habsburg rule between 1682 and 1684, after which he took shelter in the empire. After him, the Hungarians rioted once again for freedom under the leadership of II. Ferenc Rákóczi in between 1703 and 1711, which resulted in the leader's exile and settlement in Tekirdağ.¹¹⁰ Following the same pattern, the tradition was inherited by Kossuth, the last Hungarian hero who found sanctuary from the Ottomans, after the repeated struggle against the Habsburgs, along with the House of Romanov. One might even say that it has become commonplace to mention Rákóczi in a study dedicated to Kossuth and to run into the latter in a study devoted to the former, thereby making them two peas in a pod in the literature. On the other hand, the picture from the Hungarian side is not considerably different, the last of the fourteen historical figures standing in the Heroes' Square

¹⁰⁹ Pieter M. Judson, "Seeing the Habsburg Monarchy as a Global Empire in an Era of Self-Styled Nation-States," *Geschichte und Region/Storia e regione* 30, no. 1 (2021): 224.

¹¹⁰ Şakir, "Türkiye'ye İlticâ Eden, 1537-1540. Şahabettin Tekindağ, "Türk-Macar Münasebetlerine Toplu Bir Bakış," in *Türk-Macar Kültür Münasebetleri Işığında II. Rákóczi Ferenc ve Macar Mültecileri Sempozyumu: 31 Mayıs-3 Haziran 1976* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1976), 157.

in Budapest are Imre Thököly, II. Ferenc Rákóczi, and Kossuth Lajos, who fought against the Habsburgs for three consecutive centuries for freedom yet sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire after their defeats.¹¹¹ From Thököly to Kossuth, there is assumed to have been an uninterrupted thread of Hungarian claims to independence, refuge on Ottoman soil, and mutual confidence from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, without paying attention to historical peculiarities of each episode.

During the Cold War era, even one of the most controversial Islamist intellectuals in Türkiye largely adhered to the secular/republican framework. While giving the historical background of Turkish-Hungarian relations, in his book on Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Kadir Mısıroğlu (1933-2019) posits that Hungarians were originally of Turkish descent.¹¹² For him, the Turks consistently supported Hungarian independence against the Austrian rule, from Rákóczi to Kossuth.¹¹³ The author draws a parallel between the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the historical oppression of the "enslaved Turks" under Russian rule in Central Asia, inflaming the anti-Moscow image entrenched in the Turkish right in the context of the Cold-War. Even though the author integrates certain Islamic references into the historical background of the bilateral relations, different from the republican trope, it is interesting to note that this Islamist thinker does not talk about the *converts* in the context of the refugee question of 1849.¹¹⁴ In this Turkish-Islamic approach, where Turkishness is emphasized over Muslimness, the continuity between Rákóczi and Kossuth is retained, strikingly continuing to exclude the refugees who converted to Islam. Therefore, in the context of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers who took asylum in the empire, Kossuth was still placed at the center of the historical studies, though Hungary was cast in the opposing camp of the Cold War. In other

¹¹¹ Stephen I, Ladislaus I, Coloman, Andrew II, Béla IV, Charles I, Louis I, John Hunyadi, Matthias Corvinus, Stephen Bocskai, Gabriel Bethlen, Emeric Thököly, Francis II Rákóczi, and Lajos Kossuth are the figures.

¹¹² Mısıroğlu, *Macar İhtilâli*, 15.

¹¹³ Ibid., 22-24.

¹¹⁴ For the emphasis see Ibid., 19-20.

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words, Kossuth survived a new challenge. After all, the socialist regime had no issue with his legacy. He was commemorated even in the socialist era of Hungary as a bourgeois democratic revolutionary and a forerunner of socialism.¹¹⁵ In 1967, one Hungarian researcher dedicated a study to the time Kossuth spent in Türkiye, commemorating the leader's linguistic prowess, which manifested itself in Asia Minor.¹¹⁶

The consequence of such narratives relying on "Kossuth Migration" was the tacit acceptance of the reality as it was represented by this historical figure in his own time, from his perspective, and against his opponents. Kossuth's personal interpretation of history easily transforms into the official Hungarian perspective, which gradually evolves into the official Turkish interpretation. Naturally, intrusions into the psyche of the refugees who converted to Islam seep into the literature, borrowing arguments from the non-converts, who were part of the discussion. Signaling this relationship, the republican scholars in Türkiye also uttered that the refugees were advised to convert by the rulers of the empire, though the argument is actually a softened version of what Kossuth peddled through the European ambassadors at the time when the refugees decided to convert.¹¹⁷ István Deák (1926-2023) also gives the account of conversion from Kossuth's perspective, though his study sought to transcend the Kossuth cult. Accordingly, conversion was the only legal path available to Turkish generals, who "harangued" the refugees to convert, promising high ranks in the army. In return, the refugees converted, aiming to harness the empire for the liberation of Poland and Hungary.¹¹⁸ In a similar vein, Kossuth's position was retained in Italian sources in the 1960s. Accordingly, conversion was the simplest means to get away with the Austrian and Russian demands, which explains why conversion among the Italians was comparatively limited, only fifteen legionaries

¹¹⁵ Deák, *The Lawful Revolution*, XVI.

¹¹⁶ Zsuzsa Kakuk, "Lajos Kossuth'un Türkçe Grameri," in *XI. Türk Dil Kurultayında Okunan Bilimsel Bildiriler: 1966* (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 1968). Also see Zsuzsa Kakuk, *Kossuth kéziratai a török nyelvről* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1967).

¹¹⁷ Sertoğlu, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, 3009. Karal, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 216.

¹¹⁸ Deák, *The Lawful Revolution*, 340.

converted to Islam.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, in his posthumous work, *Omer Pasha Latas*, the Nobel prize-winning author Ivo Andrić (1892-1975) contributes to the discussion. He was no alien to the Ottoman past of Bosnia, where he was born. He earned his doctoral degree in the Austrian city of Graz, studying *The Development of the Spiritual Life of Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Sovereignty*, an influence which was "absolutely negative."¹²⁰ Under the shadow of ethno-religious prejudices, Andrić follows the main discursive lines more vividly and literarily than academic studies in his book, originally published in Serbo-Croatian in 1976. In several places, he conveys the message that inner religious feelings differed from those Hungarian and Polish converts performed outright, the refugees converted to Islam "at least ostensibly."¹²¹ Therefore, converts lead a double life, for instance, the author makes Ömer Pasha say: "Listen, Bogdan, don't imagine that I am inwardly all that I appear outwardly."¹²² Like him, his brother also converts and changes his name to Mustafa, of course as a fiction, yet Nikola secretly crosses himself.¹²³

Throughout the Cold War, studies sustained the modernization paradigm, which focused on the impact of western men, which manifested not only in economic relationships but also through the penetrations of explorers, adventurers, and missionaries, as well as the proselytization of western faiths.¹²⁴ Below Bernard Lewis basically copies what Akçura says:

Another [channel of new ideas] was the group of Hungarian and Polish exiles who settled in Turkey after the unsuccessful revolutions of 1848, bringing with them the romantic nationalism of central Europe. Several of these, converted to Islam and permanently established in Turkey,

¹¹⁹ Enrico De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano nel primo periodo delle riforme (Tanzimât) secondo fonti italiane* (Milan: Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università di Cagliari, A. Giuffrè Editore, 1967), 188, 193.

¹²⁰ William T. Vollmann, introduction to *Omer Pasha Latas: Marshal to the Sultan*, by Ivo Andrić, trans. Celia Hawkesworth (New York: New York Review Books, 2018), xii.

¹²¹ Ivo Andrić, *Omer Pasha Latas: Marshal to the Sultan*, trans. Celia Hawkesworth (New York: New York Review Books, 2018), 31.

¹²² Ibid., 81. "Before you stands not Ömer Pasha, but Mićo Latas from Janja Gora. And since you don't believe my words, believe this..." Ibid., 82. Also see Ibid., 118-119.

¹²³ Ibid., 233. Proselytizer Ömer Pasha also proposes to convert his later wife, Ida, who would become Saida superficially. Ibid., 172.

¹²⁴ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 149.

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played a role of some importance in the introduction of new ideas in Turkey.¹²⁵

In this context, the influx of the revolutionaries from Italy, Poland, and Hungary introduced a new wave of ideas into the Ottoman Empire, playing a significant role in shaping the evolution of modern Türkiye.¹²⁶ Accordingly, these revolutionaries injected the seeds of new ideas into a traditional society, initiating a new process that would gradually eradicate the obsolete. Nonetheless, the identification of ethnicities with prescribed roles in the teleology of modernization, where superiority (the Occident) is measured by the ability to penetrate, and the interiority (the Orient) is equated with passivity, reflects the culturalization of the ethnicities involved.¹²⁷ Indeed, the same literature generically underscores that the empire could not have been reformed within the Islamic tradition, as it was inherently incapable of undergoing such process.¹²⁸ The ethnicization of refugees and converts translates into a mechanism to legitimize dominance, reinforcing cultural hierarchies while pushing other cultural elements further to the margins. Indeed, it was this hierarchy the republican elites in Türkiye reproduced, thereby institutionalizing repression and racism. What they were preserving, however, was the dominant position of the civil-military elite, against the old ruling classes of the empire, the vast peasant masses, and the nearly absent bourgeoisie in the republican period. In this sense, it is remarkable to see how the Turkish scholars were not only in agreement with their Hungarian, Polish, and Italian counterparts but also with the world-renowned Orientalists, reaching a consensus about the interpretation of the refugee issue in the academic literature.

¹²⁵ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* first published 1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 345.

¹²⁶ De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 175-176. While modern Türkiye was established in 1923, through the passage of 1908, its origins were rooted in the events of 1848 and 1856. Ibid., 228.

¹²⁷ Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism*, 28.

¹²⁸ "Perfino le più o meno sincere conversioni all'Islâm verificatesi in questo periodo anche tra personaggi di rilievo, costituirono un fatto positivo per l'avvenire della Turchia perchè consentirono una maggiore *penetrazione* nella società musulmana di nuove idee e di nuovi fermenti *altrimenti non realizzabile*." Emphases are mine. De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 176. For the same paradigm also see Ibid., 41-42, 109.

Against the backdrop of the friendly relations between Hungary (and Poland) and Türkiye since the nineteenth century, the fall of the USSR raised Türkiye's expectations of establishing close relations with the newly emerging nation-states to convert itself into a regional power base. Likewise, the aura of enthusiasm for global integration in this period increased the appetite of the Turkish bourgeoisie to cut a share in the opening markets of the former Eastern bloc countries. For these ambitions, history again turned out to be one of the sources that provided these material expectations with historical justification. Consequently, as the twentieth century drew to a close, studies devoted to the refugees received a fresh impetus judging from the considerable increase in the number of publications on the long-unheeded topic. Albeit with minor differences, however, these studies roughly continued the visions of Ahmet Refik and Yusuf Akçura, while preserving the political, diplomatic, and military frameworks that deal with the subject more descriptively than analytically. It is safe to suggest that Bayram Nazır's descriptive work, based on the author's Ph.D. thesis, offers the most meticulous account of the political and diplomatic events of the refugee crisis, relying upon both Turkish and German sources.¹²⁹

In the new era, official perspectives increasingly converged with commercial interests, leading the nuanced interpretations to fall within existing discursive lines. Even though the modernization paradigm was under significant criticism at the time, the renewed framework reproduced the binary opposition between East-West. Rather than the studies about the Hungarian refugees, quite interestingly, it was the studies about the Polish refugees heralded the commercialized era in historiography, starting with the end of the 1980s. İlber Ortaylı and Kemal H. Karpat became the leading historians who revived that the idea that the Ottomans seized a chance to fulfill the need for qualified manpower necessary for the modernization

¹²⁹ Bayram Nazır, "Mülteciler Meselesi 1849-1851," (Phd Diss., Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1999). Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler*. Also see Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara."

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program manifested in the Tanzimat Edict by employing the Hungarian and Polish refugees (who would assume an active role in the Ottoman modernization) in the army and bureaucracy.¹³⁰ The modernizing mission of the abled refugees who brought the values identified exclusively with the hegemonic West to a subordinated Oriental state was more often emphasized, which have hitherto remained the most dominant premise in the literature.¹³¹

The modernization paradigm not only aligned with the meanings negotiated among official narratives but also conformed to the neoconservative vision of a world empire, gaining ground after the Cold War. Accordingly, a new form of civilizational confrontation was poised to dominate the international agenda. While Bernard Lewis suggested that "the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam [...] and the House of War," Samuel Huntington contended that "military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent."¹³² In response to this countercurrent, academic studies

¹³⁰ Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey," 170. This was published first here Kemal H. Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey: The Impact of Hungarian Refugees in the Ottoman Empire, 1849–1851," in *CIÉPO Osmanlı Öncesi ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Uluslararası Komitesi VII. Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, 107-121, ed. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, İlber Ortaylı, and Emeri van Donzel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994). Andrew A. Urbanik and Joseph O. Baylen, "Polish Exiles and the Turkish Empire, 1830–1876," *The Polish Review* 26, no. 3 (1981): 50. İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Hil, 1987; first published 1983), 146, 191–93. İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Askeri Reformlar ve Polonyalı Mülteci Subaylar," *Askerî Tarih Bülteni*, no. 27 (1989), 15-21. Jerzy S. Latka, *Lehistan'dan Gelen Şehit: Mustafa Celaleddin Paşa* (Istanbul: Boyut, 1987), 13. Jerzy S. Latka, "Polonya Mültecileri ve Yeni Fikirler," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 91 (1991): 51-55. Edit Tashnadi, "18.-19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı'da Macar Mültecileri," *Tarih ve Toplum* 36, no. 215 (2001): 75. Pál Fodor, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Macar Reform Hareketleri ve 1848-49 Devrimi," in *Doğumunun 200. Yıldönümünde Lajos Kossuth: 1848-49 Macar Özgürlük Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri Sempozyumu, Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 15 Mart 2002*, ed. Celal İnal and Naciye Güngörmüş (Kütahya: Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2002), 52.

¹³¹ It is not possible to reference all the sources, particularly those from the 2010s, but a selection may follow these works. Carter Findley, "The Tanzimat II," in *Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba, vol. 4 of *The Cambridge History of Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 15. Sina Akşin, "Siyasi Tarih (1789–1908)," in *Türkiye Tarihi 3: Osmanlı Devleti 1600–1908*, ed. Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2009), 130. Nándor Erik Kovács, "Hungarian Turkophiles in 19th Century Istanbul and Their Bequests in the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences," in *Osmanlı İstanbulu IV: IV. Uluslararası Osmanlı Sempozyumu Bildirileri, 20-22 Mayıs 2016*, ed., Feridun M. Emecen, Ali Akyıldız, and Emrah Safa Gürkan (Istanbul: İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016), 454. János Hóvári, "Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Macar Askeri Etkileri: Richard Guyon ve György Kmety," in *Macar Generalleri Osmanlı Hizmetinde: Richard Guyon ve György Kmety-Hurşit Paşa ve İsmail Paşa*, ed. Edit Tashnadi, trans. Ali Kemal Alpaz (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2013), 15. Musa Gümüş, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde Yabancılar: Leh ve Hungarian Mültecileri* (Istanbul: Libra Kitap, 2019). Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 159. Luca Zuccolo, "Gli italiani all'estero: il caso ottomano," *Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea*, January 29, 2011, 7-8, accessed 15 November 2024, http://www.studistorici.com/2011/01/29/zuccolo_numero_5/. Zlatanov, "Czajkowski's Christian Army," 54.

¹³² Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3 (September 1990): 49. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 31-32.

on the refugees in the post-soviet period particularly reflect the persistence of the Turkish intellectuals, officials, and bourgeoisie in advocating for the integration with the West.

The shift in focus to economic integration traces back to the commercial ties between Türkiye and Poland, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Played an undeniable role in the development of economic relations between the two countries, Kavala Group Companies pioneered the popularization of information about Poland in Türkiye.¹³³ In a publication devoted to Turco-Polish historical relations, Necla Kavala emphasizes in the publisher's note that her husband, Mehmet Kavala, successfully expanded his efforts in fostering cooperation between these countries from the commercial sector to the cultural domain.¹³⁴ The book devotes significant attention to the Polish refugees, focusing on their role in the evolution of Turkish-Polish relations.¹³⁵ According to this tradition, the commercial and cultural exchanges between the Ottomans and the Poles continued uninterrupted despite occasional periods of conflict and peace, as noted by the chairman of Fako İlaçları Company [Pharmaceuticals] in the catalogue of the exhibition organized by the Ministry of Culture of Türkiye and the Ministry of Culture and Arts of Poland, held to commemorate the 700th anniversary of the establishment of the Ottoman state.¹³⁶ Accordingly, the relations between the Ottomans and the Poles date back to the fifteenth century, when the first Polish ambassador was dispatched to Constantinople.¹³⁷ From that point onward, both licensed or unlicensed envoys metaphorically

¹³³ Many books have been published at the company's discretion and with its financial support. Jerzy S. Latka, *Lehistan'dan Gelen Sefirler: Türkiye-Polonya İlişkilerinin Altı Yüzyılı*, trans. Antoni and Nalan Sarkady (Istanbul: 1991), 87. This group was the first to market Polish industrial products in Türkiye and also exported tobacco to Poland. For examples of the books mentioned see Nigâr Anafarta, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Lehistan (Polonya) Arasındaki Münasebetlerle İlgili Tarihi Belgeler* (Istanbul: n.p., 1979). Toros, *Geçmişte Türkiye-Polonya*. İrfan Ünver Nasrattınoğlu, *Dünkü ve Bugünkü Polonya: Gezi Notları* (Ankara: Sestem Ofset, 1987). Jerzy S. Latka, *Lehistan'dan Gelen Şehit: Mustafa Celaledin Paşa* (Istanbul: Boyut, 1987). Jerzy S. Latka, *Polonya-Türkiye İlişkileri* (Ankara, n.p., 1989).

¹³⁴ Necla Kavala, "Foreword," in *Geçmişte Türkiye-Polonya İlişkileri*, by Taha Toros (Istanbul: n.p., 1983).

¹³⁵ Toros, *Geçmişte Türkiye-Polonya*, 19-37.

¹³⁶ Kaya Turgut, "Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sanatseverlere Düşen Görev," in *Savaş ve Barış: 15-19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Polonya İlişkileri*, ed. Nazan Ölçer and Tadeusz Majda (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı and Fako İlaçları A.Ş., 1999), 5.

¹³⁷ *Savaş ve Barış: 15-19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Polonya İlişkileri*, ed. Nazan Ölçer and Tadeusz Majda (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı and Fako İlaçları A.Ş., 1999), 1.

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ensured continuity of the relations in the historiography concerning the shared history of Poland and Türkiye, despite the political backlashes in the seventeenth century. The message is that uninterrupted *cultural* exchanges and *commercial* interests in bilateral relations overshadowed the diplomacy and warfare over the long haul.¹³⁸ Even the Cold War itself exemplified that forging connections between Poland and Türkiye was possible through economic cooperation.¹³⁹ In this ordering, Polish refugees are listed among the unlicensed peace envoys, following in the footsteps of many other historical figures, in the shared history.

The discourse appropriates examples of mutual sympathy from the past and lines them up to subordinate their historical significance to an invented tradition that now serves to bolster current commercial interests, resembling the Hungarian case, where revolutionary leaders continuously sought asylum from the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴⁰ Eventually, historical antecedents that demonstrate Türkiye's long-standing commitment to human rights are elevated to form the cultural backbone of a commercial cooperation, given that the warm reception of Polish patriots by the Turks in the nineteenth century was a legendary act of humanitarian service on global scale.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) patronized a book to compensate for Türkiye's lack of transnational publicity, which constitutes, in their terms, a barrier to its integration into the European Union. Therefore, the pronounced aim is to remove barriers to Türkiye's accession to the EU, suggesting that its political *culture* is not inherently strange to the democratic values presumably intrinsic to Europe.¹⁴² In that regard, the oft-referred Turkish hospitality in the case of the Hungarian and Polish refuge issue was linked to

¹³⁸ Ibid. Latka, *Lehistan'dan Gelen Sefirler*, 13-15.

¹³⁹ This statement also reveals the underlying impetus for the composition of the book. Ibid., 89.

¹⁴⁰ For just a few examples see Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara," 346. Tashnadi, "18.-19. Yüzyılda," 71-75. Ender Arat, foreword to *Lajos Kossuth'un Türkiye Günleri* [Kossuth Lajos Törökországi Napjai], trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapest: Török Köztársaság Nagykövetsége, 2002), 5. Kovács, "Hungarian Turkophiles," 453-454.

¹⁴¹ Toros, *Geçmişte Türkiye-Polonya*, 11.

¹⁴² Cengiz Ersun, foreword to *Ottoman Hospitality and Its Impact on Europe*, by Bayram Nazır (Istanbul: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, 2008), 3. For an incredible critique against this reasoning see Dirlik "Chinese History," 123.

the line of action that the Ottomans adhered to when it saved the persecuted Jewish population of Spain and Portugal three hundred-odd years before the refugee issue in the nineteenth century. Therefore, the refugee question is integrated into the long-established tradition of Ottoman hospitality, which goes back even to the fifteenth century in this construction.¹⁴³ In other words, the instrumentalization of the attitude of the Porte during the refugee crisis in 1849 to prompt national pride in the early years of the republic started to be instrumentalized to prompt the financial expectations of the post-soviet era. The transformation of the refugee issue into a culture and the instrumentalization of that culture for material ends find a strong resonance in the relations between Hungary and Türkiye, particularly after 2010. The bilateral relations between the two countries reached a new level then, taking on a strategic dimension, after the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, inaugurated the "Opening to the East." This policy aimed to dilute the economic dependency of Hungary on the EU and to attract entrepreneurs from Central Asia, Middle East, and Caucasus.¹⁴⁴ Mutual interests between the two countries still largely shape studies on their shared history, and the "Kossuth Migration" continues to define the focus of research efforts on the refugee issue.

Not surprisingly, in the recent era studies are mostly state-sponsored or endorsed by semi-official or commercial organizations, aligning with the official approaches of the concerned governments involved. The overall result is not only the surging scholarly interest in the refugee issue but also the institutionalization of the unwritten agreements between

¹⁴³ Bayram Nazır, "Ottoman Hospitality and its Impact on Europe" (Istanbul: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, 2008), 40. From a much broader angle, Nazır links the Hungarian and Polish refugees of 1849 with other statemen whose fate in the Turkish exile was similar, such as Charles XII (The Ironhead). Ibid., 76. Again for the first time, it was Ahmed Refik who focused on Charles's refuge. Ahmed Refik, *Memâlik-i Osmaniyyede Demirbaş Şarl* (Istanbul: Hilâl Matbaası, 1332). Also see Şakir, "Türkiye'ye İlticâ," 1537. For more references to the hospitality discourse also see Karpas, "Kossuth in Turkey," 171. The Hungarian official ideology also agrees upon the hospitality discourse. András Gergely, foreword to *Lajos Kossuth ve 1848-49 Yıllarında Macar Özgürlük Savaşı*. trans. Yılmaz Gülen, by Róbert Hermann (Budapeşte: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003), 10. One of the retired Turkish ambassadors to Budapest also writes a book about the refugees who sought asylum on Turkish soil. Ender Arat, *Türklere Güvendiler: Tarih Boyunca Türk Topraklarına Sığınanlar* (Istanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2016). In the new era, this agreement also shows itself in the politics of culture and memory though the renovation of historical monuments.

¹⁴⁴ Deregözü, *Türkiye-Macaristan*, 15.

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Türkiye and Hungary, thanks to the twin associations established in their capitals after the fall of the USSR, the Turkish-Hungarian Friendship Association (*A Török-Magyar Baráti Társaság, Türk Macar Dostluk Derneği*).¹⁴⁵ It has occasionally been publishing works concerning the shared history of the two countries, including the issue of 48ers, and these pieces are rarely without interventions from statesmen and their goodwill for the mutual relations.¹⁴⁶ Considering its semi-official nature, the language of these publications presents a unique opportunity to examine the sensitivities and fragilities inherent in the dominant narratives, as reflected in their overemphasis and reticence. Nevertheless, this assessment becomes even more relevant when the findings are situated within larger discursive regime, which calls for the examination of other state-sponsored publications and scholarly works of individual researchers who largely operate within the same discursive boundaries. This practice also enables us to assess the continuities and ruptures in the converged official narratives of Hungary/Poland and Türkiye (partly deriving from their civilizational patterns, European and Muslim, in an oversimplistic way), particularly regarding the issue of Hungarian and Polish refugees and converts.

The invention of a historical background that justifies the immediate diplomatic and economic agendas generically entailed the selective assembly of historical instances, in which the refugee crisis is placed in a linear sequence of causes and effects that leads to a premeditated

¹⁴⁵ One of the founding members, Vecdet Erkun (1918-2010), recounts in his memoirs how the association came to be. Upon retiring from his profession, Erkun reaches out to the commercial attaché at the Hungarian Embassy to Ankara, which leads to meeting the ambassador himself. Along with Hungarologists Hasan Eren (1919-2007) and Şerif Baştav (1913-2010), the idea of founding the association takes shape soon after. Once the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approves the proposal, the initiators set out to bring their vision to life. Erkun, *Budapeşte'den Ankara'ya*, 120-121.

¹⁴⁶ Gülen, *Lajos Kossuth'un Türkiye*. Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*. Róbert Hermann, András Joó, Kálmán Mészáros, and István Seres, *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma Hakkı Tanınan Macar Mültecilerinin Özyaşamlarından Özetler*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2010). Edit Tásnadi, ed., *Macar Generalleri Osmanlı Hizmetinde: Richard Guyon ve Györgi Kmety-Hurşit Paşa ve İsmail Paşa*, trans. Ali Kemal Alpay (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2013), 8-29. Hicran Yusufoglu, *Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri (Başlangıçtan Ankara Savaşı'na Kadar)* (Ankara: Sam Yayınları, 1995). Şerif Baştav, *Türk-Macar Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003). Tevfik, *Yadigar-ı Macaristan*. István Seres, *Thököly Imre és Törökország / Imre Thököly ve Türkiye*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2006). Tibor F. Tóth, ed., *II. Ferenc Rákóczi'nin Hayatı ve Türkiye'deki Sürgün Günleri* (Budapest: Magyar-Török Baráti Társaság, 2005).

end. However, this diachronic vision simultaneously downgraded the historicity of each instances in their specific contexts, particularly the voices of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts were sacrificed. The personal cult of Kossuth was gradually absorbed into the official Turkish narratives throughout the republican period, simultaneously reflecting an adjustment to the discursive position intrinsic to another "civilizational trajectory." In this way, the Turkish official stance also absorbed the prejudices of this trajectory toward its traditional "other," albeit within certain limits. As the republican elites instrumentalized the new language to integrate the young nation with the Western world, the leadership cult of Kossuth was transfused to the Turkish narratives, to the detriment of the refugees who severed their ties with him and converted to Islam on Ottoman soil. While silencing the converts in the literature, the republican elites were committed to stifle alternative trajectories the converts could have inspired in the future, thereby paralyzing the potential directions history could have taken. Kossuth's persona was eventually appropriated as the symbol of the culmination of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Hungary, with financial and strategic expectations attached, particularly after the end of the Cold-War. One can observe the official alignment between Hungary and Türkiye in a book devoted to the bicentenary of the birth of Kossuth. It was published in the conference proceedings of a symposium organized by the Embassy of the Republic of Hungary to Ankara. The event was hosted by the rectorate of Kütahya Dumlupınar University in Türkiye. Hungary's cultural attaché in Ankara, Róbert Csillik, welcomes the reader and finishes his short introduction by acknowledging the support of Hungary's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Cultural Heritage.¹⁴⁷ Leafing through the pages takes the reader to the opening speech of the symposium, delivered by István Szabó, charge d'affaires, who highlighted Kossuth *as the symbol of the liberal thought, freedom, and the*

¹⁴⁷ Celal İnal and Naciye Güngörmüş, ed., *Doğumunun 200. Yıldönümünde Lajos Kossuth 1848-49 Macar Özgürlük Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri Sempozyumu Dumlupınar Üniversitesi 15 Mart 2002* (Kütahya: Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2002), 5.

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bourgeois democratic structure of Hungary.¹⁴⁸ This symbolic representation forces itself through the discourse of the corresponding party, which buys the generic depiction and transforms it into *the symbol of the Turkish-Hungarian friendship in the new era*. Another work published in memory of the same anniversary was the translation of Kakuk's abovementioned work (1967) on Kossuth's notes on Turkish grammar in Kütahya, with certain abbreviations. This reprint *symbolized* the reproduction of the republican-era epistemology centered on Kossuth.¹⁴⁹ The overemphasis on Kossuth is tantamount to pushing the historical agency of his opponents, notably the followers of General Bem, into further margins in the post-soviet era, despite the increasing intellectual interests in the refugees. For instance, Turkish researchers continued to maintain that Kossuth had remained the undisputed leader of the refugees in the camps on Ottoman soil even immediately after the failure of the revolution, despite the severe blows to his authority. Accordingly, he was still a highly popular and respectable leader, who had never lost ground within the refugee community. He incessantly took care of the refugees' daily problems, along with staying tuned with their motherland. When divisions within the refugee camp came to the fore, the majority did not see any objection to appeal his side, while Bem was secluded and isolated from other refugees, according to this construction.¹⁵⁰ Again comparatively, whereas the repetitive attempts on his life only enhanced Kossuth's popularity, the suicide attempts targeting Bem did not presumably have that effect.¹⁵¹ As a result, the presence of Kossuth and his close circle in Shumen guaranteed a brotherly and peaceful atmosphere within the refugee community *unless* they were disturbed by *outsiders*.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹⁴⁹ Published by the Hungarian-Turkish Friendship Association, a retired Turkish ambassador to Budapest underscores that the time "President Kossuth" (even though he had waived his official duties when taking refuge) stands as a testament to the brotherly sentiments of the Turkish people toward the Hungarians. Arat, "Foreword to Lajos Kossuth'un," 6.

¹⁵⁰ Nazır, *Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar*, 79, 81

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 192.

¹⁵² Ibid., 342, 344.

The neglect is not merely a natural consequence of focusing on one side but also reflects a certain degree of deliberate intent. It is not a secret that the Hungarian and Polish history writings have never been so willing to extensively delve into the converts in their new lives on Turkish soil. Even in 2012, Deringil had to underline that no satisfactory follow-up on the 48ers who "turned Turk" had found its way into the official Hungarian historiography.¹⁵³ The Hungarian school textbooks still tends to avoid giving presence to the new life of Bem and his followers after their conversion to Islam.¹⁵⁴ In this regard, Deringil rhetorically asks whether it was more honorable to die as a martyr than to live as a "Turk," noting that official Hungarian narratives celebrate the "martyrs of 11 October" while remaining entirely silent about the "Turkish episode," though the converts devoted their blood to the same cause.¹⁵⁵ The converts were never fully acknowledged in Hungarian and Polish official discourses despite the growing attention deigned to the refugee converts in post-Soviet era, which could be attributed to the globalization spirit. At any rate, certain limits are preserved in the updated accounts, in accordance with the traditional discourses rooted in the earliest intra-group discussions

For one thing, it is almost impossible not to notice how a remarkably defensive language immediately seeps into the official discourses when the converts are handled, possibly to eliminate any suspicion that the national heroes might have really converted to Islam. The arguments and evidence are usually sorted through an *a priori* axiom, which is the impossibility of converting to Islam for Hungarians (and Poles and Italians). The results are usually projected backward to explain the motives, thereby proving the self-declared judgment with the wisdom of hindsight. In this regard, nearly all the textual strategies of domination exhibit considerable

¹⁵³ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 256.

¹⁵⁴ Ilona Sándor, comment during the Q&A session, 36th Annual Conference of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada (HSAC), virtual meeting, May 14–16, 2022, noting that the information that the students in Hungary are well informed about the role of Józef Bem in the national history, as he is revered as a national hero. However, his conversion and service as an Ottoman pasha in Aleppo are not mentioned.

¹⁵⁵ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 256.

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efforts to make excuses for the seemingly inadmissible act of conversion. Those revolutionaries whose wrongdoings are not easily justified are often denied more straightforwardly.

The first textual strategy to relieve the audience of the burden of being contaminated by the traditional "other" is to argue that the converts never turned to "Turk" in earnest. Instead, they remained true believers of Christianity despite their temporary Muslim outlook. An auxiliary argument is that conversion was the only means to save their lives.¹⁵⁶ The revolutionaries preserved, in this construct, their ethno-religious essence, waiting for the right moment to come out. In fact, the narrative must be quite familiar to the students of Ottoman history, resembling the nationalist accounts in the histories of the Balkan nations under Turkish rule. Accordingly, non-Muslims retreat to rural areas in response to the Turkish onslaught, while secretly preserving their true faith and customs for centuries. One authors that "Greek ingenuity and Turkish stupidity, or rather perhaps Turkish indifference to what lay beneath the surface so long as appearances were more or less kept up," presented another way to escape for the compatriots.¹⁵⁷ What is more, this representation is rooted even in the religious legends that predate national narratives. Hiding religious identity to avoid persecution is a recurring theme among the early martyrs and saints of Christendom. Even though Saint Sebastian was a devout Christian, he concealed his faith while serving in the Roman military, leading to his sentencing to death in Rome. Following this grand discursive pattern, it is not without reason that Western historiography emphasizes how conversion to Islam was proposed to Hungarian and Polish refugees to avoid persecution and how this proposal carried material benefits. The existential threat connotes *coercion in the final analysis*; even if the refugees declared themselves to have

¹⁵⁶ For a few examples see Lucyna Antonowicz-Bauer, *Polonezköyü Adampol*, trans. Yeşim Santepe (Istanbul: Çelik Gülersoy Vakfı İstanbul Kütüphanesi, 1990), 12. "To evade Russian demands for his extradition" in the case of Mustafa Celâleddin. Urbanik and Baylen, "Polish Exiles and the Turkish Empire," 50. Barbara Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration, 1831–1871: The Challenge to Russia," in *L'émigration politique en Europe aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Actes du colloque de Rome (3–5 mars 1988)* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1991), 242. Yet none of the refugees was turned away irrespective of their conformity with conversion as guaranteed the Porte repeatedly.

¹⁵⁷ R. M. Dawkins, "The Crypto-Christians of Turkey," *Byzantion* 8, no. 1 (1933): 251.

converted out of their free will, their choice is portrayed as voluntary only on the surface and not entirely candid. Since no religious community could applaud the conversion of its members to another creed, let alone a hostile one, coercion over voluntarism is thus emphatically put into play.¹⁵⁸ If we recall Kossuth's letter to Lord Palmerston, the allegation of coercion appears in its most extreme form, in which the former easily invokes the specter of forced Islamization in the public opinion in Europe, shifting the blame for compelling the refugees to convert onto the Ottomans, rather than onto the Habsburg and Tsarist rules that drove them to refuge. Following this lead, approximately one hundred and fifty years later, *coercion in the last analysis* in recent literature appears only as a milder version of the deep-seated cultural prejudices. Rather than converting, nevertheless, literary tradition would expect of the refugees to shoulder martyrdom serving as a common trope that values commitment and resilience in conventional narratives, where death is considered to be a testimony in itself, for instance, in the Risorgimento literature.¹⁵⁹

Csorba puts forward that the Ottoman statesmen secretly offered the refugees to convert to Islam to overcome the immediate diplomatic crisis at the door, and it was the recommendation that drove the refugees to convert, "[b]ut," he has to clarify that, "the emigrants saw not the refuge in it, but the hope so set the enemies against each other with this step."¹⁶⁰ According to this explanation, the rulers of the Tanzimat regime might have insidiously obliged the refugees to convert, yet the refugees surely knew how to outwit the imperial elites. Besides the bodily protection, moreover, the defensive position suggests that material benefits also helped the refugees to act as if they converted on the grounds that the converts were to be granted better living conditions, even their military rank were later

¹⁵⁸ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 153.

¹⁵⁹ "per le sante martiri la morte è ancora una testimonianza, in questo caso di una fede e di una purezza che non può essere vinta dall'aggressione." Alberto Mario Banti, *Il Risorgimento italiano* (Rome-Bari: GLF editori Laterza, 2004), 60.

¹⁶⁰ György Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49 in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Turks*, ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay, vol. 4 (Ankara: Yeni Turkey Publications, 2002), 225.

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recognized.¹⁶¹ Therefore, it was a *strategic* decision taken to serve in this army of the Muslims. As an auxiliary argument, it is suggested that the non-Muslims were not generically admitted to the Ottoman army until the early twentieth century.¹⁶² That said, entrance into an allied army could present potential political and military advantages. Relying on tactical explanations, the offer to convert made the refugees think of playing the Great Powers against each other, especially against Russia. These antagonisms could provide the refugees with the chance of re-igniting a war of independence in Hungary and Poland.¹⁶³ Thus, this line of argument grounds the conversion cases among Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries on urgent concerns.¹⁶⁴ Quite strikingly, a book dedicated to the days Kossuth spent in Anatolia inescapably assumes all the authority to speak on behalf of General Bem from an omniscient and dominating point of view and reflects that the general considered the issue of conversion as a political issue rather than a moral or ethereal one. As a result, the main motivation of the converts was insistently depicted as earthly rather than heavenly.¹⁶⁵

All the exclusive arguments soon turn out to be verified according to the results that are picked selectively in a way of reversing the cause-and-effect relationship and disregarding historical change. To illustrate, those converts who later returned to their old faith are presumed to be telling examples to suggest that conversions had remained on paper without giving ear to the experience of the converts about what really happened in the meantime. The fact that those

¹⁶¹ György Csorba, "Hungarians in Constantinople in the Mid-19th Century: Socio-Economic Background and Careers," in *Between Empires—Beyond Borders: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican Era through the Lens of the Köpe Family*, ed. Gabor Fodor (Budapest: Research Center for the Humanities, 2020), 68.

¹⁶² Yet there were refugees who remained unemployed even after converting, besides Governor Ahmed Vefik [Pasha] was recorded to have assured the refugees in Vidin that conversion was not a precondition for enlistment. Nazır, *Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar*, 213-215.

¹⁶³ György Csorba, "Hungarian Diplomatic Envoys in Constantinople During the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849," in *Şerefe: Studies in Honour of Prof. Géza Dávid on His Seventieth Birthday*, ed. Pál Fodor (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2019), 559. Sustained great hatred against Russia all through his life, it appeared more likely to change religious identity for General Bem to eventually stage a war against Russia on the side of the Ottomans. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 94. Also see Pete, *Il colonnello Monti*, 201.

¹⁶⁴ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 86.

¹⁶⁵ Gülen, *Lajos Kossuth'un*, 47.

Hungarian and Polish converts who had fought in Bosnia under the banner of the Sultan's army and later disappeared from historical records are presented as evidence to suggest that their conversion was under coercion.¹⁶⁶ In addition, there was hardly any civilian known to convert is argued to prove that the conversions were null and void.¹⁶⁷ Perhaps, the most exciting intellectual endeavor is to hunt for the gravestones. In a book dedicated to two prominent military officers who converted to Islam, Richard Guyon (1813-1856) and György Kmety (1813-1865), the way in which the issue of conversion to Islam is handled is instructive. According to this quest, conversion was a strategic decision taken to serve (and to be served) in the Ottoman army.¹⁶⁸ The generals carried on as genuine Christians. After all, their *funeral ceremonies* were handled according to the proper procedures, implying that they were never engaged with Islam.¹⁶⁹ But funeral arrangements for the defunct do not necessarily pay respect to the religious convictions of the deceased; they are often shaped by the wishes of those remained behind, whose explanations ultimately have a claim over the meaning of the departed bodies. In any case, the last argument gets literally into gravestones to trace the way the converts were buried upon their deaths and forces the ascertained meaning into the decisions to convert, which had actually been made a long time ago, to eventually verify an ahistorical judgement. This back and forth in the past is evident in almost all the supporting sub-arguments, yet the outcome is directed at one strategy, that is, to attach a string of interrelated motives for the conversion, thereby deigning presence to its practitioners in the literature. In this way, the converts are domesticated enough to gain presence only in the selective texts, as long as there is legitimate side to their conversion (as a bitter recipe, all in all, for the national

¹⁶⁶ "because of violent attempts to convert them their group split up." Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants," 227. One may argue that their "disappearance" could more likely be a wishful thinking to support the underlying argument.

¹⁶⁷ Csorba, "Hungarians in Constantinople," 70.

¹⁶⁸ One should ask about the refugees who converted, though their professions were outside the military sphere.

¹⁶⁹ Hóvári, "Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluğu," 15. Róbert Hermann, "Türk Paşalığına Yükselen İki Honvéd Generali—Richard Guyon ve György Kmety 200 Yıl Önce Doğdu," in *Macar Generalleri Osmanlı Hizmetinde: Richard Guyon ve György Kmety—Hurşit Paşa ve İsmail Paşa*, trans. Ali Kemal Alpay, Ayan Dursun, Laura Pál, Murat Şahin, and Edit Tásnadi (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2013), 63.

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cause). More interestingly, the Turkish side largely retains the code of silence on the same question even in the recent era, incorporating the revolutionaries into its national narrative by focusing on their contribution to the national modernization. Different from its counterparts, this position neither seeks excuses to question the sincerity of conversions nor expends efforts to prove otherwise, which is itself revealing a certain frame of mind.¹⁷⁰ This frame also reflects a contradiction intrinsic to the identity the Turkish nation-state project introduced; while retaining the theological basis that guided the conversion of the refugees, it tried to forge a secular-national understanding following the blueprints of the Western model.

True belief in the Ottoman understanding of Islam is not a subject to scrutiny once the proper conversion procedure is completed, whereas the inquisitorial mentality effectively dominates the academic tribunals in the West, manifesting itself through the obsessive search for religious commitments. In this context, the indifference of one side perfectly went along with the sensitivity of the other, resembling a gentleman's agreement. The subjectivities of the converts seem to have been regarded too unimportant to jeopardize the grand projects at play, including the diplomatic and commercial interactions. The result is the convergence (or more precisely, one conforming to the other) of the official historiographies within the two ethno-religious traditions regarding the Hungarian War of Independence and the refugee question, a consensus whose roots extend even to the time the events set in. The alignment plays out essentially through the personal cult of Kossuth, who asserted in his time that the revolutionaries were compelled to convert. According to him, their mission was to transform the Ottoman society, rather than allowing themselves to be transformed. Originating in the intra-group discussions, his defensive reflex gradually penetrated the official Turkish sources,

¹⁷⁰ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 169. Deringil is an exception in his effort to touch upon the question of sincerity. However, he has recourse to the official views. "The Hungarian or Polish converts of 1849," he says "remained Hungarian or Polish even after they had "turned Turk", even while loyally serving their new sovereign, some into the second generation" in a way to discard historical change. Ibid., 246.

while undermining the agency of the converts. This epistemological framework reached its zenith in the context of global integration after the fall of the USSR. However, the meanings attributed to the refugee question have never been dull reiterations in substance, they have been more likely to the adjustments of the already existing arguments into the new discursive systems, based on the negotiations of national and transnational actors. These shifts mainly flew from the nation-state formation to the enthusiasm for globalization. At the end of the day, while the refugees who sought asylum in the empire are treated within the scope of the good relations between the two nations, the channel of Kossuth, rather than (General Bem) Murad Pasha, has been consulted since the beginning.

Demonstrating in what ways certain historical actors are excluded from one particular nationalist genre and included in another is insufficient without a clear explanation of how these discursive formulations function. The prioritization of the leading hero at the expense of his opponents inevitably carries certain political implications, given that the production of historical narratives is implicated in processes of selection and elimination. As a matter of fact, we have already discussed how the inclusion of the converts in the Turkish official narrative functions (modernization and European integration). However, the source of the mainstream discourse that informs the Hungarian and Polish narratives also calls for a deeper investigation into how the discourse itself functions in its original context. It should have already been clear that this part of the study is not so much concerned with "social reality" but rather with "the discourse problem," which has a direct bearing on the construction of the reality.¹⁷¹ Otherwise, it must be true in most cases that conversions ostensibly took place in response to contemporary challenges. Indeed, the notion that over two hundred revolutionaries who had spent a significant part of their lives in a completely different cultural setting were suddenly convinced all together that Islam was the most righteous path is hardly a satisfactory explanation. That

¹⁷¹ Clifford Geertz, *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 83.

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said, we can neither rule out that there may have been some who converted out of sincere feelings. However, the fact that specific living conditions triggered religious conversion should not annul its long-term implications; it is often social circumstances that drive people to move in that direction. Rather than hunting down the true religious convictions of the dead souls, it is thus more productive to pay attention to the language of power in the literature on the refugee question, as this language itself produces a subalternity. The overemphasis on the insincerity of conversions cannot hide the weakness of the cultural position the whole argumentation relies on. Otherwise, how else can one explain scrutinizing of the funerals of the two converts to prove that they died as non-Muslims? Why is it so hard just to say that they converted, without attaching explanations and listing an array of excuses? Why all this defense, not in the past but in the text, not necessarily ontological but surely epistemological? What is the thing that is ultimately at the edge of the abyss and what is it that the defensive language preserves, against whom and what? How can one even make sure that the converts had been true believers of Christianity before, let alone after that, if a distinction between inner faith and outward posing is to be made, especially when these figures are considered to be enlightened as revolutionaries?

The converts are mentioned in the literature as long as their deeds could be justified, yet this very justification was also how Kossuth announced to the British that the Hungarians in the East could well shoulder the civilizing mission, thereby elevating them to a more acceptable position in the Western world. This approach implicitly required the refugees to transform the Ottomans, without transforming themselves. Strangely, even this justification would not always be enough to fully incorporate them into the national narratives, given that they were ultimately strained with the Orient, which had always been mistrusted in the learned culture.¹⁷² Arif Dirlik points to another, albeit related, reason to explain why "Orientalized

¹⁷² Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1977), 252.

Westerners," are more marginalized and even more ideologically suspected "at home," as they are assumed to be more enmeshed in the exoticism of the Orient, even without necessarily changing religious affiliation.¹⁷³ Even if a distinction is made between being and appearing for figures who act as if under a mask, it does little good for the nationalist literature. Even the extenuated picture becomes a source of nuisance, once a traitor is always a traitor.¹⁷⁴ In a word, even if they did not really convert, they would no longer be perceived as they were before, as they were once infected with heresy. When they are to be mentioned in studies, however, the defensive reflex comes into play. Without really consulting to their voices, claims over the motives and true religious belongings of the converts allocate an interpretative power that assigns political meanings to the symbols of the past. The narratives adhering to acceptable explanations, in fact, lay claim to the psyche of the converts, since identifying the causes of revolt, according to Prakash, is a step to control and equally an attempt to deny the agency of the insurgent.¹⁷⁵ The converts are assumed to have revolted against the enlightened leadership of the Hungarian and Polish revolutionary movements in the post-revolutionary era, as apostasy itself is traditionally considered to be a revolt against the legitimate authority not only in Islamic but also in Christian traditions and that is why it calls for execution. Thus, finding an explanation is also an apology on behalf of the converted souls for their presumed wrongdoing, leaving their own psyche aside, and making a distinction between inner faith and outward posing equally disengages the subject and the object of the investigation for the sake of transforming the latter into something the former according to political ends.

The authority of Kossuth was loaded with the power to represent the monopoly of the nationalist aspirations at a certain passage of time for the linearly defined nationalist path. Even

¹⁷³ Arif Dirlik "Chinese History," 110

¹⁷⁴ "a genuine sense of moral duty could not be expected of individuals for whom being and appearing had become two different things." E. J. Hundert, "The European Enlightenment and the History of the Self," in *Rewriting the Self Histories from the Renaissance to the present*, ed. by Roy Porter (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 78.

¹⁷⁵ Prakash, "Subaltern Studies," 1479.

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in their own times, when the emperor was overthrown in Hungary, the republicans in Rome greeted Kossuth to "represent the principal unifier of the nation" in a journal of the time.¹⁷⁶ In other words, challenging his authority meant an attempt against the unity and harmony of the nation, which was under foreign occupation, the practitioners of conversion could well be represented as traitors, thus, parting way itself was enough to push the Hungarian converts out of their mainstream. Yet this exclusion was equally related to the wish of those at the top of the revolutionary hierarchy to maintain their position. The already-existing blind prejudices against Islam had appealed to the leading circle gathering around the leaders of the revolutionary groups to employ a discriminating and uncompromising discourse when the idea of converting began to circulate at the time when their political exigencies were at stake in the tumultuous political atmosphere. It is a great irony that the leading cadres never ceased to seek moral shelter in the mercy of the British and French governments, though it was the Porte that provided the physical shelter, while the revolutionary causes had been lost due to Western indifference. This observation suggests that the Orientalist discourse was so hegemonic in the nineteenth century that even its victims could not help but to internalize it. However, the strategy of the leaders to adapt themselves to the changing conditions was to rely on the entrenched cultural norms. In a bid to create room for maneuver and not lose prominence in international politics, Kossuth resorted to peddle the civilizing mission on Ottoman soil with the presence of the refugees, which would supposedly be enlightening the Orient. When his way came to represent the enlightened path, the revolutionaries lost their legitimacy to have been represented once they converted to Islam, turning them to reactionary against the civilizational pattern. All in all, religious conversion of the 48ers has been regarded as a

¹⁷⁶ Kossuth and Mazzini "rappresentano il principio unificatore della nazione." Magda Jászay, *Il Risorgimento vissuto dagli ungheresi* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2000), 246.

phenomenon that ran against the only possible "human development," carrying a potential to revert the power relations.

Opposing the authority of the national leader whose very existence represented the enlightened road could be one thing, the decision to convert specifically to Islam is quite the other, which complicates the issue more and more. In addition to the mistrust against Islam, the Hungarian and Polish official narratives have been proud of commemorating the standing of their nations in Central and Eastern Europe as being the last bastion of Christianity (or the Western civilization) against the so-called barbaric Turkish and Muslim incursions for many centuries. This theme was dominant at the time of the revolution. The idea of Hungary as "bulwark of Western civilization" was revived in the Hungarian press at the time of the revolution as a counter against the absolutist monarchies.¹⁷⁷ This representation was well received in Italy. Following the bloody reprisals of the Austrians against the Hungarians, a Piedmontese official emphasized how the Hungarians had saved all of Europe from Tartar and Turkish invasions.¹⁷⁸ Kossuth himself reflected this interpretation in his memoir, qualifying the Hungarians as those "who defended Europe against the Turks."¹⁷⁹ At the end of the fourteenth century, King Sigismund of Hungary led the last Crusade, taking on the role of the defender of Catholic Christianity. Devoted to driving the Turks from Europe, his efforts marked a turning point in Hungarian history, placing the Turkish threat at the center of focus.¹⁸⁰ This role was crystallized with the military maneuver that Polish King Jan III Sobieski managed through the Kahlenberg hills of Vienna, which ended with the victory over the Ottomans in the Battle of Vienna that decisively halted the Turkish onslaught to the heart of Europe in 1683. Consequently, the king has become deeply rooted in both the collective consciousness of the

¹⁷⁷ "baluardo della civiltà occidentale" Ibid., 186.

¹⁷⁸ "che nel passato aveva salvato l'Austria e tutta Europa dalle invasioni tartare e turche." Ibid., 248.

¹⁷⁹ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 118.

¹⁸⁰ Yusufoglu, *Osmanlı-Macar*, 10, 44.

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Polish people and in history books as the "Protector of Europe and Christianity."¹⁸¹ Of course, this historical background influenced how those who converted are interpreted in the Hungarian and Polish literatures.

As the oversimplified dichotomy between the East and the West is perpetuated through the narratives on the refugees, apostasy to Islam became more unacceptable for even ordinary individuals, let alone national heroes. Through their very existence, the converts do not conform to the dominant interpretation of the grand narrative that consolidates national identities. Embracing elements of the traditional "other" that ensures the internal coherence of the imagined community is not only seen as an anomaly within the conventional narrative but is even deemed as an antagonistic act. This perception is sufficient to exclude its practitioners from the imagined community and erase them from the mental map of the nation. After converting to Islam, to put it more bluntly, those Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries could not be genuine members of the nation. Their incompatibility not only delineates the boundaries of the national identities in European context but also sets a worrisome example that could threaten the entire constellation of cultural codes, over which the dominance within the society is maintained. This potential blow to the foundational values that give meaning to existence and guide societies could lead to catharsis, a moment of upheaval that risks plunging the societies into chaos, shaking it from within, and forcing a reckoning with what was once unquestioned. "The constitutive outside," argues Norval, "has the capacity to put into question the very identity which is constituted through its externalization."¹⁸² Besides, the converts are thought to have possessed a comprehensive understanding of the secrets of the nation, which could be disclosed to outsiders, to the traditional enemies at worst.¹⁸³ To sum up, these deviants

¹⁸¹ Hacer Topaktaş, "Lehistan'dan Polonya'ya: Polonya Tarih yazımında Türkler ve Türkiye," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 8, no. 15 (2010): 548.

¹⁸² Aletta J. Norval, "Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid," in *The Making of Political Identities*, ed. Ernesto Laclau (London: Verso, 1994), 122.

¹⁸³ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 2-3.

have the potential to disrupt the supposed continuity of the foundational cultural codes that sustain these identities, conjuring up the specter of the traditional "other"—horrific, terrible, and barbarian image of the Turks/Muslims. The discourse was so effective that it haunted even when Islam had long lost being a considerable threat to Europe in the nineteenth century.

The cult of Kossuth serves to discipline individuals, functioning as a whip of an ideological control. As one of the apotheosized figures in the pantheon of the Magyar founding heroes, alongside I. (Szent) István and I. Mátyás, his persona is carefully appropriated and cemented in the national narrative. After all, numerous hymns and poets have been dedicated to his personality and struggles for the nation, and his statue stands in the Heroes' Square in Budapest.¹⁸⁴ His highly reputable presence in the chain of events that eventually concluded with the formation of the modern Hungarian nation-state owes to his strong image in the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-1849. During this period, he succeeded to trail the Hungarian masses behind the liberty through his eloquence and eccentric poses. His achievement to abolish the serfdom was unprecedented for the poor peasant flocks, who had been serfs for centuries: "The admiration for our father Kossuth has remained in the hearts of the people ever since," notes a Hungarian historian.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, his name even became associated with divinity in the spring of 1848. Even when he was alive, his persona was subject to legends.¹⁸⁶ The "regent," "our father," "the Moses of the Hungarians," "the great émigré," "the messiah of the nation," and "the old saint" were among the qualification used to describe him.¹⁸⁷ Although the revolution he led did not yield an immediate outcome, it remains one of the most significant events in the modern history of Hungary, so much so that the

¹⁸⁴ Géza Dávid, "Macarların Milli Kahramanı Lajos Kossuth ve Kütahya'da Yazdığı Eserleri," *Doğumunun 200. Yıldönümünde Lajos Kossuth 1848-49 Macar Özgürlük Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri Sempozyumu Dumlupınar Üniversitesi 15 Mart 2002*, ed., Celal İnal and Naciye Güngörmüş (Kütahya: Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2002), 106.

¹⁸⁵ "Kossuth babamıza,, karşı hayranlık halkın kalbinden o zamandan beri silinmemiştir." Ferenc Eckhart, *Macaristan Tarihi*, 2nd ed., trans. İbrahim Kafesoğlu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2010), 202.

¹⁸⁶ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 135-137.

¹⁸⁷ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 244-245.

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anniversary of its outbreak is still commemorated as a national holiday (March 15). It is safe to suggest that he would never have been granted such an honor had he converted. In sum, there is nothing surprising that his personality is captured by the official discourses at the expense of the alienation of those who opposed him. Nevertheless, when his persona embodies the identity of the entire nation, his image in the context of religious conversion redefines the ethno-religious boundaries of the imagined community. Trespassing irreconcilable differences filters the converts out the community since they collaborated with the evil. What is worse, their dehumanization proves to be a way to exert power over those who remain behind, as they are deprived of the capacity to empathize with the converts. While the eccentric, heroic, eloquent, courageous, charismatic, virile, and authoritarian figure of Kossuth features the imagined community, the members of this community are disciplined around his ideal type. In this framework, the isolated individual has to disappear into thin air, as nationalist understanding actually hates the nation they aim to promote. *De te fabula narratur* (the story is about you), the converts have never been the only ones who were repressed within dominant discourses. Even the most inattentive eyes cannot help but notice how Hungarian and Turkish researchers often appeal to a resemblance between Atatürk and Kossuth. This tendency serves as a telling indicator of how the image of one Pater Patriae reinforces the other on the transnational level, reflecting a shared consensus on the values and ideals they represent. In the same book, one can observe how a Turkish researcher draws the same allegory, arguing that Atatürk (Father of the Turkish nation) holds the same significance for the Turkish people as Kossuth does for the Hungarians, while another scholar explains that Kossuth would have been called Atamacar (Father of the Hungarians), had such a title been conceivable at the time.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ Naciye Güngörmüş, "Doğumunun 200. Yıldönümünde Lajos Kossuth ve 1848-49 Macar Bağımsızlık ve Özgürlük Mücadelesi," *Doğumunun 200. Yıldönümünde Lajos Kossuth 1848-49 Macar Özgürlük Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri Sempozyumu Dumlupınar Üniversitesi 15 Mart 2002*, ed., Celal İnal and Naciye Güngörmüş (Kütahya: Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2002), 40. Dávid, "Macarların Milli Kahramanı," 109.

Based on our transnational lenses, it is one of the most exciting explorations of this work that the heroic representation of one national leader can become a transnational commitment beyond the boundaries of nation-states. To make such cross-national observations, it is necessary to move beyond the inward-looking nation-state and international relations paradigms that have left their extensive marks on the literature. In fact, some of the issues we have spotted in the literature also related to the lack of a transnational perspective. There are studies that appear exceptional in terms of their transnational focus, pioneering a paradigm shift. Doubtless, one of the first major works in this sense was conducted by Lajos Lukacs, who expanded the period of the Magyar emigration to from 1849 to 1867, presenting the phenomenon in a far-reaching manner while incorporating different currents within the exile movement.¹⁸⁹ Vida's work stands out as another interesting study, particularly for its exploration of the transatlantic connections of the Hungarian presence in America and Hungarian participation in the American Civil War.¹⁹⁰ Heléna Tóth's book might be considered another exception with respect to its emphasis on the *heterogeneity* of the refugees and its efforts to reveal the social context of the exiled "little man" in the realms of the family and professional and social networks. However, it falls short to reveal transnational engagements of the Hungarian enclave in Istanbul with other brotherhood movements. While largely benefiting from Hungarian and German sources, Turkish sources seem to be beyond the author's reach, making it difficult to present a satisfying picture of the revolutionary converts since the secondary sources already offer too limited information about them. Drawing upon the experiences of émigrés from the German lands (the Grand Duchy of Baden and the Kingdom of Württemberg) and Hungary in four host societies (Swiss, Ottoman, British and American), Tóth considers the concept of exile in the aftermath of the Revolutions of 1848 as

¹⁸⁹ Lajos Lukacs, *Chapters on the Hungarian Political Emigration, 1849-1867*, trans. Dániel Székely (Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1995).

¹⁹⁰ Vida, "The True Cause."

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a European phenomenon.¹⁹¹ The book attaches historical importance to Istanbul as a refugee center, along with other European cities. However, its insistence on treating Istanbul as a temporary place for the exiles is a case in point. Relying on secondary sources about the converts do not tell something beyond the established narratives, limiting researchers to reproduce the discourse of the powerful. In any case, the book is a pioneering attempt to analyze the revolutionary network of exiles in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁹² Its effort to articulate the Ottoman capital in this scheme is appreciative, though the emphasis remains only geographical, lacking deeper political and spatial implications Constantinople might have carried. The portrayal of the exiled generation is also dismissive in the sense that it incorporates the Hungarian revolutionaries into the German exile communities, while leaving their Italian engagements aloof.¹⁹³

As a result, in line with the common ground shared by the Hungarian and Turkish history writings, a plethora of studies prefer to cast light on the revolutionary leaders who led the war of independence. Lives and works, memoirs and biographies, military and revolutionary activities, and political and intellectual tendencies of the main protagonists are prominent in this scholarship. Especially writings on Kossuth principally dominate this genre, after all, "it must be difficult," argues Deák, "to deal with a government-ordained idol."¹⁹⁴ Loaded with political implications, this selective depiction eliminates the contingent discursive variations in a certain historical moment by way of silencing the opponents of the national leader. The inevitable consequence of his elevation to sainthood within state-centered narratives is that those who opposed him at the peak of his career are naturally destined to be

¹⁹¹ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 2, 5, 6, 15.

¹⁹² Ibid., 168.

¹⁹³ For the Italian connection, it is possible to talk about a well-established scholarship in Italian. Since it is not possible to list and discuss all the secondary sources, at least for now, it suffices to see Andrea Carteny, "Un secolo di storiografia: il Risorgimento italiano e la Szabadságharc ungherese," *Rivista di Studi Ungheresi* 12, (2013): 165-171.

¹⁹⁴ Deák, *The Lawful Revolution*, XVI.

silenced. In other words, the issue of conversion signifies a particular historical moment when the "other" Hungarian revolutionaries who broke away from the mainstream were transformed from acceptable to unacceptable in the dominant discourse. Considering that the creation of historical narratives involves processes of selection and elimination, the preference for Kossuth and his inner circle over Islamized revolutionaries carry political meanings, as knowledge production implies power dynamics. On the one hand, the initial exclusion of the converts stemmed from the quest of those at the top of the social hierarchy to maintain their dominant position. On the other hand, the promotion of the cult of Kossuth was equally tied to the incorporation of cultural identity into national identity. The meaning assigned to the converts in relation to the formation of Maygariness is governed by the traditional East-West dichotomy, through which contemporary Hungarians are supposed to fashion themselves. The converts have been acknowledged only when their actions can be framed as defensible from the perspective of the national hero, representing the national teleology. In this sense, whether the revolutionaries truly converted, they undoubtedly remain a source of discomfort in the national memory. That biased representation was soon after transposed into official Turkish narratives; the instrumentalization of the converts to prompt national pride in the formative years of the republic and their integration into national narratives as carriers of modernization carefully addressed national concerns of the corresponding part, as the elites of the republic attributed the utmost importance to the diplomatic relations with Hungary. Keeping Hungarian sensitivities in place, the converts were further instrumentalized in the literature for commercial and diplomatic ends after the fall of the USSR, while the favorable relations between Türkiye and Hungary played out in the personality of Kossuth. In fact, this provides a clear indication of how Turkish narratives choose to connect with Hungarian refugees, which exposes the nature of the compromise—highlighting which side initiates it, which side dominates, and the underlying motivations, as existing studies can only be evaluated within the power dynamics

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that shaped them. To summarize the objections that have been raised to the literature so far, it would be appropriate to refer to two more or less similar judgments from two well-known historians, one from Hungary and one from Türkiye. Both statements ubiquitously assume a linear course of history external to real historical actors and judge them according to whether they stuck to or swerved from it. While admitting that academic studies are overshadowed by the strong presence of Kossuth, Karpát cannot help but conclude the following:

In early September 1851, Kossuth and the rest of the refugees were freed to go wherever they chose, thus *concluding* one of the most colorful events of modern Ottoman diplomatic history.¹⁹⁵

The immediate criticism that can be directed at this assessment is that the refugee issue in Ottoman diplomatic history cannot be assumed closed with the release of one revolutionary leader, while hundreds remained behind. Therefore, this judgment needs to be revisited, especially given the fact that the refugee issue did not come to an end just because Kossuth left Türkiye in 1851. Although uttered in a different context, on the other hand, Ferenc Eckhart (1885-1957) shares the similar methodological error, saying that "the exiles who sought shelter under *the wings of Kossuth* in foreign countries by escaping harsh punishment *were estranged from the course of history*."¹⁹⁶ Evidently because these exiles did not partake in the inevitable emergence of the Hungarian state, which had to go through the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 on the mainland.

The question arises: why did a group of people become estranged from history, as if nothing had happened, just because they followed a different track from the mainstream? In the light of this question, this research is an attempt to search for the traces of those who are considered not to have participated in the course of historical development because they followed a different path from the main vein. While imposing a cultural fiat backward onto

¹⁹⁵ Emphasis is mine. Karpát, "Kossuth in Turkey," 176.

¹⁹⁶ Translation and emphases are mine. "Hunhar intikamdan kaçarak yabancı memleketlerde Kossuth idaresi altında melce arıyanlar da, tarihi inkişafın seyrine iştirak etmekten uzak kaldılar." Eckhart, *Macaristan Tarihi*, 213.

historical actors and events to justify particular political interests at the discursive level, dominant discourses appropriate some elements of the past while simultaneously exclude some others. The elimination process itself creates its own subaltern, which is a term drawn from Gramsci to refer to subordination, highlighting "the centrality of dominant/dominated relationships in history."¹⁹⁷ The subaltern arising from the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees seeking asylum in the Ottoman Empire consisted of those who converted to Islam, as they have never spoken for themselves to this day. Instead, they have been spoken on their behalf, as they severed ties with the mainstream as soon as they switched religious allegiance. What has been said about them so far oversimplifies their own situation because official narratives are not capable to capture the complexities of their real-life struggles. In any case, the experience of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries in the Ottoman lands fostered a majority that was alienated from the authority of Kossuth, though studies are reluctant to acknowledge. Although the question is simple, it has never been engaged with: How did the other revolutionaries, who were excluded from the mainstream upon their converting, respond to their exclusion? There is no doubt that taking refuge and converting on Ottoman soil marked a civil death for the mainstream perspective, yet it was only a beginning for the subaltern. Recognizing the buried reality overwhelmed by metanarratives is only the beginning for us to search for new insights that diverge from the mainstream, much like the subaltern.¹⁹⁸

The genealogical analysis we have conducted, along with the inquiries that have followed, simultaneously provide insights into the methodological foundations of our investigation. Based on the Eurocentric modernization paradigm, the primary issue lies in the elitist and linear ascendancy of nation-states in historical narratives, which concentrate on the

¹⁹⁷ Prakash, "Subaltern Studies," 1477.

¹⁹⁸ Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (February 2006): 31-32.

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deeds of great men and the structural transformations they triggered while excluding the contributions of little men and their everyday struggles within transnational contexts. We have already placed the textual strategies and the mechanisms of repression that overshadowed those who parted their ways with the mainstream and defined the subaltern. To resurrect the voice of the voiceless, self-narratives of the converts (testimonies under oath, petitions [*arz-u hal*] memoirs, autobiographies, and scholarly books that reveal their psyche) are used as ego-documents. Based on this material, their adventures and travels are reconstructed and narrated through the premises of the narrative/interpretative branch of historical sociology, aiming to understand and explain the collective consciousness of the converts. This approach seeks not only to dismantle essentialist interpretations but also to discover an alternative cultural tradition that have not survived.

1.2. The Uses of Interrogation Protocols (İstintaknâme) As Ego-Documents¹⁹⁹

Sound in film is always in fact subsidiary to image; a 'pure' or unattributed sound is always marked by doubt and menace until it can be tracked to and synchronized with its source, which is usually to say, visualized.²⁰⁰

Along with the related bureaucratic correspondences, the empirical part of this work fundamentally rests upon the testimonies under oath by Polish Wiktor Jabłoński, Italian citizen of Hungarian origin Giuseppe Bloscò, and Ottoman subject of Hungarian origin Jusztinián Károly (Hüseyin). It also utilizes the petitions addressed to the Porte by Ottoman subject of Transylvanian origin Antal Schneider (Hüseyin Faik), not to mention that the memoirs and scholarly works of some other converts [such as Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha (Konstanty

¹⁹⁹ The theoretical framework of this section is a more elaborated version of the paper I presented in the following conference. İlkay Kirişcioğlu, "Devrimci Bir Macar Mühtedisinin Sorgusunda 'Ben' ('The Self' in the Interrogation of a Revolutionary Hungarian Convert)" (paper presented at the Osmanlı Literatüründe Ben-Anlatıları Sempozyumu, Skopje, May 24–26, 2024).

²⁰⁰ Steven Connor, "The Modern Auditory I," in *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*, ed. Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997), 213.

Półkoźic-Borzęcki), Mehmed Sadık Pasha (Michał Czaykowski), and Ismail Pasha (György Kmety)] functioned complementarily to reach the collective psyche of the larger community. I take the abovementioned evidence as ego-documents and evaluate the status of interrogation protocols within the relevant genre, noting that these records are more controversial than the others.

The term ego-document was coined by Dutch Historian Jacques Presser (1899-1970) to refer to source material such as diaries, memoirs, autobiographies, and personal letters, where the author unravels himself/herself in such a way that "the researcher is faced with an "I" [...], as the writing and describing subject with a continuous presence in the text."²⁰¹ Reformulated later the definition as "those documents in which an ego deliberately or accidentally discloses or hides itself," he fashioned a more detailed definition as follows:

I called ego-document: autobiographies, memoirs, diaries, letters and so on, in short all written sources, in which we meet a man more clearly, more personally, than in other sources, and who thus becomes to us instead of a "nameless human"—whatever that might be—a distinctive ego.²⁰²

While the term started circulating in English literature thanks to Peter Burke as a broader category of (auto-)biographical genre (including diaries, journals, memoirs, letters, and personal notes), which has the potential to be more revealing of the self, the German school sticks to the term *selbstzeugnis* in a way to acknowledge that none of the personal narratives is capable of reflecting a fully recognizable self.²⁰³ All the definitions seen so far require only an intelligible self to label a document with the prefix "ego," though faced with backlash in academic circles when Winfried Schulze attempted to widen the scope to include judicial

²⁰¹ Selim Karahasanoğlu, "Ottoman Ego-Documents: State of the Art," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 53, no. 2 (2021), 301. Arianne Baggerman and Rudolf Dekker, "Jacques Presser, Egodocuments and The Personal Turn in Historiography," *The European Journal of Life Writing* 7 (2018), 93.

²⁰² Ibid., 90-91. Rudolf Dekker, "Jacques Presser's Heritage: Ego-Documents in the Study of History," trans. Diederik van Werven, *Memoria y Civilization* 5 (2002): 14.

²⁰³ Kaspar von Greyerz, "Ego-Documents: The Last Word?" *German History* 28, no. 3 (2010), 280. Peter Burke, "Representations of the Self from Petrarch to Descartes," in *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*, ed. Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997), 21.

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hearings, as critiques find his implication too broad to make a precise sense of it.²⁰⁴ Let alone if there ever existed a self-appointed motivation to write about oneself in its purest form, what do we make of the interrogation protocols that comply with the other criteria? Asked why he mentioned all the political issues, which seemed irrelevant to the interrogator, a suspect in detention, Jusstinián, replies in his statement before the Ottoman authorities in the spring of 1861 that it was to explain his perceptions, somehow signaling the dire necessity to obstinately disclose and fashion his self in an interrogation, even without being invited to do so.²⁰⁵ So, why do some bother to regard judicial interrogations as ego-documents?

Let us run the tape back. Leopold von Ranke's (1795-1886) objective and scientific vision of knowledge was quite understandably reluctant to endow personal accounts as source material with the credit of historical significance, due to their supposedly idiosyncratic, unreliable, and subjective nature. State-ordained historical profession would not be expected to cherish personal narratives, which always have the potential to deviate from the semantic world outlined by official dogma, tasking itself with suppressing individual rather than disclosing.²⁰⁶ Yet the invention of ego documents a hundred years later went hand in hand with the frustration the field had accumulated against the so-called grand narratives. The 1980s welcomed the revival of narrative that exploited self-narratives for the benefit of the history of mentalities, while the rise of the so-called *microstoria* increased the popularity of ego documents in historical circles.²⁰⁷ New sources began to be uncovered, particularly the proceedings of criminal courts that record the full transcripts of testimonies given during interrogations and trials.²⁰⁸ Even though it initially came into existence with the examination

²⁰⁴ Schulze ran a symposium and later edited the volume of conference proceedings see Winfried Schulze, "Ego-Dokumente: Annäherung an den Menschen in der Geschichte? Vorüberlegungen für die Tagung 'Ego-Dokumente,'" in *Ego-Dokumente: Annäherung an den Menschen in der Geschichte*, ed. Winfried Schulze (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 11–30. Greyerz, "Ego-Documents," 279. Mascuch, Dekker, and Baggerman, "Egodocuments and History," 11–12.

²⁰⁵ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 23 July 1861 (15 Muharrem 1278).

²⁰⁶ Mascuch, Dekker, and Baggerman, "Egodocuments and History," 15–16.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 27. Dekker, "Jacques Presser's Heritage," 22–23.

²⁰⁸ Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative," *Past and Present*, no. 85 (November 1979): 19.

of legal proceedings, interrogations in particular, in an attempt to penetrate the voices of ordinary people under the auspices of new cultural history, which seeks to unearth and reinterpret new material, prejudice against treating court registrations as ego documents remained strong partly due to the outmoded state-society dichotomy. The dichotomy is based on the belief that state archives preserve nothing but the monopolized interests of the modern state, leaving scarce room for individual voices. Some find "the concept [ego document] anachronistic when applied to [...] the impersonal products of government bureaucracies."²⁰⁹ The bureaucratization of modern times in this sense prioritized standard forms and formats prevalent in governmental correspondence, purifying them of the flesh and blood. Thus, documents produced by the Ottoman bureaucracy, especially in the nineteenth century, have long believed to lack the human face.²¹⁰ Even the application of the notion is deemed unfortunate for autobiographical texts predating the twentieth century, where the existence of a distinct self may not be distinguishable.²¹¹

Since the supposed antagonism between the state and society as homogeneous entities, separated by clear boundaries and in constant struggle with each other at the expense of the other, lies at the heart of the issue, state-centered perspectives regard self-narratives as categorically unreliable, whereas state-free perspectives viewed narratives equally suspicious when gleaned from the state archives. However, since the state in the modern sense of the word penetrated society by abolishing mediating actors and institutions, more direct and intense interactions with society became the case. Yet this process moved in two opposing directions, as the capacity of the state to infiltrate society matched the capacity of society to influence the state, which is itself an arena, where competing interests negotiate, no matter how uneven the

²⁰⁹ Mascuch, Dekker, and Baggerman, "Egodocuments and History," 12.

²¹⁰ For an example see Ali Akyıldız, "İnsanı Yazmak: 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Biyografi Yazıcılığı ve Problemleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 50, no. 219 (2017), 227-228.

²¹¹ Greyerz, "Ego-Documents," 275.

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nature of this relationship might be.²¹² Technically, the voice of the voiceless may echo through the bureaucratic offices and institutional dossiers without necessarily undermining the image of the subaltern, thereby storing in state archives also the stories of ordinary people. For Foucault, the surveillance and disciplinary methods of modern times "lowered the threshold of describable individuality" to subject and dominate bodies, transforming each individual into a case, which is placed, therefore, in a network of documentation.²¹³ The modern state placed more importance to gather information about ordinary people, making them "readable" through various surveillance techniques. Indeed, once litigants are asked to tell their side of story, it becomes evident that their account is somewhat valued enough to put on the record, thereby granting it a permanent character.²¹⁴ Therefore, even though it might seem anomalous to try to unearth the voice of the subaltern by relying on material preserved in state archives, the dominant structures are always the point of departure for tracing the voice of the voiceless. Yet still, it remains legitimate to ask whether the nature of interrogation protocols can be functional in accessing the consciousness of the subaltern.

The protagonists whose voices we strive to bring up through interrogation protocols usually encounter the repressive side of the state under unpleasant conditions, where security and public order are perceived to be at stake, which means that the subalternity is inherently embedded in the interrogation, as the process itself frames the litigant as a "deviation from an ideal" in opposition to state authority and public order.²¹⁵ Dialectically however, a chance opens the way for the subaltern to present a personal defense in the face of a highly skeptical and sometimes even violent authority, when they confronted with allegations, without even

²¹² For this framework see Ferdan Ergut, *Modern Devlet ve Polis: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Denetimin Diyalektiği* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 52-54, 120.

²¹³ Foucault, "The Means of Correct Training," 203.

²¹⁴ Anna Vakalis, "Tanzimat in the Province: Nationalist Sedition (Fesat), Banditry (Eşkiya), and Local Councils in the Ottoman Southern Balkans (1840s to 1860s)" (PhD diss., University of Basel, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2019), 48.

²¹⁵ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 80.

thinking about the way their voice may reach future generations one day. On the contrary, this transmission would never be intended, nor desired by the interrogating authority, given that these documents were produced to circulate within a limited number of state offices, in-house in essence, at least in the nineteenth century. Precisely because of this unintentionality, it should not be theoretically impossible to hear the voice of the downtrodden through the fissures in dominant structures, which emerge from unpleasant encounters between the state and individuals. Even though interrogation protocols are official records, they may disclose aspects of the self, reflecting a sensitive balance between the two realms of the state-society dichotomy. The protocols, therefore, *could* be functional to give ear to the subaltern, in that regard, one may find similarities with the central issue of the Belin Group, which seeks the possibility of making use of the ego documents not procured by "Man, City-dweller, Christian, White, and European."²¹⁶

As historical subjects find themselves obliged to explain their deeds in a highly uneven power relationship, facing against the state equipped with repressive tools, their primary motive may easily turn into a self-narrative, including their lives and the life around them. What the defendant expresses in front of a legal authority can sometimes turn out to be an outline of a real-life story. In effect, scholars have already addressed the similarity between one's memoirs and defense in courts, in a number of cases.²¹⁷ If memoirs extracted from sworn testimonies can be considered ego documents, which are themselves born out of the genre of confession, then why are the testimonies themselves not considered as such? Despite their shortcomings, this work suggests that *istintaknames* could serve as a promising archival source for Ottoman

²¹⁶ Gabriele Jancke is the leading scholar in that sense. Selim Karahasanoğlu, "Ben-Anlatıları: Tarihsel Kaynak Olarak İmkânları, Sınırları," *Turkish History Education Journal* 8, no. 1 (2009): 217, doi: 10.17497/tuhed.565122. For Jancke's work see Gabriele Jancke, *Autobiographie als soziale Praxis: Beziehungskonzepte in Selbstzeugnissen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts im deutschsprachigen Raum* (Köln: Böhlau, 2002).

²¹⁷ The overlap between one's memoirs and defense in courts is visible in the memoirs of Zarîf Mustafa Pasha. For instance, Karal. "Zarîf Paşanın Hatıratı." The author penned this memoirs when he was under custody for his alleged misconduct during the Crimean War. Part of the memoirs comes from his testimony at the military court. Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 13-14.

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studies, offering means to give voice to the subaltern. In this sense, none of the deficiencies would make interrogation protocols any less valuable self-narrative for historical research than other ego-documents, such as memoirs. On the contrary, the protocols may even have comparative advantages, depending on specific cases. They may mirror the self in a relatively more direct manner, as the audience is not the public and the records are meant to be kept inside the bureaucracy as evidence for ensuing judicial processes, in contrast to memoirs, which are often written for public consumption. Although both are personal defenses, in essence, the narrator's expressions in the interrogation are less influenced by what the future generations will think of him/her. Instead, s/he has obviously far more immediate concerns in police headquarters or judicial courts. Moreover, compared to memoirs that are prone to be distorted given the faltering nature of the memory, the interrogation protocols are extracted on the spot, leaving less room for deficiencies caused by the deceiving nature of memory. In any case, it must be admitted that being interrogated is an overwhelming and stressful situation for individuals, no matter whether they committed a crime, thus, we cannot rule out the biggest issue in interrogations, which is the unavoidable antagonistic positioning between the sides. This induces the suspect and witness to conceal the truth or resort to distortion. Nevertheless, the position of the suspect on the brink of punishment and mistreatment is more related to how the testimonies shall be handled, as we will discuss, rather than denying their possible uses for historical research. That is to say, the point is not so much whether interrogation protocols are to be taken into consideration as examples of ego documents, but rather how to process them.

It is safe to argue that a critical mass to develop a proper methodology for evaluating ego documents has yet to come into existence in Ottoman studies, given the relative novelty of the personal turn in historical profession, efforts to compile inventories are still underway. In any case, three aspects of a particular source need to be paid attention to, "the text itself (content

+ form), its context (social + personal), and its function (social + personal)."²¹⁸ First, the content of the text concerns *what* the record is about, encompassing both qualitative and quantitative aspects. Second, the context pertains to the spatio-temporal dimensions, within which the text operates, *why* it was recorded in a specific time and place. Third, the function is related to the agents, the target audience, and what the text wants to achieve. Let us place interrogation protocols within these dimensions.

The protocols typically start with questions concerning the public identity of the person under investigation, such as their name, father's name, family members, occupation, religion, current residence, marital status, and similar details.²¹⁹ The questions usually appear on the right-hand side of a document page, which is vertically divided in half, while the corresponding answers are set down to the opposite side of the same page, but one line below.²²⁰ In some cases, questions are marked with the letter sin (س), an abbreviation for the word *su'al* (سؤال), placed above the question, while the corresponding answers are indicated by the letter (ج), short for *cevab* (جواب), placed above the immediate answer. These questions and answers may also follow one under the other, without them being allocated to the margins. They can sometimes be numbered, such as the first question (*su'al-i evvel*), the first answer (*cevab-ı evvel*), the second question (*su'al-i sâni*), the third question (*su'al-i sâlis*), the fourth question (*su'al-i rabi'*), and so on. In terms of Ottoman diplomatics, these records are written in *rik'a* script, the standard handwriting prevalent in Ottoman correspondences at the time. Transcribed on numbered pages of a long, narrow notebooks, interrogation protocols display significant variation in terms of length; while some samples are only a few sentences long, others may

²¹⁸ R. Aslıhan Aksoy Sheridan, "Nostalgia of a Frustrated Ottoman Subject: Reading Osman Agha of Timișoara's Memoirs as Self-Narrative," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 53, no. 2 (2021): 324-325.

²¹⁹ In some cases, defendants and witnesses were also asked if they were literate. Interrogators could ask women for the names of their husbands, as well. Ebru Aykut Türker, "Alternative Claims on Justice and Law: Rural Arson and Poison Murder in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2011), 88.

²²⁰ This is a typical interrogation protocol, though one may stumble upon some other variations in Ottoman archives.

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span hundreds of pages. The protocols do not identify the number of interrogators involved, the identity of each questioner (whether it was a judge, police officer, governor), or their specific questions. However, subjects speak about themselves in the first person.²²¹

Even though responses are directly quoted from the subject, the relationship between signified (the words spoken) and signified (their intended meaning) in sworn testimonies is never unmediated, as scribal practices, power dynamics, and legal frameworks inherently shape these records. Despite being signed, depositions are dictated with the mediation of clerks (*katip*), and if the suspect does not speak Turkish (as in our cases), another intervention by interlocutors, possibly provided by the government, foreign consulates, or religious authorities that represent the interrogee, are involved. Doubtless, their translations introduce an inherent risk of misinterpretation or transmission. Furthermore, the orderly nature of the scripts suggests that the protocols are copied from an original record that is presumably taken on the spot, and possibly edited later.²²² In other words, suspect's discourse is mediated through the filters of the interrogators, whose interventions may distort the original meaning of what is said.²²³ In addition, interrogees may be subjected to varying degrees of duress from both formal and explicit agents (the state apparatus) as well as informal and implicit agents (social peers), which would surely influence their testimonies. Despite all these setbacks, if not entirely unfiltered, this source material provides important insights into the world of ordinary people, being "less mediated than many of other archival sources."²²⁴ After all, the claim to any unadulterated access to meaning is itself problematic, particularly when one considers that meaning is constructed through a system of representation, reflecting the inherent uncertainty of the

²²¹ Omri Paz, "Documenting Justice: New Recording Practices and the Establishment of an Activist Criminal Court System in the Ottoman Provinces (1840-late 1860s)," *Islamic Law and Society* 21, no. 1/2 (2014): 109.

²²² Ibid., 110. I have never encountered an interrogation protocol that could be considered as a "draft" or "original copy." However, many researchers are likely familiar with unedited versions of translations from the Translation Office and their edited versions (*tebyiz*).

²²³ Türker, *Alternative Claims*, 47.

²²⁴ Vakalis, *Tanzimat in the Province*, 52.

written world.²²⁵ As a result, it can be asserted that interrogation protocols offer us a chance to hear the voices of those who deviated from the supposed norm, though *only* within certain limitations.²²⁶ When it comes to the statements obtained from the interrogations of the so-called sedition and banditry cases in 19th-century Ottoman Empire, indeed, Vakalis observes that the protocols are promising archival source to offer insights into the personal motivation and revolutionary networks of conspirators, among other things, from the perspective of ordinary participants, alongside the main rabble-rousers.²²⁷

In terms of context, the interrogation protocols examined in this study are products of the transitional period of the Ottoman Empire toward becoming a modern state. Different from the Islamic trials, the Tanzimat era introduced a new criminal court system and inquisitorial proceedings, which led to the birth of a new type of documentation in the 1840s, the interrogation protocols. The review system in a hierarchically organized judicial system required the arrangement of case files, which included the records of the interrogations, serving as a monitoring tool for the Supreme Council to follow previous court proceedings.²²⁸ In other words, the documents are situated in the legal centralization process of the empire. The same process also influenced the behavioral patterns of the actors, to the extent that law regulates human relations, specifically suspects and witnesses in our context. While the interrogation protocols are a product of this transition period, the way social actors responded to this period of change will be central to our study in evaluating the records at hand, as the ultimate aim is to unfold the mindset of the subaltern. In this sense, interrogation protocols need to be taken more into account in Ottoman studies to grasp the underlying social relations beneath the

²²⁵ Özkan Ezli, "Lejeune and Foucault or: A Name with No Identity," in *Autobiographical Themes in Turkish Literature: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Olcay Akyildiz, Halim Kara, and Borte Sagaster (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, Orient-Institute Istanbul, 2016), 44.

²²⁶ There are records of legal proceedings that shed light into the military deserters of the Ottoman army, who appeared in military court (*Divan-ı Harb*) after the Crimean War. Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean*, 378-379.

²²⁷ Vakalis, *Tanzimat in the Province*, 43, 130.

²²⁸ Paz, "Documenting Justice," 86, 103.

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reform politics of the Tanzimat era, as Özbek aptly underscores security practices are important in the sense that they present opportunities to observe the high politics and their effects on everyday life.²²⁹

Structured in a question-and-answer format, interrogations protocols do not imply a friendly conversation between equals, they present a battle of strategies. To make a better sense of the oral strategies at play, it is essential to acknowledge that both the questions and answers are directed at predestined ends. Along the way, both parties put their efforts to reach their goals. On the one hand, the interrogators, most likely experienced in the practice, tries to extract a confession or useful information that could lead the authorities to main culprits, based on the questions they ask and the hypotheses they fictionalize.²³⁰ In this regard, interrogations were not free-flowing, the questioner structures the conversation in its stead. What is more, examining magistrates paid extra attention to ensure that defendant did not lead the conversation. In other words, the interrogation is directed at every moment.²³¹ Initially asking the suspects why they were detained or when they left their hometown, interrogators usually allow defendants to reveal their version of events, waiting for an opportunity to intervene and expose contradictions immediately.²³² One of the interrogation protocols examined in this study vividly exemplifies this strategy and how it works. While the suspect narrates his story, the interrogator intervenes to expose contradictions. Suddenly disrupting his line of reasoning, this intervention plays a crucial role in leading the suspect to confess his seditious activities. Moreover, it can be observed that the role of the "good cop" is successfully enacted in these interrogations, as officers encourage the suspect to tell the truth by stating that "tell us

²²⁹ Nadir Özbek, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İç Güvenlik, Siyaset ve Devlet, 1876-1909," *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 16 (Güz 2004): 60-61.

²³⁰ Cevdet Pasha notes in the mid-century that there were skilled examining magistrates (*müstantik*) and clerks for criminal matters. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1960), 102.

²³¹ Even though her example is from the sixteenth century, Davis's suspicion about the unmediated character of interrogations also applies here. Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 5-6.

²³² Türker, *Alternative Claims*, 88.

everything, nothing will happen to you."²³³ On the other hand, the accused lines up his statements to reach a pre-determined outcome, eventually seeking absolution, besides hiding as much sensitive information as possible. This endeavor to deflect suspicion points to another underlying plot in any interrogation. Therefore, the interrogated is neither a passive recipient, bowing to the power driving the interrogation. Since the wording of interrogation protocols has unprecedented potential to mislead historians, it is necessary to remain alert and attentive to the legal stratagems of the accused, exculpatory efforts, along with the psychologies and emotions of both sides in each case. However, the most common discursive strategy of the subaltern, Petrov reaches out of his sample in the context of Tanzimat era in Bulgaria, is the unconditional submission to the judicial process, whatever the outcome may arise. This behavior is part of a larger defensive strategy, through which the suspect presents himself gullible rather than malevolent.²³⁴

"Credibility defense" is another recurring strategy, through which the accused strives to repel the blame onto their enemies, accusers, and accomplices. Their counterarguments, however, often times reveal the existing fault lines within a given community.²³⁵ These revelations may ultimately lead us closer to the voice of the subaltern, especially in politically motivated cases. Indeed, the present study argues that opportunities for researchers to trace the mentality of the subaltern arise through the cracks in dominant structures, which emerge in states of exception. Beyond the outdated state-society dichotomy, these cracks sometimes come about during legal processes, where the strategies of the dominant and subaltern collide, despite the enormous imbalance in power and resources at their disposal, as we must admit. In any case, the subaltern may leak certain information during the interrogative process, providing researcher with a clue to trace the interstices of the dominant discourses, especially when the

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Milen V. Petrov, "Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864–1868." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, no. 4 (2004): 747.

²³⁵ Ibid., 749.

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interrogating authority deems this leakage trivial to rivet in terms of its objectives. In our concrete case, no proof suggests that the Ottoman officials were interested in the intra-group conflicts among the revolutionaries, yet the testimony of Jusztinián was largely about these division, which were rooted in the dispute between Kossuth and Bem in 1849. These bits of information were not what the official document wanted to unfold; they were rather what the subaltern tried to reveal. This is where the psyche of the subaltern begins to unfurl, like a faint fragrance drifting through the air, one must pay close attention to discern its subtle sensation. The unintentionality endows these archival genre with authenticity while centering historical narratives on subaltern who deviated from the mainstream. To put it more bluntly, the leads to which the officials are totally indifferent may be those that the interrogation process necessarily points out, yet they are only fractures of evidence that require deeper inquiry to unveil the hidden meanings the subaltern intends to voice. Provided that subalternity is embedded in the dominant discourses, it may perfectly exist somewhere within the voids and hollows of interrogation protocols that came out of clashing strategies. Another counterproductive aspect of the clashing strategies, which represent two alternative chains of events, is to provoke the interrogated subjects to express personal emotions and opinions since questions may prompt them to think about the things they would never have considered and told otherwise, in other words, interrogation protocols could keep voices that would have fallen into silence without an external trigger. Additionally, the interrogated may sometimes accidentally blurt out something that he does not think would be harmful, supposing the focus of the context is different. In our cases, the suspects were not always aware of the accusations, they were interrogated based on "certain suspicions" (*belirli şüphelere binaen*) or "to better understand their actual status" (*ahvâl-i hakîkîsinin tetkiki*). Therefore, the protocols function to either exonerate the suspect or uncover a crime, yet as for the researcher, they may serve to center the subaltern within historical narratives, as the element of contingency lends these documents greater authenticity.

Researcher who treats interrogation protocols as historical source material must be vigilant not to fall into the tricks litigants pull. These official inquiries undoubtedly provide valuable information for researchers on a wide range of topics and themes, yet caution must never leave historian chasing them. As a matter of fact, the legal authority conducting the questioning has the power and opportunity to subject the testimonies to critical scrutiny, owing to several surveilling tools of the state, even before the historian attempts to do so. Indeed, regarding their consistencies, the statements are already critically dealt with, perhaps with additional information unknown to us, as police was entrusted with collecting evidence (interviewing witnesses, producing suspects, and eliciting confessions) with the judicial reforms of the reform era of the Ottoman Empire.²³⁶ When the interrogee speaks about others, those individuals could also be brought into confrontation with him/her when possible. The already-monitored nature of the process qualifies interrogation protocols with relative strengths compared to average ego documents, as the officers share the burden of critical examination with future historians, without even knowing.²³⁷ Besides, the presence of state authority prompts self-scrutiny on the part of the interrogee, as the panoptical effect compels the suspect to feel the necessity of behaving and testifying consistently, knowing that his words may be held against him, a sort of external touch that is nonexistent in many other ego-documents.

The said amenities embedded in interrogation protocols do not lessen the burden on the researcher to double-check, which must be pursued at every possible instance to verify the accuracy of the statements made during the interrogation, nor do they reduce the need to determine the underlying discursive strategies and the psychologies of the parties that struggle

²³⁶ Omri Paz, "The Usual Suspect: Worker Migration and Law Enforcement in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Anatolia," *Continuity and Change* 30, no. 2 (2015): 233.

²³⁷ In one of our concrete cases, this feature embedded in the interrogations process was particularly helpful. There was a turning point in the said interrogation when the interrogee admitted that his earlier statements had been made out of fear of being handed over to the Austrians, as his conflicting remarks were strategically held against him. This implied that some of his previous disclosures were misleading, prompting him to assure the questioner that he would reveal new "truths" from that point onward.

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through the questions and answers, to make a better sense of the documents. In any case, what makes self-narratives more fascinating is not their potential to reflect an unobjectionable reality; it is their ability to make us observe "how people explain their world and make sense of it, and how they define themselves in relation to other people."²³⁸ In other words, even if the narrative does not always intend to tell the truth, analyzing self-narratives is itself legitimate, as they allow us to sneak into the psyche of the sayer, encumbered with personal emotions, political visions, and survival strategies in reference to the mentalities of the larger collectivities, as these narratives inform about the self, family, and social milieu. Feelings, emotions, and values are particularly important for our investigation, as the study largely deals with the political struggles of the revolutionary converts. And political struggle "reflects the clash of passions, convictions, and systems of belief."²³⁹ Human beings do not move against the social order without the accumulated indignation. Interrogation protocols can effectively trace the strong emotions that drove individuals to rebel, especially in political cases, just as they have the potential to reveal the collective aspects of rebellion on a larger scale. Since the Ottoman authorities were more attentive to organized crime, as we will see in the coming chapters, these registers also serve as sources on the informal social networks of the revolutionaries, parallel to formal structures, including their transregional networks. Taken all together, utilizing interrogation protocols as self-narratives renders historical writings more humane, so to speak, as they introduce a personal dimension to the modernization narratives that adhere to structural explanations, without necessarily alienating larger domestic and international contexts. The personal dimension has the potential to uncover alternative political

²³⁸ Angela Heimen, "'I Can't Dress Like the Rest': Gender, Class, and Body Techniques in the Diaries of Anne Lister (1791–1840)," in *Fashioning the Self in Transcultural Settings: The Uses and Significance of Dress in Self-Narratives*, ed. Claudia Ulbrich and Richard Wittmann (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2016), 75.

²³⁹ Barrington Moore Jr, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 469.

trajectories. Indeed, the present research traces the political identities of a group of revolutionaries, exploring how they grappled with the major historical events.

The discussion so far must have already implied that the tendencies to make use of self-narratives bifurcate; "one is to view them as sources for history writing, while the other takes them as objects of study in themselves."²⁴⁰ Encompassing both approaches, the present research embraces a dialectical methodology for processing self-narratives extracted from interrogation protocols. First, they were not treated as infallible historical evidence, over which a broad scale argumentation could be built, but rather as "objects of study themselves," to understand and explain how particular historical actors perceptibly fashioned themselves in front of the legal authorities. This phase included intensive research to track down all the related archival material within a web of bureaucratic documentation and contextual evidence from the secondary sources for historically contextualizing the problem at the intersection of several national context and finally analyzing what have been said in the records at hand. The objective content of the records was not left unnoticed; while the veracity of the protagonists' statements was constantly checked against the firsthand and secondary sources, every lead was traced to better situate the subjective dimensions, which necessitated "a knowing based on intuition and imagination."²⁴¹ The second task turned out to connect seemingly anecdotal evidence to broader patterns by locating it within a wider textual and historical contexts. The aim was to move beyond isolated experiences or emotions and explore the possibility that they reflected broader social or collective dynamics. In this sense, the stories derived mainly from interrogation protocols insinuate a coherent narrative spanning from the 1840s to the 1860s, with its sub-plots, while the remaining historical material and historiographical insights functioned to support this grand narrative. In other words, while deconstructing existing grand

²⁴⁰ Sheridan, "Nostalgia of a Frustrated," 323-324.

²⁴¹ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, "Theoretical Generalization and Historical Particularity in the Comparative Sociology of Reinhard Bendix," in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 131.

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narratives, my attempt wound up formulating an alternative scheme, relying on the stories as told by the refugees and converts themselves. The individual stories then populated our model with real people and their testimonies.²⁴²

Overall, this study contends that interrogation protocols, which came to the fore with the practice of recording interrogations as part of the nineteenth-century Ottoman judicial reforms can be assessed within the category singled out as ego documents. This categorization allows for the methodological and theoretical guidance of this genre to inform the use of these archival pieces, though they have not been extensively adhered by the students of the Ottoman history, despite all their advantages. Treating these pieces as inherently unreliable hinders their possible advantages for historical research. Particularly important is their ability to offer a glimpse into the mentalities of the marginalized individuals who appeared in police headquarters and judicial courts. Inasmuch as "the interrogation protocols are *verbatim* accounts of what was said during the investigative process," argues Petrov, "these documents contain the first-person narratives of *bona fide* non-elite social actors." In that regard, they allow us to apply microhistory approach to the subaltern.²⁴³

1.3. Methodology for Alternative Epistemology: The Power of Narrative

Narrative asserts the power of men to be born, develop, and die, the tendency of institutions and actualities to change, the likelihood that modernity and contemporaneity will finally overtake "classical" civilizations; above all, it asserts that the domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a will to truth and interpretation, and not an objective condition of history. Narrative, in short, introduces an opposing point of view, perspective, consciousness to the unitary web of vision; it violates the serene Apollonian fictions asserted by vision.²⁴⁴

²⁴² Tonio Andrade, "A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord: Toward a Global Microhistory," *Journal of World History* 21, no. 4 (December 2010): 574.

²⁴³ Petrov, "Everyday Forms of Compliance," 735.

²⁴⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 240.

Ego-documents steer us towards reconstructing and narrating real-life experiences. One of the key advantages of narrative in historical studies lies in its capacity to broaden the scope of inquiry and challenge established interpretations. Life stories inherently imply transformation over time, offering fresh perspectives into the ways individuals respond to the developments around them, unless one pathologically relies on unchanging cultural conceptions and imposes these traits on individuals from an external standpoint. As we have already discussed at length, the literature reduces the *raison d'être* of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries and converts to the consolidation of predetermined/ahistorical cultural categories, thereby signaling a paradigmatic issue with *historical change*. While guiding the Ottoman Empire on the path of Westernization, according to traditional approaches, revolutionary converts did not allow themselves to be transformed, i.e., become Orientalized. Contrary to this portrayal, the application of microhistory to the refugee issue could be promising to unearth previously neglected aspects, as Edward Said distinguishes in the narrative the potential to countervail the so-called "synchronic essentialism," which attributes eternal stability to the Orient until its voluntary modernizers take the initiative to intervene.²⁴⁵ On the other hand, the revolutionary converts were also marginalized agents. The official approaches aim to discipline the masses through their discourses on the marginalized status of the converts. In contrast to their denouncement, actual human experience in everyday life conjures up compassion, making academic production more nuanced.²⁴⁶ It reminds us that historical actors must be understood as human beings, not as abstract machines. In addition to these, circumstantial narration helps us revive "the outward manifestations of the *mentalité* of the past," as well as inspires us to formulate new policy proposals for the present on their

²⁴⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 239–240. Comparative approaches fall short to overcome the tension between synchrony and diachrony. Werner and Zimmermann, "Histoire Croisée," 36.

²⁴⁶ Brad S. Gregory, "Is Small Beautiful? Microhistory and the History of Everyday Life," *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (February 1999): 101.

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steps.²⁴⁷ Despite all these advantages, however, it is no secret that social scientists are largely reluctant to endow the narration of historical particularity with anything more than subjective quality, as this method requires an active observer who interprets the matter in their own way. According to critiques, interpretative speculations can best be regarded as hypothetical and rhetorical, rather than of nomothetic. Even though Lawrence Stone nowhere asserts that historical writing in narrative form necessarily renounces its rational inquiry and realistic reconstruction, how far instantaneous snapshots, fleeting glimpses, and exceptional cases represent a more general mindset remains a legitimate and undeniable criticism.²⁴⁸ This concern also applies to the present study, which rests overwhelmingly on the human encounters extracted from ego-documents. Drawing on thick description, Stone suggests that the "searchlight method," narrating single events in elaborate detail within their full contexts, enables the analysis of broader cultural meanings through uncovering underlying symbolic patterns.²⁴⁹ At any rate, focusing on the tension between the particular and universal for our research objectives is somewhat misleading, given that the main concern is to explore the so-called deviant. However, such a defense would undoubtedly incur the wrath of Aijaz Ahmad, for whom the poor side of narrative is the limited resistance it justifies in the form of *personal* and *accidental*.²⁵⁰ The next layer of the defense regarding the problem of representation in the narrative can be gleaned from the linguistic theory. Without the signified, accordingly, the signifier cannot emerge as a meaningful symbol, though the signifier does not necessarily convey the same meaning to every audience. It often defines what something is not more effectively than what it is. In doing so, the language constrains what can be expressed, not enabling only certain ways of being to be inscribed, in turn, rendering only certain way of being

²⁴⁷ Stone, "The Revival of Narrative," 17.

²⁴⁸ Iggers, *Historiography*, 100.

²⁴⁹ Stone, "The Revival of Narrative," 13-14.

²⁵⁰ Aijaz Ahmad, "Orientalism and After: Ambivalence and Metropolitan Location in the Work of Edward Said," in *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (New York and London: Verso, 2000), 168.

possible as much as it is definable.²⁵¹ Also for Bourdieu, the representations of social agents are settled within their habitus, which produces practices and representations that are available for classification.²⁵² That is to say, first-person narratives are not ad hoc as it may sound, given the hypothesis that they are embedded in a social context that gives way to discourses.²⁵³ Every text exists within a semantic universe that profoundly shapes individual action and articulates a discourse that is inherently collective and systematic. Discourse entails a system of statements that delineates the boundaries of every speech and allocates positions to speakers, thus, "every autobiography [...] resonates of more than just one individual voice."²⁵⁴ Rather than uncritically relying on this reasoning, this study employs intertextuality to explore how individual narratives resonated within the broader web of discursive arrangement, and this conformity turned out to reveal a stunning consistency. There is an important point to make, however.

The fact that individuals borrow a certain language from the society does not preclude their ability to manipulate the existing discursive regime for their own benefit. Although expanding the scope of the research to explore more encyclopedic information is left for future studies, this volume focuses more on analyzing a particular mode of language within a specific sociopolitical context. Even the hovering of a certain discourse is significant in the last analysis because it is supposedly drawn from a pre-existing store of ideas, even if its embracers voiced it insincerely for immediate concerns. This does not mean that the social reality is completely overlooked in this work, despite the inherent tension between fact and fiction in our methodology. As the reader will see, the historical and social realities underlying the discourse were examined as much as possible. Unfortunately, however, it was not possible to study all

²⁵¹ Nikolas Rose, "Assembling the Modern Self," in *Rewriting the Self Histories from the Renaissance to the present*, ed. by Roy Porter (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 238.

²⁵² Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," *Sociological Theory* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 19.

²⁵³ Greyerz, "Ego-Documents," 276.

²⁵⁴ Ezli, "Lejeune and Foucault," 46.

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the primary and secondary sources of such a complex and transnational narrative in depth due to the constraints explained before.

The individual stories unfold a high level of transnational engagement across diverse geographies, ranging from Hungary and Poland through the Austrian, Russian, and Turkish empires to the Balkan and Italian peninsulas in the 1850s and 1860s. Their cross-border interactions made the protagonists go-betweens, who interacted with various environments amid grand transformations, within which they found themselves and on which they had influence. Predominantly born in Hungary and Poland, these revolutionaries fought for the independence of their countries against Habsburg and Tsarist rules. After their failure, they sought asylum and converted to Islam on Ottoman soil, taking part in its modernization efforts. However, their revolutionary fervor found new impetus in the patriotic wars that aimed at the unification of Italy in the early 1860s. Their presence at the intersection of mainly three national histories (Hungarian, Italian, and Turkish) interconnected underground activities across these regions. Evaluating their complex situation, which involved both in collaboration and competition with other exile groups across various geopolitical contexts, requires a more inclusive analytical framework than what the literature offers. After all, convert revolutionaries were both *trans-national* and *trans-imperial* agents, constantly circulating in and interacting with various regions. Their activities intersected not only with formal institutions and informal structures but also with cultural and ideological landscapes. While forcing these elusive rebels into rigid molds, inward-looking nation-state paradigms fall short to acknowledging their authenticity, which transpires through the porous empires. Indeed, these empires themselves facilitated their passage across geographies and their negotiations with the cultural backgrounds that came with it.²⁵⁵ Therefore, we need an analytical framework that foregrounds intense *cross-regional* interactions in the *trans-imperial* contexts, even beyond the connectivity

²⁵⁵ Judson, "Seeing the Habsburg," 224.

of the various regions within the same empires.²⁵⁶ In fact, *histoire croisée* has been increasingly gaining ground in social sciences for the last two decades, and refers to, according to Werner and Zimmerman, "one or a group of histories associated with the idea of an unspecified crossing or intersection; thus, it tends toward a mere configuration of events that is more or less structured by the crossing metaphor."²⁵⁷ Given that the agents of intercrossing (go-betweens, cultural brokers, and cultural translators) have the ability to transgress regional, national, and cultural boundaries (physical or imagined) without exclusively affiliating with any particularity intercrossed, this approach centers people as historical subjects rather than abstract and oversimplified concepts, thereby intending to enhance our understanding of complex relations and intense dialogue within the localities of imperial histories, which are fueled by polyphony on their own terms.²⁵⁸ Centering its focus on regional interactions, this methodology allows us to formulate history from below, while also avoiding narratives that reproduce cultural hierarchies of inferiority and superiority.

But which regions shall be absorbed, where to start the study and where to conclude? As much as the geographical limits are transient for mobile agents, insisting on pre-determined scales contradicts the spirit of the methodology since a foregone upper limit only narrows the potential for wider insights. Instead, concrete stories of go-betweens should tell the regional and cultural boundaries under scrutiny. As a structuring cognitive activity that shapes spatial perceptions, intercrossing requires source material to guide the research to perceive the world as the agents perceived. Therefore, its results could be less controlled, embracing wherever the experience on the ground leads. The aim is to emphasize the "inextricable interconnections"

²⁵⁶ I made this argument for the first time here İlkay Kirişçioglu, "The Travels of a Bohemian Deserter: Forging a Transnational Narrative" (paper presented at the Empire of Circulation: Habsburg Knowledge in its Global Settings, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, October 3–6, 2022).

²⁵⁷ Werner and Zimmermann, "Histoire Croisée," 31.

²⁵⁸ Judson, "Seeing the Habsburg," 224-225. Jan Surman, "Imperial Science in Central and Eastern Europe," in *Histories* 2, no. 3 (2022): 358.

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between regions, rather than rigid advocacy to either micro- or macro-level analysis.²⁵⁹ Yet there is an intrinsic vagueness in determining scale, in proportion to the immanent ambiguity in crossing. This ambiguity challenges normative frameworks (usually rooted in nation-state paradigms) more than assigning a universal scale afresh to the domains crossed. Even the most common analytical terms, such as regional and a global, are highly relative, "largely defined not by an objective scale, but rather by the situation and the perceptions it engenders."²⁶⁰ As a result, it is not difficult to recognize the element of preference on the part of researchers in placing the geographical contours of their study, though this does not absolve them of the ethical imperative to transparently disclose their choices.

The present study scales the matter according to the individual narratives at hand, though the focus had to be limited to three main surroundings: the Turkish, the Italian, Hungarian contexts. Even though our cases encompass far more transnational connections, the geographical focus reflects strategic limitations inherent to a three-year timeframe of my doctoral period. In that regard, the Habsburg implications except for the Hungarian, the Balkan reflections except for the Ottoman, the Russian and Polish connections except for the Ottoman and Hungarian contexts were not fully incorporated in this study. They were given space only as long as they supported the main arguments, due to the objective restrictions to delve further. To make a comprehensive sense of the compound composed of Hungarian, Italian, and Turkish geographies, we relied upon a Mediterranean perspective, albeit vaguely and loosely defined, as it has historically served as a contact zone between Europe, Asia, and Africa. On the micro level, this perspective serves to better understand the activities and political alignments of the Islamized Hungarian and Polish 48ers based in the Ottoman capital from the end of the 1840s to the beginning of the 1860s, yet constantly circulating across broader geographies, where

²⁵⁹ Werner and Zimmermann, "Histoire Croisée," 44.

²⁶⁰ Judson, "Seeing the Habsburg," 227.

they selectively appropriated discursive elements in transit. On the macro level, the Mediterranean perspective transcends nation-state paradigms by emphasizing transnational mobility, through which interactions and negotiations among different geographies could be recognized to eventually outgrow culturally biased interpretations. In this scheme, the port cities of the Mediterranean played crucial roles in connecting revolutionary activities across Italy and Hungary, while the Ottoman capital emerged as an epicenter that alternatively bridged these regions through the Danube River.²⁶¹ On the one hand, Constantinople began to transform into an economic colossus towering over the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Aegean, and Central Europe regions as the international trade routes shifted in the seventeenth century.²⁶² On the other hand, the Danube evolved into the major thoroughfare linking Central Europe with the Balkan Peninsula and the Middle East since the last quarter of the eighteenth century.²⁶³ Taken together, the role of Istanbul as a nexus that alternatively connects the Mediterranean basin and Central Europe through the Danube had grown more prominent in the nineteenth century, as a result of the transformative developments in trade and maritime technology.

Grounding in the long-term historical-cum-geographical framework of the Mediterranean, this study demonstrates definable connectivity that transcends the recent spatial boundaries of nation-states. It challenges Eurocentric history writing by emphasizing "co-evalness," treating different geo-cultural environments as co-temporal entities that interacted

²⁶¹ As port cities, Istanbul, Genoa, Naples, Messina, Ancona, Giurgu, Ruse, Varna, Orsova, Bucharest, Belgrade, Piraeus, Pest, and Mohács will be repeatedly mentioned in the individual narratives. To place the Mediterranean perspective especially two books were inspiring for me. Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914* (California: University of California Press, 2010). Kolluoğlu, Biray and Meltem Tokgöz, ed. *Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

²⁶² Faruk Tabak, "Economic and Ecological Change in the Eastern Mediterranean, c. 1550–1850," in *Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day*, ed. Biray Kolluoğlu and Meltem Tokgöz (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 26.

²⁶³ Constantin Iordachi, "Global Networks, Regional Hegemony, and Seaport Modernization on the lower Danube," in *Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day*, ed. Biray Kolluoğlu and Meltem Tokgöz (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 158-159, 165.

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with the one and the same global developments. Thus, it rejects the comparative research as an intellectual stance that reproduces a hierarchically dominated understanding of the East.²⁶⁴ Aptly remarking the essentializing tendency in overlooking cross-cultural negotiations, Said contends that when Oriental and Western are analyzed as the starting and the end points of analysis, the former is pushed more towards an imaginative Orient as well as the latter is constructed as an idealized Western, erasing the concrete *human encounters*.²⁶⁵ Preferring a relational approach, *histoire croisée* replaces comparative history and transfer studies, treating research objects *through one another* to foreground interconnectedness.²⁶⁶ In this framework, the idea of intercrossing displaces any singular center; that is, focusing on the encounters of the circulating actors purports to provincialize Europe, challenging its hegemony.

Even though postmodern studies have come a long way to expose and recover the "other," they remain trapped in an essentializing frame by overemphasizing cultural differences and processing them as self-contained units of analysis. This perpetuates the isolation of the downtrodden, reinforcing the illusion of inevitability, in which the notion that there is no alternative to the existing structures and hierarchies, whose elimination is a naive utopianism.²⁶⁷ The difference-induced approach runs the risk of depriving the subaltern, who are unable to speak for themselves, thus it fails to acknowledge their active participation in making history.²⁶⁸ Consequently, it thwarts our imagination for seeking alternative proposals that we are able to inspire, invent, and appropriate with the lessons of the past. Rather than merely representing the "other" in ways that reproduce and justify the binary established

²⁶⁴ Harry Harootunian, "Ghostly Comparisons," in *Impacts of Modernities*, ed. Thomas Lamarre and Kang Nae-hui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004). For the discussion of the asynchrony see Fabian Johannes, *The Time of the 'Other'* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

²⁶⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 45-46.

²⁶⁶ Johannes Feichtinger, "Introduction: Interaction, Circulation and the Transgression of Cultural Differences in the History of Knowledge-Making," in *How to Write the Global History of Knowledge-Making. Interaction, Circulation and the Transgression of Cultural Difference*, ed. Johannes Feichtinger, Anil Bhatti, and Cornelia Hülmbauer (Cham: Springer International, 2020), 12. Werner and Zimmermann, "Histoire Croisée," 38.

²⁶⁷ Mark Fisher, *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* (Hants: Zero Books, 2009), 16.

²⁶⁸ Feichtinger, "Introduction: Interaction, Circulation," 9.

categories, what is needed is to transgress the dichotomies and to focus on transnational interactions and their respective outcomes, which cannot be diminished to none of the constituents since intercrossing generates new logics. Transnational mobility is certainly productive, but it is on the researcher to interpret the resulting amalgam since intercrossing is not "already given," in other words, the creative enterprise of *an active observer* matters.²⁶⁹

While this thesis seeks to discover the ways in which different geo-cultural entities came across in the nineteenth century—through the movement of a group of itinerant insurgents—its primary focus is on interpreting the impacts of this circulation on their political identities and the corresponding ideological discourses they promoted, in other words, how they came to terms with different cultural environments. Accordingly, identity happens through human relationships, and it happens as a synthesis of an evolutionary process, in which appropriation, articulation, and reconfiguration of specific elements in different settings should be explored to grasp the identity traits of these mobile revolutionaries. The experiences of the revolutionary converts are not framed within a hierarchical logic that deduces the specific (the converts) from the universal (the mainstream). Instead, the interpretative argument must account the former in a dialectical relationship with the latter to grasp an uncontrolled trajectory of human development.²⁷⁰ According to E. P. Thompson, experience is not self-appointed, which rather *mediates* between "social being" and "social consciousness" through the filters of cultural background.²⁷¹ In this context, it is essential to interpret how the historical events unfolding between the late 1840s and the early 1860s shaped the perceptions of converts across diverse sociopolitical regions. To fully grasp their perceptions, one must first have the knowledge of objective social relations that shaped their lived experiences.²⁷² This analytical

²⁶⁹ Werner and Zimmermann, "Histoire Croisée," 39.

²⁷⁰ Ellen Kay Trimberger, "E. P. Thompson: Understanding the Process of History," in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 231.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 219-220.

²⁷² Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" 81.

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approach is particularly crucial when considering Spivak's assertion that "the subaltern cannot speak," underscoring the necessity of situating the subaltern's experiences within the broader structures that silence their voices.²⁷³ This recognition matters to assess subaltern's strategies to survive and fight back, and the political identity of the subaltern can be defined through these strategies within the formal and informal structures. To assign their struggles and appropriation calls for a meticulous examination of the evolution of their consciousness in relation to the experiences of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts across the key international and domestic events at the intersection of three state-formation processes, the Hungarian plea for freedom (1825-1867), the Tanzimat period (1839-1871), and Il Risorgimento (1848-1870), where our agents were structured and their activities were structuring in a mutually affecting relationship. In this way, this research aims to comprehensively assess the interplay between the evolving identities of the converts vis-à-vis the evolving sociocultural structures and sociopolitical institutions, lining up the critical historical moments across three national teleologies to reinterpret how these junctures impacted the perceptions of the converts, without dismissing their attempts to transform such structures. Therefore, the objective of this study extends beyond merely acquainting readers with the historical backgrounds of the empirical observations in the next chapter. For more interpretive and nuanced purposes, the coming chapter intends to trace interstices within the power structures, through which the agents navigated, besides interrogating the validity of their self-narratives in their specific historical contexts. Beyond their concrete political engagements and survival strategies, which themselves function as texts, their transformative discourse, aimed at reshaping the very political culture of which they were victims, comes into play precisely at this juncture, marking another dialectical twist of this study. Overall, while the state-making processes unfolded

²⁷³ Ibid., 104.

across three interconnected geographies and social systems (Hungary, Italy, and Türkiye), the transnational activism of the revolutionary converts proved counter-productive.

1.4. The Source of the Sources: Ottoman Imperial Archives

While demonstrating how the perspectives of modern historiography on Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees on Ottoman soil were shaped in the early twentieth century, it is underscored at the beginning of this chapter that existing scholarship reflected an anachronistic interpretation of Ottoman Archives, treating the imperial archives through the nation-state objectives. On the contrary, this study also reconsiders the perspectives on primary sources to better endorse transnational research. In fact, we have already discussed the nature of the main source on which the present research relies to draw its conclusions; interrogation protocols, treated under the umbrella term, ego document, as well as how we process them and for what purposes. However, where the archival material was obtained, how specific pieces were selected, and the way these documents informed our narrative equally require clarification not only to present the reader with our way of handling the archives in alignment with the research objectives but also to emphasize the practical value of Ottoman Archives for pursuing transnational histories of nineteenth-century Europe. After all, this study touches upon certain records within these archives that preserve the Ottoman entanglements with the Italian Risorgimento through the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries.

To begin with, Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of State Archives, physically located in Istanbul but largely accessible online, stand out as the primary source for studying the Hungarian and Polish 48ers in Ottoman territories due to their intensive

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interactions with the imperial bureaucracy.²⁷⁴ On the one hand, several of these refugees were employed in various branches of the Ottoman state upon converting to Islam. On the other hand, some of them acted in cooperation with Italian revolutionaries, especially between 1858 and 1862. This engagement caused the Ottoman bureaucrats to coin the term "the Garibaldi Squad" or "the Garibaldi Brigade" o (*Garibaldi Takımı*). Therefore, one should also go over the documents linked to Garibaldi to trace down the activities of the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries (in the early 1860s) who sought refuge in the empire (in the late 1840s). It is no secret that Garibaldi had a keen intent on liberating the Southern Slavs in collaboration with his Hungarian and Polish companions. The Adriatic shores of the Balkans could serve as a strategic base for incursions into Hungary from the Italian peninsula, calling the compatriots in arms against the Austrian rule, which were increasingly wary of the Slavic movements. According to the Sardinian establishment, collaboration with the Hungarians in the Balkans was a tactical move to put more pressure on the Habsburg rule through its southeastern flank. Subsequent to the Crimean War, Turin increasingly saw in the region an opportunity to establish a sphere of influence. That is to say, the Balkans constituted a flashpoint in the context of the relationship between Türkiye and Italy in the 1860s. Located at the crossroads of the Ottoman, Romanov, and Habsburg empires, the region offered fresh opportunities for insurgents from different walks. Vice versa, scholars investigating the Risorgimento phenomenon within Ottoman archival collections should expand their focus to include registers related to Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries in the Balkans to uncover indirectly kept records. Tracing revolutionary linkages between the Italian and Balkan peninsulas on Ottoman archival records via the experiences of Hungarian and Polish refugees who sought refuge in the Sublime State is one of the extraordinary findings of this study.

²⁷⁴ Formerly known as "Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives" [*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri* (BOA)], the official name of the institution is currently "Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of State Archives" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı*).

As a rule, the Ottoman archival collection harbors a huge variety of documentation about the Italian Risorgimento in general and its most renowned protagonist, Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882), in particular. It is safe to suggest that he drew greater attention than the other three founders of modern Italy in the eyes of the Tanzimat rulers, given that the Ottoman state machine generated far more documents about him than the rest, including Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), Camillo Benso Count of Cavour (1810-1861), and Vittorio Emanuele II of Savoia (1820-1878). The main reason for this pile of papers once circulated within the bureaucracy lies in the symbolic meaning of what the Ottomans represented vis-à-vis what Garibaldi did. By the nineteenth century, the empire stood as a multi-ethnic and non-secular empire ruled by hereditary monarchs, whose very existence was more and more under the threats of the newly spreading ideas, of which Garibaldi was an illustrious advocate. Since any influx of liberal/nationalist ideas into the Sultan's realm posed a significant hazard, which could have severe outcomes for the imperial order, the Italian revolutionary emerged as a source of considerable concern for Ottoman statesmen, particularly in the beginning of the 1860s.

The Ottoman "affection" for Garibaldi peaked between 1859 and 1862, when officials suspected that he could initiate a military expedition in the Balkans. Such a campaign was expected to take place through the eastern shores of the Adriatic to stir upheavals in the Balkans in cooperation with the Hungarian, Romanian, Serbian, and Bulgarian secret societies. Nevertheless, transnational cooperation was not one-sided privilege of the freedom fighters, imperial centers did not fail to adopt new governmentality techniques in collaboration with each other. The Ottoman state closely surveilled all the revolutionary activities in its territories as much as possible, often collaborating with its contenders, the Habsburg and Tsarist empires, partly due to shaped imperial impulses. The result is the substantial volume of correspondence about the underground activities of transnational movements that either operated within or traversed imperial domains during the Tanzimat era. It is precisely in this context that the

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Hungarian and Polish refugees of 1848 re-entered on the agenda of the Porte in the early 1860s, in consonance with the revolutionary activities in Italy. Below, we give a concise overview of the Risorgimento in Ottoman Archives, though archives from other contexts could be promising for a more complete picture of these multi-directional and multi-focal agents, in spite of their exclusion in this study.

At this moment, when a researcher types the keyword "Garibaldi" into the electronic database of Ottoman Archives, almost two hundred results forthwith show up.²⁷⁵ Still, this does not mean that all the results are directly linked to the activities around him. To illustrate, some results relate to his sons, Menotti and Ricciotti, and their activities in the Balkans, as the fin de siècle of the empire was on the stage, while some registers are about a ship named after the hero.²⁷⁶ Therefore, it is misleading to assume that all the documents in Ottoman Archives entitled *Garibaldi* directly concern the general himself or the activities surrounding him. A diametrically opposed judgment applies too. It is equally misleading to suppose that records bearing Garibaldi's name in their titles fully cover all the documentation about this famous historical figure, his accomplices, or the overall activities around him in the Ottoman territory. The odds of running into far more evidence kept under different titles and funds are high, especially given the chaotic nature of the archives. In addition, evidence about revolutionary groups operating on behalf of Garibaldi within the domains of the empire is perplexing in the sense that all activities attributed to this name may not always correspond to the same cause, organization, and participants. In this sense, Garibaldian committee appears more like an umbrella term that refers to different revolutionary agendas at different times. Whereas one can easily find references to a Garibaldian committee in the early 1860s, aiming to stir a revolution in the Balkans; another group of revolutionaries is mentioned to refer to the war efforts against

²⁷⁵ For the electronic database see <https://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/>

²⁷⁶ There are also results whose historical relevance is completely unknown to me, such as Adolf, Gerolamo, Antonio, Katerina, and Bogos.

Austria around 1866. Again, some other Garibaldians, led by the hero's sons, were active in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1900s. In other words, references to Garibaldi in Ottoman Archives can be remarkably diverse in terms of their contexts and contents. Garibaldi's presence spanned the Italian peninsula during the Revolutions of 1848 and the Expedition of the Thousand in 1860, the Balkan peninsula in the early 1860s, Austrian-controlled Trentino during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and Alsace Lorraine during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Amid expanding bureaucratic documentation during the state of exceptions, the Porte became attuned to the Garibaldians whenever an instability hit Southern and Central Europe, though the nature of this substantial volume of records is unknown to researchers. The documents explicitly bearing the name of the liberator represent only a tiny fraction of the whole, much like the tip of an iceberg, and the archival records are so dispersed that it is almost impossible to assign a full-fledged inventory to them. Despite these challenges, this study attempts to sketch a picture, though incomplete, of the situation of the Turkish state archives on the Italian Risorgimento, particularly around 1860. Not only was his role in the unification process at its peak in this period, but also the revolutionary activities of Hungarian and Polish 48ers on his behalf on Ottoman soil flourished.

Before everything else, we should decide on the historical period this archival inquiry will cover while surveying the documents about Italian unification. The most reasonable choice for our study appears to be the interval between 1848/1849 and 1870/1871, as Maria Tirelli did before this study.²⁷⁷ The former marks the Springtime of Nations in Italy, beginning with the riots in Sicily in 1848. The revolutionary wave came to an end with the defeat of the Roman Republic and soon after the surrender of the Venetian Republic in 1849. The latter stretches the period to 1870, when Rome was captured, culminating in the Risorgimento process.

²⁷⁷ Maria Chiara Tirelli, *The Unification of Italy as Seen Through the Ottoman Diplomatic Correspondences (1848–1870)* (PhD diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018).

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Vittorio Emanuele II made his way to the city to effect the long-awaited takeover in 1871. Even though the Risorgimento period started to become more attached to Ottoman lands through political exiles fleeing the Italian peninsula after the Revolutions of 1830, this study focuses more on how these exiles laid the groundwork for the next wave of refugees arriving with the Revolutions of 1848. Indeed, the generation of 48 was more decisive in the formation of the modern Italian state. In line with that, this survey primarily concentrates on the archival material from the Italian unification process, in which Garibaldi was strongly implicated, meaning that our venture is not to give a thorough description of the unification process according to Ottoman sources. Rather, its narrower scope places special emphasis on Garibaldi's both evident and shadowy appearances within the bureaucratic correspondences of the Sublime State. Focusing on this persona also complies with our methodology, given his unique capacity to bring different national histories together. Since this research is imbued with state formation processes, mainly in Italy, Hungary, and Türkiye, the cross-national periodization (1848/1849-1870/1871) needs to synchronize the pivotal eras shaping their respective trajectories. This framework captures the overlap of three transformative processes:

A. The Tanzimat Era (1839–1871): It is the restructuring period of the Ottoman Empire toward centralization under the leaderships of Mustafa Reşid (1800-1858), Keçecizade Mehmed Fuat Paşa (1814-1868), and Mehmed Emin Âli Paşa (1815-1871).

B. The Risorgimento Phenomenon (1848–1871): It signifies the emergence of a new nation state, though this periodization focuses on the events, in which Garibaldi increasingly played important roles from the Revolutions of 1848 to the capture of the Eternal City in 1871.

C. Hungarian Reform Era and Struggle for Independence (1825-1867): This period starts with the Reform Age in Hungary, culminating in the Revolutions of 1848. Even though the leadership of Kossuth was powerful in this phase, the period ended with the integration of the Hungarians into the Dual Monarchy, against the wishes of the revolutionary hero.

Garibaldi's global fame provides a connective thread across these histories, intersecting not only with the unification of Italy, but also the revolutionary networks of Hungarian and Polish exiles in the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, our preference between 1848 and 1871 is

integrative enough to include the intersection of three historical episodes. Besides the historical rationale, there is one more justification for this preference, stemming from the objective conditions of the archives. The collections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ottoman Archives well preserve the ministerial correspondences between 1848 and 1870, because record-keeping in the modern sense began under the initiation of Mustafa Reşid in 1846.²⁷⁸

My point of departure is the collections of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, under whose auspices most of the records relevant to this work were produced. The ministry constituted the first point of contact between the Risorgimento phenomenon and the Ottoman state, if not its society, through letters (*tahrirat, müzekkire, ariza*), which contain first-hand impressions and interpretations of the diplomatic representatives in major Italian cities (as well as other European capitals). It was through these envoys the perception of the Risorgimento for the Ottomans began to be shaped. Their communications were important in the sense that the foreign ministry was a window through which the internal bureaucracy was seeing the developments in Italy. For this reason, while processing these diplomatic notes, researcher must be sober to the possible biases that stem from the prejudices, inabilities, and personal feelings of the diplomats. For a better interpretation of their reports, it is important to get to know the diplomats themselves who conveyed their impressions to the center, to determine their political allies within the bureaucratic network, and to have an understanding of their private interests.

The first body of collection we should dwell on is the Documents of the Foreign Ministry (*Hariciye Nezareti Belgeleri*). This collection is a good place to start, because the Porte was the center of action and power during Tanzimat period. Founded in 1251/1835, the ministry carried out its duties in harmony with the Prime Ministry until 1295/1878, only after

²⁷⁸ Atillâ Çetin, "Osmanlı Arşivciliğine Toplu Bir Bakış," *Türk Kütüphaneciler Derneği Bülteni* 33, No. 2 (1984): 56-57.

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which it functioned as an independent institution.²⁷⁹ In other words, the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were functioning in an intertwined/interdependent manner.

Within the collection of the Foreign Ministry, the first fund is the Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry (*Mektubî Kalemi Belgeleri*, classified as HR.MKT). The secretariat can be considered the heart of the ministry, crucial to organizing all the correspondences and their distribution to the related state branches.²⁸⁰ Thus, it involves documents from and to a wide range of state branches, such as provincial governorships (*vilayet*), embassies (*sefaretname*), councils and commercial attachés (*konsolos* and *şehbender*), as well as other internal ministries (*nezaret*). In the context of our research, most of the documents in this fund address issues related to the administrative conducts of diplomatic envoys in the Italian peninsula, rewards endowed to Italian citizens living in the Ottoman territory, and economic disputes between the Ottoman and Italian subjects. That being said, there is a general belief that secondary issues are generally kept in this collection, as more significant matters, such as the issues related to political developments and wars, are held in the archival funds specifically designated for them.²⁸¹ Nonetheless, labeling this body of collection as merely secondary does not translate into nonimportance. Given the immense size of the volume, I only scanned those that directly reference Garibaldi in their titles, spanning from July 1860 (Zilhicce 1276) to April 1862 (Şevval 1278), which are foremost related to the present study. Accordingly, the documents related to the Italian unification in line with Garibaldi's involvement can be found in the following boxes: 341, 353, 359, 360, 361, 362, 365, 368, 369, 373, 376, 385, 386, 389, 391, 392, 393, 396, 397, and 458. Additionally, there are dossiers 458, 477, 489, 505, 572, 688, 757,

²⁷⁹ Yusuf Sarıınay, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi* (İstanbul: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2010), 379-380.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 381.

and 851, which contain documents related to the hero from October 1863 (Cemazilevvel 1280) to June 1874 (Şaban 1291).²⁸²

After the collection of the Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry, we can move to the documents found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Political Division (Hariciye Nezareti-Siyasî Kısım, classified as HR.SYS). This is the most elaborated fund within the collection of the ministry, encompassing correspondences related to the domestic and foreign political events.²⁸³ These documents can be found in a wide range of languages besides Ottoman Turkish, yet reading proficiency in Ottoman Turkish to process them is in any case *conditio sine qua non*. It can be possible to find translated drafts of diplomatic documents written in foreign languages (mostly in French, but sometimes in German and Italian too), though the documents in Turkish are not always translated into European languages. Besides, having a good paleographic knowledge is important to track the adventures of these documents across governmental departments. For instance, prospective research should know the internal working of the departments and the specific signs and notes on the official documents that say much about their immediate treatments. The ministry was the first entry of many documents on international affairs; thus, tracing any lead across different governmental branches necessitates advance language skills and archival experience. Let us first identify those files that are fully relevant to the Italian Risorgimento. Boxes 768, 769, 770, 771, and 772 are composed of missives (all titled "İtalya'da Siyasi Durum" [The Political Situation in Italy]), posted by Ottoman diplomats in Italy from 1859 to 1871. These are mostly written in French. From 782 to 789, reports and commentaries on the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 and its aftermath are predominantly visible. Box 793 is entirely about the Italian press from 1851 to 1880, while the 808 has sixty-five miscellaneous documents about Italy from 1838 to 1878. As

²⁸² A basic note: Each box usually contains around one hundred files in this collection. The number of documents per file varies, ranging from one page to a few hundreds.

²⁸³ Ibid., 385.

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Maria puts it, part of this collection has been published by Sinan Kuneralp. Those published are in the collections HR. SYS. of 768, 771, 772, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, and 789.²⁸⁴

The collection of the political division has many other first-hand registers about the Italian unification in the following boxes: 121, 124, 125, 126, 132, 157, 156, 158, 171, 173, 174, 176, 207, 208, 907, 1710, 1955, and 2929. These are the direct results that have the name of Garibaldi in their titles, yet the wide interval between 121 and 2929 should already be apparent to the readers. It must also be emphasized that there can be found records of the Italian and Hungarian involvement in the boxes between these numbers (especially between 120 and 156) in line with the developments in the Balkans. From 156 to 158, one can reach evidence about the bilateral relationships of the Ottomans with the Habsburgs from 1854 to 1866 with a special emphasis on the port-city of Trieste. The records from 172 to 174 are essentially related to the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, but there can be found hundreds of registers about the Italian involvement and the Garibaldian volunteers (in cooperation with the Hungarian revolutionaries who resided in the Ottoman Empire), who attempted to take an active role in the war that ultimately led to the cession of Venetia to Italy. Files 903 to 907 are all about the Crimean War, which is also relevant to Risorgimento studies, as it marked the first time the Italian cause earned international recognition.

After HR.SYS, the most significant part of the collections of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry for the present study is the Translation Office Registers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası Evrakı*). These registers give insights into how the Ottoman state translated the developments in Europe, often setting the bureaucratic priorities of the Porte. This fund consists of translated drafts written in languages other than Turkish, official dispatches from both Ottoman and foreign embassies and consulates, as well as letters

²⁸⁴ Tirelli, *The Unification of Italy*, ix. For Kuneralp's book see Sinan Kuneralp, ed., *L'Empire ottoman et l'Europe: Documents diplomatiques ottomans sur l'unification italienne*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: ISIS, 2009).

of the Ottoman and non-Ottoman subjects to the Porte. In brief, this fund harbors translations of documents mostly regarding external affairs.²⁸⁵ However, it is necessary to remind the reader that it would be a grave mistake to consider these as mere translations of the documents preserved in the previously mentioned funds, nor are the translations always literal and complete. In other words, treating them as mere linguistic transfer risks overlooking the ideological and administrative filters that shaped the bureaucratic narration. According to my observations, the Tanzimat rulers were conversant with the diplomatic language, even some of them hailed from the translation office, and they usually took immediate action without necessarily waiting for the translations held, which took some time. File 37 within the Translation Office Registers has dispatches sent to the center by the Belgian legation, some of which are directly related to the Italian unification, though prior to the war of 1859. In files 54 and 55, there are notes penned by Kostaki Musurus (1807-1891), who was in London at the time as an envoy. He seems to have reported unregistered gun trafficking activities orchestrated by the Sardinian government, flowing from Italy to the Ottoman territories to be delivered to the Garibaldini. Between 69 and 71 there are diplomatic notes sent from the bourbon city of Naples in 1857. The documents ranging from 99 to 103 span from 1856 to 1871, in which it is possible to come across hundreds of translations coming from Italy, including diplomatic missives sent from the cities of Turin, Naples, Genoa, Palermo, Florence, Messina, and Ancona. When we examine HR.TO 160 (July 1858–December 1860), 161 (May 1860–December 1862), 162 (February 1862–December 1864), 163 (February 1864–May 1866), and 164 (May 1866–December 1871), we find substantial records, directly related to this dissertation, corresponding to those involved in revolutionary activities on behalf of Garibaldi in the beginning of the 1860s. These files do not particularly refer to the Italian liberation; rather, they broadly comprise correspondences between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires

²⁸⁵ Sarııay, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi*, 386.

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(this series of registers starts with box 149 from the year 1845). On the other hand, there are boxes within the Translation Office documents that fully deal with the Risorgimento, such as 275, 276, and 277, covering the period from 1861 to 1870. Additionally, there are other files, namely 296, 297, 304, and 305, which contain disorganized documents about Italy from 1847 to 1870. Finally, there are some other boxes that include only a tiny fraction of documents about Italy. Whereas it is not possible to list all of these due to the unknown scope, it may still be useful to highlight the detected boxes; 313, 314, 316, 317, 318 (more extensively), 320, 322, 323, 324, 410, 580, 568, and 613. Some of these have mixed *arizas* coming from the consuls in different parts of Europe, Italy included.

Is that all? The answer is clearly no. The Foreign Ministry was just the beginning, from which the production of follow-up correspondences in terms of the Italian Risorgimento and Garibaldi within the bureaucracy started, and from there, these documents started to be circulated through the labyrinths of the internal bureaucracy. In other words, these records do not exist in isolation, and it is necessary to place each document within an interdependent network of documentation to have a better understanding of the unification period (from 1848 to 1870) in Ottoman Archives. That is to say, archival material about Garibaldi and his comrades can always be found in collections beyond those of the Foreign Ministry. Thus, it does not seem possible and feasible to give the full picture of Garibaldi's revolutionary activities and the Italian Risorgimento in Ottoman Archives, though we will just sketch a brief picture of the material we found in the funds of the Sublime Porte, the central organization for coordinating the state's policies.

The Secretariat of the Sublime Porte Chancery Documents Pertaining to General Province (*Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Umum Vilayet Yazışmalarına Ait Belgeler*, classified as A.MKT.UM), a fund that consists of letters circulated between the central and provincial

governance.²⁸⁶ This collection also encapsulates the correspondence between the Porte and provincial authorities, offering critical insights into how the imperial center translated the developments in the Italian peninsula into administrative directives and judicial actions for the provinces of the empire. This fund is organized chronologically based on the dates of the documents. While searching for a specific case within the Foreign Ministry's collections, it is useful to cross-reference the coinciding materials in this fund to identify relevant records of the case under scrutiny since it is not practical to manually review all the boxes and to see which could be relevant. Suffice it to say that the boxes between 416 and 574 pertain only to the year 1277 (1860/1861). Thus, it is not possible to go through all the documents from 1848 to 1870, including enormous registers. For now, I have identified in this fund only one certain case about Garibaldi's relations to the Bar coasts of Montenegro in the following boxes: 537, 541, 548, and 551.

Catalogued based on the reform that separated the provinces from the ministries in the registration system in 1266/1849-1850, the second fund to look at is the Sublime Porte Chancery Documents Pertaining to the Correspondences of Ministries and Offices (*Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Nezâret ve Devâir Yazışmalarına Ait Belgeler*, classified as A.MKT.NZD), which contains correspondences between the Porte and the ministries, as well as other offices located in Istanbul.²⁸⁷ Again, it is not feasible to go through all the documents one by one, but it can be noted that boxes 1 and 390 have registers about Garibaldi himself. Furthermore, the Sublime Porte Chancery Registers of Important Affairs (*Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Mühimme Kalemi (Odası) Belgeleri*, classified as A.MKT.MHM), are about the most urgent issues such as uprisings, earthquakes, border disputes, wars, famine, and settlement.²⁸⁸ Box numbers 241, 360, and 377 have some records about Garibaldi from 1279/1862-63 to 1283/1866-67. These

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 315.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 316.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 314.

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records are generally about individuals engaging revolutionary activities in the Balkans while using Garibaldi's reputation. The dates should have already caught the attention of the reader; 1862 and 1866 were the years when the activities carried out under his name in the Balkans reached their peak. In addition, another fund I focus on is the Sublime Porte Chancery Registers of Important Affairs of the Imperial Council (*Sadâret Divan-ı Hümayûn Mühimme Kalemi Belgeleri*, A.DVN.MHM), which deals with the most important and secret registers of the Imperial Council (*Divân-ı Hümayûn*). This office is commissioned to prepare instructions (*hüküm*), charters (*berat*), and safe conducts (*mürur tezkiresi*).²⁸⁹ Box 16 in this collection is about the Crimean War, containing documents about Sardinian involvement.

Lastly, we need to look at the *irâdes*, whose literal translation is "will," referring to the decrees and orders of the Sultan in Ottoman paleography.²⁹⁰ After 1832, the Sultan's chief secretary (*Serkâkib-i Şehriyârî*) became the person in the name of whom *arz tezkiresi* (petition of the Grand Vizier addressed to the Sultan) was addressed. The secretary read the letter aloud before the Sultan, who would express his opinion in return. This opinion was then dictated by the secretary on the same document.²⁹¹ As a result, this treatment was the last stage of the important bureaucratic processes, particularly concerning high politics. In this regard, Imperial Decree Foreign Affairs (*Îrâde-Hariciye*, classified as İ.HR) is the collection containing the Sultan's instructions in terms of the foreign affairs. Within this fund, there are several boxes, such as 174, 175, 176, 181, 195, 196, and 333, containing records about Garibaldi. From these, we can deduce how the Ottoman government was occupied with underground activities during the years 1276-1278 (1859-1862), in response to the developments in the Italian peninsula. Similarly, since a complete examination of all the functions of the *Îrade* collections would require a much more extensive study, we can limit ourselves to merely suggesting that

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 311.

²⁹⁰ Mübahat Kütükoğlu, "Îrâde-i Seniyye," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 22 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2000), 391.

²⁹¹ Sarıay, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi*, 299-300.

researchers should simultaneously consult other related *İrade* funds within the same period of their concrete cases. This would also give important clues about the previous treatments of the same case within the bureaucracy.

It should be underlined that Ottoman Archives have not been fully classified, the efforts to this end are still ongoing. This means that there could be many more unearthed documents about our research objectives at the time of this survey, yet still, there is already an extraordinary documentation about the unification of Italy, one of its principal agents (Garibaldi), and his associates in the empire. This pile of papers leads us to consider the potential uses of Ottoman Archives for the benefit of global history. Drawing from the self-narratives that reveal the transnational engagements of Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries in the Sublime State with the Italian and Balkan committees, this study highlights that Ottoman sources are promising for conducting transnational research across Southern, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe. In this sense, tracing the formal and informal networks of go-betweens via these archives appears highly productive, including diplomatic missions, overland and oversea merchants, political exiles, refugees, and displaced populations, as well as travelers and adventurers circulating across a vast range of geographies, from distant regions such as the Mediterranean basin, Arabic-speaking Middle East until the Indian Ocean, the northern Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Emphasizing that the empire once ruled over a vast landmass of fourteen million square kilometers across three continents, from which nearly forty different nation-states emerged, and that the primary sources for these national histories are predominantly preserved in its imperial archives is hardly a spectacular claim. Let alone it is a logical outcome; researchers have consistently emphasized the richness of Ottoman archival sources for studies covering various geographies across time. Nevertheless, our observations show that the application of these archives could well be extended beyond the national histories of the territories once dominated by the Porte. Although neither Italy nor Hungary was under

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Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century, this study partly explores the relationship between the revolutionary movements that emerged in these regions. This comprehensive insight into the imperial archives would contribute to the development of alternative perspectives that transcend cultural essentialisms. For researchers outside the field of Ottoman history, Ottoman sources often remain an uncharted territory for global history, largely due to the paleographic challenges they present, despite the potential contributions of these sources. After all, it requires an investment in a geographically distant, unfamiliar paleography, and culture, with a potentially lateral contribution whose immediate return is not easily foreseen. Thus, it would not be going too far to say that the global entanglements of the Ottoman history have not been adequately represented so far. However, their exploitation should not be a privilege reserved for Ottomanists, as history is interconnected as much as contested. The fact that the empire interacted with a vast geography makes its archives both qualitatively and quantitatively resourceful for transnational and trans-imperial studies beyond its borders, particularly when the focus is on the geographic hubs and mobile intermediaries that facilitated wider interactions.²⁹²

²⁹² This was the revised version of my paper presented at the following gathering: İlkey Kirişcioğlu, "The Possible Uses of Ottoman Archives for Writing the History of Central Europe" (paper presented at *Turkish Studies Working Meeting*, Aix-Marseille University and CIVIS, European Civic University, Aix-en-Provence, September 15–16, 2022).

Chapter 2

Hinterlands

This chapter is devoted to analyzing specific historical processes that influenced the behavior of a group of revolutionaries who operated in the Ottoman capital in the 1860s. Introducing these processes will help us examine how these revolutionaries navigated the political and social landscape of their time, seeking not only to respond to the social forces at play but also to actively shape the course of the same processes. In this sense, the central aim is to comprehensively assess the *evolution* of their psyche at the personal level in relation to the simultaneous social and legal *transitions* primarily across three national contexts, while these grand transformations interacted with one another at transnational level. That is to say, the historical processes do not merely serve as a passive historical background to illuminate the discussions in subsequent chapters; the transformations in power relations at macro-level and the identity transformations of refugees at the micro-level are taken as interactive processes. This method does not merely aim to add theoretical sophistication to the subject. Since it is difficult to postulate that these revolutionaries achieved a breakthrough in any single national narrative, their presence remained off the main tracks of the histories of Hungary, Poland, Türkiye, Italy, and even the Balkan states they engaged with. In this sense, they were neither absorbed into any coherent national historiography nor were kept wholly out of them, while remaining a bugging existence without being ubiquitously pronounced as such. Therefore, any endeavor to cast some light on their independent agency calls for analyzing state formation projects in the individual historical settings that did not appropriate their

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presence without reservation. In effect, concentrating on the "fractures" within each "coherent" national teleology leads to a liminal pattern at their intersection. Things that have been said thus far prompt us to take a deeper look at the corresponding *hinterlands*, customarily defined by national terms, not simply to set the stage for the themes and events that followed this study but to reassemble a new order of things. Given that these individuals actively interacted with these overlapping processes, this chapter will help us understand the interplay of multiple frameworks that generated an unorthodox culture—unorthodox only in hindsight, while the restoration of their agency will give us some insights into their engagements with these multiple landscapes in return. This part of the study necessarily limits itself to the state making processes in Hungary, Italy, and Türkiye (the Ottoman Empire), in proportion to their relevance of our subject matter in the context of all-embracing Age of Capital (1848-1875), where omnipresent liberal ideology determined the contour of the semantic world.²⁹³ Starting with Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849, the origins of the posthumous schism between Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894) and Józef Bem (1794-1850) within the *constitutional* movement will be explored based on personal and social dimensions. The gulf between their respective factions would be destined to irrevocably diverge in parallel with the issue of conversion in exile, and the fracture will offer a new direction to its adherents since the revolutionary converts were incorporated into the *restructuring* state apparatus of the Ottoman Empire, where the modern state was under construction in the Tanzimat Era (1839-1871). Around a decade later, both processes intersected with the *unification* of Italy across the Adriatic Sea, where another difference of opinion between Camillo Benso Count of Cavour (1810-1861) and Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) took root, and the Hungarian and Polish 48ers chose their sides. Our survey of the Risorgimento will complete the contextualization of

²⁹³ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital: 1848–1875* (London: Abacus, 1995), 129.

the highly convoluted labyrinths at the intersection of major transformations in various but interconnected settings, through which the converts sought to find their ways.

2.1. The Hungarian War of Independence of 1848-1849: Kossuth's Way

Hungarian demands for liberation from Habsburg repression go back to the end of the eighteenth century, when they started to obtain a nationalist character.²⁹⁴ The efforts of an enlightened monarch to set the peasantry free in Hungary yielded no immediate result in the face of the strong opposition of the local nobility, whose vested interests were deeply at risk.²⁹⁵ If not because of that, Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor, is notoriously remembered in the national narratives even today more with his autocratic-centralist policies that aimed to reduce Hungary to a mere dominion the empire. The Hungarian Reform Era (1825-1848) was a response to these policies, seeking to counter the suppression of the identity resulted from Vienna's centralizing measures, which imposed a melting pot from above. A major objective of the new generation of intellectuals turned out to keep the native language alive and make it official within the country, as German had been put into effect as the sole official language in 1784. The efforts of these intellectuals resulted in a literary surge, aiming at reforming the vernacular, standardizing the language, and expanding its lexicon.²⁹⁶ Reflecting the romantic nationalist vision, these youngsters were increasingly preferring Paris and Berlin for education over Vienna since 1830, corresponding to a transformative moving away.²⁹⁷

For centuries, the nobility in Hungary had fallen into two estates: the higher nobility (magnates/aristocrats), who used titles such as prince, count, or baron, and the lesser nobility,

²⁹⁴ Laszlo Deme, "Writers and Essayists and the Rise of Magyar Nationalism in the 1820s and 1830s," *Slavic Review* 43, no. 4 (1984), 625.

²⁹⁵ Stephen Lee, *Aspects of European History 1494-1789*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1984), 190.

²⁹⁶ Deme, "Writers and Essayists," 626.

²⁹⁷ Ferenc Eckhart, *Macaristan Tarihi*, 2nd ed., trans. İbrahim Kafesoğlu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2010), 185.

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who were deprived of titles and often possessed little or no land.²⁹⁸ The aristocracy did not have a homogenous ethnic outlook nor did the population, both were part of the multinational Habsburg Empire.²⁹⁹ During the Reform Era, large estate owners, comprising about five percent of the population, were the primary controller of the whole country, ninety percent of the total land mass.³⁰⁰ Prior to the Revolutions of 1848, Hungary was not a country with a developed industrial sector, restrictions on land ownership left little room for upward mobility, hence no considerable bourgeois class. The social panorama of the country found comparable representation in the legislative organ, only some 700,000 nobles enjoyed political privileges via the Hungarian Diet (composed of the Upper House and the locally elected representatives, both seated in Bratislava) in the absence of industrial and commercial activities.³⁰¹ The political nation (*natio hungarica*), thus, meant the nobility, the Catholic clergy, and the newly emerged middle class (like burghers).³⁰² Parallel to this social composition, the demand for change came from two sources: the poverty stricken lesser nobility and their selective backers among the higher nobility. Although the aristocrats were largely unresponsive to the liberal agitation, a fraction supported the cause, reminding the self-transformation of the higher classes as to the changing circumstances given their privileged positions at stake. In fact, their commitment was vital for the business because no possibility of progress could have existed had not their financial, political, and moral support been secured.³⁰³ Yet there were still limitations to their transformism, their tone was destined to remain milder compared to the lesser gentry, which

²⁹⁸ Istvan Deak, *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 4.

²⁹⁹ Alexander Maxwell and Alexander Campbell, "István Széchenyi, the Casino Movement, and Hungarian Nationalism, 1827–1848," *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 3 (2014): 510.

³⁰⁰ Deme, "Writers and Essayists," 625.

³⁰¹ Pál Fodor, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Macar Reform Hareketleri ve 1848-49 Devrimi," in *Doğumunun 200. Yıldönümünde Lajos Kossuth: 1848-49 Macar Özgürlük Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri Sempozyumu, Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 15 Mart 2002*, ed. Celal İnal and Naciye Güngörmüş (Kütahya: Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2002), 45. Laszlo Deme, "The Society for Equality in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848," *Slavic Review* 31, no. 1 (1972), 71.

³⁰² The rest was just plebs. Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 3. The burghers were in no way equivalents to the bourgeoisie of Western Europe. *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 6.

inclined to follow a radical track for emancipating the society from the feudal order. As a result, the legislative body translated into an arena, where the newly emerging liberal-nationalist ideas appeared on the stage at the beginning of the 1830s, resulting from the high pressure put by the reformist aristocrats inside and the radical nobles outside the Diet.³⁰⁴

One intellectual came to the forefront to the highest level, Count István Széchenyi (1791-1860), who contributed to the formation of the modern Hungarian nation not only with his intellectual endeavor but also with his wealth and organizational capacity. Known as "the greatest Hungarian," Széchenyi founded The Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1825, and soon after inspired the Casino Movement, which was crucial for creating a unified public sphere, crossing class differences.³⁰⁵ Descending from high nobility, he was the most prominent Hungarian nationalist thinker of his time, whose ideas manifested conservative tendencies because he envisaged a bourgeoisie transformation in collaboration with the Habsburg Court, not against it. Nevertheless, the most celebrated national figure would soon to be Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894), a journalist and landless noble with surprisingly Slavic and Protestant descent, who gradually took up the nationalist agenda and finally played a key role in abolishing serfdom in the revolutionary era.³⁰⁶

At the dawn of the Revolution of 1848, Hungary was the weakest spot of the Habsburg administration and order, conflicts between them were perennial; the news of the Parisian uprising in February quickly spurred a wind of change in the capital of Hungary, and Kossuth eloquently pushed for a liberal reform program in the Diet on March 3. His proposals included the abolishment of serfdom, convening of a national parliament, and enlarging civil liberties. While the revolutionary wave spread to the imperial center on March 13, the young generation of activists in Buda and Pest publicized the liberal demands in twelve points two days later and

³⁰⁴ Deme, "Writers and Essayists," 639.

³⁰⁵ Maxwell and Campbell, "István Széchenyi," 508-509.

³⁰⁶ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 8-9. John Bassett Moore, "Kossuth: A Sketch of a Revolutionist. I," *Political Science Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (1895): 101.

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attached Sandor Petőfi (1823-1849)'s poet *National Song* to it despite censorship.³⁰⁷ These radicals established the Committee of Public Safety and took over the administration of the city.³⁰⁸ Dominated by the aristocrats, the Upper House succumbed to pass the bills moved by the lower branch under the pressure of the revolutionary calls for change. A delegation led by Archduke Stephen, the Palatine of Hungary (the representative of the imperial court of Vienna), presented the laws to the central administration for ratification. Thereupon, Count Lajos Batthyány (1807-1849), the representative of milder politics in line with his aristocratic pedigree, formed a national cabinet, in which Kossuth, the advocator of radical politics, acceded to the minister of finance.³⁰⁹ The demands were difficult to meet, yet the Habsburg Emperor was not in a position to negotiate due to the multifocal nature of the surge within his domains, including the uprisings in the imperial possessions in Northern Italy, where the royal army significantly relied on Hungarian recruits. Meanwhile, the revolutionaries in Italy were distributing flyers, urging these recruits not to fight for the oppressive regime.³¹⁰ Appeals were directed not only to the Hungarians but also to the Polish soldiers serving in the imperial army, as in Lombardy, where Alessandro Monti emphasized that Austria was their common enemy.³¹¹ Thus, the first call for merging the revolutionary efforts in Italy and Hungary came from the former even before the latter embarked on military conflict with Austria.³¹² However, the government in Hungary did not see in Italy a viable partner in the spring of 1848.³¹³ On the

³⁰⁷ Fodor, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyılın İlk," 44. As a matter of fact, Kossuth's program for change envisioned a constitutional transformation of the imperial rule as a prerequisite for the bourgeois change in Hungary. Róbert Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth ve 1848-49 Yıllarında Macar Özgürlük Savaşı*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003), 47.

³⁰⁸ Deme, "The Society for Equality," 72.

³⁰⁹ N. J. Szenczi, "Great Britain and the War of Hungarian Independence," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 17, no. 51 (April 1939): 557.

³¹⁰ The idea of collaboration between these nationalists against the same oppressor had its roots during the uprisings of 1820-1821. Péter Hanák, "Rapporti Storici Italo-Ungheresi Verso la Metà del Secolo XIX," *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 4, no. 1/3 (1955): 215.

³¹¹ Yet these sorts of calls were not effective because discipline in the Habsburg army was tight. László Pete, *Il colonnello Monti e la Legione italiana nella lotta per la libertà ungherese*, trans. Katalin Mellace (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2013), 18.

³¹² Magda Jászay, *Il Risorgimento vissuto dagli ungheresi* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2000), 198.

³¹³ Pasquale Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano e Questione Ungherese (1849-1867): Marcello Cerruti e le Intese Politiche Italo-Magiare* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1995), 19.

contrary, the calls of the Italian revolutionaries found echoes in the radical revolutionaries in Pest, who pressed for the withdrawal of all Hungarian troops from Lombardy (April 10).³¹⁴ In any case, the Hungarian government was careful not to deviate from prudence and legality, remaining largely indifferent to the Hungarian troops stationed in Italy, tasked with suppressing the patriotic movements, in line with the *Sanctio Pragmatica* (1713), which obliged the Diet to adhere to the integrity of the empire. Not to let the things get out of control, King Ferdinand I of Austria (1793-1875) sanctioned the liberal demands of the Hungarians on April 11.³¹⁵

The first government was to face several backlashes, the most formidable being the bitter opposition from the non-Magyar nationalities, whose loyalty to and reliance on the revolutionary government quickly faded, transforming from initial sympathy for the reforms into a growing appetite for independence, ultimately culminating in outright hostility in an all-out war against Hungary.³¹⁶ The conflict with minorities is often regarded as part of a far-reaching scheme orchestrated by the conservative factions in the Viennese Court, *Camarilla*, employing the *divide et impera* tactic, to undermine and crush the revolution in Hungary.³¹⁷ Nevertheless, the preference of the nationalities for an imperial rule, rather than an overconfident nationalist state should not come as any less than understandable, not to forget that the imposition of the liberal program on Vienna created an euphoria around which the multinational Hungary turned into a Magyar state, leading to "Great Power ambition."³¹⁸ The new administration in Hungary was not so willing to make considerable concessions to the nationalities under its rule in the first place, with the exception of Croatia, which Kossuth deemed to have had historical rights to self-rule unlike the rest, whereas he was particularly uncompromising in the case of Slovakia.³¹⁹ Not to overlook that when Count Kolowrat

³¹⁴ Hanák, "Rapporti Storici," 219. Moore, "Kossuth: A Sketch of a Revolutionist. I," 117.

³¹⁵ The Diet was to make a decision about the Italian affair on July. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 32.

³¹⁶ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 120.

³¹⁷ Szenczi, "Great Britain and the War," 558.

³¹⁸ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, xii.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 45-46, 122.

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succeeded Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) as the premier, Slavic preponderance on the Austrian government was on the rise.³²⁰

The representatives of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia spearheaded an anti-Hungarian opposition. They paid a visit to Vienna for making clear their allegiance to the existing dynasty, as well as expressing their sympathies towards Baron Josip Jelačić (1801-1859) to be appointed Ban of Croatia.³²¹ He was a colonel in the Military Frontier of the Habsburg Empire. On March 23, the emperor promoted him to general and officially appointed as the ban. He immediately disavowed Hungarian authority, instructing officials to ignore orders issued from Hungary. In cooperation with the National Party in Croatia, he went on to establish a national guard and called for new parliamentary elections.³²² On March 25, a general assembly convened in Zagreb, where the establishment of a national government, the abolition of feudal privileges, and a liberal constitution were agitated. Also the unification of Croatia-Slavonia with Dalmatia and Fiume was demanded. These measures effectively cut Hungary from the Adriatic Sea.³²³ Even though the Hungarian administration made attempts to discharge Jelačić, Vienna did not take a decisive step in this direction. The Slavic league was not alone in disobedience. The Serbian minority in Hungary joined the rebellion under the leadership of Patriarch of Karlowitz Josif Rajačić (1795-1861), in fact, they independently elected their national voivode, Stephen Supljikac (1786-1848). The national assembly declared the unification of Banat, Bačka, Baranja, and part of Srem under Vojvodina. They also got mobilized against Hungary in support of the warring Croatian army on May 13.³²⁴ The Romanians neither recognized the newly formed Hungarian government, they claimed their own autonomy and engaged irregular

³²⁰ Eugene Horváth, "Russia and the Hungarian Revolution (1848–9)," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 12, no. 36 (April 1934): 629.

³²¹ Moore, "Kossuth," 118.

³²² Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 316.

³²³ Angelo Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani* (Torino: Industria Libreria Tipografica Editrice, 1958), 80.

³²⁴ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 316.

warfare in Transylvania two days later.³²⁵ In fact, Transylvania had been administered under a special chancellery in Vienna prior to the revolution, yet the Hungarian Diet unilaterally proclaimed its union with the rest of Hungary, disregarding the local assembly there. The Romanians now wished to be granted liberal reforms as elsewhere, as well as to postpone the question of unification with Hungary until a constitutional assembly was convened to reorganize the administration of the province according to the national objectives.³²⁶

The Croatian assembly (Sabor) also convened in June, enacting liberal reforms, including the abolition of all feudal obligations. Delegates were dispatched to the Slav Congress in Prague.³²⁷ Ban Jelačić declared the unification of the Croatian provinces, which followed their partition from Hungary. In response, the Batthyány government dismissed the Ban on June 18.³²⁸ Armed conflicts between Hungarians and Serbs also began in June. The antagonism between the Slavs and the Hungarians undermined a possible alliance between the revolutionary movements in Hungary and Italy. The diplomatic talks between László Splény (1817-1860) and Terenzio Mamiani of Rovere (1799-1865) did not yield any result in June.³²⁹

Greater Hungary rapidly turned into a tinderbox, and it had to be defended. Amidst this turmoil, Kossuth delivered a landmark speech to the Hungarian National Assembly on July 11, requesting approval for a budget to recruit a revolutionary army, the *Honvédség* (Hungarian Defense Force). Although Hungary was increasingly enjoying de facto independence in military, economic, and diplomatic spheres, Vienna did not approve this status, leading to deterioration in relations.³³⁰ The emperor called upon the Hungarian Diet to provide military

³²⁵ The dispute of the Hungarian government against the Romanians was unjustified, if the conflict with Serbia and Croatia was unavoidable, for Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 129.

³²⁶ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 321, 323, 324.

³²⁷ Ibid., 317.

³²⁸ Eckhart, *Macaristan Tarihi*, 206.

³²⁹ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 31.

³³⁰ The Hungarian government appointed councils to Serbia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Constantinople on June 6. György Csorba, "Hungarian Diplomatic Envoys in Constantinople During the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849," in *Şerefe: Studies in Honour of Prof. Gèza Dávid on His Seventieth Birthday*, (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2019), 543.

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assistance in Italy, to which the assembly acquiesced with the proviso that the imperial center would suppress the Serbian and Croatian uprisings in Hungary.³³¹ The revolutionary government calculated that it could gain recognition from Vienna in exchange for complying with the imperial rule in Italy, though the Hungarian troops ultimately served as a ransom for the Court, as their enlistment deprived the revolutionary government of its most capable soldiers.³³² Commanded by Field Marshal Johann Radetzky (1766-1858), the imperial army successfully repelled the Kingdom of Sardinia (also called Piedmont) and regained control of Lombardy at the Battle of Custoza on July 25.³³³ While the Hungarian troops tragically contributed to this victory, it enabled Vienna to redirect its war efforts toward Hungary. Therefore, the relations between Austria and Hungary were decisively cut.³³⁴ As support from the establishment grew, the resistance of minority groups evolved into a widespread rebellion in August and September. On September 11, Jelačić moved to counter the revolution in Hungary. Under his command, it was an attempt to invade Hungary through the Drava.³³⁵ Yet the first attack failed to bring any results, leading to the retreat of his troops following the Battle of Pákozd at the end of the month.

The establishment in Vienna was acting as though it was trying to find a compromise between the opposing parties, yet an unfortunate event made it almost impossible when Count Lamberg, Vienna's chief negotiator, was murdered by Hungarian mob on his way to Pest (September 29).³³⁶ This led to the resignation of the Palatine on the grounds that his moderate politics preaching amicable compromise with the imperial rule was proven unsuccessful. Furthermore, Batthyány attempted to persuade Jelačić to stop the fighting in vain; returned to Vienna, he resigned for good on the first day of October once he realized that he was suspected

³³¹ Hanák, "Rapporti Storici," 222-223.

³³² Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 60. Horváth, "Russia and the Hungarian Revolution," 629.

³³³ Alberto Mario Banti, *Il Risorgimento italiano* (Rome-Bari: GLF editori Laterza, 2004), 81.

³³⁴ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 78.

³³⁵ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 193.

³³⁶ Eckhart, *Macaristan*, 209.

of having taken part in the murder of Lamberg.³³⁷ While Vienna dissolved the National Assembly and declared martial law in Hungary at the beginning of October, all the troops in Hungary and Transylvania was put under the command of Jelačić, who was appointed as Royal Plenipotentiary. The Diet refused to comply with any of the imperial sanctions. Composed of the members of the parliament, to coordinate military action, the power vacuum was filled by the Committee of National Defense, whose president Kossuth undertook extraordinary powers and became the commander-in-chief of the national forces.³³⁸ In this context, the committee issued proclamations urging compatriots to disobey the imperial officers. On October 5, Kossuth declared the release of the Italian prisoners held in the Hungarian city Szeged, when he was on a campaign to recruit for the revolutionary army.³³⁹ On October 10, all the compatriots were called for defending the patria.

Amidst this turmoil, Hungarian public opinion became more attentive to the political developments in Europe, particularly in Italy and France, since a revolutionary comeback in the former could have forced the Habsburgs to revisit their attitude against Hungary.³⁴⁰ The revolutionary government also embarked on a separate foreign policy, one of the first attempts to this end was the appointment of László Teleki (1811-1861) to Paris as an envoy to gain international recognition and support for the cause and counterbalance the Austrian propaganda.³⁴¹ Teleki got in touch with Niccolò Tommaseo (1802-1874), who was representing the Republic of San Marco (Venice) in Paris, to foster solidarity between the Hungarian and Italian movements against the Habsburgs. However, this mission did not yield favorable results due to the over-prudence of both sides.³⁴² As a Dalmatian-Venetian,

³³⁷ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 173.

³³⁸ Szenczi, "Great Britain and the War," 560.

³³⁹ Dénes Mátyás, "Prigionieri italiani nella fortezza di Szeged tra il 1833 e il 1848," in *Quaderni Vergeriani. Annuario dell'Associazione Culturale Italoungherese del Friuli Venezia Giulia «Pier Paolo Vergerio»*, anno IV, no. 4 (2008): 26.

³⁴⁰ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 194.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 197.

³⁴² Hanák, "Rapporti Storici," 224.

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Tommaseo had long regarded the Hungarians as oppressive against the Slavs, yet the Polish diplomat Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770-1861) possibly persuaded him for the cooperation in Paris in the autumn of 1848.³⁴³ Furthermore, a Piedmontese merchant, Giuseppe Carosini, was entrusted with contacting Sardinia in November to facilitate the return of Hungarian deserters to the patria.³⁴⁴

The invasion of Hungary triggered a new revolutionary wave in Vienna, where the radicals seized control of the administration under the name of the Committee of Public Safety. During the unrest, the rioters killed Count Franz von Latour (1780-1848), the Austrian Minister of War, ending in the running away of the Court to Olomouc upon demonstrations and bloodshed.³⁴⁵ The Habsburg establishment was still determined to regain control; following the assassination of the minister, the imperial administration launched a counteroffensive to restore the order. Having stormed Prague in June, Field Marshal Alfred von Windisch-Grätz (1787-1862) succeeded in regaining control of Vienna at the end of October 1848. Subsequently, he began to march into Hungary as the commander-in-chief.³⁴⁶ While he was burning and cannonading the proud imperial city, the Hungarian army was stationed near the border. It was Józef Zachariasz Bem (1794-1850) who came to help and organized the resistance in the capital under the siege, though he had to leave the city for Pest in disguise upon its submission.³⁴⁷

"Mild in disposition and upright in his intentions," Ferdinand was poorly suited to the turbulent situation he suddenly faced, and in spite of his earlier consent to the liberalization in Hungary, he was prevented from putting it into effect. The establishment decisively gained the upper hand in state affairs with a coup-like action in December. The monarch was forced to

³⁴³ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 27.

³⁴⁴ Hanák, "Rapporti Storici," 223. He was to get in touch with agents in Florence, Genoa, and Turin. He received the guarantee in Turin that Sardinia would get back to war against Austria without ruling out the possibility of naval landing in Fiume. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 59.

³⁴⁵ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 179.

³⁴⁶ Horváth, "Russia and the Hungarian," 629. Johann Pragay, *The Hungarian Revolution: Outlines of the Prominent Circumstances Attending the Hungarian Struggle for Freedom, Together with Brief Biographical Sketches of the Leading Statesmen and Generals Who Took Part in It* (New York: George P. Putnam, 1850), 17.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 19.

abdicate in favor of his nephew, Franz Joseph I of Austria (1830-1916), who was just eighteen years old then. The new ruler did not swear the oath to the Hungarian constitution, approved the invasion of Hungary; thus, refused to honor with the promises made by his predecessor.³⁴⁸ As Windisch-Grätz invaded Bratislava in early December and advanced towards Buda, the revolutionary government in Hungary made significant progress in its diplomatic attempts. The negotiations between Tommaseo and Teleki in Paris set the ground for the appointment of Splényi, of Hungarian and Italian descent, as an envoy to the Sardinian capital of Turin, where he was tasked with persuading the soldiers of Hungarian origin in Italy to leave their regiments, in addition to his diplomatic duties. As the hawkish government under the premiership of Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852) accredited him, Sardinia became the first country to recognize Hungary.³⁴⁹ On December 25, Splény published the manifesto of Teleki, leading 150 Hungarians to abandon the imperial army, among them was István Türr (1825-1908).³⁵⁰ These deserters were being prepared for a naval landing at Fiume and Trieste once their number became operational.³⁵¹ For reciprocity, it was decided to dispatch Brescian Alessandro Monti (1818–1854) to Pest as a crucial step in solidifying the alliance between the two countries against the common enemy. Moreover, the kingdom took an additional initiative by appointing another diplomat, Marcelo Cerruti (1808-1896), to Belgrade to mediate between the revolutionary government in Hungary and the Slavic rulers rising in opposition to it.³⁵² These efforts were not able to prevent the imperial army to seize Buda and Pest in early January, pushing the revolutionary government to retreat to Debrecen, which hosted the revolutionary

³⁴⁸ Horváth, "Russia and the Hungarian," 629.

³⁴⁹ Gioberti took office upon the fall of the Perrone Government in December 15. Assisted by Czartoryski and his agents, along with Sardinian envoys such as Tecco, Vegezzi Ruscalla, Brignole Sale; his cabinet took more decisive steps in the Balkans to join the forces against Austria. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 90.

³⁵⁰ Pete, *Il colonnello Monti*, 47-48.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 53.

³⁵² Hanák, "Rapporti Storici," 225.

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headquarters until May 1849. Ironically, the city was the center of Hungarian-Calvinism against Habsburg-Catholicism.³⁵³

Hungary sought alliances both abroad and at home. In spite of Romanian attempts to form a common front against Russia and Austria, the Hungarian government was not eager to give sufficient concessions in Transylvania.³⁵⁴ However, to put its home in order, the revolutionary government was compelled to address minority concerns by promising autonomy—particularly in Transylvania—to turn the tide, though these attempts failed to find much appeal until the summer of 1849. On July 14, a plan for reconciliation took place between the two Danubian nations, with Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Casimiro Batthyány on one side, and Nicola Bălcescu, Ion Ghica, and Cesare Boliac on the other.³⁵⁵

Upon arriving in Transylvania via Pest, General Bem rapidly had restored the army, bringing it "to a condition that would inspire respect" and making it ready to mount offensives against significantly superior forces.³⁵⁶ Having taken command of the revolutionary armies in Transylvania (Erdély in Hungarian) and skillfully repelled the imperial forces to the frontier in February 1849, he alone reconquered most of the province and secured the rear of the national forces facing the imperial army, increasing the moral of the despairing public behind. Nonetheless, his idolization as "Father Bem" raised a sense of jealousy among the military staff, while the situation was not so bright in Upper Hungary.³⁵⁷ There was a noticeable distaste for Polish involvement in the Hungarian revolution stemmed from the concern that if the war spread to Galicia, it would provoke Russia to intervene in Hungary.³⁵⁸

³⁵³ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 216.

³⁵⁴ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 325.

³⁵⁵ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 358.

³⁵⁶ Pragay, *The Hungarian Revolution*, 80.

³⁵⁷ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 211.

³⁵⁸ Enrico De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano nel primo periodo delle riforme (Tanzimât) secondo fonti italiane* (Milano: Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università di Cagliari, A. Giuffrè Editore, 1967), 188.

Prominent Polish officers also served in the Sardinian army of Carlo Alberto (1798-1849), including Władysław Zamoyski. After the battle of Custoza, General Wojciech Chrzanowski (179–1861) had become the chief of general staff.³⁵⁹ The conflict between Austria and Sardinia reemerged when the armistice was broken, leading to the second phase of the war in Italy, though it lasted only three days, resulting in a humiliating defeat for Sardinia.³⁶⁰ Upon Radetzky's victory over Piedmont at the Battle of Novara in March 1849, effectively ending the Second Italian War of Independence, the Viennese Court announced the centralizing constitution, what the Hungarians called the *Oktroyierte Verfassung* (Imposed Constitution) to denote its reactionary quality, aiming to restore full imperial grip. Even Hungary's pre-revolutionary autonomy was abrogated, which meant that Hungary was being unilaterally subsumed under the imperial administration as a province of Austria. In response, the revolutionary government rejected the *fait accompli* and burned its boats, Kossuth declared the independence in Debrecen and became its first regent (*nádor*), deposing the Habsburg-Lorraine monarchy on April 14, 1849.³⁶¹ The proclamation of the independence had a particular emphasize on the peace and friendship "with the neighboring Turkish and Italian countries, and to make treaties and alliances with them founded on mutual interests."³⁶²

After the defeat at Novara, Polish revolutionaries also turned their eyes toward the East, attempting to negotiate cooperation among the parties of the civil war in Hungary, at least until the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland.³⁶³ Having withdrawn from the conflict, however, Sardinia-Piedmont shifted blame for the defeat onto the Polish conduct. Moreover, Rajačić indeed became reactionary, supporting the Austrians and provoking Wallachians against the

³⁵⁹ Barbara Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration, 1831–1871: The Challenge to Russia," in *L'émigration politique en Europe aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Actes du colloque de Rome (3–5 mars 1988)* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1991), 241. There was a Polish Legion in the army of General Durando fighting in Lombardy against the Austrian forces. Pete, *Il colonnello Monti*, 21.

³⁶⁰ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 89.

³⁶¹ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, 32.

³⁶² Pragay, *The Hungarian Revolution*, 45.

³⁶³ Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration," 241.

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revolutionary rule. Making things worse, Hungary launched a counteroffensive against Banat and Wallachia after the Italian defeat, further complicating the possibility of an Italian-Hungarian-Slavic accord.³⁶⁴ When the Habsburgs put Serbian autonomy under pressure, the Serbian leaders sought compromise with the Hungarians once again. Polish revolutionary Ludwik Bystrzonowski (1797-1878) hurried to Belgrade to make an alliance happen, while the Hungarian government sent Rakoczi and Tessenyi for negotiations. Nevertheless, the alliance did not take place since the Hungarian side was not eager to make enough concession about what they deemed as historical rights.³⁶⁵

General Artúr Görgei (1818-1916), who had quickly emerged as a key military talent during the war, successfully united his forces with those of György Klapka (1820-1892) in late April. Kossuth had initially appointed General Henryk Dembiński (1791-1864) as the commander-in-chief of the revolutionary army, though the decision led to personal disputes within the high command. After the Battle of Kápolna, command passed to General Görgei in May 1849, though Kossuth made this decision reluctantly.³⁶⁶ The national forces found a staggering victory in May 21, retaking Buda from the imperial forces despite facing shortages of ammunition and soldiers. The victory created a sense euphoria among the revolutionary cadres; the government hastily engaged with every possible diplomatic contact in search of recognition and cooperation. The agreement between Hungary and Venice in early June aimed to create a corridor between the two countries in rebellion (through Croatia, Styria, and Carinthia), anticipating the liberation of Venice with a sudden Hungarian incursion.³⁶⁷ Bem also supported this action, though the plan was not realistic.

Meanwhile, the mission of Monti to mediate and negotiate the terms of alliances between the Hungarians and Slavs in Belgrade was delayed due to the military conflicts on the

³⁶⁴ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 46.

³⁶⁵ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 102-104.

³⁶⁶ Eckhart, *Macaristan*, 211.

³⁶⁷ Hanák, "Rapporti Storici," 227. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 65.

way. Under a false name (Jacques Taylor), Monti had departed from Turin for the port city of Ancona on December 30, with the intention of reaching Pest within a week via Shkodër and Belgrade. He reached around mid-January in Belgrade. Even though he wished immediately to reach Hungary, believing that the situation was favourable for achieving his objectives, he had to remain in the Serbian capital since the Turin government was cautious and he had to coordinate with Cerruti.³⁶⁸ The main problem for Monti was the unpredictable behavior of the Serbian rulers, who held a sense of unity with the Slavs in rebellion against Hungary. Therefore, it was risky to set out to Hungary through the Danube, given that many ports en route were under the control of the Serbs. Furthermore, the Russian control was also effective on certain points along the river, and Monti was a military deserter in the Habsburg Empire.³⁶⁹ Indeed, his attempts to navigate through the river in February ended up his arrest two times, prompting him to take the road to Constantinople. He arrived in the Ottoman capital on March 21. Cerruti had also ended up in Belgrade through Constantinople ten days before the defeat in Novara.³⁷⁰ However, upon arriving in Constantinople, Monti discovered that the government which had commissioned his mission had been replaced. What is more, when he arrived in Belgrade in early May, he learned that Austria had established its military grip in Italy. He was now recalled to Turin. Even though his original duty fell through; he chose to disobey the orders. Monti took it upon himself to continue his journey to forge an Italian Legion among the deserters and prisoners in favor of the Hungarian cause.³⁷¹ Passed through the Serbian city of Negotin, he ended up in Hungary on May 10.³⁷² Soon after Buda was recaptured, flaming the hopes of the revolutionary forces. The Hungarian government appointed Monti as a colonel and entrusted him with the command of approximately 600 men from an infantry regiment composed of

³⁶⁸ Pete, *Il colonnello Monti*, 61.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 59.

³⁷⁰ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 40-41, 43-44.

³⁷¹ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 332, 363-364.

³⁷² Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 54, 56.

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former imperial soldiers who had been imprisoned in Hungary since the previous spring. This would form the nucleus of the Italian Legion, which was then established on May 25, which would reach to 1,100 participants in June.³⁷³

The siege of Buda was the decisive moment when Tsar Nikolai I (1796-1855) decided to intervene in the situation to the detriment of the revolutionary solidarity. Petersburg's interest in its relations with the revolution in the Habsburg Empire was undoubtedly rooted in their mutual concern over quelling the Polish movement since 1815. A sweeping army under the command of Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich (1782-1856) marched toward Hungary on the first day of June.³⁷⁴ Shortly thereafter, the imperial solidary gained victories on all fronts, undermining the effectiveness of the alliance between the Venetian and the Hungarian revolutions.³⁷⁵ Badly outnumbered by the allied forces, the Hungarian War of Independence was brutally crushed in August. Kossuth and Görgei declared the cause lost in Arad. On 13 August 1849, Paskevich sent the news to the Tsar: "Hungary lies under the feet of your majesty."³⁷⁶

Görgei was granted amnesty upon his surrender, yet his comrades were not lucky as he was. Those who fell into the hands of the Habsburgs faced brutal reprisals. Hundreds of revolutionaries were executed, more than a thousand were imprisoned, and some were symbolically hanged after being tried in absentia. The prime minister of the revolutionary government, Batthyány, was shot to death in October 1849, and his estates, valued in the millions, were confiscated. Thirteen Hungarian generals were executed. After the suppression

³⁷³ Pete, *Il colonnello Monti*, 74, 169-170. For Monti's mission also see Dénes Mátyás, "I meriti del colonnello Alessandro Monti a Szeged nella Guerra d'Indipendenza d'Ungheria del 1848-49," in *Unità italiana – Indipendenza ungherese: dalla Primavera dei Popoli alla «Finis Austriae»*, edited by G. Nemeth, A. Papo, and G. Volpi (Duino Aurisina: Associazione Culturale Italoungherese del Friuli Venezia Giulia «Pier Paolo Vergerio», 2009), 25-35; Eugenio Koltay-Kastner, "Alessandro Monti e la sua missione diplomatica in Ungheria," in *Alessandro Monti e la Legione Italiana d'Ungheria. Conferenze e discorsi pronunciati a Budapest il 18 maggio 1929* (Budapest: n.p., 1929), 35-45.

³⁷⁴ He was the head of a repressive administration in Galicia between 1845-1847.

³⁷⁵ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 88.

³⁷⁶ "Macaristan haşmetlûnun ayakları altındadır." Eckhart, *Macaristan*, 213.

of the revolution, the Viennese authorities no longer felt obliged to adhere to the 1849 Constitution. Instead, the empire was reorganized into provinces overseen by officials appointed to enforce a highly centralized administration. Although the Croats and Serbs expected to have their liberal and national aspirations sanctioned, ironically, they were not exempted; like the Hungarians, they were subdued under the Bach system.³⁷⁷ To escape retribution, thousands from various ranks rushed to Türkiye in search of asylum, marking a new phase in the history of the Hungarian nationalist struggle: Exile.

Kossuth was the central figure dominating the Hungarian nationalist agenda during the revolution. His radical-like politics often outweighed more moderate positions, and his stance proved to be particularly divisive among the ethnic minorities in the country. His confrontational path was no less a source of intra-group disputes. He quarreled with Széchenyi before the revolution, with Artúr Görgei during the war, and with Józef Bem later in exile. "The prehistory of 1848" says one historian, "was marked and symbolized by the rivalry between Széchenyi and Kossuth," and continues, "the history of the War of Independence by that between György and Kossuth," in spite of forgetting to add the post-war dispute between him and Bem in exile, while the division between the homeland and the emigration would generate another source of division.³⁷⁸

2.2. Freedom Fighters Who Sought Asylum in Türkiye: Bem's Way

When the war was declared lost in Arad, the troops under the command of Bem and Dembiński were regrouping in Lugoj. Bem was wounded at the Battle of Temesvár. The remnants of the revolutionary army plunged into chaos. Bem tasked General Richard Guyon

³⁷⁷ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 311, 318.

³⁷⁸ Deak, *Lawful Revolution*, 182.

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(1813-1856) with restoring order among the troops.³⁷⁹ Aiming at a new offensive, the commander of the national forces in Transylvania sent an encouraging message to Kossuth, urging him to continue the resistance. Fallen into despair, however, the former governor had resigned from his post and left Görgei in charge of the fight, who turned out to surrender in *Şiria* (Világos). On his way to Arad to convince Kossuth to continue the struggle, Bem learned in the Romanian city of Radna about the surrender (August 9-11). Thunderstruck by the news of Kossuth's decision to flee, Bem penned an acrimonious letter to Kossuth blaming him for cowardice.³⁸⁰ Having already written a letter addressed to the Sultan Abdülmecid for protection, Kossuth was about to cross the border to the Ottoman Empire when Bem's letter found him in Orsova. Accompanied by his assistant Sándor Asbóth (1811-1868), Kossuth tried to enter Ottoman soil in disguise with a British passport drawn up in a certain Bloomfield (August 15).³⁸¹ Nevertheless, he was immediately recognized and disarmed in Turnu-Severin. The governor of Vidin, Mehmed Ziya Pasha, personally welcomed the former governor of Hungary on August 22. Here is how Kossuth narrates his entrance in the Turkish territory:

A Turkish staff officer greeted me courteously in the name of "Allah."
He led me to a place which he had kindly caused to be prepared for me
to rest for the night under God's free heaven, and—asked for my sword
with downcast eyes, as if ashamed that a Turk should disarm a
Hungarian.³⁸²

Downhearted, Bem returned to Lugoj and made a similar appeal to Dembiński, but it was in vain; Dembiński also fled, seeking refuge on Ottoman soil alongside György Mészáros (1820-1892) on August 15. The following day, Mór and Miklós Perczel also sought refuge by way of Orsova, which was the border where the official status of the revolutionaries was about

³⁷⁹ Bayram Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016), 31-32.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 36-37.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 54-55. Abdullah Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara Bakışı ya da 1849 Macar-Leh Mülteciler Meselesi," *Belleten* 61, no. 231 (1997). 349.

³⁸² Louis Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, trans. Ferencz Jausz (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1880), V.

to change to that of refugees.³⁸³ With no other option left, General Bem sought refuge in Wallachia, along with his loyal lieutenant János Wepler and around 500 Hungarian hussars. Bem sent an ironic message to Kossuth, mentioning his financial hardships. Other revolutionary leaders, such as György Kmety (1813-1865), Richard Guyon, and Maximilian Stein (1814-1848) joined Bem in the refuge.³⁸⁴ The Italian Legion entered the Ottoman soil through the Serbian border, as they had no issues with the Serbs, unlike the Hungarians.

Refugees from Hungary and Italy had already begun to flock to Ottoman lands in the spring of 1849, before the arrival of the prominent figures. However, these early arrivals were mostly irregulars who reached through Mediterranean port cities or overland routes in the Balkans. It was the revolutionary leaders that caused the diplomatic crisis.³⁸⁵ What is more, the leading figure of the Hungarian revolution would remain on the spotlight throughout his shelter in the empire since he was the most prominent revolutionary among all those freedom fighters. Neither the initial nor the ultimate numbers of refugees who set foot in the Ottoman territory is easy to locate because of the constant fluctuations in numbers; mobility in and out of the camps remain tremendous. Karpat's estimate of the refugees reaches up to 16,000 at its highest.³⁸⁶ A far more conservative number is estimated around 5,500 in Vidin, in present-day northwestern Bulgaria, once the situation got relatively stabilized. 3,156 refugees were voluntarily brought back to Austria in October as part of the "repatriation mission" assumed by Franz von Hauslaub (1786-1853), a general of the Habsburg army, who promised that no criminal charges be applied to the foot soldiers on the condition that they return to their homeland.³⁸⁷ The casualties resulting from diseases and epidemics also make an accurate

³⁸³ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 45-46.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., 62-64.

³⁸⁵ Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara," 347-348.

³⁸⁶ Kemal Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey: The Impact of Hungarian Refugees in the Ottoman Empire 1849-1851," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 174.

³⁸⁷ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler Meselesi* (Istanbul: Matba-i Âmire, 1926), 84. The amnesty would apply to the officials unless they involved in crime. For the details of the mission see Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 97-114.

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estimation hard. At any rate, the Ottoman officials recorded 1,690 refugees in the beginning of November 1849.³⁸⁸

The flow of refugees to that extent caught not only the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âli*) but also the Austrian and Russian governments off balance. In spite of initial hesitation, the diplomatic representatives of the House of Austria and Tsarist Russia in the capital of the Ottoman Empire soon took decisive steps to incur the extradition of the refugees. Nikolai I of Russia (1796-1855) commissioned his foreign minister, Count Karl von Nesselrode (1780–1862), for the delivery of four Polish generals (Józef Bem, Henryk Dembiński, Józef Wysocki, and Władysław Zamoyski), to charge with high treason because these figures had also taken part in the Polish Uprising of 1830-1831. The Russian envoy Vladimir Titov delivered Nesselrode's note to the Porte on August, 25. The note was highly discourteous, carrying a big stick of military threat that was entirely at odds with diplomatic manner.³⁸⁹ Russia also strove to take advantage of the crisis, demanding the extradition of the Polish revolutionaries who had earlier sought asylum in the empire, including Michał Czaykowski (1804-1886).³⁹⁰ The Austrian premier, Felix von Schwarzenberg (1800-1852), demanded the extradition of all Hungarian refugees with a diplomatic note at the hands of the envoy in Constantinople, Internuncio Count Bartholomäus von Stürmer (1887-1863) on August 27.³⁹¹ Besides the sticks, the Austrian and Russian officials emphasized in their communications that they were on the same page with the Turkish empire given their multinational outlook, and these refugees would likely cause troubles for the Porte in the future.³⁹²

³⁸⁸ György Csorba, "Hungarians in Constantinople in the Mid-19th Century: Socio-Economic Background and Careers," in *Between Empires – Beyond Borders: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican Era through the Lens of the Köpe Family*, ed. Gabor Fodor (Budapest: Research Center for the Humanities, 2020), 68.

³⁸⁹ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 230-231.

³⁹⁰ Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey," 171.

³⁹¹ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 233.

³⁹² Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 87.

The failure of Austria to quell the revolution presented Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-1858) with an opportunity to demonstrate his diplomatic abilities.³⁹³ The tone of the envoys' notes prompted him to consider the possibility of war and act on it; even though the Sublime State had been left alone against the two Great Powers, the extradition of the refugees would have never been a possibility on the account of the piety (*diyanet*), dignity and prestige of the state (*namus-u devlet*), and humanity (*insaniyet*). Despite the rulers' disdain for the refugees—referred in one document as "a bunch of insolent infidels"—their extradition remained off the table.³⁹⁴ The justification of the Austrian demands was based on the eighteenth clause of the Austrian Ottoman Peace of Belgrade of 1739, which granted the Austrian Empire jurisdiction over its subjects taking refuge in the Ottoman Empire.³⁹⁵ The Russian Empire, on the other hand, invoked the second clause of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), which also concerned the extradition of refugees, but exempted "those who, in the Empire of Russia, shall have entered the Christian religion, and in the Ottoman Empire the Mohametan religion."³⁹⁶ This exception would become a safety valve for the Porte. On August 30, *Meclis-i Mahsûs* (Privy Council) convened for the first time during the crisis to determine the policy to be followed, framing its debates within the language of Islamic tradition and the pride of the throne. At the end, it was decided to transfer the refugees temporarily to Vidin rather than complying with the mounting pressures.³⁹⁷

³⁹³ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 4 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967), 23-24.

³⁹⁴ For the evaluation of Mustafa Reşid upon the note of Titov see Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 55-63. He describes the revolutionaries as "*birkaç edepsiz gâvur*." Ibid., 56. For the terms to refuse the extradition mentioned see Ibid., 58.

³⁹⁵ For the transcription of the clause see Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara," 361.

³⁹⁶ J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1535-1914*, vol. 1 (Toronto, London & New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc, 1956), 55.

³⁹⁷ For the details of the convention see Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 249-254. The first time Cevdet Pasha addresses the refugee issue in his *Tezâkir*, he explains that Reşid Pasha did not reject the refugees based on a particular Qur'anic verse. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953), 12. This verse suggests that when an infidel seeks protection, believer must grant him protection so that the infidel makes acquainted with the words of God.

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Uncertainty about the future, apathy, and tension shaped the refugees' mood in the weeks following their border crossing. While senior officers and civilians were granted entry into Vidin, most of the soldiers were left in camps on the town's outskirts. The refugees were kept in isolation for around two months in the city, during which their moral was bleak. Czaykowski sets the scene there as grim, noting that drunks were bragging about their non-existent valor in the lost war.³⁹⁸ There did the upper echelon engage in heated debates as they came to terms with what had just happened. Differences of opinions became more pronounced in all ranks, factionalism prevailed. Mór Perczel (1811-1899) had not been on good terms with Görgei and Kossuth in the battlefield. He continued to quarrel with the latter in exile.³⁹⁹ There were also controversies between ethnic groups. Zamoyski blamed the Hungarians for their course against the Slavs during the revolution, while the Hungarians linked the Russian intervention to the participation of the Poles.⁴⁰⁰ The Italians accused both group of lacking integrity and religious defeatism. One of the refugees notes that economic disparities also took hold of the refugees; there were no shortage of merriment and card games in some tents, while others endured cold and hunger.⁴⁰¹ The situation was not relieving for the Italian refugees either. Even though it was the only group that could be backed up by the government of their country of origin, their situation was particularly delicate since Monti had joined the war against his orders. Nonetheless, Cerruti in Belgrade did not refrain from reaching out to his compatriots on Ottoman soil, providing material support. Romualdo Tecco (1802-1867), the Sardinian minister in Constantinople, took initiatives in the presence of the Ottomans.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁸ Gülnar Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından Çaykovski Mehmet Sadık Paşa'nın Osmanlı Anıları* (Konya: Kömen Yayınları, 2016), 160-162.

³⁹⁹ Deak, *Lawful Revolution*, 212-213. It is asserted that it was General Bem, who was undermining Kossuth's authority via Perczel. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 146-147.

⁴⁰⁰ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 107.

⁴⁰¹ Heléna Tóth, *An Exiled Generation: German and Hungarian Refugees of Revolution, 1848-1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 40.

⁴⁰² Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 82.

The lower ranks started to develop negative attitudes to their once leaders owing to the new mode of confrontation that helped them to comprehend the strict hierarchy, within which the leaders turned out to be not so much caring their socially fragile followers.⁴⁰³ Obviously, there were to be difference between those who had served in the parliament and those who had fought on the field, furthering the divisions that had existed during the revolution.⁴⁰⁴ Neither the Ottoman administration treated the revolutionaries in an egalitarian manner, though humanitarian, those from the higher ranks were accommodated in privileged places without much contact with the refugee masses in Vidin. Bem was hosted in the home of the district governor, Yakub Bey. Kossuth and other higher ups were housed in places owned by the notables in the vicinity.⁴⁰⁵ Kossuth had failed to unite the country at the war, nor could he maintain solidarity within his comrades in exile, consistently seeking to preserve his leadership in a dictatorial manner, ostracizing his critiques.

It is known that some refugees proposed religious conversion to the Porte, even before the diplomatic crisis.⁴⁰⁶ While the diplomatic negotiations were taking place, the Magyar representative in Istanbul, Gyula Andr ssy (1823-1890), was in favor of conversion, just like Polish diplomat Czaykowski. Both figures recommended conversion to the refugees on September 18, 1849, through separate letters, which were read aloud among the refugees. However, the idea of conversion caused great distress within the enclave, particularly among the upper echelons. K zm r Batthy ny, Richard Guyon, Henryk Dembi nski, and W adys aw Zamoyski were among those who strongly opposed this kind of path to be taken.⁴⁰⁷ Zamoyski

⁴⁰³ Joseph Hutter, *Avrupa'da Hilalin G lgesine Sı ınanlar: 1850 Bir M ltecinin Hatıratından*, comp. by Bayram Nazır (Istanbul: İstanbul B y k ehir Belediyesi K lt r A. . Yayınları, 2018), 68. For the misery of the lower ranks also see Yılmaz G len, trans., *Lajos Kossuth'un T rkiye G nleri* (Budapest: T r k K zt rsas ğ Nagyk vets ge, 2002), 51.

⁴⁰⁴ T th, *An Exiled Generation*, 35.

⁴⁰⁵ Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyas  İlticalara," 354. For other references suggestive unequal treatment see Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 129, 139, 145-146, 200.

⁴⁰⁶ The refugees entering through Hır ova were reported to have threatened the government to convert to Islam unless their asylum request would not be admitted. Ahmed Refik, *T rkiye'de M lteciler*, 46. Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyas  İlticalara Bakışı," 351.

⁴⁰⁷ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 91-93.

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was particularly displeased with Czaykowski's attitude towards conversion, expressing his regret through a private letter, believing that it could potentially harm also the Polish Colony in Istanbul.⁴⁰⁸ As a chronic Catholic, Zamoyski was adept at accepting financial support from the Muslims, but was willing to keep them at a distance, says Mehmed Sadık Pasha (Czaykowski) in his memoirs.⁴⁰⁹ The Sardinian minister to Constantinople was equally terrified with the consideration of conversion among the Italian Legion to save the lives under heavy conditions.⁴¹⁰ Conversion was an apparent disloyalty to the nation for Kossuth, who slandered the Ottoman administration to force the refugees to convert in a letter to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865). Similar complaints were also conveyed to Stratford Canning (1786-1880) and Jacques Aupick (1789-1857), the British and French ambassadors to the empire. Nonetheless, it was soon discovered that the refugees had not been pushed for anything against their will, leading Kossuth to issue an apology on November 23.⁴¹¹

The Grand Vizier gave instructions to the governor of Vidin on October 7. These instructions suggested that, while the refugees had been guaranteed protection under any circumstances, the reminder that a treaty with Russia exclusively granted the Porte the authority to protect Muslim refugees might have been a mere consolation.⁴¹² Even though no solid proof exists to support the argument that the refugees were invited to Islam by the administration, the memorandum implies that the Tanzimat statesmen at least induced the refugees to adopt the creed of Islam as a diplomatic maneuver to save the skin before foreign pressures. In that sense, conversion could have appeared to make protection much easier, given that adopting Islam within Ottoman territory meant becoming a subject of the Sultan, thereby changing adherent's legal status. In any case, all the refugees were repeatedly guaranteed that they were not obliged

⁴⁰⁸ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından Çaykovski*, 177.

⁴⁰⁹ "Müzmin Katolik olan Zamoyski, Müslümanların parasını kucağını açarak almayı biliyordu, ama Ajans'ın işlerine Müslüman'ın karışmasını istemiyordu." Ibid., 178.

⁴¹⁰ And his firmness was appreciated by Tecco. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 84-85.

⁴¹¹ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 87-89. Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara Bakışı," 352.

⁴¹² Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler Meselesi*, 75.

to change their religious commitment not to be turned back, meaning that conversion had never been the only way to avoid punishment. Not to mention that the said clause was not even in force for the Hungarian refugees, nor was the mass conversion of thousands feasible and practical since conversion also imposed certain responsibilities on the state.

The conversion of the highly admired Bem significantly altered the course of events, as his prestige among the rank-and-file served as an example for many more to follow.⁴¹³ Around 250 people declared their voluntary conversion, much to the annoyance of their once-leaders, including two generals, ten commanders, fifty-two corporals and lieutenants, and forty sergeants.⁴¹⁴

On September 11, the Privy Council was gathered to resolve the response to be delivered to the Austrian and Russian envoys, Stürmer and Titov, respectively. A special representative was decided to be commissioned to communicate directly with the Tsar, bypassing the stubborn envoys, as it was rather Russia that came out of the war that vigorous to play the decisive role in the diplomatic stage. Fuad Efendi (1814-1869) was appointed as the extraordinary representative of the Sultan to negotiate the terms with Russian monarch himself.⁴¹⁵ The Porte did not ignore the Austrian Emperor either, it was also decided to send a letter to him, which would be penned by the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, Kostaki Musurus (1807-1891).⁴¹⁶ While the Porte was seeking common ground through these moves, the Austrian and Russian ambassadors took the initiative by delivering coordinated, though not joint, ultimatums to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. These notes made it clear that diplomatic

⁴¹³ Lucyna Antonowicz-Bauer, *Polonezköyü Adampol*, trans. Yeşim Santepe (Istanbul: Çelik Gülersoy Vakfı İstanbul Kütüphanesi, 1990), 12.

⁴¹⁴ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 94-95. It would be misleading to limit all cases of conversion to this group. They only paved the way for others to follow. There were individuals who converted even after the refugee crisis was literally over. Further research is needed to examine conversion trends among Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries from the end of 1840s to the 1860s. Abdullah, Saydam, "Müslüman Olan Macar-Leh Mültecileri Meselesi," *Toplumsal Tarih* 4, no. 24 (1995): 21.

⁴¹⁵ Fuad Efendi had the title of *Âmedî-i Dîvân-ı Hümayûn* in Bucharest, later embraced *Fevka'l-âde Murahhas Büyükelçi* for Petersburg mission. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 289.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., 267-268.

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relations would be cut off unless their demands were met within the specified period.⁴¹⁷ "The northern powers," writes Mustafa Reşid Pasha, "were making us do whatever they wanted up until now, but this time, the opposite is the case. The Great Powers and nations of Europe are bound to stand alongside the Sublime State."⁴¹⁸ The Foreign Minister, Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha (1815-1871), fathomed how the British and French ambassadors would react in the event of a war against Austria and Russia. Upon the representatives expressing their unwavering support for the empire in such a scenario, the Porte decidedly informed the ambassadors of the impossibility of fulfilling their outrageous demands (September 16).⁴¹⁹ Next day, Titov and Stürmer severed diplomatic relations with the Porte.⁴²⁰ Since the imperial rulers started to consider the possibility of war, the empire intensified its diplomatic efforts to secure active support.⁴²¹ The Porte contacted Prince Czartoryski to recruit Polish officers who could command foreign troops in the Ottoman army in case of a war against Russia.⁴²² In order to gain public opinion in Europe, a report was published to draw attention to the refugee issue by appealing to humanity and morality. This effort contributed to consolidate public sympathy in Europe toward the empire. Public demonstrations in favor of the empire took place in Britain and France. The carriage of the Ottoman ambassador to London, Musurus Bey, was reported to have drawn by the British youth.⁴²³ Even though the foreign ministry of France was initially hesitant to support the Porte in contrast to Britain's full endorsement, the efforts of the Ottoman envoy to Paris, Aleksandros Kalimaki, succeeded in aligning their positions by early October. He reported to the Porte that the embassy in the French capital was full of statesmen and

⁴¹⁷ Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara," 368. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 270.

⁴¹⁸ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 126.

⁴¹⁹ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 284-286.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., 272-273.

⁴²¹ Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara," 369.

⁴²² Andrew A. Urbanik and Joseph O. Baylen, "Polish Exiles and the Turkish Empire, 1830–1876," *The Polish Review* 26, no. 3 (1981): 48

⁴²³ Enver Ziya Karal, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi: Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789–1856)*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Yayınları, [n.d.], first published 1947), 216-217. According to Italian sources, the Porte had also clandestinely supported the resistance of Imam Shamil (1797-1871) in North Caucasia against the Russians. De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 177.

members of the local press, who had been quite unfavorable about a year ago. This change of heart allowed him to make sure that the situation would have a clear impact in the National Assembly, making it difficult for the French government to resist this wave of sympathy. For Kalimaki, there was no possibility for the Ottomans not to have a place in the Western family of nations due to this stance.⁴²⁴

A meeting was held at the Grand Vizier's residence on October 7. It was decided that the refugees and converts would be sent *separately* from Vidin to Shumen (*Şumnu*) to avoid potential conflicts between these groups. They would be transferred under the escort of Faik Pasha, who was expected to arrive in Vidin by the end of the month. To keep interactions between the opposing groups minimal, he was instructed to ensure that they be placed in separate lodgings in the city.⁴²⁵ Meanwhile, Colonel Süleyman Refik Bey had already gone to the destination to arrange the logistics for the upcoming caravans.⁴²⁶ The prime reason for transferring the refugees was the hazardous location of Vidin on the shores of the Danube, leaving them unprotected to shocking military attacks from outside. Besides, there was a risk that the refugees might have tried to escape from the camps across the river.

Having met with the Tsar, Fuad Efendi handed Sultan's letter, assuring that none of the refugees would be allowed to follow seditious course against Russia (October 16). The mission yielded expected results, Nesselrode was ordered to get the relations back to normal with the Ottomans, meaning that Russia had abandoned its insistence on the extradition of the refugees.⁴²⁷ Tsar Nikolai was content with having the Polish revolutionaries deported, while the converts were to be transferred somewhere far from Russian borders.⁴²⁸ A little while later, Austria officially renounced its initial demands, the extradition of all the refugees.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁴ For the communication of the envoy see Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 151-168.

⁴²⁵ Ibid., 75. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 123-126.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., 128. Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara," 358.

⁴²⁷ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 307.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., 314-315.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 324-325.

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Led by Colonel Mehmed, the first convoy to Shumen consisted of 790 refugees, including Polish refugees who had not converted (with one exception) and some lower ranking refugees.⁴³⁰ The second group to go was the Italian Legion under the leadership of Colonel Monti, who were directly sent to Gelibolu (through Sofia and Edirne) on October 31.⁴³¹ After the Italians, it was the turn of the converts. Escorted by Faik Bey, the first group of converts moved with Murad Pasha, including Colonel Osman Bey, İskender Bey, Yusuf Bey, Hüseyin Bey, two majors, two lieutenants, six sergeants, and a foot soldier. Accompanied by Major Ismail Efendi, the rest among the converts went silently with Brigadier Ferhad Pasha and Brigadier Ismail Pasha.⁴³² Those-remained-behind-Christians were recorded not even to have waved hands for the converts on the move, a perfect indication of how the issue of conversion polarized the entire enclave and to what extent. In a letter to the Porte, Kossuth expressed his concern that more refugees might convert in this political uncertainty, signaling the legitimacy crisis he faced since conversion was undermining his authority.⁴³³ Led by Colonel Ismail Bey, the Hungarian celebrities, first and foremost the former governor of Hungary Kossuth, the Foreign Minister Count Kázmér Batthyány, and General Lázár Mészáros, along with four hundred followers set out on November 3.⁴³⁴ In total, 1,469 refugees were taken from Vidin to Shumen.⁴³⁵

⁴³⁰ General Dembiński, General Mészáros, General Wysocki, General Yomrahin, Colonel Zamoyski, Colonel Przyimski, and Colonel Fatonye were in this group. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 130-131.

⁴³¹ This group composed of one colonel, two majors, one secretary, one adjutant major, four captains, fifteen master sergeants, three doctors, six sergeants, thirty-two corporals, one hundred and one soldiers, and five irregulars. There were 221 refugees in total. Ibid., 131-132. Also see Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 86. On 14 March 1850, this group sailed to Malta aboard *Feyzullah* frigate, which had 44 cannons, to eventually arrive in Italy. The Porte covered their return expenses. On 5 May, what remained from the Italian Legion entered the port of Cagliari. Thus, Monti, who had set out from Turin toward Hungary through Constantinople, completed his journey by returning to the island of Sardinia about a year and a half later. Pete, *Il colonnello Monti*, 210-212.

⁴³² Together with one kaimmakam, six majors, twenty-eight captains, thirty lieutenants, sixteen master sergeants, five corporals, and one hundred twenty-eight soldiers. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 132-133.

⁴³³ Ibid., 133. For another example, according to a report, three Italian soldiers who converted to Islam visited the tents of their former comrades and were asked to leave their place. Also see, Pete, *Il colonnello Monti*, 204-205.

⁴³⁴ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 136-137.

⁴³⁵ Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49," 4:225.

The refugees arrived in Shumen with great optimism, hoping for a war between the Ottoman and Russian empires that would serve their cause.⁴³⁶ However, the news that Kossuth and his retinue would be interned in the Anatolian city of Kütahya came devastating, meaning that an extended war of liberation was not imminent. Kossuth was still promising to his fellows that a new uprising to save Hungary would be initiated in the coming spring.⁴³⁷ The refugees were settled in two distant locations in the city under the leaderships of Kossuth and Bem, though this did not mean that there was no communication between them.⁴³⁸ According to the diplomatic negotiations, the refugees were to be relocated to Kütahya, Aleppo, and Malta following their temporary stay in Shumen. Appointed to Bucharest as the replacement for Fuad Efendi, Ahmed Vefik [Pasha] (1823-1891) was instructed with overseeing the transfer of refugees and the employment of the converts in the Ottoman army. Accordingly, those who expressed the desire to convert would be deeply investigated with the assistance of the diplomatic representatives of their countries of origin. Only after their genuine intention became clear, the necessary arrangements would be held for the candidates.⁴³⁹

Left Shumen in February 1850, the Kossuth Group was interned in Kütahya in April. Their number had increased to 113 by the end of the year, all of whom were granted permission to move to Europe and America the following autumn.⁴⁴⁰ Since their story has been told and retold many times, there is no necessity to repeat it here.⁴⁴¹ The Murad Pasha Group was transferred to the Province of Aleppo from Shumen via the city of Alexandria, escorted by a cavalry unit under the command of a certain Mazhar Bey. The Porte wanted to ensure that the converts did not feel as though they were under arrest or detention. While Diyarbakır had

⁴³⁶ Gülen, *Lajos Kossuth'un Türkiye*, 54.

⁴³⁷ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 175.

⁴³⁸ Gülen, *Lajos Kossuth'un Türkiye*, 70.

⁴³⁹ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 407-408.

⁴⁴⁰ Among the prominent figures in this group were Kázmér Batthyány, Lázár Mészáros, Perczel brothers, Szöllösy, Asbóth, Adolf Gyurmán, Józef Wysocki, and Ihász Dániel. Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 88.

⁴⁴¹ A detailed account of this group can be found in Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 335-404.

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initially been proposed as a relocation site, its geographical location risked giving the impression of imprisonment. Therefore, authorities considered Aleppo as a better option for the converts' psychological well-being.⁴⁴² The number of the converts transferred with Murad Pasha was quite small, totaling only thirty-three, while the rest of the refugees and lower-ranking converts were left in Shumen. Unfortunately, we lack sufficient accounts of the lives of these convert leaders, even the extensive work by Hajnal, for instance, does not provide the slightest clue about their new experiences.⁴⁴³ It is known that those sent to Aleppo were first accommodated outside the city, without being allowed free movement. Later, they were employed in the Arabian army and received salaries in proportion to their military ranks, which were likewise recognized. They were allowed to resign from service at any time and continued to receive their allowance even after resignation.⁴⁴⁴ No comprehensive list of those employed has been found in Ottoman Archives; however, Habsburg reports indicate the existence of a list containing 120 names.⁴⁴⁵ Bem was commissioned with the rank of Ferik, which was "the highest rank in the Ottoman army at the time, corresponding to Army Commander," in the city, where he got a top salary of 7,500 piastres. He took part in Ottoman centralization project. He took roles in the suppression of an Arabian revolt and building gunpowder works. He died on December 10, 1850, in Syria.⁴⁴⁶ The duration of the encampment in Aleppo was conditioned in parallel with that of those in Kütahya. As the latter were released, the converts were distributed to various sections of the army based on military necessities with the exception of eleven residents who preferred to go to Europe (17 October 1851).⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴² Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 91, 128.

⁴⁴³ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 405.

⁴⁴⁴ Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49," 4:227.

⁴⁴⁵ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 425.

⁴⁴⁶ Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49," 4:227. For a short account of this group see Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 405-428.

⁴⁴⁷ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 91, 308.

Since the biggest slice of the refugee community was left in Shumen without the leadership of a revolutionary celebrity, unlike the first two groups, it would be most fitting to refer to them "the Shumen Group," reflecting the region they remained. Ironically, these "remnants" were several times higher than the number of the other two groups combined, though their exact number was difficult to locate because of the irregular joining, which even led the Porte to decide to deny newcomers from Hungary in June 1850. The decision showed results, the number of refugees in Shumen started to diminish afterward. There were also escaping from the city. Ferik Halim Pasha stated in early 1850 that the refugees, despite the harsh winter conditions, were deserting in droves to the mountains, as they were desperately in need of subsistence.⁴⁴⁸ While the Porte desired to dissolve the refugees temporarily settled in Shumen, there are indications that they became a contesting arena for those vying to exert influence over them. The pro-Kossuth followers tried to lead the members of this group, yet it is not possible to say that their call found strong appeal.⁴⁴⁹ Murad Pasha also called them to arms under his command, promising them to keep their ranks and the right to resign at any time they wished.⁴⁵⁰ On the other hand, Ahmed Vefik offered them the opportunity to serve in the Ottoman army even without necessarily converting, while those who preferred to leave the empire were equally free to go wherever they chose. Four hundred refugees opted for going abroad out of nine hundred, while around two hundred were incorporated into the empire in line with their requests. Of the remaining 300 refugees; 241 (233 Poles and 8 Hungarians) wanted to go to Britain, whereas 59 Hungarians wished to go to America, though their desires could not be fulfilled.⁴⁵¹

It seems that Ömer Lütfi Pasha (1806-1871), another religious convert of Slavic origin, prevailed over the revolutionary converts. At the beginning of 1850, many refugees made an

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 153.

⁴⁴⁹ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 367.

⁴⁵⁰ Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49," 4:227.

⁴⁵¹ Saydam, "Osmanlılar'ın Siyasî İlticalara," 381.

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appeal to Ömer Pasha, who was in Bucharest as the army commander.⁴⁵² Even though the converts in Shumen were seemingly the grassroot of the Murad Pasha Group, their appeal to Ömer Pasha was related to the nature of their conversion because if they had appealed to Bem, the authorities might have considered their conversion to be motivated to stay with the General, and their situation could have been reexamined as a result, possibly involving foreign consulates in situ, and even their conversion could have been nullified.⁴⁵³ In March, two hundred and fourteen refugees who had appealed to Ömer Pasha converted to Islam, including fifteen women. Twenty-one of them had already been sent to Istanbul, the rest were located in Ruse, Vidin, and Silistre.⁴⁵⁴ In April, what remained of the converts was called to the Rumelian army under two infantry battalions, comprising roughly two hundred individuals, to suppress the uprising in Bosnia, where the notables resisted giving up their traditional privileges in opposition to the Tanzimat principles.⁴⁵⁵ On the contrary, the demands of some thirty officers in Shumen to enter the Sultan's service in March were not met due to the financial straits in the treasure of the province, in contrast to six officers who were accepted to the service upon their request.⁴⁵⁶

Kossuth faced the grim reality that his influence over the migration in Europe had markedly thinned by the time he got back to England from America in 1852.⁴⁵⁷ Furthermore,

⁴⁵² Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 159. Perhaps it was due to his role during this period that Nicolae Iorga asserts Ömer Pasha led the Islamization efforts targeting these refugees, which could also be connected to his depiction as brutal and extreme in literature. Andrić calls him as "the chief and greatest turncoat." Ivo Andrić, *Omer Pasha Latas: Marshal to the Sultan*, trans. Celia Hawkesworth (New York: New York Review Books, 2018), 32. Nicolae Iorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi (1774-1912)*, vol. 5, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2017), 382.

⁴⁵³ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 159-160. They were not allowed to join Murad Pasha. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 408.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 178. Of them 87 converts (47 Hungarian, 36 Austrian, 1 Polish, and 3 women) were employed in the Rumelian Army in Vidin, another 73 souls (44 Hungarian, 17 Austrian, 3 Polish, 5 Romanian, 4 women) joined to the same army in Ruse. 3 Austrians were commissioned in the Arabian Army. 22 more were placed in the infantry regiments of Silistre. 16 converts were randomly allocated in military units of Silistre and Ruse (9 Hungarians, 6 Austrians, and 1 Romanian). 9 members were left in Ruse to profess their expertise. (4 Hungarians, 1 Austrians, 4 women). Saydam, "Müslüman Olan Macar-Leh Mültecileri Meselesi," 21.

⁴⁵⁵ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 209-210.

⁴⁵⁶ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 189. For the details of the Shumen group see Ibid., 204-226.

⁴⁵⁷ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 95.

most of the converts who had already challenged his authority preferred to settle in the Ottoman Empire. In what follows, we shall take a closer look at the specific political and social context in which the converts unexpectedly found themselves, and under which they were to operate sooner rather than later: the Ottoman Empire in the Tanzimat period.

2.3. The Principles of the Tanzimat Era (1839-1871): Reşid's Way

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us.⁴⁵⁸

Four months after the accession of Sultan Abdülmecid (1823-1861) to the throne of the Ottoman Empire, the Tanzimat Edict (*Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümayûnu*) was read aloud on November 3, 1839, by Mustafa Reşid Pasha before a crowd composed of the sultan, top officials, foreign representatives, ulema (Islamic scholars and jurists), and the leaders of religious millets. It heralded an aggressive reform period, which had been commenced by Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839), the founder of modern autocracy in the empire.⁴⁵⁹ The edict enunciated new principles to redress the empire's lagging behind Europe for the last one hundred and fifty years as a result of the deviation from the religious law (*Shari'a*). Yet the underlying pressure was the global developments that subjected the classical regime to great difficulties that put even its very existence at risk.⁴⁶⁰ The edict reflected the dire necessity to adjust the state machine to the changing circumstances through refashioning the legal

⁴⁵⁸ Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities and Great Expectations* (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 5.

⁴⁵⁹ Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih Söyleşileri (Müşahabe-i Tarihiye)*, ed. Mübeccel Nami Duru (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1980), 44. İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 44th ed. (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2016), 45.

⁴⁶⁰ According to one interpretation, the edict was a bona fide outcome of the Islamic tradition. Butrus Abu Manneh, "The Islamic Origins of the Tanzimat Edict," *Die Welt des Islams* 34, no. 2 (1994): 173-203.

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framework. More concretely, it was the expression of the intention to transform the *ancient régime* into a modern state.

Reorganization essentially meant the formation of the modern state based on the principle of centralization, i.e., the expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus to encompass the lifeworld. At the dawn of the reform period, the empire was suffering from serious internal and external diseases. The central authority could not exert full control over the rural areas throughout the vast territories extending to three continental regions. Local notables, *ayan*, dominated social and economic life in the provinces since the center heavily depended on their cooperation to recruit soldiers, to collect taxes, and, to police the countryside, in other words, to function. This dependency regime shaped the relations between the center and periphery, resembling the interaction of the center with "vassal princes rather than those with subjects."⁴⁶¹ It is instructive to observe how a domestic problem nourished from the dispute between the Sultan and his governor, Mehmet Ali Pasha (1769-1849), could easily turn into an international crisis, involving the Great Powers because of the failure of the empire to curb the desires of its governor.⁴⁶² Not only local notables but also ulema had traditionally been regarded as a huge concern for the reformist wing of the imperial rule. Even though the classical land regime depended on the undisputed possession of the state, which did not leave room for private ownership, considerable amounts of lands were left at the disposal of *vakıfs* to supposedly serve public interests, albeit bestowing the ulema who practically control these institutions with crucial powers against the center.⁴⁶³ Another source of decentralizing force was the separatist movements in the Balkans, again in line with the power relations in local politics. Lastly, the financial and technical superiority of the West in this period was drawing the integrity of the

⁴⁶¹ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 4th ed. (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 10.

⁴⁶² Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *The modern Middle East: A Reader*, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 96-100.

⁴⁶³ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 10-11.

empire to a breakup in almost every military confrontation. This gloomy picture was so dramatic for the bureaucratic elites, who compared the current misery of the empire with its strength at its golden age, that their inevitable task emerged to initiate reforms to catch up with the West. To attain such a goal, they sought to strengthen the structures of the central organization vis-à-vis the domestic challenges to eventually resist European invasion.

The challenges to the reform efforts primarily emerged from the entrenched power holders of the regime, whose vested interests were at risk. These included governors, tax farmers, and local notables across the provinces, alongside the ecclesiastical hierarchies of the religious millets at the center, separatist movements in the Balkans, and even broad segments of the general Muslim populace. In the main, Muslim public opinion was largely uncomfortable with the principle of equality with non-Muslim neighbors, as it eroded their perceived sense of superiority, compounded by the growing economic and legal empowerment of the latter owing to foreign protection.⁴⁶⁴ The notables of the Christian millets perceived the principle of equal taxation and the elimination of ancient privileges as a threat, much like the bankers or moneychangers did since their wealth strictly depended on the existing system, not to mention that the political interests of non-Muslim rulers were at stake, entailing their opposition to the Tanzimat.⁴⁶⁵ The Greek Rum Orthodox Church was subject to diminution of status and perceived the spread of Protestantism and the changing legal status of the Jews troublesome. To the fear of Mustafa Reşid, the Reform Edict of 1856 escalated the inter-communal tensions in the Balkan and Arab provinces with the growing provocations from Russia and France; the bloody civil conflicts in Mount Lebanon, Crete, and Bosnia further impeded the general

⁴⁶⁴ Ufuk Gülsoy, "1856 Islâhât Fermanı'na Tepkiler ve Maraş Olayları," in *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağan*, 443-58 (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991), 451. Moshe Ma'oz, "Tanzimat'ın İlk Yıllarında Modernleşme Hareketinin Suriye Siyaseti ve Toplumunu Üzerindeki Etkisi," in *Tanzimat: Dönüşüm Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, ed. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, 8th ed., (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 278-79.

⁴⁶⁵ Anna Vakalis, "Nationalism, Justice and Taxation in an Ottoman Urban Context during the Tanzimat: The Gazino-Club in Manastır," *Turkish Historical Review* 7 (2016): 195-96.

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population's acceptance of the reforms. The Sharif of Mecca issued a fatwa condemning the Tanzimat circles as heretical and accused them of apostasy (*irtidad*), European (*freng*), and Christian (*nasara*) in line with their contemplation to abolish slavery.⁴⁶⁶

In addition to the resistance from traditional power holders, the reformist rulers faced significant opposition in the capital, particularly from the previous generation of conservative-leaning and court-bound bureaucrats. These individuals strongly opposed to the reformative vision that entailed a profound schism within the high politics of the empire. Koca Hüseyin Mehmed Pasha (1769-1855), Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha (1780-1860), Derendeli Topal İzzet Mehmed Pasha (1792-1855), and Halil Rıfat Pasha (1795-1856) were among the staunch opponents of Mustafa Reşid Pasha during his early years in power. Led by Hasan Rıza Pasha (1808-1877), the next generation of conservatives aligned with the Court fueled the conservative faction, which included Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha (1813-1868), Ahmet Fethi Pasha (1801-1858), and Mehmed Said Pasha (1808-1869). Due to his extensive communication with the Europeans and his inclination toward new methods, these conservatives viewed Reşid Pasha with unease, believing he was not respectful enough to custom and religion.⁴⁶⁷

Amid these internal and external disturbances, the reformist wing could rely on the support of their European counterparts while advancing the modernization program. Their external partners emerged as natural allies in their struggle against conservative rivals in domestic politics, where bureaucrats had traditionally been so vulnerable that internal disputes many times led to the execution of even the highest-ranking officials in the imperial history. Indeed, the execution of Mehmed Said Pertev Pasha (1785-1837), the tutelar of the young Mustafa Reşid, due to internal intrigues approximately two and a half years before the

⁴⁶⁶ Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir*, vol 1, 113.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 8-9.

proclamation of the Tanzimat, must have left a deep impact on the main protagonist of the reform era.⁴⁶⁸ Even when Abdülmecid ascended the throne, Hüsrev Pasha invited Mustafa Reşid and handed him a decree to be sent to the Sultan; while he assumed that this decree was for his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, it turned out to be a petition requesting his execution.⁴⁶⁹ In other words, these statesmen were in such a precarious position that they badly needed political alliances not only to enforce their political program but even to survive. Despite many people at the wolves' table, Mustafa Reşid survived, and so did the Tanzimat.

Tanzimat statesmen presumed that if the Sultan were to deviate from the reform agenda, the European ambassadors would pull him back on track, as there was no domestic social force capable of doing so.⁴⁷⁰ That is to say, the political legitimacy of the reformers in both domestic and international politics depended exactly on this reform program. They represented the only hope that could save the empire from disintegration (for domestic audiences) and open markets to global trade (for international audiences). The delicate intertwining of internal and external balances of power afforded the rising class of bureaucrats a degree of relative autonomy both domestically and internationally. Given that it was a codification movement that redefined the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate, the reforms equally aimed at safeguarding the authority and reputation of this new bureaucratic elites. After all, the concept of centralization itself required the rationalization of the bureaucracy in the Weberian sense; one of the goals was to overthrow arbitrariness in and against the bureaucracy, if another was to transform officials from mere servants of the suzerain (*kul system*) into modern bureaucrats by guaranteeing their safety and personal honor.⁴⁷¹ In the new era, no one was to be presumed

⁴⁶⁸ Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), 36.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., 162.

⁴⁷⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 34. In the words of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, "Fakat Âli Paşa dahi 'Pâdişâh'ın bir taraftan korkusu olmaz ise idâresi kaabil olmaz' itikadında bulunmağla anı frenkler ile ürküterek licâm-ı saltanatı eline alıp da tarîk-i terakkîye sevk etmek niyetinde idi." Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1960), 150.

⁴⁷¹ Şeref, *Tarih Söyleşileri*, 46.

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guilty until proven so, at least on paper, because it had been considered derogatory in traditional governance to banish officials without a fair trial.⁴⁷² The protagonists of the reform project took every opportunity to empower their internal political position and gradually made the Porte more pervasive in the rule of the empire at the expense of the traditional authorities (the Court and the chief Islamic jurist, *Şeyhülislam*). In other words, even though it was a sort of chart unilaterally endowed by the sovereign, the Tanzimat Edict paved the way for the restriction of the political power of the monarch.⁴⁷³ Thus, the state sought to strengthen, rationalize, and expand its apparatus, while the power of the new elites grew in tandem, mutually reinforcing and amplifying one another since the protagonists extended their reach to the far-flung corners of the empire. Their influence was intricately linked to the effectiveness of state power. The result was the emergence of a new type of statesmen, an intermediate stratum to oversee the transition to capitalist mode of economic relations, gaining the upper hand in the policymaking above the ever-expanding organization.⁴⁷⁴

The members of this bureaucratic stratum largely descended from relatively modest social backgrounds and enjoyed a distinguished political identity at its zenith, even though the political interests of the reformers were never homogenous as they appeared. Internal schisms consistently beset even the reformers, exacerbated by the incessant turnover of political power from one faction to another and the relentless interposition of the conservatives linked to the Court. What distinguished the reformers from the highest degree were personal rivalries, generational gaps, and the type of foreign support they secured. The schism was not endemic to the upper echelons; with each transition of power between rival factions, successors were inclined to install their internal allies by liquidating or banishing the followers of their

⁴⁷² Ibid., 51.

⁴⁷³ Halil İnalçık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayûnu," in *Tanzimat: Dönüşüm Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, ed. Halil İnalçık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, 8th ed. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 102-103.

⁴⁷⁴ For a detailed picture of "the Tanzimat man" see Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 2016, 261-298. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 83.

predecessors to rural areas, even within the lower ranks of the state apparatus. It was not uncommon for a prominent statesman to step down, taking his clients with him and leaving their positions to the newcomers altogether. In parallel, the statesmen sought to recruit new proponents and securing new allies among the bureaucrats, thereby expanding their support and clout within the bureaucracy.⁴⁷⁵ One might argue that this way of politics was nourished from the absence of a formal/organized education system at the time to cultivate statesmen based on meritocracy, and it was indispensable for candidates to get acquainted with powerful statesmen not only to enter civil service but also promote consequently within. As a result, the traditional *devşirme* and *kul* systems that had provided social mobility for the lower strata of the society gradually supplanted by the patron-clientele relations in proportion to the expanding bureaucracy, which led to a much more sprawling network of competing factions within the state, while intimate attachment to foreign embassies overlapped with the same system.⁴⁷⁶

Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-1858) was the goliath of this new intellectual/bureaucratic type, so much so that even the birth and success of the edict itself has long been attributed to his genius.⁴⁷⁷ While clashing with the older generation of conservative statesmen in his early years, he relied on British backing to counter French and Russian opposition, with which he never maintained a good relationship throughout his political career. Two of his protégés, Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha (1815-1871) and Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Pasha (1814-1869), quickly rose to prominence in state affairs, becoming his right and left hands given their competencies as statesmen and diplomats.⁴⁷⁸ In league with Mütercim Rüşdi Pasha (1811-1882), nevertheless, Âli and Fuad would take over the political power from Mustafa Reşid in

⁴⁷⁵ "Ol asrın politikası ise herkes kendi tarafını kayırmak ve me'murîn içinde tarafdarlarını çoğaltmak hususlarından ibaret idi." Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir*, vol 1, 87. Also, Ibid., 45.

⁴⁷⁶ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, ed. Ahmet Kuyaş, 18th ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2012), 205-206.

⁴⁷⁷ Şeref, *Tarih Söyleşileri*, 17. Mehmet Kaplan, "Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Yeni Aydın Tipi," in *Tanzimat: Dönüşüm Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, ed. Halil İncelik and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, 8th ed., (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 465.

⁴⁷⁸ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, vol. 1: 14.

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the mid-1850s, marking the rising of a new generation of Tanzimat rulers. Their challenge resulted with the division of the officials into two factions, the supporters of Reşid and those of Âli and Fuad.⁴⁷⁹ This transition of power at home was closely linked to the shifting balance of power abroad, where French preponderance in international relations intensified after the Crimean War (1853-1856), leading to increased competition with British influence in the Ottoman Empire. In other words, this international rivalry also manifested in the circulation of elites within the empire, as the second generation increasingly aligned with French support. Mustafa Reşid was forced to resign in 1857. It was due to his disputes with France over Balkan and Egyptian affairs. His stepping down exemplified another pattern. It became a day-to-day practice for foreign mission officials to unseat Ottoman statemen unless their tendencies were compatible. The death of Mustafa Reşid the following year coincided with the return of his main supporter, the British ambassador to Constantinople, Stratford de Redcliffe (1786–1880), decisively marking the transfer of power to the new generation. Especially after 1861, Âli and Fuad pashas were able to consolidate their full authority in the Ottoman bureaucracy.⁴⁸⁰

Âli and Fuad pashas did not always remain allied; they maintained separate factions within the bureaucracy, balancing each other. Towards the end of his life, the latter began to show a degree of sympathy toward the opponents of the former, the Young Ottomans. Fuad Pasha's death disrupted the political balance, leaving Âli Pasha as the sole dominant figure in 1869.⁴⁸¹ The death of Âli Pasha in 1871 not only signaled a setback for the reform period but also coincided with a new stage in international politics, once two young nation-states, Germany and Italy, strongly emerged on the global stage, tilting the balance of power once again. For the internal politics of the empire, Russian backed Mahmud Nedim Pasha (1818-

⁴⁷⁹ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, vol. 4: 61.

⁴⁸⁰ Butrus Abu Manneh, "Âli ve Fu'ad Paşaların Bâb-ı Âlî'deki Nüfuzlarının Kökleri (1855-1871)," in *Tanzimat: Dönüşüm Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, trans. By Fatih Yeşil, ed. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, 8th ed. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 486.

⁴⁸¹ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, vol. 4: 93-94.

1883) took over the power in the central organization, subsuming the interests of the bureaucratic class under those of the Court, while the position of Şeyhülislam regained a bit of importance through participating in the meetings of the council of ministers, yet the resurgence would reach its apex during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918).⁴⁸²

It was primarily with these influential statesmen that Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees and converts interacted as they entered the polity. They formed new alliances with them, rose and fell with their partners (tutelars and protégés), articulated themselves to the existing schism within the bureaucracy in the last analysis. They basically tried to find their ways through the cracks of these factions. As soon as they arrived on Ottoman soil, the Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha stretched out his leniency to them, while the other grand figures played their parts in the refugee crisis, as seen, Âli Pasha as the Foreign Minister, Fuad Efendi as the special envoy of the Sultan in Petersburg.

Suffering firsthand from difficulties in administration through repetitive backlashes from the older bureaucratic cadres in the provinces as well as the center, Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries were seen as natural allies for Reşid Pasha, who had already contemplated foreign experts' involvement with the reform scheme in the military bureaucracy and local industry years before the refugee issue, as the reformist party was short of know-how to further the reforms.⁴⁸³ On this score, the refugees who had military expertise presented an opportunity to the imperial administrators to consolidate the related reforms.⁴⁸⁴ Their integration into the imperial politics, in this context, gives us an important incentive to suggest that these converts constituted a part of the typology of the new Tanzimat man despite their limited numbers.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸² Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi: Islahat Fermanı Devri (1861-1876)*, vol. 3 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, n.d.), 139.

⁴⁸³ Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa*, 91-92.

⁴⁸⁴ De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 61.

⁴⁸⁵ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 2016, 280.

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The interplay of global and local developments gave birth to the emergence of new class of statesmen; however, while they pursued state-building project through centralizing reforms, the state simultaneously maintained their hold on power. There was a codification campaign that aimed to shift from indirect to direct governance, generating fresh avenues for their political standing, which inevitably colored the nature of the reforms. In other words, rather than pursuing reformist agenda for its own sake, social and political concerns of the Tanzimat rulers were also imbued with these reforms.⁴⁸⁶ They knew that the central government needed to establish a powerful army to ward off external threats as well as to increase tax revenues by reducing the shares of the local notables in the provinces. Historically, centralization of the empire had always embarked on the military canal. The modernization of the army became the driving force behind the whole modernization project indeed, making other developments (administration, economy, literature, architecture, education, and culture) contingent.⁴⁸⁷ Besides the powerful army, the rulers also required a modern police organization independent from the army to function the state in the countryside; to collect taxes, recruit soldiers, monopolize violence, and penetrate society.⁴⁸⁸ In the 1840s, the internal security organization (gendarmerie, *asakir-i zabtiye* before 1879) started to be established.⁴⁸⁹ In addition, a stratified legal system was underway through the Penal Code of 1840, which was to be modified in 1851 and 1858.⁴⁹⁰ The latter meant the recognition of private ownership in the eyes of the central authority, indirectly supporting the centralization of the government. All in all, these developments highlighted a sort of circular dependency, where the government had to increase tax revenues to conduct the envisaged reforms, yet more efficient extraction of

⁴⁸⁶ Nadir Özbek, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İç Güvenlik, Siyaset ve Devlet, 1876-1909," *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 16 (Güz 2004): 74.

⁴⁸⁷ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun*, 51-52.

⁴⁸⁸ Ferdan Ergut, *Modern Devlet ve Polis: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Denetimin Diyalektiği* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 81, 83.

⁴⁸⁹ Nadir Özbek, "Policing the Empire, the Countryside: Gendarmes in Late 19th-Century Ottoman (1876–1908)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 1 (2008): 47.

⁴⁹⁰ Omri Paz, "Documenting Justice: New Recording Practices and the Establishment of an Activist Criminal Court System in the Ottoman Provinces (1840–late 1860s)," *Islamic Law and Society* 21, no. 1 (2014): 82.

resources was dependent upon a more efficient bureaucracy. In any case, the reformers required fiscal reforms to enhance tax revenues, which could be collected with a strong and organized bureaucracy.⁴⁹¹ It is not for nothing that the Tanzimat Edict simultaneously emphasized its commitment to reforming the tax and conscription systems, alongside the preservation of life, property, and personal honor.⁴⁹²

The centralization of the empire in the nineteenth century shall never be regarded in absolute terms. While a more centralized state was underway, forces moving in the opposite direction were concurrently running against the centralization efforts, fostering transnational level of decentralizing tendency as a side effect. The economic modernization implied a transition from the autarchy of the 18th century—where trade was primarily internal with limited exceptions—to the integration into the world market, characterized by international free trade, repeal of internal and external tariffs, and opening up new geographies to international markets, either with coercion or consent.⁴⁹³ In this context, the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838 (Treaty of Balta Liman) epitomized empire's integration into the world-capitalism, along with the subsequent free-trade treaties that extended similar concessions to other European powers, gradually resulting in the commercialization of the agriculture and the gradual semi-colonization of the empire. This shift brought the empire into a deeper engagement with the impact of the world-capitalist system, fundamentally altering the existing rules of the game. Initially granted as bargaining chips to a select few states,

⁴⁹¹ The ratio of military spending within the overall expenditures was not diminishing. For instance, in 1861-62, its share in the total was 61%. The heavy burden of this incremental financial strain and the tensions fell on the peasant flocks. Nadir Özbek, *İmparatorluğun Bedeli: Osmanlı'da Vergi, Siyaset ve Toplumsal Adalet (1839-1908)* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayinevi, 2015), 36, 17.

⁴⁹² "1. The guarantees insuring to our subjects perfect security for life, honor, and fortune. 2. A regular system of assessing and levying taxes. 3. An equally regular system for the levying of troops and the duration of their service." Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa*, 114.

⁴⁹³ Çağlar Keyder, Y. Eyüp Özveren, and Donald Quataert, "Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 16, no. 4 (Fall 1993), 527. The export volume of the area within Türkiye's current borders was quite low, internal trade was playing a more significant role than external trade. Şevket Pamuk, *Uneven Centuries: Turkey's Economic History since 1820* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 115. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 12.

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capitulations and economic concessions turned out to be the instruments of Western penetration in the new era, so much so that it would no longer be possible to get rid of these capitulations or the intervention of the Great Powers in the domestic affairs until the fall of the empire. The efforts of the statesmen to achieve local industrialization through state intervention roughly from 1840 to 1860 were doomed to be futile, surrendering to the private interests.⁴⁹⁴ In a word, the economic centralization of the imperial center gave way to the increasing dependence on global market forces.

The economic peripheralization primarily set out through the port-cities of the Mediterranean shores, where transnational interactions intensified inasmuch as the commodity chains crossed the imperial frontiers. The needs of the capital interests overlapped with the centralizing ambitions of the central authority, driving both to embrace the developments in communication and transportation technologies of the time. One of the most important technological breakthroughs in this sense was the widespread adoption of the steamship, which was invented in the early nineteenth century and yet brought into force to expand market operations in the second half. Steamers revolutionized maritime transportation by making journeys faster, safer, and more scalable, while also greatly improving accuracy and predictability of voyages in terms of time and destination. As screw-propelled steamships replaced older models by the mid-century, with each decade bringing new technological advancements in steamships, the passenger ship was gradually upgraded, decisively increasing the mobility of the ordinary people.⁴⁹⁵ In the aggregate, port-cities became more tightly connected, paving the way for more frequent and regular circulation of commodities, capital, people, and information between them. This dynamic led to the evolution of many ports into

⁴⁹⁴ Rıfat Önsoy, "Tanzimat Dönemi Sanayileşme Politikası 1839-1876," *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (1984), 11.

⁴⁹⁵ M. Emre Kılıçarslan, "Avusturya Lloyd Vapur Kumpanyası'nın Osmanlı İskelelerindeki Faaliyetleri," (PhD Diss., Ondokuzmayıs Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2013), 7.

cosmopolitan hubs. These cities increasingly became receptive to outside influences and developments, regarding the emerging political and cultural trends in the mid-century.

Steamships began entering the Ottoman coasts around the 1820s, if not abruptly after its invention, though the Tanzimat era marked the transitive period of maritime transportation from sailing boats to steamships, which would eventually result in the victory of the latter.⁴⁹⁶ The port-city of Galați became a regional passageway as a result of the maritime developments in the first half of the century. The Austrian Danube Steamship Company started operations in this port on the lower Danube in 1834, launching regular fortnightly journeys to the capital of the empire through the coasts of Tulcea and Varna.⁴⁹⁷ While Varna functioned an important seaway to Romania from Constantinople (along with Constanța), Tulcea emerged as the main administrative and economic center under the Ottoman rule until 1878.⁴⁹⁸ The Austrian Lloyd, a maritime giant founded in Trieste, made an appearance in the Ottoman waters in 1840, extending steamship voyages from Galați to Constantinople.⁴⁹⁹ Innovation in maritime transportation paved the way for other advancements, such as the more rational handling of mailing in 1840, resulting from the increased efficiency of ship voyages. However, it became the Crimean War that marked a watershed moment in the development of modern communication and transportation, as it was the first time telegraphic lines were laid down between Europe and the Ottoman Empire to enhance the efficiency in communication among the belligerent allies. The port of Sulina became "the main debauchee of European trade on the

⁴⁹⁶ İlhan Ekici, "XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Deniz Ticaretinde Değişim ve Tepkiler," *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 21, no. 2 (2006), 48-49. Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914*, vol. 2, edited by Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 800.

⁴⁹⁷ İlhan Ekici, "Tuna Ticaret Komisyonu ve Tuna'da Ticaret (1856-1883)" (PhD Diss., Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1998), 40.

⁴⁹⁸ Constantin Iordachi, "Global Networks, Regional Hegemony, and Seaport Modernization on the Lower Danube," in *Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day*, edited by Biray Kolluoğlu and Meltem Tokgöz (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 158.

⁴⁹⁹ Ubcini, *Türkiye 1850: Maliye-Ordu-Millet*, vol. 1, translated by Cemal Karaağaçlı (Istanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, n.d.), 380.

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Lower Danube."⁵⁰⁰ Cables were laid to connect the capital of the empire with the two fronts of the war: Rumelia and Crimea. The lines that linked Constantinople, Crimea, and Varna were constructed by the British initiative, while the French connected this network to Shumen (*Şumnu*), Ruse (*Rusçuk*), Giurgiu (*Yergöğü*), and Bucharest through Varna, and thence the whole network were extended to wire Edirne and Constantinople by 1855.⁵⁰¹ Thus, the capital of the empire was tightly connected to the capital of the Austrian Empire through the Danube on the one hand, to the Kingdom of Sardinia through the port of Genoa, on the other.⁵⁰² In this context, the historical region of Dobruja in Romania transformed into a nodal point of communication for wider regions, linking Central Europe and the Mediterranean hinterland.⁵⁰³

These improvements in communication and transportation technologies meant different things to different interests. They were catalysts that pulled the volume of trade to huge scales, being essential for the opening of new spaces to the world market for the business interests. "Capitalism now had the entire world at its disposal," asserts Hobsbawm, and the world trade went up by 260 percent between 1850 and 1870.⁵⁰⁴ The Crimean War proved to be a decisive stage for the opening of the Ottoman economy to international markets.⁵⁰⁵ Nonetheless, while presenting opportunities to strengthen administrative centralization and modernization for the Tanzimat rulers, increased commercial engagement garnered greater diplomatic intervention in the domestic affairs, given that new foreign missions were being established to protect the growing capital interests of their subjects. The peripheralization of the imperial economy was not the only countercurrent undermining the centralization; increasing mobility of the non-government actors posed another centrifugal force since the

⁵⁰⁰ Iordachi, "Global Networks," 158.

⁵⁰¹ Musa Çadircı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 297.

⁵⁰² Ubiçini, *Maliye-Ordu-Millet*, 367-368.

⁵⁰³ Iordachi, "Global Networks," 163.

⁵⁰⁴ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, 49.

⁵⁰⁵ Pamuk, *Uneven Centuries*, 113.

ever-expanding overseas trade provided fertile ground for anti-systemic movements through the supply and information chains that the new technologies traversed. In that sense, steamers (also developments in railways) not only facilitated mobility for bureaucratic and commercial operations but also smuggled arms and weapons intended for use against central governments, aided insurgents and fugitives to move between port-cities of different countries, and to communicate secret messages and rebellious publications between regions. This occurred exactly at the time when the Porte tried to control and regulate unjustified mobility through passport-like documentation, *mürûr tezkiresi*, through *Men-i Mürûr Nizamnamesi* (Regulations Pursuant to the Regulation of Movement) in 1841. In other words, there was a constant struggle between centralizing and decentralizing tendencies from the largest to the smallest scales in the period of great transformations. In this context, it would be too simplistic to assert that one of the tendencies was necessarily destined to prevail the other. Rather, it is more convenient to talk about the grey areas where the opposing tendencies clash with one another. Indeed, the efficiency of the new technologies in endorsing anti-systemic undercurrents varied depending on the prevailing power dynamics of the day; while a Russian-flagged steamer offered refuge to Greek insurgents in the Ottoman Balkans, it posed a threat to the Polish revolutionaries at the same time. Because maritime companies required enormous capital investments, they were necessarily carrying themselves with the state backing, making their operations a matter of diplomatic concern. Steamers were regarded de facto soil of the government under whose flag they sailed. In this way, steamships turned into means of alienation in the eyes of the ordinary Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire, operating without fully subsuming under the authority of their state.⁵⁰⁶ In terms of the power relations, the same tensions also applied to postal services and railway companies. Thanks to these developments in communication and transportation, cities such as Constantinople, Izmir (Smyrna), Bursa, Salonika, Beirut, Varna,

⁵⁰⁶ İlhan Ekinci, "Osmanlı'da Yabancı Vapur Kumpanyaları ve İmajları Hakkında," *Kebikeç* no. 21 (2006): 76.

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and Alexandria (Egypt) transformed into regional hubs, attracting numerous political exiles, refugees, revolutionaries, and outlaws who interacted with one another. Their underground activities foreshadowed the "age of rogues," as they exploited imperial rivalries and transgressed boundaries to expand their autonomy, thereby attempting to transform political landscapes and institutions.⁵⁰⁷

Technological developments foster new ecosystems for socialization within a range of possible communicative (or communicable) space.⁵⁰⁸ As people gather information and articulate new discursive amalgamations within this auratic space, their imagination, expressed through language, is embedded into this context (which corresponds to a material context) that makes people capable of doing things.⁵⁰⁹ Print media, in particular, encapsulated this larger space in the nineteenth century, altering temporal and spatial awareness of ordinary people; inasmuch as the literary public became more attuned not only to political developments in their immediate surroundings but also to concurrent events in far-reaching places, a transnational civil society gradually emerged in return. The politicization of the masses highlighted a decisive rupture in the conception of the state and society, where the latter came to the fore as something that had to be governed, disciplined, and molded. "Defenders of social order" underlines Hobsbawm, "had to learn new ways of conducting politics, i.e., influencing public opinion."⁵¹⁰ The centralizing state employed all available mechanisms to infiltrate the public sphere, which was increasingly seen as a centrifugal force, to achieve its intended goals, regulating the body and mind of individuals to the desired ends.

⁵⁰⁷ Alp Yenen and Ramazan Hakkı Öztan, "Age of Rogues: Transgressive Politics at the Frontiers of the Ottoman Empire," in *Age of Rogues: Rebels, Revolutionaries, and Racketeers at the Frontiers of Empires*, edited by Ramazan Hakkı Öztan and Alp Yenen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 4.

⁵⁰⁸ Göran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1980), 80.

⁵⁰⁹ Nikolas Rose, "Assembling the Modern Self," in *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*, edited by Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997), 239.

⁵¹⁰ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, 39.

The nineteenth century differs from the previous centuries in the history of the Ottoman Empire in the sense that the symbolic representation of the sovereign was gradually subsumed into a direct representation, given that the imagined bond between the subjects and their suzerain had to be reinforced.⁵¹¹ Signaling a more direct communication with the literate public, the first official gazette, *Tâkvim-i Vekâyi*, started publication in 1831 to inform the population about the modernization program during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, and was followed by a semi-official paper, *Ceride-i Havadis*, which started in 1840, with a special emphasis on public communication of the financial and commercial interests. To voice the independent public, the evolution of journalism in the empire reached a milestone in the 1860s with the emergence of private newspapers, such as *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* (1860), founded by Agâh Efendi (1832-1885) and İbrahim Şinasi (1826-1871), and *Tasvir-i Efkâr* (1862), also associated with Şinasi and Nâmık Kemâl (1840-1888). Given their content, these initiatives bear witness that the literate public in the capital was as interested in the latest developments abroad as the news from various parts of the empire. Indeed, prompted by the raising public awareness and advances in communication technologies, even just reporting on revolution became a prominent concern for the print media, from the revolutionary events of 1848 to the major European wars of the 1850s.⁵¹² Transnational alliances and hostilities between patriotic movements in the second half of the century played out against the background of the rise of transnational public opinion.

Ever since the Spanish experience of the Trienio Liberal (1820-1823), it was possible to talk about a new political culture of internationalist ideology, which inculcated that promoting liberty required coordinated efforts across Europe because the emancipation of all was considered a precondition for peace and security on the whole continent.⁵¹³ This idea

⁵¹¹ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire (1700-1922)*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 55.

⁵¹² Lucy Riall, *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 76, 185.

⁵¹³ Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Emigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35.

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culminated in the efforts of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), who initiated *Giovine Europa* (Young Europe) in Bern in 1834.⁵¹⁴ The trans-nationalization of the revolutionary activities and ideologies took place through the displacement of revolutionaries (along with opinion-makers, journalists, and intellectuals) who constituted an international network of personal contacts and liberal diasporas outside their home countries.⁵¹⁵ Revolutions led to the formation of transgressive mode of politics through the networks of these figures and their post-revolutionary activities echoed beyond the confines of the immediate political jurisdiction.⁵¹⁶ Nevertheless, the states as corporate institutions were also linked to each other through interstate systems and subdivided alliances, with much broader surveilling capabilities against the transnational revolutionary cooperations. In response to transnational public opinion, ideologies, and revolutionary activities, surveillance practices were also getting transnational, not only through the armies of conservative regimes that were ready to intervene neighboring regions but also their police and intelligence mechanisms coordinated their efforts to demolish liberal movements.⁵¹⁷ In addition to document-based mobility restrictions, for instance, secret police networks diffused beyond the national and imperial borders, especially if the host country was not eager to obstruct certain seditious activities. While the motivation of the revolutionaries was to trigger a worldwide change, the imperial centers under the threat of the subversive movements resorted to cooperation, albeit their huge differences, at the highest level to surveil, forestall, and tackle the revolution. The international order established with the Treaty of Vienna (1815) allowed the intervention of imperial rules to the liberal movements. The convergence of the transnational revolutionary activities was an important phenomenon in

⁵¹⁴ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 67.

⁵¹⁵ Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 23.

⁵¹⁶ Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism*, 66.

⁵¹⁷ In the case of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees, I ran into a dispatch of the Ottoman envoy to Paris, underlining the necessity "*vikaye-i zabıta-ı müşterekte için*" (on the account of common surveillance). Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 106. The fear that the exiles from the German states might establish a united front helped the synchronization of police work in these states, the Habsburg Empire included, in the aftermath of the Revolutions of 1848. Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 195.

the long nineteenth century, though the divergence and sub-groupings at the transnational level in tandem with the balance of power in high politics was equally the case. Patterns of divergence persisted also within transnational contexts, extending beyond narrowly defined national objectives.

The final point to emphasize about transnational public opinion and revolutionary activities is the dynamic interplay between public sentiments that had a keen interest in international developments and governments that had a keen interest in public sentiments beyond their jurisdiction. Governments not only sought to consolidate and manipulate the public opinion within their borders in terms of transnational revolutionary activities but also sought to influence public opinions elsewhere. The Tanzimat era highlights an intrinsic relationship between internal and external politics. With public opinion emerging as a significant global force, the Ottoman administration grew highly attuned to the empire's image abroad. One of the key objectives of the ruling elite at this period was to secure the recognition of the empire as one of the civilized powers, which required them to overcome traditional prejudices and cultivate a positive image in their place. One of the methods that the reformer rulers institutionalized to achieve its foreign policy objectives was to affect international public opinion through the printed press.⁵¹⁸ In this sense, the empire badly desired to win the hearts of intellectuals in the so-called civilized world, along with its wider public, to put pressure on European governments from below and to eventually attain favorable results, a strategy akin to what would later be known as public diplomacy. Mustafa Reşid Pasha seized the opportunity presented by the refugee crisis to turn the tides in the popular perception in Europe against the empire, which turned out to have worked. Consequently, the collective efforts of the statesmen, including Reşid, Âli, and Fuad pashas, instilled confidence in European public opinion and

⁵¹⁸ Roderick Davison, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Diplomasisinin Modernleşmesi," in *Tanzimat: Dönüşüm Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, edited by Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, 8th ed., (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 299-300. Also see De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 125-126.

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reinforced not only of the reliability of the reform era but also the internal standing of the bureaucratic elite. According to Cevdet Pasha, who was the firsthand witness of the refugee crises, be in Privy Council be in his special mission in Bucharest near Fuad Efendi, the protection of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries endowed great honor with the Muslim community in Europe and America, so much so that wherever a European saw a man with fez on the streets of Paris and London demonstrated their respects, saying, "Long live the Turks!"⁵¹⁹ In his book, French journalist Ubicini (1818–1884), who followed the Revolutions of 1848 in Eastern Europe, explains his motivation to pen his famous *Lettres sur la Turquie* (Letters on Türkiye), as a response to the dire necessity of publicizing the reforms, scarcely recognized in the West, amid the renewed interest in the Ottoman Empire following the refugee issue, which was "the chivalrous rejection" against the pressures from Austria and Russia.⁵²⁰ To no one's surprise, he also puts forward that the survival of the empire was a priority for maintaining the balance of power in Europe and criticized those who believed that it could not be reformed.⁵²¹ In fact, it was the discourse the Porte advanced that the empire's survival was essential for the security of Europe, particularly as a counterbalance to Russian expansion in the Balkans, amidst the intense competition on international stage over the so-called Eastern Question, the argument resonated with several statesmen and journalists in England and France.⁵²² The Porte's protective measure extended to the refugees in 1849 seems to have had far-reaching consequences for its survival since it drew external sympathies to the empire, turning the legitimacy of the Tanzimat reforms into a showcase, while simultaneously consolidating the reformist faction's legitimacy at home.

⁵¹⁹ Cevdet Paşa, vol. 4, *Tezâkir*: 28-29.

⁵²⁰ M.A. Ubicini, *Türkiye 1850: Tanzimat-Ulema-Başın*, vol. 2, trans. Cemal Karaağaçlı (Istanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, n.d.), 23-25.

⁵²¹ Ibid., 197. Ubicini, *Maliye-Ordu-Millet*, 317, 444.

⁵²² Ibid., 424. Particularly after the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (1833), the British foreign policy started to accumulate a strong sense of Russophobia, the suppression of Polish uprising in 1831 and the Hungarian revolution in 1849 only heightened this sentiment. Russia was considered to be the stronghold of reaction. Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 87.

Russia's influence in European politics greatly increased after the Revolutions of 1848, earning it the title of the "Gendarme of Europe." The spirit of Holy Alliance was unprecedentedly dependent on the presence and military might of Russia. Even though Tsarist Russia emerged from the revolutionary wave with military victories, it suffered a significant diplomatic defeat at the hands of the Porte over the refugee crisis, prompting Russia to pursue more aggressive policy against the empire to settle the score. Through the crisis over the Holy Places, it put more pressure on the Sublime State by way of its patronage over the rights of the Orthodox Christians. While this tension led to the Crimean War, the refugee issue had enhanced the prestige and respect to the Ottoman Empire to such an extent that England and France found compelling to support it against Russia.

In early March 1853, Russia's foreign minister Prince Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov (1787-1869) paid a visit to the Porte, asking for the replacement of the Ottoman Foreign Minister Fuad Efendi, putting pressures on the Grand Vizier Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha in a threatening manner.⁵²³ The Ottomans did not resist, yet the Tsar ordered Russian armies to invade Moldavia and Wallachia under the command of Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov (1793-1861).⁵²⁴ The war resulted in the victory of the Allies, after which the Porte participated for the first time in an international conference on equal footing with the Great Powers. Moreover, the Treaty of Paris (1856) sealed the legitimacy of the empire and its reform politics. The treaty was a landmark moment in which the integrity of the empire, which was on the brink of disintegration, was placed under the joint guarantee of the European powers, provided they were authorized to oversee the reforms. This specific arrangement, however, opened the door for international powers to interfere in its internal affairs. The disruptive effects of the rapprochement between Russia and France right after the war would be felt in the Ottoman

⁵²³ Ibid., 73.

⁵²⁴ Ibid., 81.

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Balkans, highlighting the diplomatic aspect of the centralization-decentralization dialectic that is emphasized throughout the discussion of the Tanzimat period in this chapter.

All in all, the Tanzimat era was an age of contradictions between centralizing and decentralizing tendencies in both internal and external politics, which were intricately welded. Amidst the fluctuations resulted from the clashes of these aptitudes, the rulers of the empire had to lay the foundations for a cohesive ideology, *Ottomanism*, which served as an umbrella term calling for a common identity that transcended ethnic and religious differences, centered around the loyalty to the existing dynasty, in order to create an Ottoman Nation.⁵²⁵ Unlike a discriminatory and homogenizing ethnic or religious advocacy, the governing ideology of the era suggested a more inclusive imagination, the nucleus of an egalitarian citizenship and patriotism.⁵²⁶ It was within this ideological framework that Hungarian, Polish, and Italian Forty-Eighters became Ottoman subjects upon conversion. Since this study concerns their political identities, it is necessary to discuss the imperial politics of conversion in the era, within the politics of the *Ottomanism*.

During the Tanzimat era, the issues of conversion and apostasy gradually came to signify the perceived level of civilization in the empire. For this very reason, the imperial elites dealt with the conversion cases with utmost caution. In the imperial order of 1839, the Sultan declared his commitment for the protection of honor and property of all subjects, irrespective of millet statuses:

These imperial concessions shall extend to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be; they shall enjoy them without exception. We therefore grant perfect security to the inhabitants of our empire in

⁵²⁵ Ahmad, *Türkiye*, 35. The spirit of this ideal initially emerged in the 1830s with the advent of the reforms and evolved rather in a pragmatic way than through a clear ideological formulation. Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi," in *Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi (1839-1913)*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekin, 8th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 91. The idea culminated in the first constitutional period, where the subjects were welcome as "Osmanlı, whatever religion or creed they hold." Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review* 59, no. 4 (July 1954): 848.

⁵²⁶ Ibid., 852.

their lives, their honor, and their fortunes, as they are secured to them by the sacred text of the law.⁵²⁷

Assuring personal inviolability to all subjects without making (religious and sectarian) distinction implied equality before the law, and thus, religious equality was embedded into the spirit of the Tanzimat reforms.⁵²⁸ In effect, the primary focus of the reforms between 1839 and 1856 was to ensure religious equality, and more importantly, to win the hearts and minds of the non-Muslim population, even at the cost of occasionally arousing uneasiness among Muslims. The main idea was to attach the former to the empire, and eventually, to preserve its integrity. Efforts to this end gained more momentum with the Reform Edict of 1856.⁵²⁹ As moderation was the norm in the relations between the imperial center and its non-Muslim subjects, the spirit of the reforms entailed a far more liberal approach to the question apostasy and conversion than ever before.⁵³⁰

One might suggest that the Ottoman administration had always been cautious about conversion to Islam, as well as unwilling to give unconditional consent to mass conversions since the classical times, yet it was all the more so in the nineteenth century, when the bodies of the non-Muslim subjects became one of the contested domains where the Great Power politics played out. During the period of transition, when the old had not yet been fully replaced by the new, conversion and apostasy emerged as highly delicate issues for the internal and external balances of power, and the bureaucratic elite viewed these thorny issues with utmost caution not to jeopardize the entire reform project.⁵³¹ At any rate, conversion and apostasy remained sensitive issues for all the religious communities, yet the involvement of the foreign

⁵²⁷ Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 115.

⁵²⁸ Şeref, *Tarih Söyleşileri*, 51.

⁵²⁹ For the edict see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 149-153.

⁵³⁰ The moderation here can be understood well if the period is contrasted with the government's take on the conversion and apostasy during the "Muslim *etatisme* of Abdülhamid II." Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 124.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

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powers with conversion and apostasy cases according to their privileges aiming at exerting influence over their co-religionists within the empire further complicated the issue.

Tsarist Russia played the role of the protector of the Orthodox population, France was protecting the Catholics in the Middle East, and England and Prussia were backing the Protestant communities throughout the empire. Since almost every conversion case was met with opposition from the related councils and ambassadors, the Porte vigilantly processed conversion appeals with caution to prevent both the alienation of the subjects and the tiniest possibility of misunderstanding that could lead to foreign interference, which was now a more pressing concern than earlier century. These sensitives entailed a more institutionalized and bureaucratized handling, not only to standardize and centralize the religious affairs in congruence with the spirit of the reform era, but also to ensure that conversions were indeed voluntary, leaving no room for rumors otherwise, while negotiating the concerns of all relevant parties. The bureaucratization was calibrated in accordance with the Islamic doctrine, which dictates that conversion must be out of free will (*bi't tav' ve'r rızâ*), without coercion by individuals of maturity, and without any expectation of material benefit. The real motive shall be nothing but sincere.⁵³² Nevertheless, no one can deny the existence of grey areas when it comes to religious affiliation and commitment of any individual, let alone converts and apostates, though the rulers did not take up the responsibility to measure sincerity at the time. Religious conversion of individuals was officially recorded unless their cases were evaluated insincere. The official recognition led to a change in people's religious status, which had legal consequences. In other words, legal recognition was an administrative act rather than witnessing to religious sincerity. The official approach to conversion was pragmatic and flexible in such a way that the Tanzimat statesmen seem to have invented a "hierarchy of conversion," while evaluating appeals of the candidates to convert according to their usefulness

⁵³² Mehmet Şeker, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde İhtidâ Kavramı ve Mühtediler* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2007), 42-43.

or nuisance potential. Those with valuable expertise that could serve the reform agenda were welcomed, whereas vagabonds were seen as liabilities to the reform politics.⁵³³ It was an era when the empire was undertaking a sweeping reform program, through which the Ottoman/Turkish state was emerging in the modern sense of the word, yet the main protagonists suffered harsh opposition both at the center and in the provinces, and they were exclusively short of qualified manpower to implement the program, perennial concern for the reformist rulers. To recall, their quest for reform was intrinsically linked to maintaining their hold on to the power, which explains their motivation to incorporate converts, who could lend their service to the rulers, into the polity as internal allies against domestic rivals who were suspicious of the reforms. It is no secret that the Tanzimat statesmen were neither popular among the Muslim populace at large because of the reforms aiming at leveling up the legal gap between Muslims and non-Muslims.⁵³⁴ In consequence, the period under investigation prompted the imperial elite to adjust their course of action toward conversion and apostasy, maneuvering through delicate power dynamics given the empire's declining international standing and their precarious standing at home, yet without significantly straying from the core religious principles. The Tanzimat State could easily make room for Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries in the military and civil bureaucracy for benefitting from their expertise, without paying too much attention to their religious commitment. In this sense, the practice of the rulers to recruit non-Muslim experts through conversion and to integrate them into the administrative framework, and thereby securing their loyalty to the state echoes a modern iteration of the *Devshirme* system.⁵³⁵

⁵³³ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 157.

⁵³⁴ It is emblematic in the literature to stress that those anti-reformists showed their resentment against the Tanzimat through accusing its "enforcers" of infidelity, such as "Gavur Paşa." Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 859.

⁵³⁵ I presented this analytical framework about the imperial politics of conversion for the first time here. İlkay Kirişçioğlu, "Political Discourse Converted by Identity Shift: A Different Trajectory of Hungarian Patriotism in the 19th Century," paper presented at Locating the Self, Negotiating the Other: Conversion and Imperial Rule in the Early Modern Period, Department of Eastern European History, University of Münster, Germany, October 5–7, 2023.

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Overall, nineteenth-century globalization profoundly affected Ottoman state and society. These effects have been examined through the lens of two conflicting but overlapping processes: Centralization of the state apparatus and its decentralizing consequences owing to trans-nationalization. The structural transformation of the empire into a modern state generated brand-new opportunities for agents amid the tension of these contradicting tendencies to pursue their anti-systemic courses within the interstices of the evolving social structures and political institutions they happened to confront. Modernization was a gradual process transitioning from the old to the new, through which social agents were able to create new spaces of action within the cracks of existing power configurations. Dialectically, it was one of the counterproductive consequences of fast-changing times, *double movement*, in Polanyi's conceptualization, as a key to understanding how liberal market system paved the way for paradoxical results in the history of everyday life. "Society" underscores Polanyi, "protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system—this was the one comprehensive feature in the history of the age."⁵³⁶

The efforts of the Tanzimat reformers to restructure the Ottoman Empire (1839-1871) coincided with the emergence of the modern Italian nation-state (1848-1870). This overlap fostered gradual interaction between the two realms, with the increasing interest of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the Balkans and the involvement of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees and converts in the Ottoman Empire.

2.4. The Italian Risorgimento (1848-1870): Garibaldi's Way

The long unyielding sod had been broken up by the Revolutionary ploughshare, and now that the all too efficient ploughman was at last under the lock and key, 'great spirits' already 'on earth' were 'sojourning', each destined to cast seed of his own into the tumbled soil.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁶ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 79-80.

⁵³⁷ George M. Trevelyan, *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic, 1848-9* (London: Longmans, 1928), 7.

The Risorgimento was both a political and cultural phenomenon, unfolding from the end of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, aiming to establish the Italian nation and the construction of its state (independence and unity).⁵³⁸ The "resurrection" of homeland in this sense can be traced back to Napoléon's invasion of Italy, after which liberal ideas and institutions were introduced to the people of the peninsula [il Triennio Repubblicano (1796-1799)] under the French influence, except for the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. The period witnessed vivid political debates in journals, associations, and civic festivals, as well as the spread of Jacobin ideas and practices. So much so that, roughly after the second republican wave [*l'età Napoleonica* (1800-1815)], underground activities mushroomed to bring about political unification, though with an anti-French twist, as the French had invasion brought unification, not independence.⁵³⁹ First emerged in the city of Naples, the Carbonari (1806-1810) quickly spread to other Italian states and to even other European countries, which gave the way to the establishment of *Giovine Italia* (Young Italy) in the port city of Marseille, which aimed to support the universal values of freedom, equality, and fraternity.⁵⁴⁰ The restoration period in the peninsula smashed the movement, which resulted in the introduction of a new "institution" into the political life of Italy. Exile became the defining feature of Italy's history between 1799 and 1860. The phenomenon applied to a large portion of the educated elite, who would play a crucial role in shaping the patriotic movement and fostering a sense of national identity.⁵⁴¹

The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) caused political division of *il Bel Paese* under foreign monarchs. Lombardy and Venetia were subsumed under the Austrian Empire,

⁵³⁸ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, v.

⁵³⁹ Joachim Murat's proclamation in 1815 following the defeat of Napoléon can be regarded as the first manifestation of the unity and independence against foreign domination. Luis Miguel Selvelli, *Antenati a Costantinopoli: Esuli italiani negli anni del riformismo ottomano 1828-1878* (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2022), 186.

⁵⁴⁰ Emilj Consuelo Malara, "Tanzimat Reformları ve İtalyanlar (1838-1876)" (Master's thesis, Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018), 26-27.

⁵⁴¹ Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 1.

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alongside the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Central Italian Duchies of Modena and Parma, which were indirectly ruled by the House of Austria. The Papal States were restored to papal authority, and the Kingdom of Naples and the island of Sicily—known as the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies combined—were returned to the Bourbon King Ferdinando I.⁵⁴² The restoration did not change much on the peninsula. French hegemony gave way to Austrian hegemony.⁵⁴³

Revolutionary waves always found concurrence in Italy (including 1820-1821, 1830-1831, and 1848-1849). The latest one was the Springtime of Nations, which emerged in the capital of Sicily as a forerunner of the world-shaking events of 1848.⁵⁴⁴ Amid growing pressures, Ferdinand II of Bourbon promulgated the constitution for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies towards the end of January. Likewise, the Grand Duke of Tuscany granted a constitution on February 17.⁵⁴⁵ In keeping with these developments, Prince Czartoryski's representatives intensified their activities in Rome. He endorsed the unification of Italy under the leadership of liberal Pope Pious IX (1792-1878), while also offering military support against Austrian intervention. The underlying aim was to overturn Vatican's uncompromising opposition to the Polish independence.⁵⁴⁶

The revolutionary events across the Habsburg Empire, including uprisings in Vienna and Budapest, resonated in the imperial possessions in Italy (Lombardy and Venetia), adding to the broader revolutionary wave. Fervent demonstrators surged through the streets of Venice on March 17. Governor Pálffy was forced to release imprisoned patriots, including notable figures such as Daniele Manin (1804–1857) and Niccolò Tommaseo (1802–1874). Milan erupted in insurrection (from 18th March to 22nd, *Cinque Giornate di Milano*), paving the way

⁵⁴² Lucy Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society and National Unification* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 13.

⁵⁴³ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 39.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., 44.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., 72.

⁵⁴⁶ Abraham G. Duker, "The Polish Political Émigrés and the Jews in 1848," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 24 (1955): 90-91. M. K. Dziewanowski, "Czartoryski and His Essai sur la Diplomatie," *Slavic Review* 30, no. 3 (September 1971): 596.

for the retreat of the Austrian army and the proclamation of the Republic of Venice. The next day, Carlo Alberto of Savoy (1798-1849) declared war on Austria, inciting an enthusiasm for liberation throughout the peninsula. This move garnered to Sardinia nearly unconditional support from all the patriots across the political spectrum, even including the republicans. With this moral support, it did not take long for the Royal Sardinian Army to reach the capital of Lombardy.⁵⁴⁷ The public opinion in Austria prompted the Pope, who had earlier initiated a reform program, to turn reactionary in late April.⁵⁴⁸ This meant that the unification of Italy under Pope's authority was no longer applicable. Moreover, Ferdinando II seized the opportunity in mid-May to stand against the revolutionary wave by opening fire on the masses in Naples, shutting down the parliament, and recalling the troops sent to Piedmont against Austria.⁵⁴⁹ The Grand Duke of Tuscany also turned reactionary, gradually adopting repressive measures against the liberal movement. Piedmont had achieved much of the unification ideal on the peninsula, yet Radetzky put an end to the first phase of the revolution at Custozza in late July.

The Roman Republic was proclaimed in February 1849. Elected to the Constituent Assembly, Mazzini supported Sardinian's war effort against Austria and subsequently joined the triumvirate (along with Aurelio Saffi [1819-1890] and Carlo Armellini [1777-1863]) that governed the republic.⁵⁵⁰ The second phase of Sardinian's war against Austria started in March but lasted only three days. The humiliating defeat at Novara forced Carlo Alberto to abdicate in favor of Vittorio Emanuele II (1820-1878). After that the French troops made a naval landing in Civitavecchia in late April to capture Rome. Meanwhile Garibaldi and Luciano Manara arrived in the city to mount a defense against the French.⁵⁵¹ The intervention was a dishonoring

⁵⁴⁷ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 77-78.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., 78-79.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., 80.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., 82-83.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., 83-84.

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act of the French republicans as a fratricide, according to a contemporary Hungarian journal.⁵⁵² The Austrian Empire concurrently began invading the Papal Legations in Central Italy. Radetzky sent troops to Tuscany, leading to the return of the King Leopold II in July 1849. On August 6, Radetzky entered Milan.

After the Sardinian defeat at Novara, Manin led the triumvirate in Venice. He immediately initiated diplomatic efforts to gain recognition for the republic, which was under the threat of the Austrian army commanded by Field Marshall Haynau. Venice capitulated on August 24 upon the news of the surrender of the Hungarians in Világos.⁵⁵³ On the contrary to the Italian Legion in the Hungarian War of Independence (with 1,100 soldiers under the command of Monti), the Hungarian Legion in support of the Italian War of Independence (60 soldiers under the command of Lajos Winkler in October 1848 in Venice and 110 participants organized by István Türr [1825-1908] in January 1849) did not make a significant impact.⁵⁵⁴

While the Revolutions of 1848 subjected Hungary to Habsburg Neo-absolutism (1849-1867), the Bach System—named after the Austrian Minister of the Interior, which intensified suppression—Italy faced a dual tyranny. In the south, oppression was embodied by the Bourbon rule under the notorious Ferdinando II, known as "Bomba." Until 1852, Naples was governed by a repressive police regime that enforced oppression intensively. In Lombardo-Veneto, it was heavy handed regime, with the governorship of Radetzky who sat in Milano until 1857.⁵⁵⁵ The greatest external impediment to the unification of Italy emerged Austria, which had underdeveloped both Italy and Hungary, according to a somehow obsolete terminology.⁵⁵⁶ Even though the Habsburg Empire managed to suppress the revolutionary waves down to Central Italy, the transnational networks of personal contacts among the

⁵⁵² Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 210.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., 371. Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 39.

⁵⁵⁴ László Pete, "Ungheresi tra i Mille," *Rivista di Studi Ungheresi* 10 (2011): 8-9.

⁵⁵⁵ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 96-97.

⁵⁵⁶ Hanák, "Rapporti Storici Italo-Ungheresi," 213-214.

displaced revolutionaries and intellectuals turned out to gain a fresh momentum once the latest revolutionary wave came to nothing, with thousands of refugees sprawled across the world. In this way, their sojourn prompted a subterranean dynamic, which dialectically became essential motion to wave new political fabrics across Europe.

Being an exile was not an easy setup, which pushed the protagonists to make sacrifices and compromises in their personal lives and political ideas, along with new set of alliances subsequent to the wars and revolutions that forged new order of things. For many, the best they could do in exile was to propagate their national cause to literate public of the host society, to lobby in the presence of high officials of the host country, to fundraise and establish secret societies for an upcoming resurrection, and to network and seek cooperative partnerships with other exile organizations for concerted efforts. All these required negotiations with multiple parties. Hence a level of moderation in the political discourses and activities of the exile 48ers, which fit into the larger historical context, considering that it was the era of moderation, particularly the bourgeoisie ceased to be revolutionary after the Springtime of Nations.⁵⁵⁷ That said, the Revolutions of 1848 posed a pivotal moment for the development of mass politics in Europe, which supplanted revolutionary militancy in the larger scheme; as Riall notes, "although the public sphere became more nationalist, nationalism itself became more moderate."⁵⁵⁸

The negative image of the Habsburgs in both Italian and Hungarian territories undeniably left a concrete room for future collaboration among the exiles from these regions, under the guidance of their experiences in Venice, Sardinia, and Hungary in 1848 and 1849. The representatives of the oppressed nations gathered and worked together in key hubs, such as London, Paris, Turin, Bern-Geneva, and Constantinople, to coordinate their efforts;

⁵⁵⁷ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, 33.

⁵⁵⁸ Riall, *Invention*, 140.

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however, these centers also implied ideological differences, among other things, within the revolutionary circles as much as they fostered cooperation.

During the Revolutions of 1848–1849, nearly all the patriotic movements from Central and Eastern Europe had their representatives in Paris.⁵⁵⁹ Exiles from a variety of national movements, such Venetian Valentino Pasini (1806-1864), Wallachian Alexandru G. Golescu (1819-1881), Andrija Torkvat Brlić of the Southern Slavs (1826-1868), Polish Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), Hungarian László Teleki (1811-1861), Frederick Szavardy were among those who rallied in the French capital.⁵⁶⁰ In the same way, the greatest share of Italian exiles had temporarily settled in Paris, where the Republic still claimed to hold influence until 1851, including Daniele Manin (1804-1857), Giuseppe Montanelli (1813-1862), Guglielmo Pepe (1873-1855), Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852), among other lesser figures.⁵⁶¹ The exiles in Paris evaluated what they had just undergone after the revolution, seeking better prospects for the future. It was the defeat of Sardinia-Piedmont that had put an end to revolutionary hopes across the entire peninsula, though the kingdom had achieved much of the unification between April and July 1848. The exiles gradually opined that the leadership of Sardinia would be essential for achieving both unification and independence, without which these goals appeared unattainable. As a foothold, it secured the only military might capable of supporting a struggle for independence, as well as it preserved its liberal constitution and parliament.⁵⁶² Despite the humiliating defeats against the Habsburgs, the Savoyard State emerged from the turmoil stronger than ever, as "the only glimmer of hope" for patriotic aspirations across the peninsula amidst the dominance of foreign monarchies.⁵⁶³ As a result, it was no longer unthinkable to

⁵⁵⁹ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 45.

⁵⁶⁰ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 13.

⁵⁶¹ Raymond Grew, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 7-8.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, 8-9.

⁵⁶³ Arnold Blumberg, *A Carefully Planned Accident: The Italian War of 1859* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press; London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1990), 17.

cooperate with the rulers in Turin for the Paris-based Italian opposition, thus, the Mazzinian republican fervor that had dominated revolutionary circles up until that moment came under attack and was gradually subsumed by more moderate politics. A sudden republican stroke led by a vanguard cadre was no longer viable; in this sense, the events of 1848 had served as a theater, in which the legality of Sardinia contrasted with the republicanism of Rome and Venice, leaving one of the most important legacies that would shape the nationalist agenda in the post-revolutionary era.⁵⁶⁴ While moderating their stance toward the leadership of Sardinia, Italian exiles simultaneously subsumed the question of political regime under the object of liberation.

The republican declaration of August 1851 further marginalized Mazzini within the revolutionary circles.⁵⁶⁵ Due to his seditious plots in Italy, he resided in London between 1851 and 1853 as a political exile. He continued to conspire revolts across the peninsula, albeit without success. Worse still, these plots caused enormous executions and imprisonments.⁵⁶⁶ Mazzini also established alliances in the British capital with the Hungarian and Polish exiles. Adriano Lemmi (1822-1906) had played a role in the first contacts between Mazzini and Kossuth, when the latter was interned in Kütahya. When Kossuth got back to Europe, his influence over the exiles in Paris and London was considerably diminished.⁵⁶⁷ He then entered an alliance with Alexandre Ledru-Rollin (1807-1874) in London, along with Mazzini whose authority among the Italian patriots was simultaneously loosening. While Mazzini staged plans for resurrections in Lombardy, Kossuth urged the patriots in Hungary to rise up in arms once

⁵⁶⁴ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 90.

⁵⁶⁵ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 7.

⁵⁶⁶ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 96.

⁵⁶⁷ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 99.

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again through underground setups. Their plots doomed to failure in similar ways. Both figures caused great harm to their followers at home with his imprudent attempts.⁵⁶⁸

The aftermath of the unfulfilled revolutions in Italy and Hungary, therefore, signaled a shift in the center of gravity among the displaced revolutionaries. The exiles in Paris were ready to take over the nationalist agenda from the uncompromising agitators based in London. This transition heralded a new set of strategies and alliances for the unification of Italy and the independence of Hungary, which gradually supplanted the militancy of Mazzini and Kossuth. The transition of the revolutionary agenda from the Mazzinian root-and-branch approach to moderate politics, i.e. the monarchism under the leadership of King Vittorio Emanuele II (ascended to throne in 1849) and Camillo Benso Count of Cavour (elected as the premier in 1852) took place through the initiatives of certain intellectuals and revolutionaries. Having quite a name and extensive network among the exiles, Giorgio Pallavicino Trivulzio (1796-1874)—a wealthy marchese with solid patriotic credentials—positioned himself as a crucial intermediary in Turin, bridging the exiled revolutionaries and the rulers of the kingdom.⁵⁶⁹ Monarchist Gioberti was among the first to champion this new political marriage, publishing the article *Del Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*.⁵⁷⁰ As a conservative thinker, he was in favor of the monarchy and aristocracy to make the Italian people into a nation.⁵⁷¹ As a republican and federalist, it was more surprising that the hero of the Venetian revolution Manin also participated in the ranks of the new initiative, however ambiguously.⁵⁷² Eventually, the cooperation between the kingdom and the exiles was institutionalized through the establishment of the Italian National Society (*La Società Nazionale Italiana*, hereafter SNI) in

⁵⁶⁸ This time even Kossuth's mother and sisters suffered under the autocratic regime in 1853. John Bassett Moore, "Kossuth: A Sketch of a Revolutionist II," *Political Science Quarterly* 10, no. 2, (1895): 289. Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 89.

⁵⁶⁹ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 9.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

⁵⁷¹ Massimo d'Azeglio (1798-1866), Gino Capponi (1792-1876), Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810-1861), Giacomo Durando (1807-1894) were among the prominent members of the conservative wing. Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 68-69.

⁵⁷² Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 15-22.

the spring of 1857. It would play a crucial role in coordinating various national and transnational activities behind Sardinia's leadership, thereby making its capital as another significant center for revolutionary activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Turin had already started to house thousands of refugees after the Revolutions of 1848. It gradually became a larger center of anti-Habsburg activities. Kossuth proved highly adaptable to changing political atmosphere. Acknowledged the shifting balances, he severed ties with Mazzini and came closer to Cavour, successfully reestablishing his shaken political leadership. Therefore, the center of revolutionary plots had to be Turin also for Kossuth.⁵⁷³

The increasing weight of Paris and Turin for revolutionary business to the detriment of London is not to overlook the importance of another center in the Orient. Following the unsuccessful revolutionary wave, the Ottoman Empire emerged as a safe haven for not only Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries, but also for Italian exiles, though their numbers were not as large as the former. In fact, the empire had long served as a shelter for rebels from the peninsula after the earlier revolutionary waves. Constantinople saw multiple waves of Italian exiles and refugees throughout the century, resembling more the Polish migration than the Hungarian. Even when the diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire became more formal and substantial during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, the presence of the émigrés was a significant point of reference; they settled more intensively in the districts of Beyoğlu/Pera (Galata), Şişli (Pangaltı), and Sarıyer (Tarabya) in the capital.⁵⁷⁴ Overall, Asmalı Mescid was the neighborhood, where the Italians were mostly concentrated in Constantinople. Indeed, the first Italian embassy was established there in 1867.⁵⁷⁵ Among the

⁵⁷³ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 99. "The efforts made in this direction were rendered very difficult by the repeated attempts of Mazzini and his party, which, though intended to be revolutionary, had only the character of isolated insurrections. I decidedly condemned such attempts whenever I became cognisant of them, and endeavoured to restrain Mazzini, though, to my regret, without success." Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 26.

⁵⁷⁴ Malara, "Tanzimat Reformları ve İtalyanlar," 29. De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 25.

⁵⁷⁵ Selvelli, *Antenati a Costantinopoli*, 21.

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notable visitors to this burgeoning community was the young Garibaldi, who lived in the capital from 1828 to 1831, though his biographies tend to ignore this period of his life.⁵⁷⁶

Amid the growing literate public interested in political matters and the expansion of maritime trade networks between Italy and Türkiye, the mid-century saw a dramatic rise in Italian migration from diverse backgrounds, especially resulted from the Revolutions of 1848 and the Crimean War, further enriching the community.⁵⁷⁷ Besides the refugees who arrived with Monti, waves of refugees fled to the empire subsequent to the Battle of Novara and the fall of the republics in Rome and Venice. Just as the case of Hungarian and Polish refugees, some Italians converted to Islam, though their number remained less compared to the other groups. Colonel Vincenzo Giordano Orsini (Ömer) and Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Medina (Abdullah) were among those who converted and were employed in the Ottoman army.⁵⁷⁸ This generation of exiles increasingly sparked the attention of the Levantine community in Istanbul to the political developments unfolding in Italy. In fact, this community increasingly identified themselves with *Italianità*, in congruence with the developments in the mainland, albeit with distinctive traits, meaning that their national sentiments were peculiar in their own way.⁵⁷⁹ Their interaction with the political developments beyond the Adriatic presumably varied, echoing the main fault lines within the Italian patriotic movement. Some exiles received assistance from the Sardinian embassy to secure food, shelter, and employment. The Mazzinians also operated separately, Lemmi was entitled to establish a cell in the capital of the Turkish Empire in 1847.⁵⁸⁰ On the eve of the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, a new wave of

⁵⁷⁶ Veronica Musardo, *Secret Connections in Constantinople* (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2015), 12.

⁵⁷⁷ Selvelli, *Antenati a Costantinopoli*, 85. Luca Zuccolo, "Gli italiani all'estero: il caso ottomano," *Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea*, January 29, 2011, 8, accessed 15 November 2024, http://www.studistorici.com/2011/01/29/zuccolo_numero_5/.

⁵⁷⁸ De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 182-183.

⁵⁷⁹ Zuccolo, "Gli italiani all'estero," 4.

⁵⁸⁰ Selvelli, *Antenati a Costantinopoli*, 80.

political migration hit the empire, in line with the preparations of war.⁵⁸¹ From that point on, Garibaldi also found huge support from the Italian exiles in Istanbul. Also, the Sardinian agent Cerruti in Constantinople served as the key coordinator for the initiatives of the vast anti-Austrian alliances in the Balkans, with the capital becoming the central hub for orchestrating these efforts.⁵⁸²

Following the failures of the Revolutions of 1848, it became clear that Italian independence and unity could only be achieved through the intricate conflicts of interest among the Great Powers, but contrary to "the expectations of nearly all the rest of Europe, and under the guns of France and Austria."⁵⁸³ Indeed, the unification of Italy largely rested upon the internal disputes within the high politics of Europe. The founding fathers of Italy skillfully exploited these antagonisms, each international conflict served as a stronger incentive to forge the nation-state than its internal dynamics, and eventually it came out of each international crisis as the prime beneficiary. In this sense, the Crimean War was the first instance when the Italian Question was truly internationalized, simultaneously linking it to the Hungarian Question, and therefore, to the Eastern Question. It was truly a game changer since the war set new balances and alliances on international stage, making the outcomes multifaceted moving in utterly different ways. In the neutrality of Austria and Prussia, England and France fought against Tsarist armies in support of the Porte, particularly in the Crimean Peninsula. The alliance would later be reinforced by an expeditionary force of Sardinia (May 9, 1855), while the Hungarian and Polish 48ers appeared within the ranks of the Ottoman army to seek revenge against Russia. In this context, the regular diplomatic relations between Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire officially started.⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸¹ Filippo Caucci Molara, Stefanini from Garinaldo, Tito Frisolini were among the newcomers. They sought Sardinian protection, but there was also Mazzinians too, for instance, a certain Marcello Cesare Bologni. De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 220.

⁵⁸² Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 9, 34.

⁵⁸³ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand (May, 1860)*, 8th ed. (London: Longmans, 1919), 2.

⁵⁸⁴ Fabio L. Grassi, "Sardinya Krallığı'nın Kırım Savaşı'na Katılması," *Tophumsal Tarih*, no. 151 (2016), 86.

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The military involvement of Sardinia against Russia engendered the Italian cause to be internationally recognized, becoming an interest of the Concert of Europe. England and France did not refrain from displaying their sympathies to the arguments put forward by the Italian representative, Count Cavour, in the Congress of Paris. The French plenipotentiary, and minister of state, Count Walewski (1810-1868) criticized Austrian military presence in Italy, while the British plenipotentiary, the Earl of Clarendon (1800-1870), offered reforms in Pontific State and The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.⁵⁸⁵ The congress marked an important shift in the international balance of power, tilting it in the favor of France, though artificially, and pushing Britain to the margins.⁵⁸⁶ Therefore, the contributions of the Great Powers to the Italian Question would be more complementary than concerted in the new era. France would play an important role in outbreak of the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 since it deemed that Austrian dominance on the Italian peninsula must not be allowed, though its benevolence to Italy was far from being absolute because the Emperor of the French had intricate relations with the Catholic Church, besides he was concerned over the growing power of Prussia in Central Europe and the militant republicanism among the revolutionary ranks in Italy. In consequence, it was Britain's turn to play its part by performing benevolent neutrality, towards the *Garibaldini* when the Thousand set sail to Sicily in May 1860.

Once Russia was pushed back from Europe, it would turn its focus to the Near East and Central Asia, leaving the House of Austria too isolated to stand up against the underground plots of the Italian and Hungarian exiles. Russia would have no reason to complain about that situation upon the disloyalty of Austria during the war; instead, it looked forward to undoing the status quo till the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Meanwhile, Russia exploited the differences among the Great Powers to rebuild its position in Europe after the Crimean War. Petersburg

⁵⁸⁵ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 101.

⁵⁸⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 177.

took advantage of the rivalry between Britain and France, leading to its rapprochement with the latter to the detriment of the Austrian and Turkish empires. In keeping with the dynastic ambitions of the House of Bonaparte, France was increasingly relying upon patriotic ideals and movements so that new nation-states would be under its influence, while Britain was supporting the integrity of the Habsburg and Ottoman monarchies to protect status quo. In other words, the competition between the two leading world-powers would inevitably play out in the territories of these multi-national empires.⁵⁸⁷ Now aligned with France, Russia sought to bolster pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans by inciting the Orthodox populations, leveraging the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, which placed the reforms in the Ottoman Empire under the supervision of the Great Powers. The Polish Question received a heavy wound on the international stage. The developing relations between France and Russia left a negative impact on the Polish revolutionaries in Paris, while their ties with Habsburg rule started to improve in liaison with the autonomy granted in Galicia.⁵⁸⁸ The number of Polish refugees settling in the Ottoman Empire increased simultaneously after 1856. Yet the influence of the Hôtel Lambert on them significantly diminished, so much so that Czartoryski's death in 1861 was largely unnoticed in Europe.⁵⁸⁹

While France and Russia were acting in harmony to solicit the national causes in the Balkans against the Austrian and Ottoman interests, Sardinia closely followed the direction of change. Austria's ambiguous stance during the Crimean War actually served Sardinia's interests, providing both the opportunity and the incentive to support the Allies and embark its troops on Sebastopol.⁵⁹⁰ Sardinia was now involved with the Eastern Question from the vantage

⁵⁸⁷ The economic influence of France in the Ottoman Empire started to be felt more in the second half of the century, outbalancing that of the British. The period between 1850 and 1860 was one in which France increased its share of Ottoman exports from 15.8% to 29.9%. Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme (1820-1913)* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018), 32.

⁵⁸⁸ Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration," 243.

⁵⁸⁹ Robert A. Berry, "Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert and the Great Powers in the Balkans, 1832-1848," *The International History Review* 7, no. 1 (February 1985): 67.

⁵⁹⁰ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 20.

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point of the Italian Question. As a conservative statesman, Cavour planned to resolve the national cause without disrupting the balance of peace in Europe. However, the Italian unification was to run against Austria, whose integrity was essential for the British foreign policy, not to mention that Prussia also paid attention to the soundness of German Confederation. This conundrum could be solved through compensating territorial losses of Austria in Italy with territorial gains in the Balkans since the Ottoman Empire was to inevitably fall apart and the common guarantee of the Great Powers was illusory.⁵⁹¹ Indeed, the "re-orientation of Austria" (*inorientamento*) thesis was one of the fundamental aspects that had framed Sardinian viewpoint in the Orient since Cesare Balbo wrote his book, *Delle Speranze d'Italia*, in 1844. The Habsburg Empire had historical interests in Bosnia dating back to the eighteenth century; the region was regarded as part of Austria's share after the expected breakup of the Ottoman Empire, based on the presence of a significant Catholic population.⁵⁹² The re-orientation thesis could also get support from England, which deemed the integrity of the Austrian Empire essential to preserve the equilibrium in Europe. In the light of this idea, Cavour thought out the exchange of Modena and Parma under the control of the Habsburgs with the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) under the suzerainty of the Ottomans through transferring the monarchs of the former to the latter.⁵⁹³ Even though this plan proved to be unrealistic, the Balkans would always remain an alternative direction for Piedmont. Through his ambassador Cerruti in Belgrade, Cavour was kept up with the situation in the Balkans in search of new allies against the House of Austria, eventually bringing Sardinia to the Hungarian emigration closer.⁵⁹⁴ Cerruti's main mission was to foster a compromise between the Hungarians and the Southern Slavs, following the footsteps of the cooperation

⁵⁹¹ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 70. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 21.

⁵⁹² Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 90.

⁵⁹³ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 22.

⁵⁹⁴ The representatives of Mazzini were active in Bucharest for securing Romanian cooperation in favor of the Hungarian movement, yet it is not clear whether these attempts were in coordination with the activities Sardinia orchestrated. Musardo, *Secret Connections*, 81.

between Sardinia and the Polish emigration under the leadership of Czartoryski for an Ungaro-Slavic accord.⁵⁹⁵ Later, Cerruti served in Constantinople as a key coordinator for the initiatives of the vast anti-Austrian alliances in the Balkans.

Under the influence of France and Sardinia, the leaders of the Hungarian emigration in Western capitals started to turn against the Porte, which had granted them refuge not long ago. According to archival evidence, some secret activities of the Hungarians, first and foremost led by Kossuth and Klapka, was observed on Ottoman soil in late 1858.⁵⁹⁶ From Constantinople Nándor Éber (1825-1885) is known to have started to communicate with Klapka in late 1858.⁵⁹⁷ Backed by Napoleón III, Kossuth and Klapka reached an agreement with the Count Cavour prior to the 1859 war. The plot mainly included Hungary, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro for a military expedition against the Habsburgs, yet potentially threatening the Ottomans too. The operation would also be seconded by France with money, arms, and munitions. Accordingly, an advance force of Hungarian volunteers would land in the Dalmatian shores with the help of Sardinian navy. The troops would march into Hungary to join forces with other columns advancing through Romania and Serbia, led by the leaders of the emigration, to finally call for the uprisings in the mainland for the independence. Obviously, the plan required the cooperation of the Southern Slavs and Romanian rulers since their territories would serve as military bases for the upcoming incursions into Austria. In parallel, Sardinia joined the international ranks that endorsed the unification ambitions of Moldavia and Wallachia right after the Congress of Paris, against the wishes of Türkiye, Austria, and England. Even though the plan never truly materialized, the autocratic regime in Austria gradually softened in the long run, giving way to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867, which transformed

⁵⁹⁵ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 363.

⁵⁹⁶ BOA., HR.SYS., 206/35, 07 July 1859.

⁵⁹⁷ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 219-220.

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Hungary into a partner within the empire. Hungary effectively returned to its 1848 policies, accepting itself as part of the empire and reverting to its anti-Slavic and imperial ambitions.

The Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, also known as the Second Italian War of Independence, was such a pivotal moment that allowed Italian patriots to capitalize on the antagonisms within the power structures in Europe to advance the unification of the country. The conflict was the outcome of a "carefully planned accident," whose preparations had gone back to the summer of 1858, when two scrupulous conspirators, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (1808-1873), Emperor of the French, and Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, secretly met in Plombières, whereby a plausible pretext for a justifiable war against the Austrian Empire was intrigued. Strengthening his political position at home, Cavour was ascending to the leadership of Italian nationalism by addressing to the patriotic sentiments, eventually aiming to provoke a war in which "Austria was the aggressor, Sardinia the victim, and France the heroic avenger."⁵⁹⁸

Early in August 1858, Cavour quickly engaged in uprising plans in the Habsburg-controlled parts of Italy and other dominions of Vienna.⁵⁹⁹ The SNI was key in mobilizing and smuggling young conscripts from Lombardy, Venetia, the Papal States, and the Duchies into Piedmont, culminating in the formation of the volunteer units known as the *Cacciatori delle Alpi* (Alpine Hunters) under the command of Garibaldi in the spring of 1859 to support the Sardinian Army.⁶⁰⁰ Among the participants of this organization was Hungarian Türr, who strove to induce the desertion of Hungarian soldiers within the Austrian ranks.⁶⁰¹ The SNI was also in touch with other revolutionary organizations, it was the time when the aspirations for

⁵⁹⁸ Trevelyan, *The Thousand*, 78. Blumberg, *A Carefully Planned Accident*, 45.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., 44.

⁶⁰⁰ Their numbers counted not more than 5,000. There were also *Cacciatori degli Appennini* (Hunters of the Apennines) with around 2,500 souls. Along with the irregulars integrated into the army, the total number of volunteers in the war could be measured around 16,000, though the figures reach up to 24,000 according to sources. Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 107.

⁶⁰¹ Pete, "Ungheresi tra i Mille," 9.

independence in Hungary were undeniably rekindled among the exiles and refugees all over the world due to the immanent war preparations of France and Italy against Austria. The conditions looked objectively ripe for another revolutionary attempt in the opinion of the emigration, as the memories of the 1848 events remained fresh and Austrian policies since then had offered little hope for reconciliation.⁶⁰² The exiles could have incited a new revolutionary wave from the southeastern flank of the Austrian Empire, while it was occupied with a major war against Italy and France.

The involvement of Hungarian exiles in the upcoming war was crucial for the course of Cavour, whose first contact with the Klapka-Kossuth alliance was a James Fazy, the vice-president of Genoa.⁶⁰³ Cavour personally introduced György Klapka (1820-1892) to Napoléon III (1808-1873) and to even his cousin, Prince Napoléon-Jérôme Bonaparte (1822-1891) in January 1859.⁶⁰⁴ In early February, Cavour dispatched Francesco Ferdinando Astengo to Paris.⁶⁰⁵ Kossuth was initially reluctant to drag the exiles into this war, hesitant to play the role of mercenary, *Condottieri*, fearing that the emigration might be outmaneuvered since the balance of power would be unequal in their dealings with France and Sardinia.⁶⁰⁶ Never did Cavour have any intention of allowing the situation to get out of control. He handled his contacts with the exiles through the agents of the society to ensure that they would not deviate from his track in favor of the radical course, meaning that the SNI functioned to whip the Hungarian leaders for the benefit of the kingdom.⁶⁰⁷ The Hungarian emigration was to launch an expedition of exiles through coasts of Fiume, in coordination with the troops waiting for the go-ahead in the fronts of Banat and Transylvania to march into Hungary. According to an agreement between Klapka and Astengo, France was to send the weapons to the city of Galați,

⁶⁰² Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 88.

⁶⁰³ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 117.

⁶⁰⁴ Blumberg, *A Carefully Planned*, 44.

⁶⁰⁵ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 118.

⁶⁰⁶ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 140.

⁶⁰⁷ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 117.

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where they were to be distributed to Iasi and Belgrade.⁶⁰⁸ Therefore, it was necessary to include the rulers of Serbia and Romania in the anti-Habsburg coalition, for which the SNI was responsible for establishing necessary contacts in the Balkans through intermediaries travelling via Turin, Belgrade, and Bucharest.⁶⁰⁹ In the same parallel, Astengo headed to Belgrade to negotiate the Serbian rulers, while Klapka departed for Istanbul.⁶¹⁰

The communication between Sardinia and the rulers of the Balkans was primarily held through the Ottoman capital. In March 1859, Klapka was assigned to set out to Constantinople for contacting with Prince Alexandru Cuza of Romania (1820-1873). In this regard, a minister in the Sardinian Consulate in Constantinople (from 1856 to 1861), General Giacomo Durando (1807-1894), was an ardent supporter of Cavourian politics in the Balkans and supplied information to the premier on the issues particularly concerning Romania. Having long meetings with Klapka, Durando actively negotiated with Cuza to secure his support for the Italo-Hungarian cause in the Balkans.⁶¹¹ Cuza's cooperation was essential to the transshipment of rifles, as the weapons had to be moved through the Danube River. Klapka also agreed with Durando, regarding the shipment.⁶¹² Klapka then moved to the Wallachian city of Iasi. On March 22, Astengo arrived in Belgrade.⁶¹³ A week later, Klapka signed an agreement with Cuza in Bucharest.⁶¹⁴ The Prince promised logistical support in exchange of the recognition of equality for the Hungarians, Serbians, and Romanians within the borders of the future Hungary, particularly in Transylvania.⁶¹⁵ Klapka left Winkler (who used Ferreri as a pseudonym) as an agent in Iasi, in contact with Count Karacsay, another agent, operating in Constantinople.

⁶⁰⁸ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 120.

⁶⁰⁹ Blumberg, *A Carefully Planned*, 44. In fact, the foreign secretary of the society, Giovenale Vegezzi-Ruscalla, who had a keen interest in Hungarian, Rumanian, and Balkan affairs, was in close contact with "exiles from anywhere east of the Rhine." Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 255.

⁶¹⁰ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 121.

⁶¹¹ Malara, "Tanzimat Reformları ve İtalyanlar," 74.

⁶¹² Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 336.

⁶¹³ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 123.

⁶¹⁴ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 252-253.

⁶¹⁵ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 131.

Along with his friend Krivácsy, Stefano Dunyov (1815-1889), was appointed in Bucharest, where he reported that it was possible to enlist some 3,000 Hungarians among the locals.⁶¹⁶ Klapka later moved from Romania to Belgrade, then returned to Turin.⁶¹⁷

It was none other than Klapka who would shoulder the task of persuading the leader of the emigration, a role for which he was well-suited since he had known Cavour for at least two years through a mutual acquaintance, Teodoro di Santa Rosa, a colleague in the Piedmontese government. Klapka and Teleki set out to London to convince Kossuth in March 1859. In return, Kossuth decided to actively take part in the campaign in spite of his earlier reluctance. His renewed political engagement also meant his final break with Mazzini, as Cavour openly asked him to do so.⁶¹⁸ Furthermore, Kossuth's alignment with Cavour also meant aligning with France, which required him to sever ties with the Polish cause. Allied with Russia, the French Emperor assured Kossuth of Tsar's neutrality in case of a revolution in Hungary, provided that an independent Hungary would act with moderation, essentially, not supporting the Polish cause.⁶¹⁹ Moreover, the Serbian ruler Miloš Obrenović (1780-1860) also sent his son, Mihailo Obrenović (1823-1868), to London to have an audience with Kossuth. Even though Kossuth did not want to complicate the Hungarian Question by involving Russia and Türkiye, he verbally expressed his commitment to Serbian independence.⁶²⁰ It should be noted that, the Serbian and Romanian rulers, as autonomous bodies, were not permitted to conduct independent diplomatic negotiations—let alone pursue an anti-Ottoman policy. Yet in practice, they did so nonetheless, possibly with the knowledge, if not approval, of the Ottoman authorities.

⁶¹⁶ Hailed from Arad, Dunyov had a perfect command in Romanian. He was a Catholic of Bulgarian origin. Ibid., 67.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 253.

⁶¹⁸ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 70. Also see Ibid., 143-144.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid., 129.

⁶²⁰ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 127.

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After issuing an ultimatum to Piedmont-Sardinia on April 23, demanding the military mobilization be ceased, the House of Austria declared war on the House of Savoy. The Austrian forces crossed the Ticino, Austria became the aggressor on April 29. On the same day, Teleki and Klapka had a meeting with Prince Napoléon, who invited Kossuth to Paris. A few days later, Teleki and Klapka left Paris for London to convey this invitation for a conference to Kossuth.⁶²¹ On May 5, Kossuth and the Prince met. For the emperor's commitment to the independence of Hungary, the Prince conveyed one condition: that Kossuth should adopt a Constitutional Monarchy. Kossuth accepted the stipulation without reservation and assured His Highness that Hungarian nation would do the same. Strikingly, he immediately offered the Hungarian crown of St. Stephen to Prince Jérôme Napoléon, *should Hungarian independence be secured as a product of French mediation*. The prince declined the offer, suggesting that accepting a foreign throne could provoke another European coalition against the House of Bonaparte, and the possession of the imperial throne in France could not be risked.⁶²² Through the mediation of the Prince, Kossuth finally had a conference with the Emperor late at night in the Tuileries.⁶²³ The former expected of France to publicly identify itself with the Hungarian cause, as well as to steer the volunteers with its army through the Balkans, so that a call for a general uprising against the Habsburgs could have made considerable impact.⁶²⁴ The inner desire of the latter, however, was to keep the army of exiles to divert Austrian military, rather than to ally on the same footing. Upon the Emperor expressing his concerns about the neutrality of England, Kossuth took it upon himself to assure the Emperor that he would work to uphold it.⁶²⁵ While negotiating with the Hungarian exiles, in fact, the Emperor had already achieved an important trump card against the Habsburg Monarchy.

⁶²¹ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 153-154.

⁶²² Ibid., 157-159.

⁶²³ Ibid., 168-169.

⁶²⁴ Kossuth's contact with the emperor became a certain senator Pietri, the Chief of Police in France, in the name of the emperor, rather than the ministry of foreign affairs. Ibid., 184.

⁶²⁵ Ibid., 172.

On May 12, French troops landed at Genoa. Kossuth, Klapka, and Teleki established the Hungarian National Directorate in the Ligurian city of Genoa as a government-in-exile to recruit a Hungarian Legion in Italy (May 16). Kossuth returned to England, where his public speeches aimed to contribute to the defeat of the pro-Austrian Derby cabinet in the parliamentary elections.⁶²⁶ He looked like a leader who lost his way. During his propaganda tour, he also hinted at his stance against Ottoman rule in the Balkans, despite the fact that the Ottomans had granted thousands of refugees, including him.⁶²⁷ Though Kossuth made efforts in England to secure its neutrality in the war, his concerns began to materialize once the French and Italian allies displayed hesitations and excuses regarding their commitments to the Hungarian demands.

Kossuth and Klapka divided their duties: the former, assisted by Alexandre Bixio (brother of famous Nino Bixio) and Frederick Szavardy was tasked with orchestrating a far-reaching revolt in Hungary, while the latter was responsible for recruiting the Hungarian Legion from the deserters and prisoners of the Habsburg military in Italy.⁶²⁸ Klapka's proclamation on May 20 urged Hungarian soldiers in the Habsburg army to desert and join the legion by emphasizing national pride and the promise of returning to homeland. "Let us form in Italy a Hungarian army, with which, after fighting on alien ground, we may return to our own country, to take part also in the war of independence, and save the honor of the Magyar nation."⁶²⁹

⁶²⁶ Deak, *Lawful Revolution*, 346.

⁶²⁷ "Now, Sir, I know that England is pledged to assist Turkey in repelling foreign invasion, but I do not know, nor should I think it in keeping with the principles and opinions of the people of England, that you should draw your sword for the protection of Austria, in order to prevent the Christian nations of European Turkey from endeavouring to assert their independence." Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 235-236.

⁶²⁸ Blumberg, *A Carefully Planned*, 44. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 220.

⁶²⁹ István Kornél Vida, "The True Cause of Freedom: The Kossuth Emigration and the Hungarians' Participation in the American Civil War," (Phd Diss., University of Debrecen, 2008), 72. In his memoirs Kossuth distances himself from this reckless enterprise, arguing that it was not wise to move forward that devotedly without receiving enough guarantees from the allies. However, he leaves unexplained why he continued his efforts without having the same guarantees.

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On May 22, Klapka sent to Kossuth the agreement he made with the Romanian ruler, consenting that the necessary weapons could be stored in Romania. From France the weapons were to be shipped through Mediterranean ports and accumulated in the valley of the Szereth—at Bacău, Roman, or other locations even closer to the Transylvanian frontier, such as Okna and Piatra."⁶³⁰ Klapka was also entrusted to recruit a sufficient number of surgeons and engineers, besides artillery officers. In exchange of cooperation, The Moldavo-Wallachian government was to occupy Austrian-held Bucovina.⁶³¹ The eighth clause of the agreement signaled a Danubian Confederation:

It is necessary that the principle of fraternity should guide us all. This alone can lead to the goal towards which we all are straining; and this goal is, the confederation of the three Danubian States—Hungary, Servia, and Moldo-Wallachia.⁶³²

On May 24, King Vittorio Emanuele II declared the reasons for the war and called upon the patriots to join the fight for unification and national salvation. Composed of prisoners of war and military deserters, the Hungarian Legion was established. The royal decree was published on June 10 and the legion was formalized under the command of Kossuth's trustee Dániel Ihász (1813-1881) in Italy. Stationed at the barracks in Asti, Acqui, and Alessandria, it was intended to be the nucleus of the future Hungarian army. Antal Vetter was fixed as the commander of the forces on the Lower Danube.⁶³³

The Hungarian exiles from all over the world flooded to Genoa, including several converts from the Ottoman Empire, including Lajos Tüchöry (Selim).⁶³⁴ György Kmety (Ismail Pasha), who had already been the leader of the committee composed of the Hungarian exiles in London, firsthand contributed to recruiting endeavors of the legion in Constantinople and

⁶³⁰ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 300.

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*, 301.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, 303. Even during the Revolutions of 1848, the confederation idea was present. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 87.

⁶³³ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 300.

⁶³⁴ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 21.

their transfer to Italy.⁶³⁵ In this endeavor, the revolutionaries in the Ottoman capital must be in cooperation with the Italian enclave in the capital, which supported the nationalist cause in their distant homeland.

The summer of 1859 heralded decisive victories of the French-Sardinian alliance at Magenta and Solferino, opening the way towards Peschiera and Verona. Amid these developments, Kossuth met Cavour in Turin on June 24, followed by a successive meeting with Napoléon-Jérôme in Parma on the 28th. Among other things, Kossuth asked for financial support from the Prince to cover the travelling expenses of the officers in the Hungarian Legion because they had to be selected from among the refugees staying in Türkiye, England, and America.⁶³⁶

Having departed from Marseille in mid-May and reached at Galați next month, the shipment of the arms necessary for the legion did not immediately reach to Transylvania, Banat, and Vojvodina since the Porte intercepted the cargoes.⁶³⁷ Aboard a brigantine named *Maria*, the 20,000 weapons were smuggled in Galați in June 25.⁶³⁸ Meanwhile, the number of the participants in the Hungarian Legion reached to 3,200 (in 5 battalions) as of July, subsequent to the Battle of Solferino.⁶³⁹

In Valeggio, Kossuth had a meeting with Napoléon III in the beginning of July. The emperor continued to list excuses; this time he mentioned his concerns about the involvement of Prussia if the war spread more to the German territory.⁶⁴⁰ Kossuth was in Turin on July 5 to have a meeting with Cavour.⁶⁴¹ Three days later, Kossuth found out that the emperors of France

⁶³⁵ Róbert Hermann, "Csorna ve Kars Kahramanı: György Kmety," in *Macar Generalleri Osmanlı Hizmetinde: Richard Guyon ve Györgi Kmety-Hurşit Paşa ve İsmail Paşa*, ed. Edit Tásnadi, trans. Laura Pál (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2013), 61-63.

⁶³⁶ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 294.

⁶³⁷ The weapons were handed to Prince Cuza temporarily, yet he would not be well disposed to give them back to the Hungarians in the future. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 131.

⁶³⁸ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 132. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 20.

⁶³⁹ Pete, "Ungheresi tra i Mille," 9. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 131.

⁶⁴⁰ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 112.

⁶⁴¹ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 299.

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and Austria were negotiating a separate armistice. Napoléon III deserted his allies and struck an armistice with Franz Joseph at the cost of Austria's ceding Lombardy to Sardinia. The Armistice of Villafranca (11 July 1859) effectively put an end to the conflict without satisfying neither the objectives of the émigrés since there was to be no revolution in Hungary nor Sardinia's goals since Venetia was to remain under Austrian control. In any case, Sardinia was the prime beneficiary of the conflict. According to Blumberg, "[o]ut of Plombières had come a war; out of the peace that followed was to come a new world power."⁶⁴² The Treaty of Turin in March 1860 mandated the cession of Nice and Savoy to France following a plebiscite, yet it was more important for its emperor to curb the influence of Austria. Indeed, the defeat marked the end of the centralized Bach regime in Austria, paving the way for alternative systems of governance. In October, the provincial system of the pre-1848 was returned in Hungary, while keeping the peasant emancipation intact.⁶⁴³ In Sardinia, the SNI emerged once again as a significant tool for the cabinet of Turin to make the sacrifices acceptable to the Italian public opinion, presenting the territorial swap as a bitter remedy. In addition, the society became more intolerant to internal rivals, including Garibaldi, who was now labelled as adventurous, given that he was frustrated with the outcome of the war not only because it was a significant blow to his patriotic ideals but also his hometown was ceded to France. As the SNI started to draw closer to the Piedmontese government, it moderated its anti-clerical stance, seeking a compromise with traditional authorities and the social structures with which Cavour and Napoléon III were on good terms.⁶⁴⁴

The revolutionary activities of the Hungarian and Polish 48ers, in liaison with global entanglements, peaked during the war, as the conflict stirred the hopes and ambitions of the exiles more than any other political event of the 1850s. Nonetheless a Hungarian contingent

⁶⁴² Blumberg, *A Carefully Planned*, 163.

⁶⁴³ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 312.

⁶⁴⁴ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 264.

was formed, it did not see a combat because the French emperor, despite promising victories at Magenta and Solferino, swiftly signed an armistice. The Hungarian Question gained literally nothing as a result. The best Cavour could do was to provide a secure return of the legionnaires to home. Having lost all hope, the legion melted away in mid-September. The volunteers considerably returned to Hungary with great disenchantment, once they were promised amnesty. It was no coincidence that the rift between Kossuth and many exiles widened after the peace agreement was signed, because for the first time since 1849 a united front within the emigration had been the case in parallel with the provision of at least one Great Power.⁶⁴⁵ It did not take long for many exiles to realize that the Sardinian establishment had never regarded their alliance with full sincerity, beyond a leverage against Austria.⁶⁴⁶

Ludovico Frapolli (1815-1878) put forward the idea that what remained of the legion should be reorganized in Central Italy (Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and Romagna) to facilitate the integration of the region into Sardinia.⁶⁴⁷ Even though Kossuth was hesitant in the first place, Gregorio Bethlen convinced him; thus, 18 Hungarian officers, along with 40 cavalrymen and 750 soldiers formed military units in Piacenza as part of the army of Center Italy of Sardinia.⁶⁴⁸ With this turn of events, desertions of Hungarians from Austrian rule gained a new momentum, they piled up in Massa and Carrara.⁶⁴⁹ The duchies of Parma and Modena were united under the dictatorship of General Manfredo Fanti (1808-1865). Meanwhile, Garibaldi arrived in Central Italy; he desired to extend the annexation also of the territories of the Pontific State in the Marche region, yet his ambition was not shared by the Sardinian general.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁵ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 107.

⁶⁴⁶ Hanák, "Rapporti Storici Italo-Ungheresi," 231.

⁶⁴⁷ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 21.

⁶⁴⁸ The officers included Türr, Ihász, Tüköry, Károly Eberhardt, Winkler, Bethlen, Krivácsy. Ibid., 67-68. While Bethlen became the cavalry commander, Krivácsy served as artillery commander. Ibid., 22. Only four officers were integrated into the Sardinian army. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 114.

⁶⁴⁹ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 69.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid., 22.

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Cavour's gesture to provide a safe return for the legionnaires fueled Kossuth's hopes of continuing the alliance with Turin. He urged Kiss and Teleki to reestablish their connections with Vittorio Emanuele II and Cavour, pinning his hopes on a possible war for Veneto. The king had already secured British support for this region while the French attitude was under huge criticism. Vittorio Emanuele believed that the question of Venezia preceded that of Rome since France could not follow the Italians till Rome. It was his policy to approach to England, while France proved to be useless anymore.⁶⁵¹ Kossuth's approach did not only stem from his alignment with Cavour but also the fact that Venice was the closest to Hungary, though his calculations were superficial because Vienna could find eager allies in Moscow and Berlin in case of an Italian aggression.⁶⁵² On the other hand, Cavour desired to reestablish his relations with the Hungarians, asking the directorate (through Bixio) to appoint a representative to Turin. Arrived in the Sardinian capital from London as an undercover of *Daily News* reporter in April 1860, Ferenc Pulszky (1814-1897) became the link between Kossuth and Cavour.⁶⁵³

Everything started on May 11, 1860, when two ships previously confiscated from the Rubattino Company, landed Garibaldi and his thousand followers, known as "Red Shirts" (*Camicie Rosse*) in Marsala on the island of Sicily in a highly adventurous attempt to unify Italy from the south against the Royal Army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The news of this enterprise drew the attention of the political exiles here and there, including the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers in the Ottoman Empire. It is even possible to mention a small group of volunteers departed from Turkish soil in the first embarkment in Marsala, with the presence of Bidischini Family.⁶⁵⁴ Among the Italian 48ers, Orsini (Ömer) and Medina (Abdullah) also offered their services to Garibaldi from Constantinople, the former would later play important

⁶⁵¹ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 198.

⁶⁵² As Kiss and Teleki recognized the setback. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 114-115. For Tamborra, Cavour contacted Cavour at the end of February through Szavardy. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 133.

⁶⁵³ He will be reporting important news of the Garibaldian expedition from Italy. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 273. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 118.

⁶⁵⁴ Musardo, *Secret Connections*, 38.

roles in the campaign as an artillery commander.⁶⁵⁵ The expedition cultivated a new source of hope for the disappointed Hungarians. They could have been angry at Piedmont-Sardinia but their sympathy to Garibaldi was beyond discussion. Among the first thousand, there were four Hungarians, two of whom had a history of exile and conversion on Ottoman soil: Colonel István Türr (Ahmed Şamil), Major Lajos Tüköry (Selim Ağa), Sergeant Antal Goldberg, and Vencel Lajoski, a common soldier.⁶⁵⁶ The Thousand was not a regular army. Hailing mostly from the north of Italy, its participants were largely composed of young men who had a strong desire for the unification, as well as the volunteers from earlier revolutionary waves, including some from the 1859 campaign. Their number grew exponentially due to additional reinforcements and local support as the campaign progressed. At its peak, the revolutionary army comprised volunteers from diverse backgrounds, including prisoners and deserters from Bourbon and Habsburg rules, foreign volunteers who shared a sense of revolutionary solidarity, political exiles seeking new prospects for their homeland, and simple mercenaries. Doubtless, it was Garibaldi's domestic and international fame that played a pivotal role in uniting these diverse profiles and channeling their energies in the same direction.

The campaign began with a stunning success, progressed impressively, and would ultimately be completed with the political unification of most of the country. Subsequent to the initial landing, the Red Shirts swiftly moved eastward, achieving sweeping victories as they passed through Salemi, Calatafimi, and Monreale — at the *invitation* of the local population in the words of traditional historiography. In Salemi, Garibaldi proclaimed himself as the dictator of Sicily and entrusted Francesco Crispi with the task of organizing the administration as a prodictator.⁶⁵⁷ It was a war that Cavour did not seek, but ultimately accepted.⁶⁵⁸ More clearly, the premier made every possible effort to dissuade Garibaldi from launching his expedition to

⁶⁵⁵ De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano*, 185.

⁶⁵⁶ Pete, "Ungheresi tra i Mille," 10-11.

⁶⁵⁷ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 113.

⁶⁵⁸ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 120.

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Sicily, even going so far as to attempt to intercept the mission by military force.⁶⁵⁹ However, the Sicilian campaign was able to secure substantial support from Sardinia later, when it seemed likely to succeed, particularly through its window to the informal networks of the underground activities, namely the SNI. The fact that Cavour did not endorse the expedition outright in its initial phase is not to deny his important contributions, the active participation of Sicilian Giuseppe La Farina (1815-1863) right from the beginning could be interpreted as an indication of official sympathy.⁶⁶⁰ The SNI sponsored the first shipment to aid Garibaldi, with the *Utile* departed from the Piedmontese ports on May 24, 1860.⁶⁶¹ In any case, Cavour's manner was heavily adjusted to the course of events and appeared somewhat ambivalent to the revolutionaries until the first major battlefield victory when the capture of the heavily fortified Sicilian capital, Palermo, on June 6.⁶⁶² Following this success, the expedition began to receive significant support and reinforcements from initiatives connected to Sardinia, including essential supplies such as steamers, arms, and money, which were crucial for advancing the campaign.⁶⁶³ On the night of June 9, approximately 2,500 volunteers set sail for the island under the command of Giacomo Medici. Another huge embarkment left Genoa a month later with around 2,000 troops under Enrico Cosenz.⁶⁶⁴ Reinforcing Garibaldi was strikingly a subject of contention. There were two main channels through which the reinforcements were delivered. The Central Committee in Aid of Garibaldi led by Dr. Agostino Bertani, a radical and Mazzinian in political orientation, was based in Genoa and played an important role in organizing support. The Million Rifles Fund founded by Garibaldi himself but operating under

⁶⁵⁹ Denis Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict*, reprinted with a new preface (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 25.

⁶⁶⁰ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 299. Plus, four of the seven commanders of Garibaldi were members of the society. Ibid., 291. The initial guns were provided by the society. Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 112-113.

⁶⁶¹ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 301.

⁶⁶² One of the participants of the Hungarian Legion in 1859 and the Expedition of the Thousand from the first shipment, Tüchöry (Selim) fell during this siege.

⁶⁶³ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy: June-November 1860* (London: Longmans, 1928), 46.

⁶⁶⁴ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 302.

the oversight of the Sardinian government was located in Milan.⁶⁶⁵ Count Amari served as a key link between Garibaldi and the government, facilitating aid and support, eschewing militant Bertani's committee, and Cavour favored the contributions to be sent directly through him.⁶⁶⁶ In any case, more than 20,000 individuals departed from the port-cities of Genoa and Leghorn to support the military campaign within the first three months after the capture of Palermo.⁶⁶⁷

Among the most prominent group of volunteers were the Hungarians. Participated in the campaign from the very beginning, Türr took the command of the Fifteenth Division, making it the first division of Garibaldi's Southern Army.⁶⁶⁸ Volunteers kept coming to Sicily. A group of Hungarian volunteers, equal to 65 men, arrived in Palermo on June 19, via the shipment of Medici.⁶⁶⁹ Primarily drawn from the Hungarian Legion established in the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, these were entrusted to Major Adolf Mogyoródy (1824-1908), with three officers and 48 soldiers.⁶⁷⁰ Along with some other volunteers who made their way to the island from the Ottoman territories, the legion started to be organized with the participation of Dunyov, with an initial group of a hundred infantry and hussars under the command of Nándor Éber.⁶⁷¹ Éber left Palermo on June 26 to suppress the disorder in the island as the commander of a brigade.⁶⁷² The formation of the Hungarian Legion was decreed by Garibaldi on July 16.⁶⁷³ Three days later, another shipment of Sacchi, together with Dunyov, sailed for Palermo, carrying Lombardian volunteers, Hungarians included.⁶⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the hussar squadron was formed and placed under the command of Major Fülöp Figyelmessy (1821-1907). Along with

⁶⁶⁵ Trevelyan, *The Making of Italy*, 34.

⁶⁶⁶ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 296.

⁶⁶⁷ Trevelyan, *The Making of Italy*, 32. Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 113.

⁶⁶⁸ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 121-122.

⁶⁶⁹ Pete, "Ungheresi tra i Mille," 10-11.

⁶⁷⁰ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 122.

⁶⁷¹ All the Hungarians in the campaign were not limited to the legion, it is possible to run into officers of Hungarian origin in different units. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 7, 285.

⁶⁷² Ibid., 280.

⁶⁷³ Pete, "Ungheresi tra i Mille," 11. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 74.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., 73.

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other foreign volunteers, Eber's Second Brigade was incorporated into the Fifteenth Division, which was composed of two brigades, along with Éber's Second Brigade, another brigade was also organized under General Bixio.

Garibaldi's forces proceeded to the strategic port city of Messina through Milazzo and eventually took control of the entire island strong. The Hungarian Legion also moved to Messina in early August. The Red Shirts crossed the Strait of Messina on August 18 to take the campaign to Reggio Calabria, the south of the mainland. The Second Brigade (which was over 2,500 men) oversaw the landing of Garibaldi in Calabria. At the end of the month, the brigade moved to Bagnara in the mainland, with 118 Hungarians under the command of Mogyoródy and 66 in the hussars of Figyelmessy.⁶⁷⁵ At its height, the total number of the Hungarians in the legion had reached to 341.⁶⁷⁶

While the Red Shirts were advancing to Naples, Cavour's policy still looked ambiguous. Even though he had increased support to the national cause in the form of equipment and transportation of volunteers to maintain the confidence of the patriotic public opinion, he was seeking a settlement with the Neapolitan rule. Even in July, he was still prioritizing a political partnership with the Kingdom of Naples over the broader goal of Italian unity and the Garibaldians.⁶⁷⁷ Meanwhile, there was a group of Neapolitan exiles active in the capital of Sardinia, putting pressure on the high officials for the overthrow of the Neapolitan rule, while the diplomatic representatives of Sardinia were intriguing for the patriotic zeal in the capital of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.⁶⁷⁸ It was only after the victory on July 20 that Cavour became truly convinced that the radicals were more serious than he had previously supposed, and he regarded Garibaldi too dangerous to his system.⁶⁷⁹ When he learned that Garibaldi had crossed

⁶⁷⁵ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 122-123.

⁶⁷⁶ Pete, "Ungheresi tra i Mille," 12.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid., 92, 94.

⁶⁷⁸ Trevelyan, *The Making of Italy*, 20-23.

⁶⁷⁹ Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi*, 98, 101.

the Strait of Messina, he even contemplated to invade the Papal States himself.⁶⁸⁰ In any case, he meticulously avoided to facilitate and strengthen the revolutionary movement in this phase.⁶⁸¹

While the revolutionary army advanced further north through Catanzaro and Cosenza, on September 7, Cavour sent a message to Garibaldi, ostensibly urging him to focus on the conquest of Venice. However, Cavour was just preparing to invade Naples via the Papal States. His message served merely to play for time and confuse public opinion about his true intentions, and divert the Red Shirts from marching to Rome.⁶⁸² On September 11, Garibaldi addressed the king directly, implicitly asking whether Cavour and Farini could be removed from the government. He was confident that the king would support him when his influence was at its peak after the capture of Naples, as such a vast territory and so many Italians were now under his rule in the south, comparable to Vittorio Emanuele's grip in the north.⁶⁸³ On the next day, the king wrote a letter to Garibaldi to congratulate him and enquire his next forward step.⁶⁸⁴ On September 21, Garibaldi underlined that "he would like to go to Rome, but submits himself to the orders of the king."⁶⁸⁵

Despite not having been involved in any major clashes previously, the Hungarian Legion under Éber actively engaged in the last phase of the war. They resisted Bourbon attacks for weeks until the final battle on October 1. While thirteen Hungarians were killed, thirty were injured in this battle.⁶⁸⁶

The 200 Hungarian cavaliers, Garibaldi's only mounted force, were at length let loose. They went right over the batteries and on through regiment after regiment. Too few to rout the whole army, they were too brave, and too skilled with horse and sword, to be stopped anywhere

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid., 151.

⁶⁸¹ During the crossing of the strait, a Piedmontese warship was present, yet it made no effort to assist Garibaldi, leading the general to ensure Cavour's enmity to his cause. Ibid., 159.

⁶⁸² Ibid., 209.

⁶⁸³ Ibid., 218, 222.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., 234.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid., 238.

⁶⁸⁶ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 123-124.

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on this side the walls of Capua. Singly and in small groups, as evening fell, the survivors rode back, well satisfied that they had honoured the Magyar name before the eyes of Europe.⁶⁸⁷

The expedition added to Garibaldi's international fame and reputation. Cavour was uncomfortable with his growing popularity on the pretext that his militancy could alienate France, which had been protecting the Pope since 1849, and it was well known that the old man set his mind to Rome in a bid to complete the unification process. The tension became crystallized at the latter stage of the campaign. The interior minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia was not on good terms with Sicilian Francesco Crispi (1818-1901), a close associate of Garibaldi, and their dispute became clearly pronounced in June 1860. Factional struggles continued until September. Crispi's line of politics was too radical, imprudent, and adventurous for Sardinia. An important point of discussion in September and October was about the future of the south, which gave birth to two opposing camps. Cavour always wanted to swallow Sicily at once without conditions. Conservative Pallavicino adhered to an immediate annexation of the south by way of a plebiscite, while Crispi urged for the establishment of constituent assemblies in Naples and Palermo to discuss the terms of the unification.⁶⁸⁸ Beyond these disputes, Garibaldi was concentrated on invading Rome.

The rivalry between Garibaldi and Cavour had unavoidable reverberations among the Hungarian emigration. The former was quite an inspirational figure among the rank-and-file, though the upper echelons continued to stick to the latter.⁶⁸⁹ Generally, high-ranking officers in Garibaldi's army, including Türr, faced little prospects of retaining their rank, employment,

⁶⁸⁷ Trevelyan, *The Making of Italy*, 252. A few weeks later, Garibaldi himself wrote about them as follows: "Era bel vedere i veterani dell'Ungheria marciare al fuoco colla tranquillità di un campo di manovra e collo stesso ordine. La loro impavida intrepidità contribuì non poco alla ritirata dei nemici." Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 124.

⁶⁸⁸ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 114.

⁶⁸⁹ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 290. Besides strategic purposes, the leaders were now more integrated into Sardinia-Piedmont. Many were permanently settled in Italy and received salaries there. Among them, Türr married Adeline Bonaparte Wyse (1838-1899) and forged familial ties with the Sardinian and French aristocracies in September 1861. Later he became the King Vittorio Emanuele II's honorary adjutant in 1862. Maria Chiara Tirelli, "The Unification of Italy as Seen Through the Ottoman Diplomatic Correspondences (1848-1870)," (Phd Diss., Istanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018), 182.

and salaries, unless they reconciled with Cavour.⁶⁹⁰ Indeed, Kossuth and Cavour met on September 10. They reached a consensus to revive the expedition plan that had originally been conceived before the war of 1859. Accordingly, while the Kingdom of Sardinia would strike Venice, Garibaldi would steer the Hungarian Legion to Hungary through Dalmatia. Two other columns would simultaneously penetrate the homeland through Serbia and Romania. All the forces would meet in Hungary to call the co-nationals to rise up in arms against the Habsburg rule and lead to the formation of a Danubian Confederation.⁶⁹¹ Meanwhile, Cerruti was appointed to Constantinople to personally oversee this plot.⁶⁹²

One should not overlook that Kossuth and Cavour aimed to keep their dissidents on track with their renewed alliance. The leader of the emigration aimed to reconcile the disagreement between Sardinia and Garibaldi in the interest of the Hungarian cause; he desired to secure the material support of one while aligning with the leadership cult of the other. On the one hand, Sardinia would equip and finance the initiative of the Hungarian Legion. Indeed, the shipment of the weapons began in October, leaving the port of Genoa for the Danubian Principalities through Constantinople.⁶⁹³ On the other hand, Garibaldi's popularity quickly bore results; following the Directorate's decree to organize the legion in Romania, prominent figures among the émigrés who had earlier collaborated with Garibaldi joined the initiative with enthusiasm.⁶⁹⁴ Even though the agreement between Kossuth and Cavour was a strong expression of a conviction that the path to independence in Hungary laid through the liberation of Venice, the intention of the Sardinian politician was quite the other. On the one hand, he desired to keep Austria in check. While occupying Marche and Umbria, he considered the Hungarian threat to be an effective deterrent to keep the Habsburg army away from Italy. In

⁶⁹⁰ Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi*, 287.

⁶⁹¹ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 223.

⁶⁹² Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 134 For his instruction dated on September 18 see Ibid., 389-393.

⁶⁹³ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 223.

⁶⁹⁴ Including Éber, Eberhardt Károly, Türr, Dunyov, Winkler. Ibid., 85.

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September, Cavour was still calculating the possibility that Austria could launch an attack while his troops were occupied in the central region.⁶⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, on 22 September 1860, the sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria met in Warsaw. Although no formal declaration was issued, this summit could be interpreted as an attempt to revive the tradition of the Holy Alliance. It was also a coordinated response by conservative monarchies to the growing tide of liberal and nationalist movements. In short, Cavour needed some trump cards to discourage Austria from intervening in Italy. On the other hand, he desired to keep Garibaldi in check. While conspiring over Venice and Trentino, Cavour considered the Hungarians to be an effective incentive to keep Garibaldi away from Rome. As a reminder of his mission to lobby for the neutrality of Great Britain last year, Kossuth was tasked with dissuading Garibaldi from attacking Rome this time.⁶⁹⁶ What is more, the alliance with Kossuth could have deprived Garibaldi of the radical elements among the Hungarians, no matter how substantial their support might be. In effect, the prominent figures of the emigration set to work for finding a compromise between Cavour and Garibaldi on the grounds their dispute could endanger the Hungarian cause, yet what they were doing was to bring the former's thesis in front of the latter. In this sense, Kossuth was disposed to divert the general from his priorities, suggesting in a long letter that his aspiration to march into Rome would do more harm than good and could potentially ignite a war with France. He also proposed him to lead the Hungarians to home (September 24).⁶⁹⁷ Garibaldi did not even take these attempts into consideration; instead, they made clear to him which side the Hungarian Legion was loyal to.⁶⁹⁸ Beyond political considerations, Garibaldi's silence does not say much about his real intentions in terms of leading an expedition through the Balkans. Even though we do not exactly know his position

⁶⁹⁵ Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi*, 227.

⁶⁹⁶ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 136. As a bonus, the plan would secure a sphere of influence for Italy in the Balkan peninsula.

⁶⁹⁷ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 290. Éber also tried to draw Garibaldi to the Balkans. Ibid. 232.

⁶⁹⁸ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 137.

at this moment, Cavour would not cooperate with him in any case given the impulsive personality of the hero.⁶⁹⁹ In terms of an immediate attack against Austria in favor of Hungary, Cavour was clearly dragging his feet. He was careful not to spread the revolutionary activities to the domains of the Ottoman Empire, in other words, Montenegro and Bosnia had to be excluded from the scheme. Meanwhile, Turin orchestrated the shipment of weapons to Romania so clumsily, perhaps to deliberately undermine the project, that five ships were sequestered in Sulina by the Ottoman officials in December, the crates were ridiculously conspicuous in their content.⁷⁰⁰ This intervention gave a good excuse Cavour to put the plan on hold.⁷⁰¹ Later, the weapons were handed to Prince Cuza, who turned out to keep them for Romania, which aroused the ire of the Hungarian emigration and put Kossuth in a much more difficult situation, bequeathing a deep crisis within the upper echelon.

At last, Sardinia-Piedmont annexed the territories captured by the Red Shirts. Garibaldi accepted plebiscites, not the election of a constituent assembly, between October 11 and 13, 1860. It was Türr himself, who intervened the situation and forced Garibaldi on behalf of the uncomfortable senior officers of the national guard in Naples to give in. "If this really is the desire of the Neapolitan people, let it be so," said Garibaldi.⁷⁰² The plebiscites were held on October 21. Garibaldi surrendered in a symbolic meeting with King Victor Emanuele II at Teano on October 26. Soon after plebiscites in Umbria and Marche were also held, completing the whole process. The annexation was formalized in November. The King made his entrance into Naples on November 7, sharing the same carriage with Garibaldi. The official takeover was completed the following day. Garibaldi withdrew to the island of Caprera on the 9th.⁷⁰³

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid., 141.

⁷⁰⁰ When five ships arrived at Golden Horn at the end of October, Cerruti boarded on one of them and was shocked to see that the crates were clearly labelled as "Regio Arsenale di Genova Regio Arsenale di Torino," "con una innocenza tutta battesimale." Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 135.

⁷⁰¹ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 139-140.

⁷⁰² Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi*, 373-374.

⁷⁰³ Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 115-117.

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What would happen to the volunteers? After all, it was Garibaldi's cult of personality that brought all the volunteers from a wide range of ethnic background.⁷⁰⁴ Exactly for that reason, Cavour's perspective was to get rid of them for good, if not disclosed with such clarity, considering their attachment to Garibaldi, who had now become a political threat with his popularity at its zenith. Moreover, incorporating the army of volunteers into the Sardinian army could lead to rivalries and disagreements with the professional soldiers already serving in the royal army, given that it was a revolutionary army. General Fanti was particularly ruthless in his efforts to dismantle the volunteer corps. Although Garibaldi appealed to be appointed as an official in the Sardinian army in the south for one year and to prevent the dispersion of his forces, a decree on November 16 mandated all his officers and soldiers to appear before a special commission, ultimately leading to their substantial elimination, particularly among the foreigners.⁷⁰⁵ "The privates," notes Trevelyan, "were sent back each to his home with gratuity," and the SNI undertook a significant responsibility to make sure of their return.⁷⁰⁶

Italy was ultimately forged through the domination of the virile subalpine kingdom over the south, which was represented as a natural development or *piedmontization* in a pejorative way. Posing a challenge to this narrative, the legacy of Garibaldi found no immediate place in this construction and was condemned to be forgotten.⁷⁰⁷ The elimination of Garibaldi was saddening for many of his foreign followers, yet it left the Hungarians particularly perplexed, as they faced a moment of hesitation in deciding their next course of action, given that they had no home to go. They were allowed to remain in the Hungarian Legion, which was to be kept ready for future attempts to pursue the independence of the homeland. Upon the dissolution of the Southern Army of Garibaldi, the legion was relocated to Nola, near Naples,

⁷⁰⁴ For Garibaldi's global fame see Lucy Riall, "Travel, Migration, Exile: Garibaldi's Global Fame," *Modern Italy* 19, no. 1 (2014), 41–52.

⁷⁰⁵ Riall, *Invention*, 315.

⁷⁰⁶ Trevelyan, *The Making of Italy*, 280. Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 304.

⁷⁰⁷ Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi*, 408, 411.

where it continued to exist under more concrete supervision of the Sardinian state. Some Hungarians refused this prospect, to illustrate, three days after the meeting at Teano, Éber submitted his resignation to Garibaldi, and decided to move to Great Britain, though the large portion of the legion remained in the service of the royal army.⁷⁰⁸

A revolutionary like Garibaldi could have no intention of stopping. After being sidelined by the establishment, he continued intense political activities and revolutionary intrigues between 1861–1862.⁷⁰⁹ There existed mainly two options in front of him. The first was to invade Rome and the Papal States with a volunteer corps, a plan that he obviously favored against the wishes of Turin. The second was to coordinate his efforts with Cavour, whose counterplan envisioned an expedition through the Balkans to curb the imprudent political ambitions of the general and to increase the grip of the kingdom in the area. This controversy continued to have its reverberations among the Hungarians in the new year, yet more strongly than ever. Contemplations suggesting closer collaboration with Garibaldi were gaining ground for many exiles. Besides the failure of the Kossuth-Cavour agreement in September 1860 to produce any concrete action, Cuza's confiscation of weapons in December further added discontent among the Hungarian émigrés, leading to a leadership crisis at full steam. Pulszky started to put pressure on Kossuth to align with Garibaldi since Cavour did not have any intention to take a concrete step in favor of the Hungarians. For Kossuth, however, Garibaldi could not be a partner to fully rely upon for the national aspirations. In January 1861, he made it very clear to Pulszky: "Therefore, I will not break with Cavour. Whoever breaks with him, also breaks with me, and our roads will be divided forever."⁷¹⁰ As a result, Pulszky parted his way from Kossuth, though he kept informing him of his meetings with Garibaldi in February. Another source of dissidence was Klapka. On January 9, he had a conference with

⁷⁰⁸ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 224.

⁷⁰⁹ Riall, "Garibaldi's Global Fame," 48.

⁷¹⁰ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 141. "Perciò io non rompo con Cavour. Chi rompe con lui, rompe anche con me e le nostre strade si divideranno per sempre." Ibid., 142.

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Cuza to transport the confiscated weapons to somewhere near Transylvania.⁷¹¹ He was still trying to orchestrate the efforts for the insurrection in Hungary from Constantinople even though the shipment of weapons had been blocked. For a little while, he did not refrain from criticizing Sardinia, suggesting that its consul in Galați was inadequate on the matter. Upon his return to Turin, however, Klapka readjusted his position and chose to align himself with the pragmatic and prudent approach of Cavour, who had a victory in the January elections despite the discontent in the south. As a result, Klapka ruled out an immediate war against Austria.⁷¹²

The relative softening of the Habsburg rule after the defeat of 1859 was revoked with the issuance of the February Patent of 1861, which reinstated centralist regime.⁷¹³ The internal disputes among the Hungarian exiles continued. In March, Klapka put the blame for the confiscation of arms on the recklessness of Kossuth and expressed discomfort with Türr's involvement with political affairs.⁷¹⁴ Klapka likely saw himself as an alternative leader for the Directorate and sought to gain the confidence of Cavour.⁷¹⁵ On the other hand, while demonstrating his discontent with both Kossuth and Klapka (April 1861), the Hungarian agent in Constantinople, Karacsay, extended his criticisms to Sardinia, whose unreliable politics, in his view, added to the confusion within the emigration.⁷¹⁶ Meanwhile, the legion was tasked with struggling with the relentless brigandage of Molise and Abruzzo (Marche Region) in April 1861.⁷¹⁷ Furthermore, under the heavy criticism of high treason, Teleki committed suicide in Pest, where the conservative party did not share the revolutionary tactics of the exiles in Italy. Amid these recriminations came a great purge at all levels of the Hungarian Legion, targeting

⁷¹¹ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 138.

⁷¹² Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 181.

⁷¹³ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 312.

⁷¹⁴ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 183.

⁷¹⁵ He resigned from the Directorate on 30 May 1862. Ròbert Hermann, András Joò, Kálmán Mészáros, István Seres. *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma Hakkı Tanınan Macar Mültecilerinin Özyaşamlarından Özetler*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2010), 55.

⁷¹⁶ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 183-184.

⁷¹⁷ Trevelyan, *The Making of Italy*, 281. There were two periods in which the legion fought against the brigandage after the unification. The first period lasted until August 1862. The second period was from June 1865 to July 1866. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 229.

all the radicals or those suspected as such, starting with Mogyoródy for his strong ties with Garibaldi.⁷¹⁸ Kossuth tasked Lajos Sréter with the political inspection of the legion, but Sréter relegated the duty to Vetter, whose relentless manner divided the legion into two opposing factions, so much so that Kossuth was obliged to remove both from the leadership and put the legion again under his trustee, Ihász, in May 1861. The internal disputes tarnished the image of the legion, providing Turin with the pretext to diminish their role in the country.⁷¹⁹

Not long after the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy on March 17, the chief architect of the unification died on June 6, 1861. The death of Cavour was obviously another blow to the Hungarian Legion since the successor, Baron Bettino Ricasoli (1809–1880), was not an ardent supporter of the Hungarian cause. It would be too deterministic to argue that Cavour had planned this result from the beginning, but it can be said in hindsight that his policy gradually led to the absorption of the Hungarian Question into the Italian Question. After Cavour died, little of the Hungarian cause in the exile remained. Through Kossuth, it was gradually isolated from the Mazzinian radicalism, the Polish Question, Garibaldi's movement, and finally from the potential support from the Balkan revolutionaries. Assumed the role of its champion, King Vittorio Emanuele II took up the Cavourian plans for a little while longer, at least superficially, since the questions of Venice and Rome were still on the table. In other words, the establishment still expected of Garibaldi to launch an expedition along the Adriatic coasts in coordination with the committees in the Balkans to help the kingdom to annex what remained in Austria: Veneto and Trentino. Between July and October 1861, an alternative plan was considered to compensate Austria with Bosnia in exchange for Veneto.⁷²⁰ Throughout that year, the British foreign ministry also favoured the peaceful solution in the Balkans, inducing the Vienna to cede the region to Italy. It is really difficult to decipher the strategies of the

⁷¹⁸ Ibid., 186.

⁷¹⁹ Ibid., 187.

⁷²⁰ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 31. Buying Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Porte was another option on the table in July. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 202-203.

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concern parts with exact terms around this time, since their contending visions included elements of doubts and ambiguities against the fast changing conditions, yet studies suggest that Garibaldi himself may have given his approval to the plan of liberating Hungary and Veneto in the spring of 1861.⁷²¹ By the fall, all the powerful players (Vittorio Emanuele, Urbano Rattazzi, Kossuth, Türr, Garibaldi, and even Mazzini) were agreed upon the "Grand Plan" to revolutionize nearly the entire Balkan peninsula (including Albania, Montenegro, and even Greece).⁷²² Nevertheless, evidence presents confusing signals regarding Kossuth's contemplations, it could be well possible that he sought alternative solutions in response to the ambiguities of the Serbs and Romanians, along with Italy. Indeed, after achieving the unification of Wallachia and Moldavia, the ruler of the principalities came under strong international pressure to obstruct Polish and Hungarian intrigues unfolding on Romanian soil after the war against Austria.⁷²³ On September 19, Kossuth informed Cerruti that his agent in Constantinople was working on a plan to establish closer cooperation with the Porte. He reasoned that an independent Hungary could serve as a powerful block for the integrity and security of the Turkish empire in the Balkans against the Austrian and Russian empires, thus, Hungary was necessary for the Ottoman Empire, particularly against the growing Pan-Slavic agitation.⁷²⁴ Indeed, the government in Italy was too prudent to orchestrate a far-reaching plot in favor of the Hungarians. Cavour had revealed his reservations about spreading revolutionary plots to Ottoman soil just a few months ago. Since the Porte formally recognized the Kingdom of Italy on the third of July, there was no explicit reason to contaminate the relations from the start. Thus, it is safe to suggest that the spread of the insurrections in the Balkans was not

⁷²¹ Hanák, "Rapporti Storici Italo-Ungheresi," 232. According to Jászay, Kossuth was still pondering over the expedition under the command of Garibaldi around April 1861. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 30.

⁷²² Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 232. For the reference for Mazzini's preference of Veneto over Rome see Ibid., 32. Furthermore, in May 1861, a Mazzinian revolt erupted in Lombardy with the aim of extending it to Trentino. It was seconded by Garibaldi. Tirelli, "The Unification of Italy," 106. However, a letter of Kossuth to Cerruti at the end of the summer of 1861 did not consider the offensive against Austria earlier than next year a possibility. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 147.

⁷²³ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 333.

⁷²⁴ Ibid., 148-149.

exactly what Italy sought.⁷²⁵ Yet one can suggest that the fear of a general uprisings in the Balkans had already alarmed the diplomatic representatives of the Porte in Italy.⁷²⁶ These concerns would largely shape Ottomans' perception of Giuseppe Garibaldi, Giuseppe Mazzini, the Kingdom of Italy, and the Hungarian and Polish refugees throughout the decade.

The diplomatic efforts of the Ottoman envoy to Turin intensified in late 1861. Rüstem Bey (Giovanni Timoteo Calosso) (1789–1865), who had been appointed there in 1857, proposed the Porte to establish new consulates in Italy for a better flow of intelligence upon getting the wind of the revolutionary activities linked to Garibaldi in the Balkans. Also, he requested clarification from Ricasoli about the topic. The premier gave assurances that the situation was under control.⁷²⁷ In January 1862, the anxiety of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was galvanized with the rumors that the Great Powers had the plan to compensate the loss of the Habsburg Empire to the Kingdom of Italy with the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire.⁷²⁸ Furthermore, Rüstem's reports about the revolutionary activities connected with Italy continued in the following months, recommending the Porte not to rely on the assurances and to suppress any seditious attempts in the Balkans.⁷²⁹ Indeed, Klapka and Marco Antonio Canini, a Mazzinian journalist, were negotiating to forge an alliance between Romania and Hungary in Bucharest, which was formalized in Turin on April 15.⁷³⁰ In July, Garibaldi issued a proclamation calling on the Balkan Slavs to take up arms against the despoticisms of both the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The Ottoman government thought that this could be a sign that Garibaldi might move from Sicily to the Balkans.⁷³¹ However, Garibaldi set to complete the unfinished work in August 1862. Gathering a group of Sicilian volunteers, he crossed the

⁷²⁵ Ibid., 169.

⁷²⁶ Tirelli, "The Unification of Italy," 147.

⁷²⁷ Ibid., 105.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Ibid., 107.

⁷³⁰ Pulszky also supported the alliance. Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 121.

⁷³¹ Tirelli, "The Unification of Italy," 167.

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Straits of Messina once again to march into Rome and put an end to the Papal States. He had not even spread the word to his Hungarian comrades, with whom he did not see any prospects for settlement. Indeed, Pulzsky went after Garibaldi to Sicily, attempting to persuade him to shift his movement toward the Orient, while Türr wrote a letter to him for the same purpose.⁷³² The Kingdom of Italy took strict measures to prevent the Hungarians from involving with the Garibaldini; the Hungarian Legion was moved from Nocera to Alessandria. The legionnaires were disarmed and boarded onto ships from Salerno to Genoa on August 13.⁷³³ However, Garibaldi was not distracted a bit, yet his venture ended up with a great tragedy. When the Red Shirts landed in the hill town of Aspromonte (Reggio Calabria), King Vittorio Emanuele acted firm to thwart the enterprise. The volunteers were halted by the royal army, leading to a military confrontation on August 29, during which Garibaldi was wounded and captured. It was not only a decisive blow to the republican and democratic currents in Italy but also to the unity and solidarity of the Hungarian émigrés. Even though Kossuth and Klapka effectively stood up against the initiative, Gusztáv Frigyesy (1835-1877) and Stefano Dunyov actively supported Garibaldi.⁷³⁴ Despite the former's optimism, the participation of the Hungarians in the campaign remained very dim, only a handful managed to join the troops gathered in Sicily (around 20 individuals).⁷³⁵ On balance, neither the opponents nor the proponents of Garibaldi did any good to the patriotic cause. The participants of the expedition were imprisoned, Garibaldi ceased to be a figure that the Hungarian Legion might rely on. Klapka and Kossuth's efforts to gain favor with Turin not only increased resentment among the exiles towards themselves but also failed to benefit the cause. The legion was restructured in November. The soldiers were permitted to join the royal army but were required to fully surrender to the existing rules and regulations. Indiscipline and politicization within the legion would no longer

⁷³² Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 227.

⁷³³ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 229.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, 224-228.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*, 221-222.

be tolerated; indeed, the regulation gave all the justification to the rulers to dissolve the unit whenever deemed necessary. The task of overseeing the reform was entrusted to Colonel Károly Földvály.⁷³⁶

Soon after, the Hungarian leadership in exile began to see potential benefits from the Polish Uprising of 1863 in Tsarist Russia, also known as the January Uprising, which was considered to be an opportunity to ignite the revolutionary flame in Hungary on the grounds that if the uprising were to spread to Galicia, it could connect the Polish Question with the Hungarian Question. Desertions from the Hungarian Legion upon the political developments in Poland signaled that the discipline and revolutionary spirit in the legion had not yet fully established despite the careful considerations of the Italian and Hungarian leaders.⁷³⁷ In the spring of that year, Türr attempted to come to an agreement with Cuza in Bucharest, aiming to cooperate with the Danubian Principalities in line with the uprising in Warsaw, yet it remained only as a personal initiative.⁷³⁸ In March 1863, Kossuth and Klapka appealed to the provisional Polish government to recruit Hungarian regiments, though the Polish leadership was wary of this proposal, fearing it could jeopardize their revolution by drawing Austria into the conflict. Next month, Kossuth applied to the Italian premier Marco Minghetti (1818-1886) for involving also Italy, as the uprising could help the kingdom to annex Venetia if the Habsburg Empire would engage in a warfare in Hungary and Galicia.⁷³⁹ All the same, the government in Turin was firm to weaken its ties with Kossuth and Klapka, opting instead to communicate through György Komáromy and Tivadar Csáky on behalf of the Hungarian movement in exile. The aging Kossuth remained relentless; he never ceased his efforts to establish himself as the representative of the emigration, relying on his former friend Cerruti (late 1863 and early 1864), who had now risen to the position of Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign

⁷³⁶ Ibid., 229-230.

⁷³⁷ Ibid, 231.

⁷³⁸ Ibid., 220.

⁷³⁹ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 121.

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Affairs.⁷⁴⁰ However, Cerruti also lost interest in the Hungarian Question, not to mention that Turin was soon to banish him to Iran.⁷⁴¹ In April 1864, the meeting between Klapka and Garibaldi in London, and their following visit to Mazzini, came too little, too late, resembling more of a charade than a real threat to a large-scale revolution.⁷⁴² Given that the Polish revolutionaries aimed to extend the uprising to other regions, Klapka and Éber rushed to Turin in the spring of 1864, yet no concrete result was secured. The prospect of a far-reaching revolt in Central and Eastern Europe soon faded.⁷⁴³ The attempts of the Hungarians during the Polish uprising proved that unity within the emigration was no longer a matter of discussion. Time and again, Kossuth had become even more marginalized, and the emigration was further divided. Along with Klapka, Komáromy and Csáky decisively severed their ties with Kossuth. Klapka criticized the dictatorial manners of Kossuth and offered an alternative democratic program. He believed the alliance with Italy should be maintained, yet the Hungarians must rely on their own strength for the revolution and independence in their homeland.⁷⁴⁴ Nevertheless, under severe pressures from the revolutionary developments, the Habsburg rule launched negotiations with the Hungarian moderates in 1865. Representing the national interests at home, Ferenc Deák (1803–1876) was eager to agree upon a personal union between Hungary and Austria, with a shared foreign and defense policy, while preserving internal autonomy for the Hungarian territories.⁷⁴⁵ From the Polish side, French sympathy for the uprising strained the rapprochement with Russia, while the eventual failure entailed a new generation of refugees to the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴⁶

⁷⁴⁰ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 233-234.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid., 237.

⁷⁴² Ibid., 220.

⁷⁴³ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 233.

⁷⁴⁴ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 241-242.

⁷⁴⁵ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 313.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid., 329.

The fact that two German powers in Central Europe contended for leadership in the impending unification presented another opportunity for Italy and Hungary to advance their nationalist claims. As the relations between Austria and Prussia deteriorated, the Kingdom of Italy and the Hungarian Legion emerged as natural allies for Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), the Prussian Prime Minister and key architect of German unification. With his tireless efforts and steadfast devotion, Kossuth claimed for the leadership within the emigration between May and September, despite the long-standing critiques. The Italo-Hungarian plan of Cavour was revived in this context, and the agreement was negotiated in June 1866. Accordingly, the Prussian army would engage the Austrian forces from the north. Under the command of Garibaldi, the Hungarians were to advance with approximately 28,000 men from the Adriatic coasts toward Austria. Türr was tasked with moving into Hungary through Serbia, while another contingent was to enter from Transylvania.⁷⁴⁷ For that purpose, Éber was tasked with organizing the expeditionary force in Romania.⁷⁴⁸ Kossuth also contacted Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele.⁷⁴⁹ Hungarian volunteers were recruited in the Puglia region of Italy to embark from the Dalmatian coast and to incite a revolt in Hungary, creating a diversion to ease the seizure of Venetia for the Ottoman envoy to Turin.⁷⁵⁰ Meanwhile, La Società Operaia Italiana di Mutuo Soccorso (The Italian Worker's Society for Mutual Aid) in Constantinople provided forty-five volunteers for Garibaldi, among them existed also Poles.⁷⁵¹

Following the Prussian victory over the Austrian forces on July 14, Italy declared war on Austria. The Italian government launched an offensive in what would become known as the Third Italian War of Independence, with the primary objective of capturing Venetia. The Italian

⁷⁴⁷ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 125.

⁷⁴⁸ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 233.

⁷⁴⁹ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 267.

⁷⁵⁰ Tirelli, "The Unification of Italy," 130. The Ottoman envoy in London, Musurus Bey, warned in May that the project could even bring up the compensation of Austria with Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Albania in exchange of Venezia, though it would not be supported by the British government. Ibid., 123-124.

⁷⁵¹ Fabio L. Grassi, "Garibaldi e Garibaldini a Costantinopoli e nell'Impero Ottomano: Conoscenze Attuali, Piste per Future Ricerche," in *Garibaldi: Cultura e Ideali. Atti del LXIII Congresso di Storia del Risorgimento* (Cagliari, 11-15 Ottobre 2006), ed. by Stefania Bonanni (Roma: Istituto Per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, 2008), 432.

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troops experienced with a crushing defeat at the Battle of Custoza (24 June 1866). History repeated with farce. The old-wolf Garibaldi once again seized the moment, leading to a volunteer corps into the mountainous Trentino region to confront the Austrian forces. Despite his success in July, Garibaldi was ordered to halt his campaign. He obeyed with a one-word telegram, "Obbedisco." History repeated itself with tragedy. Vittorio Emanuele agreed to an armistice. Kossuth learned of the armistice in Ferrara on July 24. Even though Ricasoli continued to give him hope, the Sardinian fleet was not even prepared for the planned operation.⁷⁵² Klapka achieved to form a Hungarian Legion in Prussia, though it could not achieve much because all sides came to agreement. The armistice came prematurely without the cooperation between the Italians and the Hungarians. The Hungarian Legion was posed as a leverage against Vienna for the benefit of the seizure of Venetia.⁷⁵³ History repeated itself again with farce, it happened what happened in 1859. Since Austria ceded Venetia to Italy, no rationale for a cooperation between the Hungarian émigrés and Italy remained, as the acquisition put an end to Italy's hostility against Austria.⁷⁵⁴ That is to say, 1866 proved to be another disappointment for the Hungarian emigration under the leadership of Kossuth, who recounts this repetition in this memoirs as follows:

It appears that on both occasions, just as the angel of God's compassion was handing the cup of liberation to the much-suffering Hungarian nation, it became a bitter cup of vanished hopes. On the first occasion, the sanguinary but speedy victory over the Austrians, and the victorious Emperor's fear of that conflict which occurred twelve years later, and which he could have forestalled in 1859, dashed the cup from our lips. On the occasion of the war of 1866 the cup was dashed from our lips by the speedy victory of the Prussians, and still more—by the nation herself. The germs of the Austro-Hungarian dualism were then already in the air.⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵² Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 126.

⁷⁵³ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 274.

⁷⁵⁴ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 126. Eric R. Terzuolo, "The Garibaldini in the Balkans, 1875–1876," *The International History Review* 4, no. 1 (February 1982): 111

⁷⁵⁵ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, xxi.

The neo-absolutist regime in Hungary came to an end, as it could no longer sustain Austrian hegemony, Deák was invited to Vienna, and after negotiations, a dual regime was declared, the Hungarians became the partner of the Habsburg Empire. In effect, this provision marked the return of the March Laws of 1848. In parallel, the Ausgleich ran counter to the interests of the South Slavs and Romanians, as was the case at the time of the 1848 revolution.

The process of German unification, on the other hand, worked against French interests. The seizure of Rome took place in 1870, following the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. At the Battle of Sedan, Napoléon III was taken prisoner, leading to the collapse of the French Second Empire. The safeguard of Rome and the Papal States turned out to be fallen, which entailed an opportunity for Italy to breach the Aurelian Walls of Rome at the Porta Pia without much resistance. Surrendered in September 1870, the Eternal City soon became the capital of the Kingdom of Italy, marking the completion of the Risorgimento. And with the unification of Germany, a new era in European politics commenced.⁷⁵⁶

To sum up, it was relatively a long chapter for a historical background section of a doctorate thesis, though this chapter does not only give different national contexts and themes but also conveys the cracks within the disposition of powers, the tunnels through which our agents made their ways. After the Hungarian War of Independence, Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees made their ways into the centralizing period of the Ottoman Empire, which integrated them into its polity. While trying to open space for themselves within a growing and centralizing bureaucracy, their efforts within the formal structures would couple with the political developments in Italy, where Garibaldi played a center role. The next chapter will present the stories of those who tried to find their way through these institutions and structures to investigate how individuals exploited the fractures intrinsic to the social systems in

⁷⁵⁶ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall*, 188.

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transformation to create space for their rebellious agendas and how they negotiated these tensions in their selves.

Chapter 3

Refugee Stories as Told by Themselves

Everyman is anonymous, but becomes memorable in rebellion; and in the many memorable rebellions of nineteenth-century Europe, [...] historians have rejoiced that the poor had found voice in violence.⁷⁵⁷

3.1. The State of Affairs in the Balkans Around 1860

Even though the Treaty of Paris (1856) placed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire under the joint guarantee of the Great Powers, the rapprochement between France and Russia soon moved in the opposite direction in the Balkans, where the unrest among the populations substantially increased in return. Replacing Aleksandar Karađorđević (1806-1885), Russia-backed Miloš Obrenović (1780-1860) returned to power in Serbia in December 1858. The unification of Italy was an aggravating factor that further destabilized the region for the Sublime Porte; while the Kingdom of Sardinia was making preparations for the upcoming war against the Habsburg Empire toward the end of the decade, it sought the cooperation of the Balkan principalities through the Hungarian refugees and exiles. In this context, France-supported Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1820-1873) was elected both in Wallachia and Moldavia, which led to the de facto unification of Romania under his personality, against the strong opposition of Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-1858). In a similar manner, the Austrian and Turkish empires regarded instability in the Balkans as a threat to their own security, besides their integrity was also a perennial concern for the British foreign policy. Yet

⁷⁵⁷ Sheridan Gilley, "The Garibaldi Riots of 1862," *The Historical Journal* 16, no. 4 (December 1973): 697.

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the reports of disorder were continuous in the Ottoman provinces of Rumelia, particularly where the population was overwhelmingly Slavic.

The Porte immensely increased its military presence in Rumelia against the backdrop of the developments in Central and Eastern Europe.⁷⁵⁸ The rebellions in the Balkans, however, encouraged Tsarist Russia to internationally condemn the Porte for persecuting its non-Muslim populations. Russia also proposed the Great Powers to establish a joint commission to oversee the situation thither. The Porte took the initiative of inspecting the administration itself to avoid foreign intervention. Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha (1813-1871) set out on the mission in May 1860. Left Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha (1815-1871) in the capital as his vice, he departed for the Black Sea coast of Varna, then passed through Shumen (*Şumnu*), Svištov (*Ziştovi*), Lom, Vidin, Berkovitsa (*Berkofça*), Şehirköy, Niş (*Niş*), Priştina (*Priştine*), and Bitola (*Manastır*).⁷⁵⁹ However, the Grand Vizier had to return to the capital when another uprising erupted in Damascus, and the Porte willy-nilly shifted its focus to the Middle East, neglecting the affairs in the Balkans. The commander of the Imperial Army in Rumelia (*Rumeli Ordu-yı Hümâyûn Mûşîri*), Çerkes İsmail Pasha (1805-1861), was left authorized for the incomplete inspection at the time when he was in Herzegovina.⁷⁶⁰

Hungarian refugees and fugitives on Ottoman soil came into prominence in the context of the unrest in the Balkans. At the time, the Italian consul in Galaţi, an important port located on the left bank of the Danube, Luigi Antonio Leardi served as a key person for the communication between Hungary and Italy. Until December 1860, his correspondence with Marcelo Cerruti (1808-1896) in Constantinople had primarily focused on the issue of the weapons confiscated in Sulina. The new year, however, brought a new wave of Hungarian and Polish refugees to Galaţi, where they requested their transfer to the Hungarian Legion in Italy,

⁷⁵⁸ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1960), 76.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid., 100-102.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid., 111-112.

which placed considerable financial strain on the Italian consulate.⁷⁶¹ Naturally, the influx of refugees from Hungary in the winter was also a significant agenda item for the Ottoman administration in the region. The Porte viewed the refugee flow as a threat to the stability of its rule in the Balkans. It informed Ferik (General of Division) Ismail Pasha that Hungarian, Italian, and Polish refugees who had ended up in the empire *after the Hungarian War of Independence* came to rally in Vidin, Ruse (Ruşuk), Tulcea (*Tulça*), and Sulina (*Sünne*) with seditious intentions (*niyât-ı fâside*).⁷⁶² The general was thereby ordered that those bands of conspirators (*güruh-u fesâd*) be kept out of the coasts of the Danube given the obligations of the Sublime State to the House of Austria, as their presence in the frontier region was risky. Also, they had to be promptly sent to the capital via steamers navigating through the river after investigating their situation on the spot, if necessary, in cooperation with foreign consulates nearby. If any consul claimed a suspect as a subject of their government, the situation should be wired to the capital for further instruction before taking any action. According to the dispatch, the administrative chiefs in the area were also alerted to cooperate with the general on the account of similar instructions.⁷⁶³ However, even though the Porte instructed the local authorities to collaborate with the foreign representatives, their relations with them were not without tensions. Anyhow, it was made clear to the pasha soon after that the said treatment not be applied to those refugees who had permanently settled (*tevattun*) in Vidin, while the

⁷⁶¹ Pasquale Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano e Questione Ungherese (1849–1867): Marcello Cerruti e le Intese Politiche Italo-Magiare* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1995), 162.

⁷⁶² A variety of terms such *fesâd*, *fesede*, *müfsid*, *fâsid*, *ifsâd*, and *fesâd-amiz* almost endlessly appear in the documents at our disposal while reporting issues related to revolutionary activities. For Vakalis, *fesat* was a broader term for disloyalty and disobedience, carrying a specific connotation of disrupting social and political order. Anna Vakalis, "Tanzimat in the Province: Nationalist Sedition (Fesat), Banditry (Eşkîya), and Local Councils in the Ottoman Southern Balkans (1840s to 1860s)" (PhD diss., University of Basel, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2019), 251. As an important concept in the Ottoman Penal Code (*Ceza Kannunname-i Hümayûn*), however, one can suggest that the usage of *fesat* in bureaucratic correspondence was murky, remarking security concerns of the state while describing facts, events, and people in political context. Ilkay Yılmaz, "Conspiracy, International Police Cooperation and the Fight against Anarchism in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1878–1908," in *Age of Rogues: Rebels, Revolutionaries, and Racketeers at the Frontiers of Empires*, ed. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan and Alp Yenen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 223–224.

⁷⁶³ BOA., HR.MKT., 360/73, 10 Cemâziyelevvel 1277 (24 December 1860). As an example of the instruction given to the mutasarrıf of Tulcea see BAO., A.MKT.UM., 458/66, 18 Şâban 1277 (01 March 1861).

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conspirators (*erbâb-ı fesâd* and *tahrik*) be sent to places away from the borders, such as Plovdiv (*Filibe*), *Evreşe*, and Slive (*İslimye*).⁷⁶⁴

On January 13, 1861, the Field Marshall of Police (*Zabtiye Müşiri*, the chief/minister of police/gendarmerie organization, *Bâb-ı Zaptiye*) in Istanbul was immediately urged to secretly investigate the situation of three Hungarian fugitives who had arrived in the capital on a British ship from the Black Sea port of Constanța.⁷⁶⁵ Not long after, Ismail Pasha wired a telegram from Plovdiv to the Porte, reporting that five Hungarians without passports were caught in Vidin. They had departed from Hungary for Italy through Wallachia. Even though he was about to transfer them to the capital given their suspicious outlook, the governor of Vidin informed him with a telegram of the demand of the Austrian consul for their arrest and transfer to the border of Orsova under police surveillance.⁷⁶⁶ The Porte then confirmed that those five Hungarians be handed over to the Austrian consul via Orsova.⁷⁶⁷ The district governor of Sulina also reported in February that the investigation of the suspects had already been underway, so the names of troublemakers were being secretly investigated and registered until the arrival of the general of division in the district.⁷⁶⁸ In a petition addressed to the Porte in the same month, the administrator of the Albanian city of Berat suggested that Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882), responsible for the revolutionary and seditious activities in Italy, spurred revolutionary activities among the subjects of the empire and reported that one Italian steamer had been caught red-handed a month ago while carrying arms and munitions.⁷⁶⁹ On the other hand, the governor of Vidin, Abdühû Mehmed Said Pasha, briefed the central government on the first of March that *this time* three fugitives were put under arrest and

⁷⁶⁴ BOA., A.MKT.UM., 448/46, 01 Receb 1277 (13 January 1861).

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid. They were to be investigated secretly because they were regarded "reliable" (*mu'teber*). However, in a related document, it is said that five Hungarians, rather than three. BOA., HR. MKT., 363/30, 01 Receb 1277 (13 January 1861).

⁷⁶⁶ BAO., A.MKT.UM., 450/20, 09 Receb 1277 (21 January 1861).

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid., 1.

⁷⁶⁸ BOA, HR.SYS., 1798/59, 10 February 1861.

⁷⁶⁹ HR.MKT., 371/46, 7 Ramazan 1277 (19 March 1861), 1. Also see HR.MKT., 369/17, 20 Şâban 1277 (3 March 1861), 2.

separately questioned in the presence of the acting commander of the administrative unit, Mehmed Bey. Accordingly, having escaped from the Turin embassy of Austria, Károly son of Majrik, József son of Károly, and Thomas, son of an Austrian, proceeded to Vidin via Serbian soil. Even though the suspects claimed that they held Austrian citizenship, the respondent consul in the city asked for their detention on the ground that they had long been involved with seditious activities against his government. The suspects were therefore sent to Ruse by river, then to Istanbul through Varna since the river was frozen down to the destination.⁷⁷⁰ Just a few days later, the government warned the administrators of Constanța and Tulcea of the Hungarians rallied in Moldova and ready to infiltrate from Măcin to Cernavodă (Boğazköy).⁷⁷¹ Amidst the security reasons, some Hungarians and Poles in Ruse were displaced in March; Bolyos Galis and Jangel were sent to Constantinople, along with their families, while Izak Merdehay, a Hungarian convert named Ali, as well as a certain Dobriski and Petrev who were employed in telegraph office in Ruse, were transferred to Edirne.⁷⁷²

These correspondences suggest that the Balkan territories of the empire witnessed an influx, primarily of Hungarians but also partly of Poles, arriving via various routes. Indeed, György Klapka (1820-1892) recognized in mid-March that drawing volunteers from Hungary to Naples was a key strategy for the revolutionary cause.⁷⁷³ However, Austrian and Ottoman authorities were cooperating in their efforts to curb this stream, neither Italy was willing to welcome them unconditionally. Even though most of the suspects detained by the local authorities stated in their testimonies that they intended to reach Italy, it was evident that some aimed to arrive in Istanbul. These reports, of course, are limited to spot those who came under

⁷⁷⁰ BOA., İ.DH., 469/31446, 08 Ramazan 1277 (20 March 1861), 2. The governor was informed on April 5 that those three Hungarian fugitives who acted against the politics (*politika aleyhinde*) were sent to Istanbul under arrest. A total cost of 1,345.50 piastres for their transportation was covered by the local subdivision of the treasury. BOA., A.MKT.UM., 464/58, 24 Ramazan 1277 (05 April 1861). For the correspondence addressed to the Ministry of Finance see BOA., A. MKT.MHM., 214/19, 24 Ramazan 1277 (05 April 1861).

⁷⁷¹ A.MKT.MHM., 211/89, 25 Şâban 1277 (08 March 1861), 1-2.

⁷⁷² HR.MKT., 371/46, 07 Ramazan 1277 (19 March 1861), 1-6.

⁷⁷³ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 182.

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the radar of official authorities; there were undoubtedly many others who overcame the challenges on the way and managed to reach Galați and Istanbul.

In early March 1861, the Sardinian consulate in Galați was financially overwhelmed, as the number of refugees reached to 130. Following Cerruti's recommendations, it was decided that the refugees would be transferred to Naples via Constantinople, on the condition that they would provide written consent not to disembark along the route (as Austria would seek their extradition from the Porte) and agree to join the Hungarian Legion once reaching their destination.⁷⁷⁴ Just after the steamer *Taurus* from the French company *Messageries Maritimes* set sail from Galați on March 17, Count Cavour hesitated at the last minute and suggested the consul to negotiate with the local authorities in Moldova. It was too late, however, the refugees were already on board. Two days later, when the ship arrived in the Ottoman capital, Cerruti discovered that the number of refugees had increased, with 20 new refugees and 60 additional candidates. At any rate, the refugees were sent to Naples aboard a French steamship *Cydnus*.⁷⁷⁵ Even though the first shipment was handled with success, leaving aside a few desertions, the operation was far from being well-organized. The transfer was handled with buying tickets on a regular voyage for this large number of refugees. The operation was costly even as such. In parallel with the decreasing interest in the Hungarian Question in Turin, Cerruti soon after informed Cavour that he had tasked his agents with the duty of taking precautionary actions to obstruct more migration.⁷⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the influx proved to be unstoppable. The second significant shipment took place on April 4, with 116 refugees aboard the French steamship

⁷⁷⁴ Their transfer could be done to Naples for 50 francs for each person, maintenance included. Ibid., 164-165.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid., 166. However, it is stated in the same book that the first transfer took place on March 18, when 168 Hungarians were transferred from Galați on *Pericles*. Two days later, three individuals were lost, and the refugees were transported from Istanbul to Naples aboard the French Messageries company's ship. These refugees were fully absorbed in the legion in Nola. Ibid., 176.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid., 167.

Jourdain, simulating the previous operation. Upon their arrival in Galați, the refugees were detained in Brâila ve Bacău before being sent to Constantinople.⁷⁷⁷

Following the confiscation of weapons in Sulina that the Sardinian government had intended to deliver to Hungarian revolutionaries in Serbia and Wallachia, the Ottomans closed the Albanian coasts on 13 April 1861.⁷⁷⁸ The Porte also informed the governor of Sulina in May about a Hungarian lieutenant and five sergeants accompanying him, all equipped with Italian-made daggers. They appeared in Serbia as deserters from the Habsburg army on their way from Belgrade to Montenegro through Novi Pazar.⁷⁷⁹ In June and July, refugees continued to make their way to Galați, albeit in small numbers, as the situation for the patriots in Hungary was still unpleasant.⁷⁸⁰ It was particularly unbearable in Transylvania, where the Wallachians, supported by Vienna, were hostile to the Hungarians, according to the Italian consul. The Ottoman authorities would pay more attention to the suspicious activities around the Italian consul in Galați toward the end of 1861.⁷⁸¹ Despite the difficulties, the Italian consul repeated to orchestrate the transfers of refugees to Naples throughout the year.⁷⁸² In this sense, the Austrian envoy best summarized the mobility of these revolutionaries in his note to Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire, in such a way that vagabond groups, as he called, either roaming in Constantinople or flooding from Europe with steamships every day were worrisome not only for the Habsburgs but also the Ottomans.⁷⁸³ The magnitude of this revolutionary activities is unknown, but several documents applied to the word "*makûle*," suggesting a large scale.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid., 177.

⁷⁷⁸ Angelo Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani* (Torino: Industria Libreria Tipografica Editrice, 1958), 137.

⁷⁷⁹ BOA., A.MKT.UM., 471/36, 01 Zilkade 1277 (11 May 1861).

⁷⁸⁰ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 168.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid., 171.

⁷⁸² Ibid., 179.

⁷⁸³ "[...] gerek Dersaadet'te dolaşan ve gerek Evropa'dan her gün vapurlar ile gelmekte olan serseri makuleleri [...]" BOA, HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861.

⁷⁸⁴ BOA., HR.MKT., 391/86, 6 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (9 November 1861), 2.

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Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries, fugitives, and exiles were passing through the Balkan peninsula with the intention of reaching to the Italian peninsula via Istanbul in 1860-1861. Among them were refugees who had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire in 1848-1849. Doubtless, a legitimate scholarly interest in this context involves tracing these displaced individuals, reconstructing their personal experiences through their own judgments, to place how they confronted the great historical events of their time, along with their hopes and doubts about what they witnessed.⁷⁸⁵ Indeed, as elaborated in the first chapter, our agency-based methodology is intrinsically concerned with the restoration of subjectivities, therefore, the rest of the present chapter will be devoted to these revolutionaries themselves, through their own voices, albeit within certain limits, aiming finally to map our agents' transgressive mentality. In the following will be narrated three real-life stories of those Hungarian and Polish refugees who were intercepted by the Ottoman police in the abovementioned context.

3.2. The Twin Story of Giuseppe Bloscò and Wiktor Jabłoński

The governor of Silistre Province, Mehmed Arif Pasha (1808-1866), reported to the Porte on May 16 about a Hungarian-born revolutionary who had previously been detained in Ruse on the suspicion of being a revolutionary agent (*erbâb-ı ihtilâl casuslarından*). Since the initial investigation had yielded no clue about the actual situation of the suspect and the Prussian consul had requested for his release on the account of the Sardinian passport at his disposal, Giuseppe Bloscò⁷⁸⁶ was released on the condition of his extradition when demanded. Bloscò was taken into custody again in the government office after the Austrian consul in the vicinity stressed the necessity of his arrest. No identity documents were found on him this time,

⁷⁸⁵ Magda Jászay, *Il Risorgimento vissuto dagli ungheresi* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2000), 6.

⁷⁸⁶ I read his name this way, but it could also be Bloscio or Blascio, since it is not common in Italian surnames ending with a vowel with accent, as my colleagues in Italy told me.

and following a telegram from the Porte, he was interrogated and then transferred to the capital via Varna, the biggest port of the Bulgarian shores.⁷⁸⁷

His sworn testimony indicates that Bloscò was of Hungarian origin, hailing from Salonta in western Transylvania, despite claiming to have Sardinian citizenship at the time of the investigation. As the son of a certain Ludwig, he was likely born no later than 1830, given his age being thirty-one during the interrogation. Having enlisted in the Hungarian War of Independence at the age of eighteen or nineteen, Bloscò sought refuge in the Ottoman city of Vidin, along with thousands of other refugees from Hungary, Poland, and Italy. Seemingly, he was among those who were left in Shumen after the revolutionary leaders were allocated to Kütahya and Aleppo, as he later headed to Istanbul by land via Plovdiv and Edirne.⁷⁸⁸ The Shumen Group was the one we have the least information about Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who sought asylum in the empire.

In the summer of 1850, the Porte decided to grant a total of 50,000 piastres to the refugees in Shumen, who wished to practice their artisanship within Ottoman lands.⁷⁸⁹ Bloscò looks to have benefitted from this aid. As a shoemaker, he spent six or seven weeks in the capital, yet his sojourn in the empire quickly came to an end when he decided to leave for Western Europe, perhaps because he could not find an opportunity to make a decent living since life was difficult for these people, if not for revolutionary purposes.⁷⁹⁰ Three months later, according to his testimony, he ended up in Turin, where he took service with the Sardinian army for ten years as a lieutenant.⁷⁹¹ His military service included the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, which ended in a great despair not only for the Italian but also for the Hungarian

⁷⁸⁷ Unfortunately, his interrogation in the capital is not found. BOA., HR.MKT., 391/86, 6 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (9 November 1861), 3.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁸⁹ Bayram Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016), 219.

⁷⁹⁰ He does not specify the exact place where he went in the first place. It is likely to be France. The term he used is *Frengistan*, which resembles *Schot* in Austria, carrying a negative meaning rather than signifying a specific place or ethnicity.

⁷⁹¹ BOA., HR.MKT., 391/86, 6 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (9 November 1861), 4.

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patriots, following the betrayal of the Napoléon III, who failed to keep his promises. This disappointment likely steered Bloscò to resign from the military service and to opt for the *third way*, getting back to the Ottoman Empire, and thereby parting his way from the Sardinian-Hungarian alliance. While Cavour had secured a safe return for the Hungarians to their country, the remainders of the Hungarian Legion began to regroup in Central Italy, as seen in the previous chapter. Thus, like many other Hungarian and Polish 48ers who had taken refuge in the Sublime State, his path crossed the Ottoman geography once again about ten years later. After spending one week in Constantinople, Bloscò obtained a safe conduct (*mürur tezkiresi*) to travel to Bucharest. First, he made it to Ruse via Varna by sea. After registering his travel document, he was accommodated at an inn in front of *Maverdi Çorbacı* in Ruse for a few days. According to his interrogation protocols, Bloscò eventually arrived in Bucharest and started to work as a shoemaker under the *yiğitbaşı* Nikolay and Dirster.⁷⁹²

Since the beginning of his investigation, the citizenship/subjecthood status of Bloscò was not evident, just as other Hungarian and Polish refugees at the time. The Porte asked the Field Marshall of Police for investigating his current citizenship in June 1861 by consulting with the Sardinian consulate, because Bloscò did not have a valid passport.⁷⁹³ Even though the outcome of this initiative remains unknown to us, ensuing documents about the case in Ottoman Archives always referred to him as Sardinian, and thus his allegation of being Sardinian should have come true.⁷⁹⁴

The other figure of the twin story involves another 48er, Wiktor Jabłoński, who had joined the refugees fleeing to the Ottoman Empire after the suppression of the Hungarian War

⁷⁹² Ibid. *Yiğitbaşı* was an important component of the classical guild regime in the Ottoman Empire, serving as a mediator who conveyed internal disputes to the *kethüda* (the leader of a specific guild branch) and to the relevant official authorities. Starting in the 18th century, it became a seat that had to be found in any guild organization. They were elected from among the prominent members of the guild. İlhan Şahin, "Yiğitbaşı," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 43 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2013), 549-550, 549 ref.

⁷⁹³ BOA., HR.MKT., 379/83, 22 Zilkade 1277 (01 June 1861).

⁷⁹⁴ BOA., HR.MKT., 391/86, 6 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (9 November 1861), 2, 3, 4, 5.

of Independence. He was recently roaming around the inner Rumelia. Even though his documents were in order, his sudden appearance in the province and possession of another person's passport aroused suspicion, leading to his arrest in Ruse and transfer to the capital together with Bloscò following an interrogation on May 5.⁷⁹⁵

Jabłoński was from the Kingdom of Poland under Russian control. He reveals his age as fifty-two in his interrogation, suggesting that he was born around 1809, making him significantly older than Bloscò.⁷⁹⁶ In Ottoman safe conducts, one can find information about the father's name of the travelers, along with their travel itinerary and their physical descriptions, including age, height, hair color, eye color, and distinctive bodily features (*eşkal-i mahsusa*). It is noted in Jabłoński's safe conduct that he had blonde hair, a yellow moustache and beard, hazel eyes, and was of medium height.⁷⁹⁷ Since his hometown was near Hungary, according to his testimony, Jabłoński escaped from the Russian empire together with approximately 5,000 soldiers to take part in the Hungarian revolution twelve years ago. After the revolution was put down, however, he fled to the town of Vidin, along with eight to ten thousand soldiers from the entourages of General Bem and Kossuth. Soon after, Jabłoński was relocated in Shumen, where he resided eight months, likely until April 1850. Afterward, he was allowed to travel to Istanbul. Unlike Bloscò, Jabłoński was fortunate enough to establish himself in Istanbul, perhaps because of the stronger ties of the Polish enclave there. He worked as a miniature artist (*nakkaşçılık*) and charioteer for six years in the capital, until the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853-1856). The war brought him to Edirne, where he served the French army for three months, after which he headed to Plovdiv to do the same as a quartermaster (*vekilharç*) for about five months. After the peace, Jabłoński moved to Greece. First, he spent a year in the port city of Thessaloniki (*Selanik*) at an inn alongside a Hungarian, though he does

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid., 3, 5.

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid., 6.

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not provide further details of this period of his life, such as locations, activities, and other contacts. Later, he returned to chariot business in Serres (*Siroz*). Due to health issues, he sought better air conditions in the village of Zilhova (*Zihne*), located in the Drama and Serres region, where he worked as a miniature artist and occasionally as a charioteer for three years. Recently, he obtained a safe conduct to go to Tulcea, settled his debts, and began a new adventure.⁷⁹⁸ When Jabłoński reached customs office to register his travel document in Tarnovo (*Turnova*), the Ottoman officials requested him to present a sponsor (*kefil*).⁷⁹⁹ Thanks to a Hungarian doctor who acted as his sponsor, he stayed five days at an inn, yet the police escorted him from there to Ruse.⁸⁰⁰ Asked about his citizenship, the last question of his interrogation protocol, Jabłoński gives an interesting reply: "Even though I am originally a Russian subject, they would not accept me now. I will either become an English or French subject, yet it would be better if I were a subject of the Kingdom of Sardinia since we have officers there."⁸⁰¹

Jabłoński and Bloscò likely knew each other even before their paths crossed in 1861. Both served in the Transylvanian army under General Bem during the Hungarian Revolution. Both sought refuge in the empire via Vidin and were among the refugees left in Shumen. Later, both were among the few who moved on to Istanbul. While one resided in the city for an extended period, the other's stay remained very short. Years later in 1861, Jabłoński and Bloscò were detained in Ruse and then transferred to Istanbul by the governor of Silistre upon the order of the Porte.⁸⁰² On June 15, the Field Marshall of Police was instructed to deport these

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid., 5, 6.

⁷⁹⁹ The provision of a quarantine system along the Danube after the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) created a clear sense of separation between the Romanian Principalities and the rest of the Ottoman territories. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 265. In line with this observation; although the travelers moved from Bulgaria to Wallachia, both regions were under Ottoman suzerainty, this sense of a border is revealing in the stories of Bloscò and Jabłoński, as well as Jusztinián in the following pages.

⁸⁰⁰ BOA., HR.MKT., 391/86, 6 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (9 November 1861), 5, 6.

⁸⁰¹ The answer reflects a form of forum shopping in citizenship preferences, as he evaluates various options. "Asıl Rusya tebası isem de şimdi Rusya beni kabul etmez ya İngiliz veyâhud Fransız tebası olacağım. Fakat Sardinya devleti tebasından olsam daha güzel olur. Çünkü orada bizim zabıtlar var." Ibid., 6.

⁸⁰² Ibid., 2, 3.

revolutionary squads, considering that their presence within the empire was illicit (*caiz olmamak*). According to a record on October 26, the two revolutionaries were jointly deported to Messina on September 16.⁸⁰³

It is not possible to be certain about the veracity of the details in the self-narratives of Bloscò and Jabłoński, at least until further historical evidence comes to light, though their accounts do not seem to contain overtly sensitive revelations, given that these figures were yet another Hungarian and Polish refugees who endeavored to reach Italy through the Ottoman Empire in the spring of 1861. Alerted to the revolutionary mobility in the Rumelia region, on the contrary, the Ottoman administration took the big shot in April 1861. When a Hungarian convert was captured in Ruse, the provincial center of the empire in its surroundings, travelling in the reverse direction—from Italy to the Balkans—against the ordinary flow, a transnational conspiracy was about to be unfolded. More strikingly, the suspect sought shelter in the administrative building of the province, rather than being captured by the police. What is more, the story of Jusztnián Károly turns out to be more traceable for us than the previous ones, owing to the archival and contextual evidence, and it is far more captivating and inspiring. In this sense, his story offers not only a fertile ground for interpreting and analyzing the transnational revolutionary activities of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers on Ottoman soil but also evokes a picturesque experience of a young romantic revolutionary—through the vividness of the concrete encounters with revolutionary events and celebrities, counterintelligence activities and revolutionary intrigues, and adventurous travels replete with emotions, such as commitment, recrimination, treachery, and fear. Let us move to the story in which mainly Jusztnián Károly, Antal Schneider, and Colofon Matthias were involved.

⁸⁰³ In parallel with that on November 9, the governor and the Field Marshall of Police were jointly informed by the Porte of the deportation of two revolutionaries to Messina. Ibid., 1, 2. BOA., HR.MKT., 381/56, 06 Zilhicce 1277 (15 June 1861).

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3.3. The Story of Jusztinián Károly⁸⁰⁴

Among those taken into custody in the spring of 1861 was a young captain of Hungarian origin who had deserted from the Habsburg army. It was evident from the outset that Jusztinián was not just another refugee attempting to reach Italy through Romania, as he had already been arriving from Naples.⁸⁰⁵ Unlike the others, it was Jusztinián who found his way into detention in Bulgaria and surrendered himself while running away from the Austrian officials. He was someone full of suspicion in every aspect, yet even the Ottoman officials could not have anticipated that this case would soon unravel into a conspiracy that extended even into the imperial structures. The story was highly complex. Jusztinián was of Hungarian origin, yet Hungarian was not among the languages he spoke. He deserted the Austrian army to take part in the revolutionary wars in the Italian peninsula, yet his disappointment led him to denounce the Sardinian leadership. He later travelled to Constantinople, where he converted to Islam and became a subject of the sultan upon the invitation of the Hungarian and Polish 48ers. Tasked with distributing proclamations, he embarked on a mission to the Balkans, where he was eventually arrested and interrogated since his activities were found seditious. The adventures of Jusztinián will be reconstructed primarily through his interrogation protocols, as a source of self-narration, while other relevant material, e.g. intra-state correspondence related to his inquiry and the contextual evidence will serve as complementary. Since his interviews and

⁸⁰⁴ I have presented different aspects of Jusztinián's story in various academic gatherings. One of my earliest attempts to publish his narrative was İlkay Kirişçioglu, "Şarl Cüstinyani: Osmanlı Topraklarında Casusluk Yapan Bir Macar Mühtedisinin Hatıraları" [Charles Justinian: Memoirs of a Hungarian Convert Spying Through Ottoman Territories], in *Genç Akademisyenlerin Kaleminden Sosyal Bilimler*, ed. Ziya Polat, Ayşe Çekiç, Sabri Mengirkaon, and Aysel Fedai (Ankara: İlâhiyat), 85–107. A more concise and interpretative version is also in progress. İlkay Kirişçioglu, "Charles Justinian: Travels of a Hungarian Convert Spying Through Ottoman Territories," forthcoming in *ITHACA: Migration Narratives in the Global Mediterranean (1450–1850)*, Studies in Global Migration History series (Leiden: Brill, 2024). However, the story narrated in this thesis is the most up-to-date and comprehensive version, incorporating additional sources and insights. Since every time new evidence came up, it became necessary to make changes in the story, and this process will likely even continue as further evidence and insights come to light.

⁸⁰⁵ It is worth noting that even his young, single, and unemployed status, as well as travelling from outside, was sufficient to categorize him as a usual suspect in the Ottoman mindset, let alone his obviously suspicious outlook in its specific historical context. Vagrants, migrants, and other mobile individuals without a permanent residence were mostly considered as potential sources of sedition and insecurity.

interrogations are not only integral to his adventures but also continuously referred throughout his story, a brief introduction is necessary.

Upon his surrender to the governor's office in Ruse, Jusstinián was immediately interviewed by Ottoman officials on April 26, 1861.⁸⁰⁶ Given his lack of communication skills in Turkish, he was interviewed through certain translators, most likely in German. His initial interrogator is not identifiable, it must be people from the local council. Jusstinián was not alone in his travel through the Balkans, his companion named Colofon Matthias had accompanied him to Bulgaria. Matthias was apprehended (April 26), interviewed (April 28) in the Austrian consulate to Ruse, and then dispatched to Vienna (April 30).⁸⁰⁷ In the light of his only testimony, Jusstinián was re-interrogated by the Ottomans the following day (April 29).⁸⁰⁸ Jusstinián's first two interviews were only to figure out his actual situation before being sent to the capital, where the Field Marshall of Police was to deepen the investigation with additional interrogations. Indeed, the local authorities under the Tanzimat rule played a decisive role in countering seditious activities in the Balkans, yet their role was more investigative; the suspects and their files (including the interrogation protocols and local council's report) were often forwarded to the central authorities for further action.⁸⁰⁹

Having been sent to Constantinople, Jusstinián was interrogated three more times in succession in June to extract a confession.⁸¹⁰ His interpreters in the capital were recorded on his interrogation protocols: Murad Efendi and İkiyadis Efendi.⁸¹¹ His questioners are

⁸⁰⁶ It corresponds to 15 Şevval 1277 in the Hijri calendar. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3.

⁸⁰⁷ His sworn testimony, along with a Turkish translation, is preserved in Ottoman Archives, as it was forwarded to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. For both original minutes and Turkish translations see BOA., HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3-4. Also see, BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 5 August 1861 (28 Muharrem 1278), 4. For his transfer to Vienna see BOA., HR. SYS., 1798/16, 17 August 1851.

⁸⁰⁸ This interrogation was held on 05 Şevval 1277 according to the Hijri calendar. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

⁸⁰⁹ For the procedure see Vakalis, "Tanzimat in the Province," 233-235. However, the compact file of Jusstinián's trial in Istanbul, if ever exists, has yet to be found.

⁸¹⁰ These were on June 5, 6, and 13. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 23 July 1861 (15 Muharrem 1278).

⁸¹¹ Ibid.

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unidentifiable.⁸¹² The primary significance of the first testimony in Istanbul lies in the fact that the questioner(s) uncovered his false statements as the first day's task by drawing attention to the inconsistencies the subject could not conceal, after which Jusztenián revised his statements claiming to tell the truth from then on. The second day's questions aimed to see if the suspect had anything to do with the seditious activities, whereas Jusztenián showed great efforts to prove otherwise. Held one week after the last, the third interrogation in the capital was to unfold the nature of the revolutionary committee that Jusztenián was believed to have been a member of, judging from the questions about its members, gathering places, and objectives. Ten days later, the protagonist was questioned two days in a row on the third and fourth of July. The former was a compact confession that concluded the investigation, while the latter was for the matters about the financial sources and the transnational network of the committee.⁸¹³ At the end, Jusztenián testified that he was a member of a revolutionary committee called Garibaldi's Sword of Glory (*Garibaldi'nin Şan Kılıcı*), which was primarily composed of Islamized Hungarian and Polish émigrés in Dersaadet, while maintaining close ties with some revolutionary groups in Italy.⁸¹⁴

The interrogation protocols mentioned above offer rich data for researchers only if they are treated with utmost caution, as the odds to fall into the traps set by the young deserter always remain high. Jusztenián was in a vulnerable position in the face of horrendous punishment at the hands of the Habsburgs as a public enemy in case of being turned back by the Porte. Even though the Ottoman Empire was a safer haven for him, he could not fully rely on its officials, as he had involved in seditious activities in the Balkans seemingly against the

⁸¹² There could be some witnesses who follow the questionings as well.

⁸¹³ These were held on 24 and 25 Zilhicce 1277. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

⁸¹⁴ According to the judicial reforms of the time, the preliminary interrogations conducted by the local administrators and the police authorities in the capital could, given the importance of the case, have been referred to the Supreme Court. This suggests that additional documents and testimonies related to Jusztenián's case may exist, though we have found no record indicating that Jusztenián was ever formally brought to trial, despite extensive archival research. For now, we must rely on the available documents while constructing his story.

Ottoman rule. This precarious position *between* and to some extent *against* two monarchies obliged Jusstinián to testify inconsistently at times, so much so that a twist in his statements can be observed at the end of his first interview in Istanbul, when his conflicting revelations were noticed and held against him. Without much resistance, which is something characteristic of him as seen also in other confrontations, Jusstinián revised some of his statements, claiming to tell the truth from then on, though it remains unclear precisely which of his earlier statements were false or to what extent his later statements were true. Indeed, his testimonies always involve highly conflictual and convoluted revelations and blank spots that make the reconstructing of his story somewhat challenging. To illustrate, he gives two different versions of his surrender or capture on Ottoman soil, in addition to another three versions of how and where he met with his fellow, Matthias. One source of information was Matthias himself, whose statements, separately delivered to the Austrian authorities, luckily grant us, as much as the Ottoman officers, a chance to cross-examine Jusstinián's statements. What is more, Jusstinián was unaware, at least for a while, that his once-companion had testified against him. This point is even more important because Matthias seems to be among the few people who knew his fellow's real intentions. Furthermore, the interrogation records at our disposal were handled neatly and the revelations (figures, dates, and places) were checked whenever possible before coming up with conclusions. The methodological notes briefly presented here are based on the specific case at our disposal, offering a nuanced addition to the more abstract discussion on handling the interrogation protocols as ego-documents previously covered in the first chapter.

It was in the spring of 1861. Mediated by a military physician, two Hungarians met in Constantinople. The meeting took place in a house, located in the Taş Merdiven neighborhood of Ortaköy district. The place was owned by an Ottoman general who was then away from the capital and rented it out to Kaimmakam (Lieutenant Colonel) Physician Hüseyin Faik (Antal

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Schneider), who hosted the meeting.⁸¹⁵ The host was among the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees who had crossed the border with the empire to seek asylum after the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. Following the lead of the heroic Polish General, Józef Zachariasz Bem (becoming known as Murad Pasha after converting to Islam), Schneider embraced Islam and his name became Hüseyin Faik, after which the Porte assigned him to the Vilayet of Aleppo. After taking part in the Crimean War, Hüseyin Faik moved to Dersaadet, where he emerged as an influential figure among the revolutionary circles until his deportation to Italy in 1862.

Jusztinián Károly was the first to participate in the meeting.⁸¹⁶ Born in the town of Baranya in Hungary, three hours away from Mohács port, he was at the age of twenty-two when encountering Colofon Matthias at the house.⁸¹⁷ Jusztinián puts forth in his first testimony in Istanbul that he had nobody in his hometown except for his twenty-eight-year-old brother named Schneider. His twenty-four-year-old sister, Mari Petri Mendel, was living in Pest. She was married to an artist called Adel Petri Mendel painting "the sun and the people," in the words of Jusztinián.⁸¹⁸ Moreover, he identifies Physician Hüseyin Faik as his father, while explaining that his mother came to Istanbul six years earlier, during the Sivastopol War, and started to live with his alleged father.⁸¹⁹ These information should be treated with skepticism since Jusztinián's answers about his identity and relatives at the beginning of his interrogation

⁸¹⁵ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸¹⁶ It is not always easy to grasp non-Muslim names that appear in Ottoman sources because of the Arabic script. It is more often than not same names may have other variations. Jusztinián Károly must be the Hungarian version of our main protagonist, Charles Justinian, as Bodnár-Király Tibor was so kind to clarify to me. In the documents written in Ottoman Turkish Şarl, Çarls, Şarlo, Karlo, and Cüntinyani were also in circulation, not to mention that he was also called Hüseyin, Macarlı Hüseyin Bey, and Mühtedi Hüseyin because of his conversion to Islam.

⁸¹⁷ Matthias, in his testimony, presented his companion's place of birth as Bohemia, which could be true considering his language abilities. BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3. The phrase Matthias uses is "*mesmuata göre*," "according to hearsay," signifying oral transmission of a rumor whose source is unspecified.

⁸¹⁸ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 23 July 1861 (15 Muharrem 1278).

⁸¹⁹ Ibid.

were part of an underlying, possibly pre-planned plot to acquit himself. After the aforementioned twist, in fact, he clarifies that Hüseyin Faik was not his biological father.⁸²⁰

In his testimony given to the Austrian officials, Matthias declared himself to be born in Pest. He was twenty years old, single, and dependent on a wage for his livelihood, identifying himself as Protestant.⁸²¹ Jusztinián in his initial interviews called him "Hungarian Tatay Matyas," adding that his friend was a relative to the Serbian Prince.⁸²² He maintained in his third testimony in Istanbul that "Baron Tatay" was a Serbian national, which he allegedly witnessed when the two visited the Serbian chancellery together.⁸²³ He was mentioned as someone from Italy by the governor of Silistre Province in a letter sent to the Porte.⁸²⁴ Like Jusztinián, Matthias also converted to Islam on Ottoman soil. Taken all together, Matthias's true identity remains elusive, whether he was Serbian, Hungarian, Austrian, Italian, Protestant, Muslim, or an unknown combination of these is difficult to say.⁸²⁵

With an Austrian passport, Matthias testifies, he had departed Pest for Serbia and Bosnia on the second day of February 1861. Boarded a steamship in Belgrade called *Overtemde*, he arrived at Istanbul passing through the Black Sea port of Constanța. Having been a member of the Hungarian and Polish revolutionary committee in the capital with the reference of a friend, he was dispatched to Naples, where he met famous Hungarian revolutionary leader Ferenc Pulszky. Upon his return next day, Matthias was commissioned the rank of first lieutenant in Constantinople by the committee established on behalf of Garibaldi.⁸²⁶

⁸²⁰ Also, the reader should pay attention to his alleged brother, Schneider, which is the real name of Hüseyin Faik.

⁸²¹ BOA., HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

⁸²² "arkadaşımın Sırp Beyinin familyasıyla akrabalığı olduğundan dolayı" BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3.

⁸²³ "Sırp kançılaryasına beraber gittim için biliyorum." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸²⁴ BOA., HR. SYS., 1798/16, 17 August 1851.

⁸²⁵ There is only one piece of evidence to show Matthias's name in the Latin alphabet, which is "Baron Tatay Matthias (Colofon Matthias)", yet I am not sure if this is his real name considering his activities or if there is a distinction between Baron Tatay Matthias and Colofon Matthias. For the evidence see BOA., HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861, 4.

⁸²⁶ Ibid., 3.

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Having met at Hüseyin Faik's house, Jusztinián and Matthias spent a week together, walked around the city, and visited the Ihlamur valley in Beşiktaş district. After a certain sense of mutual trust was built, their friendship moved in another direction once they finally decided to travel to the Serbian capital, Belgrade.⁸²⁷ To make their journey safe and imminent, Hüseyin Faik invited both to Islam shortly before their planned departure.⁸²⁸ Accepting the invitation, Jusztinián adopted the name of his godfather, who had then hosted and supported him for approximately three months in this house, while Matthias assumed the name Mehmed Ali. Moreover, Hüseyin Faik was likely to help them to obtain safe conducts, which also functioned as passports, since he was working at *Bâb-ı Zabtiye* (the police headquarters) at the time.⁸²⁹

While the Hungarians and Poles from the Habsburg domains were flowing into the Balkans to be finally transferred to Italy, the motive behind this reverse journey raises a question. Jusztinián's statements regarding this travel contained conflicting and suspicious revelations, which spoke for themselves. He puts forward in one of his early statements that he left Constantinople to meet her sister (so-called Mari Petri Mendel) in Belgrade, while avoiding the details.⁸³⁰ Additional information was uncovered as the interrogation process went on. In a concise fashion, he revises it that "as stated in my previous testimony, I was detained in Ruse while I was on my way to Belgrade, where I was heading to receive money since I had no money left and permission to stay in Istanbul from my father via my sister whom I would summon there."⁸³¹ Asked how he was going to contact his sister who lived in Hungary, Jusztinián answered:

I was going to summon [her] from Hungary by a letter because it is impossible to send a letter from elsewhere. Given the fact that I am a

⁸²⁷ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸²⁸ Jusztinián suggests in his first interrogation in Ruse that he converted three months ago, yet he revisited the date of his conversion two or three days before his departure for Belgrade. Ibid. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

⁸²⁹ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸³⁰ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3.

⁸³¹ "Param kalmadığından hemşiremi oraya çağırıp pederimden hem para götürmek hem de İstanbul'da oturmak için izin olmak üzere Belgrad'a kalkıp gider iken Rusçuk'da evvelki ifadem vehicle tutuldum." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

deserter from the Austrian army if I were to write a letter from elsewhere, they would open it and read it. They would not even deliver it to my sister. I was going to send the letter through a commuter coming to and going from Belgrade.⁸³²

Regarding the reason for traveling together with Matthias, he pleaded that when he casually brought up his travel plans "out of friendship" ("*karındaşça*") while hanging around Istanbul, his companion proposed to join him, pretending that he also had a reason to go to Belgrade.⁸³³ In doing so, he justified his trip with private reasons, leaving no room for a suspicion of an underground setup, while portraying Matthias as somebody who merely followed, or perhaps tailed him. The officer persisted in questioning whether it would not be more practical to communicate with her sister through the assistance of somebody who would be directly destined to Hungary from Istanbul, rather than going to Belgrade himself. The question disrupted Jusztnián's reasoning, causing him to have recourse to what he had just said, yet the answer remained far from satisfying. He simply goes on to reiterate that all his envelopes he sent through Austrian and French mail services were intercepted, perhaps twenty times, and he never received a reply.⁸³⁴ Without mincing his words, on the other hand, Matthias claimed in his separate interview that his companion was supposed to deliver some revolutionary proclamations to the Serbian rulers in Belgrade and some letters to the Hungarian leaders, while he himself had been allowed by Austria to tag him.⁸³⁵ In other words, Matthias had an utterly different agenda from those he had infiltrated in Istanbul and Naples; while having meetings with Jusztnián and Schneider in Istanbul, he was in contact with the Austrian

⁸³² "Macaristan'dan mektup ile celp edecek idim. Zira başka yerden mektup gönderilmesi muhaldir. Çünkü ben Nemçe askeri firarisinden bulunduğum cihetle başka yerden mektup yazacak olsam açıp okurlar. Karındaşıma dahi vermez. Belgrad'dan gidip gelen vasıtasıyla yazacağım mektubu gönderip götüreceğim idim." Ibid.

⁸³³ Ibid.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3. Their destination could be Mihailo Obrenović, Prince of Serbia, who replaced Miloš Obrenović towards the end of October. According to some source, his mother was a Hunyadi, and Jusztnián stressed that Matyas was a relative to the Serbian Prince. And Mihailo was known to have a Pan Slavist vision. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 184. He had a much more aggressive agenda for independence from the Ottoman Empire and a Balkan alliance. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 334.

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officials. He explained the reason for accompanying Jusstinián on his journey to Belgrade as such: "I had detested the member of this committee, I had undertaken to deliver my companion to the Austrian officials," in his own words.⁸³⁶ Unlike the two Hüseyins, in other words, Mehmed Ali was an informant, assigned to hand the young revolutionary over to Austria while behaving as a comrade within the revolutionary circles, a fact Jusstinián would tragically notice when the governor in Ruse told him so.⁸³⁷ In other words, the Viennese government was well aware of these "subversive" activities, which led its officials to run counter-insurgent activities in return.

Jusstinián was also confused up for some time in his interrogations, showing ambiguous reactions about Matthias, though he must have started to mistrust his companion after the Austrian consul in Ruse attempted to arrest himself. "No one but him knew that I was a Hungarian, thus, I realized that he [Matthias] was a spy," he says.⁸³⁸ Nonetheless, Jusstinián started to target Matthias outright in his interrogations once he felt certain about his former fellow's allegiance to Austria. He then elucidates that Matthias was viewed with suspicion by the revolutionary enclave in Istanbul because of his frequent visits to a restaurant in Beyoğlu district, whose clerk was on good terms with the Austrian officials, and therefore the newly arrived Hungarians in the city were not advised to affiliate with him.⁸³⁹ This clerk was "a grand spy," presumes Jusstinián in hindsight, after learning the inner motive of his erstwhile companion.⁸⁴⁰ Matthias could have been part of the transnational spy network sponsored by the Habsburg Monarchy.⁸⁴¹ Alternatively, he could have been a member of a rival underground

⁸³⁶ "mâadâ işbu komite azasından teneffür ettiğimden ve refikimin Avusturya memurlarına teslim etmekliğimi taahhüd etmişim." BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

⁸³⁷ "O gece lokantada yattık sabahleyin daha ben uykuda iken refikim merkum Nemçe konsolosu konağına gitmiş. Merkumun konsolos konağına gitmiş olduğunu dahi Rusçuk'ta sonra paşadan işittim. Çünkü bir daha ben merkumun yüzünü görmedim." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸³⁸ "Macarlı olduğumu ondan aşka bilir kimse yoğ idi bu cihetlerle merkumun casus olduğunu anladım." Ibid.

⁸³⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁰ "Beyoğlu'nda Nemçeliden kaçkın ve zannıma göre bir büyük casustur Tutukluş[?]." Ibid.

⁸⁴¹ It is difficult to mention a rich literature on the surveillance network laid by Metternich throughout Europe from a transnational point of view. For an up-to-date survey of Metternich's policing see Chris Aliprantis, "The Origins of Transnational Political Policing in Europe, 1830-1870," (PhD Diss, University of Cambridge, 2020).

group, as the Ottoman and Habsburg administrations treated Jusstinián and Matthias as active members of a revolutionary committee. It is known that the Austrian secret police were capable of abusing schisms within revolutionary organizations and there was a lot of internal disputes within the Hungarian emigration by 1861. Either way, Matthias's activities likely spanned a wide geography, considering the multiple identities at his disposal, which were manufactured by the Ottoman, Serbian, and Austrian authorities. However, if Matthias had been spotted to have affiliated with a suspicious people in Istanbul, it is not clear why Jusstinián set out a journey with him in the first place. Matthias could have served as a double agent, but we can only speculate without additional evidence. Anyhow, Jusstinián and Matthias took up the journey, to which we now turn our attention.

The journey by steamboat on the Danube River is such a lovely voyage. The water is delicious, the air is fresh, and the boat often stops at piers where all kinds of supplies can be bought. From time to time, musicians come from the piers to the boat and play music. The trees and meadows on both sides are enjoyed with delight and pleasure. There is much entertainment, and no fear of storms. Truly, it is a very beautiful journey.⁸⁴²

The journey on the Danube might have been delightful for a high official like Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, yet it is highly contentious whether it was the same for a revolutionary like Jusstinián. Traveling *to* the Balkans in the nineteenth century was an adventure, suggests Mattes, primarily because of movement restrictions, quarantine regulations, as well as the

Spying was one of the repressive tools for the reactionary regimes at the time. To illustrate, Trevelyan suggests that between 1821 and 1860, the history of the Neapolitan regime was beset with the annals of the police backed by innumerable spies. George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand (May, 1860)*, 8th ed. (London: Longmans, 1919), 40. The name of a book published in 1852 is itself telling about the policing measures in Hungary at the time. Charles Lorin Brace, *Hungary in 1851: with an Experience of the Austrian Police* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1852).

⁸⁴² "Tuna nehrinde vapur ile hareket ne güzel seyâhattir. Suyu leziz havası temiz sık sık iskelelere uğranılır ve her türlü levazımât alınır. Ara-sıra iskelelerden vapura çalgıcılar gelir çalgılar çalınır. İki tarafın eşcâr ve çemenistânı nazar-ı zevk ü safâ ile temâşâ olunur. Eğlencesi çok fırtına korkusu yok. Doğrusu pek güzel bir yolculuktur." Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1963), 100.

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competitions among political groups.⁸⁴³ This judgement also appeals to the trips *through* the Balkans, as the experience of Jusstinián demonstrates.

Jusstinián departed Istanbul for Belgrade with Matthias, whom he had met and befriended just eight days prior at the house of Hüseyin Faik.⁸⁴⁴ In fact, the committee had originally assigned Major Sándor Károly Viola of Pécsváradi to accompany and oversee Jusstinián. Feeling unwell, however, Viola was obliged to remain a few more days in Istanbul.⁸⁴⁵ It is worth noting that while questioning Jusstinián, the officer points out that that there was actually the record of an additional safe conduct obtained together with his and Matthias's. The third document bore the name Ismail. Even though Jusstinián expressed that he did not know about that, we may reason that it was issued for Viola. In other words, it is possible that Viola also converted to Islam and embraced the name of Ismail.⁸⁴⁶

Jusstinián and Matthias first departed for the Wallachian city of Constanța, which was one of the two main arteries opening the capital to the Balkans by sea.⁸⁴⁷ Upon arriving there on April 21, they proceeded on horseback to Cernavodă, a sub-district of Medgidia, where they boarded a steamship bound for Belgrade.⁸⁴⁸ They made contacts along the route, learning that Viola had been instructed to depart for Cernavodă onboard a steamer called *Arsad* on April 23. Moreover, even though they had earlier received a written instruction to travel through the regular steamers, the original scheme had to be altered once Jusstinián found out that

⁸⁴³ Johann Mattes, "Cooperative Empires: Scientific Societies, Habsburg's Imperial Agents, and the 'Orient,'" in *Empire of Circulation: Habsburg Knowledge in its Global Setting*, ed. Franz L. Fillafer and Johannes Feichtinger (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming), 7. Manuscript shared by author. I am grateful to Dr. Mattes for allowing me to use his unpublished work.

⁸⁴⁴ BOA., A.M. 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁴⁵ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

⁸⁴⁶ BOA., A.M. 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁴⁷ The other was Varna, through which Jusstinián would be sent back to the capital, as we will see.

⁸⁴⁸ In his first interview in Ruse on April 26, he says that he arrived in Constanța five days back without giving a detailed account about how much it took there from Istanbul. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3. Predicated on other travel accounts of the time, it could take two or three days, which makes their departure on April 17 or 18, yet more information is still needed for a sharper judgement. On the other hand, the railway line between Cernavodă and Constanța was completed in October 1860, and the journey could have taken approximately 2.5 hours by train. Ziya Enver Karal, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi: Islahat Fermanı Devri (1856-1861)*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, [n.d.], 263. It should be noted that Jusstinián and Matthias opted for horseback travel, likely due to concerns about the cost or safety of the railway.

passengers' belongings would be thoroughly inspected at the border of Orsova. According to the revised plan, they were to travel to Raduyevac through Ruse by land to eventually reach the final destination by ferry along the Serbian coasts. While navigating through the river aboard an Austrian-flagged steamer called *Sofia*, what appeared to be a routine stop turned into a disruption even in the revised plan when the clerk unexpectedly asked Jusstinián to get off at Giurgiu (*Yergöğü*), a small town on the left bank of the river, on the grounds that his presence was dangerous on board. Jusstinián accepted the warning and disembarked without making a scene. Charged with tailing his companion, Matthias followed him to the port.⁸⁴⁹ In any case, the two fellows made their way into an inn nestled in a foreign neighborhood at the heart of the town to spend the night. Run by a German-speaking innkeeper, it was almost deserted when they arrived, hardly anyone was there due to the late hour.⁸⁵⁰ There, they decided to cross the river next morning to reach Ruse.⁸⁵¹

What Matthias elaborates on, but Jusstinián does not even mention, is that the Wallachian police raided their place in the middle of the night to arrest them, while they were there, yet no one was taken, for the innkeeper handled the situation skillfully.⁸⁵² Nevertheless, early in the next morning (25 April), Matthias went to the Austrian consulate to report the whereabouts of his companion, according to his own testimony, though he was detained there on the grounds that he could not show his identity document, as it had remained in his create.⁸⁵³ Jusstinián also witnessed his companion's encounter with the Austrian officials in Giurgiu; however, Matthias is understood to have justified the situation to his fellow once they were reunited.⁸⁵⁴ Later, an officer with two guardsmen came to the inn once again in the morning to

⁸⁴⁹ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

⁸⁵⁰ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

⁸⁵¹ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

⁸⁵² Ibid.

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ "ben daha yatakta yaturken arkadaşım kalkıp çarşıya çıkmış galiba Avusturya konsolosunun adamları rast gelip konsoloshaneye götürmüşler." BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3.

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detain them since the two held Muslim documents and their stay in Giurgiu could not be tolerated hence, asserts Jusztenián.⁸⁵⁵ Nonetheless, Matthias testifies that his fellow was detained by the Wallachian police because he had thrown his crate, containing revolutionary documents, into the river even before arriving in Giurgiu.⁸⁵⁶ After having breakfast, they were taken to the police station, where they were kept waiting for several hours because the station was too crowded. They were asked the reason for their heading to Bucharest, the center of Wallachian Province. Upon expressing their intention to arrive in Belgrade, rather than Bucharest, they were immediately transferred to the port at around eight o'clock in the evening and subsequently sent to the Ottoman shore of the river by a vessel.⁸⁵⁷

It took about one hour and a half to land on Ruse, likely around 10:30 to 11:00 at night. Registered their safe conducts at the customs, they thereupon intended to spend the night at an inn called *Trnova*, which was run by a person called Mûytab Mihail.⁸⁵⁸ Early in the next morning while Jusztenián was sleeping without having any clue what his companion was after, Matthias hurried outside to inform the Austrian consul in Bulgaria of the deserter's whereabouts, something he had failed to accomplish in Giurgiu, as soon as he found the opportunity.⁸⁵⁹ One dragoman and two *kavas* (consulate orderlies) of the consul raided the premises, waking up Jusztenián and urging the consul's wish to see him.⁸⁶⁰ Having asked a random Bulgarian the location of the governor's office, which happened to be around half a

⁸⁵⁵ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3.

⁸⁵⁶ BOA., HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3. Considering that Price Cuza was not eager to cooperate with Hungarian revolutionaries against neither the Ottoman nor the Habsburg empires at the time, what Matthias narrated sounds meaningful in its specific historical context.

⁸⁵⁷ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3. According to this testimony, Jusztenián was likely to be interrogated in Yergöğü by the Wallachian police, yet no first-hand evidence exists in Ottoman archives even if the interview was dictated is not clear.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). Curiously, the name of the innkeeper is pronounced in the testimonies of both suspects. BOA., HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁰ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). *Kavas* refers to a special police force, similar to security guards, in the service of consuls and ambassadors mainly for protection in this context. They were usually armed. The term later transformed to embrace all the officers in the service of diplomatic representatives. For more information see Mehmet Canatar, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kavaslar ve Kavas Teşkilatı," *İlmi Araştırmalar*, no. 4 (1997), 68-69.

kilometer away, Jusstinián began to run and be chased after by the Austrian ambassador and his agents.⁸⁶¹ Luckily, he managed to enter the provincial hall without being captured and surrender to the Ottoman authorities. Let us hear how Jusstinián told the occasion himself.

While I was lying in bed, one dragoman and two men of the consul wanted to take me away by getting me out of bed and saying, "come on, the consul wants you!" When I went out of the restaurant, the security guards were going to hold me. Thus, I held a Bulgarian by the arm there and pulled him saying, "come on, show me the pasha's mansion. He showed me the pasha's mansion, which was about five or six hundred steps away, and I ran away and entered the mansion. The security guards of the Austrian consul came running after me and wanted to catch up with me and take me out of the mansion, yet I said, "I don't recognize your embassy, my embassy is here," They took me to someone who turned out to be a major of police, then to his principal clerk. They interrogated me in the presence of the clerk, the aforementioned major, and another efendi after offering me coffee and pipe for an hour. I had told them the way I told you earlier out of fear and they set it down, then they put me in a room and even gave me a Greek servant.⁸⁶²

Treated very well, Jusstinián was detained for the next twelve days in the governor's mansion, which served also as the local police station, to figure out his actual status before being transferred to Istanbul for a more exhaustive investigation.⁸⁶³ On the third day of his compulsory stay in Ruse (28 April), he was brought to the presence of the governor, unaware

⁸⁶¹ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). The governors had magnificent mansions in the provincial centers to conduct their affairs, remarks Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 20.

⁸⁶² "Daha ben henüz yatar iken konsolos mümaileyh tarafından bir tercüman ile iki kavvası gelip beni yataktan kaldırıp haydi seni konsolos pek istiyor diyerek beni götürmek istediler. Ben dahi kalıp gidip lokantadan dışarıya çıktığımda kavvaslar beni tutacak idi. Ben dahi orada bulunan bir Bulgarın kolundan tutup haydi bana paşanın konağını göster diyerek çektim. Paşanın konağı dahi orada beş altı yüz adım kadar ötede imiş gösterdi kaçıp konağından içeriye girdim. Arkamdan Nemçe konsolos kavvasları, dahi koşup geldi ve yetişip konaktan dışarıya çıkarmak istedi ise de ben dahi ben sizin sefarethanenizi tanımam benim sefarethanem burasıdır diyerek gittiğimden beni zabtiye binbaşı imiş onun karşısına çıkardılar. Sonra dahi paşanın divan efendisi yanına götürdüler divan efendisi ve mezkur binbaşı ve bir başka efendi hazır olduğu halde bir saat kadar bana kahve çubuk içirdikten sonra istintak ettiler. Ben de korkumdan size evvelki söylediğim gibi söyledim onlar da yazdılar sonra bir odaya koyup bir Rum uşağı dahi hizmetçi verdiler." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁶³ In terms of being treated very well, prudence is necessary in this context because it was the Tanzimat period, where the use of torture to extract confessions and arbitrary punishment without proper trial were officially banned. Therefore, the officers would be held responsible for these sorts of misconduct. Thus, the statement could be read two ways. One reads that the officers recorded the statements as such to secure themselves against any allegations, as evidence suggests that torture could still be used on suspects and only rarely such violations reached the courts, while the other suggests that the new principles were really put into practice in this specific sequence. Omri Paz, "The Usual Suspect: Worker Migration and Law Enforcement in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Anatolia," *Continuity and Change* 30, no. 2 (2015): 240.

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of what he was going to face. Jusstinián might have shocked when he saw the governor sitting with the Austrian council, Ferdinand Haas, who had chased him just a little while ago.

The encounter suddenly turned into a confrontation once the consul started to question him by asking which languages he spoke. Jusstinián replied that he spoke Italian, French, and German.⁸⁶⁴ The next question was where he was from. "I am from Istanbul," he said. The consul who did not like the answer infuriated: "No, you are a Hungarian and a subject of Austria!" The young captain insisted that he was a subject of the Ottoman sultan vis-à-vis denying his Hungarian identity by citing as a witness his safe conduct he had recently obtained on which his name appeared as Hüseyin.⁸⁶⁵ The last question the consul desperately asked was related to his family. "My family is in Istanbul and my father is Hüseyin Bey who resides in Ortaköy," replied Jusstinián. Resembling a scene out of a movie, the consul desperately asked: "Did you remember me?" The answer was negative. He said, "I am the Austrian consul," adding immediately afterwards. Jusstinián repeated that he did not recognize him anyway. As the discussion was going on, the governor intervened and asked the consul if he had further questions to put an end to the discussion. Nervous for not getting what he wished, the consul complained: "What do I ask him? What answer comes down from him?" Then, they took the young revolutionary to a different room, where he sat for half an hour before being recalled back to be notified that the consul had gone.⁸⁶⁶

To claim Jusstinián as a subject of the Austrian Empire for providing his extradition from the governor, the consul had to prove that he was a Hungarian. That was the reason of this confrontation and short questioning. Nonetheless, the consul's efforts to bring him into

⁸⁶⁴ When he was separately interrogated by the Ottoman officers, he gave a more detailed account of his language abilities. Accordingly, he declared that he could only speak French, both read and write in German, and had only basic command in Slavic that he did not specify. He did not speak Hungarian at all. He explains his inability to speak Hungarian by the fact that he speaks German because his hometown was close to Austria. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁶⁵ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid.

captivity did not yield any result. It was probably for this possibility that Jusstinián had obtained a safe conduct and converted to Islam before undertaking the travel, even though he had no intention of setting foot on Austrian soil, as far as we know. Indeed, he fled from the Austrian officials to the Ottoman officials, meaning that it was preferable to be a suspect under investigation of the Ottomans than to be left at the mercy of the Habsburgs. The attitude of the governor in this occasion was one of benevolent neutrality towards Jusstinián, who recounted how the governor had assured him not to expatriate him to Austria by stating that "I have sent a telegram to Istanbul, I am going to send you to Istanbul. Do not worry, I will not turn you over."⁸⁶⁷

The telegram dated April 26 survives in Ottoman Archives, in which the governor asks the Porte what kind of action ought to be taken on the issue of "Hüseyin Bey, the son of Hungarian Hüseyin Bey who resides in Ortaköy," who was sent to Ruse from Giurgiu based on undefined suspicions. The telegram also confirms the consul's visit to the governor, as Jusstinián mentioned, and his verbal request for Jusstinián's arrest.⁸⁶⁸ The Porte notified the governor that the release of the suspect be inappropriate, which meant that his arrest officially began.⁸⁶⁹ He was to be kept in detention a little while longer for interrogation through the Austrian vice-consul (*şehbender vekili*) in Giurgiu, and if possible, with the assistance of the Serbian authorities, to figure out his actual status before being sent to Istanbul. Arif Pasha also reported that no mischief-making proclamations (*fesâd-amiz i'lannâmeler*) were found at the disposal of Jusstinián despite earlier warnings to that effect.⁸⁷⁰ According to Austrian foreign ministry, these could have been seized in Giurgiu. Through a diplomatic note, Austria drew the

⁸⁶⁷ "Nemçe konsolosu gitti deyü söylediler. Sonra paşa beni tekrar yanına çağırıp senin için her İstanbul'a telgraf urdum. Seni İstanbul'a göndereceğim korkma seni onlara teslim etmem deyü söyledi." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁶⁸ "Ortaköy'de sâkin Macarlı Hüseyin Beyin oğlu Hüseyin Bey." BOA, A.MKT.UM., 468/23, 17 Şevval 1277 (26 April 1861), 3.

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁸⁷⁰ BOA., HR. SYS., 1798/16, 17 August 1851.

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Ottoman officials' attention to the documents, strongly advising them to open an investigation because Matthias had already revealed that his companion had thrown a crate full of letters and leaflets into the river in Romania.⁸⁷¹ These documents were probably those that Jusztnián was to carry to Serbia. We do not know whether these documents were seized at some point by any governmental authorities; even though their existence is often rumored in the archival pieces at our disposal, no traces of these copies or their content have been found in Ottoman Archives.

On the twelfth day of his arrival in Ruse (possibly May 6), Jusztnián was taken outside. Accompanied by a clerk named Rasim Efendi, he was transported to Shumen. The documents about Jusztnián, perhaps including interrogation protocols, were also transported with him. From Shumen, his transportation to the port of Varna was supervised by another police (*zabtiye*), commissioned by the administrative chief.⁸⁷² Jusztnián pleaded with the local administrator in Varna not to be placed on an Austrian ship; he was shipped to Istanbul three days later, yet it is not clear whether it was an Austrian or British steamship.⁸⁷³

He must have arrived in Constantinople on May 14.⁸⁷⁴ Once his ship docked in the Golden Horn, the officer who had escorted him from Varna arranged a vessel to transport the suspect to the police headquarters, where Jusztnián was put into a room with Lieutenant Şemsi and Mehmed Aghas. He was held incommunicado for the next twenty-two days, likely waiting

⁸⁷¹ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 1.

⁸⁷² *Zabtiye* can be regarded as the proto-gendarmerie form of internal surveillance during the Tanzimat era, a transitional period in terms of modern policing, where the differentiation between police and army had not yet been institutionalized. Zabtiye officers usually had a military background and were recruited in cooperation with the local notables. For a detailed account of the evolution of internal security organization in the Ottoman Empire see Ferdan Ergut, *Modern Devlet ve Polis: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Denetimin Diyalektiği* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015).

⁸⁷³ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). Jusztnián claims that it was a British ship, while an official correspondence says it was an Austrian.

⁸⁷⁴ A *tezkiye-i samî* to the Police Field Marshal reports that the suspect, who was heading toward Istanbul via Varna, would arrive the *next day* on an Austrian steamship and shall be detained without allowing him to see anyone. BOA., HR.MKT., 377/51, 03 Zilkade 1277 (13 May 1861).

for further instructions from the Porte.⁸⁷⁵ He was finally ordered to be interviewed on Tuesday, June 4, 1861.⁸⁷⁶

Born in the second half of the 1830s, Jusstinián experienced the revolution in Hungary and the ensuing war of independence in his formative years, which should have left deep marks on his soul, though where he witnessed the historical events, whether in Pest or Baranya, is not verifiable. He later enlisted in the Austrian army. During his tenure as a captain, he was likely in contact with the Hungarian exiles on Ottoman soil. He recounts his connection with Schneider back in Hungary, noting that they were from the same town and maintained regular communication. They were exchanging secret letters "every month or every two months."⁸⁷⁷ Thus, he appears to be encouraged to desert. While serving as a captain in the Austrian army near Po River, Jusstinián seized the moment to escape to the city of Ferrara.⁸⁷⁸ His desertion through this area was no surprise, as it was not only the closest to the Kingdom of Sardinia but also inhabited by the discontented petty bourgeoisie, which made the minority soldiers legitimate targets to seduce for the tricolor.⁸⁷⁹

There are incompatible leads about his timing to leave Austria. To begin with, Matthias testifies that his companion deserted during the war; though he does not specify which one, it could be either the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 or the Expedition of the Thousand.⁸⁸⁰ Keeping in mind that the latter was chronologically closer to his interrogation, the former might have needed more description lest not get it wrong. However, Jusstinián gives two different accounts on his timing. On the one hand, he might have fled in August-September 1860. He

⁸⁷⁵ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁷⁶ BOA., HR.MKT., 380/11, 25 Zilkade 1277 (04 June 1861).

⁸⁷⁷ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁷⁸ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2. I could not read the name of the city, it could be something like Polende or Polesine.

⁸⁷⁹ Raymond Grew, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 177, 183. The context of this determination is the Austro-French Piedmontese War in 1859.

⁸⁸⁰ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

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argues in June that it has been ten months since his crossing the border for Ferrara.⁸⁸¹ At the end of his investigation in July 1861, on the other hand, he suggests that he fled fifteen months ago, which would place his desertion around March-April 1860. "I left my regiment with the intention of joining the belligerent Italian army, which [had] risen against the Austrian state," says Jusztinián, in his confession statement.⁸⁸² Considering that the Expedition of the Thousand did not primarily target the Austrians, rather the immediate enemy was the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which was backed by the French, what he meant must be the war of 1859, while stating "which had risen against the Austrian state." From this expression, however, it is not easy to tell if the Italian army was at war with Austria at the time of his desertion or it had earlier fought against it. Yet the latter was more likely the case, since the war against Austria was too early to fit into Jusztinián's schedule. Thus, even though more concrete evidence is necessary to make a sharper judgement, it is arguable that he could have joined the Hungarian forces rallied in Central Italy subsequent to the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, as desertions gained a relatively fresh momentum after the war, and a total of 750 Hungarians rallied in Central Italy. In this case, however, he should have spent some in Italy until joining to the Garibaldian expedition, though Jusztinián's own narrative highlights a more sequential timing without interruptions and pause, not to mention that the Armistice of Villafranca was a great disappointment for his countrymen, meaning that there could be less incentive for newcomers while the Hungarian Legion was dissolving. In fact, we should also consider that his first account had in mind to disengage himself from revolutionary activities, as the period of September-August was more tranquil for the deserters as to the patriotic ideals. If nothing else, his participation in the Red Shirts was absolute.

⁸⁸¹ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁸² "alayımı terk ile Nemçe devletinin aleyhine kıyam etmiş olan İtalya askerine dahil olmak emeliyle." BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

Jusztinián's testimony reads that after spending only one and a half days in Ferrara, he departed for Bologna, where the deserters were guided and subsidized along the way, since the travel from for Italy from Austria was too expensive to afford for young idealists.⁸⁸³ Four days later, he headed to Genoa from Bologna. He ended up in "the cradle of revolution" (*erbâb-ı ihtilâl*) Turin four days later to seek advice from renowned Hungarian revolutionaries such as Lajos Kossuth and Ferenc Pulszky because "when I fled from Austria," he says, "I did not know where to go."⁸⁸⁴ They seemed unhelpful, as the Hungarian leaders did not know exactly where Garibaldi was, according to Jusztinián.⁸⁸⁵ He returned to Genoa eight days later. His arrival there was no accidental; it was the port where the reinforcements for Garibaldi were organized.

After learning Garibaldi's current whereabouts, Jusztinián underscores, he sailed to Sicily to join the campaign toward Naples. If it took him around a month to reach the Red Shirts, he might have caught a shipment from Genoa to Sicily around June-July, as reinforcements for the campaign substantially increased following the fall of Palermo, as detailed in the previous chapter, and continued until Sardinia halted them in August 1860.

Jusztinián first landed in the port city of Messina, possibly in July. After spending six days there, he proceeded to Palermo, where the Hungarian Legion was being formed under the command of Nándor Éber (1825-1885). Subsequently, he was incorporated into the legion established by Garibaldi through a decree in July. The legion was organized in two units, infantry and hussars. Since Jusztinián reveals he was a hussar officer, he was likely to be put under the command of Major Fülöp Figyelmessy (1821-1907). It is logical to assume that the

⁸⁸³ Grew, *A Sterner Plan*, 180.

⁸⁸⁴ BOA., HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3. "Ben Avusturya'dan kaçdığım vakit nereye gideceğimi bilmez idim akıl danışmak için Macaristan firarilerinin büyüğü olduğundan onlara gidip Turin'de bulup sual ettim. Napoliye git dediler." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). Also, we should remember from the previous chapter that Pulszky moved to Turin in the beginning of April as the representative of the Hungarian National Directorate, while Kossuth arrived there in September to meet Cavour.

⁸⁸⁵ "Çünkü merkurat Garibaldi'yi Napoli'de zan ediyorlar idi." His statements here again find an interesting overlap with concrete historical situations. Kossuth was able to establish contact with the volunteers within the Garibaldian army in the autumn of 1860. Róbert Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth ve 1848-49 Yıllarında Macar Özgürlük Savaşı*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003), 109.

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volunteers must have gone through a certain orientation program before going to the battlefields. Indeed, after spending fourteen days in Palermo, Jusstinián marched into Messina in early August with his legion, which oversaw the landing of Garibaldi in Calabria.

Jusstinián joined the campaign in Messina, where he likely shared the enthusiasm with many Hungarians to cross the Strait after days of feverish anticipation.⁸⁸⁶ Under the command of Figyelmessy, the contextual evidence suggests that he was among the 118 Hungarians who landed Bagnara in Calabria at the end of the month.⁸⁸⁷ While the revolutionary army was advancing further north, Jusstinián took part in great historical events, including the capture of Naples in early September, the Battle of Volturno in October, and the siege of Gaeta from November 1860 to February 1861. He served as a commanding officer in his legion, participating "in the battles that took place in Naples and Gaeta and some other places", in his own words.⁸⁸⁸ The following is a vivid description of the Hungarian Legion while resisting the attacks of the Bourbons in southern Lazio Region:

The 200 Hungarian cavaliers, Garibaldi's only mounted force, were at length let loose. They went right over the batteries and on through regiment after regiment. Too few to rout the whole army, they were too brave, and too skilled with horse and sword, to be stopped anywhere on this side the walls of Capua. Singly and in small groups, as evening fell, the survivors rode back, well satisfied that they had honoured the Magyar name before the eyes of Europe.⁸⁸⁹

As narrated in the previous chapter, the military campaign generated schisms among the founding fathers in Italy and no less among the Hungarian patriots who took their sides in the dispute. One of the issues that heightened the tension was the prospects for the volunteers within the army of Garibaldi. Even though the Hungarian Legion was relocated near Naples

⁸⁸⁶ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 283.

⁸⁸⁷ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 122-123.

⁸⁸⁸ "Mesina'dan Garibaldi'nin askerine yüzbaşılık ederek Napoli'ye geldik." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 2.

⁸⁸⁹ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy: June-November 1860* (London: Longmans, 1928), 252. A few weeks later, Garibaldi himself wrote about them as follows: "Era bel vedere i veterani dell'Ungheria marciare al fuoco colla tranquillità di un campo di manovra e collo stesso ordine. La loro impavida intrepidità contribuì non poco alla ritirata del nemicos." Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 124.

under closer surveillance of Sardinia, there were volunteers who refused to surrender, leading them to forge new ways of living and perhaps new causes to fight for. In his interrogations, Jusztinián states that he left the army after the war. This suggests that he either resigned, was disbanded, or possibly even deserted, and suddenly found himself unemployed without any place to go, just like many other foreign volunteers and exiles, unless he accepted to join the legion.⁸⁹⁰ Consequently, he spent five months in Naples, which had always been a prominent point of contact for revolutionary activities.⁸⁹¹ In due course, he made contacts with renowned revolutionaries of the time and even claims to have participated in Garibaldi's conversations in Naples, yet the nature of these talks, if they were private or public, remains unclear.⁸⁹² What he meant could be the instances in which Garibaldi publicly greeted the Hungarian Legion. For example, while inspecting the Fifteenth Division of Türr, Garibaldi greeted the legion in front of the Royal Palace of Caserta, which was his headquarters:

Ad essi - disse Garibaldi in quella solenne occasione - non solo dobbiamo gratitudine, ma è nostro dovere aiutare la loro causa e farla nostra. E lo faremo!⁸⁹³

A few weeks later in Naples, Garibaldi delivered another speech:

Oggi è un bel giorno, un gran giorno - disse, tra l'altro, Garibaldi nel suo discorso. E bello, e grande perche rannoda con nuovo vincolo la fratellenza che lega l'Italia all'Ungheria. I popoli liberi sono soldati fra loro. Gli italiani liberi non possono, non devono, non vogliono dimenticarlo, né lo dimenticheranno. [...] L'indipendenza e la libertà d'Italia è strettamente legata alla indipendenza e alla libertà d'Ungheria.⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁹⁰ For the story of one such figure, Jessie White Mario see Elizabeth Adams Daniels, *Jessie White Mario Risorgimento Revolutionary* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1972), 100.

⁸⁹¹ He must have been there until January 1861, after which he set out to Istanbul at the end of the month or the beginning of February for the next three months, ninety-five days to be more precise, which corresponds to his arrest in the Ottoman Balkans in April. In other words, his accounts are consistent in terms of timing.

⁸⁹² "Musina'dan Garibaldi'nin askerine yüzbaşılık ederek Napoli'ye geldik beş ay onun başında muhabbetlerinde bulunup sonra buraya geldim." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁸⁹³ Fornaro, *Risorgimento*, 124.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid., 127.

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In Naples, Jusstinián became a member of a revolutionary committee called Garibaldi's Sword of Glory, through the mediation of Hungarian general, Sándor Gál (1817-1866).⁸⁹⁵ Matthias puts forward that the committee initially dispatched Jusstinián to Venice from Naples, yet this assertion cannot be confirmed through cross-examination, as the latter nowhere mentions such a visit, nor is there anything related to it brought up in his interrogations.⁸⁹⁶ What he confesses at the end of his investigation is that he was authorized to distribute some forty proclamations ("fifteen copies for Istanbul, twenty-five for Hungary") to various centers. To that end, he first set out to Messina, where he posted proclamations for the contact persons (whose names Jusstinián could not recall) in Piraeus, Athens, and Malta. Second, he boarded a steamship bound for Dersaadet with a Sardinian passport and Ottoman safe conduct. While on board, he was approached by a Hungarian revolutionary leader, Károly Viola, who handed Jusstinián a sealed letter. It belonged to one of the Italian revolutionaries Jusstinián had met back in Naples. The letter instructed him that Viola was his superior.⁸⁹⁷

Having arrived in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, likely at the end of January or in the first days of February 1861, Jusstinián and Viola stayed together for two days in a shared room at an inn called London Restaurant, with their rations at hand until finding Physician Hüseyin Faik. Jusstinián handed certain proclamations to Hüseyin Faik, who accommodated him for the next ninety-five days until his guest departed for Belgrade with Matthias.⁸⁹⁸ Jusstinián also made various contacts with the revolutionary circles in the city during this interval, which was also the time when his friendship with Matthias began.

According to his confession, Jusstinián had another travel to the Balkans before his mission in Belgrade. Together with Viola, he embarked on an abortive venture in Romania. Realizing that they would be arrested if they continued their mission in Wallachia due to the

⁸⁹⁵ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

⁸⁹⁶ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

⁸⁹⁷ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid. BOA., A.M. 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

schism among the Hungarian revolutionaries, they hastily got back to Istanbul. Jusstinián suggests that even though Sándor Buda in Bucharest had been on their side, he changed sides and informed Prince Cuza of their mission.⁸⁹⁹

Finally, accompanied by a fellow-looking agent whom he had only recently met, Jusstinián headed to Belgrade for revolutionary motives, but things did not work out as they were supposed to. As they traveled along the Danube, the sequence of events described above happened, and while Jusstinián took shelter in Turkish authorities, Matthias ended up in the Austrian consulate in Ruse. Jusstinián was investigated in Ruse and Istanbul for about five months, after which he was deported to Messina on August 22 on the grounds that "he was understood to be one of the intriguers, in parallel to his confession."⁹⁰⁰

As it has already been discussed at length, when we take an overview of the interrogations of Jusstinián, we witness a twisting moment when he admits that what he said up to that point was because of his anxiety about being extradited to the Austrians. He then says: "Now, I am going to tell what I know, yet you ought not to extradite me. If you did it, they would tear me to pieces because I was a captain for the Austrians. I had been serving in the army since childhood."⁹⁰¹ Yet it would not always be easy to make sure to what extent his previous statements reflect the truth since even the revised statements are sometimes contradictory or not clear enough. I have endeavored until now to construct the story with the help of other archival pieces and complementary secondary sources. In some cases, I clearly explained how I came up with my conclusions, and in others, I altogether refrained from making comments in the face of insufficient information. There is one element left worthy of

⁸⁹⁹ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

⁹⁰⁰ "ikrarına nazaran eşhası müfsideden olduğu anlaşılmasıyla emsali vechile memâlik-i mahruse-i şahanedan tard-ü def olunması" BOA., HR.MKT., 386/72, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861). BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2. BOA., A. MKT.NZD., 368/72, 24 Rebülevvel 1278 (29 September 1861).

⁹⁰¹ "Ben de artık size malumatımı doğruca söylerim. Fakat beni Nemçelilere teslim eylememelisiniz. Eğer teslim edecek olursanız beni parça parça ederler. Çünkü ben Nemçelilere yüzbaşı idim. Küçükten beri askerliğe hizmet ediyordum." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

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mention, which is a characteristic attitude that permeates Jusztinián's testimonies. When he seeks to manipulate his interrogator, he attempts *to distort the truth by presenting concrete facts*. To illustrate, while vehemently denying the accusation, even if it was not even made, that he was spying through the Ottoman territories as an Austrian agent, he meticulously avoids mentioning his anti-Austrian revolutionary activities. While referencing the names of real individuals, he distorts their identities by attributing them to entirely different roles and purposes. Therefore, even when we know that he distorts, it would be a mistake to completely dismiss his statements. For this reason, it is still worth mentioning other information delivered by Jusztinián, however unverified they may be. What are mentioned below may not be the truth, but they certainly correspond to another kind of truth hence.

According to the scenario before his conflicting statements were uncovered, as soon as he left his hometown, Baranya five years ago, he came to find his (alleged) father, Hüseyin Faik, in Istanbul, who had promised to take him to France and Italy for education. He gives a detailed account of a Danube voyage:

The port of Mohacs is three hours from Baranya from which I took an Austrian steam and in three days I came to the port of Orsova, which is near the border between Austria and the Sublime State, and from there I came to Kalas in three days with another Austrian ferry. And from Kalas I came to Istanbul in one day and one night with another Austrian ferry. I stayed with my father in Ortaköy.⁹⁰²

Here narrates Jusztinián a trip on the Danube from upon his return from Europe, though he later denies his traveling to France and Italy to study at military schools after the moment of twist. Even if what he tells about the voyage from Mohacs to Constantinople does not correspond to his own situation, it is likely pointing at something else. While revealing his first departure from his hometown for Istanbul five years ago, he was actually acting as a Hungarian

⁹⁰² "Baranya Mohaç iskelesi üç saattir oradan bir Avusturya vapuruna binip üç günde Avusturya ile Devlet-i 'Aliyye hududu yanında olan Orsova iskelesine geldim ve oradan diğer bir Avusturya vapuru ile üç günde Kalasa geldim. Ve Kalasdan dahi yine diğer bir Avusturya vapuriyle bir gün bir gecede İstanbula geldim. Ortaköy'de pederimin yanında kaldım." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

refugee heading to Galați to finally arrive in Italy (we have discussed this mobility at the beginning of the chapter), indicating that he was well aware of the situation unfolding there.

After spending eight days with Physician Hüseyin on his first alleged visit to Istanbul, he states that he moved to France (Lyon) where he resided for two years before leaving for Italy (Genoa).⁹⁰³ He returned to Istanbul three years later. He explains the reason why he visited Italy and France for the purpose of education at military schools (*usul-ü askeri*). He describes the military schools as follows:

I studied at the military school in the French town of Lyon. The name of the pasha is Granuli, the name of the colonel is Dusan, and the name of the first teacher is Bahman. And there are about a hundred other teachers, along with around two hundred students who study, and fourteen instructors of the hundred teachers lecture and train writing, and even the rest is assistant trainers. And like in Italy, it was a military school in Genoa. It does not have a pasha but a colonel. And his name is Sarki and the headmaster is Asinaci. There were twelve other instructors and one hundred and ten trainees. Fifty of them were naval and sixty of us were troops. And I studied in both of these schools as a cavalry soldier.⁹⁰⁴

If the military schools he mentions here are not entirely fictitious, they could be parts of the revolutionary establishments he joined, maybe the "school" in Genoa was the description of the Hungarian Legion, stationed there for a while there, or it could be a military camp, where he was drilled before participating in the southern campaign.⁹⁰⁵ Therefore, even if there exist false pretenses in his testimonies, they often align and resonates with something real in some

⁹⁰³ The reader probably realizes that he spent eight days with Matthias in Istanbul before heading to the Balkans for revolutionary purposes. He also says that he spent ninety-five days with his father in Istanbul on his return before going to Italy, which is the same temporality as his actual visit after landing with Viola. Furthermore, he also told on April 26 that he returned from the school where he used to study three months ago. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 3. In other words, he really spent ninety-five days in Istanbul but in a different context. Thus, he seems to narrate a parallel story.

⁹⁰⁴ "Fransız Lyon kasabesindeki askeri mektebinde okudum. Paşasının adı Granuli, Miralayının ismi Dusan ve birinci hocasının ismi dahi Bahman sair yüz kadar dahi hocası vardır ve iki yüz kadar dahi ders okur şakirt vardır ve yüz kadar dahi hocadan on dördü ders okutur ve yazı talim eder ve kusurları dahi talim için yardımcıdır ve İtalya'da gibi dahi Cenova'daki askeri mekteptir. Paşası yoktur miralayı vardır. Ve ismi dahi Sarki ve birinci hocası Asinacidir. Ve sair on iki hocası yüz on dahi şakirdi var idi. Elli bahriye ve altmış beriyeye askeri idik. Ve ben bu mekteplerin ikisinde dahi süvari askeri silkinde bulunup okudum." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁹⁰⁵ The commander of the legion was a colonel, Dániel Ihász.

way. The name Dusan, for another instance, mentioned in reference to a French military school, appears again in another document, this time as a revolutionary leader.⁹⁰⁶ In short, we should note that even if we know that there are lies, errors, and distortions in his accounts, they should not be disregarded categorically, which may still carry other meanings behind them because his false accounts are too detailed to be made up on the spot. These false accounts could be more innocent versions of what really happened in the past or they could tell what others experienced, rather than his first-hand experiences.⁹⁰⁷

The story of Jusztinián has not finished here, we will repeatedly return to his statements in different contexts, however, before that we need to narrate the story of Hüseyn Faik.

3.4. The Story of Antal Schneider⁹⁰⁸

This section aims to present the life story of Kaimmakam Physician Hüseyn Faik Bey (Antal Schneider), whom Jusztinián Károly (Hüseyn) introduced as a family friend back in Hungary, in whose house he was hosted during his stay in Constantinople, who mediated his conversion to Islam and his encounters with the revolutionary circles in the city and the bureaucracy of the empire, and whom he depicted as the leader of the revolutionary committee of which he himself was a member.

Despite the prominent role he once played within the transnational revolutionary networks of his time, knowledge about Hüseyn Faik has remained extremely limited in

⁹⁰⁶ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 1.

⁹⁰⁷ This also reflects how I approach ego-documents. For the discussion see reader may go back to the first chapter.

⁹⁰⁸ Antal Schneider is spelled here based on his signature on the petitions he presented to the Porte. Kaimmakam Tabib Hüseyn Faik and Tabib Hüseyn Bey are the common usage in Ottoman documents, while the form Antal Şınayder is rarely seen, and Antuvan (Antoine) can appear in the diplomatic correspondences. The Hungarian version must be Antalt Schneider. In a book devoted to Sándor Gál, his name appears as one of the contributors in the form of Antonio D. Schneider. Antonio D. Schneider, Alessandro de Halász, and Carlo Viola de Pécsvárad, *Biografia di Alessandro Gal: Capo militare della Nazione de' Siculi in Transilvania negli anni 1848, e 1849* (Napoli: Tipografia Banchi Nuovi, 1861).

national historiographies to this time.⁹⁰⁹ The fact that studies consistently refer to him by the name "Hüseyin" after converting to Islam speaks volumes about the limited scholarly interest in his biography, as our archival work lays bare that this revolutionary figure in Ottoman subjecthood was more accurately known as "Hüseyin Faik." This lack of interest might even originate in the archives themselves, which are designed to reinforce national/official narratives rather than delve into the micro-stories of the so-called deviants, whose political decisions led them astray across diverse geographical regions. Indeed, Schneider's political activities ranged over a large area that would become home to several nation-states, to which, however, his contribution appears to remain off the beaten path with the wisdom of hindsight. Take the situation in Ottoman Archives, the correspondences that could be related to Hüseyin Faik are not preserved in a compact fashion, not to mention that he should assumably have left very fragmented traces in Austrian, Hungarian, and Italian archives. The highly dispersed nature of firsthand evidence in each national archives makes any effort to bring these bits of information together and narrate them in a coherent way discouraging from the outset, given the disparity between the challenges involved and the potential gains ahead. What is worse, the subjective nature of the archival pieces in Ottoman Turkish, written in a mixture of Arabic and Persian script, further exacerbates the difficulties to conduct research about individuals, especially those of non-Muslim origins, let alone from rank and file. In our case, the similar spelling of the names "Hüseyin" (حسین) and "Hasan" (حسن) in Ottoman Turkish seems to have misled the clerks at the time and later the archivists who cataloged their records. To illustrate, the documents about granting of the Order of Mecidiye to Hüseyin Faik are cataloged under the title "Regarding the decorations of Physician Kaimmakam *Hasan Faik* Bey and others of the

⁹⁰⁹ For a bit of information about his biography based on Hungarian sources see Ròbert Hermann, András Joò, Kálmán Mészáros, István Seres. *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma Hakkı Tanınan Macar Mültecilerinin Özyaşamlarından Özetler*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2010), 65-67.

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regular army," yet they were about *Hüseyin Faik* himself.⁹¹⁰ In other words, any attempt to track down archival evidence mentioning him must go through not only the documents labeled as "Hüseyin" but also those labeled as "Hasan," since it is not always possible to immediately judge whether a document is related one way or another to the issue without examining its content.⁹¹¹ This line of investigation, however, significantly increases volume of documents to be handled, often to the point of frustration, especially when dozens of analyzed documents turn out to be just irrelevant or presenting conflictual clues, even while the related documents usually give mild information anyway, about the subject to cloud the mind of researcher instead of clarifying it. Besides, the appearance of another military physician (hopefully) named Hüseyin, who also participated in the Crimean War and received the Order of Mecidiye, just like Hüseyin Faik, makes the issue even more challenging. While the former, who had served in the Arabian army at the time the order was awarded, held the rank of kaimmakam, the latter, who served in the *Bahr-i Sefid* (Aegean Islands) army, held the rank of colonel.⁹¹² Furthermore, our main protagonist is interchangeably referred to as "Tabib Hüseyin Bey" and "Tabib Hüseyin Faik Bey," and his rank was kaimmakam.⁹¹³ What is more, archival documents in our

⁹¹⁰ Emphasis is mine. "Asakir-i Nizamiye Tabib Kaymakamı Hasan Faik Bey ile sairenin nişanlarına dair." BOA, İ.DH., 361/23876, 26 Rebiülevvel 1273 (24 November 1856).

⁹¹¹ To give an example, a researcher working on Hungarian and Polish refugees gives a one-sentence information about Schneider in his book, "Physician Hüseyin Bey, while he was the chief surgeon in the Anatolian army, was appointed as the town physician of Taşköprü Kazası," based on a document. BOA, A.MKT.NZD., 246/38, 25 Rebiülâhîr 1274 (12 December 1857). However, a scrupulous examination refutes this information. Hüseyin Faik held the rank of kaimmakam at that time, and when the Ottoman documents are considered as a whole, no mention of him as "Hüseyin Efendi" is seen. He is also referred to as "surgeon of his hometown Taşköprü township with a salary of eight hundred piastres" in another source. BOA., MVL., 355/196, 26 Ramazan 1274 (10 May 1858). However, Schneider was no way from Taşköprü. Also see BOA., A.MKT.MHM., 123/88, 25 Cemâziyelevvel 1274 (11 January 1858). Musa Gümüş, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde Yabancılar: Leh ve Hungarian Mültecileri* (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2019), 133.

⁹¹² BOA., A.AMD., 67/58, 29 Zilhicce 1272 (31 August 1856). BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 197/94, 19 Safer 1273 (19 October 1856). BOA., İ.DH., 394/26063, 19 Cemâzeyilevvel 1274 (05 January 1858). The existence of two different Physician Hüseyin may even have confused the bureaucrats at times, indeed, Kaimmakam Physician Hüseyin Faik Bey was occasionally referred to as colonel (*miralay*) in some cases, such as BOA., HR.TO., 437/47, 09 May 1861, 1. Yet this may not be a mistake as it seems, though, it could rather be a matter of translation as some of the documents about him are obtained from the bureau of translation. In any way, it is a source of confusion for researchers.

⁹¹³ For "Tabib Hüseyin Faik Bey" see BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 352/77, 05 Zilkade 1277 (15 May 1861). For "Tabib Hüseyin Bey" see BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 390/39, 05 Receb 1278 (06 January 1862). The seal of Hüseyin Faik himself appears in one of his petitions. For the seal of Hüseyin Faik Bey and Antal Schneider see BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 385/60, 14 Cemâziyelâhîr 1278 (17 December 1861), 2.

context may not always provide reliable historical evidence for the message they carry, for instance, the appearance of a letter instructing something did not guarantee that it was really carried out. The story of Hüseyin Faik presents a vivid example in this regard. Even though he requested his release from the Vilayet of Trabzon, where he declared himself in exile on May 9, the governmental decree for his banishment was seemingly issued in July. Even more strangely, his wandering in the capital months after the order became a source of complaint for the high officials.⁹¹⁴ After all, Ottomanists are of the opinion that the archives that provide main source material for their studies do not offer abundant opportunities for writing biography, especially of those outside the ruling elites.⁹¹⁵

If the correspondences circulating within the governmental branches provide one source of information to reconstruct the story of Antal Schneider, the other was his petitions (*arz-ı hâl*) that he dispatched mostly to the Porte. These petitions suggest that Physician Hüseyin Faik was well-versed in the working principles of Ottoman bureaucracy and did not abstain from demanding justice whenever he felt wronged.⁹¹⁶ From the time he was on active duty in the Vilayet of Aleppo in 1852 to the period he was under investigation in 1861, and even later during his stay in Italy in the mid-1860s, he repeatedly attempted to make his grievances known to the highest officials through his petitions. In spite of the difficulties in judging the accuracy of his complaints and the way the rulers responded to them in the absence of follow-up documentation, it is clear that Hüseyin Faik succeeded to make his voice heard to us and provided additional evidence for his biography. It is not known whether he was fluent in speaking Turkish since his petitions at our disposal are mostly written in French and German,

⁹¹⁴ BOA., HR.TO., 437/47, 09 May 1861, 1. BOA., HR. MKT., 391/18, 01 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (04 November 1861).

⁹¹⁵ Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih Söyleşileri (Müşahade-i Tarihiye)*, ed. Mübeccel Nami Duru (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1980), 253. Ali Akyıldız, "İnsanı Yazmak: 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Biyografi Yazıcılığı ve Problemleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 50, no. 50 (2017), 226.

⁹¹⁶ His knowledge may have two sources: first, the influence of the previous generation of converts already employed in the bureaucracy after his conversion; second, his own years of experience in the bureaucracy starting.

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with only one exception in Ottoman Turkish. In short, even though his name, rank, language abilities, nationality, religious affiliation, and pre-conversion life are subject to a great deal of confusion, we will try to trace the life of Hungarian Kaimmakam Physician Huseyin Faik Bey in general terms largely based on Ottoman archival registers.

In 1816, Antal Schneider was born in Timișoara (Temesvár), which is now in Romania.⁹¹⁷ He had been a physician at the onset of the Hungarian Revolution, mostly likely in this hometown. Judging from his profession, it is reasonable to conclude that he belonged to the petty-bourgeois class, which strongly advocated for the establishment of a liberal society governed by the rule of law in the pre-revolutionary Hungary. At the outbreak of the revolution, he was thirty-two years old and volunteered as the chief physician for the *honvéd* troops stationed beyond of the Tizsa River. He was promoted to lieutenant-assistant physician in February and to captain in the 72nd battalion in April 1849. Soon after, he was appointed to the national corps in Transylvania as the chief physician with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.⁹¹⁸ His acquaintance with the heroic Polish General Józef Bem should have started during this mission. Subsequent to the defeat of the revolutionary cause by the Tsarist and Habsburg armies, Schneider sought refuge in Vidin under the protection of Sultan Abdülmecid of the Ottoman Empire. His profession belonged to the most represented occupational category among the Hungarian and Polish refugees, yet it was still an asset that would open new job opportunities for him, as the empire was undergoing a period of reform, during which the rulers were in need of experts to further their political agenda.⁹¹⁹

Following the footsteps of Bem (Murad Pasha), Schneider converted to Islam in Vidin against the wishes of the leading cadre of the movement and adopted the name Hüseyin Faik.

⁹¹⁷ Hermann et al, *Türkiye’de Kendilerine Sığınma*, 65.

⁹¹⁸ His family could be from Morava, Serbia because his biographical note says in Turkish that "Moravica'lı doktor." Ibid., 65.

⁹¹⁹ György Csorba, "Hungarians in Constantinople in the Mid-19th Century: Socio-Economic Background and Careers," in *Between Empires – Beyond Borders: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican Era through the Lens of the Köpe Family*, ed. Gabor Fodor (Budapest: Research Center for the Humanities, 2020), 70.

He was first transferred to Shumen, along with other converts, and then to Aleppo together with Murad Pasha's entourage through the city of Alexandria, while the Kossuth Group was transferred to the city of Kütahya in Anatolia. Hüseyin Faik's military rank was recognized in the Ottoman army as equivalent to that of a kaimmakam. He served as the private doctor of Murad Pasha, who had been wounded towards the end of the revolution. After his death in 1850, Ismail Pasha (György Kmety) ascended to the highest rank among the converts in Aleppo, becoming their natural leader.⁹²⁰ Nevertheless, he did not seem particularly eager to uphold the general's legacy, given that he offered the Porte to auction off Murad Pasha's paraphernalia, in contrast to Hüseyin Faik, who managed to keep his pall, and thereby symbolically claiming for the legacy of the heroic general whom he was attached to. Even years later, when the biography of a Hungarian general was published, his named appeared among the contributors, followed by the description: "Companion of Bem in Aleppo."⁹²¹ In the absence of a firsthand account from Hüseyin Faik, we may speculate that he could have regarded the pall as a talisman, preserving the memories of the revolution, war, and refuge that had huge impacts on his identity, as material culture is a significant vehicle for expressing one's identity.⁹²² This gesture could have also been intended to carry that formidable past to the future, serving as a symbolic plea for authority, given his later political activities. The leadership of Ismail Pasha was short-lived in Aleppo, he resigned from his duties in the empire to leave for London in 1851, while Hüseyin Faik remained in Syria to serve as a staff physician (*kurmay doktor*) in the Arabian Army until the outbreak of the Crimean War.⁹²³ The Ottoman

⁹²⁰ János Hòvári, "Geç Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Macar Askeri Etkileri: Richard Guyon ve György Kmety," *Macar Generalleri Osmanlı Hizmetinde: Richard Guyon ve Györgi Kmety - Hurşit Paşa ve İsmail Paşa*, trans. Ali Kemal Alpay, Ayan Dursun, Laura Pál, Murat Şahin, and Edit Tásnadi, (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2013), 21.

⁹²¹ "compagno di Bem a Aleppo, e dopo la morte, compagno di Gal nell'emigrazione." Antonio D. Schneider et al., *Biografia di Alessandro Gal*, 1861.

⁹²² Ibid. Peter Burke, "Representations of the Self from Petrarch to Descartes," in *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*, ed. Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997), 24.

⁹²³ BOA., HR.TO., 102/23, 18 August 1864.

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Middle East was also where he got married to Franciska Czauner, whose convert name is not known to us, and started to have children.⁹²⁴

Like many other refugees, Hüseyin Faik participated in the Crimean War under the auspices of the so-called the *Asâkir-i Nizâmiye-i Şâhâne* (Royal Regular Army) against the Russian troops that had played a vital role in suppressing the Hungarian War of Independence, hoping to rekindle the revolution in his distant homeland. He participated in the Battle of Kars in 1854 with the rank of kaimmakam, an engagement that earned him the Order of Mecidiye, the first Western-style insignia issued in the Ottoman Empire.⁹²⁵ Subsequent to the battle, his good service was investigated and recognized upon Hüseyin Faik's personal request, and the Minister of War (*Serasker*) Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha (1811-1882) wrote a letter of recommendation on October 19, 1856, to be forwarded to the Council of the Imperial Order (*Nişân-ı Hümayûn Meclisi*) with the approval of the Supreme Military Council (*Dâr-ı Şûra-yı Askeri*).⁹²⁶ On November 12, he was approved to be decorated with the Order of Mecidiye (*Mecidiye Nişan-ı Hümayun*) from the fourth rank upon the council resolutions (*matbata*), bearing the seals of Mustafa Reşid, Mehmed, Ali Şefik, Mehmed Fuad, and Ahmed Muhtar.⁹²⁷ The permission to award him was granted with an imperial decree two days later, and an imperial patent (*berât*) was issued for his good service, loyalty, and efforts in the Battle of Kars, as well as his skills and knowledge as a physician.⁹²⁸ Some secondary sources assert that he was the Hungarian physician who attained the highest rank in the Ottoman army.⁹²⁹

⁹²⁴ Hermann et al, *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma*, 67.

⁹²⁵ It was introduced in 1852 with five grades. The fourth and fifth orders were worn on the left side of the chest and were returned to the treasury upon the death of the holder. İbrahim Artuk, "Nişan," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 33 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 154-155. Hüseyin Faik might have participated in one more battle in 1856 based on indirect evidence, but I cannot document its details at this point.

⁹²⁶ BOA., İ.DH., 361/23876, 26 Rebiülevvel 1273 (24 November 1856), 9.

⁹²⁷ Ibid., 11.

⁹²⁸ Ibid., 13. BOA., A.DVN.MHM., 19/95, 10 Rebiülâhir 1273 (08 December 1856). On December 23, the Ministry of Finance was notified for the minting of the order. BOA., A.MKT.MHM., 104/47, 25 Rebiülâhir 1273 (23 December 1856). BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 207/18, 02 Cemâziyelevvel 1273 (23 December 1856).

⁹²⁹ Heléna Tóth, *An Exiled Generation: German and Hungarian Refugees of Revolution, 1848-1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 147.

After the conclusion of the peace, part of the Hungarian and Polish exiles relocated to Istanbul, such as Nándor Éber remained in the capital until the spring of 1859.⁹³⁰ Hüseyin Faik was among those who moved to the capital, though the exact timing and circumstances remain insufficiently documented.⁹³¹ In contact with György Klapka and Garibaldi's Turkish agents, according to source, he took part in the fundraising campaign in the Ottoman capital for the Italian unification.⁹³² During the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, however, many of the revolutionary returnees poured into Genoa, where the Hungarian National Directorate was established to organize the Hungarian Legion as an expeditionary force against Austria. In this context, Hüseyin Faik was likely among those who left Constantinople for Italy to take part in this campaign, as the emigration enthusiastically welcomed the calls of the revolutionary leaders. Once the war concluded with a devastating blow to the cause, Hüseyin Faik declined to join the Sardinian army and made his way back to Istanbul, following the *third way*, filled with bitterness. It is interesting to note that physicians constituted an occupational group able to practice their profession across various societies, though Hüseyin Faik seems to have preferred to stay in the empire until his deportation.⁹³³

The interrogations of Jusztnián and the related correspondences within Ottoman bureaucracy during his investigation indirectly provide bits of information about the new episode of Hüseyin Faik's life on Ottoman soil. It is often emphasized in the literature that Hungarian and Polish Forty-Eighters suffered from serious financial problems, yet he seems to be outside this generalization. He was living with a butler, a Hungarian convert named Hasan, and another unidentified convert, along with his family in Taş Merdiven street of Ortaköy, Istanbul. Hüseyin Faik rented this house from an Ottoman general who was temporarily out of

⁹³⁰ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 219.

⁹³¹ According to Jusztnián's account, it was about seven years ago, which corresponds to the Battle of Kars in 1854. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁹³² According to the source, Schneider was kept imprisoned for two years until diplomatic intervention of the British envoy. According to our findings, these do not look like reliable. Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 147.

⁹³³ Ibid., 120. Also see Ibid., 142.

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the city.⁹³⁴ It might perhaps be recalled here that it was the same house where Jusztinián stayed for about three months during his stay in Istanbul, while his travel in the Balkans with Matthias was financially covered by its tenant. These connections point to a certain level of financial adequacy that left Hüseyin Faik out of severe difficulties often experienced by his countrymen elsewhere.

His life resembled one in which official and illicit activities were merged and carried out together. He was no longer on active military duty by 1861, but was employed at the police station (*Bâb-ı Zabtiye*) in the capital.⁹³⁵ His official role there might have been related to forensic work, as the legal reforms introduced regulations requiring the employment of professional chemists, physicians, and surgeons in police stations to examine corpses and collect medico-scientific evidence.⁹³⁶ Whatever his official role was, however, he did not fail to use his power to pursue covert agendas; owing to his experience, position, and network within the bureaucracy, he was also able to provide logistical assistance to other revolutionaries involved in the cause, without the knowledge and, more importantly, against the wishes of the Ottoman higher echelons. Particularly striking was his ability to maintain and provide official documents for Jusztinián and Matthias to ensure safe mobility in the Balkans. Indeed, the former reveals in one of his interrogations that he obtained safe conducts from Hüseyin Faik "to freely go to Belgrade and get back without being harassed by the Austrians," a privilege that Matthias also confirmed in his separate interrogation before the Austrian officials.⁹³⁷ In other words, Hüseyin Faik's prominence within the revolutionary circles in Constantinople stemmed not only from the material resources at his disposal but also his effective manipulation

⁹³⁴ This street is also known as Taş Basamak Sokak. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 385/60, 14 Cemâziyelâhir 1278 (17 December 1861), 2.

⁹³⁵ BOA., A.MKT.MVL., 133/18, 28 Rebîülevvel 1278 (03 October 1861). Bâb-ı Zabtiye was responsible for the security of Galata and Beyoğlu districts.

⁹³⁶ Ebru Aykut Türker, "Alternative Claims on Justice and Law: Rural Arson and Poison Murder in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire" (PhD Diss, Boğaziçi University, 2020), 231, 232, 307, 323, 331.

⁹³⁷ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). BOA, HR. TO., 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

of the state mechanism in which he was employed. Moreover, he was a key figure in transnational revolutionary networks. The person Juszinián sought to find as soon as he arrived Constantinople from Naples was none other than Hüseyin Faik, whom he called "our chief" ("reisimiz").⁹³⁸ Apart from this confession, archival evidence also exists to support the notion that his superior was a key contact in the capital. A letter sent from Naples to Schneider, which seems to have been intercepted, dated on July 22, 1861, notified him that a small crate had been posted to him by Prince Marino Caracciolo in April.⁹³⁹ However, since the courier (likely a young member of the organization) had not yet arrived in the city, Schneider was informed to be able to receive the package directly from the French post office, with the receipt enclosed. The same letter states that General Sándor Gál was released from prison with the support of the King Vittorio Emanuele II. It continues by stating, "although the aforementioned man has many enemies, his nation appreciates his worth and value, and his life story will be published in ten thousand copies on April 5. And he is also editing a book on law and warfare."⁹⁴⁰

The year 1861 appears to have been particularly eventful for Hüseyin Faik, with traces in Ottoman Archives proliferating. After Juszinián mentioned this military physician in his testimonies, Hüseyin Faik was promptly reassigned to the Anatolian Army, aiming to effectively remove him from the capital.⁹⁴¹ Since he resisted the instruction on the grounds that he needed to remain in the city for personal reasons, Hüseyin Faik was detained in Constantinople, and then the Porte ordered his forceful transfer to the Ministry of War.⁹⁴² Hüseyin Faik wrote a petition to Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha (1813-1871), in

⁹³⁸ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

⁹³⁹ I came across some figures bearing this surname in secondary source, though I could find enough information to make judgements for now. For instance, Camillo Caracciolo di Bella was the founder of the Italian Masonic Lodge in Istanbul. Luis Miguel Selvelli, *Antenati a Costantinopoli: Esuli italiani negli anni del riformismo ottomano 1828-1878* (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2022), 111.

⁹⁴⁰ "her ne kadar merhumun çok düşmanı var ise de kendisinin milleti hiç olmaz ise kadr-ü kıymetini bilir ve merhumun tercüme-i hali bu miktarda on bin nüsha ile ve beş nisan üzere tab' neşr olunacak ve kendisi dahi kanun-ı harbiyeye dair bir kitab te'lif etmektedir." BOA., HR.TO. 437/4, 14 August 1861, 1. For the said biographical book see Schneider, Halász, and Viola de Pécsvárad, *Biografia di Alessandro Gal*, 1861.

⁹⁴¹ BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 350/22, 19 Şevval 1277 (28 April 1861).

⁹⁴² BOA., HR.MKT., 377/20, 29 Şevval 1277 (10 May 1861).

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which he narrated the ordeal of his banishment from the capital.⁹⁴³ According to his own account, a certain Hüsrev Pasha had told him to leave the city without delay. Despite asking why he was apprehended for days, Hüseyin Faik did not get any response and submitted his resignation from his official post. Moreover, he was dragged to a steamer by three officers and five sergeants, "like serious offenders," in his words.⁹⁴⁴ In his petition, Hüseyin Faik emphasized in a disenchanted manner that he had sought refuge and placed his trust in the Sublime State for his personal safety, hinting at the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. Still, he did not forget to express his eagerness to stand trial for any accusation and accept punishment if he found guilty.⁹⁴⁵ While asking the reason for his arrest, demanding trial if he was a suspect, and reminding his loyalty to the state; Hüseyin Faik uses the language and the principles announced in the Tanzimat edict that guaranteed no punishment without trial, especially for the civil servants even though he did not ostensibly justify his demands as such.⁹⁴⁶ At the conclusion of the petition, Hüseyin Faik implores the Grand Vizier for his release and requests his reemployment in a hospital near Istanbul to take care of his pregnant wife and three children, who were orphaned in Istanbul, if his resignation was not accepted.⁹⁴⁷

While Hüseyin Faik was under arrest in Istanbul, a certain Amelya petitioned to the Porte, demanding the release of his relative.⁹⁴⁸ In keeping with Tóth's observations, familial

⁹⁴³ BOA., TO. 437/47, 09 May 1861, 1.

⁹⁴⁴ "Mücrim-i 'azîm gibi üç zabita ve beş nefer çavuş terfîkân vapura nakl ve irsâl" Ibid., 1. For his personal signature and seal see Ibid., 2. Ten days prior to the petition on May 9 places his arrest on April 30, which comes just after the only interrogation protocol of Matthias at the Austrian consulate and the first interrogation of Jusztnián in Ruse.

⁹⁴⁵ "Zât-ı hazret-i ser-askeri ile dâr-ı şûra tarafından bu vech hakk-ı 'âcizânemde zâlimâne vaki' olan mu'âmeleden dolayı şimdi tekrâr protesto iderim ve kullarına şayed bir cürm-ü kabâhat isnâd olunduğu takdîrde muhâkemeye hazırım ve kabahatim muhakkak eylediği hâlde dahi hakk-ı 'âcizânemde tertib idecek cezâyâ razıyım. Emniyet-i zâtiyemi muhâfaza etmek için devlet-i 'aliyyeye iltica etmiş olduğum hâlde hakk-ı 'âcizânemde bu misillü mu'âmele-i nâsezânın (uygun olmayan) icrâsı tecviz buyurulamayacağı derkâr idüğünden" BOA., TO. 437/47, 09 May 1861, 1.

⁹⁴⁶ This tactic was also generic in interrogation protocols, where defendants used it to plead innocence, expressing their willingness to endure whatever punishment the court would place if proven guilty. Vakalis, *Tanzimat in the Province*, 50.

⁹⁴⁷ BOA., TO. 437/47, 09 May 1861, 1.

⁹⁴⁸ Yet neither the petition nor its substance is traceable. BOA., HR.MKT., 382/37, 21 Zilhicce 1277 (30 June 1861). There is another person named Amália Hebelt, who was the wife of a certain Iskender from the followers of Bem, yet it is not clear if she is the same person. Hermann et al, *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma*, 47.

ties were similarly invoked by the exiles in the empire when petitioning official authorities for release, just as they were in the Habsburg Empire, functioning as an effective lobby for amnesty, usually mobilized by elderly parents, wives, and children in the aftermath of the Revolutions of 1848. The concept of traditional family was a proof of responsible and loyal public attitude, appealing to the compassion from the magnanimous imperial authority.⁹⁴⁹

Amidst this sudden turmoil, he might have started experiencing financial difficulties, as we can trace a petition in which he requests the repayment of his debt from Brigadier Iskender Pasha on May 15.⁹⁵⁰ Sticking to the formulaic style in petitions calling for mercy, Hüseyin Faik complies with the legitimate government with hidden references to its ruling codes in general and his years of loyal service after taking refuge in particular, though his resignation in protest could be regarded rebellious at the same time.

It is not clear whether his efforts to find a common ground with the government did yield any result, yet the indirect evidence suggests that Hüseyin Faik could have returned to the capital for a short period of time. Even this compromise was not absolute; while the Porte considered Jusztenián to be a member of the seditious group (*fesede takımı*) and consequently deported him to Italy, his superior initially received a somewhat different treatment. The Porte ordered the Minister of War to utilize Hüseyin Faik if he had duly obtained a diploma that attested his profession and proved his skill in medicine. If he sought asylum in the generosity of the sultan *like other refugees*, he was to be "sent to Trabzon to be favored in the future when

⁹⁴⁹ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 7, 79, 83.

⁹⁵⁰ BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 352/77, 05 Zilkade 1277 (15 May 1861).

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something appropriate [for him] comes up."⁹⁵¹ Eventually, Hüseyin Faik was instructed to go to Erzurum on August 4.⁹⁵²

The preparations were underway to appoint Major Physician Panayot from Haydarpaşa Hospital as Hüseyin Faik's replacement, as the latter was thought to have already departed from the capital.⁹⁵³ However, it soon came to the attention of the officials that he was still wandering in the city, contrary to instructions.⁹⁵⁴ Hüseyin Faik seems to be sent to Trabzon only in mid-November. He was shortly thereafter dismissed from the army by the decision of the Supreme Military Council on the grounds that "it would not be permissible for him to be employed in the service of military medicine and therefore he would no longer be liable to the army," while his possible employment in Trabzon was left to the discretion of the serving governor.⁹⁵⁵ It is recorded in another document that "he could not be one of the physicians who had obtained a diploma, so he was dismissed from the service of military medicine and the record of his military rank was undone," and accordingly, the decision to send him abroad was finalized.⁹⁵⁶

It is stimulating to discuss why the issue of medical diploma was brought up all of a sudden even though he had been in the Ottoman service for more than a decade and his skills and knowledge as a physician had already been appreciated with the award of the Order of Mecidiye. One might speculate that the government preferred to forestall any negative

⁹⁵¹ "İleride münasip bir şey düşdüğe göre kayrılma üzere Trabzon'a irsalı" BOA., A.MKT.MHM, 229/54, 27 Muharrem 1278 (04 August 1861). The distinction between the ordinary refugee-convert and the refuge-convert who proved himself in a particular field of expertise, medicine in this case, reminds of the hierarchy of conversion that reflects the pragmatic aptitude of the politics of conversion in the late Ottoman Empire. Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 157. It is mysterious how Hüseyin Faik, who had written a petition from Trabzon, could have been sent back to Trabzon where he had possibly been imprisoned for about three months. Perhaps, he was sent to Trabzon two times with a period of time spent in Istanbul in the middle, unless we do not misread or misinterpret the documents at hand.

⁹⁵² BAO., HR.MKT. 391/18, 01 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (04 November 1861). I suppose that there must be a missing document that highlights the result of the investigation about whether he had a diploma, after which his transfer to Erzurum could have been issued.

⁹⁵³ BOA., A.MKT.MVL., 133/18, 28 Rebiülevvel 1278 (03 October 1861). BOA., İ.MVL., 453/20289, 20 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (25 September 1861).

⁹⁵⁴ BOA., HR.MKT., 391/18, 01 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (04 November 1861).

⁹⁵⁵ "hidmet-i tabâbet-i askeride istihdâmı caiz olmayacağı ve bu cihetle askere ta'allüku kalmayacağı derkâr olacağından" BOA., HR.MKT., 393/10, 27 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (30 November 1861).

⁹⁵⁶ "diploma ahz etmiş etibbâdan olamacağı cihetile hidmet-i tababet-i askeriyeden ihrac ve rütbe-i askeriyesi kaydı terkin" BOA., A.MKT.NZD, 385/60, 14 Cemâziyelâhir 1278 (17 December 1861), 1.

diplomatic reaction that could have arisen, had one of its own officers been understood to have taken part in revolutionary activities against Austria. This could indeed be the case, as it serves as a good example of the Ottomans' pragmatic stance, providing a diplomatically reassuring explanation. In this context, the issue was likely to serve as a pretext for the dismissal of Hüseyin Faik because he could have otherwise been invited, as usual in the transition period to modern medicine, to take the necessary exams to continue practicing his profession. Foreign-trained physicians seeking to practice in the empire had to pass a comprehensive equivalency examination in the Ottoman Imperial School of Medicine, regardless of their nationality. Their diplomas were validated after successful completion of the tests in key medical disciplines, including anatomy, obstetrics, internal medicine, surgery, and forensic medicine.⁹⁵⁷ Indeed, a series of regulations were being implemented to control, regulate, and centralize services for the sake of public health in both the capital and the countryside, which included monitoring whether physicians, apothecaries, midwives, and nurses held diplomas.⁹⁵⁸ It appears that Schneider was found to be without a diploma, but he was not given a second chance to prove his professional competence, at least according to the available documents. It was a great irony that while Schneider converted to Islam and began to work in the bureaucracy owing to the ongoing reform era in the early 1850s, and he repeatedly demanded justice several times during his stay in the empire, using the language of the same era, while the very principles that had regenerated him ironically worked against him about a decade later, leading to his smooth elimination again in line with the principles of the reform period.

⁹⁵⁷ Ceren Gülser İlkan-Rasimoğlu, "Boundaries, Education and Licence: The Nineteenth Century Ottoman Standardization of Medical Professions," *Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 19, no. 1 (June 2017): 232.

⁹⁵⁸ The first pharmacy act (*Nizamnâme-i Eczacıyan Der Memalik-i Osmaniye*) was enforced in 1852 and its revision in February 1861 led to the Municipal Pharmacy Act (*Beledi İspençiyarlık San'atının İcrasına Dair Nizamnâme*), which was followed by another act ("Memâlik-i Mahrusâ-i Şâhâne'de Tabâbet-i Belediye İcrasına Dâir Nizamnâme") in October 1861 to include articles about civil physicians. Türker, "Alternative Claims," 232, 244-245. Also see Ceren Gülser İlkan, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Sağlık Mesleklerinde Diploma Mecburiyeti," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 194 (February, 2010), 80.

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Hüseyin Faik was stripped of his military rank and official duty in December 1861. While under arrest at the police station where he had once been in charge, he petitioned in Turkish, with his own seal, to be released on bail.⁹⁵⁹ He requested that the necessary documents and tickets be provided for his family, servant, and himself since he was about to go abroad. He expressed to have been in a very dire financial situation (*açlıktan telef olacağım bedihi bulunmuş olmağın*) due to the fact that his per diem allowance had not been paid even though he had previously traveled to Trabzon and Cevizlik and his receivables had accumulated. In the same petition, he also wanted to be given a certificate (*şahadetname*) to practice his profession.⁹⁶⁰ Since this certificate used to give authorization to practice medicine for medical personnel at the time, his request may also attest that he could not present a diploma when asked. In response, according to a letter of the Field Marshall of Police, Abdülkerim Nâdir Pasha (1807-1883), he was allowed ten days of leave to carry out all these tasks.⁹⁶¹ At the end, Hüseyin Faik was deported to Italy after his seditious activities were found to be proven. A biographical entry adds that he stayed in the island of Corfu in 1861 before he lost "his property and rank because of a political impostor," but we could not find any trace of the alleged impostor or his exile in the island in Ottoman Archives.⁹⁶²

Even after his expulsion from the empire, Schneider is recorded to have kept his contact with the Ottoman bureaucracy and geography on various occasions. As far as archival records can trace, the first of these contacts took place on August 17, 1864. A day later, according to a request submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ottoman ambassador to Turin, Schneider, who had served in the Ottoman service for thirteen years under the name Hüseyin

⁹⁵⁹ But how and when he got back to the capital is not traceable. BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 385/60, 14 Cemazeyilahir 1278 (17 December 1861), 2. Although this document bears his seal, it is undated.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁶¹ Ibid. BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 386/62, 17 Cemâzeyilahir 1278 (20 December 1861). We cannot deduce from this document whether his debts were closed, yet a trace in the archive suggests an attempt to the end. BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 390/39, 05 Receb 1278 (06 January 1862).

⁹⁶² Hermann et al, *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma*, 67.

Faik Bey, had *somehow* lost his medals awarded to him for his participation in the battles of 1854 and 1856, and kindly requested that new ones be allocated to him.⁹⁶³ The phrase "somehow" has no fixed meaning to be ascribed in the context of Ottoman parlance, yet we can interpret that Rüstem Bey did not find the claim credible in this context. The envoy sent another dispatch to the Porte in April 1865, stating that Schneider "lost the medals that he carried on his way from Dersaadet to Italy."⁹⁶⁴ In the meantime, Schneider appears to have inquired several times about the latest updates regarding the issue of the awards by frequenting the embassy, where he was informed that a response from Istanbul had been awaited. Indeed, he reiterated his request on his last visit for at least one of the medals to be given to him, as he would soon be leaving Turin. Unfortunately, the available evidence does not provide a satisfactory clue about the way the Ottoman statesmen dealt with the issue. Nevertheless, it is certain that Schneider was residing in Turin, the capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia, at the time and was preparing to leave the city. This departure was planned to Constantinople, and perhaps Schneider needed the medals for a justification of his presence in the capital, given his exceptional comprehension concerning material symbols. The underlying motive for the departure is unknown, which could be related to the upcoming war against Austria, which would take place next year. In fact, it is written elsewhere that he joined the Hungarian Legion in Italy and later became a colonel physician during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, which led to the unification of Venetia with the Kingdom of Italy.⁹⁶⁵

Besides legitimacy, Schneider needed money for the trip to Istanbul. He appears in bureaucratic correspondence again in early 1865 when he demanded repayment of his receivables that he had lent to Edouard Blacque (1824-1895), the Ottoman council in Naples. Schneider claims that even though his debtor had given a letter of assurance, he did not receive

⁹⁶³ BOA., HR.TO., 102/23, 18 August 1864.

⁹⁶⁴ One is a General Service Medal (*Madalya-i Umûmi*) and one is an Order of Mecidiye. BOA., HR.TO., 102/60, 27 April 1865.

⁹⁶⁵ Hermann et al, *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma*, 67.

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the 2,500 piastres debt for almost twenty years despite all his efforts.⁹⁶⁶ Edouard was the son of Alexandre Blaque (1792-1836), who was invited to Constantinople by Sultan Mahmud II of the Ottoman Empire to publish the French version of the first official gazette, *Le Moniteur Ottoman*. Following the blueprints of his father, he had initiated a newspaper in 1845, *Courrier de Constantinople*, yet this enterprise turned out to be unprofitable, leaving him in debts for many years. When the refugee issue erupted in 1849, Edouard was residing in Constantinople. Suffering from financial hardships for a long time, he might have received this debt from Schneider one way or another, either personally in Vidin or through mediators in Istanbul.⁹⁶⁷

Schneider's departure from Turin was likely related to another episode of his life in the Ottoman capital, yet the details surrounding his latest presence remain unknown. No longer referred to as Hüseyin Faik in the relevant documents, Heimatlos Schneider (*bilâ tâbi*) submitted a complaint this time to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 7, 1865, regarding the mistreatment he had been exposed to. Accordingly, when the celebrations of the anniversary of the accession of Sultan Abdülaziz to the throne were held at the mansion of Grand Vizier Yusuf Kamil Pasha (1808-1876), Schneider was verbally insulted on his way to the event by a person named Monsieur Duran.⁹⁶⁸ In his petition, Schneider argues that he has managed to maintain his composure on the spot, though the same person taunted and harassed him two days later again with five or six men while Schneider was walking around with Ohannes Efendi and Monsieur Lori. They were accompanied by constables assigned to them from the police station at the suggestion of a person named Franko Efendi, which did not, however, prevent Schneider from being attacked with sticks. In the ensuing brawl, Schneider claims that he has defended himself, during which the officer accompanying him was injured

⁹⁶⁶ BOA., HR.TO., 447/9, 28 January 1865, 1.

⁹⁶⁷ I thank Anıl Göç, who kindly provided me with the details about Edouard Blaque.

⁹⁶⁸ Sultan Abdülmecid died at the end of June 1861.

in the arm.⁹⁶⁹ In another petition related to the issue, Schneider expresses that he has always acted in accordance with his duties and orders. Even though the Porte started to investigate the situation, he asked for Duruni's punishment to be pardoned.⁹⁷⁰

We do not yet know whether Schneider managed to collect his money from Blaque, nor is it unclear whether this debt issue had any relation to the ensuing altercation in Constantinople. However, it is safe to suggest that his unpaid receivables remained a persistent source of concern from the moment he set foot on Ottoman soil. His first appearance at the level of the Porte in this regard goes back to the years when he was residing in Aleppo, where he penned a letter to Grand Vizier Reşid Pasha on April 24, 1852. He claims that he lent money to Iskender Bey, from the entourage of the deceased Murad Pasha, two and a half years back in Vidin. According to the appeal, Iskender Bey provided a written assurance to repay his debt in a short period. The amount in question was ninety-two Hungarian gold coins, each worth fifty-six piastres. Although Hüseyin Faik wrote repetitive letters to Kaimmakam Iskender Bey, he received no reply and thereupon made attempts at the presence of the debtor's protector and even appealed directly to Serasker Mehmed Pasha later.⁹⁷¹ Iskender Bey's protector, Ömer Lütü Pasha (1806-1871), provided his opinion on the matter with a marginal note on a document sent from the Porte for an investigation on August 9, 1852. Accordingly, the alleged debtor asserts that Schneider has become indebted not to himself but rather to General Bem. The money was borrowed for the provision of the soldiers during the Hungarian revolution, Iskender Bey signed a letter of guarantee in the capacity of a member of the military staff (*erkân-ı harb*). In any case, Iskender puts forward that Bem informed him that the debt had

⁹⁶⁹ "Geçen hazîrânın yirmi sekizinci günü Ohannes efendi ve mösyö Loriyle berâber seyir yerinde bulunduğum hâlde merkûm Duruni beş altı nefer refikâsıyla kullarını tehdid etmişler ise de mukabeleden ictinâb ve Franko efendinin teklifi üzere karakolhânenen bir nefer zabtiye istishâb ile gider iken şahs-ı merkûm on nefer kadar rüfekâsıyla üzerine hücum iderek ellerinde bulunân değneklerle harb eylemeğe başladılar. Mümkün mertebe müdafa'ya kıyam eyledim ise de zevâli zabtiye neferinin eli kolu kullarına muhâfaza uğrunda mecrûh olmuştur." BOA., HR.TO., 447/34, 07 July 1865, 1.

⁹⁷⁰ BOA., HR. TR., 447/100, 30 December 1865.

⁹⁷¹ BOA., HR.TO., 417/28, 24 April 1852, 1. If one Hungarian gold was converted to five piastres in February 1850, according to one estimation, the amount does not seem to be a fortune.

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been closed. Since Murad Pasha had already died at the time, it was not possible to ask him to verify the allegations. However, as Hüseyin Faik still held the letter of guarantee, Ömer Pasha reasons, the debt had not been settled; in any case, Iskender refused to pay the claimed amount.⁹⁷² Since he could not get any results in this attempt, Hüseyin Faik decided to take the matter to the Porte when he was put under investigation in 1861, as we mentioned, claiming that Brigadier (*Mirliva*) Iskender Pasha had not paid his debt of 7,600 piastres.⁹⁷³

It is unclear whether Hüseyin Faik was eventually repaid upon his demands, though the implications of the issue of receivables and payables are worth discussing. First of all, we know that Hüseyin Faik lent money to the two figures since he demanded their repayment within the bureaucratic structures. There could be other cases where Hüseyin Faik lent or granted money that do not find expression in official documents, especially if transactions were uncontested. Thus, their nature could be broader than just a personal matter. Second, the location where the transaction between Hüseyin Faik and Iskender Bey occurred was Vidin, the first destination for Hungarian and Polish refugees seeking asylum in the empire. Also, the other transaction with Blaque likely took place in Vidin. The timing corresponds to the flow of the refugees in the city, but their prospects had yet to be reassuring. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the source of money at Hüseyin Faik's disposal in the Turkish Empire might have a political ramification. Indeed, İskender Pasha states that this indebtedness was for the provision of soldiers during the revolution. The total amount involved in the two cases exceeds 10,000 piastres, which was a significant sum, if not a fortune. To exemplify, a salary of 2,000 piastres was given to the colonel (*miralay*) and 1,000 piastres to the major (*binbaşı*) serving in the Zabtiye units at the time. In addition, they also received benefits in kind, such as food and

⁹⁷² BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 57/85, 07 Zilkade 1268 (23 August 1852). It is worth noting the way these figures deal with written documents instead of eyewitnesses.

⁹⁷³ BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 352/77, 05 Zilkade 1277 (15 May 1861).

clothing.⁹⁷⁴ Hüseyin Faik, however, was a physician serving within the police force at the rank of *kaimmakam*, rather than as a rank-and-file officer, which may have led to variations in his salary compared to this pay scale. In any case, we can assume that his debtors combined owed him an amount at least five times his monthly salary. The debt issues could have somehow been derived from his revolutionary activities, Hüseyin Faik was a revolutionary personality, whose influence was beyond borders. Alternatively, these embezzlement cases could simply be related to the presence of individuals who tried to take advantage of the difficulties others faced, or they were just simple borrowing disputes. It is worth questioning the source of Schneider's financial situation and to follow the loans he provided to the individuals.

Returning to his homeland after nearly twenty years of struggle marked by unimaginable ups and downs, Schneider was recorded as a member of the Budapest Honvéd Society in 1868. In his homeland, he was registered as a lieutenant-colonel physician, holder of the Hungarian Military Order of Merit 3rd Class. He died in 1897 as a retired Italian colonel physician.⁹⁷⁵

Despite the practical difficulties and rare evidence at hand, we have made a modest yet significant contribution to the biography of Antal Schneider (Hüseyin Faik), one of Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries who sought refuge and converted to Islam on Ottoman soil after the Hungarian War of Independence and later participated in the revolutionary wars in Italy. He seems to have been the head of a revolutionary organization, connected with the revolutionaries in different countries. Let us take a short glance at this organization.

3.5. The Garibaldi Squad as Told by a Confessor

⁹⁷⁴ Ali Sönmez, "Zaptiye Teşkilatının Düzenlenmesi (1840-1869)," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 25, no. 39 (May, 2006): 210.

⁹⁷⁵ Hermann et al, *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma*, 67. It seems that his being awarded with the Order of Mecidiye was skipped in this biography.

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The Porte assured the Austrian and Russian monarchies that it would prevent the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries from pursuing a political agenda against their domains during the refugee crisis in 1849. These assurances evolved into a long-term commitment, extending well into the 1860s, especially after the Treaty of Paris. As soon as Matthias testified before the Austrian council in Ruse, his disclosures were immediately forwarded to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, whereby Austria urgently called attention to the revolutionary committee operating on behalf of Garibaldi. The note underscored that Habsburg and Ottoman mutual interests were at stake due to the revolutionary activities in the Balkans and called for punitive actions against the "unacceptable" committee in the interest of both governments. Although the committee operated in the name of Garibaldi, its upper ranks were largely composed of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who had settled in Istanbul after the Revolutions of 1848, some of whom were even officers in the Ottoman service. Due to this connection, Austria complained that these seditionists were making use of Ottoman passports and money.⁹⁷⁶ The Ottoman attitude towards these revolutionaries became consistent with the transnational solidarity among the traditional empires. The interrogators did not confine their questions to the imperial level; while attempting to identify the network of the members and the places they connected to each other, the interrogators also sought to unfold their transnational revolutionary networks.

The revolutionary committee was variously referred to in the official correspondences of the Sublime State, often associating it with the most famous revolutionary figure at the time. In addition to the Dersaadet Committee (*Dersaadet Komitesi*), the Ottoman officials coined terms such as the "Garibaldi Squad" or "Garibaldi Brigade" (*Garibaldi Takımı*) and Garibaldi Society (*Garibaldi Cemiyeti*), though many of its members were composed of the Hungarian

⁹⁷⁶ BOA, HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

and Polish revolutionaries who had found asylum in Türkiye after the Revolutions of 1848.⁹⁷⁷ In his confession statement, on the other hand, Jusstinián revealed the name of the committee as Garibaldi's Sword of Glory (*Garibaldi'nin Şan Kılıncı*). It is unclear if it refers to the same organization, but a quite similar reference in an Italian source also appears as "Spada Fiammeggiante di un Eroe" (*Flaming Sword of a Hero*).⁹⁷⁸

Before elaborating on the organizational details of the committee, it is necessary to admit that evidence is too scarce to present a comprehensive picture until further evidence shows up. This section of the study will be only a partial sketch based on the existing evidence, leaving the last word for future studies. For one thing, the committee focused mainly on three geo-cultural domains: Central Europe through Hungary in the Habsburg Empire, Southern Europe through the Italian and Balkan connections, and the Middle East through the Ottoman Empire. Every aspect of the committee, therefore, arguably carries shades of this composition to varying degrees, including its organization, field of activity, membership, political identity and ideology, as well as its transnational alliances.

Disenchanted with Kossuth, Sándor Gál, seems to be the leader of the Italian wing of the committee in the port city of Naples, where Jusstinián became a member through Italian revolutionaries, such as certain Salvati and Dengeri, and was commissioned to go to Istanbul, where the contact person was Hüseyin Faik, whom Jusstinián described as his chief. The position of Pulszky is hard to determine at this point, as Jusstinián and Matthias revealed conflicting accounts about him: while the former denounces him, the latter claims to have met

⁹⁷⁷ Organizing under the name of Garibaldi was not unique feature to Hungarians and Poles in Constantinople. A similar example of solidarity could be observed in far-off regions as well. For instance, the 39th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment was known as the "Garibaldi Guards," although it was composed of individuals from various nationalities, including French, French Canadian, Spanish, Portuguese, Swiss, and German, with Garibaldi serving as the unifying symbol. István Kornél Vida, "The True Cause of Freedom: The Kossuth Emigration and the Hungarians' Participation in the American Civil War," (Phd Diss., University of Debrecen, 2008), 113. For Garibaldi's global fame see Lucy Riall, "Travel, Migration, Exile: Garibaldi's Global Fame," *Modern Italy* 19, no. 1 (2014), 41–52.

⁹⁷⁸ Fabio L. Grassi, "Garibaldi e Garibaldini a Costantinopoli e nell'Impero Ottomano: Conoscenze Attuali, Piste per Future Ricerche," in *Garibaldi: Cultura e Ideali. Atti del LXIII Congresso di Storia del Risorgimento* (Cagliari, 11-15 ottobre 2006), ed. Stefania Bonanni (Roma: Istituto Per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, 2008), 426.

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him in Naples before returning to Constantinople.⁹⁷⁹ Their diverging revelations could be related to Pulszky's undecisive politics, as we discussed in the previous chapter, he parted his way with Kossuth in early 1861 while simultaneously drawing closer to a Garibaldian position without becoming a staunch supporter. The third person that accompanied Jusstinián from Naples to Istanbul must be Major Sándor Károly Viola of Pécsváradi, who was possibly responsible for the operations in Hungary, as Matthias suggests that Viola was commissioned to revolutionize Hungary.⁹⁸⁰ At this point, the nature of the relationship between the different branches is not clear. Although Jusstinián mentions an "instruction" from Italy in his confessional interrogation, there is no conclusive evidence of a clear hierarchy among different groups. Revolutionary movements of that time were generally organized in a decentralized manner, even within a specific national context. In a transnational organization, especially when differences of opinion surged, it seems unlikely that centralist tendencies would prevail within the intra-group relations.

The Austrian envoy, in the aforementioned note, expressed his dissatisfaction with the inability of the Ottoman police to locate the gathering place of the Garibaldian organization.⁹⁸¹ As a rule, however, the Ottoman officials were quite preoccupied with resolving the way revolutionaries connected with each other than in delving into their underlying motives and ideologies.⁹⁸² Indeed, the interrogation protocols available to us include numerous questions about the specific places; where Jusstinián and Matthias spent the night in Giurgiu upon their arrival, which language the innkeeper spoke, where they were hosted in Ruse after crossing the river, where Jusstinián had spent time before coming to Istanbul, where he went upon arriving at Constantinople, whether he had stayed with his alleged father in the city, where he met and

⁹⁷⁹ As briefly mentioned in the story of Matthias, he could be a member of a rival group. It could also be possible that a division could happen in the meantime and Pulszky changed side.

⁹⁸⁰ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 6 May 1861, 3.

⁹⁸¹ Ibid., 1.

⁹⁸² Vakalis, "Tanzimat in the Province," 143-144

befriended with Matthias, why he was hosted by Hüseyin Faik, whether Matthias stayed with them, where Matthias lodged in Istanbul, where Jusztenián went after deserting the Habsburg army, where he met other people in the city, where he converted to Islam, and so forth.⁹⁸³ Needless to say, it was indispensable to ask, "when did you leave your homeland, and where did you travel? (*Memleketinden ne vakit çıktın ve nerelerde gezdin?*), a question one might come across in almost all interrogations. In return, the reader must already have recognized the spatial precision of the individual stories narrated in this chapter.⁹⁸⁴ Owing to the questioning officers who paid special attention to identifying public and private places the revolutionaries frequented and contacted each other, as they heavily relied on informal networks to get on with their activities, the stories at our disposal contain partial yet vivid references to the spatial dynamics in the revolutionary business in the Ottoman capital at the time.

Doubtless, private houses were the most secure places to exchange political ideas about dangerous topics, as well as to make new contacts. If Hüseyin Faik was the contact person of the committee in Istanbul, his house seems to be a quasi-headquarters of the related activities, given the frequency of the gatherings that took place there. Jusztenián was not only hosted at this residence for more than three months but also came into contact with several figures, including Colofon, Matthias, and Károly Viola, who were regular visitors of Hüseyin Faik. In addition, Jusztenián visited Colonel Tasler's house in the Pera District of Istanbul eight or ten times, where he contacted Fevzi (Kohlman) Pasha, who was then living in the Çengelköy

⁹⁸³ "Bu lokantanın sahibi hangi lisan üzere tekellüm ederdi?" "Rusçuk'a geldiğiniz vakitte olan gece hangi hanede misafir oldunuz?" BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3. "İstanbul'a gelinceye kadar nerelerde eğlendin?" "İstanbul'a gelince doğru nereye çıktın?" "Vilayetde iken pederin ile mekan eder midin?" "Nerede [...] görüşüp dost oldun idi?" "Bu Baron Tatay ile iptidaen Hüseyin Bey'in hanesinde de mi görüştün?" "Bu Hüseyin Bey ile [...] yatıp kalkmağa sebep ve münasebet nedir?" "Ortaköy'de sizin eve geldiği vakit gece dahi kalır midin?" "Merkum Baron Tatay [...] İstanbul'da nerede yatar mı?" "Sen Nemçede yüzbaşı olduğun halde ne vakit firar ettin ve nerelere gittin idi?" "her birile kaçır defa ve nerelere bulunup görüşülmüştür?" "Sen [...] nerede tebdil-i mezheble İslam oldun?" "Hazır bulunup ismi hatırında olmayan ve İslam'dan bulunan Macarlı necidir ve nerede ve ne hizmetle meşguldür?" BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861). These are just a selection of the questions about places in the interrogations under study.

⁹⁸⁴ Also, the stories of Bloşçò and Jabłoński have references to specific places and contacts, such as Maverdi Çorbacı, a Hungarian that accompanied Bloşçò at an inn, Yiğitbaşı Nikolay and Dirster, another Hungarian that sponsored Jabłoński.

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neighborhood of Üsküdar.⁹⁸⁵ Even though their paths diverged, Jusstinián also reports visiting the house of Count Karacsay in Bebek neighborhood. On the other hand, public places such as coffeehouses, taverns, restaurants, inns, and casinos were other venues to contact, especially if their owners were friendly to the cause. In an Italian coffeehouse in Pera, Jusstinián conversed with a Polish revolutionary called Miyüsinsky(?), who was running his own casino in the same district, where they also met once. If their owners were not friendly to the cause, however, the revolutionaries avoid those public places. For instance, there was one Austrian shopkeeper in the same district, whom the revolutionaries were suspected of spying for the benefit of the Habsburgs, given that the owner had been seen in contact with Austrian diplomats, so the revolutionaries newly arrived in the city were not advised to frequent there. Aside from these interactions, Jusstinián had casual conversations with some figures on the streets of Pera during encounters and socialized with others in the Beşiktaş district (İhlamur). Lastly, there are some other places that Jusstinián mentioned but whose relations to revolutionary activities are not obvious, yet the officials were still interested in learning their details in any way, such as London Restaurant, where he and Viola spent two nights as soon as they arrived in Istanbul from Naples, an inn run by a German-speaking keeper at the outskirts of Giurgiu, where he and Matthias spent a night on their way to Belgrade from Constanța, and Tırnova inn, where Jusstinián was betrayed by his companion just before his surrender in the mansion of the government in Ruse.⁹⁸⁶ All in all, these venues were undoubtedly important places where revolutionaries engaged in ideological debates, discussed current affairs, and form alliances, a context that also partly explains the origins of Jusstinián's political socialization, like many others.

⁹⁸⁵ For a short biography of Josef Kohlman see Hermann et al, *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma*, 57-59.

⁹⁸⁶ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3. BOA., A.M. 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

It is possible that coded phrases were used in the internal and transnational communications among the members of the organization. However, communication within the committee and with other political groups extended beyond public and private spaces; an informal network of communication and transportation parallel to formal structures was an equal necessity given the dangerous nature of the operations beyond borders and the untrustworthiness of formal channels, especially when they were under the influence of hostile states. As we recall, Jusztnián resolved that his earlier posts had been intercepted because he was never responded despite sending several letters via the French and Austrian postal services.⁹⁸⁷ Moreover, he requested the officials in Shumen to arrange his transfer to the capital on a British ship rather than an Austrian one to avoid potential dangers. Similar to the ownership of public places, therefore, the control of the transportation and mail services mattered for the members of the organization while pursuing their revolutionary agendas. From Naples, a message to Schneider relied on French postal service, though his letter was somehow intercepted. In the same letter, he was informed that a courier was on his way to hand him a passcode to collect his package, revealing another mode of communication that utilized young comrades as couriers.⁹⁸⁸ From Naples, indeed, Jusztnián was tasked in the first place with delivering proclamations to various centers. In Messina, he posted some to Malta, Piraeus, and Athens, while carrying the remainder himself to the Ottoman capital on a steamer.⁹⁸⁹ Later in Istanbul, he was commissioned to deliver three proclamations to the Serbian leaders in Belgrade to secure their support for the cause. As a result, the committee largely relied upon informal channels for communication to eschew hostile encounters, even possibly employing their own network of couriers. Through these individuals, private letters for communication and negotiation among the revolutionary leaders, journals and gazettes for propaganda

⁹⁸⁷ BOA., A.M. 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

⁹⁸⁸ BOA., HR.TO. 437/4, 14 August 1861, 1.

⁹⁸⁹ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

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purposes, instructions and messages for low-ranking members, proclamations and appeals for attracting larger audience were circulated across lands and seas. In this context, mobility was a crucial asset for the members of the committee. Owing to Hüseyin Faik, both Juszinián and Matthias (and possibly Viola) were able to obtain safe conducts from the Ottoman bureaucracy to provide a safe passage across the borders. Given that Hüseyin Faik was among the Hungarian and Polish 48ers who converted to Islam and became integrated into the political system as internal allies of the reformist rulers, he enjoyed the privilege to pursue his unofficial agenda, making use of official means. In other words, the members of this committee strategically navigated official structures, often leveraging international balances of power and playing one government against another.

Even though we do not know their rituals of acceptance and the oath, if there were any, how often the higher-ups got together, if such meetings took place, how the cells at lower ranks were organized, if they even existed, and the principles, rules, and regulations that the members had to stick to; the regular visitors of Hüseyin Faik can be considered at least sympathizers, if not members.⁹⁹⁰ As this study focuses primarily on the deeper ramifications symbolized through social realities, rather than the realities themselves, it is more important to consider these individuals as regular participants in a specific social circle. Accordingly, the majority of the foremost members were among those who sought asylum, converted to Islam, and become officials in the Sublime State, which was something the Austrian envoy complained about in his aforementioned diplomatic note. When asked about his knowledge of the committee members, Matthias reveals that he met Karacsay ("punished," in his words), Viola, and Captain Letkowsky in addition to several other Hungarians and Italians.⁹⁹¹ Along with the 48ers, including Antal Schneider (Hüseyin Faik), Fevzi (Kohlman), and Colonel Tasler, Juszinián

⁹⁹⁰ It is even questionable what makes a group of politicians a revolutionary committee and whether the committee in our case can be regarded as such, though it is clear that Juszinián repeatedly called it a committee.

⁹⁹¹ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 6 May 1861, 3.

also discloses the names of some non-Muslims in Constantinople, such as a Hungarian named Pap, a Greek individual, and another physician of non-Muslim origin.⁹⁹²

It is not clear whether the upper echelon of the organization adhered to a dress code that symbolized something related to the cause, unless the uniforms of the employees in the empire could be regarded as such, let alone if the rank and file were imposed on wearing a certain type of garment. Based on a report of a police informer in Pera, the Porte drew the attention of both the Field Marshall of Police and the Minister of War on May 5 to fifteen Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries passing through the capital with the intention of joining Garibaldi. They were not only wandering through Galata and Pera in their red shirts but had also placed a big-sized poster of Garibaldi, mounted on a wooden plate adorned with flowers, in the show window of a store in a bustling area, which seemingly gathered the public attention. In that sense, the display was regarded as a propaganda effort (*teşviş-i ezhân*) on behalf of Garibaldi, leading immediate instructions to arrest and deport the group to where they came from and to take down the picture.⁹⁹³

The committee relied on remittances collected from various locations to supply the necessary arms and munition for the liberation of Hungary, as well as to recruit new members for the cause. Jusstinián confesses that the proclamations he had spread to Athens, Piraeus, Malta, and Istanbul were intended to raise funds. When asked whether Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Wallachia, and Transylvania would financially contribute to the cause; he states that his incomplete trip to Belgrade was to request support from the Serbian rulers, no aid was expected from Romania, and he was unaware of anybody authorized to collect aid in other places. Additionally, he reveals that the committee raised funds in Italy, America, and England

⁹⁹² Unfortunately, I could not place the names of the last two individuals at this moment. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 05 August 1861 (28 Muharrem 1278), 3.

⁹⁹³ BOA., HR.MKT., 376/45, 24 Şevval 1277 (05 May 1861), 1-2.

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through its representatives. Asked whether Prussia and Denmark had any intention to provide financial support, Jusstinián replies that he did not know anything about such efforts.⁹⁹⁴

The ultimate aim of the committee was to liberate Hungary from the Habsburg Monarchy. Jusstinián expresses the intention of the committee in his words as follows:

The aim of this company is to procure the independence of Hungary and to appoint one of the princes of Italy as its king, while never recognizing the state of France, not but what not to unite with the men who wanted Prince Napoleon to be appointed king of Hungary and whose head of the company in Istanbul was Count Karacsay.⁹⁹⁵

The committee embarked on agitating through written proclamations to recruit new volunteers for the cause from the fugitives, exiles, vagrants, and the conscripts of the Habsburg Empire, with the goal of inciting an armed insurrection in Hungary.

And when we went to Belgrade, my aim was to see the Serbian leader, to maintain some money through him and to revolutionize Hungary by recruiting a fair number of soldiers from the fugitive Hungarians.⁹⁹⁶

The endeavor was not restricted to Hungary, the committee rather aspired to a far-reaching plot, including the Slavic populations in the Balkans, against the Austrian and Turkish empires. Matthias suggests that the committee pursued a rebellion of refugees (*muhacir isyanı*) in Serbia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria.⁹⁹⁷ Indeed, the leaflets that Justinian threw out the river back in Giurgiu were supposed to reach to Hungarian leaders in the Balkans for the unification of Serbia, Bosna, and Bulgaria. For this reason, Jusstinián's mission was to create revolutionary

⁹⁹⁴ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2. The question may seem irrelevant at first glance, given that Denmark and Prussia were politically and geographically too far from being involved with the underground activities in the Ottoman Empire. The reason for the question must be related to the Greek connections of the Garibaldians. After the German King of Greece abdicated his crown in 1862, his place was to be filled by Prince Wilhelm, the son of the King of Denmark. This ruler had extremist ambitions, such as to make Constantinople the capital of the Kingdom of Greece.

⁹⁹⁵ "bu kumpanyanın muradı Macaristan'ın serbestiği istihsâl ile İtalya beylerinden birini kral nasb etmek ve fakat Fransa devletini asla tanımayıp Prens Napolyon'un Macaristan'a kral nasb ettirmek emelinde bulunan ve İstanbul'da şirket başları Kont Karaçay olan adamlar ile birleşmemek." BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

⁹⁹⁶ "Ve âmâlım Belgrad'a gittiğimizde Sırbistan beyini görüp onun vasıtasıyla bir mikdar akça tedârik idüp oralarda bulunan firari Macarlılardan mürettip bir mikdar asker tedârik ile Macaristan'ı ihtilâl etmek için gitmek idi." BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 05 August 1861 (28 Muharrem 1278), 2.

⁹⁹⁷ BOA, HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

committees in the Balkans, in addition to extract financial support.⁹⁹⁸ According to Austrian intelligence, a certain Herr Dusan played a vital role in the establishment of this so-called "secret alliance" (*ittifâk-ı hafî*).⁹⁹⁹

Even though I would have liked to present a full-fledged monograph on this committee and its members, the available sources are not sufficient to nurture such a venture as of now. Rather, the purpose has to limit itself to be more sociological in nature, focusing on the circumstances of Hungarian and Polish revolutionary 48ers who converted to Islam in the Ottoman Empire. More specifically, it examines their revolutionary strategies, the identity shift they experienced, and political imaginaries they developed over time, as well as their survival strategies. These are the focus of the next section. The stories of Giuseppe Bloscò, Wiktor Jabłoński, Jusstinián Károly, and Antal Schneider offer a faint view of an underground political vision in piecemeal fashion, as well as the transnational revolutionary networks at the time.

⁹⁹⁸ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 05 August 1861 (28 Muharrem 1278), 2.

⁹⁹⁹ BOA, HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

Chapter 4

A Historical Sociology

In such difficult moments, when we feel that the ground is slipping away from under our feet and our hands stretch vainly upward, we reach instinctively for what we had not realized we knew or possessed. We are suddenly aware of the buried experience and habits of our forebears that we had not imagined lived on in us. In such moments, when it was necessary to flee from death and disgrace, and there was no way out anywhere, his forebears had found only one solution: Turkey.¹⁰⁰⁰

There are lessons to be drawn from the individual stories narrated in the previous chapter. To begin with, the stories of Giuseppe Bloscò, Wiktor Jabłoński, Jusztinián Károly, and Antal Schneider all together demonstrate that even though the refugee crisis had served the interests of the Sublime Porte both in domestic and foreign politics, those who sought asylum in the empire dialectically opened the door to future problems a little over a decade later. In this context, Bloscò and Jabłoński vividly invigorate two real-life stories of those Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries who had sought asylum on Ottoman soil in 1849 and decided to move to Italy in the spring of 1861. The stories of Jusztinián (Hüseyin Bey) and Schneider (Hüseyin Faik Bey) indicate that part of the followers of Murad Pasha (General Józef Bem) were still active in the revolutionary business on Ottoman soil, yet in their own ways. This was one of the legacies of the refugee crisis that carried into next decades, though it has not been acknowledged in the literature so far. Moreover, the latter case has more profound implications than the individual stories offer, in the sense that the allegory between Jusztinián and Schneider can be reinterpreted as Hüseyin the father and Hüseyin the son, representing the psyche of their respective generations of refugees and converts on Ottoman soil, larger communities they gave

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ivo Andrić, *Omer Pasha Latas: Marshal to the Sultan*, trans. Celia Hawkesworth (New York: New York Review Books, 2018), 132.

voice to, thereby offering metaphoric and metonymic lenses for broader sociological interpretations in terms of the transmission of a certain memories, skills, and experiences from one generation to another through informal networks and methods. Based on these observations, the dynamics that conditioned the emergence of a revolutionary tradition and the mechanisms of its reproduction, which also touch upon the *modus vivendi* of a revolutionary organization and the preservation of the inner-group solidarity within the larger community, can be discussed to lay the groundwork for understanding the identity traits of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers who converted to Islam in the Ottoman lands. Whether their revolutionary committee truly represents the political interests and aspirations of the entire convert community is debatable, the political discourse extracted from its confessor finds resonance within the larger textual universe and corresponds to the identity shift these revolutionary converts underwent for more than a decade in the empire. In other words, the significance of the real-life stories at hand stretches far beyond individual experiences, ad hoc instances, and accidental encounters; rather, it lies in the symbolic truth they convey, encapsulating collective experiences and deeper insights into broader social and cultural phenomena. Throughout the present chapter, indeed, references to testimonies, memoirs, travelogues, articles and scholarly works by fellow converts will complement and collectivize the individual narratives.¹⁰⁰¹

The individual narratives, on the other hand, exhibited strong transnational entanglements, traversing vast territories that extended beyond national and imperial boundaries of the nineteenth century. In macro level analysis, these connected the Ottoman geography with the international liberal-revolutionary network of the time, as well as the

¹⁰⁰¹ Including Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha (Konstanty Półkoźic-Borzęcki), Mehmed Sadık Pasha (Michał Czaykowski), Ármin Vámbéry (Reşid Bey), Magyar Dr. Abdullah Bey (Karl Eduard Hammerschmidt), Maximilian Eugen von Stein (Ferhad Pasha), Ismail Pasha (György Kmety), Władysław Kościelski (Sefer Pasha), Hayreddin (Karol Karski), Hurşid Pasha (Richard Guyon), Fevzi Pasha (Josef Kohlman), Iskender Bey (Gusztáv Adolf Frits), Hüseyin Faik (Antal Schneider), Selim Ağa (Lajos Tücköry), and Reşid Ağa (János Fiala).

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political, military, and diplomatic developments in Europe, especially in relation with the national unification phenomenon in Italy. In the micro level analysis, it is tempting to interpret how these displaced revolutionaries navigated the complex and often incompatible political interests and cultural values across vast domains, crossing so many ethnic, religious, national, and imperial divides. In other words, the geo-cultural context provided the social and political backgrounds, where the political identity and ideological discourses of the revolutionary-converts were shaped and reshaped through interactions across a broad range of geo-cultural domains, from Southern and Central Europe to the Near and the Middle East. The evolution of their identities in relation to different cultural contexts implies transformations, extending the focus of the evaluation beyond the point of intersection to the processes that may result from the intercrossing, as much with the authentic reconfigurations that stem from the intercrossed parties, in full agreement with the methodological premises of *histoire croisée*.¹⁰⁰² In that sense, the protagonists cultivated their selves through encountering with different sociopolitical contexts, given that identity was bound to negotiation within a concrete time and space. Circulation itself implicates "acts of creative appropriation."¹⁰⁰³ This study treats the question of the identity of the converts in line with the methods developed by historical sociology while incorporating daily concerns and interactions of the converts, constantly resulting from their new encounters in different geographies as they circulated, into the narrative on the grounds that identity is subject to a set of struggles in a constant process of definition and redefinition in response to every day realities because identity "has fluid and uncertain boundaries to the extent that daily social relationships are fluctuating and ambiguous."¹⁰⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰² Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (February 2006): 38.

¹⁰⁰³ Franz L. Fillafer "Empire of Circulation: Habsburg Knowledge in its Global Settings," Forthcoming in *Empire of Circulation: Habsburg Knowledge in its Global Settings*, edited by Franz L. Fillafer and Johannes Feictinger. London: Bloomsbury, 3. Manuscript shared by the author. I am grateful to Dr. Fillafer and Dr. Johannes Feictinger for sharing this volume.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Barrington Moore Jr, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 174, 486.

For students examining regional encounters of go-betweens, Pieter Judson recommends focusing on the particular settings that shaped "feelings of loyalty to nation, region, or empire" in individuals, rather than imposing pre-assigned identities on historical subjects, especially when they are in exile.¹⁰⁰⁵ While converging with wider geo-cultural regions, however, the political commitments of the converts gradually diverged from the existing mainstream nationalist genres, so much that they rendered the capital of the Ottoman Empire as a power base to counterpose their factional rivals settled in the classic revolutionary centers in Europe, at least until new options emerged. In this manner, their activities *alternatively* tied Hungarian, Polish, and Italian national movements of the 1860s *through* the Ottoman context, both in terms of their newly invented methods and objectives. Taken together, this chapter is an attempt to a historical sociology seeking to discuss the generational dynamics among Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts, their survival strategies and revolutionary tactics, their identity shift in a transnational setting, and the ideological discourses they promoted in line with fast-changing social and political environments, all imply historical change from the late 1840s to the early 1860s.

4.1. Two Generations of Refuge and Conversion¹⁰⁰⁶

Conversion must be regarded as a process rather than an instant transformation not only for selves but also for communities, which means that it must take some time to take roots in the collective memory of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers. Given that intergenerational

¹⁰⁰⁵ Pieter M. Judson, "Seeing the Habsburg monarchy as a global empire in an age of self-styled nation-states," *Geschichte und Region* 30, no. 1 (2021), 226.

¹⁰⁰⁶ The precedent of this section was first published in Turkish and later presented at the Turkologentag in Vienna, though the present version is the most mature one. For the previous version see İlkay Kirişçioğlu, "On sene sonra Macar mültecileri (1848-1851): İhtida ve ilticanın iki nesli?" *İçtimaiyat Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 6, no. 2 (2022): 507-521. İlkay Kirişçioğlu, "Hungarian and Polish Refugees (1848-1851) in the Ottoman Empire Over a Decade Later: A New Generation of Conversion," paper presented at *Turkologentag 2023: The Fourth European Convention on Turkic, Ottoman, and Turkish Studies*, Vienna, September 21, 2023.

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exchanges are central to the processes of remembering and forgetting for collectivities seeking a basis for identity, it is essential to investigate "the mechanisms through which societies change and reproduce themselves."¹⁰⁰⁷ The idea of transformation through generations necessarily calls for the examination of transfusion of accumulated knowledge, skills, and experience to place historical evolution within a cultural tradition.¹⁰⁰⁸ Yet the carriers matter as much as the carried. Inspired by Max Weber, Şerif Mardin points out in an interview that ideas do not come out of the blue, they require *carriers* to find us. "For this reason," he continues, "when you examine ideas, carriers need to be taken into account as well, it is necessary to analyze how carriers do that."¹⁰⁰⁹ Along with rituals, for opposition movements, informal social ties such as family, friendship, acquaintances, neighborhoods, and alike may productively help create and carry a distinctive set of experiences and knowledge that would evolve into a cultural tradition that gives the group its defining character. While sustaining an oppositional culture from one generation to another, interpersonal exchanges also establish the way solidarity is entrusted within factions in the pursuit of self-interest against rival groups, and the core sense of the culture is rooted in language, which is the central vehicle of transmission of perceptions and values and gives them a distinctive and recognizable shape. Addressing their own testimonies, the following analysis seeks to examine the patterns of informal practices transmitted between the two consecutive *generations* and migratory *flows* of Islamized Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries and converts (from the 1840s to the 1860s) to grasp their continual distinctiveness, based on the overlapping stories of two Hungarian

¹⁰⁰⁷ Leyla Neyzi, "Remembering to Forget: Sabbateanism, National Identity, and Subjectivity in Turkey," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 1 (2002): 139. Dennis Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 1.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Edward H. Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 150-151.

¹⁰⁰⁹ "Fikirler kendi başlarına gelip de bize vurmaz, bazı taşıyıcılar getirirler bu fikirleri. Onun için, fikirleri incelediğiniz zaman taşıyıcıları da inceleme lazım, taşıyıcıların bu işi nasıl yaptıklarını incelemek gerekir." Burcu Toksabay, "Şerif Mardin Sosyolojiden Tarihe Bakmak," in *Tarihsel Sosyoloji*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2016), 220.

revolutionaries, Jusztenián and Schneider, who sought refuge, converted, and adopted the same name in the empire, twelve years apart.¹⁰¹⁰

For analytical purposes, I metaphorically frame the relationship between Jusztenián and Schneider as one of a father-son. This depiction is not as arbitrary as it may seem at first glance, it was rather the young insurgent himself introduced his veteran chief as his father in his very first interview and then carefully sustained that representation until confessing otherwise once his inconsistent statements were revealed. It is still telling that he insists on associating himself with the Hüseyin Faik, despite revising his earlier testimony: "Even though he is not my father, he is like a father to me."¹⁰¹¹ According to this version of representation, Hüseyin Faik was a family friend back in Hungary. He welcomed Jusztenián into his house, saying, "you can come here and stay in my house like my son."¹⁰¹² There are also other reasons to treat Hüseyin Faik as a father figure, if not literally, given that he encouraged his stepson, so to say, to desert Austria, housed him in his residence in Istanbul, invited him to convert to Islam, handed him official papers, and financed his subsequent travels in the Balkans, not to mention that their converted names were the same: Hüseyin. This analogy merits to symbolize two consecutive generations of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who adopted Islam on the empire after the Revolutions of 1848. When the young revolutionary came to Constantinople to find his chief in the spring of 1861, the relationship between the two consecutive generations materialized, based on which five key observations can be made in what follows about the two generations of refuge and conversion inasmuch as this particular encounter could unfold.

¹⁰¹⁰ The generational perspective in this context not only implies a familial interpretation, with the children of the 48ers born in the Ottoman Empire, but also encompasses the subsequent migratory flow from Hungary in the 1860s, which was historically contingent upon the earlier exodus of the 48ers and driven primarily by political motives.

¹⁰¹¹ "Her ne kadar babam değilse de babam gibidir." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰¹² "Hüseyin Bey babamın ahabâbı olduğundan Ortaköy'de gidip buldum. Merhum dahi sen benim evlâdım gibi buraya gelip benim evimde oturabilirsin deyü söyledi." Ibid.

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4.1.1. Political Socialization: Ideological Conditioning and Indoctrination at Home

Polanyi believes that human behavior is shaped in concrete social frameworks imbued with belief systems and structural varieties.¹⁰¹³ No individuals—neither Jusstinián nor Schneider in the present case—are abstract creatures hanging isolated from society that have immense influences on the perceptions of its constituents. In the words of Carr:

Every human being at every stage of history or pre-history is born into a society and from his earliest years is moulded by that society. The language which he speaks is not an individual inheritance, but a social acquisition from the group in which he grows up. Both language and environment help to determine the character of his thought; his earliest ideas come to him from others. As has been well said, the individual apart from society would be both speechless and mindless.¹⁰¹⁴

Amidst the ups and downs of a series of political and social developments, the adolescent period of Jusstinián was prolific to observe one of the most prominent aspects of the relationship between his generation and the 48ers, one that was substantially ideological. Jusstinián was in his early twenties when he took shelter in the provincial center of the Ottoman Empire in Bulgaria not to fall into the hands of the hostile agents, suggesting that he was born roughly in the second half of the 1830s. He was an eyewitness to a great many events, first and foremost, the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49, during which the leadership of Lajos Kossuth was pivotal. Jusstinián witnessed first-hand how the freedom fighters could not but flee the country they fought for, while the remainders were subjected to bloody witch-hunts upon the restoration of order. He was too young to directly take part in the revolutionary skirmish, besides his testimony implies that he was conscripted into the Austrian army at an early age.¹⁰¹⁵ This duty was consistent with official policies in the post-revolutionary

¹⁰¹³ Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, "Beyond the Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi," in *Vision and Method of Historical Sociology*, ed. by Theda Skocpol (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 62.

¹⁰¹⁴ Carr, *What is History?* 36-37.

¹⁰¹⁵ "Nemçelilere yüzbaşı idim küçükten beri askerliğe hizmet ediyor idim." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

era, which obliged Hungarian youth to take up military service following the suppression of the revolution. These experiences in the turbulent years inflated political awareness in his conscience, even if he had been largely indifferent to politics earlier, and the souls of his generation would certainly bear the deep scars of the catastrophe. Indeed, the Springtime of Nations was one of the most commemorated historical events in Hungary, so much so that "generations of Hungarians have lived in the aura of that unforgettable year," asserts István Deák, "it unites the people as much as it divides them."¹⁰¹⁶ It is not clear where Jusstinián was caught in the invading armies of Russia and Austria, which could be Pest or Baranya, though another figure from his generation, Ármin Vámbéry (1832-1913), conveys his analogous experience as follows:

Two of these bloody scenes especially took deep root in my memory. One was the execution of Baron Mednyanszky, the commander of the little fortress of Leopoldstadt, taken by the Austrians, and of his adjutant, by name Gruber. Both were young, and, laughing and talking, they walked arm-in-arm to the scaffold. When I saw how those constables of the Camarilla treated the corpses of these martyrs for freedom, swinging them by the feet as they hung on the gallows, I was overcome by a strange feeling of revenge. I called the Slav soldiers several opprobrious names, and it would have gone hard with me had I not hurried away.¹⁰¹⁷

The disastrous outcome of the revolution proved defining for the generation that witnessed it firsthand, as the sense of suffering/miserableness is arguably the most potent emotional drive to unify a social group and forge a collective identity, *esprit de corps*, in return.¹⁰¹⁸ Nonetheless, it is crucial to make a distinction between the generation that took a leading role in the revolutionary events and the subsequent generation, which experienced the same events without active participation due to being too young. Those who took part in the

¹⁰¹⁶ Istvan Deak, *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), XIV.

¹⁰¹⁷ Arminius Vambery, *The Story of My Struggles: The Memoirs of Arminius Vambery* (London: Thomas, Nelson and Sons, 1909), 68-69

¹⁰¹⁸ François Georgeon, "Nesil Kavramı Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Kemalist Türkiye'ye Gelişi Anlamada Anahtar Olabilir Mi?" in *Tarihsel Sosyoloji: Stratejiler, Sorunsallar, Paradigmalar*, ed. Ferda Ergut and Ayşen Uysal (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2012), 83. 79–90.

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revolution were exiled, while their absence from home was a constant reminder to their communities left behind how the revolution failed and their relatives were persecuted.¹⁰¹⁹ The experiences of the 48ers, with all their merits and failures, left their traces on the political consciousness of the coming generation, who absorbed the revolution and internalized its collective memory, myths, and traumas through the lens of its consequences. These traces resonate with Jusztnián's interrogations, where he implicitly or explicitly refers to the experiences of the previous generation, which shaped his understanding of the political universe. His first allusion came in the first interview, when he lined himself up to the legacy of "Murad Pasha, whom they called General Bem," in his words, placing in the following interrogations in contrast to figures such as "Kossuth and Pulszky and others who were responsible for the earlier humiliation of Hungary."¹⁰²⁰ In the same way, he tries to convince the questioner that he had nothing to do with anti-Ottoman activities.

The Austrians insulted the Hungarians too much and even the Ottoman State did so many favors to the Hungarians by making some of them general and some of them colonel and it is known to the world that the Hungarians are entirely the enemies of the Austrians. How could it be possible that a Hungarian works for the benefit of the Austrians by forgetting all the favors of the Ottomans? If you think of me Austrian agent, do not think that way because a man does not want evil for the man who helped him. I am not involved with these matters.¹⁰²¹

These discourses were by no means spontaneous and self-generated. Jusztnián could have partly embodied the burden of the past events via the prevailing mood of his habitus, though the members of the previous generation deliberately inoculated him with its true meaning. Even though he personally witnessed the revolution, there is no way for him to know the specific instances he referred to without the mediation of others, such as how the revolutionaries from his compatriots became officers in the Turkish Empire. He could not have

¹⁰¹⁹ Heléna Tóth, *An Exiled Generation: German and Hungarian Refugees of Revolution, 1848-1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 18.

¹⁰²⁰ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰²¹ Ibid.

otherwise known the polarization between Kossuth and Bem that took place twelve years earlier and far away from his homeland, let alone have taken the side of the latter, who had already died a decade before the time of the interview. What is more, Jusztinián reports himself to have been recruited by the Austrian army before deserting, which makes it unlikely for him to have been exposed to the political notions there. Therefore, while the 48ers played a decisive role in shaping the mindset of the subsequent generation through their actions, their efforts to mobilize them in a specific direction yielded direct results in the language of their audience. Considering the repressive atmosphere of the time, the channels through which ideological interpellations reached Jusztinián and shaped his political views should primarily be informal and clandestine.

To have a better understanding of the informal networks and clandestine interactions that contributed to Jusztinián's political stance, it is necessary to reconstruct the sociopolitical influences of his childhood in Hungary, despite scarce evidence. Sufficient clues exist to get the impression that he was brought up in a highly politicized neighborhood in his hometown if his claim about Hüseyin Faik being a family friend was accurate, as the theoretical premise that parents are prone to see to it that their children adopt the values and moral judgments they perceive as right, making the relationship with parents formative in the emergence of a revolutionary personality.¹⁰²² In fact, ideological formation starts within the proper familial context, even before encountering with the larger social environment.¹⁰²³ In addition to his first-hand memory of the unforgettable year, the influence of his household and neighborhood was an important factor, among others, that led Jusztinián to defect from the army in the first place. It is tempting to picture that the child Jusztinián sitting with his family, listening as they read aloud the news and commentaries from *Pesti Hírlap* to stay informed about the reform

¹⁰²² For the role of parents and intergenerational transmission in the shaping of revolutionary personality, see Moore, *Injustice*, 111-112, 497.

¹⁰²³ Göran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1980), 43.

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politics that led to the revolutionary war. After all, the idea of disobedience itself stems from social interactions, as when candidates see someone else do that, they are able to relate and act in the same way.¹⁰²⁴ Grew exemplifies that any volunteer, in the case of the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, who left his home in the face of highly dangerous nature of crossing hostile borders, just as Jusztenián did, must be a convinced supporter of the revolutionary cause; what is more, at least one family member he left behind would have been as fervent as he was.¹⁰²⁵ Some of Jusztenián's family members may have been directly involved in the revolution and severely punished by the Habsburgs, as he put forward that the Austrian state executed and insulted his relatives, if he meant this literally.¹⁰²⁶ Moreover, he defected from the Austrian army to enlist as a volunteer in Italy for anti-Habsburg and anti-Bourbon forces, and joined Giuseppe Garibaldi's Red Shirts. The military campaign in Italy likely exposed him to another set of ideological foundations, which further radicalized his political worldview. By the spring 1861, he left Naples for Constantinople, where he spent three months socializing with the Hungarian and Polish exiles and converts, further enriching his ideological repertoire and deepening his heterodoxy in quite a different context. The common element in all these experiences across different geographies that conditioned his ideological tendencies was, of course, the influence of the previous generation of revolutionaries, yet this influence was more than abstract since it reflected the interpellations of certain political factions (the converts and the Garibaldians) against others (the elites of the revolutionary movement).

On theoretical and empirical bases, the revolutionary events from the late 1840s to the early 1860s left imprints on the psyche of the generation represented by Jusztenián, while revolutionaries of the previous generation, represented by Hüseyin Faik, played key roles in these events. While organizing and indoctrinating the next generation of revolutionaries in the

¹⁰²⁴ Moore, *Injustice*, 97.

¹⁰²⁵ Raymond Grew, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 178.

¹⁰²⁶ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

post-revolutionary era, the revolutionary exiles intersected with the new generation coming below. By the early 1860s, the relationship between these generations had come to mirror that of a teacher and student in terms of political ideology. Indeed, Juszinián's nuanced grasp of contemporary affairs as a young enthusiast was quite fascinating. This caught the attention of an interrogating officer, who asked him why he exhibited such extensive political discourse when it would have been sufficient to reveal his status.¹⁰²⁷ This communication underscores the efficacy of his ideological socialization in a specific direction, reminding that initiators of bold political actions often play a more important role in ideological mobilization than the theoreticians.¹⁰²⁸ The effectiveness was related to the effectiveness of the informal networks and clandestine interactions.

4.1.2. Informal Network of Cooperation: Political Action and Activism

In his days of asylum in the empire, Kossuth tasked Hungarian refugees with sending "a stimulating magnetic current home to their country, so that the nation should not languish under her sufferings." For him, the exiles had to forge a connecting link between the aspirations of their nation and the unfolding events on the world stage.¹⁰²⁹ Maintaining contact with the homeland, however, was certainly not a behavior unique to Hungarian émigrés. The Polish democrats also sought to reestablish their connections with Poland after the Revolutions of 1848.¹⁰³⁰ In a similar vein, the influence of the 48ers on the next generation of activists cannot be reduced solely to ideological socialization and indoctrination. In terms of concrete political actions and activism, young enthusiasts operated consistently under the guidance of their

¹⁰²⁷ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰²⁸ Therborn, *The Ideology of Power*, 119.

¹⁰²⁹ Louis Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, trans. Ferencz Jausz (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1880), ix.

¹⁰³⁰ Peter Brock, "Joseph Cowen and the Polish Exiles," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 32, no. 78 (December 1953): 55.

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predecessors all along their enterprise. To begin with, the refugees who rallied in the Ottoman Balkans at the end of the 1840s set a precedent for a subsequent wave of migration in the early 1860s.¹⁰³¹ Further to that, sources attest that Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers on Ottoman territories did not cut loose their informal contacts with their homelands in the following decade.¹⁰³² Neither did the Italian exiles. After coming to Istanbul, Cristina Trivulzio Belgiojoso (1808-1871) strove for the Italian cause and continued to closely follow the political developments in Europe, while preserving her contacts in the mainland.¹⁰³³

Through these contacts, the exiles channeled their efforts into smuggling and storing arms and munitions for the patriotic cause, circulating information and intelligence effectively over large territories, plotting alternative revolutionary intrigues, and recruiting sympathizers within the Habsburg and Tsarist domains in the 1850s and 1860s. As we may recall from the second chapter, the Hungarian and Italian exiles in Constantinople took up the task of mobilizing volunteers for the revolutionary wars that took place in Italy between 1859 and 1860. Indeed, several exiles who had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire were found under the commands of István Türr (1825-1908) and Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) in these wars. Moreover, archival evidence points to the attempts to persuade Polish soldiers in the Russian army to defect, particularly in the Crimean War (1853–1856), which provided the long-awaited conditions for the Poles, who were looking for a cooperation with the Circassians in the Caucasus.¹⁰³⁴ In a similar vein, Jusstinián's story illustrates how his desertion from the

¹⁰³¹ However, the precise scope and demographic magnitude of these movements remain elusive, given the fragmentary nature of extant archival records. In any case, it is possible to speak of a vast movement of political emigration flowing from Hungary, passing through Romania and Constantinople, and ultimately ending up in Italy in 1861. One researcher refers to this as about "il consistente flusso migratorio." Pasquale Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano e Questione Ungherese (1849–1867): Marcello Cerruti e le Intese Politiche Italo-Magiare* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1995), 159.

¹⁰³² References from Ottoman archives can be found about the communication between the Hungarian refugees in the empire and the revolutionaries in Hungary. To cite but one see BOA., HR.SYS., 1798/54, 1 December 1855. BOA., HR.MKT. 129/46, 29 Rebiülevvel 1272, (9 December 1855).

¹⁰³³ Emilj Consuelo Malara, "Tanzimat Reformları ve İtalyanlar (1838–1876)" (master's thesis, Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018), 59.

¹⁰³⁴ However, the precise mechanisms and scope of these operations remain understudied, necessitating further inquiry to fully elucidate the complexities. For a reference see Erdoğan Keleş, *Kırım Harbine Dâir Notlar*

Habsburg army was inextricably linked to the strategies of the Hungarian and Polish converts, whose activities obviously transgressed imperial borders and cultural norms despite their embeddedness in the Ottoman state structures. He states that his contact with Hüseyin Faik originated in Hungary, as they were both from the same town, and the two exchanged secret letters "every month or every two months" prior to his desertion.¹⁰³⁵

This mode of clandestine communication owed much to religious conversion of the previous generation of revolutionaries working for the Sublime State because correspondence through postal services carried the risk of attracting the interception of imperial authorities.¹⁰³⁶ Jusstinián was well aware of this risk, revealing in one of his interrogations that his correspondences were under the threat of official interception given their suspicious outlook. Alternatively, Hüseyin Faik's ability to leverage his position as an Ottoman officer to manage postal exchanges undoubtedly streamlined the covert activities. This unfolds a communicative strategy, implying that the 48ers utilized the institution of conversion to maintain their contacts in their distant homelands in the post-revolutionary era. In other words, despite changing their official religion and employment within the Ottoman bureaucracy, they did not burn their bridges in their countries of origin, as they were urged to do so upon conversion, thereby becoming unlicensed bridge between empires in its stead. It is striking that a Hungarian-born officer in the Austrian military (Jusstinián), was covertly encouraged to desert by a Hungarian émigré physician serving in the Turkish army (Schneider), through secret contacts afar. In essence, the converts exploited their dual identities to advance unofficial agendas within the formal structures of both the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, owing to the informal network

(Ankara: Atatürk Türk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 47. According to this source, there were 200 Polish deserters in the Caucasus at some point. According to Temizkan, there were 25,000-30,000 Polish soldiers serving in the Russian army in the Caucasus. Abdullah Temizkan, "19. Yüzyılda Çarlık Rusya'sının Kafkas Ordusu'nda Lehistanlılar," *Karadeniz Araştırmaları* 20 (2009): 74. Abdullah Temizkan, "Lehistanlıların İstanbul'da Lobi Faaliyetleri ve Kafkasya'ya Lejyon Gönderme Girişimleri," *Türklük Bilimi Araştırmaları* 28 (2010): 381.

¹⁰³⁵ "Kâh ayda kâh iki ayda bir vuk'u bulur idi." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰³⁶ "Çünkü ben Nemçe askeri fîrarisinden bulunduğum cihetle başka yerden mektup yazacak olsam açıp okurlar." Ibid.

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and institutions. After clarifying the conditions that led Jusstinián to act, his motivation for deserting Austria and joining the patriotic wars in southern Italy is articulated in his confession as follows:

Fifteen months ago, while residing in the city of Polende? near the Po River with my regiment as a lieutenant on active duty in the Austrian army, I left my regiment with the intention of joining the Italian soldiers, who had [already] fought against the Austrian state, because the Austrian state was not only malevolent to Hungary, which is my homeland, but also had executed our relatives and insulted our families a lot. To that end, I went to the agents appointed by Garibaldi in Genoa, joined the Italian soldiers with the rank of captain, and was employed in the battles that took place in Naples and Gaeta, and some other places. Upon the end of the war, I gave my resignation and came to the city of Naples.¹⁰³⁷

Talking about the execution and humiliation of his relatives, Jusstinián discloses his profoundly offended self on the one hand and gives enough evidence to make us think that his secret communication was decisive in his counter-mobilization on the other, as it was none other than Hüseyin Faik who seduced him to escape. "Upon the request of my father," replies Jusstinián to the question of whether his leaving from Austria and eventual arrival in Istanbul was upon his own will.¹⁰³⁸

Having deserted the army, he sought out Hungarian 48ers in Italy, since he had no idea where to go, yet they turned out to be unhelpful however, as narrated in the previous chapter. Soon after, Jusstinián took part in the war efforts against the Bourbon monarchy under the leadership of Garibaldi, the hero of the Defense of the Roman Republic in 1849. Sailed from Naples to Constantinople after the military campaign, Jusstinián was accompanied by Viola Sándor along the route. Their task was to transport revolutionary documents to the Hungarian

¹⁰³⁷ "Bundan on beş ay evvel Nemçe askerinin mülâzımlığından müstahdem ve Po Nehri civarında Polende nâm şehirde alayım ile ikamet ettiğim esnâda Avusturya devletinin zaten olan vatanım Macaristan'ın hayırhâhı olmadığından başka hısımlar ve akrabalarımıza pek çok hakaret etmiş olduğundan dolayı alayımı terk ile Nemçe devletinin aleyhine kıyam etmiş olan İtalya askerine dahil olmak emeliyle Cenova'da Garibaldi tarafından tayin olunan memurlara gidip yüzbaşılık rütbesi ile İtalya askerine dahil ve Napoli ve Gaeta vesair bazı mahallerde vuku bulan muharebede istihdâm olunduktan sonra gâilenin def'ile bende isti'fâmi verip Napoli şehrine geldim." BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861), 2.

¹⁰³⁸ "Pederim gel de seni Fransa'ya İtalya'ya götüreceğim deyü yazıp istemiş idi. Pederimin iş'arı üzerine geldim." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

and Polish 48ers in the Ottoman capital. Even if we aside for a moment the fact that Jusztenián was always under the guidance of the informal network of the 48ers throughout all these journeys and activities, his final duty points to another communication strategy within the transnational network of revolutionaries. Jusztenián assumed the role of a courier, posting some letters in Messina and then carrying some to Constantinople, where he transported a new set of proclamations to the Balkans himself.¹⁰³⁹

Upon landing in the capital, Jusztenián searched for Hüseyin Faik, who had encouraged him to leave Austria, and made his way to his home in the Ortaköy neighborhood, following the information in their secret letters.¹⁰⁴⁰ Later in the city, he cultivated connections in private houses and public spaces, which served as hubs that brought revolutionaries together across diverse ethnicities, generations, and ranks. While private properties were the safest places for interacting and making new contacts, the revolutionaries were more selective about the public places. Coffeehouses, restaurants, inns, and casinos served venues for socializing, provided their owners were friendly to the cause. Through these spaces, Jusztenián interacted with the informal networks of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries in the empire.

Having sense of the surety system (*kefil sistemi*) in the Ottoman Empire is helpful to better understand the informal networks. The system was practiced even at earlier times to tightly connect individuals with each other, holding the residents of each town and neighborhood accountable for each other, thereby ensuring control over the population.¹⁰⁴¹ Even though new tools of internal surveillance were introduced during the reform era, the

¹⁰³⁹ This mode of communication was not exclusive to the 48ers in the Ottoman Empire; similar practices can be traced in the underground activities in Italy. For example, a certain Kupa was personally entrusted with delivering a letter to Dunyov in Naples. Magda Jászay, *Il Risorgimento vissuto dagli ungheresi* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2000), 85. Undoubtedly, secret societies exploited Masonic lodges to circumvent state surveillance, and their relation to the revolutionary activities is a fine research topic, yet our research does not include these aspects for now. I am grateful to Roberto Motta Sosa for sharing me an excellent list of related studies in this respect.

¹⁰⁴⁰ "gelen mektuplarında dahi Ortaköy'de olduğunu yazar. Ondan geldiğim vakit doğru Ortaköy'e gidip buldum." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰⁴¹ Çadircı, Musa. *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 71.

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surety system persisted, continuing to emphasize the importance of individuals' social milieu in the eyes of the authorities while judging their innocence. In this context, the judiciary system in the nineteenth century was not only interested in the testimonies of the litigants but also their neighbors, relatives, friends, and other associates. Regardless of whether these individuals were eyewitnesses to a crime, their input was considered significant in evaluating the reputation of the defendants and plaintiffs within their communities.¹⁰⁴² This reasoning expounds why Jusstinián starts revealing "trustworthy" names during his second interrogation in Constantinople, aiming to clear himself of any suspicion being a secret agent: "If you suspect me of being a spy, ask the engineer pasha residing in Çengelköy, Fevzi Pasha, also inquire with Colonel Taschler Bey from Hungary in Beyoğlu and Hüseyin Bey in Ortaköy."¹⁰⁴³ Obviously, the questioning officers were deeply interested in these revelations, as the interrogation protocols aimed not only to extract a confession but also to collect additional evidence for the upcoming judicial processes.¹⁰⁴⁴ Whatever the strategies of the questioner and the questioned, we are informed indirectly of an intricate web of relationships through the related questions and answers in the interrogations of Jusstinián. Given that the three figures he mentions by name were all from the 48ers, two of whom were among the converts. Conversely, a noteworthy point is that, just as Jusstinián reveals trustworthy names, he also identifies individuals he does not consider reliable from the perspective of his own revolutionary network, possibly from a rival network—including Count Sándor Karacsay, Sándor Buda, János Pap, and so on. Jusstinián reports his meeting with Pap, who was running a coffeehouse in the city.¹⁰⁴⁵ However, once Jusstinián realized that Pap had showed a copy of the

¹⁰⁴² Ebru Aykut Türker, "Alternative Claims on Justice and Law: Rural Arson and Poison Murder in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2011), 93-94.

¹⁰⁴³ "beni casus gibi zan ediyor iseniz Çengelköyünde sakın mühendis Paşası Macarlı Feyzi Paşadan dahi sual edin ve Beyoğlunda Macarlı miralayı Taşler Beyden sual edin ve Ortaköy'deki Hüseyin Bey'den dahi sual edin." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰⁴⁴ Building on this reasoning, we hypothesize that the individuals mentioned might also have been interrogated. However, we have not yet come across any traces of such interrogations.

¹⁰⁴⁵ János Pap was the president of the Hungarian Association (January 1859-June 1861). György Csorba and Gábor Fodor, "İstanbul'daki Macarların Örgütlenmesinden Bir Örnek: İstanbul Macar Cemiyeti (1850-1961)," in

proclamations to Karacsay, who was "punished," he took back what remained of the proclamation Pap held.¹⁰⁴⁶

Apart from official positions, the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers were involved in a wide range of occupations in civilian life, including private doctors, pharmaceuticals, scholars, chemists, booksellers, tailors, firemen, charioteers, waiters, gamblers, bakers, interpreters, engineers, farmers, photographers, as well as coffeehouse and innkeepers.¹⁰⁴⁷ It is also likely that many individuals from these occupational groups were part of the informal networks of the exiles, leveraging opportunities and connections within their respective working areas. For example, the interrogation protocols of Bloscò and Jabłoński narrates how the exiles were heavily dependent on personal contacts, certain Hungarians in their cases, as guarantors (*kefil*), particularly for travelling, lodging, and finding employment.

Given the complex networks of informal ties and operations that sustained their political activities in the next decade, the refugees and converts in the Ottoman Empire did not simply vanish from the revolutionary arena after the defeat of cause in 1849. They quickly tended to their wounds in exile after the continental-wide debacles and embarked on new missions in cross-cutting geo-cultural settings, while maintaining contacts with those they left behind. Informal ties across the borders of empires ensured uninterrupted communication channels, while transnational networks of revolutionary organizations enabled them to cooperate against the common adversaries, such as the Habsburg and Tsarist regimes. Owing to these channels, the convert revolutionaries communicated across borders with strategic agility and recruited new members for the cause. They also leveraged both public and private

Osmanlı İstanbulu IX: Uluslararası Osmanlı İstanbulu Sempozyumu Bildirileri, ed. Feridun M. Emecen and Ali Akyıldız (İstanbul: İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi Yayınları İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş., 2024), 304.

¹⁰⁴⁶ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 05 August 1861 (28 Muharrem 1278), 2.

¹⁰⁴⁷ György Csorba, "Hungarians in Constantinople in the Mid-19th Century: Socio-Economic Background and Careers," in *Between Empires – Beyond Borders: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican Era through the Lens of the Köpe Family*, ed. Gabor Fodor (Budapest: Research Center for the Humanities, 2020), 71.

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avenues to forge new alliances, coordinate transnational operations, and secure logistical support, while exploiting their embedded roles within the new social and political setting.

4.1.3. Logistics: Housing, Providing, and Financing Newcomers

The 48ers in the Ottoman Empire played the role of social provider and local guide for the next generation of revolutionaries, travelers, and adventurers from their kins who were passing through the imperial territories in the years to come. Since these people were often unfamiliar with the bureaucratic and social working of the new environment, it was often the converts who first welcomed them. A passage from the travelogue of Vámbéry (Reşid Bey) gives some ideas about the way the newcomers were welcomed in the capital of the empire. First arrived in 1857, he was just twenty-five, and Constantinople was full of Hungarian refugees, "many of whom no doubt have fallen through the cracks of history."¹⁰⁴⁸ As he disembarked the ship at the Golden Horn, having travelled from Budapest via the Danube, Vámbéry encountered the Hungarian community in Istanbul thanks to a convert who recognized the visitor's ethnic belonging thanks to his distinctive hat.¹⁰⁴⁹ The person was among the revolutionaries who had fought in the Hungarian struggle for independence, fled to the empire, and participated in the Crimean War against Tsarist Russia. Owing to his mediation, Vámbéry stayed for a while at a place the community ushered without charging any sum.¹⁰⁵⁰

¹⁰⁴⁸ Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 171.

¹⁰⁴⁹ The emigrants who helped Vámbéry in Istanbul had already been aware of his journey from the Hungarian newspapers before his landing. Nándor Erik Kovács, "Hungarian Turkophiles in 19th Century Istanbul and Their Bequests in the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences," in *Osmanlı İstanbulu IV: IV. Uluslararası Osmanlı Sempozyumu Bildirileri, 20-22 Mayıs 2016*, ed., Feridun M. Emecen, Ali Akyıldız, and Emrah Safa Gürkan (Istanbul: İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016), 457.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Arminius Vámbéry, *Bir Sahte Dervişin Orta Asya Gezisi* [Travels in Central Asia], 7th ed., trans. Abdurrahman Samipaşazâde Abdülhalim (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2019), 29.

The general secretary of the Hungarian Association in the city, Ferecskay, hosted him in Tatavla, where the headquarters of the association was located.¹⁰⁵¹

Vámbéry was not the only one; it was a custom among the converts and refugees from the 48ers to logistically assist the younger souls on Ottoman soil. Hüseyin the father not only encouraged Hüseyin the son to break away from Austria but also opened the doors of his home to him in Constantinople. Schneider sheltered and assisted Jusstinián in his residence for ninety-five days until his novice departed for Belgrade: "He told me that you can come here and stay in my house like my son."¹⁰⁵² In any case, his stay in the city was entirely dependent on his godfather's discretion, even from the legal point of view, as those without guarantors were deported from the capital under the aforementioned surety system.¹⁰⁵³ Later, Jusstinián's and Colofon Matthias's mission in the Balkans was also financed by Schneider, as it was too expensive for young idealists to afford such adventures. Their financial assistance was not limited to indirect contributions, the converts also sponsored the newcomers to find jobs in the empire. To illustrate, Vámbéry relied on the sponsorship of Ismail Pasha (György Kmety) to find a job as a tutor in the residence of an Ottoman high official, Hüseyin Daim Pasha.¹⁰⁵⁴ These émigrés also leveraged impersonal bonds, particularly kinship networks, as a psychological support in exile, and even as an effective lobby group when their brethren facing judicial persecution.¹⁰⁵⁵ As seen, when Hüseyin Faik was detained, his family member petitioned to the Porte, evoking compassion from the authorities to get her relative released.

The efforts and considerations of the 48ers to ensure the settlement and sustenance of the new wave of fugitives, refugees, and adventurers of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian descents

¹⁰⁵¹ György Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49 in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Turks*, ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Turkey Publications, 2002), 4: 228.

¹⁰⁵² BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰⁵³ İlkay Yılmaz, "Conspiracy, International Police Cooperation, and the Fight Against Anarchism in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1878-1908," in *Age of Rogues: Rebels, Revolutionaries, and Racketeers at the Frontiers of Empires*, ed. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan and Alp Yenen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 224.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 171.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 7.

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who set foot on Ottoman territory extended beyond mere personal commitments. As early as the 1830s, the Polish opposition successfully established a settlement on Asiatic shore of Istanbul, aiming to provide solidarity and shelter for the incoming refugees. The exiles also furnished the Eastern Agency of the Hôtel Lambert to manage diplomatic activities in the Near East.¹⁰⁵⁶ Their projects likely served as a source of inspiration for the refugees from Hungary and Italy after the Revolutions of 1848. In his final letter from Vidin, Kossuth writes to the British ambassador to Constantinople, stressing the necessity of establishing a Hungarian colony in Türkiye, though the plan never materialized, perhaps due to the diplomatic pressures of Russia and Austria.¹⁰⁵⁷ Additionally, Belgiojoso also contemplated to bring the Italians together under a colony within the territories of the empire. Despite receiving support from the Sardinian envoy, her plan did not come to fruition.¹⁰⁵⁸ Likewise, Ludwik Adam Mierosławski (1814-1878) contemplated to relocate a Polish school in Dersaadet in 1862, as it was to be dismantled in Genoa, with the intention of spreading revolutionary activities in Poland. Accordingly, the management of the school were to be entrusted to Józef Wysocki (1809-1872), another 48er who found asylum in the empire.¹⁰⁵⁹ All these examples suggest that Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers in the empire took the initiative, or at least attempted, to institutionally house the incoming refugees, revolutionaries, and exiles from their respective countries based on revolutionary and solidarity purposes, lest the newcomers experience material difficulties and culture shock among other hazards. In their efforts, the close-knit social networks that connected the revolutionaries to one another and to their home countries provided material and emotional support in exile.¹⁰⁶⁰

¹⁰⁵⁶ Andrew A. Urbanik and Joseph O. Baylen, "Polish Exiles and the Turkish Empire, 1830–1876," *The Polish Review* 26, no. 3 (1981): 47.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Bayram Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016), 136. Also see Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49," 226.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Malara, "Tanzimat Reformları ve İtalyanlar," 59.

¹⁰⁵⁹ BOA., HR.TO., 439/8, 26 February 1862.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 8.

4.1.4. Spiritual Guidance: Conversion and Proselytization

The Hungarian and Polish 48ers acted as spiritual guides for the newcomers. Their relationship in this sense had a resemblance to a sheik-disciple one, bearing in mind that a mediator is essential for the conversion of new souls since there has to be somebody who introduces the candidates to the specific types of custom and procedures. In other words, the conversion process requires one believer who is willing to share the religious foundations (advocate) and another person who is willing to receive the message (novice).¹⁰⁶¹ Undoubtedly, the role of the 48ers was crucial in shaping the religious conversions of the consecutive generations of refugees and migrants. The interpersonal bonds (such as kinship and acquaintance) between members of the two generations served as a crucial hinge for the recruitment.¹⁰⁶² Thus, it is possible to talk about a chain of conversion that manifests itself when a convert becomes a converter consequently, "[r]eligious conversion efforts come in waves that are historically contingent," argues Baer.¹⁰⁶³

Even setting aside the spiritual aspect, it would have been impossible for later migrants to know the bureaucratic process required for conversion. Indeed, the Ottoman practice obliged the candidates to undertake a certain procedure, which figures like Jusztnián would no way know beforehand, to convert to Islam upon the declaration of the intention to switch, otherwise, conversion cases would not be recognized by the Sublime State. In the custody of Hüseyn Faik, Jusztnián was honored with the Islamic religion following a ceremony held at the

¹⁰⁶¹ Lewis Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 122.

¹⁰⁶² John Lofland and Norman Skonovd, "Conversion Motifs," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 20, no. 4 (1981): 379.

¹⁰⁶³ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford University Press, New York 2008), 15-16. "Although qualified by ideological interpellations," suggests Therborn, subjects also become qualified to "qualify" these in return, in the sense of specifying them and modifying their range of application." Therborn, *The Ideology of Power*, 17.

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residence of his godfather. He even adopted the same name, Hüseyin, in a way that imitated his spiritual father's example. The proceeding was completed in front of three Muslims as witnesses, one of whom was Hüseyin Faik himself, along with the butler of the residence (a Hungarian convert called Hasan) and another Hungarian convert whose name Juszinián could not remember.¹⁰⁶⁴ Furthermore, Matthias followed the same pattern with the assistance of Hüseyin Faik, as a result of which his name became Mehmed Ali.¹⁰⁶⁵ This likely repeated in the case of Viola, whose name turned to Ismail.

These examples imply that the 48ers occasionally assumed the role of proselytizers for the next generation of Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries in the 1860s. In this way, the generations of Hüseyin Faik and Juszinián were also linked to each other through the institution of conversion, with their conversions being historically contingent. As a matter of fact, conversion and proselytization activities typically gain momentum under specific historical conditions, particularly when crises prevail in the economic, political, and social environment.¹⁰⁶⁶ Neither Schneider's generation nor Juszinián's would have felt any urge to convert, nor would they have spread their new religion, had the political turmoil in their homeland not heightened the likelihood of religious change. Their conversions to Islam took place at the time of wars, with both instances happening a decade apart, aligning with the developments in Europe. One's spontaneous conversion turned out to offer new prospects for the resistance. Once realized, conversion secured a level of autonomy and an opportunity to accumulate sufficient force for the adherents to take revenge when the time comes.

4.1.5. Bureaucratic Amenities: Unexpected Gains

¹⁰⁶⁴ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰⁶⁵ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Baer, *Honored*, 18.

Jusztinián required a sponsor to convert in the Ottoman capital. He also had to be guided through the related bureaucratic procedures mentioned, such as the ceremony before judicial-religious authorities and witnesses, since he had no prior experience or knowledge about the working of the bureaucracy at large. In this context, the 48ers served as mediators between the bureaucratic institutions of the Tanzimat era and the next generation of refugees, owing to their knowledge and experience within the state apparatus, to which they had secured access upon their employment around a decade ago.

Conversion was one of the bureaucratic practices for which one generation required the assistance of the other, yet the institution of conversion turned out to be a way for revolutionaries to open new spheres of action, access fresh opportunities, and transcend psychological boundaries because conversion within the domains of the empire automatically conferred subjecthood to the Sultan, according to Ottoman canon. The ability of the 48ers to grant subjecthood to their henchmen was unique in this sense even though it remains perplexing why these people voluntarily resorted to this subjecthood by adopting Islam at a time when the empire's markets were opening to the outside world, diminishing the "value" of Ottoman identity vis-à-vis European ones.¹⁰⁶⁷

To begin with, obtaining subjecthood at times offered the followers the opportunity to get employed in the bureaucracy and army, as the forerunners had done a decade earlier. The mediation of the mentors in this sense was crucial in securing employment within the imperial structures, thanks to their know-how and networks. In his memoirs, Mehmed Sadık Pasha (Michał Czaykowski) reveals that he was able to provide Polish converts with access to the civil service.¹⁰⁶⁸ Considering that the traditional patron-client relationships within the imperial

¹⁰⁶⁷ Indeed, merchants among the empire's subjects were seeking foreign passports to exploit the opportunities presented by the great powers, which had secured trade agreements granting extraterritorial privileges. Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar* 20th Edition (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 32-35.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Gülnar Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından Çaykovski Mehmet Sadık Paşa'nın Osmanlı Anıları* (Konya: Kömen Yayınları, 2016), 153.

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structures took on new ideological dimensions during the reform era, the influence of the 48ers was largely derived from the factions to which they were attached within the expanding and evolving state structures, while new members they helped to integrate into the system were valuable assets for their networks in return. In that respect, the interaction between these two generations sounds like a patron-client relationship, a system of relations articulated through the Ottoman administration, where such dynamics within the bureaucratic ranks had been endemic.

Obtaining foreign passports in the midst of the great power competition was a common stratagem among the revolutionary circles of the nineteenth century, enabling exiles to escape the harassment of target states and circulate across broader geographies with greater freedom. Gaining (proto-)citizenship through conversion on Ottoman soil was a practical way for the revolutionaries to obtain official papers from the imperial administration, as Juszinián and Matthias achieved to do so with the mediation of Hüseyin Faik. Before heading to Belgrade for undercover work, Juszinián was furnished with a safe conduct (*mürûr tezkiresi*), which also functioned as a passport at the time, to carry out his duty in the Balkans without interference from Austrian surveillance.¹⁰⁶⁹ Shortly before his journey with Matthias, Juszinián asked his patron for the document, in his words, "I kindly requested it from Hüseyin Bey to freely go to Belgrade and get back without being harassed by the Austrians. He got me an Ottoman certificate that calls me Hüseyin Bey."¹⁰⁷⁰ Matthias also confirms in his separate interrogation in the Austrian consulate that he got the same type of document, on which his name appeared

¹⁰⁶⁹ It is important to note that neither passports in the modern sense of the word nor citizenship status was introduced at the time. The Passport Office Regulation (*Pasaport Odası Nizamnâmesi*) was introduced in 1867. Besides, the Internal Passport Regulation (*Pasaport Nizamnâmesi*) was promoted in 1887. The Ottoman Law of Citizenship (*Tâbiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunu*) was introduced in the 1869. Not until 1885 the practice of obligatory identity paper was enforced for all the Ottoman citizens. The only *mürûr tezkiresi* at our hands contains information about the passenger's citizenship/subjecthood status, identity (name and father's name), destination, physical description (including age, height, hair, beard, and eye color), and sponsor, along with the date of issue.

¹⁰⁷⁰ "Belgrad'a gidip gelinceye kadar Nemçeli tarafından bana ilişilmemek ve rahatça gidip gelmek için yine Hüseyin Bey'e rica ettim. O dahi bana Hüseyin Bey deyü bir Osmanlı tezkiresi alırdı." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

as Mehmed Ali, through one of the members of the committee, a colonel working for the Ottoman army in the capital, without directly mentioning Hüseyin Faik's name.¹⁰⁷¹

Jusztinián and Matthias were required to have safe conducts for their movement, yet its issuance involved a bureaucratic procedure, which (again) entailed two sponsors. First, those Ottoman subjects intending to leave Istanbul needed to visit the neighborhood mukhtar or guild steward (*esnaf kethüdası*) for having a sealed envelope. Then, they had to provide a health report and apply to the municipality in the capital (*şehremâneti*).¹⁰⁷² However, Jusztinián and Matthias had no way of knowing the specific requirements, managing the paperwork, and overcoming the necessary procedure; their sponsors and guides were essential through these phases. If their sponsors had good connections within the related public offices, the procedure could become much smoother and quicker. As Hüseyin Faik was working at the police headquarters (*Bâb-ı Zabtiye*) in the capital, his official position enabled him to provide safe conducts more easily to the members of his committee, considering that one of the functions of the police was to issue safe conducts.¹⁰⁷³ In addition, the municipality in the capital was another avenue, where the foreigners in general were highly active and held a certain degree of local autonomy and control over the provisions.¹⁰⁷⁴ The converts had connections also in the municipality, which also played a role in issuing safe conducts, indeed, the city council resigned in April 1861, curiously coinciding with the height of the activities of the Hungarian,

¹⁰⁷¹ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 6 May 1861, 3.

¹⁰⁷² It was actually *İhtisap Ministry* that the travelers had to address to according to the regulation of 1841, yet the municipality assumed this duty after 1854. Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Çıkarılan Men-i Mürûr ve Pasaport Nizâmnâmeleri," *Belgeler* 15, no. 19 (1993): 172.

¹⁰⁷³ According to the regulation of the Police Assembly (*Polis Meclisi*) in 1845, it was one of the duties of this assembly to issue safe conducts. Even though the assembly had already been dissolved by 1861, we may assume that the related police organization was still authorized with the same task. Ali Sönmez, "Polis Meclisinin Kuruluşu Ve Kaldırılışı (1845-1850)," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 24, no. 37 (2005): 263.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Steven Rosenthal, "Foreigners and Municipal Reform in Istanbul: 1855–1865," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 2 (April 1980): 235–236. In one of the questions in the interrogation of Justinian, the questioner says that "Şehremanetinden size verilmiş olan mürûr tezkerelerinden ilmühaberini şehremanetinden getirttik." Because for those who were granted this document also an ilmühaber in their place of residence was arranged. Mehmet Demirtaş, "XIX. Yüzyılda İstanbul'a Göçü Önlemek İçin Alınan Tedbirler: Men-i Mürûr Uygulaması Ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler," *Belleten* 73, no. 268 (Aralık 2009): 751.

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Polish, and Italian revolutionaries.¹⁰⁷⁵ Maximilian Eugen von Stein (Ferhad Pasha) was one of the participant of the municipal reform in Constantinople as being member of the Commission for the Regulation of the City (*İntizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu*), an advisory board entrusted to a member of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinance (*Meclis-i Vâlâ-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*), Emin Muhlis Efendi.¹⁰⁷⁶

There is a slight difference that has to be emphasized with this sophisticated operation; religious conversion was not a prerequisite for having a safe conduct, all travelers entering, exiting, or transiting the empire were required to carry such documentation, irrespective of their citizenship and religious statuses. The ulterior motive of the revolutionary converts was rather to ensure that these documents included Muslim credentials, which could be crucial in emergencies. As we recall from the previous chapter, once the Austrian consul in Ruse tried to take Jusstinián prisoner, the young revolutionary presented his travel document to assert his subjecthood to the Sultan, as the consul had to prove that Jusstinián was in fact an Austrian subject.¹⁰⁷⁷ This explains why even though the young revolutionary had arrived in Constantinople from Naples with a Sardinian passport, he waived this passport in favor of the Ottoman subjecthood.¹⁰⁷⁸ Having naturalized as subjects of the Sublime State, Matthias and Viola could also wander in the Balkans, which raised significant concerns for Austria.¹⁰⁷⁹

What is more, the safe conduct as a document was primarily instituted to maintain public order in response to the potential threat of public disorder following the dissolution of the Janissary corps in 1826. The regulation placed a special emphasis on preventing the influx of vagrants into the capital, in addition to underlining the necessity of registering the residents

¹⁰⁷⁵ A new city council was established on May 10, 1861. Rosenthal, "Foreigners and Municipal," 239.

¹⁰⁷⁶ It was an advisory body to advance the municipality reform in Istanbul. Rosenthal, "Foreigners and Municipal," 231. For the involvement of Stein see Ibid., 232.

¹⁰⁷⁷ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid. What he omits in his own testimony is that being an Ottoman subject did not comply with holding other citizenships.

¹⁰⁷⁹ The story of Vámbéry further equally illustrates how the wider public exploited the fractures within the existing institutions for personal ends, as he traveled with the name Reşid Efendi to travel freely.

of Istanbul.¹⁰⁸⁰ In effect, it aimed to effectively control mobility, ensuring security and stability during a period of staggering military and administrative transformation. In this sense, *mürûr tezkeresi* was part of the surveillance system, providing a document-based mobility control regime, to restrict and monitor mobility within the empire. Following the footsteps of this regulation, the *Men'i Mürûr Nizamnâmesi* (1841) was introduced during the Tanzimat era to place domestic and international mobility under the jurisdiction of the central state, while the document itself distinguished legitimate mobility (i.e., trade, labor, and pilgrimage) from illegitimate activities (i.e., banditry, smuggling, and vagrancy).¹⁰⁸¹ It is compelling to observe that, even though the system was designed to permit travel only for individuals with legitimate reasons, which did not include revolutionary mobility, the converts managed to bypass the imposed intention. In other words, the Ottoman surveillance regime, originally aimed to restrict internal mobility, paradoxically facilitated undesired transnational mobility. This unintended consequence not only intensified the circulation of revolutionaries across wider regions but also enhanced communication of the convert revolutionaries with the revolutionary groups and potential allies in Europe. The revolutionary converts were, therefore, able to integrate their anti-systemic activities into the international system through operating within the Ottoman imperial framework without directly confronting its authority. Through this dual engagement, the empire did not only provide their repertoire with means of mobility but also inadvertently conferred them a degree of legitimacy. While adopting their political roles in one imperial setting to undermine another, these figures blurred the lines between institutional conformity and revolutionary resistance at a trans-imperial scale, reflecting how the Tanzimat era prompted complex dynamics in which former insurgents converted into legitimate agents at

¹⁰⁸⁰ İhtisap Ağalığı was the traditional regulatory body. Nalan Turna, "Osmanlı İstanbulu'nda İç Pasaport: Mürûr Tezkeresi," in *Osmanlı İstanbul'u: II. Uluslararası Osmanlı İstanbulu Sempozyumu (27-29 Mayıs 2014) Bildirileri Kitabı*, ed. Feridun M. Emecen, Ali Akyıldız, and Emrah Sefa Gürkan (İstanbul: İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2014), 393.

¹⁰⁸¹ David Gutman, "Travel Documents, Mobility Control, and the Ottoman State in an Age of Global Migration, 1880–1915," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 3, no. 2 (November 2016): 350-351.

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home but with insurgent agendas abroad.¹⁰⁸² Strangely, the practice gave the revolutionaries to act as if the protégés of the Porte without its knowledge, so much so that one author suggests that this engagement placed the revolutionary efforts of the Poles who embraced Islam under the protection of the Ottomans.¹⁰⁸³ In return, these activities had an echo in Habsburg diplomatic complaints about the revolutionary activities under the auspices of the Ottoman state:

On behalf of Garibaldi, [the committee] which turns out to be composed mostly of officers and other people in the service of Sublime State, as anyone knows, in Dersaadet [...] organizes a great rebellion and internal insurrection by acquiring and giving Ottoman passports and money.¹⁰⁸⁴

This quote suggests that some senior converts on active service did not fail to misuse the bureaucratic power at their disposal to assist their comrades, defying the wishes of their superiors. In stark contrast, the revolutionaries also tried to capitalize on the institutional sanction of the empire to get organized, albeit with the consent of the imperial center this time. The Polish revolutionaries negotiated imperial approval to establish military units, like the Cossack Cavalry Legions, within the Ottoman army during the Crimean War to fight against their archenemy, Russia. These legions were formed under the commands of Mehmed Sadık Pasha and Władysław Zamoyski, but *separately*, while the former held a higher rank than the

¹⁰⁸² The reflection of a passport fraudster in the records, occurring simultaneously with revolutionary developments in Italy, serves as a reminder that, alongside obtaining travel permits through religious conversion, there could be other ways to enhance mobility for the revolutionary cause. Accordingly, a certain Hungarian named Kun, was reported to have issued false passports to various people in Galata. As anybody might expect, the Austrian embassy requested the eviction of his residence. BOA., A.MKT.NZD., 412/87, 17 Şevval 1278 (17 Nisan 1862).

¹⁰⁸³ Lucyna Antonowicz-Bauer, *Polonezköyü Adampol*, trans, Yeşim Santepe (Istanbul: Çelik Gülersoy Vakfı İstanbul Kütüphanesi, 1990), 14.

¹⁰⁸⁴ "meğer nefis-i Der-saâdetde olarak ve herkesin ma'lûmu olduğu hâlde ekser-i âzâsı Devlet-i Aliyye hidmetinde bulunan zâbâtân eşhas-ı sâireden mürekkep Garibaldi nâmına olan komite Osmanlı pasaportları ve akçaları tedârik ve i'tâ ile 'alenen isyân ve ihtilâl-i dâhili tertip ve teşkil etmektedirler." BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 1.

latter.¹⁰⁸⁵ These efforts exemplified how anti-imperial agendas could be advanced through both subterfuge and sanctioned collaboration with the Porte.¹⁰⁸⁶

4.1.6. Hierarchy

In a letter to Kossuth, Ferenc Pulszky wrote that the generation born in the 1830s was timid, subservient, and not patriotic enough: "New talents have not arisen, perhaps because they have no opportunity to distinguish themselves."¹⁰⁸⁷ More than what message this statement literally conveyed, it can be read as a claim for power over others. The last dimension of the relationship between the two generations, embodied respectively by Hüseyin Faik and Jusztinián, comes to the fore with its subordinate-superior nature. The former was the leader and contact person of a revolutionary committee in Constantinople, not to mention that his residence was a gathering place for the organization in the light of the testimonies at hand, while the latter was subordinated to him within the same hierarchy. Embedded in the relationship between the two succeeding generations, the asymmetry encapsulates, in fact, other observations (already discussed) since their relationship was paternal (by the 1860s), as all our metaphorical archetypes (father-son, teacher-student, sheikh-disciple, patron-client, and subordinate-superior) perfectly imply. In our specific case, uprooted from his country of origin and subsequently ended up in a completely unfamiliar environment, a young fugitive like Jusztinián, at any rate, would not be expected to be in a more secure position vis-à-vis his host,

¹⁰⁸⁵ J. A. Teslar, "Unpublished Letters of Adam Czartoryski and Władysław Zamoyski to Lord Dudley C. Stuart and the Earl of Harrowby, 1832-1861," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 29, no. 72 (Dec. 1950): 160. Even though the Hungarians also contemplated the same, their plan lagged behind, no Hungarian unit was formed hence. Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants of 1848-49," 227.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Dobriski and Petrev, mentioned in the previous chapter, also held positions of critical importance in terms of communication. Employed in telegraph office in Ruse, they were later transferred to Edirne amidst the suspicious mobility of the Hungarian and Polish refugees in the Balkans in 1861. While it remains unclear whether their displacement was directly related to their position or involvement in the revolutionary activities, but the administrative conduct was meaningful in its specific historical context.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 407.

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especially considering the uncertainties for most of the no-name revolutionaries from his generation. The unevenness in their interactions makes itself evident in every single instance where the two protagonists were involved, and thus it is necessary to discuss not only the origins of this power relation but also its consequences.

The Forty-Eighters were all charismatic figures, even those whose presence in historical records remained in the background, such as Schneider. Their life-stories went public in the decade following the revolutionary wave, driven by the public's appetite for entertainment, particularly in Great Britain and the United States.¹⁰⁸⁸ The authority of the revolutionary "fathers," a good deal of them were pronounced as such in their own lifetime, derived from a confluence of factors: age and experience, military ranks and honors, extensive networks and alliances across countries, access to logistical and financial resources, as well as organizational and strategic capabilities built over many years of revolutionary activities. Despite their comprehensive failures in the Revolutions of 1848, this generation exhibited remarkable resilience. Most of them quickly regained their footing after a brief period of disorientation, taking matters into their own hands and undertaking renewed missions to reclaim their leading roles in the 1850s. Strikingly, the younger generation consented to their guidance despite the catastrophes their chiefs had previously caused. Therefore, some of the Islamized 48ers later assumed mentorship roles for the ensuing generations of émigrés; tendering inspiration, housing, provisioning, funding, and tactical counsel. Central to their influence was their ability to mediate between the nascent generation of refugees and the Tanzimat rule, balancing the complexities of both revolutionary aims and bureaucratic pragmatism. In this regard, the interaction between the two consecutive generations was exemplary to observe the ways the convert community conformed to local practices amidst rapid institutional change, forged new practices to further their revolutionary zeal, and passed them on to the next generation.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 4.

Some of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers operating in the Ottoman Empire *gradually* recognized that voluntary conversion to Islam could open up ample opportunities for their revolutionary cause. While translating voluntary conversion into a sophisticated strategy and handing the newly invented practices down to the next generation, the first generation of revolutionary converts laid the foundations of a distinctive tradition. Conversion granted formal subjecthood to the Sultan, which entailed official documents issued by the empire, securing relatively safe passage through hostile territories, and maintenance of informal networks under new identities. It could also provide employment in the civil and military bureaucracy of the empire, along with relatively regular and sufficient salaries, access to a new nexus of official connections and opportunities to organize within the concurrently evolving Tanzimat-era institutions. These tactical benefits, however, must not outweigh the substance of conversion, which initially took place within the context of political displacement and survival imperatives. In other words, it would be a mistake to interpret the religious outlook of the converts to be mere manipulation and purely cynical instrumentalism, which reflects retrospection since this position evaluates historical process through the lens of the later outcomes, while attributing them an explanatory power to the reasons. The Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts did not convert to infiltrate the state and to promote new strategies for their revolutionary zeal that would give fruits years later; rather, they discovered its possibilities in time. After all, the reform period was highly dynamic, for the revolutionaries it was not feasible to anticipate the long-term implications of conversion and act on them, awaiting years to see if they could reap the harvest. While the Porte was implementing state-making reforms to strengthen the central authority, the bureaucratized revolutionaries were integrated into the system to further the reforms, though their influence also expanded while actively contributing to the reforms. This symbiosis generated a side effect in the years to come, especially when the emergence of a new nation-state in Italy. All that can be said with certainty is that some of

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them would implicate in seditious activities (*fesat*) that ultimately clashed with the interests of the Porte, which was highly alerted to revolutionary activities in the Balkans. Getting involved with the Ottoman bureaucracy did not only save their lives against the Habsburg and Tsarist revenge but also restored some level of autonomy and power to them ex-officio in an environment where the central bureaucracy and army were expanding with the newly introduced practices in the way of centralization. As a result, the 48ers featured themselves as a power base not only against the next generation of revolutionaries but also against the revolutionary centers in Europe until violating their contract with the Porte.

Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts became nodal points through which not only a set of practices but also a collective memory flowed from one generation to the next. Based on the evidence, oral transmission dominated this transfer, while written culture, including books, news and essays in newspapers and magazines, revolutionary proclamations, pamphlets, and correspondences (personal communications, certificates of debt, safe conducts, and petitions to the authorities) also played complementary roles in creating a communicative space, through which new generations inherited vivid life-stories, revolutionary strategies, and ideological formulations. It should not be forgotten that the attachment of the converts to governmental structures also imposed on them to use a proper bureaucratic language (in petitions, missives, military reports, diplomatic correspondences) with its specific idioms and wording already in circulation. Even their convert names, often associating them with the religious tradition and emphasizing loyalty to the empire, were constant reminders of a collective memory. In addition, the settlements and colonies in Constantinople, where the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees were predominantly found, particularly important was the Polish Village (*Polonezköy*) in this sense, reflect refugee's efforts to reorganize their surroundings to connect with an unfamiliar space, in other words, to feel at home, while carrying the memories of the past. Furthermore, places like private homes, coffeehouses, inns, taverns, restaurants, and

casinos also played significant roles in the creation and transfer of this culture. The relic Hüseyin Faik retrieved from the funeral of Murad Pasha, uniforms worn in the army and bureaucracy, and medals and honors conferred them upon their commitments on battlefields can also be counted among the materials that brought the past memories in the present, obviously with particular emotions. Their émigré networks provided a framework within which the legacy of the revolution was formulated and communicated to others.¹⁰⁸⁹ Jusztnián's testimonies indicate that the memories of converts resurfaced throughout their lives, recalled time and again, shaping the political language of the new generation along the process. These memories and the formal-cum-informal practices fostered a core sense of solidarity among the converts, gradually giving way to the emergence of a new political identity, as we will see, which was not only created by concrete individuals but also evolved across generations in a continuously changing historical circumstances.

The guidance of the 48ers was decisive in the transmission of this identity in the sense that psychological self does not exist in a tranquil world of meanings but rather within a universe of conflicts and struggles over the meaning, as the protagonists of this transmission were subject to the ups and downs of concrete power relationships. The intermediary and hegemonic position of one generation dictated the way their followers perceived what the truth was, yet the truth was the one hailed and inculcated from the perspective of the those who had been excommunicated by formal compatriots upon their conversion to Islam. These interpellations constituted and reconstituted the identity of those who were willing to appropriate them, "[t]o the extent that a particular interpellation is received, the receiver changes and is (re)constituted."¹⁰⁹⁰ Indeed, the intergenerational perspective on ideological formation for individuals and groups suggests that "interpellations and experiences of what is

¹⁰⁸⁹ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 172.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Therborn, *The Ideology of Power*, 78-79.

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and of what is possible" overshadows "changes of ideologies of what is good and right."¹⁰⁹¹ The mindset of the new generation was partly shaped in reference to the successes and failures of the 48ers, remaining under the heavy influence of their fathers who posed as a role-model to imitate, in other words, the thoughts, opinions, perceptions, ideals, actions, and discourses of the generation of Jusztián reflected the specific power relations with the generation of Schneider par excellence.

When General Józef Bem converted to Islam together with his followers at the time of political turmoil, he would never have foreseen that the seed he sowed would grow into a revolutionary tradition, which drew on knowledge and experiences accumulated through the entrance of his followers into the state affairs and later transposed to the next generation of revolutionaries, while operating within Ottoman bureaucracy and tradition. Having analyzed the carriers and mechanisms through which the legacy of Murad Pasha was transmitted to the next generation, we will draw our attention now to *what* was transmitted, a new political consciousness and its attendant discourses. In the following, their experiences on the ground will retell alternative identity traits.

4.2. From the Late 1840s to the Early 1860s: An Identity Under Construction

And when you look long into an abyss,
the abyss also looks into you.¹⁰⁹²

This part of the study delves into the empirical processes through which a certain identity evolved among the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts, in line with their individual and collective interests. Rather than framing identity as a mechanical, rigid, and abstract construct, this study conceptualizes it as an organic, versatile, and historically grounded

¹⁰⁹¹ Ibid., 44.

¹⁰⁹² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 89.

phenomenon. It emerges through the lived experiences and actions of concrete actors in their interactions with a diachronic sequence of events within specific sociopolitical contexts. These events include "a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness."¹⁰⁹³ This analysis focuses on "the disparate and seemingly unconnected events" with which the converts interacted, forging their own way accordingly. The Revolutions of 1848 and its aftermath in the Ottoman Empire as refugees; including conversion to Islam and employment in a new state bureaucracy, taking part in its political program, and participating in its military campaigns (notably the Crimean War) were among these moments. Their interactions with the Risorgimento phenomenon from 1859 to 1861 were another sequence of events that shaped their lives. After all, religious conversion is not an experience that starts and ends instantly, it is rather a gradually unfolding and dynamic process, through which people embrace religious transformation.¹⁰⁹⁴ In this sense, the inquiry into the interplay between events and actors, where historical contingencies intersect with the life course of concrete actors, enables us to trace the evolutionary process of the identity shift of the convert revolutionaries. Without acknowledging this aspect, it is almost impossible not to get stuck into essentialisms, a trap common in official narratives prioritizing ideological cohesion over lived complexity. Even if their initial motive behind conversion was fictitious, the converts did not have to remain unaffected after constantly performing as converts for many years in the empire. And even performing this identity for years did not make their renewed identity resistant to change. In any case, it is almost impossible to fully grasp how many converts genuinely embraced the new religion, or to what degree, as this obviously varies from person to person and internal mindset is inaccessible. Nevertheless, external actions are

¹⁰⁹³ Edward Palmer Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 9

¹⁰⁹⁴ Baer, *Honored*, 13.

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observable, and their performances suggest that an identity shift was the unexpected outcome of conversions in the long run.

The Hungarian and Polish 48ers who converted to Islam had much in common. These included oppression and persecution in the Habsburg and Tsarist empires, taking refuge on Ottoman territory, the tough decision to convert, and the subsequent exclusion from their once-fellows, as well as the roles they played in the Ottoman army. These exiles meanwhile maintained ties to their homelands and preserving their revolutionary agendas, alongside growing dissatisfaction with their former leaders. Their responses to the internal and external aggressors eventually defines their class, which "happens when some men as a result of common experience (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs."¹⁰⁹⁵ Nonetheless, this is not to say that there were no differences among these revolutionary converts, the unity and harmony among themselves stemmed from their outright divergence from the mainstream, i.e. their subaltern nature. To put it differently, conversion was the main point of reference that ensured inter-ethnic solidarity and mutual trust within this cross-cultural entity, whether sincere or not, and that it converged their fates, no matter their ethnic origins. In that sense, the formation of this variegated identity was more confessional and generational than simply ethnic and national, where common experiences outweighed the chance factors.¹⁰⁹⁶

Upon the decisive defeat in Temesvár, thousands of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries desperately piled up in the border area to seek shelter from the Ottoman Empire in the summer of 1849. A profound sense of despair prevailed among the revolutionaries. "In reality, my last days in Orsova was the most desperate, disconsolate ones," recalls one of

¹⁰⁹⁵ Thompson, *The Making*, 9.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Daniel Chirot, "The Social and Historical Landscape of Marc Bloch," in *Vision and Method of Historical Sociology*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 29.

the refugees from rank-and-file, as the asylum seekers faced not only the threat of the royal armies but also that of the unfriendly neighboring Serbs.¹⁰⁹⁷ The psychological well-being of the refugees remained deeply unsettled in the camps at Vidin. The dismay among the Poles is depicted in the memoirs of Czaykowski, reporting nothing but false pretenses, heavy drinking, and brawling among his compatriots.¹⁰⁹⁸ The situation among the Italians was equally dire, the Sardinian minister to Constantinople was terrified with the consideration of conversion among the compatriots to save the lives ("but not the honor") under heavy conditions.¹⁰⁹⁹ There were also sub-groupings among Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugees.¹¹⁰⁰ The revolutionary leaders were the most concerned about the chaos, they were the ones most targeted by the mounting criticisms from the lower ranks since there was a great disappointment spreading.

This Hungarian war drama lacked all these features. Caught in the grip of despair, even the actors forgot their roles. The biggest flaw of the closing scene lay here according to me. Yet the leaders have never broken their silence about this mistake. It is true that the heroic war drama's introduction and development phases were overshadowed by the disappointment of the finale. But was it absolutely necessary to remain silent because of this?¹¹⁰¹

The leaders had claimed to downplay feudal privileges and foreign oppression at home, yet they failed to forge solidarity among the compatriots in exile, even within a much smaller and convinced community. Kossuth had failed to unite Hungary during the revolution (if one considers the minorities), nor could he maintain unity within his comrades in exile, consistently seeking to preserve his leadership though ostracizing his critiques. He had already resigned from his position as regent toward the end of the war, and his attempt to reclaim leadership in

¹⁰⁹⁷ Joseph Hutter, *Avrupa'da Hilalin Gölgesine Sığınanlar: 1850 Bir Mültecinin Hatıratından*, comp. by Bayram Nazır (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş. Yayınları, 2018), 50.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, 160-162.

¹⁰⁹⁹ "ma non l'onore." Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 84.

¹¹⁰⁰ Hutter, *Avrupa'da Hilalin*, 154.

¹¹⁰¹ "Bu Macar savaş dramında bütün bu özelliklerin hiç biri yoktu. Hatta oyuncular çaresizliğin kışkacında rollerini bile unuttular. Kapanış sahnesinin en büyük sorunu bana göre buradaydı. Fakat yöneticiler bu hata hakkında şimdiye kadar sessizliklerini hiç bozmadılar. Bu kahramanca savaş dramının giriş ve gelişme bölümünün finalden dolayı büyük bir hayalkırıklığı yaşadığı doğrudur. Fakat bu yüzden illaki de susmak mı gerekiyordu?" Hutter, *Avrupa'da Hilalin*, 38. For more references also see Ibid., 45.

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exile received severe blows since it became untenable for many of the refugees, given that the most prominent obligations of the ruler are to protect their subjects from outside enemies, to secure peace and order at home, and to secure the justice.¹¹⁰² Kossuth found himself in a legitimacy crisis, especially in the early phase of the refuge when the revolutionaries were slipping from his grasp.

With a striking twist of fate, however, it turned out to be the Caliph of All Muslims (*Halife-i Müslimin*) that granted refuge and offered hope for the future to the revolutionaries in their darkest hours, while the Habsburg and Tsarist rules were turning their homeland into a hell on earth. Sociological observations propose that a negative experience within a previous community is often a significant factor in religious conversion later.¹¹⁰³ Nevertheless, the transition from Christianity to Islam in our case immediately carried profound implications, which can be described in civilizational terms. The contrast between the attitudes of the civilized world, nothing more than indifference, and the so-called uncivilized Muslim empire, offering a beacon of hope, was evident in the memories of a refugee:

We were pleased to find that, while most of the Christian people look on our expatriation with indifference and some-even-chased us to death as bloodhounds do with renegade slaves, only the Turkish nation, which was called 'pagan' gave us shelter: not only giving food to the starving and clothes to the naked, not only ready to enter an expensive war against the powers demanding our extradition, but with their thoughtfulness and caring also trying to make us forget our own homelessness.¹¹⁰⁴

Since incompetence to rule is a marker of the collapse of the existing social contract, the alienation against the revolutionary leadership induced many refugees to seek permanent shelter in religious conversion, which emerged as an alternative way to strike a social contract

¹¹⁰² Moore, *Injustice*, 20-21.

¹¹⁰³ Hugh Goddard, *Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual Understanding* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), 170.

¹¹⁰⁴ Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants," 239. Even years later, Çaylak Tevfik reports, the Hungarians did not forget how the Ottomans accepted those revolutionaries, treated them as brothers, and offered them high positions, whereas no government in Europe did anything for their compatriots. Mehmed Tevfik, *Çok Yasa! Csok Jasa! Yedigâr-ı Macaristan Asr-ı Abdülhamid Han* (Istanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1294), 49-50.

with the reformist rulers of the Ottoman Empire. The Porte had already proven to its ability to fulfill what their once-leaders was too desperate to do, to provide them a safe haven. The conversion of General Bem, who had aroused sympathetic sentiments among the revolutionary cadres from all ranks in Transylvania, created a breach in the existing social contract since many refugees followed his suit and expressed their will to voluntarily convert much to the annoyance to their once-leaders. While Kossuth was the representative of the mainstream forces, Bem helped create the forces to challenge the existing dominance. This sudden shift from acquiescence to revolt against the revolutionary leadership was a collective process, in which conversion to Islam became part of a strategy "to achieve a distinct kind of integration."¹¹⁰⁵ In this sense, conversion to Islam gradually translated into a revolutionary act, breaking the existing social contract with the elites of the former revolutionary movement in favor for an alternative social imagery for many refugees.

Having modest backgrounds, many of the converts were typically young and inexperienced without much formal power, authority, reputation, and prestige, unlike the illustrious leaders who had widespread domestic and international prestige and publicity. Indeed, the call for conversion found more appeal from the individuals financially and socially in a precarious situation, as conversion studies often stress the tendency of the socially vulnerable is high.¹¹⁰⁶ It is also important to underscore that conversion cases among the revolutionaries continued even months after the first group converted, though the anxiety for security was far less pressing than the early phase of their refugee on the account that the related governments had already settled their differences. Conversion could appear to the candidates as a way to distinguish themselves from, rather than be subsumed under, the supposed

¹¹⁰⁵ Eyal Ginio, "Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion to Islam in the Ottoman State," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 25, no. 1 (2001): 113-114.

¹¹⁰⁶ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 408. Many refugees were suffering from financial difficulties, it was not an uncommon aptitude among the refugee groups to flee to the mountains in spite of the harsh winter conditions in early 1850. Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 153. For instance, General Stein was particularly recorded financially broke. *Ibid.*, 160.

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leaderships. Anthropological studies indicate that subgroups, when perceiving a threat from the dominant group, may adopt a new religious affiliation as a weapon in its intra-group conflict.¹¹⁰⁷ Conversion manifests itself often along the pre-existing social, cultural, ethnic, or political lines.¹¹⁰⁸ The so-called pre-existing line came to fore at the war itself. Kossuth's preferences had sparked disputes among the highest ranks, including his alignment with the Polish generals, including Bem and Dembiński. When Kossuth waived his official duties at the end and left the battlefield in search of refuge, General Bem was still in favor of continuing the resistance, though some Hungarian generals were displeased with his presence. On his way to persuade the leader to continue, Bem was thunderstruck upon learning of Kossuth's decision to flee, despite his own commitment to the revolution. This motivated Bem to pen an acrimonious letter to Kossuth, accusing him of cowardice. Even though this controversy was embryonic, the split between Bem and Kossuth reasserted itself once again when the refugees encountered a new social environment. On the other hand, in a strange similarity to the inner conflicts in Hungary, the differences of opinions within the Polish revolutionary circles preceded the question of conversion, which rather galvanized personal rivalries. Believing in the merits of forming a common front with other Slavs, Czajkowski was inclined to support the Serbian and Croatian revolutionary efforts (against Hungary) during the Revolutions of 1848, though the Parisian factions made it clear that the Polish patriots would never ally with them since the leaders had already struck a deal with the Italians on the grounds that both nations were Catholic.¹¹⁰⁹ In fact, when Czajkowski converted, he had already lost considerable support and prestige from the Parisian elites.¹¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰⁷ Rambo, *Understanding Religious*, 91.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹¹⁰⁹ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, 138-141.

¹¹¹⁰ Aleksandar Zlatanov, "Czajkowski's Christian Army of the Sultan: 1853–1870," in *Turkish Yoke or Pax Ottomana: The Reception of Ottoman Heritage in Balkan History and Culture*, *Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Nauki Społeczne* 24, no. 1 (2019): 49. Temizkan, "Lehistanlıların İstanbul'da," 372.

As expected, prominent figures among the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian refugee groups strongly opposed the idea of conversion, including Lajos Kossuth, Kázmér Batthyány, Henryk Dembiński, Władysław Zamoyski, and Alessandro Monti. However, the discontent among the revolutionaries had already accumulated enough, the stage was ready for the "outside agitators."¹¹¹¹ Upon the invitation of some refugee leaders, conversions started. Already turned into a myth on battlefields, in this context, Bem offered an alternative leadership path against the revolutionary oligarchies when the issue conversion came to the fore. Mehmed Sadık Pasha asserts in his memoirs that fanatical Catholics were not comfortable with himself because he encouraged the Poles to convert to Islam, yet the opportunist racketeers exploited popular cause for their own personal material gains.¹¹¹² In this sense the conversion of the Polish compatriots ran the risk of shattering the grip of the Paris-based leadership of emigration. In a similar vein, the commander of the Italian Legion criticized the religious defeats (*disfattismo religioso*) of the Hungarians and Poles on the grounds that it would break the cohesion among the Italian refugees.¹¹¹³ Moreover, Kossuth expressed his concern that more refugees might convert amidst uncertainties, signaling the legitimacy crisis he faced as conversion was undermining his authority.¹¹¹⁴ Taken all together, the sensitivity surrounding the issue of conversion was not so much about the hardships that led the compatriots to convert, but rather what the religious tradition symbolized for the leadership claims and vested interests of a select few. In this regard, shifting the focus from the religious sincerity of converts to whether the leaders were sincere in adhering to their religious traditions offers a promising perspective to better evaluate their aggressive attitudes. Indeed, Kossuth suddenly found himself a governor without a subject to govern, which drove the former leader toward an increasingly aggressive discursive position since those bodies could no longer be subjected, as

¹¹¹¹ Moore, *Injustice*, 172.

¹¹¹² Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*," 136, 155.

¹¹¹³ And his firmness was appreciated by Tecco. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 84-85.

¹¹¹⁴ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 133.

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matters stood, and the body could only be deemed useful as long as it was productive and compliant.

While the sanction for the ruler is the forfeiture of the right to rule, Moore suggests, the violation of social contract results in the dismissal from the membership in society.¹¹¹⁵ It was exactly what Kossuth resorted to while excommunicating Bem, who had now become the antihero since "in the darkest region of the political field," suggests Foucault, "the condemned man represents the symmetrical, inverted figure of the king."¹¹¹⁶ Conversion became both the cause and the effect of his marginalization, more importantly though he represented that the elites had already lost hegemony. In other words, if the issue is viewed in terms of power dynamics, the conversion of the refugees appears as "sacrosanct" a decision as not converting, considering that the refugees assessed the goods and evils of conversion, as much as the leaders did, and made their decisions accordingly. The defeat of the cause, security-related concerns and uncertainties, scant prospects about the future, economic and social precariousness, and disappointment toward the leadership were surely involved in this assessment, eventually causing a religious defeatism and facilitating the conversion of the refugees. In the United States at the same time, it was common for Hungarian émigrés to seek refuge in the occult to overcome the psychological consequences of the failed revolution.¹¹¹⁷ Similarly, the same sentiments also played a role in the decision to convert for some refugees in the Balkans.

What the refugee leaders feared most soon came to pass: the mass conversion of the 48ers deepened the already existing divisions within the refugee community, ultimately fracturing the group. The experience of conversion sadly taught its adherents that social exclusion resulted from leaving an entity upon conversion was not an easy outlook, let alone the decision itself was not easy at all. The converts were not only displaced from their homes

¹¹¹⁵ Moore, *Injustice*, 25.

¹¹¹⁶ Michael Foucault, "The Body of the Condemned," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 176.

¹¹¹⁷ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 141.

but also faced bitter rejection from their peers, subjecting them to an incremental exclusion, which likely led to moral outrage. Along with the irreparable estrangement from former comrades, the personal choice to convert risked bitter quarrels between the converts and their family members dedicated to the ancestral faith. This entailed disputes with their natal cultural and religious surroundings, leading a sort of "civil death" in some cases.¹¹¹⁸ For one of the refugees, Gábor Egressy, conversion meant the denial of "the homeland, the nation, the family and memory," sending the soul into exile.¹¹¹⁹ In other words, the issue of conversion crystallized existing fractures within the revolutionary ranks, leading to despal, stigmatization, and exclusion from the mainstream. The rift was not solely moral and psychological; it also had tangible consequences, as the Porte physically separated them. Once the converts were transferred to Shumen from Vidin to avoid possible military complications, those who remained behind did not even wave goodbye to their former fellows, a perfect indication of how deeply the issue of conversion had polarized the entire enclave. As their once-comrades turned their backs while they were moving, the converts must have felt profound anxiety, grievance, and alienation from the undeserved shaming and bullying, in contrast to the kind reception of the rulers of the empire. Indeed, the officials showed great respect and sympathy to their initiative; to illustrate, the governor of Vidin, Mehmed Ziya Pasha, was so moved that he kissed Bem's hand.¹¹²⁰ It is quite understandable why the refugees traded obedience and loyalty for security as long as the relationship bore the marks of justice and affection.¹¹²¹ There was also a significant local support for the potential converts in the form of celebration and gifts.¹¹²² What is more, while the refugee groups were held in Shumen, the Porte decided to relocate the refugees to two regions far apart from each other, according

¹¹¹⁸ Ginio, "Childhood, Mental Capacity," 94-95.

¹¹¹⁹ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 167.

¹¹²⁰ Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler*, 104-105.

¹¹²¹ Moore, *Injustice*, 463.

¹¹²² Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 143.

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to the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations. While the Kossuth Group was sent to Kütahya, the Murad Pasha Group were transferred to Aleppo. The Porte acted extremely careful to ensure that the latter group did not feel alienated. For instance, Diyarbakır was initially thought to be their destination, yet since it was soon realized that the converts would feel like they were imprisoned there, and thus, the Vilayet of Aleppo appeared as a better alternative. These spatial considerations solidified the figurative gap between the converts and non-converts, as the distance between different social groups reverberates on the description of the social distance. In effect, Kossuth's grip over the converts must have significantly diminished, if remained any at all, which must be exactly what he had already feared, as anthropological observations suggest that maintaining authority heavily relies on physical appearance and visibility.¹¹²³ Not surprisingly, Kossuth protested against the decision to send the refugees to Kütahya, believing that their proximity in the Balkans would allow them to trigger a new uprising, yet no record evidences that the groups in Shumen and Aleppo posed similar reserves, suggesting that the authority of the Porte glossed over Kossuth's influence over the refugees.¹¹²⁴ Later on, Kossuth and his companions left Asia Minor for Europe and America after two years of sojourn, the converts largely remained within the territories of the empire.¹¹²⁵

Their interaction with the new cultural milieu continued to consolidate, contributing to their identification, given that social space is not merely a passive background for featuring identity but actively shapes it.¹¹²⁶ Even the departure of the Kossuth Group from the empire might have increased the autonomy of those who remained behind, the converts, as the international spotlight was on the former. As stated in an article of Prakash:

the subalterns had acted in history "on their own, that is, independently of the elite"; their politics constituted "an autonomous domain, for it

¹¹²³ Moore, *Injustice*, 99.

¹¹²⁴ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 149.

¹¹²⁵ Eleven converts from Aleppo requested permission to leave in September 1850.

¹¹²⁶ Lynda Nead, "Mapping the Self: Gender, Space and Modernity in mid-Victorian London," in *Rewriting the Self Histories from the Renaissance to the present*, ed. by Roy Porter (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 167.

neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter.¹¹²⁷

The history of those who embraced Islam was going to be quite different from that of the other group.¹¹²⁸ However, before delving into their new encounters with two formative historical phenomena (the Ottoman reformation period and the unification of Italy), it is essential to examine the implications of religious conversion for the revolutionaries.

In line with the spirit of the reform period, even conversion to Islam became institutionalized, for the reasons explained in Chapter Two. This institutionalization, however, did not entail the creation of an institution that aimed to convert masses, but rather the implementation of standardized procedures for handling conversion cases.¹¹²⁹ Unlike many Christian traditions, Islam does not require a long period of training, a formal catechetical instruction, so the state did not have a juridical control over people's faith. In the Tanzimat era, the candidates had to perform certain procedures to make sure that their conversion to Islam was *recognized* by the Sublime State, rather than *authorizing* people to embrace Islam. The standard procedure for conversion during the Tanzimat era was as follows. The novices had to inform provincial administration through a petition that they wished to convert. Upon expressing the desire to be "honored with the Islamic religion" (*şeref-i İslam ile müşerref olmak*), they were brought to the religious court, where the *kadi* presided. In his presence, the potential converts declared that their decision was out of free will and conscience (*bil tav ve ul rıza*) and without any external pressure (*bir gûna ibram ve ilhan olunmadığı*). The candidates had to be of sound mind (*akıl*) and majority (*büluğ*). A spiritual guide to instruct the candidate how to perform religious acts or how to recite specific prayers had to be present throughout the ceremony, and the proceedings took place in front of witnesses (*şahit*). The candidate declared

¹¹²⁷ Prakash, "Subaltern Studies," 1478.

¹¹²⁸ Kemal Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey: The Impact of Hungarian Refugees in The Ottoman Empire 1849-1851," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 177.

¹¹²⁹ Halide Aslan, *Tanzimat Döneminde İhtidâ (1839-1876)* (PhD diss., Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008), 109.

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voluntary commitment to Islam by reciting *kelime-i şahadet* (declaration of faith, "*There is no God but Allah, and Muhammed is his Prophet*") while getting down on their knees in front of an Islamic jurist in mosque.¹¹³⁰ The judge then put the case on the record to ensure the moral status of the convert was officially changed. The procedure had to be repeated in the secular local administrative council of the province, which included the consultation with the relatives of the converts, the religious authorities of their former religion, and the diplomatic representatives to thoroughly investigate the sincerity of conversion.¹¹³¹ Unless any complications aroused, the judge would formally rule on the conversion, thereby granting the individual official recognition of their new legal status.

For the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries, the procedure described above was largely followed in 1849.¹¹³² The initiation ceremony marked the first step in their immersion into a new cultural and social environment, setting their identity shift into motion, though the converts had to go through a learning process since their orientation to the principles, practices, and values of the new religion and society had to come afterwards.¹¹³³ For the converts the most immediate and tangible change was their names: they acquired Muslim names upon adopting Islam in substitution for their names at birth; even though renaming was not mandatory as to the doctrine. Although it is not likewise compulsory, circumcision was strongly recommended for men in the Islamic tradition. There is a huge gap in our knowledge about the circumcision of the 48ers; archival records do not allow us to trace every individual case. For one thing, it is for sure that the converts' circumcision was left postponed. However, there are also records that the operation was conducted in some cases, though it was not deemed

¹¹³⁰ For the practice of the refugees see Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 96.

¹¹³¹ For the procedure see Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 42-47. Sponsor and spiritual guide did not have to be the same person. Also see Şeker, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde*, 62-67.

¹¹³² Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 408.

¹¹³³ For instance, in response to people inquiring about the conditions to convert, Cevdet Pasha emphasized in his letters that his sole duty was to provide guidance on religious matters and to introduce the core principles of the faith. For the letters see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 4 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967), 161-164, 167.

obligatory.¹¹³⁴ It is widely acknowledged that Murad Pasha was among the first to undergo circumcision; despite being recommended him otherwise due to the injuries he had sustained toward the end of the revolution. Also, having been honored with the glory of Islam, Mahmud and his son Mehmed were referred for the procedure. Similarly, a certain Ahmed Tevfik of Hungarian origin was also sent to the hospital (*bimarhane*) for circumcision.¹¹³⁵ It is worthy of note that circumcision is a practice that concerns only men, so it is not an applicable parameter for discussing the situation of the female converts in the same context.

They were introduced to another sacred tongue and prayers. Irrespective of how neatly they adhered to religious references and practices, new concepts such as "*haram*" and "*helal*" entered their lives, potentially influencing their everyday habits and routines, from personal hygiene and dietary choices to dressing styles and the organization of their living spaces. Particularly important in our context was the change in their dress, as attire not only communicates and signifies one's identity within society but also plays a crucial role in shaping and transforming that identity, integrating people into social groups while simultaneously disengaging them from others.¹¹³⁶ Under Ottoman jurisdiction, there were traditional provisions that permitted or prohibited members of different religious communities to wear certain colors, patterns, and material, for the attire was an expression of social status, marking regional, ethnic, confessional, and social identity. *Fez* was obligatory for the officials throughout the reform era.¹¹³⁷ For these reasons, the government traditionally subsidized converts to purchase new clothes to adjust themselves to their new lives (*kisve bahası*). A total

¹¹³⁴ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 45.

¹¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 172.

¹¹³⁶ Claudia Ulbrich and Richard Wittmann, "Fashioning the Self in Transcultural Settings: The Importance of Dress in the Historical and Cultural Sciences," in *Fashioning the Self in Transcultural Settings: The Uses and Significance of Dress in Self-Narratives*, ed. Claudia Ulbrich and Richard Wittmann (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2016), 9, 12.

¹¹³⁷ Elke Hartmann, "Shaping the Armenian Warrior: Clothing and Photographic Self-Portraits of Armenian Fedayis in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century," in *Fashioning the Self in Transcultural Settings: The Uses and Significance of Dress in Self-Narratives*, ed. Claudia Ulbrich and Richard Wittmann (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2016), 123, 127.

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of 18,643 piastres was endowed to the converts as financial aid during their three-month-stay in Vidin, along with numerous aids in kind, including various articles of clothing such as socks, raincoats, shirts, underpants, trousers, sandals, fezes, among others.¹¹³⁸ Those employed by the state were furnished with official uniforms, designed to strengthen the cohesion within the army. Wearing a uniform earned them respect also in the eyes of the society. The officials had already paid the revolutionaries tributes upon their decision to convert, which was in stark contrast with their official condemnation in their distant countries and the shame they faced among former peers. In this sense, their official garments must have had a formative impact on their sense of belonging in the long run.

Conversion to Islam entailed both a spiritual and legal rebirth. Theologically, converts are absolved of pre-conversion sins, and this forgiveness symbolizes a rupture from their past religious identity.¹¹³⁹ Nonetheless, the transformation in their judicial status had a more immediate and tangible effect on the mundane lives of the converts. They were no longer subjected to any religious authorities for matters such as baptism, marriage, worship, and burial rites, as they had been in their previous faith. Likewise, their legal duties and obligations prior to embracing Islam were null and void.¹¹⁴⁰ In a similar vein, conversion on Ottoman soil automatically translated into the subjecthood to the Sultan/Caliph, forfeiting former subjecthood/citizenship, according to the Ottoman jurisprudence.¹¹⁴¹ If the Caliph was the symbolic leader of Sunni Islam, new citizenship status not only bound the converts to the empire but also connected them with the imaginative global Muslim community (*ümmet*) through the bond of brotherhood: "Believers are all brothers (and sisters)," reminded Ahmed

¹¹³⁸ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 119.

¹¹³⁹ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, vol. 4, 259.

¹¹⁴⁰ Ginio, "Childhood, Mental Capacity," 94. During the refugee issue, the impact of conversion to Islam on protecting the individual from the jurisdiction of other governments is perfectly reasoned in the following correspondence. Ahmed Refik, *Türkiye'de Mülteciler Meselesi*, 145.

¹¹⁴¹ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 157.

Cevdet Pasha to a candidate who conveyed his desire to convert.¹¹⁴² Unlike the non-Muslims of the empire, the converts were now subject to Islamic civil law (*sharia*), which regulated domestic affairs (including paternity, marriage, divorce, slavery ownership, and inheritance), while also integrating them into distinctive legal frameworks in terms of land tenure, taxation, and military obligations. After the conversion of the military officers, in our case, their wives were required to convert if they wished to continue their marriage, as the officers of the Ottoman army were not allowed to be married to non-Muslims, whereas single male converts were often encouraged to marry Muslim women.¹¹⁴³

As soon as the conversion procedures were completed, Governor Ziya Pasha proposed to the Porte that salaries be assigned to the converts in proportion to their previously acquired military ranks, which formalized their integration of the Ottoman military hierarchy.¹¹⁴⁴ This was a moment that not only elevated the converts from outlawed refugees to legitimized state personnel but also shielded them from financial destitution. Like conversion, employment was more than a momentous change in the lives of the former refugees, it was one of the crucial variables that influenced the experience of exile in a concrete manner, even extending beyond making a living.¹¹⁴⁵ Employment offered them opportunities for upward mobility, allowing some even to climb to the highest ranks within the ruling hierarchy (as well as the high society) at the time when the Porte dominated the politics. Indeed, some would enjoy the highest possible prestige and influence, in addition to having free access to the highest government ministers, and even to the presence of the Sultan himself. Their positions and influence in the empire as counselors in political and military matters facilitated the convergence of their political position with the interests of the empire, transcending the tension between their former

¹¹⁴² "Mü'minler hep karındaştır." Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, vol. 4, 247.

¹¹⁴³ Taha Toros, *Geçmişte Türkiye-Polonya İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Perka A.Ş, 1983), 22.

¹¹⁴⁴ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 96.

¹¹⁴⁵ Tóth, *An Exiled Generation*, 118.

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set of beliefs and the new one.¹¹⁴⁶ In any case, their political and social positions in the empire were far superior to those they had in their countries of origin.¹¹⁴⁷ In hindsight, the institution of conversion in the Tanzimat era served as a short step into the political universe, where the revolutionaries could articulate themselves within a new world of relationships that had their own dynamics. While the refugees were in desperate need of protection, the empire's reform agenda offered significant opportunities for them, allowing their active participation in the process of building a modern state. Because the reformist elites were walking a tightrope in implementing their modernization program amid delicate domestic and international balances, and the arrival of refugees emerged as an opportunity to inject fresh blood into their political agenda. In other words, it was not a one-sided relationship; while the empire was refashioning itself, the converts took part in that transformation, which simultaneously transformed them. In this sense, their marriage with the refugees resembled a social contract; while the reformist cadres gained valuable allies, leveraging their expertise to advance the empires' modernization efforts, the converts enjoyed certain legal legitimacy, financial stability, social prestige, and institutional influence. This symbiosis enabled both the rulers and the converts to thrive together, contributing to the broader project of state-building during a transformative period in Ottoman history, while equally having a transformative impact on the identities of the converts. The converts had to strengthen the empire to strengthen their livelihood, meaning that their military service in the empire was more than a professional contribution. Furthermore, since they were respected in their new environment, they became willing and liable to defend the order when an external enemy was sighted on the horizon.¹¹⁴⁸ In other words, their participation in the wars for the good of the empire was not solely driven by an ulterior motive to incite uprisings in Hungary and Poland. The objectives emanated from the pre-conversion era and

¹¹⁴⁶ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1977), 222-223.

¹¹⁴⁷ Karpas, "Kossuth in Turkey," 181-182.

¹¹⁴⁸ Moore, *Injustice*, 225.

after those absorbed after that were combined. The settlers of the Polish enclave in Istanbul were committed to strengthening the empire, believing that a stronger Türkiye would eventually be more advantageous to the independence of their distant homeland.¹¹⁴⁹

Not long after the pioneering converts, 200 newly converts among the Shumen Group were also recruited into the Ottoman army in the Balkans to quell the Bosnian revolt in April 1850, with new rituals and rites:

As they were leaving the city the müftü sacrificed a sheep to them and lifting up his hands, said 'I pray for your victory'. After intonations of 'amen' the newly converted refugees set off with their newly found brothers in religion for Bosnia.¹¹⁵⁰

Even though conversion eased the refugees' access to military service, their engagement in several conflicts within the Ottoman army clinched their identification with the empire's cultural and political fabric. In other words, those wars and battles themselves functioned as converter; they created a collective memoir. In return, military service functioned as a powerful instrument that assimilated the converts into the state structures, while simultaneously influencing the evolution of their political identities within the empire.¹¹⁵¹ The potential of this type of service for social integration materialized in the common fate that the converts shared with the rest of the officers, who stood as comrades-in-arms in the face of death. Their martyrs were now one and the same, which forged a bond akin to blood brotherhood for those who remained behind. They were expected to act in coordination, as the limbs of the same body, submitting to a strict hierarchical order; otherwise, they could be subjected to disciplinary courts for insubordination, much as they could be rewarded with orders, honors, and medals for their service and loyalty. Moreover, the Ottoman army's inherently religious character immersed the converts in certain religious rituals and ceremonies (prayers, animal sacrifices

¹¹⁴⁹ Lucyna Antonowicz, *Polonezköyü*, 15.

¹¹⁵⁰ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 172.

¹¹⁵¹ Contemporary sources reveal that the Ottoman administrative mindset also associated military service with loyalty to one's homeland. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun, vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1963), 30, 184.

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for God, and Qur'anic recitations), all under the guidance of religious authorities (imam, müftü, and sheikh), through which their learning was strengthened. Their military activities were framed through religious imperatives and motives (tekbir, martyrdom, and jihad). After all, performing military service made these Ottoman subjects into partners of the state, which is traditionally defined by its monopoly on the use of violence, and their partnership likely contributed to the transformation of their political identities in the long run.

The converts served on numerous battlefronts, participating in wars, campaigns, and the suppression of internal revolts across various regions of the empire, from the Balkans to the Middle East, under the hierarchy of the central army from 1850s to 1870s. A complete account of their military engagements will not be presented here, yet it must be mentioned that perhaps the most active figure in this respect was Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha, who appears to have taken great satisfaction in lending his service during endless military confrontations throughout his long and intense military career, which lasted once he died in the Montenegrin–Ottoman War in 1876.¹¹⁵² Among his military engagements, the Crimean War was a crucial milestone in the maturation of the political identities of the converts. As a matter of fact, regardless of whether they converted or whether their conversion was sincere in the first place, it is noteworthy that this war uniformly took an important place in the biographies of nearly all the Hungarian and Polish 48ers on Ottoman soil. Nevertheless, the interests and activities of the converts and non-converts would imply certain differences.

Not only did the converts see an opportunity to capitalize on the opportunity to engage in anti-Austrian and anti-Russian activities, but also the Hungarian and Polish exiles from England and France started to converge on Istanbul in the summer of 1853.¹¹⁵³ Not long after

¹¹⁵² He took part in the following campaigns, Montenegro (1852), the Crimean War (1853-56), Bagdad (1857), Montenegro (1861), Crete (1867), Herzegovina (1875), Montenegro (1876). Yusuf Akçuoğlu, *Türk Yılı 1928* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2009), 324.

¹¹⁵³ Some degree of revenge was taken. Let alone the victory of allies at the end, some of the Russian officials were among those who participated in the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, according to one of the

the war erupted, Mehmed Sadık presented a memorandum to the Porte via Grand Vizier Reşid Pasha, proposing the formation of military units composed of Cossacks from Northern Dobrudja and the Christian subjects of the Sultan.¹¹⁵⁴

Promoted to the rank of *mirmiran* (general), in late November, Sadık Mehmed Pasha was appointed to recruit and command a Cossack Legion.¹¹⁵⁵ Interestingly, this was precisely what the Hôtel Lambert had been trying to achieve for decades: the establishment of Polish legions stationed across Europe, ready to be mobilized against Russia in the event of a European war. It was an apostate who managed to accomplish it with great skill and agility, likely provoking some jealousy among the Parisian elites. Zamoyski did not want to come under the command of Sadık Mehmed Pasha; yet while he was actively pursuing something that his adversary had already achieved, Sadık Mehmed was on the field as a commanding officer.¹¹⁵⁶ Only in late 1854, another regiment was established under the command of Zamoyski, which was placed under the British command, as its commander did not surrender to an Ottoman Pasha. Teslar compares both as follows:

Sadyk Pasha, a Mohammedan in Turkish service, was not able to ask, as a condition of its formation, that the Polish Unit should preserve a purely Polish character. Zamoyski, on the contrary, as an ardent Catholic, could not compromise in matters of religion, and as a Pole he sought order granting to the Legion Polish officers, uniforms and colours and for the right to use the Polish language in commands.¹¹⁵⁷

There is no doubt that the economic, professional, and cultural experiences many converts had gained during their years of service in the empire granted them a certain autonomy. Receiving instructions from the other end of Europe was not as easy for them as it once had been.

military reports from the field, and they were defeated at the Battle of Çatana, where their medals and honors were seized by the soldiers. Keleş, *Kırım Harbine Dâir*, 19-20.

¹¹⁵⁴ Zlatanov, "Czajkowski's Christian Army," 49.

¹¹⁵⁵ Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 103.

¹¹⁵⁶ Teslar, "Unpublished Letters," 160.

¹¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 161.

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The potential defeat of Russia could have led to the wind of change once again, György Klapka (1820-1892) ended up in Constantinople in the autumn of that year to provoke the Ottoman army to a war with Austria under the pretext of a "preventive war." He presented his military plan in a memorandum to Ömer Lütfi Pasha, yet it quickly became apparent that his scheme was far from being realistic. Having evaluated the impossibility of a war between Austria and Türkiye, Klapka left the capital in June 1854, despite having been offered the command of the Caucasian army.¹¹⁵⁸ Even though Klapka was supported by the allied powers, Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha did not allow him to command.¹¹⁵⁹ On the contrary to the unrealistic plots of the Hungarian exiles based in Europe, several converts and exiles lent their service and loyalty to the empire, taking part in the war efforts of the empire both in Anatolia and in the Balkans (to a lesser extent, along with Sadık Mehmed's unit, Iskender Bey also served under Ömer Pasha). Those converts who had been stationed in the Arab army were integrated into the Anatolian army.¹¹⁶⁰ Hurşid Pasha (Richard Guyon), Ismail Pasha (György Kmety), Fevzi Pasha (Josef Kohlman), Ferhad Pasha (Maximillian Stein), Hüseyin Faik (Antal Schneider), Selim Ağa (Lajos Tüccöry), and Reşid Ağa (János Fiala) participated in the Ottoman war efforts.¹¹⁶¹ Among them was Ismail Pasha the exception for being entrusted a commanding position leading the *başıbozüks* (irregulars) at Kars. Among the staff officers were Polish generals Feliks Klemens Breanski (Şahin Pasha [1794-1884]) and Ludwik Bystrzonowski (Arslan Pasha [1797-1878]), Polish colonels Gosciminski (Tufan Bey), Paczek (Yıldırım Bey), Zarzycki (Osman Bey), majors Grotowski (Sahil Bey), Jagmin, Antoni

¹¹⁵⁸ During the war, Kossuth's contacts with the refugees in the empire was restricted to Sándor Gál, Richard Guyon, and Dániel Irányi. Róbert Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth ve 1848-49 Yıllarında Macar Özgürlük Savaşı*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Türk-Macar Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003), 100.

¹¹⁵⁹ Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 225.

¹¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 146.

¹¹⁶¹ Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants," 229.

Wieruski (1804-1870), and the Belgian Baron Schwarzenberg (Emir Bey). Ferhad Pasha was tasked with the inspection of the Anatolian army later.¹¹⁶²

The differences of opinion among the exiles appears to have continued during the war. Klapka criticized the officers who did not share his ideas, suggesting that they "seemed to have no higher idea of their mission than the carrying on a constant war of intrigue against each other."¹¹⁶³ The commander of the Anatolian Army, Zarîf Mustafa Pasha, did not favor Richard Guyon (Hurşid), he rather appreciated Colonel Fevzi Bey (Kohlman), who spoke Turkish very well, for his military and engineering abilities. According to the commander in chief, Feyzi Bey was a colonel in the Hungarian army, while Richard Guyon was a major under him. Mustafa Zarîf's recommendation to promote the former to the rank of Brigadier (*Mirliva*) was also shared by Ferhad Pasha (Stein). Zarîf Mustafa admired some other Polish and Hungarian officers, such as Brigadier Arslan Pasha, Şahin Pasha (Breanski), and Ismail Pasha (General Kmety).¹¹⁶⁴ The Polish officers did neither support Guyon's plans, including Arslan, Şahin, Mehmed Sadık, and Iskender.¹¹⁶⁵

The military engagement of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts earned many of them orders, medals, and promotion of ranks for their contributions and loyalty on battlefields. As a gesture of gratitude, Sultan Abdülmecid presented a ceremonial Ottoman standard to the Cossack unit that had fought alongside the Ottoman army in the war.¹¹⁶⁶ Nonetheless, the refugees did not participate in the war solely as officers, engineers, and physicians. Beyond their military engagements, there were also lesser-known figures who made fortunes in the canteen and logistic businesses during the war and played substantial roles in facilitating communication between the allies.¹¹⁶⁷

¹¹⁶² Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 147-148.

¹¹⁶³ Ibid., 148.

¹¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 215.

¹¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 217, 220.

¹¹⁶⁶ Toros, *Geçmişte Türkiye-Polonya*, 16.

¹¹⁶⁷ Csorba, "Hungarians in Constantinople," 73.

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The individual stories narrated in the previous section does not fail to cover the activities of the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries in the Crimean War. Jabłoński served the allied soldiers in Edirne and Plovdiv as a quartermaster. Schneider took part in battles as a military physician, earning an imperial order and a general service medal, while Jusztenián's mother arrived in Istanbul from Hungary after the Battle of Sevastopol.¹¹⁶⁸ The experiences recorded in these stories also point to crucial aspects of the identity trajectories of the refugees. Doubtless, Schneider's experience implies a deeper identification with the empire for the reasons elaborated above. Considering that many of the refugees and converts came to settle in Constantinople upon the peace, Jusztenián's testimony exemplifies this mass relocation of the Hungarian and Polish refugees not only for the émigrés but also for their family members.

An anthropological study suggests that forcibly displaced migrants had a new grip on their lives *seven lean years* later, during which they faced strains upon kinship, financial setbacks and unexpected gains, as well as challenges to their belief in traditional values and authorities.¹¹⁶⁹ This observation is applicable to our case, as seven years after the refugee crisis roughly coincides with the end of the Crimean War, which accelerated the assimilation of the Hungarian and Polish converts into the Ottoman army and society.¹¹⁷⁰ Refining this judgment based on our observations, even though many of the exiles joined the war as Hungarian and Polish converts, it would be more accurate to say that they emerged from it as Ottomans. Whether the refugees joined the war with the intention of revenge against Russia, igniting revolution in Austria and Poland, or just fulfilling their military obligations, the war nonetheless had unexpected consequences, giving rise to the currents that went in reverse directions. In cooperation with the Hungarian exile leaders, the Kingdom of Sardinia began to consider pursuing a more active policy in the Orient, which brought the refugees and converts

¹¹⁶⁸ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹¹⁶⁹ Peter Loizos, "Ottoman Half-lives: Long-term Perspectives on Particular Forced Migrations," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 12, no. 3 (1999): 237.

¹¹⁷⁰ Karpát, "Kossuth in Turkey," 182.

on the verge of a choice. In that context, the war unveiled another dynamic; while providing the refugees with opportunities to form new connections with Muslim officers and statemen, it simultaneously offered another socialization in a countervailing direction.

There are indications that factionalism among the Hungarian and Polish refugees and converts continued in the aftermath of the war, although the details of these intra-group disputes remain insufficiently known. Schism was a perennial issue among the refugees, particularly following disputes over conversion. One might come across a mutual aid association (*Magyar Egylet*, Hungarian Association), established by Kossuth's aides-de-camp in 1851, yet the association later fell apart in a consequence of financial strains and partiality.¹¹⁷¹ It goes without saying that factionalism was also evident among the Polish revolutionaries; the Parisian elites did not support the activities of Mehmed Sadık Pasha, whose conversion entailed the turn of the leadership of the Eastern Agency to Władysław Kościelski (Sefer Pasha).¹¹⁷² Moreover, according to an archival record, Kossuth and Klapka were reported to have appeared in Tulcea at the end of 1858. Arrived on steamers operated by the French maritime company *Messageries*, they sought to win over the Hungarian and Polish refugees gathered in the area by distributing money and clothing, with the aim of mobilizing them toward Serbia and Hungary. Notably, these activities were reported to the Ottoman authorities again by Hungarians, seemingly not following these leaders.¹¹⁷³ More importantly, it is not difficult to infer that these activities align with the political developments in Italy, as said, the events of the Risorgimento constituted another important phase that left a lasting impact on the identity formation of the converts, initially reigniting hopes that ultimately turned into full frustration against the leadership of Kossuth and Klapka.

¹¹⁷¹ Csorba, "Hungarian Emigrants," 228.

¹¹⁷² Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*," 176.

¹¹⁷³ BOA., HR.SYS., 206/35, 07 July 1859.

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The Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 ignited the hopes and ambitions of Hungarian exiles worldwide more than any other political event of the 1850s. From as far as New York and Chicago, thousands of them flocked to Italy with great enthusiasm, giving rise to the Hungarian Legion in Genoa.¹¹⁷⁴ Yet their hopes were swiftly quashed when the emperor of the French, despite the promising victories at Magenta and Solferino, negotiated an armistice, which sidelined the ambitions of the Hungarian revolutionaries even before the legion engaged in any battle. The Hungarian Question was basically sold out, arousing grievances and pessimism among the exiles. Fueled by moral outrage, the legionnaires in Italy were deprived of any hope for a glamouring prospect, the liberation of Hungary had never been that distant for the majority. Many just started to look for new opportunities to sustain their lives, just as Emile Zulavsky and Louis Vöneky, who resorted to emigrating to the U.S. subsequent to their participation in the Hungarian Legion.¹¹⁷⁵ Resulted in great desperation for the revolutionaries everywhere, the war proved to be as destructive as it was creative for Ottoman-based Hungarian converts. Heeding the advice of the revolutionary leaders in Europe, some converts forfeited their relatively secured life and rushed to the peninsula. Their disillusionment with the revolutionary leadership was crystallized, hence their detachment from figures like Kossuth and Klapka, whose strategies now seemed to them just unbearable. The participants of the legion were offered the choice either to return to their homelands or remain in Italy, yet taking shelter in the empire emerged as a third option beyond these alternatives. Shortly afterward, Garibaldi's Expedition of the Thousand took place, again receiving support from Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts based in the Sublime State. The aftermath of the campaign, however, unearthed the long-standing divisions among the founding fathers of Italy. The ideological rift between Garibaldi's radicalism and Cavour's moderation found echoes among

¹¹⁷⁴ István Kornél Vida, "The True Cause of Freedom: The Kossuth Emigration and the Hungarians' Participation in the American Civil War," (Phd Diss., University of Debrecen, 2008), 71.

¹¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 325, 335.

the Hungarian émigrés, who would find themselves caught in a back-and-forth, torn between their admiration for Garibaldi and their allegiance to Sardinia.¹¹⁷⁶ For the converts, the situation was even more complicated, as their fractured allegiance extended beyond the political divisions in Italy, also involving loyalty to the Sultan. In this context, Kossuth's alignment with Sardinia's safe harbors further alienated his opponents, including some revolutionary converts. When the southern army disbanded, the volunteers of the Hungarian Legion faced another difficult decision: they were either to be subsumed under the Italian army or eliminated if they chose to opt for Garibaldi. This is precisely the context in which Jusztiánián was captured and his interrogations were recorded.

Charles Tilly proposes that the mere presence of uprooted masses is not sufficient to provoke insurgence, emphasizing the necessity of mobilization and organization in canalizing collective action.¹¹⁷⁷ The revolutionary organization overwhelmingly composed of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who converted to Islam is the one Jusztiánián disclosed to the Ottoman authorities, Garibaldi's Glory of Sword, whose details were given in the previous chapter. Regardless of whether Jusztiánián's testimonies fully represent the political priorities of all the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who converted to Islam, the political discourse he exhibited was an appropriation, one he may not have even fully agreed with himself. In this way, it illuminates the collective experiences of a generation of revolutionary converts and their perception of the world around them. His testimonies, though reflective of his singular experience, illuminate broader patterns of an alternative revolutionary tradition insofar as his experiences find parallels in the biographies of many other refugees and converts, his narration is consistent with the real historical events and figures, and the arguments he put forward are symptomatic of the shifting political and social dynamics of his

¹¹⁷⁶ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 127.

¹¹⁷⁷ Lynn Hunt, "Charles Tilly's Collective Action," in *Vision and Method of Historical Sociology*, ed. by Theda Skocpol (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 249-250.

time. Jusztenián's discourse in this sense is framed within a specific language and terminology, shaping the way individual consciousness is expressed, while no less reflecting collective forms of expression.¹¹⁷⁸ As such, his discourse offers a glimpse into an alternative constellation of knowledge and social power, where the converts accumulated experiences, shared them within their peer groups, and ultimately produced a more egalitarian and decentralized political approach.¹¹⁷⁹ Finally, we can start to evaluate this language itself as a subject of analysis, as it crystallizes all the experience discussed so far and reflects the corresponding identity shift.

4.3. The Political Discourse of the Revolutionary Converts

Emerson: "Henry, why are you here?"
Thoreau: "Waldo, why are you not here?"

The imagined community of any given human group is socially constructed through the perception of its constituents in response to shared experiences, implying a dynamic process in which the idea of togetherness is interpreted again and again as the circumstances change. Accepting the fluid nature of national identities, which must be all the more so in the nineteenth century, is not only crucial to avoiding essentialization in academic writing but also enables the re-identification of critical moments that are constitutive in terms of the self-fashioning of individuals and groups. Against the background of its specific historical circumstances, this section asserts that, after undergoing a series of traumas, (including defeat on the battlefield, seeking asylum for fear of harsh punishment, choosing the bitter path of conversion, ostracization within their former peer group and physical separation from them, coming to terms with the Other, material advantages of the new lives, and the repeated disappointments

¹¹⁷⁸ Kaspar von Greyerz, "Ego-Documents: The Last Word?" *German History* 28, no. 3 (2010), 275.

¹¹⁷⁹ For my inspiration for this idea see Margriet Hoogvliet and Sabrina Corbellini, "Writing as a Religious Lieu de Savoir," *Le foucaldien* 7, no. 1 (2021): 4, 2, <https://doi.org/10.16995/lefou.92>.

with the political and military measures of the leadership in exile), fractures in the personalities and crises in the identities of the Hungarian and Polish converts got underway in the Ottoman Empire, gradually converting their identities and political allegiances in accordance with their individual and collective interests. More bluntly, the process reflected how they perceived the world around them and how they made sense of the contemporary state of affairs in which their particular interests were submerged.

The processes in the making of their identity were not linear, progressing from one particular point in the past to another definite point, but rather involved uncontrolled shifts and reversals, leading to new settlements and negotiations across various geo-cultural contexts. Indeed, studies suggest that diasporic identities are bound to get torn between the memories of the homeland left afar and the pressure to comply with the value system of the host country.¹¹⁸⁰ Speaking of values, the most crucial turning point in the biographies of the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts was the decision to adopt Islam on Ottoman soil, which opened up a new cultural nexus, encompassing its own system of meanings, symbols, and practices that shaped the everyday life of the 48ers. Yet it never meant a wholesale renunciation of the previous set of codes, as Smith suggests, even the most thorough ruptures are not liable to destroy the sense of continuity and common ethnicity in people's consciousness.¹¹⁸¹ Simply, the converts did not "turn Turk" overnight, switching from one set of beliefs and ethnic identity to another that are culturally antagonistic cannot be "achieved" instantly, even if the motives were entirely sincere. In any case, the tension was pathologically out there, one modality of which manifested itself in their negotiations with the new cultural environment, where the dogmas of the Orient conflicted with the tangible reality of the Orient in their first-hand experiences.¹¹⁸² The tension

¹¹⁸⁰ Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Emigres and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 223.

¹¹⁸¹ Retrieved from Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 150.

¹¹⁸² Said, *Orientalism*, 222-223.

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was presumably destructive enough to eventually bring about a breakdown in their worldview and the ways of making sense of their experiences, until another ideological influence captivated them. For many, holding on to Turkish soil as a safe haven, both literally and figuratively, outweighed other alternatives as the best way to tackle all the ups and downs of the second half of the nineteenth century, which had the converting effects on them in return.

These individuals were able to participate in another community that connected them to another past and present, ultimately generating a vision for the future.¹¹⁸³ However, it is indefensible to insist that religious conversion did strictly determine their political identities and discourses uniformly, though it provided another foundation upon which a plausible ideology could be constructed. Along with conversion, the Tanzimat Era of the empire provided the refugees with the social and cultural space, where the dissidents could autonomously "develop their distinct social arrangements, cultural traditions, and explanations of the world around them."¹¹⁸⁴ It is the ideology that expresses the self-interests of the converts in a constantly changing social practice, if we follow the definition of ideology as "a set of beliefs that seems to serve and shape the interests of a certain group in society; has a legitimating/justifying function; and has the power to control or influence how people think about, or act in, their social circumstances."¹¹⁸⁵ It is safe to suggest that the converts had accumulated enough experience and maturity by the 1860s to produce their own ideological discourse, both as a justification of their deeds in reference to the past and an effort to bend the existing circumstances for their collective benefit. This discourse primarily aimed to transform the existing power relations and redirect the social processes in their collective interests.¹¹⁸⁶

¹¹⁸³ Rambo, *Understanding Religious*, 2.

¹¹⁸⁴ Moore, *Injustice*, 482.

¹¹⁸⁵ Gordon Bailey and Noga Gayle, *Ideology: Structuring Identities in Contemporary Life* (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003), 23.

¹¹⁸⁶ Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism*, 48.

Among many other things, the case study of Jusstinián Károly (Hüseyin) and Antal Schneider (Hüseyin Faik) unequivocally demonstrates that the split between Lajos Kossuth and General Józef Bem (Murad Pasha) in 1849 (also between Mehmed Sadık and Zamoyski) over the question of conversion had far-reaching consequences in the next decade for the political emigration of the Hungarian and Polish revolutionary circles to the extent that the heirs of the latter still continued their revolutionary quest for the liberation of their countries independent from the followers of the rival factions in tune with their later acquired identities. Was it possible for the discourse to remain unchanged even if the movement fragmented?

Vakalis observes that the interrogees in the Tanzimat era perceived the newly introduced courts more like fora than official authorities, as their language on the records carried more unofficial tones.¹¹⁸⁷ In a similar vein, Jusstinián not only elaborates on his political activities across multiple national and imperial contexts but also offers important insights into the mindset of a young insurgent, while reflecting no less the evolving mentality of the converts who had been living in the empire for over a decade. Full of revolutionary celebrities, public affairs, and diplomatic developments, Jusstinián's testimonies give vent to the intense emotions and the mindset of these people in response to the developments of their time. Even though the officials interrogating Jusstinián openly displayed their indifference to his political revelations and the motives that animated his activities, he still managed to articulate and record these thoughts and feelings, which we will now analyze.¹¹⁸⁸ As we have already emphasized in the first chapter where we explained our methodology of processing interrogation protocols, it is important to take the uncontrolled leaks during the interrogation process into account. Even though making sense of these revelations can at times be

¹¹⁸⁷ Anna Vakalis, "Tanzimat in the Province: Nationalist Sedition (Fesat), Banditry (Eşkiya), and Local Councils in the Ottoman Southern Balkans (1840s to 1860s)" (PhD diss., University of Basel, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2019), 194.

¹¹⁸⁸ Even though Jusstinián talks about political issues, the interrogator never engages such a dialogue. He rather asks: "Politika maddelerini neden beyan ettin idi? Onların ifadesinde sebep nedir?" ("Why did you declare the political issues? What is the reason in their expression?") BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

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challenging because Jusztenián's ideological commitment does not neatly align with any orthodoxy, a closer examination of his political discourse will reveal a meaningful whole out of what may initially seem like a series of haphazard revelations. In this way, the voices of the converts can be heard primarily through their own words, which present a unique opportunity to cast light on an alternative political vision of Hungarian and Polish patriotisms in the beginning of the 1860s. This vision not only *diverged* from the mainstream nationalist views of the Hungarian and Polish leaderships in exile but *stood in contrast* to them.

The political discourse that Jusztenián depicted in his testimonies was ultimately grounded in opposition to the sheer Catholicism defended by Napoléon III, Emperor of the French, along with his allies Count Cavour, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and Lajos Kossuth, the best-known Hungarian leader in exile. The opposition among the Polish converts was directed primarily at the Parisian elites, first and foremost Zamoyski, along with their allies, including the French-backed Catholic missionaries that secured quite an impact on the Polish exiles in the Ottoman Empire, as well as Piedmont-Sardinia. These countercurrent discourses were also manifestations of an accommodation of the revolutionaries' particular objectives with the interests of the Ottomans in a quite heterodox way. Strikingly, the discourse also informed their intellectual output, as we will mention in reference to other works made by other converts. Let us break down the main tenets of what this study calls the convert school of thought.

4.3.1. Diagnosing The Disease: The Legacy of Bem Against Domestic Aggressors

A new diagnosis and appropriate remedy for miseries are necessary for any given oppositional movement against oppression to explain the reasons for undeserved suffering while the sense of outrage starts to predominate within the group. While the diagnosis calls for

a redefinition of friends and foes, which also governs the self-definition of the community members, generating a counterculture supplies the ingredient to overturn the moral authority of the oppressors, who propagate the illusion that misery is inevitable because people are inclined to tolerate pain when it seems unavoidable, no matter how painful it may be.¹¹⁸⁹ At the beginning of the 1860s, the Hungarian and Polish converts seemed to have clung to the legacy of Murad Pasha, whose conversion had offended and infuriated the upper echelon of the respective nationalist movements more than a decade ago, against their rivals, particularly Kossuth and Zamoyski, whose political choices, according to the converts, had caused great harms. These harms were most deeply felt at the lower ranks of the emigrations. Even though he had already died in 1851, the personality of Murad Pasha played a vital role in converging the political identities of the Hungarian and Polish converts in the empire in the years to come, irrespective of their ethnic origins. In that regard, Bem's conversion was more than a momentous act, it left a movement behind.

The fact that Jusstinián was discreet in renouncing Kossuth as a leader in his interviews and interrogations may seem like a mere manipulation at first glance, yet a more astute observation hints that his renunciation was not accidental. He made it very clear that his revolutionary faction, composed of Hungarian and Polish converts settled in the Ottoman Empire, was resolutely withstanding the political influences of the rival factions gathered around figures like Kossuth, Klapka, and Zamoyski, while hauling the legacy of Murad Pasha well into the 1860s. The very first interview of Jusstinián upon his immediate starts with questions about his identity, including his place of birth, occupation, and religion.

My name is Hüseyin. My father's name is Colonel Hüseyin Bey. I am twenty-one years old. My country of origin is the town of Baranya in Hungary, yet eleven years ago we went to Istanbul with my father during the Hungarian War. We reside in Ortaköy in Istanbul. I am studying at school for now.¹¹⁹⁰

¹¹⁸⁹ I borrowed this framework from Moore, for the related pages see Moore, *Injustice*, 82, 87, 88, 458, 459, 462, 485.

¹¹⁹⁰ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

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Then, he says that his father "converted to Islam on their way to Aleppo with Murad Pasha, whom they called General Bem," and continues, "three months ago, when I went to Dersaadet from the Italian school, my father brought a few neighbors and an imam and made me Muslim. And I am Muslim now."¹¹⁹¹ At this phase, he does not even mention Kossuth, who was supposed to be the leader of the whole emigration, in contrast to clearly connecting his political tradition to Murad Pasha, which foreshadows the coming ideological breakdown. In fact, he does not speak of Kossuth until the fourth interrogation, when he confrontationally labelled Kossuth and Pulszky as those "who are responsible for the earlier humiliation of Hungary."¹¹⁹² The way Jusstinián refers to Bem and Kossuth also causes us to think that the image of Murad Pasha as a charismatic persona still continued to play a role among the converts, not only in shaping their group identity but also in recruiting new members, as Jusstinián represented the following generation of converts, though the leader had not involved with conversion of others.¹¹⁹³

But what did Jusstinián mean by the humiliation of his motherland? From the beginning of his political career, the authority of Kossuth had never been uncontested. The support of the magnates for the revolutionary cause remained only partial for one thing, though two instances were exclusively decisive in leaving deep wounds on the souls of the converts: the failure of the Hungarian War of Independence with its aftermath in exile and the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859. The unjustified decisions of the leader from the military point of view were not immune from resentment among the chief-of-staff; Kossuth had disputes with Artúr Görgei (1818-1916) and Józef Bem even before the exile. His decision to turn the command to Henryk Dembiński (1791-1864) infuriated Görgei, who laid the arms down at the end, while Bem was in favor of the continuation of the struggle. For Mehmed Sadık Pasha, the onslaught of the

¹¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁹² BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹¹⁹³ Rambo, *Understanding Religious*, 113.

victorious Russian and Austrian armies before the retreating Hungarian army compelled Kossuth to appoint Bem as the commander of the army, yet it came too late because it should have been made from the outset.¹¹⁹⁴ Even though Kossuth faced yet another opposition in the early days of his sojourn in Vidin, where Mór Perczel (1811-1899) openly challenged him, the most serious blow to his authority occurred when his fellows converted to Islam by the score, following the footsteps of Bem, vitiating his authority among the refugees unprecedentedly.¹¹⁹⁵ Later on, when Kossuth got back to Europe from America, his influence over the exiles in Paris and London had been considerably diminished.¹¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, he was a remarkable survivor. He gave a greenlight to the conspiracies in Hungary in 1851, yet the attempts only caused sufferings to compatriots.¹¹⁹⁷ At the beginning of the decade, Kossuth claimed for his leadership among the refugees by forming an alliance with the radical republicans, including Alexandre Ledru-Rollin (1807-1874) and Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) in London, aiming to promote revolutionary movements across Europe. He also collaborated with Polish democrats, including Stanisław Gabriel Worcell (1799-1857), opponents of the conservative faction in Paris, for mass demonstrations in the mainland.¹¹⁹⁸ While Mazzini staged plans for insurrection in Austrian-held Lombardy, Kossuth urged his compatriots in Hungary to rise up in arms once again through underground setups. Together with Lajos Winkler, István Türr took part in this endeavor by encouraging the Hungarians from the Austrian army to desert.¹¹⁹⁹ Settled in Switzerland after the Revolution of 1848, Klapka was also in tune with these attempts, which turned out to be a failure.¹²⁰⁰ The failure of the Milan uprising of 1853 resulted in agony among the Italian exiles, significantly diminishing the popularity of radical

¹¹⁹⁴ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, 156-157.

¹¹⁹⁵ Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı*, 146-147.

¹¹⁹⁶ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 99.

¹¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 89.

¹¹⁹⁸ Peter Brock, "Joseph Cowen and the Polish Exiles," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 32, no. 78 (December 1953): 57.

¹¹⁹⁹ Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 65.

¹²⁰⁰ Ibid., 16.

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republicanism. In return, Kossuth's alliance with the republican agitation caused great harm to his followers at home due to his imprudent attempts; this time even his mother and sisters suffered under the autocratic regime in Austria in 1853.¹²⁰¹

It is widely argued that numerous revolutionaries converted to Islam in the belief that a war might break out between the Russian and Turkish empires, which could also present new opportunities for the revolutionary aims in Hungary and Poland. The prophecy came true. When the Crimean War erupted, Kossuth and Klapka intended to trigger another uprising in Hungary owing to the war efforts of the Ottoman Empire, yet no revolution did take place either. Quite similarly, the fractures between the Polish leaders in Paris and Czajkowski in Constantinople, which had already begun before the Revolutions of 1848, persisted during the same war. Even though the Porte permitted the Polish exiles to form their military units within the Ottoman army under the separate commands of Sadık Pasha and Zamoyski—the division speaks for itself—the outcome of the war did little to advance the Polish Question. The Polish émigrés felt left alone, much like the Hungarians would do a few years later, despite earlier promises by the allied powers to raise the Polish issue on the international stage.¹²⁰² In fact, the most disheartening defeat for the Hungarian exiles dispersed all over the world came with the end of the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859. The peace of Villafranca dashed all the hopes of the patriots, as the revolutionary plots did not endow anything with the Hungarian Question despite the mobilization against Austria following the appeals of the Hungarian National Directorate to come to the aid of Sardinia in the hope of initiating a revolution in Hungary.¹²⁰³

These failures explain Jusztnián's negative remarks in his interrogations about Kossuth and Pulszky, "who are responsible for the earlier humiliation of Hungary." As a recurring pattern, the tendency to accuse the upper echelons of failures finds its parallel among the Polish

¹²⁰¹ John Bassett Moore, "Kossuth: A Sketch of a Revolutionist II," *Political Science Quarterly* 10, no. 2, 1895, 289.

¹²⁰² Antonowicz-Bauer, *Polonezköyü Adampol*, 28.

¹²⁰³ Moore, "Kossuth," 290. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 21.

converts, unfolding comparable sentiments. "Wladislaw Zamoyski's fantasy must have been so vast. Wretched Poland! It hurt my heart to see the Jagiellon Dynasty and the Polish name that fell," mourns Sadık Pasha, who laments that the liberation of his motherland was paralyzed by the clumsiness of Zamoyski and his exaggerated reverence for the Catholic creed.¹²⁰⁴ With their ways of handling the issues, he suggests additionally, the decisions and actions of the policymakers in Paris merely served the interests of other nations. According to Mehmed Sadık's memoirs, the Parisian elite instructed him to contact the Circassian and Tsakhur leaders, Imam Shamil (1797-1871) and Daniyal Sultan (1803-1873), as well as to seek potential connections with the British rule in India through Iran and Herat. "According to this instruction," argues Sadık Pasha, "we subserved in the Caucasus to the British and Roma Catholic Church interests, not to the interests of nationalists of Türkiye and Poland."¹²⁰⁵

In brief, the failures of the European-based revolutionary leaderships in bringing independence and liberation and peace and security to Hungary and Poland resonated with the converts, explaining the negative emotions echoed in the testimonies of two converts Jusztenián (Hüseyin) and Sadık Pasha (Czaykowski). The accumulated outrage against the rival factions was on the verge of bursting, as the converts constituting the lower cadres of their national movement could no longer tolerate the authorities of the leaders based in London, Paris, and Turin. On the contrary, they undertook to define their identities in opposition to them. This explains why the unjustifiable political considerations and actions of the figures who assumed the leadership over the whole emigration came under heavy criticism for being overly aligned with the interests of third countries. The miscalculations of the revolutionary elites aroused a powerful impetus for the converts to decisively part their ways with the mainstream at the end, yet the redefinitions of friends and foes had wider ramifications.

¹²⁰⁴ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, 146.

¹²⁰⁵ Ibid., 135-136. Also see, "We turned out to have worked for the Italians, Hungarians, and English, not for Poland. And we gave up what could have been best for our motherland on purpose." Ibid., 149.

4.3.2. Critiques of the Political Uses of Catholic Faith: Anti-France and Anti-Sardinian Front

While formulating their own political discourse, the Hungarian and Polish converts on Ottoman soil not only broke away from their former leaders, who were indifferent to their real situations, but also from the network of alliances and the cultural underpinnings that went along with them. In other words, the converts sought to reverse the cultural standards imposed from above, and above which the domestic aggressors stood with their allies in high politics, eventually aiming to undermine the entire system of power, through which they were repressed. Targeting the source of solidarity represents one of the cultural aspects of political resistance.¹²⁰⁶ While supplanting the older cultural codes, partly rooted in Catholicism, with newer ones based on the principles of the Tanzimat through conversion to Islam, converts' desire to reconcile with the objectives of the Porte is striking, especially considering that confessional lines within the empire were deeply influenced by Great Power politics during this period. As the converts incorporated new moral standards into their rebellious culture, their opposition to the custodian of the Catholics in the Ottoman Middle East was consistent. Indeed, much to France's dismay, softening French preponderance over the Catholic population of empire was on the agenda of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who tried to establish direct relations with the Pope in 1847.¹²⁰⁷

In his first interrogation in Constantinople, Jusztenián denounces everything one way another related to the French. To begin with, he puts forward that both the Austrians and the

¹²⁰⁶ Moore, *Injustice*, 87.

¹²⁰⁷ Enrico De Leone, *L'impero Ottomano nel primo periodo delle riforme (Tanzimât) secondo fonti italiane* (Milano: Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università di Cagliari, A. Giuffrè Editore, 1967), 158-159.

French do not appreciate erudite Muslims, according to his observations in France and Italy.¹²⁰⁸

He testifies to have personally witnessed the hostile attitudes of the French government against the Porte in Turin, where he reportedly had frequent meetings with the officials from the French embassy. Asked about the reason for his visits to the French diplomats there, Jusstinián replies that it was once in a while he had interactions with figures such as Kossuth and Pulszky, he saw the French officials with them.

I used to get acquainted with Kossuth and Pulszky and others who were responsible for the earlier humiliation of Hungary, and even the French ambassador's officials were sometimes present with them. In this occasion, I met them [the French officials] and understood their opinions.¹²⁰⁹

In this instance, Jusstinián diligently insinuates the affinity between the Hungarian leaders in Italy and the French government that held cultural perceptions hostile to the Muslims. He does not fail to address that the imperial ambitions of France were endangering the integrity of the Sublime State, to which his loyalty was allegedly rested. Accordingly, the French emperor's crusader-like mentality manifested itself in Lebanon, where the sectarian clashes between Maronite Christians and Druzes provided France with the pretext to provoke European intervention in July 1860, just a year before the interrogation. Quite interestingly, from the previous generation, another revolutionary convert was actively involved in this conflict, Ismail Pasha. Even though he was entrusted with maintaining the order in Syria, the French did not recognize his authority, leading to his protests and resignation, while the General Beaufort took a hard line with the Druzes.¹²¹⁰ This connection is another clue that strengthens the observation that Jusstinián's statements were not individual fantasies but had a collective dimension,

¹²⁰⁸ BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹²⁰⁹ "Macaristan'ın mukaddema izlâline sebep olan Koşut ve Poliski ve sairî dahi var ise ben bunlar ile ülfet ederdim ve bunların yanında dahi Fransa elçisi me'mûrları dahi bazen bulunur idi. Bu münâsebetle görüşüp efkârlarını anladım idi." Ibid.

¹²¹⁰ Ròbert Hermann, András Joò, Kálmán Mészáros, István Seres. *Türkiye'de Kendilerine Sığınma Hakkı Tanınan Macar Mültecilerinin Özyaşamlarından Özetler*, trans. Yılmaz Gülen (Budapeşte: Macar-Türk Dostluk Derneği, 2010), 57.

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offering insights into the origin of the discourse and reminding our discussions of the transmissions of the collective memory.

Building on this experience, Jusztenián suggests that the French continued to desire ethnic clashes between Christians and Muslims to make use of such conflict as an excuse to attack Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. His anti-French salvo is almost never-ending. He also provides an example from the Balkans to illustrate France's provocations against the empire in the area. Accordingly, the spread of Catholicism in Bulgaria was the result of the provocations of France and Austria.¹²¹¹ This agitation was supported by the Polish monarchists in Paris and Cavour in Turin.¹²¹² As a Hungarian patriot, it would not come as surprising that Jusztenián's views on Russia and Austria appear negative, but his anti-French tirades, even without being asked, seem puzzling at first sight. Nevertheless, when his statements are taken as an expression of the political imagination of the revolutionary converts, their efforts to articulate their particular interests and the broader interests of the Ottomans become undeniable. The message is that the followers of Murad Pasha would not be expected to comply with the government that agitated Catholics in Mount Lebanon and in the Balkans to weaken the grip of the Tanzimat State, on which they depended.

The political engagement with France was equally a matter of dispute for the Polish refugees and converts on Ottoman soil. Although the Polish opposition in the nineteenth century was diplomatically quite effective almost everywhere in Europe, it cannot be denied that the Paris-based monarchists led by Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770-1861) were often inclined towards the politics and culture of the French.¹²¹³ As the principal representative of

¹²¹¹ A nationalist faction came to exist at the time mainly in Salonica, Bitola, Tulcea, and Plovdiv aiming to spread Catholic faith among the Bulgarians against the influences of Hellenism and Pan Slavism. For more information see Daniela Kalkandjieva, "Bulgarian Eastern Catholic Church," in *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Lucian Leustean (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 681–703. Eduard Engelhardt, *Tanzimat*, trans. Ayla Düz (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976), 119–123.

¹²¹² Robert A. Berry, "Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert and the Great Powers in the Balkans, 1832-1848," *The International History Review* 7, no. 1 (1985), 52. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 325. Rather, the British interests were against the Catholic propaganda among the Bulgarians. *Ibid.*, 327.

¹²¹³ Berry, "Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert," 52.

the Hôtel Lambert, Zamoyski frequently came into conflict with Mehmed Sadık Pasha on Ottoman soil. The imposing attitudes of this faction did not appeal to the revolutionary converts. To illustrate, the centralizing attitudes over the Polish refugees backfired in the administration of the Polish colony in Constantinople. Established through the patronage of Czartoryski, the village was meant to be a Polish colony in Ottoman lands to lodge and support the freedom fighters escaping from Russia.¹²¹⁴ The Paris faction placed the administration of the colony under the oversight of Lazarist Priests, who expected the settlers to cooperate unquestionably.¹²¹⁵ However, the issue of administration remained a persistent source of internal conflict, as the (Ottomanized) settlers continually demanded more autonomy from the religious and political commissars, whose grudging and contemptuous attitudes were a matter of concern. While struggling with the centralist tendencies of the Paris, the residents were clinging to the Ottoman state. There is no doubt that Mehmed Sadık Pasha went to great lengths to secure the independence of the village, in line with his vision to curb the influence of the Parisian elites and the tutelage of the Catholic priests over refugees and converts in the Ottoman Empire. He adhered that the village be purchased and subsumed under the protection of the Porte. Upon his elimination, his successor Sefer Pasha (Władysław Kościelski) also took an autonomist stance, going further to suggest that the village be placed under Ottoman policing. Around twenty years after its foundation, the colony became finally independent from the Lazarists.¹²¹⁶

While the converts were crafting political discourses of their own in response to their interests within the existing power dynamics, they also strove to intellectually ground their political claims, engaging with knowledge production to justify their approaches. In that sense,

¹²¹⁴ The first initiative was sponsored by the bankers, whose close ties with the French officials were known. According to the nineteenth clause of the by-laws legalized in 1842, those who wanted to settle in the colony had to be Catholic, Polish, or Slav, along with a reference letter. Lucyna Antonowicz, *Polonezköyü*, 18-20, 22.

¹²¹⁵ Antonowicz-Bauer, *Polonezköyü Adampol*, 22-24.

¹²¹⁶ Ibid., 26-31.

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Mehmed Sadık Pasha's stance on Catholicism was thought-provoking. Arguing that his propositions are based on historical truth, he propounds that the adoption of Catholicism was a destructive decision of his ancestors, out of which political turmoil and human sufferings in Poland came to the fore since the shift distanced the Poles from their ethnic roots, replacing them with allegiance to the Catholic Church, to put it more bluntly, the tradition and culture of the Western civilization. On the one hand, their conversion provoked the wrath of the Slavs against the Poles, deepening the rift between them. On the other hand, since they could not fully integrate themselves into Germanic and Latin cultures while retaining certain aspects of their Slavic origins, the Poles failed to gain the full confidence of the Roman Church, which largely represented Germans and Jesuits. In return, the Teutons and Swabians seized every opportunity to humiliate the Poles. What the leaders dubbed "pursuing the political mission" was nothing but the insistence on tagging along the West, which had reduced the poor Poles to a mere toy in the hands of the Germans. This deception forced the nation to commit ever more mistakes while making it increasingly difficult to return to the truth.¹²¹⁷ "The bigoted Catholics," he noted elsewhere, "had long detested me" for insisting that the nation had been turned into a Slavophobic pawn. The Poles were alienated from the Eastern world. Eventually, this split led to the fall of Poland.¹²¹⁸ In fact, these views also deconstruct the traditional approach in the Polish and Hungarian narratives that these nations defended the Western civilization against the Turkish/Muslim incursions. Indeed, the Paris faction clung to the narrative that Catholic Poles were the guardians of Western civilization against the Russian threat.¹²¹⁹ While radically challenging the friend and enemy dynamics of the Poles and Hungarians, many of the converts openly attacked the French government under the leadership

¹²¹⁷ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*," 115.

¹²¹⁸ Ibid., 153.

¹²¹⁹ Barbara Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration, 1831–1871: The Challenge to Russia," in *L'émigration politique en Europe aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Actes du colloque de Rome (3–5 mars 1988)* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1991), 237.

of Napoléon III. In this context, Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha and Polish Hayreddin (Karol Karsky) pressured the editorial office of the newspaper *Basiret* to support the German side during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, which ultimately marked the fall of the French emperor.¹²²⁰ However, the Polish emigration kept supporting the host country in this war, despite the general disillusionment with France.¹²²¹

Hungarian and Polish converts held deep differences of opinion about the nationalist agenda set by the top leaders, who instrumentalized Catholicism to sustain their political hegemony, a strategy interpreted by the converts as self-serving. These exile leaders were allied with the imperialist rulers in France, whose shifting stance toward the Porte after the Crimean War was not comforting for the converts. Therefore, while severing ties with their former leaders, the converts simultaneously reassessed their stance toward those leaders' latest allies, who were perceived as new evils. In this context, although their opposition to Sardinia was not as pronounced as it was to France, the material available to us provides few evidence to suggest that the converts also broke with another ally of the European revolutionary leadership, Piedmont-Sardinia, viewing this rupture as the price of betrayal in 1859.

If the revolutionary committee that Jusztnián was a member parted its way from Kossuth and his allies in France, the logical outcome is that the converts must also have abandoned their cooperation with Count Cavour. The young revolutionary stresses his contacts with Hungarian leaders and French officials back in Turin prior to his participation in the conflicts in southern Italy. At one point during his interrogations, Jusztnián informs the interrogating magistrate that he waived his Sardinian passport in favor of the papers issued by the Sublime State, thereby emphasizing his allegiance to the Sultan.¹²²² As already demonstrated, conversion on Ottoman soil meant the annulment of earlier legal statuses,

¹²²⁰ Basiretçi Ali Efendi, *İstanbul'da Yarım Asırlık Vekayi-i Mühimme*, ed. Nuri Sağlam (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1997), 70.

¹²²¹ Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration," 244.

¹²²² BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

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including citizenship and subjecthood. While refashioning himself in front of the officials, Jusztinián brought this shift to undecidedly stress his negative feelings against Sardinia. What is more, one can also find other quotes indicating anti-Sardinia feelings among the Polish converts. Unlike the revolutionary elites in France, Mehmed Sadık Pasha had long been in favor of the cooperation with the Slavs rather than with Sardinia. Indeed, he had long considered the alliance between the Polish emigration and Sardinia to be a mistake, particularly in 1848. In line with this objective, he reminds how the Piedmontese ambassador and other Italian politicians unfairly placed the blame for Austria's victory in the Hungarian Revolution on the ineffectiveness of the Polish fighters in combat.¹²²³ In any case, the opposition to Sardinia was not articulated and formulated as substantially as the opposition to France, as there was, at that very moment in the spring of 1861, a noticeable confusion regarding the commitments of this kingdom within the émigré communities in the Ottoman Empire. After all, it was a period of daily-changing political balances, and confusion was inevitable.

Evaluating the confusion among the revolutionaries and converts on Ottoman territory requires to have a strong sense of the coeval developments in Europe, particularly related to national unification in Italy. It was not only the converts who were uncomfortable with the Franco-Sardinian alliance, through which Kossuth and Zamoyski sought advantages for their patriotic causes. The revolutionary developments between 1859 and 1861 also unfolded an important political divide between two prominent founding fathers of Italy: Giuseppe Garibaldi and Count Cavour. In terms of its consequences, the Second Italian War of Independence (1859) was a disaster for the Hungarian Legion, yet it was neither a complete victory for the Italian revolutionaries in the peninsula. On the contrary, it fueled anti-French sentiments because Napoleón III abandoned his allies by striking a separate armistice with Austria. Moreover, even though the emperor of the French did not fulfill his promises and obligations,

¹²²³ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*," 156.

he did not hesitate to annex Garibaldi's hometown, Nice, as a compensation for the military support he presented at the war. Cavour was also disturbed by this betrayal and even resigned, though he soon returned to his post and remained loyal to the kingdom's alliance with France. Nevertheless, this alliance continued to stumble the national aspirations since Catholicism played a special role in the foreign policy of the Second Empire. Indeed, the support of the Pope's followers at home was crucial for the French emperor, just as the standing of the Pontiff in Rome had to do with the bayonets of the emperor.¹²²⁴ That is how the question of Rome was linked to the revolutionary converts on Ottoman soil. Without the consent of the French government, thus, Garibaldi's aspiration to march into Rome could not be realized, as the matters with Cavour stood. As a matter of fact, the Expedition of the Thousand remained incomplete in Naples, and subsequently, Garibaldi's expedition to Rome in 1862 was thwarted by the Sardinian troops. Since we have already revealed the related events and chronologies, the discussion here is focused on the ideological ramifications of this split both for the Italian and Hungarian movements.

Although the outcome of the legendary military campaign of Garibaldi was the territorial unification of the country, the expedition simultaneously deepened tensions within the domestic politics, particularly with Cavour. Ensuring popular support, Garibaldi represented the romantic, dynamic, popular, and secular faction of the national movement, characterized by its anti-clerical and radically democratic stance, along with its charismatic persona. In contrast, Cavour represented the traditional, prudent, and moderate leadership, which had a more conservative, elitist, and aristocratic outlook, favoring a gradual and pragmatic approach to unification, aligning with the realpolitik, and safeguarding the balance of power in the countries surrounding Italy. While Garibaldi's position should not be conflated

¹²²⁴ George M. Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and The Making of Italy: June-November, 1860* (London: Longmans, 1928), 206.

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with Left of republicanism or socialism, neither should Cavour's be equated with reactionary conservatism or clericalism.¹²²⁵ The polarization between the figures manifested in the religious sphere. After all, the papacy under Pope Pius IX (1792-1878) posed a significant obstacle to the unification, given his role as the spiritual leader of the Catholic world, his influence over national divisions, and his control over Rome, which was regarded as the natural capital of the new nation. The presence of French troops in the Eternal City since 1849, tasked with safeguarding the Pope's rule, meant that any attempt to challenge papal sovereignty would risk provoking a diplomatic and military confrontation with France. In this regard, Cavour's political stance showed more respect for religious influence in higher politics, if not a direct attachment, compared to Garibaldi's. This was despite the fact that Cavour had significantly curtailed the political power of the Church in 1850 and 1854.¹²²⁶ His political strategy was to carefully manage diplomatic relations with both the Papal State and France, while treating religion in domestic politics more as a cultural and social convention. Staunchly anti-clerical, on the contrary, Garibaldi was not comfortable with the tutelage of the Church over Italian politics and favored republican and democratic solutions.¹²²⁷

The revolutionary battles in Italy would present new grounds for internal schisms among the Hungarian political exiles, indeed, the split between Cavour and Garibaldi in Italian domestic politics resonated among the opponents of Kossuth, particularly after the Expedition of the Thousand. Because this time, Garibaldi's persona offered new hopes to the revolutionaries disenchanted with the leaderships of Kossuth and Klapka. To the discomfort of both Cavour and Kossuth, several figures from the Hungarian and Polish exiles had fought

¹²²⁵ Denis Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict*, reprinted with a new preface (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2.

¹²²⁶ These reforms concerned the legal and financial relationship of the Church with the government. For these measures see Alberto Mario Banti, *Il Risorgimento italiano* (Rome-Bari: GLF editori Laterza, 2004), 98-99.

¹²²⁷ In fact, the victory of the one to the other gave birth to the famous reflection on passive revolution (*rivoluzione passiva*) thesis of Gramsci, who criticized Benedetto Croce's idealized approach of the Risorgimento and linked to the emergence of fascism. He asserted that the plea of the population for getting rid of the feudal order in the countryside was absorbed by the dominant classes, impeding the actual progress. Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento*, 2-3. Banti, *Il Risorgimento*, 141.

alongside Garibaldi, an experience that had left impacts on their political loyalties. As they admired him, they grew further apart from the privileged others, the revolutionary leaders in European capitals. To illustrate, Kossuth could get in touch with the Hungarian volunteers within the Garibaldian army of volunteers during the Expedition of the Thousand only in the autumn of 1860.¹²²⁸ As we recall, Jusstinián testified that when he ended up in Turin to get information from the Hungarian leaders, he found out that they did not know Garibaldi's whereabouts. Furthermore, the Sardinian policymakers prevented the national hero from further advancing beyond Naples and took concrete measures to undermine his influence among the lower ranks of the Southern Army in the fall of 1860. In carrying out these actions, they found willing associates. Cavour sought to win over the Hungarian fighters to marginalize Garibaldi, leveraging the influence of Kossuth. Besides, Kossuth took on the task of persuading the general to align his actions with Cavour's strategic goals. Nonetheless, this attitude only soured his relationship with Garibaldi, who set his mind on Rome—still held by the Papal State and protected by France. This contemplation led to another chivalrous enterprise in 1862. In line with his French and Sardinian allegiances, Kossuth did not support this expedition to Rome. According to him, the next move should be directed at the Ottoman Balkans.¹²²⁹ Because the leader of the Hungarian emigration believed that a possible war against the Habsburgs was on the horizon, however, "there was no war; and no revolution took place in Hungary," added yet another failure to the repertoire of Kossuth.¹²³⁰ At the end, the political adjustments of Kossuth in tune with the Sardinian and French interests further marginalized him from the converts who tended to gravitate towards Garibaldi.¹²³¹ Kossuth lost his closest ally when Cavour died on June 1861. Cavour proved to be the friendliest ally to Hungary, as

¹²²⁸ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 109.

¹²²⁹ Ibid.

¹²³⁰ Ibid., 109-110. Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 346.

¹²³¹ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 112.

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long as "it happened to be at war with Austria," points out István Deák, yet this judgement was likely shared by the converts too.¹²³²

Overall, the efforts of the converts to reassess their interests in relation to the complex networks extended beyond the rival factions and their immediate allies. Even the loosely connected partners of their adversaries were required to be scrutinized anew. Remarkably, the definitions of friends and foes of the converts never resided in essentialist interpretations of stereotypical portrayals. In addition to their personal experiences on the micro level, their perceptions were based on where their interests lay amidst the intricate webs of alliances and enmities on the macro level. Although their archenemies reasserted themselves in their political imagination in the early 1860s, their stance evolved in response to shifting alliances and power configurations in international politics.

4.3.3. Old Enemies: Austrian and Russian Empires

What could be more natural for the Hungarian and Polish converts to despise the Habsburg and Tsarist rules? It goes without saying that the converts harbored no benign emotions against the governments in both Austria and Russia, whose combined military efforts had decisively put an end to their revolutionary movements and pushed them into exile in the Ottoman Balkans. After all, it was the Austrian empire from whose territories the Hungarians sought to extract a nation-state, while it was the Russian empire that kept the Kingdom of Poland under occupation. In this sense, the liberation of Galicia connected the Hungarian and Polish revolutionary efforts, while simultaneously drawing Russia into an alliance with Austria against wind of change. In fact, all the "forces of change" came to comprehend after the

¹²³² Deák, *The Lawful Revolution*, 298-299.

revolutionary waves that the bulwark against progress was the Russian empire, a conviction that deeply permeated the political consciousness of that generation of revolutionaries.¹²³³

After disengaging his political position from the Cavour–Napoléon III axis, Jusztiánián tries to strengthen his pro-Ottoman image in the eyes of Turkish officials by means of his hostility towards the Habsburg Empire, the chief persecutor of the Hungarians. Beyond abstract notions, he was a deserter from the Austrian army at the time of his arrest in Ruse. Asked whether he had mentioned his desertion to Kossuth and Pulzsky near Turin, Jusztiánián proudly replies, "Yes, I did because saying that is a glory and pride to me."¹²³⁴ His hostile tone against the Habsburg state persists through his repeated repudiations in different times and places. He was asked in his first interrogation in Ruse how they disseminated the documents that he had brought with him from Istanbul to Giurgiu, according to the information obtained from the Austrian embassy. Jusztiánián answers, "since we are refugees, the Austrians can say anything about us; we do not recognize them."¹²³⁵ Later in Istanbul, while narrating how he was chased in Bulgaria by security guards working for the Austrian council, he recalls that when the guards came to capture him, he sought refuge with the governor, shouting back at them, "I do not recognize your embassy, this is my embassy!"¹²³⁶ A few lines later, he pleads not to be turned back by saying to the Ottoman officials, "if you inform the Austrian embassy that I am a military deserter, you will see how they would slap me into irons and kill me on the spot within twenty-four hours."¹²³⁷ Obviously, his determined resistance to evil occasionally gives way to

¹²³³ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 170.

¹²³⁴ "Evet söyledim çünkü bence söylemek bir şan ve iftihardır." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹²³⁵ "Fakat biz mültecilerden olduğumuz cihetle Avusturyalular bizim hakkımızda her türlü şey söyleyebilirler. Biz onları tanımıyoruz." BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

¹²³⁶ "ben sizin sefarethanenizi tanımam benim sefarethanem burasıdır diyerek" BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹²³⁷ "Benim askeri firarîsi olduğumu Avusturya sefareetine haber verin yakın beni nasıl alıp demirlere urup yirmi dört saat zarfında burada öldürürler." Ibid.

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a deep fear for his life. He urges the Ottoman officials not to let him aboard a ship operated by Austrian companies once he was about to be sent to Constantinople from Varna.¹²³⁸

Jusztinián seizes the opportunity to demonstrate how he was an enemy of the Austrians vis-à-vis a friend of the Ottomans, while negotiating and performing his identity. As a reminder of how the Porte was benevolent to the Hungarians, "because," says Jusztinián, "the Austrians are the enemies of the Sublime State because of its benevolence toward the Hungarians." He continues to remind that while the Austrians humiliated the Hungarians, the Ottomans promoted many of them to officer ranks, and the Hungarians are entirely enemies of the Austrians.¹²³⁹ Declaring his alliance with the Porte, Jusztinián continues his analysis. He contends that what the French desired was an ethno-religious clash and mutual killings between Christians and Muslims in the empire to amass troops in Dersaadet on that pretext, just as how they had recently accomplished in Damascus: "Of course, you would have already read the newspapers and seen it. That is how it happened in Damascus."¹²⁴⁰ Furthermore, the French occupation of Istanbul would follow the Russian invasion of Asia Minor from the Caucasus, emphasizes Jusztinián. In fact, there is nothing new in his anti-French discourse, which has already been analyzed above, though the way he connects it to an anti-Russian discourse is intriguing since it was not an imagination he accidentally brought up. By raising the issue of Russian aggression, Jusztinián might initially appear to be smartly tapping into the traditional apprehension deeply rooted in the Tanzimat rulers toward their traditional enemy because one of the foreign policy objectives of the Tsars was to encroach toward the south at the expense of the Ottomans to eventually seize Istanbul. In its specific context, however, Jusztinián implicitly refers to the rapprochement between France and Russia that started to emerge just

¹²³⁸ Ibid.

¹²³⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁴⁰ "Ve Rusyalı dahi Fransızlı ile müttefikdir. Nasıl Şam fıkrası yaptı ise İstanbul'da dahi öyle bir şey yapıp asker dönecektir ve siz dahi elbette gazeteleri okuyup görmüşsünüzdür. Şam fıkrası öyle olmuştur." Ibid. For an example see "The French Expedition to Syria," *The Times* (London), 9 August 1860.

after the Crimean War, after which rumors about a possible Russo-Ottoman war never lost their momentum in diplomatic circles.¹²⁴¹ Jusztinián's negative interpretation of Russia, in this sense, was not merely nourished from an unchanged anxiety over time but rather reflected an evolving stance in relation to contemporary issues. After placing France at the center of his critiques, the way he extends his political analysis not only to its immediate allies but also to its distant partner, while simultaneously seeking alignment with the political objective of the Porte, is particularly intriguing.

It was true that there was a continuous enmity among the converts against Russia, which had played a decisive role in suppressing the Hungarian War of Independence. This sentiment can be traced back to the founding figure, Murad Pasha, who hated Russia to the utmost level. Some even suggests his conversion to Islam in 1849 was ultimately driven by the prospect of a war against the Ottomans' northern enemy. In a petition to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1851, Ismail Pasha explained his ulterior motive for converting, which was the expectation of the Porte to declare war on Russia and Austria.¹²⁴² Traces of similar sentiment can also be found during the Crimean War, as Zarîf Mustafa Pasha reports in his memoirs that Hurşid Pasha hated the Russians, much like the Ottoman commanders.¹²⁴³ The anti-Russian stance continues to influence the political thinking of Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha much later on, manifesting multiple times in his book, *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes*.¹²⁴⁴ It is thus reasonable to suggest that while promoting their political discourse in line with their distinctive interests, the converts sought common ground with the Ottomans to render their goals more effective.¹²⁴⁵

¹²⁴¹ The possibility appealed to many unemployed soldiers, revolutionaries, and adventurers, drawing them to the Porte in search of a position in the Turkish army. Kuntay Gücüm, *İmparatorluğun "Liberal" Yılları (1856-1870)* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 133.

¹²⁴² Karpat, "Kossuth in Turkey," 178.

¹²⁴³ Ziya Enver, "Zarîf Paşanın Hatıratı 1816-1862," *Belleten* 26, no. 4 (1940): 492.

¹²⁴⁴ Mustafa Celâleddin Paşa, *Eski ve Modern Türkler* [Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes], 4th ed., trans. Güven Beker (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 91, 109-110, 112, 145, 148, 173, 194.

¹²⁴⁵ The only exception about the prevailing anti-Russian feelings among the sources that I processed appears in the figure of Mehmed Sadık Pasha, who meticulously avoids criticizing anything about Russia in his memoirs. He believes that the Russian government had no real interest in the refugees, seemingly forgetting why he converted to Islam. He sometimes puts forward unconvincing assertions, such as the dire necessity that the

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As a result, the old relationships reasserted themselves with new implications as the converts were getting integrated into a new sociopolitical order and adapted to its cultural contours. In this regard, it is remarkable how Jusztinián reconciles his anti-France and anti-Russia rhetoric within a pro-Ottoman framework, whose ideological implications needs to be discussed.

4.3.4. Remediating the Disease: Reconciliation with the Tanzimat State

Perhaps out of an urge for legitimacy or perhaps indicating just as honest expression, the self-narratives of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who sought refuge in the empire and converted to Islam, along with the biographies, academic works, and popular writings about them, are replete with references to their deep loyalty in serving the empire, an allegiance also echoed in archival documents of the time. It has been suggested that the only aim of Murad Pasha after conversion was to serve his new country and its sovereign, whom he paid great respects. Sultan Abdülmecid is said to have felt deep sorrow upon learning the death of the pasha.¹²⁴⁶ Commissioned with medals and honors, the so-called Hungarian Abdullah Bey (Karl Eduard Hammerschmidt) lived as a Muslim Turk who loved his country and nation. For one researcher, he never reverted to his former identity and took off his fez.¹²⁴⁷ Dedicated to a book for Sultan Abdülaziz, Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha advised him on policies to restore the strength of the empire. In a letter addressed to the Oriental Agent, Isa Saharin (Pruski) describes his relation to Poland and Türkiye as follows:

Russians faced during the Hungarian War of Independence to intervene reluctantly despite their heartfelt commitment to the Slavic uprisings during the People's Spring. The shift in his perspective remains open to discussion. It could be that he developed these views at a later point in his life and retrospectively projected them to the past memoirs because it is known that toward the end of his life he compromised with Russia. Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, 13, 59, 144.

¹²⁴⁶ Zafer Gölen, "Jozef Bem'in (Murad Paşa) Osmanlı Günleri," in *Türkiye-Polonya İlişkilerinde 'Temas Alanları' (1414–2014) Uluslararası Konferansı Bildiriler Kitabı*, ed. Hacer Topaktaş and Natalia Królikowska (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2017), 172–173. Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 166.

¹²⁴⁷ Ekrem Kadri Unat, "Macarlı Dr. Abdullah Bey (Karl Eduard Hammerschmidt) ve Türkiye'deki Çalışmaları," in *Türk Kızılayı'nın Kurucusu Dr. Abdullah Bey*, ed. Sefa Kaygılı (Ankara: Türkiye Kızılay Derneği, 2010), 27.

Poland is my mother and Turkey is my stepmother. The welfare and happiness of this country, which until the great night of my mother's resurrection I took as my second homeland, lies at my heart, therefore, as a Muslim, I have the right to meddle in everything, to praise the good and reprove the bad of it, not to sit idly by and make piastres, as some maintain.¹²⁴⁸

Declarations of loyalty from the lesser-known figures I have studied among the revolutionary converts in the empire are evident. Needless to say, Jusztinián repeatedly reminded his interrogators of his loyalty to his adopted country. The same goes for his godfather. In a petition to the Porte, Schneider points out how he sought refuge in the empire to ensure his safety, even while protesting the mistreatment he faced.¹²⁴⁹ No declaration is as explicitly manifest as in the very name of Mehmed Sadık Pasha, who explains as such:

I submitted a written petition to the Ottoman government that I had wanted to become a Muslim. I was given the name Mehmet Sadık Pasha. My second name meant "loyal" and was given to me at the suggestion of Fuat Efendi because I was loyal to Türkiye.¹²⁵⁰

This expression provides clues that the loyalty of converts was not the result of an abstract identification with the state or tight attachment to the Sultan himself, but rather emerged from concrete relationships. The material side of their loyalty originated in their political alliances they entered with the new class of the reformist statesmen in the empire. Upon employment, these revolutionary converts were integrated into the imperial polity, leading them to constitute the third category of the new Tanzimat statemen. The process of the identity transformation among the convert revolutionaries from the end of the 1840s to the early 1860s has already been empirically examined, likewise their concrete alignment within

¹²⁴⁸ I thank Aysen Kaim for the translation of this expression from the original source and sharing with me. For the original context see Agnieszka Aysen Kaim, *Ludzie dwóch kultur – wybrane przypadki transgresji kulturowej Polaków w Imperium Osmańskim w XVII, XVIII i XIX wieku* [People of Two Cultures - Selected Cases of Cultural Transgression of Poles in the Ottoman Empire (17th–19th c.)], (Warsaw: Instytut Sławistyki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2020), 240.

¹²⁴⁹ BOA., TO. 437/47, 09 May 1861, 1.

¹²⁵⁰ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, " 177.

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the new sociopolitical environment. But how about the relationship between this transformation and their ideological conditioning?

The processes of breaking away from their once-revolutionary leaders for the benefit of new political alliance with the Porte required adjustments in the ideological orientations of the converts. Once allied with the reformist statesmen, they were expected to dedicate themselves to the principles of the Tanzimat and *nothing more*. In more academic terms, the Porte *qualified* the refugees to perform their assigned roles, reflecting the dialectic of ideology; while they were subjected to a new order, the converts turned into subjects, *charged* with the reproduction and reformation of the social organization.¹²⁵¹ In other words, while serving as agents of change, their transformative impact was inherently circumscribed by the reform agenda itself, as they had to ensure the integrity of the empire.

Many converts fulfilled what was expected of them to do. They actively participated in the reform initiatives upon their concrete alignment with the policymakers in the Porte, who rescued them from persecution. Just to give an example, Magyar Abdullah gave lectures at the Imperial Military School of Medicine (*Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-yi Şahane*) on geology (first time in Türkiye), mineralogy, and medical zoology, subjects on which he gave birth to several works. He was also assigned as the director of the museum of natural history in Istanbul to make it organized. Titled Colonel in 1867, Abdullah took the first initiative to establish the Red Crescent in Türkiye into being next year, though his efforts did not yield immediate results.¹²⁵² Furthermore, the contributions of the refugees and converts to military were beneficial to the survival of the empire, particularly in supporting the state's efforts toward centralization, eliminating autonomous forces, to institute the Tanzimat reforms. While operating within the framework of the Tanzimat era and fulfilling the duties assigned during this reform period, the

¹²⁵¹ Therborn, *The Ideology of Power*, 16-17.

¹²⁵² Unat, "Macarlı Dr. Abdullah Bey," 20-26.

converts' formal activities can well be understood within its ideological context. It was known as Ottomanism (*Osmanlıcılık*), which advocated for the equal treatment of all ethnoreligious groups within the empire and directed their allegiance to the Sultan, aiming to save the empire from dismemberment. This interpellation must have appealed to the converts on the grounds that it entrusted solidarity to the territorially defined empire beyond the racial and confessional lines. Although the roles they fulfilled ex-ufficio *ultimately* reinforced the reform agenda and the political power of its pioneers, the converts also *directly* shouldered the responsibility of contributing to this ideological framework. When the Tanzimat statesmen inaugurated Lycée de Galatasaray in 1868 to promote political fusion between Muslims and non-Muslims under secular principles, Polish Hayreddin was among those who supported its establishment.¹²⁵³ Besides furthering military reforms in the areas of cartography and artillery, Mustafa Celâleddin served as a counselor for the rulers of the empire, owing to his intellectual prowess. Beginning his book with the advantages of the reform program under the heading "Reform or Tanzimat," he proposed to the Sultan that religious differences among the population be terminated in line with the principles of the Tanzimat to strengthen the empire internally, while fraternity and equality be the norm in this sense.¹²⁵⁴ The stimulation to reconcile the interests of the converts along with the lines of the interests of the country they later adopted is evident as a reminder of a quote from Bendix who suggests that "[t]o be effective, an ideology must appeal to other groups with their own interests, mentalities, and ideas; and emergent ideologies in each case are shaped by the existing stock of ideas, including those that give full play to or restrict sharply the pursuit of self-interest."¹²⁵⁵

¹²⁵³ Jerzy S. Latka, "Polonya Mültecileri ve Yeni Fikirler," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 91 (1991): 52. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1964), 189.

¹²⁵⁴ Mustafa Celâleddin, *Eski ve Modern Türkler*, 85-88. Also see *Ibid.*, 67.

¹²⁵⁵ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, "Theoretical Generalization and Historical Particularity in the Comparative Sociology of Reinhard Bendix," in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 143.

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4.3.4. Into the Practice: Conflicting Political Projects

The efforts of the converts went beyond simply managing perceptions of domestic and international allies and adversaries, while simultaneously reconciling their revolutionary intentions with the ideological and political imperatives of the Porte. After years of acculturation in the empire, the entry into a dominant culture, political solutions of the converts for the liberation of their distant homeland inescapably stood in contrast to those of their opponents in Europe. Indeed, the secondary literature provides insights into the numerous political projects within the Hungarian emigration in the early 1860s, which often conflicted due to competing leadership claims. The involvement of the Hungarian revolutionaries in the Italian peninsula only posed great challenges and complications for the leadership, who sought to lead the emigration from Turin. Of the many political projects that emerged in this chaotic environment, the so-called Danubian Confederation would eventually prevail within the higher ranks. Even though its roots went back to the negotiations for an alliance among Hungary, Wallachia, Moldova, and Serbia just before the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, or even to the Kütahya Constitution that Kossuth formulated in exile, it was brought up for public debate in the newspaper *L'Alleanza* in early 1862. Founded by Ignác Helfy (1830-1897) just recently, the newspaper started to reflect one of the strongest voices of the Hungarian emigration, primarily representing the perspectives of Kossuth's circle, until the *Ausgleich* in 1867.¹²⁵⁶ In accordance with the expectations of the French and Italian allies, the leadership suddenly made the plan public in the newspaper, shortly before Garibaldi initiated his expedition to Aspromonte for eventually seizing Rome.¹²⁵⁷ The confederation would initially consist of Hungary, Transylvania, Romania, and Croatia. However, Kossuth did not rule out the

¹²⁵⁶ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 201.

¹²⁵⁷ The newspaper itself was funded by Turin, thereby subordinated to its official policies. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 203. This confederation could also have benefited Italy commercially. Ibid., 219.

possibility of incorporating Serbia and other Southern Slavs. What he categorically left out were the Czechs and Poles to ensure the neutrality of Prussia and Russia.

The legislative body of the presumed confederation was to consist of one or two chambers. If the latter were preferred; the House of Representatives would be elected through separate elections in the constituent parts, in proportion to their populations, while the Senate would be convened with equal representation from all member states. The executive power was thought to be exercised by a Federal Council, which would be elected by the legislative body.¹²⁵⁸ The capital of the confederation would rotate among Pest, Bucharest, Zagreb, and Belgrade (and Kolozsvár was later included by Kossuth). The president of the state that hosted the capital at any given time would also function as the president of the entire confederation. Foreign policy and trade would be coherently and uniformly administered.¹²⁵⁹ The official language would be French, despite none of its constituents speaking it. Kossuth had the idea to install a Catholic King from one of the members of the Western European dynasties, someone whose absolutist inclinations would not endanger the confederation's prospects.¹²⁶⁰

Jusztinián's statements indicate that the converts were firmly opposed to the course of action to which Kossuth and his retinue were devoted in the early 1860s. At the time, numerous leadership claims emerged within the Hungarian emigration during the short period between Garibaldi's expeditions to Sicily and Rome. Even the positions of revolutionary leaders themselves such as Garibaldi, Kossuth, and Pulszky were surrounded by contradictions and ambiguities. In this regard, even if what Justinián criticized was not explicitly the confederation plan outlined above, it corresponded to a premature version during the evolution of that idea, which was actually negotiated during the preparations for the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859. Indeed, the discussion between Kossuth and Serbian Prince Mihailo included mentions of the

¹²⁵⁸ Ibid., 208.

¹²⁵⁹ Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 116.

¹²⁶⁰ Ibid., 117.

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idea of the Danubian Confederation.¹²⁶¹ Therefore, the plan for confederation along the Danube helps contextualize Justinián's ideological revelations.

For Juszinián, a Catholic King from one of the members of the Western European dynasties could be none other than Jérôme-Napoléon (1784-1860), the uncle of Napoléon III.¹²⁶² As will be remembered, during the negotiations of the 1859 war, Kossuth had personally offered the St. Stephen's Crown to Prince Napoleon. In this context, Count Karacsay appears in the narrative of Juszinián as the representative of the Kossuth's way in the Ottoman Empire. As a discursive strategy, Juszinián strikingly equates Karacsay with the principal enemy by labeling him an "Austrian" [*Nemçeli*], contrasting this with his own Hungarian identity, while also associating his opponent with the partisanship subservient to the French interests.¹²⁶³ The marginal position of Karacsay among the converts in Constantinople is confirmed by another source. In his separate interrogation, Matthias states that Karacsay was punished by the committee.¹²⁶⁴ It is important to note that the dispute between the two opposing groups was harsh and intense. In his final testimony, Juszinián asserts that while he was on a revolutionary mission in Romania with Viola, the rival factions, whose representative in Bucharest was Buda, reported them to the Wallachian police to ensure their arrest.¹²⁶⁵

It is not difficult to understand why the Hungarian leaders might have viewed France as a potential ally in their struggle for liberation because its emperor was sympathetic to the independence movements of young nations, based on *le principe des nationalités*. This policy reached its zenith in 1859, when France declared war on Austria in support of Sardinia, an

¹²⁶¹ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 327.

¹²⁶² "Napolyon'un amcasının oğlunu Macaristan'a kral ettirmesini ister" BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹²⁶³ Residing in Bebek Town in Istanbul, the "Austrian Karacsay" had been in Naples six months prior to the interview, Juszinián suggests. Ibid.

¹²⁶⁴ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3. After the defeat in 1849, Karacsay traveled to London and Paris before moving to Istanbul in 1854. Even though he criticized Kossuth later, he remained the agent of Kossuth in Istanbul for a long time. A biographical entry begins by highlighting his Catholic faith, distinguishing him from many other Hungarian refugees in the empire. Hermann et al., *Macar Mültecilerinin Özyaşamları*, 53.

¹²⁶⁵ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

event that marked one of the most decisive moments in the Risorgimento process. From this war onward, the plan for a military expedition of the Hungarian Legion, from Italy to Hungary through the Balkans, emerged as a recurring theme in the political aspirations of the émigré leaders, shaping their relations with both Italy and France. Due to the inconsistent disposition of its emperor, the Hungarian and Polish converts regarded France as hardly a plausible partner to put unreserved reliance on, particularly after 1859. At a time when the disappointing memories of the war were fresh, Jusstinián—if not pretending to be—exhibited strong criticism of the project to liberate Hungary through crowning a French monarch. He projected this course as part of the grand plans of the senior exiles such as Kossuth and Pulszky, "who were responsible for the earlier humiliation of Hungary." Frustrated by their disproportionate reliance on the Franco-Sardinian pact against Austria, Jusstinián confesses that the revolutionary committee, *Garibaldi's Glory of Sword*, aimed to crown an Italian prince in Hungary.

The aim of this company is to procure the independence of Hungary and to appoint one of the princes of Italy as its king, while never recognizing the state of France, not but what not to unite with the men who wanted Prince Napoleon to be appointed king of Hungary and whose head of the company in Istanbul was Count Karacsay.¹²⁶⁶

This monarch was to presumably secure the support of the Italian patriots for the Hungarian cause, contrary to the strategies orchestrated by the rival faction whose principal program was to make Napoléon III's uncle as the King of Hungary, thereby ensuring French support as the protector of Catholicism and the emerging nations in the Balkans.

Neither the overemphasis of the French foreign policy on Catholicism nor its role of custodian in the Balkans appealed to the converts. Unlike the émigré leaders in Europe, the convert revolutionaries had to consider their relationship with the Porte in their political

¹²⁶⁶ "bu kumpanyanın muradı Macaristan'ın serbestiği istihsâl ile İtalya beylerinden birini kral nasb etmek ve fakat Fransa devletini asla tanımayıp Prens Napolyon'un Macaristan'a kral nasb ettirmek emelinde bulunan ve İstanbul'da şirket başları Kont Karaçay olan adamlar ile birleşmemek." BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 2.

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engagements. For Jusztenián, the path the rival faction adhered to would place the Ottoman Empire in a significant danger, possibly dragging it into a war since if a French monarch became the King of Hungary, a conflict would break out between France and Austria. In such scenario, French troops would need to pass through Ottoman territory to aid Hungary, which would provoke Russian armies in the East to invade Anatolia.¹²⁶⁷ On the other hand, the bitter crushing of the Hungarian War of Independence in 1849 had impressed upon the revolutionaries the need for a great power to rely on.¹²⁶⁸ In this context, the Porte should emerge as a partner for the Hungarian converts in their struggle, if not France, along with the more embracing political lines of the cohesion ideology, *Ottomanism*, especially if they wished to maintain their cross-ethnic unity with the Polish converts. Conversion, therefore, solidified factional solidarity to the extent that the identity of the converts evolved, forging a distinct and harmonical sense of belonging, which ran against the rival faction in Europe.¹²⁶⁹ The political fantasies of the Hungarian leaders in Europe deliberately excluded the Polish Question from their action plans by 1861, as the political projects of Kossuth and Klapka could not contradict the interests of France, along with its new ally, Russia. Needless to say, the plan for the Danubian Confederation categorically excluded the Poles altogether not to provoke Russia. Even Cavour was unwilling to confer refuge upon the Polish revolutionaries in Romania, while the Hungarians fleeing Austria were not only allowed but also aided to participate in the Legion in May 1861.¹²⁷⁰ If one is referring to a homogeneous and unified group of Hungarian and Polish converts around 1861, it must be firmly envisioned that this group was largely converged

¹²⁶⁷ But the troops could have passed through Italy. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹²⁶⁸ In their temporary stay in Shumen, Kossuth delivered a speech to boost the morale of the refugees, in which he promised that their just cause would be supported by France and England. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler*, 135.

¹²⁶⁹ According to Moore, society is "the largest body of inhabitants in a specified territory who have a sense of common identity, live under a set of distinct social arrangements, and do so most of the time at a level of conflict well short of civil war." Moore, *Injustice*, 12. The largest body of inhabitants must include the Polish revolutionaries too, if the specified territory is the Ottoman Empire, the set of arrangements included the Reform Era, and the most important component of the identity was being a convert.

¹²⁷⁰ After learning of the Polish participants in the operation, Cavour ordered Cerruti to stop sending more Poles to Italy. Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 178.

within itself, simultaneously diverging from their Western counterparts. Their political vision, thus, must reflect on these tensions.

It is highly debatable whether the Ottoman Empire could be considered a great power in the nineteenth century, though there is significant evidence that at least some converts viewed it as a partner in their own national independence aspirations. Unlike the projects of the revolutionary leaders in Europe—embodied in the Danube Federation—the converts viewed broader integration under the Ottoman umbrella as more beneficial.¹²⁷¹ For Mehmed Sadık Pasha, it was necessary to establish a reserved force within the Ottoman army. Composed of Polish soldiers, this force could be readily mobilized in case of a war in Europe. "There were Polish soldiers in the Turkish army. We had to make use of this fact as much as possible; that was precisely what I longed for," clarifies Mehmed Sadık Pasha, outlining his plan of action. "Nevertheless, in Paris, they approached my ideas in a different way."¹²⁷² To illustrate, while the Pasha advocated for an alliance with the Cossacks, his rival saw them as enemies of the Catholics with utmost prejudices, fearing that such a partnership would divert Poland from Western civilization.¹²⁷³ Thus, Catholicism obstructed the integration of the Poles into the Slavic world for Mehmed Sadık Pasha. The idea of organizing Polish revolutionaries under the institutional framework of the empire had more profound implications:

The Catholics could not forgive me for assisting all the Polish converts to join the Turkish army and enter civil service. I will not lie, the fact that the Poles accepted to become Muslims for political purposes made me happy. Because this allowed me to make my compatriots and through them the Southern Slavs into the subject of the Turkish Sultan who was a relative to the Slav rulers on his mother's side.¹²⁷⁴

¹²⁷¹ However, the extent to which this unity was sincere and absolute, or merely considered a "transitional" phase, remains a separate subject of debate.

¹²⁷² Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*," 134.

¹²⁷³ Ibid., 116.

¹²⁷⁴ Ibid., 153.

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In general, the Polish program during the nineteenth century emphasized Serbia as the leading Balkan state among the Southern Slavs.¹²⁷⁵ Emerged by 1840, according to this program, the Balkans could host an independent center, preferably under the Ottoman suzerainty, embodying anti-Russian and anti-Habsburg stances, to eventually lead to an independent Poland.¹²⁷⁶ Following this grand scheme, Sadık's vision for Serbia was its unification with the empire under the personality of the Ottoman Sultan, to whom he claims a blood relation with the Slavs (through the Serbian rulers). Meanwhile, he envisions the Serbs leading a Southern Slavic Federation in the Balkans, an idea that ran against the projects of the exile leaders in Italy and France.¹²⁷⁷ "We could have dragged the whole Southern Slavs behind us for our unity," he grieves, and "Islam could have played a major role in that." However, everything he aspired to, he argues, was ruined because of the Catholic religion.¹²⁷⁸ Signaling elements of negotiation, he also suggests in his memoirs that the integration of Bosnia into his scheme (and the empire) was a lot easier given both the Slavic and Muslim character its population, while Catholicism in the area could balance the ambitions of France and Austria.¹²⁷⁹ These expressions highlight that the converts had internalized the cohesion ideology of the Tanzimat in the period under investigation.

The formula of unity across the imperial domains and solidarity with its ethno-religious communities was likewise upheld by other converts, who operated under the banner of the empire, while safeguarding its integrity in the Balkans under the authority of Sultan/Caliph. Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha provides intellectual depth to the idea of a united front in the Balkans against the potential hazards that might come from Russia.¹²⁸⁰ For starters, he opposed the separatist nationalisms in the region to stand up against Russian interventionism and the Pan-

¹²⁷⁵ Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration," 240.

¹²⁷⁶ Berry, "Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert," 52. Zlatanov, "Czajkowski's Christian Army," 47.

¹²⁷⁷ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*," 184.

¹²⁷⁸ Ibid., 154.

¹²⁷⁹ Ibid., 113.

¹²⁸⁰ Mustafa Celâleddin Paşa, *Eski ve Modern Türkler*, 67.

Slavic currents. For him, Russia was at the doorstep, waiting for a suitable moment to swallow and enslave the Balkan folks under false pretenses, just it had done with the Poles. The need to integrate non-Muslim subjects into the empire inspired him to generate the Touro-Arienne theory. Based on racial and linguistic grounds, he contends that the Turks were among the autochthonous peoples in Europe, a stance diametrically opposed to the approach aiming to drive the Turks to Asia.¹²⁸¹ Accordingly, the Turks were ethnically related to other European people as part of the one and the same ethnic family. One of the political connotations of this premise was to justify the ruling position of the Turks in the eyes of the insurgent Wallachian, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek constituencies of the empire. Another was to narrow the imagined racial gap distinguishing the Turks from Europeans. Because the policymakers in Europe discriminately classified their nations as stemming from the Aryan race, in contrast to the Turks.¹²⁸² In other words, Mustafa Celâleddin's racial theory can also be seen as an anthropological justification of the official ideology of the Tanzimat, while simultaneously as an attempt to redress the system of quasi-Aryan belief, at least for the Turkish race.

Crafted to mainly persuade the Balkan people, this theory was also self-reflexive, aiming to persuade its author himself. In other words, it was an effort to convince others of a representation that he had already internalized, as he must first be convinced to convince others. That is to say, Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha must have already confronted these intellectual discussions within his consciousness while attempting to make sense of his existence and identity in the new cultural environment after his conversion. Stressing the lack of study in this respect, Jerzy Łatka points out that Mustafa Celâleddin's personal background could be the prime reason behind his racial and linguistic theory. After all, he was brought up in a neighborhood where the value system carried a strong Catholic bias vis-à-vis Muslims, who

¹²⁸¹ Yusuf Akçuraoglu, *Türk Yılı 1928*, ed. Arslan Tekin and Ahmet Zeki İzgöer (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2009), 320-21.

¹²⁸² Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* first published 1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 345.

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were seen as "infidels, the great danger aiming to subjugate the Christian world."¹²⁸³ The situation was no substantially different for the Hungarian converts, who had been conditioned in their homelands to take a hostile attitude against the Turks and Muslims, an attitude inherited from their ancestors, who had long regarded themselves as protectors of European civilization. Destined to hate Muslims, the converts were likely to feel the urge to perforce the mental boundaries to better frame themselves within the tradition that they happened to adopt. In this sense, the supposed racial affinity between the Indo-Europeans and the Turks may have well served as a cognitive basis for Mustafa Celâleddin to ease his personal identification with a culture that was supposed to be the "other." As a result, reflecting concrete efforts of a revolutionary convert to reconcile the old and the new cultural elements on a deeper psychological level, the theory turned out to be interpellated to the Balkan people on the imperial level, from the perspective of an author who had experienced the similar tensions firsthand.

4.3.5. The Convert School of Thought: Anti-Imperialism at Its Apogee

Even though the converts collectively fostered a political discourse in response to their uneasy encounters with various geo-cultural domains, theirs nested wider political implications that extended beyond immediate practical necessities, as we previously hinted while discussing Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha's contributions to the ideology of Tanzimat or Mehmed Sadık Pasha's comments on the historical Catholicism of the Poles. Imbued with direct references to their own struggles and first-hand experiences, the language of the revolutionary converts signaled an alternative constellation of knowledge, which appeared as a meaningful whole if

¹²⁸³ He asks, "what positive words could he have heard about Islam during his two-year-study at the denominational school?" Jerzy S. Latka, *Lehistan'dan Gelen Sefirler: Türkiye-Polonya İlişkilerinin Altı Yüzyılı*, trans. Antoni and Nalan Sarkady (Istanbul: 1991), 47-49.

viewed in retrospect, as this study attempts to do. In this sense, it is the task of the researcher to piece the main points together for the sake of larger theorizing. At the height of their influence, the converts articulated a political discourse that sharply criticized the opportunist approaches of Western high politics in its relations with the Eastern societies. Though without clearly defining these terms, the converts presented the West (but often encompassing the ethno-religious policies of France, England, Italy, and their exiled collaborators) as a source of oppression, oligarchy, and opportunism, while sympathizing more with the ethos of the East (often implying the Turks/Muslims, Hungarians, and Slavs). Although labeling this political discourse as anti-imperialism may seem provocative at first glance, accepting that modern imperialism had not yet emerged (as a specific stage of capitalism) makes such a classification somewhat anachronistic.¹²⁸⁴ Quite similar to Hobsbawm's analysis of Luddism, the political stance of the converts can be evaluated as an early and vague form of resistance, born out of frustration, yet lacking a systematic ideological orientation in which to situate their reaction. It is safe to say that their individual and collective experiences gave way to a heterodox patriotism. Since this was the expression of a certain identity shift among the Hungarian and Polish converts, its substance was considerably antagonistic to their former leaders representing mainstreams.

The first lead that encapsulated the uneasiness of the converts with the political attitudes of European governments precedes even their refuge and conversion in the Ottoman Empire. Again, General Bem took the lead in this matter toward the end of the Revolutions of 1848, when Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries were abandoned to fend for themselves. No European power was eager to "lift a finger on behalf of Hungary."¹²⁸⁵ This was not only the moment when they were left to die, but also when the troops under the command of Bem

¹²⁸⁴ Similarly, terms like postcolonial critique and Third World are also problematic from a temporal perspective.

¹²⁸⁵ Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 290.

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trespassed into the Ottoman territory from Transylvania to disseminate proclamations, in which the silence of the European powers towards the Russian invasion of Hungary was condemned.¹²⁸⁶ Such statements and expressions of dissatisfaction were not intrinsic to the revolutionary converts. Although similar declarations were echoed by the Kossuth cabinet during the revolution, the resigned leader revised his discourse in exile, seeking opportunities to align with Western governments.¹²⁸⁷ Even Kossuth himself suggests in his memoirs that he was "a prisoner of European diplomacy in Asia minor."¹²⁸⁸ He did not refrain from seeking help from European policymakers afterward. Yet many converts did not follow this path. The disillusionment with the French and British foreign policies regarding the Hungarian Question was perhaps the general psychological state of the exiles at the time, but it must be among the converts that efforts emerged to formulate an ideology in response to this general feeling. In this sense, once again, the contrast between Kossuth and Bem subtly manifested in their positions against the West, which was also linked to the issue of conversion. While the former complained to the Western ambassadors that the Porte had forced the refugees to convert, the latter laid the foundation of the conversion movement. Accordingly, Kossuth's perspective survived until today, while the converts were silenced.

Bem's proclamation did not highlight an anti-imperialist discourse in earnest but rather a premature reflection of discontent spread among the revolutionaries, which would grow into larger interpretations on Ottoman soil, simultaneously widening the ideological rift between the converts and their former leaders. Unlike Kossuth, the highly critical attitudes of the converts toward the West and its politics cannot escape the attention of even the clumsiest observers. It is sufficient to remind the reader of how the converts had no affinity for France's

¹²⁸⁶ "Rusyalu hiçbir gûna i'lân-ı harb itmeksizin Macar memleketine yeniden tahattî ve ta'addî eyledi ve kâffe-i hukûk-ı ümem ve akvâma vâki olan bu makûle ta'arruz üzerine Avrupa ihtiyâr-ı sukût ider." Gölen, "Jozef Bem," 159.

¹²⁸⁷ For similar appeals of the revolutionary rule see Deak, *The Lawful Revolution*, 292-293. For Kossuth's recourse see Nazır, *Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar*, 136.

¹²⁸⁸ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 16.

imperial ambitions in the Near and Middle East, in contrast to the alignment of the exile leaders in European capitals. Furthermore, their uncompromised hostility toward Russian and Austrian expansionisms at the expense of the Balkans and Caucasus was in accordance with their sub- and supra-identities. Besides the role France played as the custodian of the Catholic population in the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was no less supportive of the Christians of the empire, with a particular emphasis on the protection of Protestants. Stratford Canning, the British ambassador in Istanbul from 1841 to 1858, was particularly strict in his ardent crusader mentality at the time when British supremacy in the international system was at its highest. Strongly opposed to British politics, Mehmed Sadık Pasha asserts in his memoirs that Great Britain exaggerated its influence on the Porte, making it seem as though they were the ones pulling the strings in the policy of the Porte.¹²⁸⁹ The reality on the ground was the opposite, Mustafa Reşid Pasha managed Canning "like a cunning nanny disciplining a spoiled child."¹²⁹⁰

This critique suggests that while cultivating a protest discourse, the converts did not find it burdensome in many cases to speak up for the Porte, asserting its agency against Eurocentric representations. Indeed, the assertion of subjectivity is also evident in the memoirs of Ismail Pasha on the defense of Kars during the Crimean War (1855), in which the general explains the tactical preparations, battle logistics, and the valor of Ottoman troops, while simultaneously criticizing British accounts that underplayed non-British contributions.¹²⁹¹ Furthermore, Sadık Mehmed Pasha also bitterly criticized at the war that Colonel William, "like most of the English officers who bought their ranks and did not earn them by service and merit, treated his officers like Negroes."¹²⁹² The Hungarian and Polish converts also took up the task of challenging stereotypical depictions of the Turks and Muslims, feeling compelled

¹²⁸⁹ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, 14.

¹²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹²⁹¹ For the related pages see George Kmety, *A Narrative of the Defence of Kars on the 29th September 1855*, 2nd ed. (London: James Ridgway, 1856), 3, 5, 7, 16, 27.

¹²⁹² Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 243.

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to defend them against the banal assumptions embedded in the Orientalist scholarship.¹²⁹³ The historical part of Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha's aforementioned book also offers historical depth to the importance of the Turks in universal history (*tarih-i umumi*), emphasizing their contributions to the civilizing process of mankind (*beşerin vetire-i temeddünü*) as *active participants*.¹²⁹⁴ Based on the French, German, Russian, and Polish sources available at the time, he argues that the Turks were never *barbaric*. On the contrary, Turkish high culture emerged in response to large-scale invasions of the Crusaders and the Mongols, pressing from opposite directions. This tension marked the birth of a conquering (*fetihçi*), pragmatic, and positivist culture that placed great importance on religious differences, also explaining how the local Ottoman dynasty rose in the thirteenth century to eventually become a world empire.¹²⁹⁵ On the other hand, Sadık Pasha's critique of the British discourse on *civilization* and *barbarism* focuses more on its inherent contradictions, rather than presenting a defensive argument. He criticizes not only the attitudes of the British statesmen as unprincipled but also the hypocritical attitudes of British merchants living in Ottoman cities.¹²⁹⁶ Despite their constant rants about the barbarism and corruption of the Turks, Sadık Pasha reports that the merchants did not hesitate to act arbitrarily in their dealings with the locals in the city of Edirne, feeling entitled to all kinds of abuses themselves.¹²⁹⁷ While sympathizing with the Orient in this case, he envisions a fundamental divide between East and West in his political imagination, where he posits himself in opposition to the latter: "With all my heart, I united with the East, which pertains to the Slavs and to which the Slavs belong."¹²⁹⁸ Furthermore, Sadık Pasha could identify with the Orient not only through his Islamic affiliation but also through his Slavic

¹²⁹³ Their defensive efforts do not mean that their Orientalist prejudices were eradicated. The Orientalist always refers to a reservoir of accredited knowledge. Said, *Orientalism*, 20.

¹²⁹⁴ Akçura argues that the vast scale of the geographical expansion of the Turkish race, its enormous role in the history of mankind, the richness of the Turkish language, and its contribution to the growth of other languages are discussed for the first time. Akçuraoğlu, *Türk Yılı 1928*, 321.

¹²⁹⁵ Mustafa Celâleddin, *Eski ve Modern Türkler*, 79-84.

¹²⁹⁶ Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından*, 31.

¹²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

origin, though the latter could push the boundaries of the anti-Russian rhetoric prevalent among the convert revolutionaries.¹²⁹⁹ Compared to many other converts, he was less anti-British and more Pan-Slavist. He criticizes the so-called *civilized Europe*, supposedly led by Britain, for equating Russia with a *barbaric Asian state*, while simultaneously elevating Austria as one of the most civilized, humanitarian countries in spite of their persecution of revolutionaries that Russia refrained from in 1831. As if it were not enough, he points out that Britain positioned itself as the guru of law and human rights, all the while boasting its colonial rule in India.¹³⁰⁰

The political discourses of the Hungarian and Polish converts by the 1860s exhibit recurrent themes that prefigure key concerns of postcolonial studies, which would start to emerge about a century later. These include challenging Eurocentric dominance in knowledge production about the culturally defined "other," asserting the agency of the oppressed, questioning stereotypical depictions of the non-Western world, and critically engaging with the civilizational teleology to revive silenced alternatives. While navigating multiple loyalties, however, the convert revolutionaries brought about their political stance from the vantage point of their trans-imperial and trans-national experiences, rather than from that of the colonized. Absent from their language was a profound critique of capitalism, the international division of labor, and the institutions and ideologies built upon it. They were clearly liberal revolutionaries in this sense, albeit with notable deviations since their paths ontologically diverted from the mainstreams in many years in exile. In fact, it is not defensible that these revolutionaries established a genuine school of thought after gathering around a magazine, journal, university, or research institute to develop theories and discourses resulted from exhaustive analyses in archives or libraries. Many of the converts were primarily men of action, possibly lacking a

¹²⁹⁹ In fact, Britain's position in the political imaginations of the converts does not appear to be consensual. Although Mehmed Sadık Pasha retained strong reservations about British politics, some figures were known to have strong ties with it such as Ömer Lütfi Pasha, Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha, Ismail Pasha, Reşid Efendi, and Hurşid Pasha.

¹³⁰⁰ Ibid., 173.

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sophisticated theoretical background. Indeed, it could well be said that their works have serious deficiencies, ambiguities, and methodological problems, even by the standards of their times. Embedded in their struggles, the inspiration for their political discourse and intellectual production came to the fore rather spontaneously, stemming from their own experiences in a constantly changing social practice. In this sense, their discourse was not imposed from above, their corpus of work was the result of their individual and collective encounters with various circumstances on the ground. As such, the convert school of thought possessed neither great thinkers nor foundational texts, it was oriented toward immediate concerns and embodied a certain mentality that evolved over time on Ottoman soil. Imbued with direct references to their own struggles and experiences, the language of the revolutionary converts entered the frame as to justify their political commitments. Their reflections did not form a well-structured set of abstract ideas, the convert school of thought can be presented as an umbrella term under which a wide range of sometimes contradictory ideas were concealed, though all were connected to their position as to the forces of power, which consistently pushed them into the subaltern. Since they were the target of conflicting and competing ideological influences in different sociocultural contexts from the end of the 1840s to the early 1860s, their responses and political alignments were not necessarily consistent.¹³⁰¹ This framework explains their ideological vacillations; how the Hungarian and Polish revolutionary converts gradually shifted from the Kossuth's path to the Mustafa Reşid's way through the Bem's path, eventually ended up in Garibaldi's way.

4.4. The Question of Garibaldi: Straying from Reşid's Way?

È difficile per l'uccellino
aspettare la fine dell'inverno

¹³⁰¹ For a related discussion see Therborn, *The Ideology of Power*, 79.

è difficile per il povero ungherese
aspettare Garibaldi¹³⁰²

Some aspects of the political discourse that Jusstinián voiced before the Ottoman authorities *may not* entirely align with the discursive framework that a typical revolutionary convert was supposed to embrace, especially considering the gap between his pronounced principles and concrete actions in terms of the relations with the Southern Slavs, Giuseppe Garibaldi, and Kingdom of Italy in the spring of 1861.

The first problem arises when his political program related to the Slavic people in the Balkans is closely examined in relation to the ideological principles of the convert revolutionaries. To recall from the previous chapter, Jusstinián was on his way to Belgrade with his companion, Matthias, whom he argues that a relative to the Serbian rulers, to seek financial support (though he did not specify who these rulers were) to the Hungarian cause when he was forced to take refuge in the government office in Ruse.¹³⁰³ According to his companion, the trip was a short step to a far-reaching plot that aimed to incite the Slavic populations, against both the Austrian and Turkish empires. In this context, the proclamations Jusstinián tossed into the Danube at Giurgiu called for the unification of Serbia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria.¹³⁰⁴ Indeed, their mission also included the establishment of revolutionary committees in the Balkans, besides disseminating revolutionary documents.¹³⁰⁵ There is no doubt that these activities could not have been compatible with the Ottoman identity, to which Hungarian and Polish converts were assumably loyal. The so-called "unification" of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia could resonate with the ideal agenda of the revolutionary converts only if it intended

¹³⁰² Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 128.

¹³⁰³ At his initial interview in Ruse, Jusstinián argues that he set out with his fellow because of his kinship with the Serbian ruler. BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 05 August 1861 (28 Muharrem 1278), 3. Later, he additionally refers to the Serbian ethnicity of his fellow twice, along with his allegedly familial connection with the Serbian notables once time in his interrogations in Istanbul. BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹³⁰⁴ BOA., HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

¹³⁰⁵ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 05 August 1861 (28 Muharrem 1278), 2.

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the Slavic Federation under the leadership of Serbia within the Ottoman suzerainty, as envisioned by Mehmed Sadık Pasha.

According to Tamborra, the federation plans in Central-Eastern Europe followed two competing paths in the spring of 1848. While Bystrzonowski sought a federation centered on Pest through an agreement with the Hungarians, sticking to the principle of the "integrity of the Ottoman Empire," Czajkowski aimed to secure Turkey in order to reconstruct the entirety of Eastern Europe under the scepter of the Sultan.¹³⁰⁶ In fact, factionalism in the Balkans consistently gave rise to moderate politics that sought to cultivate the cooperation of the Porte. Even beyond, similar tendencies were observed among Austrian Serbs. To illustrate, Archbishop Rajačić of Karlowitz (1785-1861) also considered a unified Serbian state under vassalage of the Porte.¹³⁰⁷ In fact, the policy to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had gone back to the aftermath of the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831, leading to the Great Emigration of thousands of revolutionaries. Operated from Paris, Prince Czartoryski lobbied in favor of the Porte against Russia through his agents, though his policy likely envisioned the gradual independence of the Christian Slavs from Ottoman rule, especially between 1841 and 1849.¹³⁰⁸ Therefore, it is necessary to question what kind of unity Jusztiński's committee envisioned: a temporary federation under Ottoman rule originated in the thoughts of Czartorsky, a Kossuth-style confederation along the Danube under a Catholic monarch, or a Garibaldian-Mazzinian Slavic union?

Mazzini had supported Slavic aspirations almost from the very beginning since the 1830s, albeit insisting that this issue should be addressed in conjunction with the Italian Question, rather than in a way that might provoke Russian influence.¹³⁰⁹ Indeed, endorsed by

¹³⁰⁶ Angelo Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani* (Torino: Industria Libreria Tipografica Editrice, 1958), 355-356.

¹³⁰⁷ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 36.

¹³⁰⁸ Andrew A. Urbanik and Joseph O. Baylen, "Polish Exiles and the Turkish Empire, 1830-1876," *The Polish Review* 26, no. 3 (1981): 46. Jelavich, "The Polish Emigration," 239-240.

¹³⁰⁹ Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, 48-49.

Svetozar Miletic, there was also a Yugoslav program aiming to promote a Greater Kingdom of Serbia, composed of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slavonia, through calling for a general uprising.¹³¹⁰ In our specific historical context, the Hungarian authorities gave their consent to the principle of autonomy for all nationalities in February 1861. In the spring of the same year, Prince Mihailo Obrenović sent Ilija Garašanin, along with Giovanni Ristie, to Vienna and Pest — as well as to Karlovac and Novi Sad — in an effort to negotiate a compromise between Serbian and Hungarian interests. While Juszinián departed for Serbia, Garašanin was likely in Constantinople.¹³¹¹ It is also known that the center of the Balkan alliance was Belgrade, which was the destination of Juszinián, yet any alliance plan involving with Prince Mihailo was unlikely to align with the interests of the Porte.¹³¹² Indeed, Juszinián's scheme also involved Bosnia, which was among the prominent objectives of the Mihailo's program.¹³¹³ In other words, Juszinián's revolutionary activities could well be resonated with these activities. He stated that his committee aimed to place an Italian king at the head of the confederation; however, this approach was incompatible with Mazzinian republicanism.

The revolutionary figure Matthias exposed to the Austrian authorities in this context does not appear to be a pro-Ottoman, either, Georgi Sava Rakovski (1821-1867), who was regarded as the first major Bulgarian national revolutionary. Until the early 1860s, Rakovski was a prominent figure in the radical wing of the Bulgarian movement, opposing moderate factions that sought gradual autonomy and independence from the Ottoman rule. However, he eventually turned to a more pragmatic approach, seeking a form of union with the empire. In his "Memorandum to the Sultan" (1866), he proposed a model of a "Turkish-Bulgarian

¹³¹⁰ Ibid., 166-167.

¹³¹¹ Ibid., 187-188

¹³¹² Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 333.

¹³¹³ Ibid., 350.

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Dualism," where the Sultan would assume the role of King of Bulgaria, offering a compromise between Bulgarian autonomy and Ottoman sovereignty.¹³¹⁴ In any case, this figure did not look like the most reliable partner for the imperial rulers. Needless to say, to carry out a project to unify the Balkans under the suzerainty of the Sultan, the committee would have needed to negotiate the action plan with the Porte, rather than opting for clandestine operations from its behind. However, these revolutionaries had the means to convey their political projects to the highest authorities of the empire, which were readily accessible to them. Perhaps they did so—after all, the submission of *layiha* (memorandum) by both Ottoman and foreign observers and counsellors was part of an imperial tradition—but we do not know whether these projects were actually submitted or how they were received. At the very least, they should not have been punished for these activities. In any case, the state viewed their engagement with Garibaldi as a threat to the empire's stability, a source of *fesat*, which meant sedition and conspiracy. One could also consider the influence of the foreign policy and its reflections on the domestic politics in the Ottoman context. According to Juszinián, the committee was opposed to the Franco-Sardinian alliance, while at the time the Porte was dominated by Âli and Fuad pashas, both known for their pro-French orientation, in proportion to the growing influence of the French in international politics since the Treaty of Paris. Neither should the rapprochement between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans be overlooked in this matter, as it stood in contrast to the growing alignment between Russia and France to alter the status quo in the Balkans.

Juszinián's cooperation scheme does not include Romania, aside from his overpronounced denunciations when it comes to the supporters of the rival faction, such as Karacsay, Buda, and Pap. At the beginning of his confession, he reveals that he first noticed back in Naples that the intention of this revolutionary committee was to supply arms,

¹³¹⁴ Johann Strauss, "Twenty Years in the Ottoman Capital: The Memoirs of Dr. Hristo Tanev Stambolski of Kazanlik (1843–1932) from an Ottoman Point of View," in *Istanbul - Kushta - Constantinople: Narratives of Identity in the Ottoman Capital, 1830-1930*, ed. Christoph Herzog and Richard Wittmann (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 254-255, 291.

munitions, and soldiers for the liberation of Hungary. Accordingly, these activities were to be financed through remittances from Athens, Piraeus, Malta, Istanbul, Romania, and Serbia.¹³¹⁵ Unless it was a slip of tongue, this statement suggests that the committee had initially expected potential cooperation from the Danubian Principalities. Nonetheless, Jusstinián emphatically excluded Wallachia and Transylvania from the revolutionary scheme at the end of the same statement once he did not count them as potential financial contributors to the cause. It goes without saying that the relationship between Hungary and Romania was always threatened by the question of Transylvania since the patriots from both revolutionary movements regarded the region within their own sphere of influence. Therefore, it is even possible to think that new disputes might have emerged within the Hungarian emigration even from Jusstinián's departure from Naples (February 1861) to his Serbian expedition (April 1861), which could have suddenly diverted the objectives of the organization. As already narrated, the confiscation of weapons in Wallachia had contaminated intra-group relationships in Italy, causing the emigration to grow increasingly frustrated with the Prince Cuza, who was largely alienated from the anti-Habsburg and anti-Ottoman initiatives in the early 1860s. Even the Danubian Confederation fell through, partly due to the non-cooperation of the Romanian ruler, though Kossuth was ready to make concessions in terms of Transylvania, leading many exiles to criticize him.¹³¹⁶ In that context, Jusstinián's revolutionary committee might have considered to extend their cooperation with the Southern Slavs down to Bosnia and Bulgaria as a replacement for Romanian Principalities. This vision could also resonate with the revolutionary ambitions of Garibaldi in the Balkans, simultaneously complying with the projects of the Torinese policymakers to divert his attention from Rome, even if this does not mean that Garibaldi excluded the independence of Romania. Accordingly, the situation in Transylvania

¹³¹⁵ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

¹³¹⁶ Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 208, 211. Hermann, *Lajos Kossuth*, 116-118.

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in the perceptions of the revolutionary converts was probably taking a more uncompromising turn, possibly in contrast to the evolving vision of Kossuth. Indeed, the individual stories narrated in the previous chapter were intimately connected to Transylvania. As a Székely, Sándor Gál (1817-1866) had plotted over so many years for the same region. Sprung from Transylvania, Schneider was among the followers of General Bem, who had been the commander of the revolutionary forces in Transylvania. The Wallachian police effectively prevented Jusztenián from his activities at least two times, according to him, their once-fellow Buda reported them to the police because he had deserted from his committee's side

What is more unsettling in the revolutionaries' position against the Principalities is their shifting tendencies, which could now work with Turin's desires regarding the next move of Garibaldi. This is where the second problem comes, the possibility of cooperation with the Kingdom of Sardinia (Italy), which was hardly a potential ally for the revolutionary converts. Even though the committee members were disappointed with Cavour's policies on the subject of the Hungarian Question, a communication from Naples arrived in Istanbul (possibly around April 1861), urging the committee to provoke Hungary, based on the anticipation that the Italian fleet was about to strike Venice. As a product of this sudden instruction, Jusztenián was commissioned by Physician Hüseyin Faik, who provided him with money and safe-conduct, to deliver revolutionary proclamations to Hungarian and Serbian plotters in Belgrade. Their aim was to spur a "general insurrection," in line with the "order," as Matthias describes, promoted by Garibaldi himself. Furthermore, Viola was to disseminate proclamations in the Balkans, together with Jusztenián.¹³¹⁷ The effort to direct Garibaldi's attention towards the Balkans and Venice was undoubtedly a role that Sardinia had assigned to him. If our committee members were opponents of Sardinia, how would it be possible for them to align their efforts with its fleet for an expedition led by Garibaldi? If the convert revolutionaries were careful not to

¹³¹⁷ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3. BOA, HR. TO, 161/30, 06 May 1861, 3.

jeopardize their relations with the Porte, how can one explain their latest enterprise against its integrity? Considering that the Italy was no longer pursuing anti-status quo ambitions by April 1861, as its rulers focused more on stability, how could the convert revolutionaries have possibly conspired with Italy in the first place against the Austrian and Turkish empires? More intriguingly, intriguing in the Balkans was more in congruence with Kossuth's vision. Upon his alignment with France and Sardinia, he had already underscored in May 1859 that the British public opinion would not agree upon the protection of Austria and Turkish rule in the Balkans.¹³¹⁸

I was always so much of the opinion that, after those acquisitions of self-government which were already secured by treaty to Servia, as well as to Moldo-Wallachia, the absolute independence of these states would be in the interest, not only of us Hungarians, but also of the Porte herself, that I am really astonished that Turkish statesmen did not see it to be so. The retention of the nominal supremacy over Servia and the United Danubian Principalities is a source, not of strength, but of weakness, to the Porte, for it wounds the national self-respect, and makes the Servians and Roumanians enemies of the Porte without giving her compensation, by some perceptible advantage in a material or political respect, for the danger and damage arising from the present situation. The paltry tribute is not worth mentioning. The whole suzerainty is mere foolish vanity for which the Porte will have to suffer severely, sooner or later, if she continues to cling to it. While I was the guest of Turkey, first as a fugitive, and later by* detention, I endeavoured to make Turkish statesmen understand this; but, I am sorry to say, in vain. The word of a poor exile, who has no power in his hands, does not carry much weight with it; I believe, however, that if Hungary became independent and tendered similar counsel, backed up by power, she might expect to be listened to.¹³¹⁹

He continues that:

With regard to the eventual dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe, I cannot deny that, as the Turks came to Europe at a time when the countries which they conquered were inhabited, no longer by heterogenous, undeveloped races, but by historically-formed, real nations, this historical basis, in connection with the religion and intensity of national feeling, has produced such contrasts as cannot very well be reconciled. I myself therefore consider the eventual dissolution of the Turkish Empire very probable; and I only express my conviction

¹³¹⁸ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 235-236.

¹³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 329.

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when I say that, in the logic of history, the matter of greatest importance to my country, and, I might even say, to Europe, is not that the Christian nationalities of the Turkish provinces should remain under Turkish rule, but that they should come under neither Russian nor Austrian dominion, nor within the sphere of their power, and that, as you have rightly remarked, the freedom of the people should be the heir of Turkish rule.¹³²⁰

Studies suggest that Kossuth and Garibaldi may have given their approval to the plan of liberating Hungary and Veneto in April 1861.¹³²¹ Could the initiative of Juszinián also be in tune with Kossuth's expectation? In the summer of 1861, Kossuth signals in a letter that his agents were engaging in projects to cooperate with the Porte, while bypassing Serbia and Romania. In exchange of its support for the Hungarian cause, Kossuth planned to offer security guarantees to the Ottoman Empire against the Pan-Slavist current. A powerful Hungary could serve as a buffer for the Ottomans against German and Russian expansionism.¹³²² Have we just returned to the point where we started? Had not the instruction to strike Venice truly come "unexpectedly," is it possible to suggest that the convert revolutionaries were entrapped at a time when support of Garibaldi within the Hungarian exiles was being eliminated?

There is one more element in this conundrum that makes it even harder to resolve. The relationship between the convert revolutionaries and Garibaldi constitutes the third problem in this context. Up until this point in the discussion, what was expected of the revolutionary converts to induce the general to move not towards the Ottoman Balkans, but towards Rome. To repeat, Juszinián's committee neither agreed with the foreign policies of France and Italy toward Hungary, meaning that their cooperation with Garibaldi was conceivable as long as the alliance did not pose threats to the Porte. Nevertheless, Garibaldi was perhaps one of the last

¹³²⁰ Ibid., 330.

¹³²¹ Péter Hanák, "Rapporti Storici Italo-Ungheresi Verso la Metà del Secolo XIX," *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 4, no. 1/3 (1955): 232. Jászay, *Il Risorgimento*, 30.

¹³²² For the details of the letter see Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano*, 145-150. In the context of the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859, Kossuth pronounces more or less similar ideas in his memoirs, suggesting that without an independent Hungary, the Balkan nations would fall under the Russian rule in case the Ottoman Empire falls. Emphases are mine. Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, 130-131.

figures of the time to propose Ottoman rule to the patriots of the Balkans. The cult of Garibaldi was built on the idea of devotion to the freedom of oppressed peoples in the broadest sense. It is thus absurd to expect him to support an Oriental monarchy in opposition to the people engaged in the process of nation-building. Indeed, the Slav sympathies of Italian thinkers and activists, including Giuseppe Mazzini, Niccolò Tommaseo, and Cesare Balbo, had deep historical and intellectual roots, along with the strong prejudice surrounding the Ottoman Empire. Even though Garibaldi's firm anti-Ottoman conviction in the Balkans had gained momentum in the 1870s, he issued a proclamation calling on the Balkan Slavs to take up arms against the despotisms of both the Ottoman and Habsburg empires in 1862.¹³²³ Even though the nature of the relationship between the convert revolutionaries and Garibaldi is unclear, this cooperation, if really existed, ran against the identity shift that the converts had undergone upon conversion to Islam, unless their agenda differed even in the case of cooperation. Therefore, it remains perplexing how they articulated themselves to the political developments in Italy and legitimized their new direction.

The twists and turns in high politics and the schism among the revolutionary figures of Italy and Hungary in the early 1860s were too dynamic and complex, harboring too many blind spots, to present a flawless picture that could capture each and every intricacy within the revolutionary movement, especially considering the complications on the transnational scale. Even in their private correspondences, the leading figures signaled lots of inconsistencies in

¹³²³ For his presence in the 1870s see Eric R. Terzuolo, "The Garibaldini in the Balkans, 1875–1876," *The International History Review* 4, no. 1 (February 1982): 111–126. For Garibaldi's proclamation see "To my brothers of the Herzegovina and to the oppressed of Eastern Europe. The Turks must go away to Broussa. He descended like a wolf, passing the Bosphorous, devastating, murdering, and violating those populations who gave us the Pelasgi, who were, perhaps, the first civilisers of Europe. He must no longer tread upon that part of the world kept by him in misery. At Broussa, with his vices, depredations, and cruelties, he will find enough people of Asia Minor to torment and plunge into desolations. Rise then, heroic sons of Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Servia, Therapia, Macedonia, Greece, Epirus, Albania, Bulgaria and Roumania! "Garibaldi and Herzegovinians," *Northern Territory Times* (Australia), March 4, 1876, 2. Luis Miguel Selvelli, *Antenati a Costantinopoli: Esuli italiani negli anni del riformismo ottomano 1828-1878* (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2022), 195. Maria Chiara Tirelli, "The Unification of Italy as Seen Through the Ottoman Diplomatic Correspondences (1848-1870)," (Phd Diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018), 167.

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their political strategies. In this context, it is difficult to determine exactly how Garibaldi's Sword of Glory, as an initiative strongly linked to the Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts, interacted with both domestic and international politics in the early 1860s. In an environment where political balances, alliances, and projects shifted almost daily, the oscillations the converts experienced is equally understandable. Insofar as it was an expression of the revolutionary converts' efforts to position themselves in response to political fluctuations domestically and internationally, their political discourse inherently contained inconsistencies and contradictions, especially in the period between the Crimean War and the establishment of Kingdom of Italy. Therefore, this study does not claim to present a complete monographic account of all the political projects in response to these fluctuations. As Jelavich underscores, this period witnessed the proliferation of innumerable secret societies with a variety of programs. Although only a few achieved success in hindsight, even the authorities often found it difficult to distinguish one from another.¹³²⁴ In my view, the committee known as Garibaldi's Sword of Glory was as much in favor of an anti-Ottoman alliance as it was opposed to the Habsburg and Russian empires. However, the importance of this study lies less in uncovering absolute social and historical realities than in examining how these realities have been interpreted and represented, specifically by exploring the ideological influences underlying a certain political discourse concerning the Hungarian and Polish converts in the Ottoman Empire. More concretely, the discourse that Jusztinián articulated in front of experts may not have reflected his personal convictions, but it certainly pointed to the mentality of a particular community, the convert revolutionaries. Indeed, the methodologies of this study maintain that these contradictions stem not from the unreliability of the available sources, but rather from gaps in our current knowledge. Consequently, further research is imperative to illuminate the

¹³²⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 330.

different engagements of the converts. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that historical credibility in literary evidence hinges not on the precision of every individual detail, but on the internal coherence and plausibility of the narrative as a whole, which had been largely maintained in our cases.¹³²⁵

¹³²⁵ Peter Laslett, "The Wrong Way Through the Telescope: A Note on Literary Evidence in Sociology and in Historical Sociology," *The British Journal of Sociology* 27, no. 3 (September 1976): 321.

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Conclusion

Depending on who you believe, modernity is identified both with the making and the unmaking of the self. One story about modernity would identify it with the apprehension of the self's autonomous self-grounding, the positive precipitate of the act of expelling all inauthenticity and error from the self. [...] But the very condition of such a bootstrap-lifting stunt is that there is, after all, nothing to *guarantee* the modern self—nothing, that is, except its abandonment, in the mode of reflection or of delirium, of all external guarantees. So, according to the other story, the absence or impotence of God, the Church, the king, tradition, makes the modern subject more liable to come apart at the seams than ever before. The very strength of the modern self is its weakness, just as its weakness is the ultimate source of its strength.¹³²⁶

We have finally come to the end of this journey. What have I undertaken so far? I first traced the specific times and places, individuals and groups, and key historical events appeared on a five-page-long archival document whose context was undetermined. It was the records of the third interrogation protocol of a Hungarian revolutionary, Jusstinián Károly. After collecting as much evidence as possible, I tried to reconstruct both his personal adventures and the broader historical context surrounding him through this lens. I sought to penetrate a different mentality, system of thought, lifestyle, and way of seeing the world. After placing Jusstinián's "ego" at the center of my study, I projected the mentality he revealed back to the history of Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionary converts in the Ottoman Empire. In other words, I sought to let the subaltern to speak, and their practices carry the narrative.¹³²⁷ As much as Jusstinián's revelations echoed in other concrete cases, his narrative turned out to represent a collective psyche. Some other converts left traces on archival records as a result of their encounters with the Ottoman bureaucracy, whereas some others preferred to spread their

¹³²⁶ Steven Connor, "The Modern Auditory I," in *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*, ed. Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997), 203.

¹³²⁷ Natalie Zemon Davis, "Decentering History: Local Stories and Cultural Crossings in a Global World," *History and Theory* 50 (May 2011): 190.

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ideas though published books and articles. Taken as a whole, convert revolutionaries left a body of materials behind, which appear more or less consistent to give researchers opportunities to get to the bottom of their mentalities. In this sense, what the testimonies of Juszinián presented was just a prelude to a more compact and extensive picture that the present study tried to draw. At the very least, what he testified demonstrates that there were objective conditions sufficient for the emergence of a certain political identity and ideological discourse. Otherwise, how should one interpret the ideological resonances within some other texts articulated by the converts across different places, times, and even languages? How can we make sense of the fact that certain ideological themes expressed in German by Juszinián during his interrogation by Ottoman authorities in the early 1860s reappear—almost a decade later—in Turkish newspaper articles written by the Polish Hayrettin Karski in *Basiret*, in a report written in French by Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha, and, many years later, in a completely different region and language, in the memoirs of Sadık Mehmed, as well as in the petitions of numerous other converts found in the Ottoman archives?

Since his sworn testimonies were the departing point of my research, they largely dictated the sources to be exploited, the methodologies to be employed, the spatio-temporal scales to be limited, and the scholarly discussions to be engaged with. This path marked a continuous process of exploration, shaping the project into a historical study from the bottom up. I did not place an ideological commitment ahead of my research. There is no denying that I was not free from personal values, prejudices, and intellectual blind spots, yet the results were not clearly predetermined, at least consciously. Even I myself could not have foreseen the way this thesis would wind up because I did not have an a priori agenda to begin with. I was not even prepared to study on the nineteenth century. My sole purpose became following the initial document wherever it would lead. I was not even sure whether some of my results were accurate until the last minute of submitting my thesis, as the reader may occasionally see my

doubts throughout the text. Perhaps in congruence with Foucauldian understanding of authorship, it is not exaggerated to suggest that the study has just emerged. It was me who orchestrated the means, though it was more like the thesis was writing itself. It was not rare for me to feel as though Jusztiáni himself was trying to have his voice heard to me. The reader should not assume that I ran into the sworn testimonies and the related documentation in archives ready to proceed, reconstructed all the stories at once, and then smoothly presented analytical discussions. It was exactly the opposite. One cannot imagine how many times I misinterpreted documents, made predictions that turned out to be groundless, and had to revisit my arguments, which were truly frustrating from time to time. I shouldered archival research for a year just to find some meager evidence that might support my arguments. Reading countless documents sometimes turned out to be just irrelevant. I had to read and reread the same documents many times, and write and rewrite my drafts endlessly in the light of new discoveries. To give some examples, throughout my doctoral studies, I have written the literature review part four times, Jusztiáni's story three times, and Schneider's story three times. At the outset, I did not even take Jusztiáni's testimony seriously, they looked bizarre to me. Therefore, I initially considered him yet another outlaw who tried to get away from punishment. However, he somehow got me in the right direction every time I strayed. After making unprecise interpretations, it happened a lot to me, I sometimes heard from his testimonies and checked the related sentences and refined my discussions. In this sense, this thesis is merely the latest version of my research efforts, not a final word. At some point, I had to bring this work to an end, and it ended here. However, it remains open to revision, as future investigations would refine it.

At the very early phase of my doctoral research on Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries who sought asylum in 1849, I was struck by the almost-hidden yet surely existent question to which most of the Turkish historians were seemingly indifferent in contrast

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to the Western observers who were much more attentive, which was the issue of mass conversion of the refugees to the creed of Islam. Yet it did not take me long to realize that the issue is even more delicate than I had assumed. The more I dealt with my research topic, the question became more unignorable, like the elephant in the room lying at the heart of the whole matter. Religious conversion has always been a sensitive topic for individuals and societies, making it almost impossible to have tranquil discussions, especially when religious conversion falls between "civilizational" fault lines, which is often the case, I suppose. The issue of conversion among the refugees is not an exception. Whether implicitly or explicitly, much of what has been said about the converts roughly boils down to the discussion of whether their religious change was "sincere." The theme of being the last bastion that stood up against the so-called Turkish and Muslim invaders in the name of European civilization for centuries is deeply rooted in the Hungarian and Polish official narratives and the collective consciousness. The "defection" of national heroes to the opposition camp, in this context, sounds like an oxymoron that carries a potential to jeopardize the entire system of values. As such, conversion of the national heroes required a line of defense with acceptable excuses. Nonetheless, the ways revolutionary converts grappled with the brand-new cultural environment they encountered and the ways they combined a new value system with their cultural background have never been elaborated. Largely derived from self-narratives, however, this study scrutinized the identity shift of these revolutionary converts over the long run, along with their gradually evolving political imaginations. In a similar vein, conversion studies often highlight the gradually unfolding process of religious transformation in people's selves. Since transformation does not imply a sudden and decisive break, a study on religious conversion must not reflect a frozen image of a particular moment, i.e., the moment the refugees converted in our case, whereas the larger process points to a greater analytical significance. More than a momentous decision, conversion was an experience that might have different phases, which did not have to be

uniform for every protagonist. Consequently, the present study aimed to indicate that hybrid forms may emerge that cannot be reduced to binary oppositions such as "sincere Muslim" or "crypto-Christian." Neither explains the evolution of the identities of the refugees after spending more than a decade in the empire whose ruling values relied highly upon Islamic tradition.

Hungarian, Polish, and Italian revolutionaries piled up in the Balkan territories under Ottoman rule following the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. Soon after, many of them converted to Islam. This decision provoked strong reactions from their comrades, especially among the leading cadres of the revolutionary movement, whose attitude toward those who converted would remain an important point of reference even for subsequent generations. In the daily struggles of these converts, religious conversion sparked a transformation in their perception, which can be observed and interpreted via their ego-documents, inasmuch as they provide clues about their political identities and ideological discourse. Our approach to the issue of conversion among these revolutionaries does not aim to present a flawless portrayal of social realities, but rather to analyze their discursive representation, both in the literature and in the convert's own narratives. As a matter of fact, conversion can be taken in three seemingly separate, yet interconnected layers. The first concerns the personal sphere, in other words, how converts feel about their inner religious commitment, without feeling any urge to justify their own in front of others. This is something only individual could tell, though there may be times when they cannot fully disclose the truth even to themselves, reminding Dostoyevsky's *Notes from Underground*. The second layer concerns theological and legal frameworks, what the Ottoman understanding of Islamic canon dictates on the issue. There are prerequisites for conversion, as candidate must act out of "the free will and conscience," therefore, forcible conversion shall be nothing but null and void. In parallel, conversion with material expectation is unacceptable since innate motive is absent in

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such cases. This must be hard to grasp at any rate, nobody is even entitled to oversee one's religious practice. The third and final layer concerns the discursive problem, how conversion is represented. This dimension is all the more important, especially in the nineteenth century, when the boundaries between public and private spheres were constantly redefined. This study focuses on the latter two dimensions (canonical position and discursive formulation), tracing how Turkish and Hungarian official positions evolved from the nineteenth century to the present, and how the converts articulated their own situation through their own voices. For many who engage with this topic, in any case, the central question of whether these individuals genuinely "turned Turks" remains. We return to the point where we started once again. I vividly recall attending a conference, where this topic was discussed at length. At the end of the panel session, however, participants were still wondering: But did they truly convert?

To answer such a question, we may concentrate on certain parameters. There are studies aiming to prove that conversions among the refugees were feigned. Textual strategies behind these arguments were unfolded in the first chapter, attaching a string of reasons to conversions. These reasons include avoiding harsh punishment, securing employment and livelihood, preserving family, and igniting a follow-up revolution. Relying more upon concrete parameters, there are researchers who examine gravestones and burial practices of some converts, though such arrangements do not necessarily reflect the religious convictions of the deceased. They are often shaped by the wishes of those who remain behind. Another concrete clue could be the so-called double naming in the Ottoman context. The dichotomy of wielding two names at the same time is often presented as a sign of insincerity in conversion cases, denoting a sort of dual identity, with one keeping the old customs secretly.¹³²⁸ For Deringil, the

¹³²⁸ For some examples see Mark Mazower, *Salonica City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950* (London and New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 69. "This man, as a Turk, was called Ibrahim; his name which he had received in Christian baptism was Yannis. The distinction is so strict between Christian and Moslem names, that this bearing of two names was an inevitable consequence of the position of a Crypto-Christian." R. M. Dawkins, "The Crypto-Christians of Turkey," *Byzantion* 8, no. 1 (1933): 252.

typical case of double naming appears when whether a person is Osman or Constantine depends on who is asking.¹³²⁹ The prevailing idea is that the Turks might have mastery over the bodies of Christians, but not over their souls, as one of the Greek patriarchs suggested in the fourteenth century.¹³³⁰ However, this criterion does not always hold when it comes to the subjects of this study. Conversion entails immediate practical difficulties, especially on account of the name change. For a person who has lived under a certain name for twenty or thirty years, it may not always be easy to adapt to a new one immediately and straightforwardly. Even if people can overcome this difficulty, their social circle may insist on treating them as to the previous situation. As already seen, conversion entails quarrel with peers who insisted on maintaining ancestral faith. Furthermore, the secret identities in double-naming practice were not supposed to be disclosed unless necessary.¹³³¹ However, Antal Schneider (Hüseyin Faik) is documented to have used his convert name alongside to his name of birth in his official letters, not in a mutually exclusive way. One can also have a glance at the degree to which a convert adhered to religious regulations, such as prohibitions, though non-compliance with religious instructions does not make one a crypto. Another parameter to evaluate sincerity could be circumcision, though this was not a mandatory operation according to religious doctrine and practice. Besides, focusing on circumcision was androcentric, explaining nothing about the motives of female converts. Anyhow, it is assumed that nobody would undertake the risk of being operated on just to convince others of something fictitious. However, one convert could concede to circumcision even though he was not a true renegade. His underlying desire could be to secure a position in the Ottoman army, whatever the costs may be. That person, in his own narration, could also give conflicting accounts about his circumcision, according to the

¹³²⁹ Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 123

¹³³⁰ Stavro Skendi, "Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans," *Slavic Review* 26, no. 2 (June 1967): 228.

¹³³¹ *Ibid.*, 151.

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audience he addresses. All in all, personal testimonies in this regard also pose challenges, as the same individual might express different motives for their conversion at different times and in varying contexts.¹³³²

While implying coercion at various levels, all the textual strategies in the literature calls the conversions into question, thereby speaking on behalf of the converts. However, self-depictions should also be assessed in the light of their intended audiences and historical contexts. Even if a convert represents his story this or that way, the retrospective depiction may not always capture the authentic emotions and existential factors that triggered and guided religious transformation at its specific juncture. Converts may struggle to disclose the truth about themselves for varying reasons, inasmuch as their accounts are presented to the likes of a certain audience. Furthermore, all these interpretative parameters rest on a paradigm that sustains an imaginative division between the public and private spheres. Supposedly, cryptos led two separate lives at the same time, requiring a distinction between the outward pose in public life based on Muslim identities and the secretly preserved non-Muslim names and customs in the private sphere. However, public and private spaces have never been that separate when it came to the informal workings of the convert community, as we have shown in the fourth chapter. Rather, these spaces functioned as sites where constant negotiations on identities took place. Ultimately, the religious commitment of the revolutionary converts is too personal to evaluate from the gaze of outsiders, and the possibility of drawing generalizations is inherently limited, let alone the unnecessary to raise such an issue, just as we would never know the inner religious attitudes of the non-convert refugees.

Converts have to rationalize their decision, stresses Oliver Roy.¹³³³ Let us hear how one of them did this. In our specific case, how did Jusztinián present his own conversion? We are

¹³³² Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford University Press, New York 2008), 23.

¹³³³ Olivier Roy, "Conclusion: What Matters with Conversions?" in *Religious Conversions in the Mediterranean World*, ed. Nadia Marzouki and Olivier Roy (Basingstokes: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 175–187.

particularly fortunate that his statements permit us to interpret the motivations behind his conversion, though his own record also discloses a seemingly contradictory—or is it truly so?—vision and experience of converting to Islam. When asked about the time he and his father adopted Islam, Jusztnián states that his father "converted to Islam on their way to Aleppo with Murad Pasha, whom they called General Bem." He continues, "three months ago when I went to Dersaadet from the Italian school, my father brought a few neighbors and an imam and made me Muslim, and I am Muslim now."¹³³⁴ This was the first time he described his religious identity, in his first interrogation in Ruse on April 26.

On June 13, when the interrogator asked why he had obtained a safe conduct issued for a person named Hüseyin despite his original Hungarian identity, like his companion Baron Tatay (Colofon Matthias), who had done the same by changing his name to Mehmed Ali, "because these are Islamic names." Jusztnián responded as follows:

In order not to be harassed by the Austrians until going to and getting back to Belgrade and travel freely, I kindly requested Hüseyin Bey and he got me an Ottoman certificate calling me Hüseyin Bey. I was going with it, and I happened to convert to Islam in the presence of three witnesses and became Muslim.¹³³⁵

In terms of timing, he states that "two or three days before I left Istanbul, I converted to Islam in the presence of two or three people at the house of Hüseyin Bey."¹³³⁶ It can thus be inferred that Jusztnián and Matthias converted to Islam shortly before their departure for Belgrade, primarily to obtain official documents that could also function as an identity paper, thereby allowing them to carry out their clandestine activities without Austrian interference.

¹³³⁴ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

¹³³⁵ "Senin Macar adın Cüstinyan ve refkin merkumun dahi Baron Tatay imiş sen ismini tağyir ile Hüseyin Bey ve merkum dahi Mehmed Ali deyü tezkerede almışsınız. Böyle isim tağyirine sebep ve murad nedir? Çünkü bunlar İslam isimleridir."

"Belgrad'a gidip gelinceye kadar Nemçelü tarafından bana ilişilmemek ve rahatça gidip gelmek için yine Hüseyin Bey'e rica ettim. O dahi bana Hüseyin Bey deyü bir Osmanlı tezkiresi alırdı. Onunla gidiyor idim. Ve gittim dahi üç şahid indinde tebdil-i mezheb ederek Müslüman oldum." BOA., A.M., 25/46, 15 Muharrem 1278 (23 July 1861).

¹³³⁶ "İstanbul'dan gitmezden iki üç gün evvel Hüseyin Bey'in hanesinde tebdil-i mezheble iki üç kişi indinde İslam oldum idi." Ibid.

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Jusztinián viewed conversion as a practice to be employed for a political end, according to this representation. But if that were truly the case, would he not have felt the need to conceal it? As discussed at length, their activities were guided and sponsored by Hüseyin Faik, whose generation of converts appears to have incorporated religious conversion into their revolutionary culture and transferred their experiences to the next generations, which is why we call them revolutionary converts. Hüseyin Faik should have already warned Jusztinián not to disclose his inner religious motives to officials, as it might have revoked their conversion, if insincerity had been the case. The follow-up inquiry is about who the witnesses were and the motive for converting to Islam on such short notice and before the journey. Jusztinián states the following:

One of those present was Hüseyin Bey and one was his servant Hasan and there was one more whose name escapes me, yet he was a Hungarian who had converted to Islam and the reason why I became Muslim was to become a subject of the Sublime State and to get rid of the Austrians and turned out to Muslim because I believed in Cenab-ı Hak (God Almighty) and his spiritual guidance.¹³³⁷

Becoming an Ottoman subject did not constitute a legitimate motive for conversion according to Islamic jurisprudence, nor should it not have entailed official recognition within the empire because it did not meet the basic requirement. By the opposite, subjecthood was the consequence of conversion, at least ideally. Neither, getting away from Austrian surveillance qualifies conversion as an acceptable reason. On the contrary, when considered the final part of this statement, "I believed in God Almighty and his spiritual guidance," it might cause us to think differently since this explains an acceptable condition. How should we make sense of the coexistence of these seemingly contradictory motives in the same sworn testimony, lined up after one another? What if these revolutionaries did not perceive such a contradiction, whereas historians often impose binary frameworks, such as that between "sincere Muslims" and

¹³³⁷ "Hazır bulunanlardan biri Hüseyin Bey'dir ve biri uşağı Hasan'dır. Ve biri dahi ismi hatırımda değildir. İslam olmuş bir Macarlıdır ve İslam olmaklığım sebebi dahi teb'ayı devleti aliyyeden olmak ve Nemçeliden tahlisi giriban etmek ve Cenabı Hakkın ve hidayetine inandığım için Müslüman oldum idi." Ibid.

"Crypto Christians"? We cannot rule out the possibility that these people may not mull over the question of identity as we obsessively do today, given the floating nature of identity, which was possibly all the more so in the nineteenth century. Some may even have believed in both faiths at the same time. Others many have adhered to neither. What appears anomalous to contemporary observers might have been coherent within its original sociohistorical framework; the perceived bizarreness in such cases may reside in our epistemological paradigms. A perspective aiming to prove that his conversion was nominal could rely on his statement about "to become a subject of the Sublime State;" while an argument attempting to prove the opposite could draw upon "I believed in God Almighty and his spiritual guidance." This is precisely why this study emphasizes the need to avoid simplistic binaries because such frameworks are insufficient to explain the gray areas of human experience. The central aim is at least to push out our intellectual frontiers in this work, as the existing analytical lenses are reluctant to decolonize the categories through which our societies imagine and produce themselves.

Did the converts embrace Islam sincerely? This work intended to consider religious conversion in congruence with definable power relations, rather than referencing to spiritual essence. Their conversion and the emergence of a protest discourse were largely class related; thus, I tried to move away from culturalist discussions that obscure power relations. It is not reasonable to assume that more than two hundred revolutionaries abruptly converted to Islam just because they suddenly realized that one religion was more divine than another. Certainly, some did convert out of genuine conviction in the first place, just as others refused to convert due to their strong attachment to their ancestral customs. Nonetheless, most candidates evaluated the issue rationally and made final decisions accordingly, which did not make their conversion any less sincere or unimportant. In the literature, all in all, what mattered most have never been their spiritual sentiments, it was rather the role religion played within their

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respective social contexts. Obviously, mainstream narratives have never been more interested in social realities than the continuation of certain hegemony. Their function has largely been to isolate individuals themselves. Ergo, the issue of conversion remains as a discomfort for modern national identities, as this whole research problematize.

Could not it be that those who initially converted as a tactical move gradually embraced their new faith in a sincere way? Some eventually adopted Islam in earnest, regardless of their initial urges. Whatever the initial impulses could be, it is not easy to defend that the decision did not have any impact on the long-term transformation of these revolutionary converts, even if the change was not strictly religious. "It is very difficult to act a mask or a role continually without acquiring the character that goes with the role," notes Barrington Moore.¹³³⁸ "People adopt the role of the convert and perform accordingly, and internal changes may then follow," argues Lewis Rambo.¹³³⁹

To what extent did they convert, if they did at all? Some became Islamized to some degree that they became *Ottomanized*, while some became *Ottomanized* without necessarily Islamized. To define this blur, a conception can be imported from a contemporary who mentions "Orientalized Franks."¹³⁴⁰ Many of them consistently emphasized their loyalty to the Sultan in their self-narratives, however, in response to their specific circumstances, the converts gradually cultivated a tradition of their own revolutionary tradition. Their political identities and ideological discourses could only be understood in their interactions with different political actors and institutions they confronted (mainly in Hungary, Türkiye, and Italy). This introduced fluidity into their identities, which reflected neither purely Hungarian (Polish)/Catholic nor Turkish/Muslim (neither Italian/Anticlerical later).

¹³³⁸ Barrington Moore Jr, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 464.

¹³³⁹ Lewis Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 122.

¹³⁴⁰ Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, ed. Şemsettin Kutlu (Istanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1973), 23.

The cohesion ideology of the Sublime Porte does not imply a bona fide religious transformation; it aimed to level up the legal differences between religious millets for preventing the empire from disintegration. For converts, it signified convergence with larger imagined community, while diverging from narrow ethnoreligious roots. Becoming an Ottoman was not only a survival strategy for the converts, but it also became a means to reimagine selfhood through the prism of the new cultural nexus, reflecting a dialect of pragmatic adaption and aspirational shift. In other words, regardless of their initial motivations, convert revolutionaries embraced Ottoman identity, even contributed to this identity through their scholarly and artistic works.

Their Ottomanness was neither decisive nor fixed. It would be inaccurate to suggest that this processes of conversion and adaptation were homogenous, uncontested, and irreversible. In the last chapter, we evaluated the interactions of the converts with the "disparate and seemingly unconnected events" to construct an alternative teleology, based on the self-narratives and life stories at hand. Not to fall into the instrumentalization trap, it is necessary to note that this encapsulating narrative does not necessarily predetermine the trajectory of each individual case. Each of those seemingly unconnected events could have produced uncontrolled consequences depending on the person involved. It would be erroneous to assert that all revolutionary converts were uniform in their experiences, feelings, and reactions, even if they were often shaped by similar historical currents. All categorizations have their "misfits."¹³⁴¹ Indeed, it is not a distinct possibility that some revolutionaries sustained a sense of superiority in what they perceived as an Oriental empire, complicating any identification with their new surroundings. Another integration challenge was their isolated socialization within close-knit communities in their daily lives. First, these revolutionaries had been torn from their homelands. While in exile, second, they were even marginalized within their own

¹³⁴¹ Göran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1980), 55.

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revolutionary movements. Third, their acceptance within the host society was not taken for granted. Although they entered into an alliance with the Ottoman ruling elite, we lack sufficient evidence to claim that they were able to assimilate themselves into the Muslim society in the local setting. On the contrary, some available documents and anecdotes suggest the opposite, indicating that these revolutionary converts were rather compelled to socialize only within their own narrow circles. The only son of Mustafa Celâleddin suggests that "these people, who had severed their ties with their own civilization, but who were not really accepted by conservative Muslim circles, only felt at home among their own kind."¹³⁴² If so, their informal connections could have reinforced their pre-existing identities, making broader assimilation more difficult. Considering that schism was an inherent feature of Ottoman rule, their submission to a hierarchical structure does not guarantee an organic integration. Not to mention that there were obviously many who just gave up politics and tried to fill up their stomach. The participation of the revolutionary converts in the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 poses a question mark since the agreement between Hungary, Serbia, and Romania was based on the independence of these government not only in front of the Habsburg rule but also the Ottoman unless they were aware of all the details. The domestic developments in Hungary presumably entailed many converts to return to their homelands, when certain amnesties were granted in 1857, 1859, and 1867. In any case, our observations suggest that some strayed from the Ottoman path, in line with the revolutionary developments in Italy and Hungary.

Let us summarize the linear evolution this study offers by examining the interplay between the political and ideological influences on which the Hungarian and Polish

¹³⁴² I can hardly feel relief by relying on the classical division between the enlightened few and the inept, inert, and reactionary masses, yet the evidence falls short to prove otherwise. Jerzy S. Latka, *Lehistan'dan Gelen Sefirler: Türkiye-Polonya İlişkilerinin Altı Yüzyılı*, trans. Antoni and Nalan Sarkady (Istanbul: 1991), 50. I quoted Deringil's translation. Deringil, *Conversion*, 174. Also see Lucyna Antonowicz-Bauer, *Polonezköyü Adampol*, trans. Yeşim Santepe (Istanbul: Çelik Gülersoy Vakfı İstanbul Kütüphanesi, 1990), 15. According to Mehmed Sadık Pasha, many of the Poles who ended up in Istanbul had difficulties in finding a decent place within the society, which led them to misery, despair, crime, and alcohol. Gülnar Kara, *Polonezköy'ün Kurucularından Çaykovski Mehmet Sadık Paşa'nın Osmanlı Anıları* (Konya: Kömen Yayınları, 2016), 67. Also see BOA., HR.MKT., 36/9, 17 Şevval 1266 (26 August 1850).

revolutionaries were exposed and their corresponding reactions.¹³⁴³ The Hungarian Reform Era (1825-1848) introduced two competing approaches into the political agenda. The representative of the aristocratic interests was Count István Széchenyi (1791-1860), who defended a moderate path against the radical politics of the petty-bourgeois classes, led by Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894), who gradually had won the ideological war once the revolutionary wave of 1848 in Europe broke out. What began as a liberal constitutional movement seeking the abolition of feudal privileges within the Habsburg monarchy quickly morphed into a struggle for full independence. This escalation heralded the emergence of a revolutionary persona, whose fervent speeches induced thousands of Hungarians and Poles to enlist in the national forces. Even though Kossuth's coalition with the magnates did not prevent the war with Austria from happening, the state-formation attempt in Hungary was doomed to a failure due to the alienation of nationalities that refused to comply with the great power ambition of the revolutionary leaders and their exclusionary perspectives. Once the cause was lost, however, thousands of revolutionaries sought asylum on Ottoman soil, where Kossuth lost more credit and legitimacy in the eyes of the refugees, as was the Western world that had remained indifferent to their plight.

One of the most admired figures of the revolution, Józef Zachariasz Bem (1794-1850), offered an alternative leadership for the refugees, while aligning himself with the Sublime Porte. Exemplified by Father Bem, conversion to Islam appeared for many as a pathway to a new social integration, marking the loss of the ideological hegemony once exerted by figures like Hungarian Kossuth, Polish Zamoyski and Italian Monti, whose ostracizing tones alienated the converts more. While revolutionary elites mostly denounced conversion, it became a widespread phenomenon among their socially vulnerable followers. In front of this challenge, quite interestingly, the revolutionary elites reverted to a discourse that was actually based on a

¹³⁴³ While explaining their vacillations, I borrowed the theoretical framework from Therborn, *The Ideology*, 80.

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feudal ideology. On the contrary, Ottoman statesmen offered a progressivist, if not revolutionary outright, state-making project into which the converts could put their efforts. At the time, the empire was undergoing a restructuring period, as known as the Tanzimat Era (1839-1870), the foundations of which were inaugurated by Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-1858). In this context, religious change easily translated into entering an alliance with the reformist statesmen once the converts were employed in the imperial bureaucracy. As the converts distanced themselves from their former peers, they were simultaneously integrated into the state-building process, exposing them to a more inclusive ideological framework of *Ottomanism*.

Conversion to Islam was a new beginning for the refugees. It opened access to an entirely different political cosmos. Rather than constituting a rupture in identity, this shift enabled converts to seize new opportunities, forge new networks, and acquire new tools needed to cultivate a culture of resistance against oppression. Unlike the discriminatory manners of their former leaders, the imperial framework provided the revolutionary converts with institutional mechanisms and cultural background to pursue their revolutionary aims. This was a moment when the empire was undergoing a certain refashioning phase to morph into a legal-rational state in the modern sense of the word. The dynamism of the reform era afforded them autonomous spaces, where they could consolidate their intra-group solidarity, alternatively enhance their organizational capacities, and invent novel discursive elements to assimilate to their ideologies. Even their political discourses showcase how the convert revolutionaries refashioned themselves through these interstices, highlighting their efforts to turn the domestic and international rivalries to their own advantage.

For most of them, immediate conversion in the aftermath of a lost cause could be an opportunistic thing to do, though they gradually accumulated the political and cultural traits of their new environment into their own selves and a shift in their identity became the case in the

long run, which was surely a direction that they did not initially intend. His only son, Hasan Enver Celâleddin Pasha (1851–1929) explicitly recalls that his father, Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha (1826-1876), embraced Islam for practical reasons at first, yet he became a genuine Muslim over time.¹³⁴⁴ Even though conversion was initially a form of protest, it soon granted its practitioners ideological strength. Some of the Islamized 48ers tried to compromise their political priorities and those of the Porte after being sidelined by their former leaders following their conversion. They adopted the empire as a new motherland, despite the negative image of Islam that had governed their earlier identities. They adapted their discourse dynamically to the new conditions in which they found themselves, and the former political demands gradually evolved into more sophisticated ones through the prism of the new cultural environment and their transnational confrontations resulting from forced migrations. While redefining their allegiances both at home and abroad, the converts took into account of the political concerns and cultural standards of their new homeland on personal, collective, and imperial levels.

More than a decade after their conversion emerged the climax of their Ottomanization. Nevertheless, the ideological influences on which the converts were exposed were neither unilateral nor absolute. Although the Crimean War (1853-1856) marked a significant phase in the converts' identification with their new identities, it also coincided with countercurrent influences that threatened to pull them away from the empire's ideological orbit, stemming from the revolutionary wars that led to the unification of Italy (1859-1862). By the early 1860s, political developments on the Italian peninsula had caused notable divisions not only among Italian revolutionaries but also within the Hungarian émigré communities. Lining up with their former leaders was not the most relieving option, so the convert revolutionaries saw Garibaldi as a partner, as he also disagreed with Kossuth.¹³⁴⁵ In this context, the ideological influence of

¹³⁴⁴ Latka, *Lehistan'dan Gelen Sefirler*, 46.

¹³⁴⁵ In fact, the stance taken by the Hungarian émigré leaders against Garibaldi led to a general questioning among the Hungarian exiles. Pasquale Fornaro, *Risorgimento Italiano e Questione Ungherese (1849–1867): Marcello Cerruti e le Intese Politiche Italo-Magiare* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1995), 224.

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another respected figure on some converts likely overshadowed the previous commitments in the empire, if not entirely eradicating them. At this juncture, their political loyalties were put to a new test, leading them down two alternative paths.

Viewed as the savior of the oppressed peoples of the Balkans, some converts set their hopes on a military expedition of Garibaldi along the Adriatic coast, to eventually to spark uprisings in Hungary, while downplaying the ideological influence of the Tanzimat era. In this way, they carried their revolutionary agenda well into the 1860s, albeit separate from the mainstream leadership, forging an alternative network of alliances. Alternatively, some revolutionary converts tried to articulate their alignment with the revolutionary hero, while avoiding alienation from the Porte. Their reliance on the Porte persisted to establish a counter-hegemony that might allow them to overcome the sense of inevitability surrounding their suffering. At the time when Kossuth turned to the Balkan nations in an attempt to harness the aspirations of emerging nations, despite the memories of the Revolutions of 1848, it is not difficult to opine that the converts found his prospects far from convincing. In this context, they likely advanced a counterproposal for the unity of the Balkans under the suzerainty of the Sultan, a perspective that was intellectually prompted by many Polish refugees. This project opposed to the Kossuth faction who sought the support of the Cavour-Napoléon III axis. If that were the case, the Garibaldian stance would have been seen purified of the political uses of the Catholic religion, especially for the converts sensitive to the concerns of the Ottoman Empire. In any case, the new enterprise of some converts broke their social contract with the Porte, which investigated their underground activities and subsequently deported those who strayed back to Italy.

Kossuth's recollection of prisoner selection among the Austro-Hungarian forces in Italy to organize the Hungarian Legion in 1859 offers striking examples of how national identity was ambiguous at the time. Accordingly, the French authorities attempting to separate

Hungarian prisoners from others relied on external signs—most notably, the tight-fitting trousers (*pantolon collant*) and *bakkancs*—as indicators of Hungarian nationality. This crude method led to both exclusion and inclusion errors: non-Hungarians wearing this trousers were selected as Hungarians, though some Hungarians were overlooked and sent away. This confusion, as Kossuth recounts, even encouraged Italian and other foreign prisoners to claim Hungarian identity in the hope of avoiding deportation or joining the Piedmontese cause. Even more telling is his remark about Polish recruits slipping into the Hungarian forces, though they were not desired in the legion.¹³⁴⁶ In our study, the fluidity embedded in the political identities of the revolutionaries manifested itself in the interrogation protocols of Wiktor Jabłoński and Jusztenián Károly. Asked about his citizenship, the last question of his interrogation protocol, Jabłoński gives an interesting reply: "Even though I am originally a Russian subject, they would not accept me now. I will either become an English or French subject, yet it would be better if I were a subject of the Kingdom of Sardinia since we have officers there." And he adds, "when I fled my country, I did not take a passport with me. And to this day, I still do not have a passport. I have never obtained a passport from any consulate."¹³⁴⁷ This statement casts light on another dimension of the refugee psyche on Ottoman soil. Ottoman was not a sole identity the converts accumulated. Above all else, they were exiles. It is difficult to say how many years are necessary to abandon this sense of exile, but as we recall, at some point, Jusztenián states that "since we are refugees, the Austrians can say anything about us; we do not recognize them."¹³⁴⁸ In this statement, he uses the third-person plural, "we" and "us," to stress his belonging to a larger community of exiles. Kossuth himself defines Hungarian émigrés as "nation of refugees," making an additional distinction with the nation in the distant

¹³⁴⁶ Louis Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, trans. Ferencz Jausz (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1880), 284-285.

¹³⁴⁷ "Ben memleketten kaçtığım vakit yanıma pasaport almadım. Ve bu ana kadar pasaportum dahi yoktur. Bir konsolosdan şimdiye kadar pasaport almadım." BOA., HR.MKT., 391/86, 6 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (9 November 1861), 6.

¹³⁴⁸ BOA., HR.MKT., 386/73, 28 Muharrem 1278 (05 August 1861), 3.

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homeland.¹³⁴⁹ Their refuge connected them with wider communities. Hundreds of people across Europe and even beyond formed a single community after the revolutions of 1820s.¹³⁵⁰ This tradition continued after the Springtime of Peoples. It was an exiled generation for Heléna Tóth, describing the revolutionaries who took part in the Revolutions of 1848.¹³⁵¹ Nevertheless, their being exile does not downgrade their differences and animosities among different exile groups. While their revolutionary agenda opposed to those of the revolutionary leaders resided in certain European centers, such as London, Paris, and Turin, the converts thrived in the Ottoman capital, transforming it into another revolutionary hub that reflected their political aspirations and alliances. In this sense, Constantinople was not merely a transit hub. Instead, it functioned as a space where alternative ideological discourses emerged within their larger revolutionary movements.

As a result, the individual stories narrated in this study point to something remarkable about their prosopography; besides rich and eventful, their experiences bear the fruitful marks of various geo-cultural encounters. While intensely circulating through Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Near and Middle East, they interacted not only with the political developments in Europe but also the internal developments of the Ottoman Empire. This thesis was about how and what they appropriated from the places they circulated.

It is not the claim of this study that every stage of the teleological trajectory outlined in this study applies to every single Hungarian, Polish, and Italian 48ers who converted to Islam. Despite developments in Italy, there were those who managed to maintain their social contract with the Porte, whose stories will be evaluated later in follow-up studies based on other life-stories, whereas there were also others who had distanced themselves from the supposed

¹³⁴⁹ Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile*, vi, xi, x.

¹³⁵⁰ Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Emigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 23.

¹³⁵¹ Heléna Tóth, *An Exiled Generation: German and Hungarian Refugees of Revolution, 1848-1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2.

teleology even at earlier stages. Overall, referring to a revolutionary convert does not denote a well-defined society organized around a singular goal and a consistent ideology. At best, it is possible to talk about a convert school of thought that came from the collective experience across different times and places and entered into published and unpublished records, all accumulated and finally gave way to a distinctive political discourse. In many cases, the act of conversion led to a profound fragmentation in the sense of self, one that would relentlessly resurface with each new social or political challenge. Therefore, it gave rise to moments of indecision and instability that emerged intermittently. Some of the convert revolutionaries took their own lives; some others sought solace in alcohol or drugs. For some, military service within the Ottoman army offered only a form of escape. Some ultimately drifted away from the Ottoman path and faced deportation.

Even after playing their roles in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and its integration into the global capitalism, the journey of the converts did not come to an end. In the early republican era, these revolutionaries were integrated into the grand narrative of the newly formed nation-state of Türkiye, which was under the influence of the civil and military bureaucratic elites. Based on the capitalist modernization and nation-state projects of the republican elites, Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries (the Italians never mentioned) were valued as the carriers of modernity. At the same time, the refugee crisis was instrumentalized to install national pride to the new nation. This intellectual enterprise looked out to integrate the Republic of Türkiye into the Western family of nations, thus, the representations of the refugees and converts were aligned with Orientalist epistemology. While admitting the transformative impacts of the refugees (modernizing mission), the transformation of their selves on Ottoman soil was often disregarded (insincerity of conversion). In other words, perspectives embedded in Hungarian official narratives largely prevailed in the Turkish official narratives in the last analysis. This framework remained largely intact throughout the Cold War

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era. The fall of the USSR, however, significantly altered the global power dynamics. In the new era, there was an apparent spark of interest in the case of the Hungarian and Polish refugees, particularly within the context of Turkish-Hungarian and Turkish-Polish relations. While these former Eastern Bloc countries sought to integrate into the global capitalism, the Turkish bourgeoisie expected to secure a place in this new global order. Studies in this period continued to provide cultural explanations for the expectations of diplomatic and economic relations. The re-structuring of global capitalism also structured the scholarly production that relies on the oversimplified cultural distinction between the West (European) and the East (Islam), especially with the advent of the Clash of Civilizations paradigm. Even though studies roughly maintained the nation-state framework in the post-Soviet period, the narratives continued to rely on the banal dichotomy of East versus West, reinforcing the culturally defined "other." Religious distinctions had already played a significant role in shaping national identities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this sense, the refugee issue and their conversions have always been an arena where the grand narratives of different "civilizations" come into conflict.

Postmodernist critique has been criticized on several grounds, one of which is its dismissal of the possibility of radical change. Arif Dirlik points out that the essentialist treatment of culture leads to unproductive identity politics and overlooks the socioeconomic aspects and international divisions of labor within the capitalist system. Culture must not be fetishized, nor ignored altogether as a scam. The issue is not whether culture is important, but rather to reimagine it as a force for liberation rather than hegemonic force.¹³⁵² History writing often involves elimination and appropriation processes, inescapably suppressing possibilities and alternatives obliterated, realized with the wisdom of hindsight.¹³⁵³ Thus, uncovering

¹³⁵² Arif Dirlik "Culturalism as Hegemonic Ideology," in *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism* (Oxford, Westview Press, 1998), 28.

¹³⁵³ Moore, *Injustice*, 376.

alternative paths lost in the cracks of history carries significant implications for proposing alternative policies today, eventually challenging the belligerent cultures that dialectically endorse the very systems they depend on to oppress. Our aim in this study was to go beyond nation-state paradigms as the telos of historical development, which proved to be ethno-religious (as well as gendered even if our research does not cover this aspect). Instead, this study seeks to revive a buried alternative experience and discourse that might inspire today.

My research addresses today's social and political challenges in some ways. To begin with, it is important to critically examine and to deconstruct the genealogy of the prevailing epistemology largely grounded on the East-West divide to explore how Hungarian, Polish, and Italian converts gradually developed a political identity that appears unorthodox and syncretic to us in retrospect. Their trajectories indicate that these cultural divides not mutually exclusive. Moving beyond essentialist divisions between so-called Eastern and Western civilizations, which are habitually portrayed as non-interacting, is important to deconstruct the identities built over this dichotomy. The example at hand shows that although the Hungarian and Polish converts changed their religious outlook at a certain point in their lives and repeatedly expressed their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, they never abandoned the hope that their fellow countrymen would one day be liberated. What is more, some seems to have pursued this struggle under their Muslim identity—in other words, they were able to be both Muslim and Hungarian/Polish/Italian at the same time.¹³⁵⁴ Looking at the intellectual production of the converts, this study explores how displaced individuals negotiate their identities and contribute to the cultural landscape of their host countries, highlighting the productive aspects of political displacement, and cultural exchange beyond the typical East-West antagonism. Therefore, the present study aims to disrupt discursive narratives often associated with ethno-religious

¹³⁵⁴ I presented this argument for the first time here İlkay Kiriscioglu, "The Garibaldi Team: An Alternative Projection of European Identity Presented by the Hungarian and Polish Converts in Constantinople in the 1860s," paper presented at the conference: *European Identity. History, Tradition, Innovation*, University of Messina, Messina, October 26–28, 2023.

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understanding by offering a more inclusive approach. The converts developed a heterodox transnational identity converging with wider geo-regions yet diverging from their particular national genres. Given that this political tradition is largely overlooked, unearthing it aims to revise the discursive narratives that cultivate, solidify, and reproduce illiberal political cultures. Indeed, the prevailing representations of these revolutionaries in the literature often align with the corresponding dominant political cultures in Türkiye, Hungary, and Italy—countries where far-right leaderships currently dominate the internal politics, within the larger EU-wide political context. In this sense, my findings critically engage with how religiously sensitive topics are addressed to consolidate intolerant political cultures. Ultimately, this research paves the way for nuanced insights that could aid policymakers and scholars in understanding the complex relationship between displacement and exclusion.

Türkiye's non-membership in the EU can partly be attributed to the perceptions that sustains cultural antagonisms. In other words, the traditional other, Islam, impedes a wider integration, as well as fuels the far-right politics in Europe. It is important to sympathize with those who were excluded from national narratives upon conversion because embracing traditional other is considered to be an anomaly in the conventional narratives. It is important to disrupt the traditional narratives to disrupt today's hostile confrontations.

These religious motives color the discourses of contemporary politicians. Even though their political leaders often resort to religious references, the bilateral relations between Türkiye and Hungary now enjoy the heyday. The reflection of this relations can also be followed in memory politics. As Jeremy Walton observes:

A footpath encircles the sculptures and tombs commemorating the Siege of Szigetvár, Ottoman rule in Hungary, and later ties between Hungary and Turkey. This culminates in a celebration of the political, economic, and cultural initiatives led by Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.¹³⁵⁵

¹³⁵⁵ Jeremy F. Walton, "Sanitizing Szigetvár: On the Post-Imperial Fashioning of Nationalist Memory," *History and Anthropology* 30, no. 4 (2019): 435.

According to a think-tank that supports the policies of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the rise of Islamophobic discourses in Hungary poses a potential source of tension between these countries.¹³⁵⁶ With the influx of Syrian refugees into Europe, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán frequently emphasized the need to protect Hungary's Christian identity against Muslims.¹³⁵⁷ However, the favorable relations between the two governments may produce an unexpected outcome. Relying on mutual admiration of these leaders and the financial improvements between two countries, at least not to jeopardize the material benefits, knowledge production might take a new turn, reviving alternative approaches for cultural heritage. After all, it is hardly conceivable that a ruling mentality that closely aligns itself with Islamic values would endorse the prejudiced narratives coming from Hungary and Poland regarding a shared historical topic. Independent researchers can play their part in proposing policies in this regard. My humble suggestion here is as follows.

Religious conversion emerges as a sensitive topic that demands reparative approaches. Kossuth has long been symbolically promoted as the emblem of Turkish-Hungarian friendship, though his political speeches and political leanings did not always prove to be Turcophile and Islamophilic. Rather, it must be the legacy of Father Bem, whom Kossuth denounced outright, that should form the foundation of the friendship between these two nations. The futile quest for the personification of nations should come to an end, for the sake of the epistemological castaways, whose perspectives carry the potential to endorse wider human integration. Although General Bem was of Polish origin, he was also a national hero for Hungarians. He died as Murad Pasha, an Ottoman general in Syria. His figure obviously moves beyond the exclusionary national and religious representations. Why should not such a figure, and others

¹³⁵⁶ Murat Deregözü, *Türkiye-Macaristan İlişkileri* (İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2020), 39.

¹³⁵⁷ Ibid.

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like him, be represented in a way that fosters reconciliation among people, rather than serving as a site of contestation between them?

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
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Appendix A




The first page of Jusztinián's first interrogation in Constantinople.

Everything started with this document.

BOA., A.M., 25/46, 23 July 1861 (15 Muharrem 1278)


Appendix B



Giuseppe Blosco's interrogation protocol.

"I went to the town of Turin in the Italian territories and became a military officer. I served in the army for about ten years. Two years ago, during the war between Austria and Italy, I resigned from the military. I returned to Istanbul."

BOA., HR.MKT., 391/86, 6 Cemâziyelevvel 1278 (9 November 1861), 4.



BOA., HR.SYS., 173/19, 15 March 1865.

Appendix E

THE TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1860.

THE MASSACRES IN SYRIA.

We publish to-day a number of extracts from private letters, which will be found of great interest:—

“Beirut, July 19.

“We are favoured by yours of the 28th ult., and in reply to your information that the Sublime Porte had changed some governors, and ordered the despatch of some soldiers to this country, and, in consequence of those measures, hopes were entertained of a speedy settlement of those disturbances, we beg to say that the fearful occurrences in the mountains against the Christians are totally absorbed now in the last events and cruelties at Damascus. On Monday, the 9th inst., a rising of the Moslems took place against the Christians of that capital, and about 6,000 men in three divisions attacked their quarter, and at once commenced burning, pillaging, and murdering, and on the following day Moslems, Bedouins, and Druses of the neighbourhood poured into the town and continued the tragedy. Some Christians took refuge at the house of Abd-el-Kader, others with some respectable Moslems, and the women and children at the Castle, and at the English and Prussian Consulates, which, being Moslem property, and in the Moslem quarter, were saved. All the Christian quarter, with the other Consulates, to the number of about 1,000 houses, were pillaged and burnt. On the 12th inst., when they had done with the pillaging and burning of every house, they went into the city, and there ransacked all the warehouses and shops belonging to the Christians, and, according to the last news arrived from Damascus yesterday, pillage and murder continued up to the last date, the 16th inst. The number of killed some calculate at 6,000, and some at more. At the time these horrible deeds began there were about 1,200 regular Turkish troops and as many Bashl-Bazouks, but they never gave any protection to the Christians, but helped to throw them back into the burning flames when they attempted to escape; those who are still alive are in danger of meeting their death by starvation. In fine, if we were to write all the details we should require a large volume; suffice it to say,—God save us! At present fears are entertained for the Christians in every place,—at Homs, Hamnah, Salda, Latakia, Aleppo, Tripoli, Beyrout, Tyre, Acre, Jaffa, Nablous, and Jerusalem,—lest the same fearful crimes should be committed there, as, after these events at Damascus, the Druses and Moslems killed the Christians of Hama and Baalbec, pillaged their property, and forced many to embrace Islamism. About half the population of Beyrout have fled for Alexandria, Syria, and other parts of Greece, and even for Russia. Two days ago His Excellency Fud Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and His Excellency Halim Pasha, commander of the army of Damascus, arrived, and before them, and in their company, came regular soldiers, sent for the last disturbances in the mountains, as when they left they had not the news of the Damascene events; so we have about 6,000 in Beyrout, and with the soldiers that went with Mahmm Pasha, the new Governor of Damascus, there will be about 4,000 there; but no one knows what will happen afterwards.”

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

“On Monday, the 9th inst., a rising of the Moslem mob of Damascus took place, and the Christian quarter was attacked on all sides, pillaged, and burnt entirely, with whole churches and convents; and, between priests (Franks as well as natives), the people of Damascus, and fugitives, more than 5,000 fell victims, while women were violated and children massacred. This state of things continued for seven days, the Turkish authorities either doing nothing, or coniving at the slaughter. So children and women, married and unmarried, were driven into the streets, crying for help and assistance, with heads uncovered and feet naked, appealing to the mercy of the murderers, but some of them were taken into the respectable Moslem houses, also to the English and Prussian Consulates (as they were the only ones saved). This done, these brigades turned their attention to the city, and pillaged all the Christian warehouses and shops, so that the Christian population of Damascus are either killed or ruined. No doubt, such calamities will fall heavily upon some of the respectable Moslem commercial houses of Damascus, and also on some here. This is the state of things at present. May God, when these things are known in Europe, inspire its Christian Princes to come to our help, and save us, at least, from further atrocities!”

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

“Whatever you might have learnt of the fearful occurrences in these places is not one part of what happened

the case of Dar-el-Kamar and Zahleh. The Consuls, however, say that Beyrout is safe, but refrain from advising any one whether to remain or leave, telling every one to follow the dictates of his own heart. As to myself, whatever may be the opinion, I believe the place in present circumstances to be safe, but nothing will be settled in less than six months. The Christians of Hama and the neighbourhood of Damascus have been massacred by the Bedouins, Kurds, Druses, and Moslems of the place. To-day a firman was read here of the inflexion and full authority of Fud Pasha to inquire into the late events between the Maronites and Druses in Mount Lebanon; but, while I write, one of the Imperial troops, passing before the warehouse, took on the point of his bayonet a few loaves of bread from a poor creature who does not possess a plate in the world; from this you can judge for yourself what our protectors are. The new Governor of Damascus arrived there on Monday, the 16th inst., and it is reported that his soldiers killed 15 Christians in a place called Midan, the Christians of which were not molested, as the Mahomedan population did not agree with their other coreligionists. It is also said that the Jews took part with the Moslems and killed many Christians, and served as capital guides to the Christian shops and warehouses. In one word, many reports and many kinds of news circulate, of which I guarantee none, except that the disasters are heartrending, and that the infamy of the Mahomedan mob of Damascus, of the Druses, Bedouins, and Kurds, is far greater than words could paint.”

The following is extracted from a letter dated Damascus, July 16th, and may be relied on as authentic:—

“Our Consul, Mr. James Brant, had to wait twice last week to the palace of our Pasha, and there he underwent a most exciting interview. He tells me he could with the greatest difficulty restrain himself within the bounds of official propriety while reasoning with the Pasha, and insisting upon measures which the Pasha promised to adopt, but which our Consul felt sure he would not perform. He is a complete coward, and dares not stir out of his house and court-yard, which, however, is filled with soldiers and artillery. Instead of leading these soldiers and making them assist in extinguishing the conflagration and stopping the carnage, this Governor keeps close in his serai, or tends to be consulting with others what is to be done, but never doing anything that his counsellors recommend. The mob, therefore, are left to do their own will. Perhaps 300 to 400 people have been murdered or burnt, and their corpses are left to putrefy in the streets. The Pasha will not order them to be removed, even to prevent a pestilence; a few bodies only have been taken away and thrown into the river, which will probably render the water itself pestiferous.

“The Pasha would not take measures to prevent the Druses or the peasants from entering the town, joining in the plunder, and murdering the Christians. In short, the Pasha appeared completely paralyzed from abject fear, and incapable of exercising his judgment. If, indeed, he has any, I must add that our Consul, Mr. Brant, behaved nobly and bravely through all these horrible scenes. He did, indeed, good service, and saved many lives. He was the only Consul or European who ventured out of his house. He remonstrated with the Pasha. He went with a motive, only attended by a guard of a few Turks. Had not our Consul showed no fear, but boldly appeared in the midst of the most imminent danger, and ventured among the insurgents, Europeans would have been worse treated. Not a word had been spoken against the English, and it is quite certain that all bear our excellent Consul good-will and respect, and not one of the people would have knowingly hurt him. His house and court-yard are full of refugees, starving, naked, and ruined; and he has enough to do to find the means of procuring food and clothing for 200 destitute, afflicted, and despairing people.”

The following is an extract of a letter dated Piræus of Athens, July 23:—

“A day or two after I wrote my last letter we received such startling intelligence by telegraph from Syria, that our captain, upon his own responsibility, steamed off to Beyrout at once. We arrived there about four days afterwards, and found the Druses, a powerful tribe of Mahomedans, massacring Christians all over the country, and threatening to attack Beyrout. The Turkish troops were doing nothing towards preventing them, but rather encouraged them, and, in two or three instances, actually took part in killing the unfortunate Christians. The arrival of ourselves, a French frigate, and a large Russian frigate, however, prevented them attacking Beyrout,

"Of course, you would have already read the newspapers and seen it. That is how it happened in Damascus."

"The Massacres in Syria," *The Times*, August 9, 1860,

Appendix F

A
NARRATIVE
OF THE
DEFENCE OF KARS,
ON THE
29TH SEPTEMBER, 1855.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF
GEORGE KMETY,
LATE HUNGARIAN GENERAL,
NOW LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ISMAIL PASHA, IN THE SERVICE
OF HIS MAJESTY THE SULTAN.

SECOND EDITION.


LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.
1856.

"I was sufficiently conversant with the Turkish language, and with the regulations and drill of the Sultan's army, to enable me to exercise this command without assistance."

George Kmety, *A Narrative of the Defence of Kars on the 29th September 1855*, 2nd ed.

(London: James Ridgway, 1856), 13.

Appendix G




Antal Schneider (Tabib Kaimmakam Hüseyin Faik Bey)

Beatrix Cs. Lengyel, Olaszthoni emlék: az itáliai magyar emigráció fényképeinek katalógusa – Ricordo dall'Italia: catalogo delle fotografie degli emigranti ungheresi in Italia (Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum, 2007).

"Like a serious offender, I was escorted by three officers and five sergeants and transferred to the ship under guard. I now once again protest before the Commander-in-Chief and the Council of State against this cruel treatment inflicted upon me in this manner. And should any crime or offense be attributed to me, I am ready to stand trial."


Appendix H



A Petition of Hüseyin Faik, former lieutenant-colonel Antal Schneider

BOA., HR.TO., 417/28, 24 April 1852, 1.

Appendix I




Another Petition of Hüseyin Faik, with his own seal, just before being deported to Italy

"Your humble servant has been employed in the military profession for thirteen years. Due to my discharge, I am now to depart for a foreign land. Therefore, I humbly request that safe-conduct passes for my family, children, one servant, and myself, along with cabin tickets for the ship, be granted to me."

BOA., A.MKT.NZD, 385/60, 14 Cemâziyelâhir 1278 (17 December 1861), 2.

Appendix J



A Petition of a Hungarian convert named Ahmed, who was persecuted after his religious conversion

"Since I do not speak Turkish, I pursue my occupation and perform my worship here and there in Istanbul. However, I am subject to beating and mistreatment on insufficient grounds. Therefore, I am in urgent need of a written document from your highness to avoid myself from slander and insult."

BOA., HR.MKT., 36/9, 17 Şevval 1266 (26 August 1850)