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# CONTRACTIONARY TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS

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This paper adds to the large body of literature on the effects of technology shocks empirically and theoretically. Using a structural vector error correction model, we first provide evidence that not only hours but also investment decline temporarily following a technology improvement. This result is robust to important data and identification issues addressed in the literature. We then show that the negative response of inputs is consistent with an estimated monetary model in which the presence of strategic complementarity in price setting, in addition to nominal rigidities, lowers the sensitivity of prices to marginal costs, and monetary policy does not fully accommodate the shock.

**Keywords:** Technology Shocks, Inputs Dynamics, Structural Vector Error Correction Model, New Keynesian DSGE Model, Bayesian Inference

## 1. INTRODUCTION

A large body of literature has challenged the empirical relevance of the concept of technology-driven business cycles. The shift of interest from the analysis of sample correlations among macroeconomic time series to the analysis of their conditional counterparts has identified a countercyclical behavior of factor inputs following a technology shock. This result is apparently at odds with the predictions of a broad class of business cycle models that envisage technology shocks as one of the main determinants of the observed procyclical dynamics of factor inputs.

The idea that technology improvements can have contractionary effects is supported by several empirical studies that mainly focus on the emergence of a negative conditional correlation between productivity and hours worked in structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) identified with long-run restrictions [Gali (1999); Francis and Ramey (2005); Pesavento and Rossi (2005)].

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1 However, with the exception of Basu et al. (2006), who use a purified measure of  
2 technology in two-variable VARs, and Giuli and Tancioni (2012), who estimate a  
3 monetary model characterized by a particularly flat New Keynesian Phillips curve  
4 (NKPC), the evidence of an additional negative short-term response in investment  
5 has not generally been established in the empirical and theoretical literature on  
6 business cycles.

7 This paper develops this literature from both an empirical and a theoretical  
8 perspective. First, using a medium-scale structural vector error correction (SVEC)  
9 model, we show that both hours and investment respond negatively to a positive  
10 technology shock and that this result is robust with respect to the main control  
11 dimensions addressed in the literature. Second, we demonstrate that the negative  
12 response of inputs is consistent with an estimated monetary model in which (i)  
13 the presence of strategic complementarities in price setting, in addition to nominal  
14 rigidities, lowers the sensitivity of prices to marginal costs and (ii) monetary policy  
15 does not fully accommodate the technology shock.

16 Related to the main empirical findings, our results are not new. Our novel  
17 contribution is that the puzzling evidence in Basu et al. (2006) can be robustly  
18 replicated from a more standard empirical perspective and can be theoretically  
19 explained by a reasonably parameterized monetary model encompassing a number  
20 of alternative theoretical explanations in the literature.

21 The evidence on the contractionary effects of productivity improvements is  
22 highly debated among macroeconomists. The empirical controversy relates to  
23 the identifiability of technology shocks within the long-run SVAR approach  
24 when low-frequency movements in productivity [Fernald (2007)] and hours  
25 [Canova et al. (2010)] are present and to the role of monetary policy in the  
26 accommodation of shocks affecting the unobserved output potential [Galí et al.  
27 (2003)].

28 The empirical evaluation of structural macro-models also reaches conflicting  
29 conclusions. Basing the calibration of a monetary model on an impulse response  
30 matching strategy, Altig et al. (2011) obtain a positive short-term response of  
31 both factor inputs. Del Negro et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate  
32 monetary models with nominal and real frictions and find that whereas the response  
33 of hours is negative, that of investment is positive.<sup>1</sup>

34 From a theoretical point of view, different explanations of the contractionary  
35 effects of technology shocks have been proposed. Galí (1999) suggests a sticky  
36 price explanation based on a model in which monetary authorities adopt a partially  
37 exogenous money supply rule so that, following a productivity improvement, the  
38 weak response of real balances constrains the demand expansion, leading to a  
39 reduction in the use of labor.

40 Francis and Ramey (2005) show that a negative response in hours (but not  
41 in investment) is obtained in a flexible price model with real demand rigidities  
42 modeled in the form of consumption habits and capital adjustment costs. This is  
43 also Smets and Wouters's (2007) preferred interpretation for the negative response  
44 in hours.

1 Lindé (2009) shows that the negative correlation between output, hours, and in-  
2 vestment can emerge in a baseline RBC model in which the permanent technology  
3 shock is autocorrelated in growth rates. Under this hypothesis, the temporary con-  
4 traction in inputs is due to the interaction of wealth and intertemporal substitution  
5 effects stemming from the expected increase in productivity.

6 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011) show that a flexible price model in which  
7 the common stochastic trend is driven by both neutral and investment-specific  
8 productivity shocks is also consistent with a temporary contraction of inputs  
9 following an investment-specific shock.<sup>2</sup>

10 Basu et al. (2006) take into account these different explanations and conclude  
11 that standard sticky price models, in which monetary policy follows a non-fully-  
12 accommodative rule, can account for the negative response in both hours and  
13 investment better than the alternative explanations. However, they do not support  
14 their argument with an analytical monetary model.<sup>3</sup>

15 Overall, there is no clear consensus on the robustness of the empirical results,  
16 and the competing theoretical explanations lack substantial empirical testing from  
17 a comparative perspective.

18 The analysis is organized in two stages. We first estimate a SVEC model  
19 using unprocessed data for per capita real variables and considering hours as  
20 stationary. The SVEC is specified to approximate a fairly general monetary model  
21 subject to permanent technology shocks. In particular, the explicit consideration  
22 of the stationary relations among nonstationary variables favors the separation  
23 between permanent and transitory components, thus improving the identifiability  
24 of the technology shock. The resulting cointegrating vectors are the theory-based  
25 stationary ratios among real and monetary variables, and the long-run effects  
26 matrix is restricted by imposing the hypothesis that only technology shocks can  
27 have permanent effects on per capita output.

28 The SVEC analysis confirms the existence of the short-term contractionary  
29 effects of productivity improvements. This finding provides new evidence that  
30 calls into question the ability of technology shocks to explain the unconditional  
31 procyclicality of investment and hours. Moreover, the responses of inflation and  
32 of the nominal interest rate signal that the monetary authority does not fully  
33 accommodate the shock.

34 From the robustness checks we find that, contrary to Fernald (2007) and Canova  
35 et al. (2010), under the SVEC specification, the consideration of breaks in produc-  
36 tivity and hours is not crucial for the results in either a precrisis sample that is fully  
37 consistent with the information used in previous analyses or an extended sample  
38 including the recent economic contraction. Our evidence holds even considering  
39 exact balanced growth, a feature that, although standard in general equilibrium  
40 models, is not supported by the data. We also show that the use of alternative  
41 long-run identification strategies does not alter the main conclusions of our inves-  
42 tigation.

43 The second stage of our analysis provides a theoretical interpretation of the  
44 SVEC evidence to be confronted with the data and with alternative explanations.

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1 We set up and estimate a monetary model that can replicate the different empirical  
2 results and the different theoretical interpretations provided by the literature. In  
3 addition to the real and nominal rigidities that characterize standard monetary  
4 models, we assume that capital is firm-specific [Svein and Weinke (2005); Wood-  
5 ford (2005); Altig et al. (2011)] and that the demand elasticity among differentiated  
6 goods is endogenous [Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007); Smets and Wouters (2007)].

7 Under these additional hypotheses, the slope of the NKPC depends not only  
8 on the frequency with which firms are allowed to reset their prices but also on  
9 the degree of strategic complementarities in price setting [Woodford (2005)]. This  
10 additional element lowers the slope of the NKPC, weakening the sensitivity of  
11 price inflation to variations in the marginal cost. The economic rationale for this  
12 result is that because capital must be accumulated by the firm, marginal costs are  
13 firm-specific and the incentive to cut prices following a productivity improvement  
14 is partially counterbalanced by the expected increase in marginal costs due to the  
15 expected increase in demand.

16 The importance of the aggregate demand response to productivity improvements  
17 highlights the role played by monetary policy. It is well known that for a wide  
18 class of monetary models, a policy rule that responds to the theory-consistent  
19 output gap can approximate the optimal policy, namely, the one that would min-  
20 imize the volatility of the target variables around their natural levels. However,  
21 the implementation of this rule in real-life operations requires knowledge of the  
22 natural rate of interest or of the level of potential output, which is not within a  
23 monetary authority's information set. For this reason, we consider two alternative  
24 contemporaneous rules—one targeting output deviations from its trend (i.e., an  
25 “empirical” rule) and the other targeting the theory-based output gap—and let the  
26 data indicate which is the more empirically relevant.

27 The theoretical model is estimated with Bayesian techniques, counterfactually  
28 eliciting a prior parameterization for which the model does not replicate the  
29 SVEC-based evidence on the negative conditional correlation between per capita  
30 output and investment. We show that the dynamics of the estimated model is  
31 qualitatively similar to that produced by the SVEC.

32 As a further check of the validity of the SVEC analysis, we generate samples of  
33 artificial data by stochastically simulating the models at the posterior estimates and  
34 repeat the SVEC analysis. The IRFs show that our specification and identification  
35 strategies are able to replicate the dynamic properties of the true data-generating  
36 processes.

37 Our estimates also show that neither real rigidities in consumption and invest-  
38 ment nor intertemporal substitution effects originating in expected productivity  
39 improvements are sufficient to explain the empirical evidence. Although an im-  
40 pulse response matching experiment shows that a flexible price version of the  
41 model is able to replicate the negative conditional correlation of labor and invest-  
42 ment, direct estimates of the restricted models provide strong evidence in support  
43 of a New Keynesian interpretation. On one hand, the evidence in favor of the  
44 empirical rule indicates that the policy response to productivity improvements is

1 not fully accommodative. On the other hand, a flat slope of the NKPC signals the  
2 presence of relevant rigidities in price setting that cannot be attributed exclusively  
3 to nominal rigidities, because this would imply a degree of price stickiness that  
4 is at odds with the evidence on the frequency of price optimization at the firm  
5 level. Firm-specific capital and endogenous demand elasticity are crucial to obtain  
6 a plausible estimate of the degree of price stickiness.

7 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses and the  
8 results of the SVEC analysis. Section 3 presents a monetary DSGE model with  
9 firm-specific capital and endogenous demand elasticity. Section 4 provides details  
10 of the Bayesian estimates of the model. Section 5 discusses the results in light of the  
11 different theoretical explanations advanced in the literature. Section 6 concludes.

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## 2. SVEC-BASED EVIDENCE

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The empirical literature on the productivity–employment puzzle reaches conflicting conclusions on whether hours worked rise or fall after a productivity improvement. A controversial issue is whether hours should be assumed to be stationary or nonstationary in empirical trials [Christiano et al. (2004); Pesavento and Rossi (2005); Fernald (2007); Gil-Alana and Moreno (2009); Canova et al. (2010); Lovcha and Perez-Laborda (2015)]. The empirical controversy on the role of technology in macroeconomic dynamics shows that the imposition of long-run restrictions on highly persistent series (such as hours), or the presence of regime breaks, may lead to a problematic identification of the technology shock.

Closely related to the debate on the identifiability of technology shocks within the SVAR approach is the methodology detailed in Basu et al. (2006), which avoids these identification difficulties by using VARs in which a “direct” measure of technology is considered in the place of average productivity. Employing this alternative strategy, the authors find that the short-term responses of both hours and investment are negative conditional on productivity improvements. However, even though this approach has the advantage of eliminating the estimation biases induced by aggregation problems and the presence of low-frequency components in hours and productivity, this comes at the cost of adopting a complex methodology for the derivation of the technology measure.<sup>4</sup>

In this section we show that by adopting a SVEC representation, we can provide empirical evidence that robustly confirms Basu et al.’s (2006) conclusions even without considering processed data for productivity and regime-shift control dummies.

The choice of an SVEC specification has two major advantages. First, with respect to SVARs, it provides a more adequate approximation to a large class of structural models that predict long-run balanced growth and differential dynamic adjustments in real and monetary variables. Second, the explicit consideration of the stationary relations described by the cointegrating vectors (CVs) in the SVEC improves the identifiability of the technology shock, because the presence of linear relations that satisfy the stationarity requirements enhances the separation

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1 between permanent and transitory components [Harvey and Stock (1988); King  
2 et al. (1991)].

3 In the following section we propose a benchmark SVEC and then evaluate the  
4 robustness of the results with respect to alternative samples, specifications of the  
5 long-run relations and identification schemes.

7 **2.1. Data and the Baseline SVEC Model**

8  
9 The VEC model is estimated using U.S. quarterly time series for real per capita  
10 output ( $y_t$ ), consumption of nondurable goods and services ( $c_t$ ) and fixed in-  
11 vestment ( $i_t$ —which includes consumption of durable goods), hourly labor com-  
12 pensation ( $wr_t$ ), inflation ( $\pi_t$ ), per capita hours worked ( $h_t$ ), and the short-term  
13 nominal interest rate ( $r_t$ ). The civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and  
14 older is used as a normalizing variable. The statistical sources and data transfor-  
15 mations are fully consistent with the information used in other empirical trials  
16 in the literature [e.g, Smets and Wouters (2007); Canova et al. (2010); Altig  
17 et al. (2011)]. The reference sample period considers a large time span ranging  
18 from 1948:1 to 2008:4, extended to 2014:3 for a robustness check. A detailed  
19 description of the data and their manipulations is provided in Table A.1 in the  
20 Appendix.

21 From the Phillips–Perron (PP) and KPSS tests, we find that real variables are  
22 all  $I(1)$  in levels irrespective of how the deterministic components are specified.  
23 Price inflation and per capita hours are shown to be  $I(0)$  according to both the PP  
24 unit root test and the KPSS test for stationarity. The tests are inconclusive with  
25 respect to the nominal interest rate, resulting in  $I(1)$  according to the PP test and  
26  $I(0)$  according to the KPSS test. The results are summarized in Table B.1 in the  
27 Appendix.

28 On the basis of the very weak decay of the autocorrelation function for inflation  
29 and the interest rate, we assume that both monetary variables,  $r_t$  and  $\pi_t$ , are  $I(1)$ .  
30 The dependence of results on this latter hypothesis is evaluated in the robustness  
31 checks.

32 A convenient structural formulation of the  $m$ -dimensional VEC representa-  
33 tion for the endogenous variables  $\mathbf{x}'_t = [y_t \ \pi_t \ h_t \ r_t \ c_t \ i_t \ w_t]$  can be  
34 specified by assuming no contemporaneous correlations among variables in the  
35 SVEC,

$$36 \quad \Gamma(L) \Delta \mathbf{x}_t = \Pi \mathbf{x}_{t-1} + \mathbf{B} \varepsilon_t, \quad (1)$$

37  
38 where  $\Gamma(L) = \Gamma_0 - \Gamma_1 L - \dots - \Gamma_{p-1} L^{p-1}$  are structural coefficient matrices and  
39  $\Gamma_0 = \mathbf{I}_m$ . Under this hypothesis,  $\mathbf{B}$  contains the contemporaneous structure of the  
40 system, which is thus modeled in the stochastic component. The long-run relations  
41 matrix  $\Pi$ , in the presence of cointegration, is a reduced-rank matrix and can be  
42 decomposed as  $\Pi = \alpha \beta'$ , where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are  $m \times r$  full-column-rank matrices  
43 containing, respectively, the loading coefficients and the  $r$  cointegrating vec-  
44 tors. The vector of disturbances  $\varepsilon_t \sim (\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{I}_m)$  contains the orthonormal structural

1 innovations. The system of linear equations relating the estimated reduced-  
 2 form errors  $\mathbf{u}_t$  to the structural shocks is thus  $\mathbf{u}_t = \mathbf{B}\varepsilon_t$ , which implies that  
 3  $\Omega = \mathbf{u}\mathbf{u}' = \mathbf{B}\mathbf{B}'$ .

## 6 2.2. Long-Run Components and CI Space

8 We impose a third-order memory for the starting VAR, a lag order that ensures  
 9 serially uncorrelated errors. Considering a VEC structure with unrestricted constants,  
 10 the LR trace test indicates the presence of five stationary components at the  
 11 90% significance level. The results are basically unaffected for lower and higher  
 12 lag order specifications of the VAR. According to this evidence, the system is  
 13 driven by two permanent components and five transitory shocks. The rank test  
 14 results are summarized in Table B.2 in the Appendix.

15 We assume that the permanent component observed in the four real variables  
 16  $y_t$ ,  $c_t$ ,  $i_t$ , and  $w_t$  is due to the stochastic trend in technology [King et al.  
 17 (1991); Pesaran and Smith (1995); Garratt et al. (2003)] and that the permanent  
 18 component observed in the monetary variables  $r_t$  and  $\pi_t$  is due to the way  
 19 the central bank adjusts its policy target [Vlaar (2004)].<sup>5</sup> Among other checks,  
 20 in the robustness analysis we will evaluate the effects of considering inflation  
 21 and the nominal interest rates stationary, as predicted by standard monetary  
 22 models.

23 In terms of the variables' ordering, the first CI relation in  $\beta'$  defines stationary  
 24 hours; that is, we impose a CI relation in which only  $h_t$  enters the corresponding  
 25 CV. The second CI relation defines the Fisher interest parity, namely, the stationary  
 26 real interest rate ( $r_t - \beta_{22}\pi_t$ ). The last three CVs define the stationary "great ratios"  
 27 of the economy,  $c_t - \beta_{31}y_t$ ,  $i_t - \beta_{41}y_t$ , and  $w_t - \beta_{51}y_t$ .

28 The estimated coefficients of the great ratios are all significant but only  
 29 marginally consistent with the hypothesis of exact balanced growth, i.e., with  
 30 the restriction  $\beta_{31} = \beta_{41} = \beta_{51} = -1$ :

$$31 \beta' = \begin{bmatrix} 32 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 33 & 0 & -3.7 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 34 & -1.2 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 35 & -1.1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 36 & -0.9 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} .$$

37  
 38  
 39 Consistent with sample evidence, the estimated long-run relations indicate that  
 40 per capita consumption and investment grew more than per capita output, whereas  
 41 the real wage grew less. By construction, the CI space defines the structure of the  
 42 long-run effects matrix. Given the estimated  $\beta'$ , a permanent technology shock  
 43 leading to a 1% increase in long-run output will increase consumption, investment,  
 44 and the real wage by 1.2%, 1.1%, and 0.9%, respectively.

### 2.3. Identification

The permanent components are identified by imposing exclusion restrictions on the long-run effects matrix  $\mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{B}$  in the structural vector moving average (SVMA) representation  $\mathbf{x}_t = \mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{B} \sum_{i=1}^t \varepsilon_i + \mathbf{C}^0(L)\mathbf{B}\varepsilon_t + \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0$ . We espouse the standard hypothesis that only technology shocks can have permanent effects on real variables [Blanchard and Quah (1989); Shapiro and Watson (1989); Galí (1999); Francis and Ramey (2005)]. This provides one exclusion restriction on the long-run effects of inflation shocks on per capita output (the element  $c_{12}$  of the  $\mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{B}$  matrix is zero).

The assumption of a lower triangular structure for the  $(m-r) \times (m-r)$  upper left block of  $\mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{B}$  separates the real from the nominal permanent component in the system. This hypothesis is consistent with the predictions of a broad class of business cycle models.<sup>6</sup> The orthogonality among permanent and transitory components ensures that the dynamic effects of a technology shock on  $\mathbf{x}_t$  do not depend on the identification of the transitory components [King et al. (1991)]. A more detailed description of the identification strategy is provided in Appendix C.

The estimated long-run effect of a productivity improvement, i.e., the elements of the first column in  $\mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{B}$ , show that the long-run responses of real variables are all positive, with those of consumption, investment, and the real wage defined by their estimated long-run relations with output:

$$\mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{B}'_{i=1} = [0.56 \quad -0.02 \quad 0.00 \quad -0.07 \quad 0.66 \quad 0.63 \quad 0.51].$$


### 2.4. Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition

Figure 1 depicts the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation productivity shock. Solid lines denote the IRF point estimates of the benchmark specification, in which long-run balanced growth is not imposed, whereas dotted lines define the corresponding 90% confidence intervals. The bulleted lines denote the IRFs obtained when the extended sample 1948:1–2014:3 is considered. In this case, a long-run dummy accounting for the liquidity trap period is considered in the CI vectors.

The results of the IRF analysis can be summarized as follows.

1. The medium-run (20 periods) responses of real variables (output, consumption, and investment) are positive, confirming the standard theoretical prediction that positive technology shocks are expansionary. Following a technology improvement, the output response reaches its long-run value after 14 quarters, while at the same time horizon consumption and investment reach 95% and 84% of their long-run effects.
2. Although the short-term responses of output and consumption are basically consistent with the predictions of standard business cycle models, those of hours and investment are not. Hours decline immediately after a supply shock ( $-0.3$ ) and remain negative for eight quarters. The 90% error bands indicate that the contraction is significant over approximately five quarters. Similarly, the impact response of investment is negative ( $-0.9$ ) and persistent, with the point estimate crossing the zero line only





**FIGURE 1.** Impulse responses to a technology improvement. Solid lines: benchmark specification. Bulleted lines: extended sample. Dotted lines: 90% confidence interval.

after seven quarters. According to the 90% confidence intervals, the negative response is significant over approximately four quarters. The contraction of investment on impact is aligned with that obtained by Basu et al. (2006), whereas that of hours is lower ( $-1.1$  and  $-0.6$ , respectively). However, the latter contraction is consistent with the findings from the extended SVAR estimates in Galí (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2005) and the results in Canova et al. (2010), indicating an impact reduction in hours by between 0.2 and 0.3. Because these analyses adopt the BLS total hours index or the hours-to-population ratio as labor input measure, whereas Basu et al. (2006) use hours per employee, we conjecture that the differences obtained in the impact response are mainly related to the different scaling used for this variable.<sup>7</sup>

3. The IRFs of inflation and the interest rate are consistent with the theoretical predictions of monetary models. Inflation and interest rate responses are significantly negative, and the response of the nominal rate denotes monetary policy inertia and gradual accommodation. The reduction in inflation indicates that in the short run, the monetary policy does not fully accommodate the increase in productivity.
4. The consideration of a sample including the postcrisis period does not alter the main findings of our analysis. The IRFs of all the variables in the SVEC are shown to be aligned to those obtained with the restricted sample. The short-term response of hours and investment is confirmed to be negative in the short term.

The FEVDs, reported in Table 1, confirm that technology shocks are important but are not the main driver of economic fluctuations. The percentage of variance explained by the technology shock on impact is 0.3% for output, 21% for

1 **TABLE 1.** Forecast error variance decomposition (%)

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Period	Variable						
		$y_t$	$\pi_t$	$h_t$	$r_t$	$c_t$	$i_t$	$wr_t$
1	0.3	26.0	29.6	20.0	21.0	4.0	0.2	
4	2.6	28.4	15.0	17.9	27.1	1.3	2.5	
8	15.3	31.6	9.4	13.6	45.6	5.9	7.1	
12	31.3	29.1	11.2	11.1	63.6	11.3	14.3	
16	42.0	27.5	15.6	9.9	73.6	14.1	22.2	
20	47.7	27.2	17.7	9.6	79.0	14.9	29.6	
40	61.4	27.6	17.5	11.3	88.5	18.7	51.7	
$\infty$	100	25.5	0.00	14.0	100	100	100	

14 Notes: Fraction of FEV attributed to a technology shock.

15  
16 consumption, 29% for hours, 4.0% for investment, and 0.2% for the real wage.  
17 By construction, the technology shock asymptotically tends to explain all the  
18 variability of real variables. These results, which are basically aligned to those  
19 obtained in previous analyses [e.g., King et al. (1991); Basu et al. (2006)], show  
20 that technology shocks, even if expansionary in the medium term, explain only a  
21 limited fraction of the total variability of real series at business cycle frequencies. In  
22 particular, the technology shock is unable to explain the business-cycle variations  
23 in investment.

## 24 25 26 2.5. Robustness


27 The robustness of our results can be evaluated in several ways. Here, we focus  
28 on three major aspects of the analysis: (i) the relevance of not imposing the  
29 balanced growth hypothesis in the long-run identification strategy; (ii) the impor-  
30 tance of considering price inflation and the nominal interest rate as cointegrated  
31  $I(1)$  processes; (iii) the importance of the VAR specification and of the long-run  
32 identification strategy.

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34  
35 *Imposing exact balanced growth.* Most monetary models display exact bal-  
36 anced growth in real variables such that the resulting stationary great ratios satisfy  
37 the restrictions  $\beta_{31} = \beta_{41} = \beta_{51} = -1$ . By construction, the estimated long-run  
38 proportionality in the  $\beta$  matrix is reflected in the elements of the long-run effects  
39 matrix  $C(1)B$ , i.e.,  $c_{51}/c_{11} = -\beta_{31}$ ,  $c_{61}/c_{11} = -\beta_{41}$ , and  $c_{71}/c_{11} = -\beta_{51}$ . The  
40 exact balanced growth restriction thus ensures homogeneity in the long-run effects  
41 of the technology shock on real variables.

42 We evaluate whether our results, obtained with estimated  $\beta$ s, are robust to the  
43 imposition of this theoretical constraint. Compared to the baseline specification,  
44 the IRFs are only marginally affected (Check 1 in Figure 2), showing that the

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**FIGURE 2.** Impulse responses to a productivity improvement: robustness checks. Bulleted lines: benchmark specification. Solid lines: robustness checks. Dotted lines: 90% confidence intervals. Check 1: SVEC with exact balanced growth. Check 2: interest rate and inflation as stationary processes. Check 3: neglecting CI: BQ long-run identification (SVAR). Check 4: alternative specification of the CVs.

choice of relaxing the exact balanced growth assumption is not crucial for the main findings of our analysis.

*Price inflation and the interest rate as stationary processes.* The baseline SVEC was specified assuming two permanent and five stationary components.

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1 Given the strong evidence on stationary hours, the remaining four stationary  
 2 components were interpreted in terms of the three great ratios and the Fisher  
 3 interest parity. To evaluate the dependence of the results on the inclusion of the last  
 4 relation, we reestimate and simulate the SVEC, assuming that both inflation and  
 5 the interest rate are stationary, as predicted by most monetary models. In this case,  
 6 the long-run behavior of the system is driven by the technology (real) component  
 7 only, whose identification is provided by the zero restrictions on the long-run  
 8 effects matrix implied by the six transitory components (the last six columns of  
 9  $C(1)B$  are zero vectors) and by the orthogonality between the permanent and the  
 10 transitory components.<sup>8</sup>

11 Even in this case, the IRFs are only marginally affected by the hypothesis of  
 12 stationary inflation and nominal interest rate (Check 2 in Figure 2). The short-term  
 13 responses of hours and investment remain negative and significant, although for  
 14 investment this evidence is observed over a slightly shorter period. Unsurprisingly,  
 15 the major differences are observed for the IRFs of inflation and the interest rate,  
 16 which display negative but slightly less persistent responses.

17  
 18 *Alternative specifications and long-run identification strategies.* Two alter-  
 19 native long-run identification strategies and SVAR specifications, both consistent  
 20 with the stochastic properties of the data, are evaluated. We first consider a second-  
 21 order stationary SVAR with the real variables entering in first differences, in  
 22 which the technology shock is identified with a standard recursive scheme for  
 23 the long-run effects matrix [Blanchard and Quah (1989); Galì (1999)]. Then,  
 24 following Christiano et al. (2005) and Altig et al. (2011), we consider a third-  
 25 order stationary SVAR including differenced output and the consumption, invest-  
 26 ment, and wage-to-output ratios in place of the corresponding level variables; i.e.,  
 27  $x'_t = [\Delta y_t \quad \pi_t \quad h_t \quad r_t \quad c_t - y_t \quad i_t - y_t \quad wr_t - y_t]$ , in which the permanent  
 28 technology shock is identified with the instrumental variables method detailed in  
 29 Shapiro and Watson (1989) and Francis and Ramey (2005).<sup>9</sup> Under this peculiar  
 30 SVAR representation, the hypothesis of stationary inflation and nominal interest  
 31 rate is adopted along with that of exact balanced growth, so that the three control  
 32 dimensions of the robustness analysis are jointly considered.

33 The IRFs clearly show that with the former SVAR (Check 3), the results are only  
 34 marginally aligned to those obtained with the SVEC specifications. In particular,  
 35 the negative responses of hours and investment are shortened, with the latter  
 36 returning positive results after one quarter only. In contrast, with the second  
 37 SVAR specification, the results confirm those obtained with the baseline and the  
 38 alternative SVECs (Check 4).

39 Because the two long-run identification strategies are basically equivalent, the  
 40 difference in results should be attributed to the fact that the former SVAR omits  
 41 the consideration of the stationary ratios. In the presence of CI, this omission  
 42 can bias the results through the misspecification and weak instrumentation issues.  
 43 In fact, the exclusion of the stationary ratios implies the omission of the error-  
 44 correcting component from the model and does not allow the separation between

1 permanent and transitory components [Harvey and Stock (1988); King et al.  
2 (1991)], weakening the identifiability of the technology shock.

### 3. THE MODEL

4  
5  
6 In this section, we describe the linearized version of a cash-in-advance monetary  
7 model that is able to encompass alternative theoretical explanations for the con-  
8 tractionary effects of technology improvements and to reproduce the contrasting  
9 empirical results in the literature.

10 To obtain these model features, we consider the main factors that can constrain  
11 the aggregate demand response to a productivity improvement and allow for in-  
12 tertemporal substitution effects by assuming that technology shocks are permanent  
13 and autocorrelated in growth rates [Lindé (2009)].

14 In addition to standard nominal and real rigidities, the model is characterized  
15 by the presence of strategic complementarity in price setting, emerging from the  
16 hypotheses of firm-specific capital [Svein and Weinke (2005); Woodford (2005);  
17 Altig et al.(2011)] and endogenous demand elasticity (Eichenbaum and Fisher  
18 (2007); Smets and Wouters (2007)).

19 The model economy is populated by maximizing households and firms, whereas  
20 monetary and fiscal authorities follow exogenous policy rules. Final sector firms  
21 operate in a perfectly competitive environment as simple aggregators of the differ-  
22 entiated goods produced by intermediate sector firms. These combine labor and  
23 capital services, employing a Cobb–Douglas production technology that is subject  
24 to permanent productivity shocks, giving rise to a common stochastic trend and  
25 to long-run stationary ratios among real variables. This feature makes the model  
26 consistent with the nonstationary and co-trending behavior of the data addressed  
27 by the SVEC analysis.

28 Each intermediate firm rents differentiated labor services from the households  
29 and makes an investment decision to adjust its capital stock to the desired level,  
30 taking into account a capital adjustment cost. Intermediate sector firms can re-  
31 optimize their prices only infrequently, according to a random duration Calvo  
32 lottery. Households maximize a separable utility function defined over consump-  
33 tion and leisure. Their preferences exhibit persistence in external consumption  
34 habits and are assumed to be log-linear in consumption and CRRA in leisure to  
35 guarantee balanced growth. The presence of differentiated labor services implies  
36 some monopoly power in labor supply, and wages are set in staggered contracts  
37 according to a Calvo scheme.

38 The linearized model is expressed in stationary form, which is necessary because  
39 we deal with the hypothesis of nonstationary technology shocks, which induce a  
40 common stochastic trend in the real variables [Juillard et al. (2008)]. To obtain  
41 model stationarity, we first scale the real variables with respect to the stochastic  
42 technology level  $Z_t$  by imposing the transformation  $X_t = \hat{X}_t Z_t$ , where the cir-  
43 cumflex indicates that level variables are expressed in terms of stationary ratios.  
44 The model is then log-linearized around the steady state of the scaled variables.

1 Lowercase letters with a circumflex denote log deviations in the corresponding  
2 detrended variables.

### 3.1. Production

6 The linearized aggregate production function is

$$8 \quad \hat{y}_t = \alpha \hat{k}_{t-1} + (1 - \alpha) h_t - \alpha \log g_t^z, \quad (2)$$

9 where we assume that firms produce their output  $\hat{y}_t$  by combining, in a Cobb–  
10 Douglas production function, their accumulated (thus firm-specific) capital en-  
11 dowment  $\hat{k}_{t-1}$  with hired labor services  $h_t$ . The parameter  $\alpha$  ( $1 - \alpha$ ) denotes  
12 the capital (labor) share in production. The term  $\log g_t^z$  is the growth rate  
13 of the labor-augmenting technology, which is assumed to follow a first-order  
14 autoregressive process  $\log g_t^z = (1 - \rho_z) \log \gamma_z + \rho_z \log g_{t-1}^z + \varepsilon_t^z$ , where  $\gamma_z$   
15 is the deterministic long-run growth rate. Under this specification, the evolu-  
16 tion of the technology level has a nonstationary second-order autoregres-  
17 sive representation, because  $\log Z_t = \log Z_{t-1} + \log g_t^z$  can be rewritten as  
18  $\log Z_t = (1 - \rho_z) \log \gamma_z + (1 + \rho_z) \log Z_{t-1} - \rho_z \log Z_{t-2} + \varepsilon_t^z$ .

19 This choice for the technology process is motivated by the need to separate  
20 the model-specific dynamics from that potentially emerging from a fairly general  
21 specification of the stochastic components. In fact, when technology is autocorre-  
22 lated in growth rates, even flexible-prices models can be made consistent with the  
23 contractionary effects of positive technology shocks because of the operation of  
24 wealth and intertemporal substitution effects [Lindé (2009)].

25 We assume that firms face convex adjustment costs of changing their fixed asset  
26 holdings, which become productive with a one-period lag. By log-linearizing the  
27 capital adjustment cost function, we obtain the following law of motion for capital:

$$28 \quad \hat{k}_t = \frac{(\delta + \gamma_z - 1)}{\gamma_z} \hat{i}_t + \frac{(1 - \delta)}{\gamma_z} \hat{k}_{t-1} + \frac{(\delta - 1)}{\gamma_z} \log g_t^z, \quad (3)$$

29 where  $\hat{i}_t$  is the stationary log deviation of gross investment, and the parameter  $\delta$   
30 denotes capital depreciation.

### 3.2. Pricing Behavior of Firms

31 The aggregate price dynamics  $\pi_t$  is described by the following specification of the  
32 NKPC:

$$33 \quad \pi_t = \iota_p \pi_{t-1} + \beta E_t (\pi_{t+1} - \iota_p \pi_t) + \kappa \widehat{mc}_t + \log u_t^\pi, \quad (4)$$

34 where  $\beta$  is the discount factor,  $\widehat{mc}_t = \hat{w}_t^r - \hat{y}_t + h_t$  is the log-linearized real  
35 marginal cost ( $\hat{w}_t^r$  is the real wage),  $\kappa$  is the reduced-form NKPC slope coefficient,  
36 and the stochastic term  $\log u_t^\pi$  denotes a cost-push disturbance that is assumed to  
37 follow the stationary first-order autoregressive process  $\log u_t^\pi = \rho_\pi \log u_{t-1}^\pi + \varepsilon_t^\pi$ .

1 The backward-looking component in (4) emerges from the hypothesis of partial  
2 indexation (of degree  $\iota_p$ ).

3 Equation (4) is compatible with a large class of monetary models. The adoption  
4 of the firm-specific or the rental capital specification (FSK or RK, respectively)  
5 and of constant or endogenous demand elasticity (CDE or EDE, respectively) only  
6 affects the convolution of parameters defining the reduced-form slope coefficient  
7  $\kappa$  [Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007)]. Under RK and CDE, the slope coefficient is  
8 given by  $\kappa_{\text{RK}} = \frac{(1-\beta\theta_p)(1-\theta_p)}{\theta_p}$ , where  $\theta_p$  defines the random fraction of firms that  
9 are not allowed to reset their price. Under FSK, the NKPC slope coefficient can  
10 be written as  $\kappa_{\text{FSK}} = \kappa_{\text{RK}} \Lambda$ , where  $\Lambda$  is a function of the model's parameters.

11 The computation of  $\Lambda$  is not straightforward and can only be obtained using  
12 the undetermined coefficients method. Sveen and Weinke (2005) and Woodford  
13 (2005) provide the useful approximation  $\Lambda \simeq \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha+\alpha\epsilon}$  in terms of the capital share  
14 in production and the elasticity of substitution  $\epsilon$ , where equality holds exactly in  
15 the case of constant capital [Woodford (2005)]. With respect to the standard rental  
16 capital specification, the multiplicative term  $\Lambda$  reduces the slope of the NKPC for  
17 any model parameterization.

18 The economic rationale for the reduced price sensitivity to changes in the  
19 marginal cost under FSK is that because firms operate with a predetermined (firm-  
20 specific) stock of capital, their marginal cost increases with the level of output.  
21 Compared with a situation in which capital services can be chosen period by period  
22 in a RK market, this implies that reoptimizing firms facing a positive productivity  
23 shock are induced to cut prices by a smaller amount because they anticipate that  
24 price reductions eventually lead to higher marginal costs as a result of increased  
25 demand and output at the firm level.

26 Another theoretical hypothesis that can induce strategic complementarity in  
27 price setting is the EDE assumption [Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007); Smets and  
28 Wouters (2007)]. In such a case, the coefficient relating inflation to the marginal  
29 cost in the EDE model ( $k^{\text{EDE}}$ ), irrespective of the RK or FSK specification, is  
30 reduced by the factor  $(\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}\phi_k + 1)^{-1}$ , where  $\phi_k$  is the percentage of change in the  
31 demand elasticity evaluated in the steady state due to a 1% change in the relative  
32 price of the good [Kimball (1995)]. The relation between the CDE and the EDE  
33 specifications of the reduced-form NKPC slope coefficient is thus approximated  
34 by the following equation:

$$35 \kappa^{\text{EDE}} = \kappa^{\text{CDE}} \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}\phi_k + 1}.$$

36  
37  
38  
39 The fact that both the FSK and the EDE models differ from the baseline rental  
40 capital model only for the size of the NKPC slope coefficient makes the different  
41 models observationally equivalent when a specification is considered in which  
42 the reduced-form coefficient  $\kappa$  enters the NKPC. This allows us to estimate the  
43 model without specifying whether capital is firm-specific or rental and whether  
44 the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods is constant or endogenous

[Altig et al. (2011)]. From the estimated value of  $\kappa$ , given assumptions about  $\epsilon$  and  $\phi_k$ , we can infer the price duration in each model.

### 3.3. Pricing Behavior of Wage Setters

Concerning the pricing behavior of monopolistically competitive wage setters, the following real wage equation holds:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\pi}_t^w = & \beta E_t [\hat{\pi}_{t+1}^w + (\pi_{t+1} - \iota_w \pi_t) + \log g_{t+1}^z] - \log g_t^z - (\pi_t - \iota_w \pi_{t-1}) \\ & + \kappa^w (\widehat{\text{mrs}}_t - \hat{w}_t^r - \log \chi_t) + \log u_t^{\pi^w}, \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where  $\hat{\pi}_t^w = \hat{w}_t^r - \hat{w}_{t-1}^r$  is real wage growth,  $\widehat{\text{mrs}}_t = \frac{\gamma_z}{\gamma_z - \lambda_c} [\hat{c}_t - \frac{\lambda_c}{\gamma_z} (\hat{c}_{t-1} - \log g_t^z)] + \eta h_t$  denotes the (real) marginal rate of substitution between consumption  $\hat{c}_t$  and labor, and  $\lambda_c$  is the degree of habit persistence in consumption. The parameter  $\kappa^w = \frac{(1 - \beta \theta_w)(1 - \theta_w)}{\theta_w} \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon_H \eta}$  is the reduced-form slope coefficient, where the parameter  $\theta_w$  denotes the degree of nominal wage stickiness, and the parameters  $\eta$  and  $\epsilon_H$  are the inverse Frisch labor elasticity and the elasticity of substitution among differentiated labor services, respectively. The stochastic wage-push disturbance  $\log u_t^{\pi^w}$  is assumed to follow the first-order autoregressive process  $\log u_t^{\pi^w} = \rho_{\pi^w} \log u_{t-1}^{\pi^w} + \varepsilon_t^{\pi^w}$ . Even in this case, the backward-looking component in (5) is due to partial indexation to past inflation (of degree  $\iota_w$ ).

### 3.4. Demand Side

Concerning the demand side of the economy, the dynamics of consumption  $\hat{c}_t$  resulting from the corresponding Euler equation is described by

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{c}_t = & \frac{\lambda_c / \gamma_z}{1 + \lambda_c / \gamma_z} (\hat{c}_{t-1} - \log g_t^z) + \left(1 - \frac{\lambda_c / \gamma_z}{1 + \lambda_c / \gamma_z}\right) E_t (\hat{c}_{t+1} + \log g_{t+1}^z) \\ & - \frac{1 - \lambda_c / \gamma_z}{1 + \lambda_c / \gamma_z} [(r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - \rho) - E_t (\Delta \log \chi_{t+1})], \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where  $r_t$  and  $\rho$  are the current and the steady state nominal interest rates. Current consumption thus depends on the expected real interest rate and on a weighted average of past and future consumption, with weights depending on the degree of external habit persistence  $\lambda_c$ . The term  $\log \chi_t$  denotes a consumption preference shock and is assumed to follow the stationary first-order autoregressive process  $\log \chi_t = \rho_\chi \log \chi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^\chi$ .

The investment dynamics depends on the firm's choices in relation to capital accumulation, defined by the log-linear capital Euler equation

$$\hat{k}_t = \frac{1}{(1 + \beta)} \hat{k}_{t-1} + \frac{\beta}{(1 + \beta)} E_t \hat{k}_{t+1} + \frac{1 - \beta \gamma_z^{-1} (1 - \delta)}{\epsilon_\psi \gamma_z (1 + \beta)} E_t \widehat{\text{mrs}}_{t+1}$$



$$\begin{aligned}
& - \frac{1}{\epsilon_\psi \gamma_z (1 + \beta)} (r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - \rho) - \frac{1}{(1 + \beta)} \log g_t^z \\
& + \frac{\beta}{(1 + \beta)} \log g_{t+1}^z + \frac{1}{\epsilon_\psi \gamma_z (1 + \beta)} [\beta \gamma_z^{-1} (1 - \delta) E_t \log \zeta_{t+1} - \log \zeta_t], \quad (7)
\end{aligned}$$

where  $\beta = (1 + \rho)^{-1}$  and  $\widehat{m}s_{t+1} = \widehat{w}_{t+1}^r + h_{t+1} - \widehat{k}_t + \log g_{t+1}^z$  is the expected stationary log deviation of the return on capital, which, under firm-specific capital, is expressed in terms of the firm's marginal savings on labor costs. Current installed capital thus depends on its past and expected future values, expected marginal savings, and expected real interest rates. The dynamics of investment/capital is affected by a stationary first-order autoregressive disturbance to the convex capital adjustment cost function,  $\log \zeta_t = \rho_\zeta \log \zeta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^\zeta$ , whose steady-state elasticity is  $\epsilon_\psi > 0$ .

### 3.5. Model Closure

The model is closed by the aggregate resource constraint and the policy reaction function. The log-linear constraint is given by

$$\hat{y}_t = (1 - \psi - g^y) \hat{c}_t + \psi \hat{i}_t + g^y \hat{g}_t, \quad (8)$$

where  $\psi = \frac{\alpha(\delta + \gamma_z - 1)}{[\epsilon/(\epsilon - 1)]\gamma_z(\rho + \delta)}$  is the steady-state investment-to-output ratio. The term  $\hat{g}_t$  is an AR(1) measurement error capturing public expenditure and other exogenous components affecting the aggregate resource constraint. The coefficient  $g^y$  denotes the steady state public expenditure-to-GDP ratio.

Two alternative monetary policy reaction rules are considered. The first targets inflation deviations from a nonzero policy target  $\pi^*$  and output growth deviations from the deterministic long-run rate of growth  $\Delta y_t - \log \gamma_z = \Delta \hat{y}_t + \log g_t^z - \log \gamma_z$ . The second targets inflation deviations and the theory-based output gap  $\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^p$ , where  $\hat{y}_t^p$  is the level of output that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities. The policy instrument is adjusted gradually, giving rise to interest rate smoothing, whose degree is defined by  $\rho_r$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
r_t &= \rho + \rho_r r_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_r) [\phi_\pi (\pi_t - \pi^*)] \\
&+ \phi_y (\Delta \hat{y}_t + \log g_t^z - \log \gamma_z) + \log u_t^r, \quad (9)
\end{aligned}$$

$$r_t = \rho + \rho_r r_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_r) [\phi_\pi (\pi_t - \pi^*)] + \phi_y (\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^p) + \log u_t^r. \quad (10)$$

The parameters  $\phi_\pi$  and  $\phi_y$  define the strength of the policy reaction to inflation and output deviations from the respective targets. The stochastic term  $\log u_t^r = \varepsilon_t^r$  denotes an i.i.d. monetary policy error.

Considering a productivity improvement, a policy rule targeting potential output would be more accommodative than a policy rule targeting the long-term growth rate. In fact, under the empirical rule (9), the authorities underestimate the actual

1 growth rate of natural output, resulting in a not fully accommodative interest rate  
2 response.

3 There are at least two reasons that justify the use of an empirical rule. First,  
4 targeting the theory-based output gap requires knowledge of the natural level of  
5 output, which by definition is unobservable. Second, given that real-time data on  
6 potential output are subject to relevant imperfections, under model uncertainty  
7 and when technology evolves according to a random walk with drift process, the  
8 estimated long-term deterministic growth component  $\gamma_z$  might represent the best  
9 prediction for output growth.

10 In the estimation process, we will evaluate the relevance of both the empirical  
11 and the theory-based monetary policy reaction functions and let the data decide  
12 which model—and thus which rule—is to be preferred.

13 The linearized system is composed of four behavioral equations, (6), (7), (4),  
14 and (5), the production function (2), the permanent inventory equation (3), the  
15 aggregate resource constraint (8), and a Taylor rule (9 or 10). Four definition  
16 equations for  $\hat{w}_t^r$ ,  $\hat{m}s_t$ ,  $\hat{m}r_s_t$ , and  $\hat{m}c_t$  complete the economic system.

#### 17 18 19 **4. BAYESIAN ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION**

20 The strategy adopted for the parameterization of theoretical models is key in  
21 the face of the conflicting SVAR-based evidence discussed in Section 2. Some  
22 influential contributions supporting the procyclicality of investment and hours  
23 worked [Christiano et al. (2005); Altig et al. (2011)] use monetary models pa-  
24 rameterized through estimators that minimize the weighted distance between the  
25 theoretical and the SVAR-based impulse responses. In our view, results obtained  
26 using a matching estimator applied to a model with particularly flexible dynamic  
27 properties cannot be considered conclusive because they do not add much to the  
28 evidence implied by the SVAR-based impulse responses.

29 This consideration leads us to use a calibration strategy that does not rely upon  
30 our SVEC evidence but is based on a direct estimate of model's parameters.  
31 This section provides details of the estimation methodology and the evaluation  
32 of the empirical relevance of the two alternative specifications of the monetary  
33 policy rule. Note that by estimating a reduced form slope coefficient of the NKPC,  
34 we do not impose any prior assumptions about the CDE/EDE or the RK/FSK  
35 specifications of the model.  
36

##### 37 38 **4.1. The Posterior Distribution and Model Comparison**

39 We derive the posterior distribution for the  $j$ th model's parameters  $P(\theta_j | \mathbf{Y}_T, M_j)$   
40 by nesting prior beliefs for models  $M_j$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots$ ) and structural parame-  
41 ters  $\theta_j$ —i.e., the prior distribution  $P(\theta_j, M_j)$ —with sample information—i.e., the  
42 conditional distribution  $P(\mathbf{Y}_T | \theta_j, M_j)$ —where  $\mathbf{Y}_T = \{\mathbf{y}_t\}_{t=1}^T$  contains sample  
43 information.  
44

1 The consideration of the alternative policy rules corresponds to the evaluation  
 2 of two different model structures ( $j = A, B$ ), one adopting the empirical policy  
 3 rule (9), the other the theory-based rule (10). The empirical relevance of the  
 4 alternative feedback rules is evaluated by estimating the two competing models  
 5  $M_A$  and  $M_B$  with parameter vectors  $\theta_A$  and  $\theta_B$  and deriving the Bayes factor from  
 6 the log-marginal likelihood.

#### 8 4.2. Measurement Equations, Priors, and Posterior Distributions

9  
 10 *Measurement equations.* We use the same U.S. data as the SVEC analysis  
 11 briefly described in Section 2.3. The reference sample is thus composed of quar-  
 12 terly series for the period 1948:1–2008:4. Seven variables are considered: the log  
 13 differences of real per capita GDP  $\Delta y_t$ , consumption  $\Delta c_t$ , and investment  $\Delta i_t$ , the  
 14 log differences of the real hourly wage  $\Delta w_t$ , and the log levels of per capita hours  
 15  $h_t$ , GDP price inflation  $\pi_t$ , and the federal funds rate  $r_t$ . The vector of observables  
 16 is thus

$$17 \quad \mathbf{x}'_t = [\Delta y_t \ \Delta c_t \ \Delta i_t \ \Delta w_t \ h_t \ \pi_t \ r_t].$$

18 Because we express the models in log deviations around the stochastic growth  
 19 path ( $\log Z_t$ ), the measurement equations linking the model variables to observ-  
 20 ables are the following:

$$22 \quad \begin{aligned} \Delta y_t &= \widehat{y}_t - \widehat{y}_{t-1} + \log g_t^z, \\ \Delta c_t &= \widehat{c}_t - \widehat{c}_{t-1} + \log g_t^z, \\ \Delta i_t &= \widehat{i}_t - \widehat{i}_{t-1} + \log g_t^z, \\ \Delta w_t &= \widehat{w}_t - \widehat{w}_{t-1} + \log g_t^z, \\ h_t &= h_t, \\ \pi_t &= \pi_t + \log g^p, \\ r_t &= r_t - \log(\beta) + \log \gamma_z + \log g^p, \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

26  
 27  
 28  
 29 where  $\log g_t^z = (1 - \rho_z) \log \gamma_z + \rho_z \log g_{t-1}^z + \varepsilon_t^z$ .

30  
 31 *Priors.* We initialize the estimates over a parameter space for which both  $M_A$   
 32 and  $M_B$  do not replicate the SVEC-based evidence on the persistent contractionary  
 33 effects of productivity improvements on investment. Outside this choice, reflected  
 34 mainly in the prior mean for the autoregressive component in the monetary au-  
 35 thority's reaction rule, we adopt a common prior parameterization (i.e.,  $\theta_A = \theta_B$ )  
 36 defined according to sample information or considering the results obtained in  
 37 previous analyses.

38  
 39 We impose six dogmatic priors by fixing the discount factor  $\beta$  to 0.995, the  
 40 steady state values for the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods  $\epsilon$   
 41 and labor services  $\epsilon_H$  to the customary value of 11, consistent with a price/wage  
 42 mark-up  $\epsilon(\epsilon - 1)^{-1}$  of 10%, the capital depreciation rate  $\delta$  to 0.025, and the  
 43 parameters defining the degree of price and wage indexation to past inflation,  
 44  $\iota_p = \iota_w = 0$ .<sup>10</sup>

1 All the remaining parameters are estimated. Prior distributions are summarized  
 2 in Tables 1 and 2 together with the posterior mode and mean estimates. Some  
 3 choices in the elicitation of priors deserve discussion. The reduced-form NKPC  
 4 slope coefficient  $\kappa$  is described by a weak beta-distributed prior with mean 0.05  
 5 and s.d. 0.025. Under a RK specification, this prior implies a Calvo parameter  
 6 value  $\theta_p = 0.8$ , which is in line with the available macroeconomic evidence  
 7 [Galí and Gertler (1999); Smets and Wouters (2003); Del Negro et al. (2005);  
 8 Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007)]. Under the FSK and EDE hypotheses, given the  
 9 demand elasticity parameter and a curvature parameter of the Kimball aggregator  
 10  $\phi_\kappa = 10$ , the prior implies a Calvo parameter close to 0.5, in line with the  
 11 microdata-based evidence produced by Bils and Klenow (2004), suggesting an  
 12 average price duration of nearly two quarters.

13 The coefficients of the monetary policy reaction rule are assumed to follow a  
 14 normal distribution with prior means  $\phi_\pi = 1.5$  and  $\phi_y = 0.25$ , both with s.d.  
 15 0.1. The interest rate smoothing coefficient  $\rho_r$  is beta-distributed with prior mean  
 16 0.5 and s.d. 0.1. This value is lower than that adopted and estimated in other  
 17 applications but ensures that the estimates are initialized over a parameterization  
 18 for which monetary policy is sufficiently accommodative to rule out the emergence  
 19 of contractionary effects on investment.

20 Even if we assume that all shocks but the monetary policy shock are serially  
 21 correlated, we adopt differentiated priors for the autoregressive coefficients. A low  
 22 degree of autocorrelation is assumed for the stationary disturbances to favor the  
 23 separation between stationary and nonstationary components [Smets and Wouters  
 24 (2003)].<sup>11</sup>

25  
 26 *Posterior distributions.* Table 2 reports the posterior mode and mean estimates  
 27 of the parameters for models *A* and *B*.<sup>12</sup> Table 2(a) presents the estimates of the  
 28 11 parameters defining the model structure, and Table 2(b) presents those of  
 29 the parameters defining the persistence and size of the 7 stochastic components.  
 30 According to the estimated posterior standard deviations and the implied pseudo-*t*  
 31 values, all parameter estimates appear significant at the standard level in both  
 32 model specifications, except for the autoregressive coefficient of the technology  
 33 growth process. This result indicates an absence of autocorrelation in technology  
 34 growth.

35 Outside the measurement error in the aggregate resource constraint and the  
 36 capital adjustment cost shock, a moderate degree of autocorrelation is obtained  
 37 for all the remaining shock processes. This is more evident for  $M_A$ , signaling that  
 38 the empirical specification of the policy rule tends to tone down the relevance of  
 39 the stochastic sources of persistence.

40 The posterior mean estimates for the behavioral and policy parameters are close  
 41 to our priors and to the results obtained in the literature. However, two exceptions  
 42 deserve some discussion.

43 First, the estimated reduced-form NKPC slope coefficient is lower than the  
 44 prior mean value under both model specifications, indicating a weak transmission

**TABLE 2.** Priors and posterior distribution of structural parameters and of shock processes

		Prior distribution			Posterior distribution					
		Models A and B		Model A			Model B			
	Distr	Mean St. Dev.	Mode St. Dev.	Mean	5%	95%	Mode St. Dev.	Mean	5%	95%
(a) Structural parameters										
$\gamma_z$	$\mathcal{N}$	1.004 0.002	1.005 0.001	1.005	1.004	1.006	1.004 0.001	1.004	1.003	1.005
$\gamma^p$	$\mathcal{N}$	1.009 0.002	1.010 0.001	1.010	1.009	1.011	1.010 0.001	1.010	1.009	1.011
$\alpha$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.360 0.030	0.237 0.013	0.241	0.219	0.262	0.152 0.012	0.152	0.132	0.172
$\eta$	$\mathcal{N}$	1.000 0.250	1.297 0.223	1.303	0.942	1.660	1.644 0.206	1.662	1.319	1.996
$\lambda_c$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.700 0.100	0.631 0.047	0.658	0.565	0.748	0.664 0.041	0.694	0.626	0.757
$\epsilon_\psi$	$\mathcal{N}$	5.000 0.200	5.516 0.217	5.504	5.145	5.852	6.067 0.179	6.038	5.838	6.272
$\kappa$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.050 0.015	0.014 0.004	0.015	0.009	0.022	0.013 0.003	0.014	0.010	0.019
$\theta_w$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.500 0.100	0.871 0.024	0.870	0.830	0.910	0.800 0.023	0.794	0.755	0.833
$\rho_r$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.500 0.100	0.602 0.042	0.595	0.526	0.665	0.575 0.033	0.570	0.515	0.627
$\phi_\pi$	$\mathcal{N}$	1.500 0.100	1.375 0.065	1.406	1.292	1.527	1.226 0.049	1.256	1.175	1.339
$\phi_y$	$\mathcal{N}$	0.250 0.100	0.401 0.060	0.415	0.316	0.512	0.133 0.033	0.139	0.084	0.194
(b) Shock processes										
$\rho_z$	$\mathcal{N}$	0.000 0.200	-0.001 0.049	0.006	-0.078	0.087	-0.091 0.049	-0.078	-0.155	0.001
$\rho_\zeta$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.750 0.100	0.943 0.011	0.939	0.921	0.958	0.990 0.005	0.987	0.978	0.996
$\rho_g$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.750 0.100	0.992 0.003	0.990	0.986	0.995	0.993 0.003	0.992	0.987	0.996
$\rho_\chi$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.750 0.100	0.767 0.051	0.729	0.622	0.840	0.858 0.044	0.815	0.732	0.900
$\rho_{\pi^w}$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.250 0.100	0.412 0.042	0.413	0.344	0.482	0.425 0.042	0.433	0.365	0.503
$\rho_\pi$	$\mathcal{B}$	0.250 0.050	0.499 0.041	0.501	0.435	0.566	0.489 0.039	0.498	0.435	0.558
$\sigma_z$	$\mathcal{IG}$	0.010 2	0.011 0.001	0.011	0.011	0.012	0.010 0.001	0.010	0.010	0.011
$\sigma_\zeta$	$\mathcal{IG}$	0.010 2	0.012 0.001	0.012	0.010	0.014	0.011 0.001	0.011	0.010	0.012
$\sigma_g$	$\mathcal{IG}$	0.010 2	0.014 0.001	0.014	0.013	0.015	0.015 0.001	0.015	0.014	0.016
$\sigma_\chi$	$\mathcal{IG}$	0.010 2	0.014 0.001	0.016	0.011	0.020	0.016 0.002	0.017	0.014	0.021
$\sigma_{\pi^w}$	$\mathcal{IG}$	0.010 2	0.004 0.000	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003 0.000	0.003	0.002	0.003
$\sigma_\pi$	$\mathcal{IG}$	0.010 2	0.002 0.000	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003 0.000	0.003	0.003	0.004
$\sigma_{u^r}$	$\mathcal{IG}$	0.010 2	0.005 0.001	0.005	0.004	0.006	0.003 0.000	0.003	0.003	0.004

Notes:  $\mathcal{N}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{IG}$  are normal, beta, and inverted gamma distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates obtained with 500, 000 Metropolis–Hastings replications.

1 mechanism from marginal costs to price inflation. The estimated slope is basically  
2 the same as that obtained by Altig et al. (2011).<sup>13</sup>

3 Second, the estimated parameters defining the interest rate response to real  
4 activity in the two alternative monetary policy reaction functions depart from the  
5 common prior mean, but in opposite directions:  $\hat{\phi}_y$  is 0.40 under  $M_A$  and 0.13  
6 under  $M_B$ . The degree of interest rate smoothing is only slightly higher than the  
7 prior under both  $M_A$  ( $\hat{\rho}_r = 0.60$ ) and  $M_B$  ( $\hat{\rho}_r = 0.58$ ).

8 These differences signal that under  $M_B$ , the estimates tend to highlight the  
9 sources of persistence in the model. This result can be attributed to the fact that the  
10 higher stabilizing effects implied by the theory-based monetary policy reaction  
11 rule are counteracted by higher estimates of the economic and stochastic sources  
12 of persistence.

13 The log-marginal likelihood is 5,939.1 for Model A and 5,884.4 for Model B,  
14 so that the Bayes factor is  $B_{A,B} = e^{[\log P(Y_T/M_A) - \log P(Y_T/M_B)]} = e^{54.7}$ , a value that,  
15 according to Jeffrey's scale of equivalence, indicates that the evidence in favor of  
16 Model A is decisive.<sup>14</sup>

## 17 18 19 5. MODEL DYNAMICS


20 In this section, we provide an evaluation of the dynamic properties of the models  
21 using stochastic simulations based on posterior mean estimates, summarized in  
22 Figure 3. In discussing our results, we focus on the economic mechanisms deter-  
23 mining the sign and the persistence of the response of factor inputs to a positive  
24 technology shock.

25 To verify the validity of the SVEC analysis, we simulate models A and B  
26 parameterized at the posterior estimates to generate samples of artificial data (250  
27 quarterly observations) and check whether our empirical identification strategy is  
28 able to replicate the dynamic properties of the true data-generating process. The  
29 artificial data SVEC IRFs are reported in the same graphs in Figure 3, together  
30 with the IRFs at the prior parameterization.

### 31 32 33 5.1. Posterior Impulse Responses

34 At least four indications are worth highlighting. First, the estimates for Model  
35 A, but not those for Model B, confirm the results obtained with the SVEC anal-  
36 ysis presented in Section 2. With  $M_A$ , the investment and hours responses are  
37 qualitatively in line with those obtained with the SVEC-based impulse response  
38 analysis. The investment response is negative in the short run and becomes positive  
39 only after some periods, when the demand constraint becomes less binding and  
40 the standard expansionary mechanisms display their effects. The posterior hours  
41 response is also negative in the short and in the medium run. With  $M_B$ , both  
42 hours and investment respond positively to the productivity improvement even on  
43 impact.  
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**FIGURE 3.** Prior and posterior impulse responses to a productivity improvement. Solid lines: IRFs computed at the model's posterior mean estimates. Bulleted solid lines: artificial data SVEC-based IRFs. Bulleted lines: model's prior IRFs. Dotted lines: 90% confidence of artificial data SVEC-based IRFs. Model A: empirical policy rule. Model B: theory-based policy rule.

1 Second, the short-run interest rate reduction, which obtains under both model  
 2 specifications, signals that the estimated monetary policy rules are fairly accom-  
 3 modating, but not enough to prevent a short-run decrease in inflation. The impulse  
 4 responses of inflation and the interest rate, however, are quite different from those  
 5 obtained with the SVEC, in which a more persistent contraction of both variables  
 6 is observed. Differences are greater for the posterior IRFs obtained under  $M_B$ .

7 Third, consumption and output responses are standard under both model spec-  
 8 ifications: consumption rises smoothly in response to the expected permanent  
 9 increase in productivity and output, driving the expansionary aggregate demand  
 10 response. Unsurprisingly, the speed of convergence toward the new steady state is  
 11 higher under  $M_B$  than under  $M_A$ .

12 Fourth, the SVECs estimated over artificial data for  $M_A$  and  $M_B$  are able to  
 13 replicate the dynamic properties of the true data-generating processes, validating  
 14 the empirical evidence obtained with real data. It is worth highlighting that such  
 15 a result is not trivial, because models in which slowly changing variables such  
 16 as the capital stock are present—such as our models—generally do not display a  
 17 finite-order VARMA representation in a subset of the model variables [Fry and  
 18 Pagan (2005)]. In these cases, finite-order VAR approximations are often affected  
 19 by serious truncation biases. These results show that this is not the case for our  
 20 structural model estimates.


## 22 5.2. Theoretical Insights and Model Comparison

23 The literature suggests alternative theoretical explanations for the contractionary  
 24 effects of productivity improvements. Our model specification allows us to con-  
 25 sider some of them from a comparative perspective, basically focusing on the real,  
 26 nominal, and monetary factors.

27 *Real factors.* Our estimates rule out explanations based on intertemporal sub-  
 28 stitution effects due to expected increases in productivity. As shown by Lindè  
 29 (2009) and Hamilton and Francis (2014), this result can arise in flexible price  
 30 models when the permanent technology shock is autocorrelated in growth rates.  
 31 The size of the autoregressive coefficient  $\rho_z$  is, in fact, estimated to be not statis-  
 32 tically different from zero. We have verified that, in the flexible-price version of  
 33 our model and absent real frictions, the contractionary effects on inputs emerge  
 34 only for values of  $\rho_z$  well above 0.8, which is the value used by Lindè (2009) in  
 35 his RBC model simulation.

36 The estimates also do not support explanations based on real rigidities di-  
 37 rectly affecting consumption and investment decisions [Francis and Ramey (2005);  
 38 Smets and Wouters (2007)]. In the absence of nominal frictions, i.e., considering  
 39 the flexible price/real rigidities version of the model, and given a standard calibra-  
 40 tion for the capital adjustment cost parameter ( $\epsilon_\psi = 5$ ), a negative hours—but not  
 41 investment—response to a positive technology shock can be observed on impact  
 42 only for high degrees of habit persistence ( $\lambda_c > 0.9$ ). By assuming  $\epsilon_\psi = 10$ , the  
 43  
 44





**FIGURE 4.** Impulse responses to a technology improvement. Solid lines: benchmark SVEC-based IRFs. Dashed lines: flex-price-matched IRFs. Dotted lines: 90% confidence interval of the SVEC-based IRFs.

threshold  $\lambda_c$  value for observing a negative impact response of hours is reduced to 0.85.

For a further evaluation of the empirical relevance of explanations based on real factors, we adopt the following procedure: First, we calibrate the flexible price/real frictions model with an impulse response matching procedure targeting the 20-period IRFs of the four real variables and hours obtained with the baseline SVEC, i.e.,  $x_h = [y_h, c_h, i_h, wr_h, h_h]$ . Formally,

$$\arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} [\mathbf{x}_h^{\text{SVEC}} - \mathbf{x}_h^{\text{Model}}]' \Psi^{-1} [\mathbf{x}_h^{\text{SVEC}} - \mathbf{x}_h^{\text{Model}}],$$

where  $\theta$  is the vector of matching parameters  $\theta' = [\alpha, \eta, \lambda_c, \epsilon_\psi, \rho_z]$ ,  $x_h^{\text{SVEC}}$  and  $x_h^{\text{Model}}$  are the  $(20 \times 5)$  vectors of SVEC and model-based IRFs, respectively, and  $\Psi$  is a diagonal matrix containing the standard deviations of the SVEC IRFs. Next, we adopt the resulting calibrated values as priors for a direct estimate of the flexible price model, for which we use the same sample information employed for the SVEC and  $M_A/M_B$  estimates. Two flexible price versions of our model are estimated, one considering the real rigidities in consumption and investment, i.e., habits and capital adjustment costs, and the other assuming a standard RBC specification ( $M_C$  and  $M_D$ , respectively).

As shown in Figure 4, outside the wage, the flexible price model is able to qualitatively match the SVEC-based IRFs [Lindé (2009)]. However, this result

1 **TABLE 3.** Alternative model specifications: Summary of results

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Model	Log marg. lik.	Posterior mode estimates for selected parameters								
		$\alpha$	$\eta$	$\lambda_c$	$\epsilon_\psi$	$\rho_z$	$\kappa$	$\rho_r$	$\phi_\pi$	$\phi_y$
$M_A$	5939.1	0.24	1.30	0.63	5.52	-0.00	0.014	0.60	1.37	0.40
$M_B$	5884.4	0.15	1.64	0.66	6.07	-0.09	0.013	0.57	1.23	0.13
$M_C^{\text{IRM}}$	—	0.28	0.93	0.58	0.94	0.95	—	—	—	—
$M_C$	4482.7	0.31	1.06	0.79	5.57	-0.07	—	—	—	—
$M_D$	4482.3	0.29	1.34	—	—	-0.01	—	—	—	—

11 *Notes:* Models  $M_C$  and  $M_D$  denote the flexible price versions with and without real demand frictions, respectively.

12

13 is obtained at the cost of a parameterization that is hardly supported by existing

14 evidence. Even if the estimates for the capital share, labor disutility, and habits pa-

15 rameters are reasonable ( $\alpha = 0.28$ ;  $\eta = 0.93$ ;  $\lambda_c = 0.58$ ), the capital adjustment

16 cost parameter is estimated to be very low ( $\epsilon_\psi = 0.94$ ) and the autoregressive

17 coefficient for technology growth very high ( $\epsilon_\psi = 0.95$ ).

18 These values are not supported by the empirical literature and the data, as shown

19 in Table 3, which provides a summary of results from the Bayesian estimation of

20 the alternative model specifications. The table reports the marginal likelihood and

21 the posterior mode estimates of the key parameters for the conditional dynamics

22 of hours and investment. The results for  $M_A$  and  $M_B$  and for the impulse response

23 matching parameterization ( $M_C^{\text{IRM}}$ ) are reported for comparison.

24

25 *Nominal and monetary factors.* In the presence of an accommodative policy

26 reaction function (Model  $B$ ), the estimated nominal and real frictions cannot

27 generate the negative response of inputs. A temporary contraction can be obtained

28 for hours, but not for investment, by increasing the level of real demand frictions to

29 values that are higher than those needed in the flexible price model and by lowering

30 the interest rate reaction to inflation to values close to one (or by assuming a

31 backward-looking policy rule). The reason for this result lies in the strongly

32 procyclical investment response that characterize the monetary models. These

33 models imply that, because (i) nominal frictions themselves lead to the opening of

34 positive gaps in Tobin's  $q$  and (ii) the central bank's reactions operate in the same

35 direction as increased expected capital returns, the incentive to invest is higher

36 than in the flexible price economy. This is the basic reason that Galí and Gertler

37 (2007) argue that, other things being equal, monetary models generally predict

38 that firms invest more than they would under flexible prices.

39 Our results thus allow us to specify Basu et al. (2006)'s conclusion that monetary

40 models can account for the contractionary effects of productivity improvements.

41 First, the negative hours and investment responses to productivity improvements

42 emerge only by considering monetary policy informational lags or empirical rules

43 such as those adopted in Model  $A$ . Second, under a RK-CDE specification, the

44 estimated slope of the NKPC would imply an excessively high level of nominal

1 frictions compared with survey evidence. This is not the case if strategic com-  
 2 plementarities in price-setting emerging under the FSK-EDE model specification,  
 3 along with nominal rigidities, are considered.

4 A low degree of accommodation of monetary policy and the flatness of the  
 5 NKPC are thus the most empirically relevant factors explaining the negative  
 6 response of hours and investment. When a technology improvement hits the econ-  
 7 omy, the degree to which real activity follows its natural level depends on the  
 8 resulting price cut. A small NKPC slope coefficient implies that, following a  
 9 productivity improvement, the contraction of the marginal cost is followed by a  
 10 weak reduction in prices. For low degrees of monetary policy accommodation,  
 11 the aggregate demand response is insufficient to meet the increase in productivity,  
 12 leading to a reduction in the use of inputs.

13 The role of these two key factors is addressed in more detail in the next two  
 14 subsections.

15  
 16 *Nominal and real rigidities and the slope of the NKPC.* As stressed in Section  
 17 3.1, a weak relation between marginal costs and price inflation is the result of both Q1  
 18 nominal and real rigidities, the latter defined in terms of strategic complementarity  
 19 in price-setting. From the estimated reduced-form coefficient  $\kappa$ , given assumptions  
 20 about the demand elasticity coefficient  $\epsilon$  and the coefficient defining its degree of  
 21 endogeneity  $\phi_\kappa$ , we can obtain the degree of nominal rigidity that emerges under  
 22 alternative model specifications.

23 Considering a RK-CDE specification, the estimated slope coefficient implies  
 24 a price Calvo parameter  $\theta_p$  close to 0.87 (0.88 in Model *B*), consistent with a  
 25 frequency of price optimization of 8 quarters (12 in Model *B*). These values  
 26 are distant from those implied by the available firm-level evidence, indicating an  
 27 average frequency of roughly two quarters [Bils and Klenow (2004)]. This micro-  
 28 macro puzzle persists, but to a reduced extent, when the FSK-EDE specification  
 29 is considered: In this case, given that  $\epsilon = 11$  and  $\phi_\kappa = 10$ , our estimates point  
 30 to a sticky price parameter value of 0.71 (0.72 under Model *B*). Table 4 shows  
 31 the sensitivity of the NKPC slope coefficient to different values of  $\epsilon$  and  $\theta_p$ , given  
 32  $\phi_\kappa = 10$ . Q2

33 Unfortunately, the parameters  $\epsilon$  and  $\phi_\kappa$  are unobservable.<sup>15</sup> Bowman's (2003)  
 34 recent estimates of the price mark-up, which point to a value close to 4% for the  
 35 U.S. economy, would suggest an implied elasticity parameter of nearly 26. On  
 36 this basis, the resulting price stickiness parameter is reduced to values slightly  
 37 above 0.6, consistent with a frequency of price optimization close to 2.5 periods,  
 38 in accordance with Bils and Klenow's (2004) firm-level evidence and macro  
 39 estimates [Altig et al., 2011; Smets and Wouters (2007)];<sup>16</sup> Riggi and Tancioni  
 40 (2010); Altig et al. (2011)].

41 The importance of the real rigidities entailed by the FSK and EDE hypotheses is  
 42 that because of their effects on the relation between marginal costs and prices, low  
 43 estimates of the NKPC slope are consistent with a degree of nominal stickiness that  
 44 is close to the available firm-level evidence on the frequency of price adjustments.

1 **TABLE 4.** The NKPC slope coefficient  $\kappa$ 

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	$\epsilon$	$\theta_p$							
		0.5	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.85
3	0.0653	0.0482	0.0350	0.0248	0.0170	0.0111	0.0067	0.0036	0.0016
6	0.0791	0.0584	0.0425	0.0302	0.0208	0.0137	0.0084	0.0046	0.0021
11	0.0617	0.0457	0.0333	0.0237	0.0164	0.0108	0.0067	0.0037	0.0017
21	0.0381	0.0282	0.0206	0.0147	0.0102	0.0068	0.0042	0.0024	–
26	0.0316	0.0234	0.0171	0.0122	0.0085	0.0056	0.0035	0.0020	–
41	0.0209	0.0155	0.0113	0.0081	0.0056	0.0037	0.0024	–	–
RK	0.5010	0.3691	0.2675	0.1892	0.1292	0.0838	0.0504	0.0268	0.0113

13 *Notes:*  $\theta_p$  is the Calvo parameter (nominal rigidity);  $\epsilon$  is the demand elasticity parameter;  $\kappa$  is obtained with the  
 14 undetermined coefficient method. Kimball curvature parameter  $\phi_\kappa = 10$ .

15 In contrast, under a standard rental capital specification, a flat NKPC estimate  
 16 implies unrealistically low probabilities of price re-optimization.

17  
 18  
 19 *Productivity improvements and monetary policy.* Our estimates show that the  
 20 data support the hypothesis that monetary policy follows an empirical rule rather  
 21 than a theory-based reaction rule. This, together with the flat slope of the NKPC,  
 22 explains the negative short-term hours and investment responses.

23 The degree to which a rule targeting a measure of potential output does not fully  
 24 accommodate the technology shock depends on the measure being used. The policy  
 25 rule adopted in Model A considers the long-run deterministic trend in potential  
 26 output, which by definition does not respond to stochastic variations in technology.  
 27 Consider a technological improvement that increases the potential and actual levels  
 28 of output. The general rise in economic activity leads to a positive *measured* output  
 29 gap, counteracting the interest rate drop stimulated by the induced deflation. If  
 30 demand is constrained by the presence of real and/or nominal rigidities, the *true*  
 31 output gap is instead negative. Consequently, the policy response suggested by the  
 32 measured gap is the opposite of what the actual gap would indicate.

33 From a normative point of view, neutral technology shocks do not pose a relevant  
 34 policy trade-off. The monetary authority could fully stabilize the economy by  
 35 employing an optimal rule [from a timeless perspective, Clarida et al. (1999)].  
 36 Nevertheless, this could not happen in the real world because of the difficulties  
 37 in the identification of the specific source of the shocks and the impossibility of  
 38 determining a reliable measure of the natural real interest rate through the real-time  
 39 informational content of macroeconomic data.<sup>17</sup>

40 Our analysis, conducted from a positive point of view, aims to evaluate whether  
 41 and under which parameterization a monetary model can replicate the empirical  
 42 evidence on the contractionary effects of productivity improvements. What the  
 43 data unambiguously tell us is that monetary policy does not fully accommodate  
 44 the productivity improvement. This is evident in both the SVEC and model-based

1 impulse responses. Clearly, this conclusion is conditional on the specific policy  
2 rules and models being tested and cannot be generalized to the vast set of options  
3 that are present in the literature.

4 From this perspective, our results relate to a large body of literature addressing  
5 the implications of a not fully accommodative rule for the propagation mechanics  
6 of the productivity shocks. Galì (1999) proposes an interpretation of the con-  
7 tractionary effects of technology improvements based on a partially exogenous  
8 money supply rule. Galì et al. (2003) evaluate a similar interpretation from the  
9 perspective of not fully accommodative contemporaneous Taylor rules. Basu et al.  
10 (2006) propose an interpretation based on sticky prices and monetary policy  
11 reaction rules targeting past measures of the gaps, consistent with the idea that  
12 “the central banks observe technology shocks only with a long lag.” Moreover,  
13 a recent literature focusing on the implications of the liquidity trap environment  
14 for the effectiveness of monetary policy has shown that central banks could be  
15 unable to stabilize a deflationary shock, irrespective of the possibility of having  
16 full information about the specific source of variability [Eggertsson et al. (2014)].

17 The estimates, in which we do not impose any prior weight on the rule to be  
18 preferred, confirm this view by showing that Model A maximizes the posterior  
19 marginal likelihood and is able to qualitatively reproduce the impulse responses  
20 provided by the SVEC analysis, notwithstanding the unappealing normative im-  
21 plications of the resulting model.

## 22 23 6. CONCLUSIONS

24 This paper addresses the contractionary effects of positive technology shocks.  
25 With a SVEC model, we show that the short-term response of both hours and  
26 investment to a positive technology shock is negative and that this result is robust  
27 to important data and identification issues addressed in the literature.

28 We then show that the SVEC-based results are consistent with an estimated  
29 monetary model in which firm-specific capital and endogenous demand elasticity  
30 lower the price sensitivity to marginal costs (i.e., the slope of the NKPC) and  
31 monetary policy follows a not fully accommodative interest rate rule. Conditional  
32 on productivity improvements, these factors lead to the emergence of relevant  
33 demand constraints and ensure that the negative hours and investment responses  
34 are also observed for reasonable degrees of real and nominal rigidity.

35 Our results are consistent with those obtained by Basu et al. (2006), who use a  
36 purified measure of the Solow residual in VAR estimates, but they contrast with  
37 some of the conclusions in the macro literature.

38 With respect to SVAR-based results, the reasons for these different outcomes are  
39 to be found in the use of the SVEC representation. Such a representation, which is  
40 consistent with the nonstationary and co-trending properties of the data, improves  
41 the identifiability of the permanent productivity shock underlying the common  
42 trend among real variables because the explicit consideration of the stationary  
43 ratios enhances the separation between permanent and transitory components.  
44

## 30 FRANCESCO GIULI AND MASSIMILIANO TANCIONI

1 With respect to model-based results, our analysis shows that the key assumption  
2 that prevents the emergence of the short-term contraction of investment in other  
3 contributions is the one of monetary authorities targeting flexible price output.  
4 The data indicate that an empirical rule is preferred to a theory-based rule.

5 Our results thus provide additional evidence challenging the empirical relevance  
6 of flexible price models addressing neutral technology shocks as the main driver  
7 of the observed procyclicality of productivity, investment, and hours. The analysis  
8 also allows a comparative evaluation of some of the theoretical explanations of the  
9 contractionary effects of productivity improvements suggested by the literature.  
10 In this respect, our main conclusion is that both real and nominal rigidities, along  
11 with a weakly accommodative policy rule, are needed to explain the apparent  
12 puzzle within a monetary model apparatus.

13 However, the key real rigidities are different from those that directly affect  
14 the dynamics of consumption and investment. Although habit persistence and  
15 capital adjustment costs may contribute to explaining the observed persistence  
16 in the real variables and, for some model calibrations, the negative response of  
17 hours, they are, in fact, unable to produce a negative investment response to  
18 technology improvements. The emergence of this phenomenon requires a weak  
19 relation between marginal costs and firms' pricing behavior, which can be brought  
20 about by the additional real rigidities implied by the strategic complementarities  
21 generated by capital firm-specificity and endogenous demand elasticity.

22  
23 *NOTES*

24  
25 1. Del Negro et al. (2005)'s baseline specification adopts a monetary policy rule that responds  
26 to technology shocks. Smets and Wouters (2007) assume instead that the monetary authority targets  
27 flexible price output. In both cases, the policy rule accommodates the technology shock.

28 2. The temporary contraction in inputs appears to be driven by the short-term negative response  
29 of both types of productivity to the investment-specific productivity shock, which is interpreted as  
30 indicating the operation of technological diffusion delays. A similar argument—based on the wealth  
31 and intertemporal substitution effects implied by the presence of technological diffusion delays or by  
32 expected increases in productivity—has been proposed by Rotemberg (2003) and Beaudry and Portier  
33 (2007).

34 3. Their conclusion refers to Basu's (1998) model, in which the policy rule responds to lagged  
35 inflation and the lagged output gap.

36 4. This measure is obtained using a bottom-up growth accounting method, first estimating a purified  
37 Solow residual by controlling for capacity utilization in Hall-style regressions and then obtaining the  
38 aggregate technology as a weighted sum of the industry residuals. This methodology requires the use  
39 of industry-level annual data, the estimation of theory-based proxies for unobserved utilization and the  
40 use of a bandpass filter to isolate the frequencies of interest in the hours series.

41 5. Theoretically, this assumption is justified by the fact that in the absence of inflation biases, the  
42 long-run output gap is zero and long-run inflation is determined by the nonstationarity of the monetary  
43 authority's policy target.

44 6. Theory may suggest including a further exclusion restriction for the long-run effects of produc-  
tivity shocks on hours [Francis and Ramey (2005)]. We do not take such a restriction into account,  
on the ground that in the presence of permanent productivity shocks, its theoretical validity is limited  
to a specification of utility where income and substitution effects exactly cancel out in the long  
run.

1 7. By regressing per capita hours growth on four lags of Basu et al.'s (2006) purified technology  
 2 measure growth rate, we have verified that the size of the impact coefficient is smaller than that  
 3 obtained in their analysis [Table 3 in Basu et al. (2006)]. The same difference in results is obtained  
 4 when the estimated (and annualized) real permanent component obtained from the SVEC-based  
 5 historical decomposition is considered.

6 8. The zero restrictions on the  $m \times r$  right block of  $\mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{B}$  are implied by the six cointegrating  
 7 vectors  $\pi_t, h_t, r_t, c_t - \beta_{51}y_t, i_t - \beta_{61}y_t$  and  $wr_t - \beta_{71}y_t$ .

8 9. The identification of the technology shock is obtained by estimating the first equation of the VAR  
 9 with the contemporaneous values and  $p - 1$  lags of  $\Delta\pi_t, \Delta h_t$ , and  $\Delta r_t$  and with the contemporaneous  
 10 values and  $p$  lags of  $\Delta(c_t - y_t), \Delta(i_t - y_t)$ , and  $\Delta(wr_t - y_t)$ .  $p$  and  $p + 1$  lags of the level variables,  
 11 respectively, are used as instruments. The shock of the first equation is then included as a regressor  
 12 in the remaining five equations of the VAR to capture the contemporaneous correlation between  
 13 the technology shock and the other variables, i.e., to ensure orthogonality between the permanent  
 14 components of interest and the stationary components.

15 10. No dynamic indexation is assumed, to enhance empirical identification and to allow an inter-  
 16 pretation of results on the estimated NKPC slope in terms of the frequency of price adjustments. In  
 17 fact, because under dynamic indexation prices are changed each period according to past inflation, the  
 18 Calvo parameter loses its direct link with the frequency at which firms reset their prices.

19 11. This choice enhances the identification of the economic (endogenous) as opposed to the stochas-  
 20 tic (exogenous) sources of persistence.

21 12. The posterior mode is estimated with the Simsoptimizer, and numerical integration is performed  
 22 by employing 500,000 Metropolis–Hastings (M-H) replications. The fraction of the drops in the initial  
 23 parameter vector estimates is set at 30%. The scale parameter for the variance of the jump distribution  
 24 is calibrated to obtain an acceptance rate of nearly 30%.

25 13. Both  $M_A$ - and  $M_B$ -based values lie well within the wide range of NKPC slope coefficient  
 26 estimates reported in the literature. Schorfheide (2008) provides a survey of these findings.

27 14. By estimating models  $A$  and  $B$  with full dynamic indexation, which is not supported by the data,  
 28 the results do not qualitatively change. The main effect is a reduction of the estimated autocorrelation  
 29 coefficients for the price and the wage push shock processes.

30 15. This explains the wide array of values adopted in the literature for the demand elasticity param-  
 31 eter, ranging from a value of 3, as in Smets and Wouters (2007), to a value of 101, as in the benchmark  
 32 specification of Altig et al. (2011).

33 16. However, given their assumptions on the demand elasticity coefficients ( $\epsilon = 3$ , and  $\phi_\kappa = 10$ )  
 34 and their EDE model specification, the implied NKPC slope coefficient is near 0.028, a value that is  
 35 above our estimate.

36 17. Because potential output is inherently unobservable, the consideration of different statistical  
 37 measures can, at best, reduce but not solve this problem, as evidenced by the fact that the most  
 38 frequently used measures of the output gap do not match the theoretical measures [Orphanides and  
 39 van Norden (2002)]. In contrast, model-based measures are theory-specific and thus subject to the  
 40 problems implied by model uncertainty. For these reasons, policy effectiveness resulting from targeting  
 41 a misperceived output gap can be inferior to that of a policy rule responding to output deviations from  
 42 the trend [Orphanides (2003a, 2003b, 2007); Del Negro et al. (2005)].

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## APPENDIX A: SOURCES OF DATA AND THEIR TRANSFORMATIONS

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5 GDP ( $Y_t$ ), personal consumption expenditure for nondurable goods and services ( $C_t$ ), fixed  
6 investment including durable goods consumption ( $I_t$ ), and the GDP deflator ( $PY_t$ ) are taken  
7 from the U.S. Department of Commerce–Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database.  
8 Civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and older ( $P16_t$ ), employment level aged 16  
9 and older ( $N16_t$ ), the average weekly hours worked in nonfarm business index ( $H_t$ ), and  
10 the hourly compensation in nonfarm business index are taken from the U.S. Department of  
11 Labor—Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) database. The nominal interest rate ( $R_t$ ) is the  
12 effective federal funds rate from 1954 and the three-month interest rate prior to 1954, both  
13 taken from the Federal Reserve Board economic database (FRED).

14 Real GDP is expressed in chained 2009 dollars. Nominal consumption, investment,  
15 and hourly compensation are deflated using the chained price GDP deflator. Real GDP,  
16 consumption, investment, and hours are scaled with respect to active population so that  
17 per capita figures are obtained. These choices make our dataset fully consistent with that  
18 employed in previous analyses in the literature.

19 The use of a common deflator eliminates the positive trend in the investment share  
20 resulting from the almost flat dynamics of the investment price index [Del Negro et al.  
21 (2005); Smets and Wouters (2007); Altig et al. (2011)]. The use of the hours-to-population  
22 ratio as the labor supply measure is standard in the literature [Christiano et al. (2004);  
23 Del Negro et al. (2005); Smets and Wouters (2007)]. All series are seasonally adjusted  
24 and entered in percent logs. The quarterly nominal interest rate is obtained by simply  
25 dividing the original series by four. Table A.1 summarizes the data sources and details their  
26 manipulations.  
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**TABLE A.1.** Sources of data and their transformations

Variable	Source	Definition	Table/code	Transformation
$Y_t$	BEA	Gross domestic product (GDP)	NIPA Table 1.1.5	$y_t = \log \left( \frac{Y_t}{\frac{PY_t}{100} \frac{P16_t}{P16_{2009}}} \right) 100$
$C_t$	BEA	Cons. of nondurables and services	NIPA Table 1.1.5	$c_t = \log \left( \frac{C_t}{\frac{PY_t}{100} \frac{P16_t}{P16_{2009}}} \right) 100$
$I_t$	BEA	Fixed investment and durable cons	NIPA Table 1.1.5	$i_t = \log \left( \frac{I_t}{\frac{PY_t}{100} \frac{P16_t}{P16_{2009}}} \right) 100$
$PY_t$	BEA	Implicit price defl. for GDP 2009 = 100	NIPA Table 1.1.9	$\pi_t = \log \left( \frac{PY_t}{PY_{t-1}} \right) 100$
$P16_t$	BLS	Civilian non inst. population 16 years and older	LNU00000000	-
$N16_t$	BLS	Employment level 16 years and older	LNS12000000	-
$W_t$	BLS	Hourly compensation idx. Nonfarm business	PRS85006103	$w_t = \log \left( \frac{W_t}{\frac{PY_t}{100}} \right) 100$
$H_t$	BLS	Avg. weekly hours worked idx. Nonfarm business	PRS85006023	$h_t = \log \left( \frac{\frac{N16_t}{N16_{2009}} H_t}{\frac{P16_t}{P16_{2009}}} \right) / h 100$
$R_t$	FRB	Effective Federal Funds Rate	FF	$r_t = \frac{R}{4}$

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## APPENDIX B: TESTS FOR (NON)STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION

Table B.1 provides summary information for the results of the Phillips–Perron (PP) unit root test of the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests of stationarity for the variables used in the SVEC and the structural model estimates, discussed in Section 2.1. The specification of the deterministic components considers the appropriate process under the alternative hypothesis of stationarity: a  $\tau_\mu$  specification is preferred for nonzero mean variables and a  $\tau_\beta$  specification for trending variables. The results summarized in the table are obtained by considering the 1948:1–2008:4 sample. We have verified that the consideration of the extended 1948:1–2014:3 sample does not change the statistical properties of the series considered in the analysis.

Table B.2 provides a summary of Johansen’s trace tests results for the seven variables VEC discussed in Section 2.1. The results summarized in the table consider an unrestricted constant specification. The table reports the results for the different lag order specifications of the starting VAR suggested by the Bayesian information criteria. The Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) indicate one and three lags, respectively, in the 1948:1–2008:4 sample and one and five lags, respectively, in the extended 1948:1–2014:3 sample. The critical values are obtained from MacKinnon et al. (1999).

**TABLE B.1.** PP and KPSS test results for model variables: Sample 1948:1–2008:4

Variable	Det. comp. (levels)	Differences				Levels			
		PP		KPSS		PP		KPSS	
		Test	5% cv	Test	5% cv	Test	5% cv	Test	5% cv
$y_t$	$\tau_\beta$	-11.0	-2.87	0.28	0.46	-2.37	-3.43	0.20	0.15
$h_t$	$\tau = 0$	-13.4	-1.94	0.05	0.46	-2.91	-1.94	0.44	0.46
$\pi_t$	$\tau_\mu$	-24.2	-1.94	0.04	0.46	-5.92	-2.87	0.38	0.46
$r_t$	$\tau_\mu$	-12.7	-1.94	0.11	0.46	-2.37	-2.87	0.48	0.46
$c_t$	$\tau_\beta$	-13.7	-2.87	0.15	0.46	-1.42	-3.43	0.37	0.15
$i_t$	$\tau_\beta$	-11.8	-2.87	0.12	0.46	-2.72	-3.42	0.20	0.15
$w_t$	$\tau_\beta$	-18.1	-2.87	0.11	0.46	-2.02	-3.43	0.39	0.15

Notes:  $\tau_{\mu,\beta}$  defines the specification of the deterministic component;  $\tau_\mu$ : constant;  $\tau_\beta$ : trend.

TABLE B.2. Johansen's trace test results

Rank	LR trace stat				Critical values*	
	1948:1–2008:4		1948:1–2014:3		90%	95%
	$p = 1^a$	$p = 3^b$	$p = 1^a$	$p = 5^b$		
0	233.64	156.18	222.28	177.08	120.37	125.61
1	144.09	112.02	140.28	124.45	91.11	95.75
2	98.70	76.60	94.41	85.57	65.82	68.82
3	56.92	50.55	56.73	52.88	44.49	47.86
4	28.71	28.10	26.91	30.48	27.07	29.79
5	7.03	9.86	6.51	13.27	13.43	15.49
6	0.00	0.32	0.34	1.30	2.70	3.84

Note:  $p$  is the lag order. <sup>a</sup>SBC. <sup>b</sup>AIC. \*MacKinnon et al. (1999).

## APPENDIX C: IDENTIFICATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK

Consider the SVMA representation of the SVEC,

$$\mathbf{x}_t = \mathbf{C}(1) \sum_{i=1}^t \mathbf{B}\varepsilon_i + \mathbf{C}^0(L) \mathbf{B}\varepsilon_t + \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0, \quad (\text{C.1})$$

where the long-run effects matrix  $\mathbf{C}(1) = \beta \perp (\alpha' \perp \Gamma \beta \perp)^{-1} \alpha' \perp$ ,  $\Gamma = \mathbf{I}_m - \sum_{i=1}^{p-1} \Gamma_i$ , and  $\alpha \perp$ ,  $\beta \perp$  are the orthogonal complements of the loading coefficients and the long-run equilibrium matrices, respectively.  $\mathbf{C}^0(L) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{C}_j^0 L^j$  is a convergent infinite-order polynomial in the lag operator denoting the impact and interim multipliers of the shocks and  $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0 = \mathbf{C}(1)\mathbf{x}_0$  depends on initial conditions [Johansen (1995)].

Leaving out the coefficients attached to the lagged variables, the reduced-form VEC provides  $m(m+1)/2 = 28$  nonredundant coefficients in the dispersion matrix  $\Omega$ , whereas the SVEC has  $m^2 = 49$  unknown structural coefficients in  $\mathbf{B}$ . Once errors are orthonormalized, the order conditions for identification require the imposition of  $m(m-1)/2 = 21$  restrictions. Because the rank of the  $m \times m$  total impact matrix  $\mathbf{C}(1)$  is given by the number of permanent components in the system, which is  $m-r = 2$ , the last five columns of  $\mathbf{C}(1)$ , which correspond to the  $r$  transitory components in the model (the CI vectors), are zero vectors. However, given the reduced rank of  $\mathbf{C}(1)$ , CI provides only  $(m-r)r = 10$  constraints for the long-run response matrix  $\mathbf{C}(1)$ , leaving  $(m-r)(m-r-1)/2 = 1$  additional restrictions to exactly identify the permanent shocks and  $r(r-1)/2 = 10$  restrictions to exactly identify the transitory shocks.

Given the orthogonality between permanent and transitory components, the identification strategy of the latter does not affect the identification of the technology shock, so that to our scopes leaving the transitory shocks unidentified (i.e., the  $m \times r$  right block of  $\mathbf{B}$ ) unrestricted is equivalent to any other short-run identification strategy imposing restrictions on the  $m \times r$  right block of the impact effects matrix.

## APPENDIX D: BAYESIAN ESTIMATION AND MODEL SELECTION

The posterior density is obtained by employing the Bayes rule,

$$P(\theta_j | \mathbf{Y}_T, M_j) = \frac{P(\mathbf{Y}_T | \theta_j, M_j) P(\theta_j, M_j)}{P(\mathbf{Y}_T, M_j)}, \quad (\text{D.1})$$

where  $P(\mathbf{Y}_T, M_j)$  is the marginal data density, which can be normalized because it does not depend on  $\theta_j$ . Because the posterior density of interest is a complex nonlinear function of the deep parameters  $\theta_j$ , its analytical calculation is not generally feasible. For this reason, we calculate the posterior distribution via numerical integration. Operationally, the Bayesian MCMC posterior estimates are obtained in a two-step procedure, first employing the Kalman smoother to approximate the conditional distribution and then the Metropolis–Hastings (M-H) algorithm to perform Monte Carlo integration. Bayesian model selection is based on the Bayes factor. Considering Bayes’ theorem, this posterior distribution can be expressed in terms of the posterior probabilities of the models, i.e.,

$$P(M_A, \mathbf{Y}_T) = \frac{P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_A)P(M_A)}{P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_A)P(M_A) + P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_B)P(M_B)}, \quad (\text{D.2})$$

where  $P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_j) = \int P(\mathbf{Y}_T/\theta_j, M_j)P(\theta_j, M_j)d\theta_j$ ,  $j = A, B$ , is the marginal distribution. The ratio between the posterior distributions of the two models gives the posterior odds ratio, which can be expressed as the priors ratio  $P(M_A)/P(M_B)$  times the Bayes factor  $P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_A)/P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_B)$ . Because we do not have any prior preference for one of the two models, we assume that  $P(M_A) = P(M_B)$ , so that the posterior odds is equivalent to the Bayes factor:

$$B_{A,B} = \text{PO}_{A,B} = \frac{P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_A)}{P(\mathbf{Y}_T/M_B)}. \quad (\text{D.3})$$

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**Author's queries:**

- Q1: As meant? Section 3.1 has no subsections.
- Q2: Renumbering OK? There is a different Table 3 earlier.
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